The politics of promoting social protection

Transcription

1 The politics of promoting social protection Sam Hickey, IDPM, University of Manchester World Bank Social Protection Network 5 May 2010

2 Politics matters Development and poverty reduction are intrinsically political Reaching the poorest is a particular challenge Do they deserve it? Will richer & more powerful groups support investments for the poorest? Research shows that politics has been central to the success and failure of social protection Politics viewed here as an enabling as well as constraining force

3 Structure Conceptualising the links between politics and social protection in Africa Investigating the politics of what works Donor strategies to promote social transfers and social protection in Africa

4 The links between politics and social protection: a basic conceptual framework

5 The Politics of What Works What forms of politics underpin the success of social protection policies in developing countries? And are donors in tune with this? Comparative analysis of policy success via a shared analytical framework Cases: Vulnerable Group Development Programme, Bangladesh GAPVU / INAS, Mozambique National Old Age Pension, India Old Age Pension, Namibia Old Age Grant, South Africa Old Age Pension, Lesotho

6 Defining success Demonstrably achieved a recognised degree of success in reducing levels of extreme and/or chronic poverty Longevity: most cases established for ten years or more

7 Key hypotheses to be tested 1. High quality poverty data is required to influence policy actors and processes 2. SP programmes should be located within government agencies/ministries mandated to protect vulnerable groups 3. Pro-poor policies are more likely to emerge in open policy spaces that include civil society advocates 4. Pro-poor policies are more likely to emerge: a) under democratic politics b) during times of stability rather than crisis 5. Patronage politics will undermine social protection 6. Universal approaches to targeting social protection are more likely to garner political support than targeted approaches 7. Social protection will only work if it is owned by national regimes

8 Ideology and political discourse Evidence & data can matter, especially for targeting and also sustainability (e.g. proving success through strong systems of monitoring and evaluation) BUT the broader battle of ideas in society is more important especially on the causes of poverty, and around concepts of development and nation-building Social protection and political projects: socialism, nationalism, anti-imperialism Mainstream forms of poverty data/analysis are not helpful here: do not focus on causality in a structural sense Donor focus on entitlements & cash-transfers vs. national political discourses on dependency & productivity

9 Culture vs. power? Within government Go with the weaker Civil Society tendency or the more powerful Finance Ministry tendency? ZA (SD); Mozambique (SD lacked muscle); Lesotho (Finance), Namibia (Health) Consider working thro more powerful social ministries (e.g. Health, Education) Locating SP within more powerful institutional spaces, while capacity-building currently marginal social welfare actors

10 From NGOs & policy spaces to politics Few nationally-driven SP policies/programmes have so far emerged from open policy spaces (e.g. Sector Working Groups) or civil society advocacy Closed, political spaces as more significant Parliament, cabinet discussions Civil society pressure may help, but this is more important AFTER policies are established by political actors Donors need to shift focus from civil to political society

11 Politics: timing & events matter Elections: can offer windows of opportunity e.g. NOAPS in India, Namibia However, the quality of political institutions is critical here. Dominant political parties, operating within wellinstitutionalised and broadly representative party systems, were often vital to success in our cases. Events : the politics of crisis offers more opportunities than politics as usual Humanitarian crises (e.g. Mozambique, Bangladesh) Political crisis : upheaval & a new political settlement Capitalism & development: Polanyi s impulse Pensions & mining in ZA; GAPVU and SAP; NOAPS in India ( liberalisation with a human face ) mass poverty vs. inequality levels of urbanisation

12 The role of informal politics Contrary to mainstream (modernist) thinking: patronage and clientelism can help protect the poorest Our findings: positive in Bangladesh, not in Mozambique Wider findings: patron-client relationships as safety nets Implications: Politically optimal programme design? (Also Lesotho and the role of MPs)

13 Is more for the poor less for the poor? There is little evidence that programmes targeted at the chronically poor are politically unsustainable. Such programmes may endure and be expanded, even during economic decline, while more universal programmes can be placed under political pressure on cost grounds. Implications: inclusive (categorical) targeting, include the deserving poor, ensure procedural justice although this is not an argument against universal approaches

14 Ownership or a social contract? Building sustainable programmes of support for the poorest groups involves extending the social contract between states and citizens Several interventions based states acknowledging responsibility for previously excluded citizens South Africa & Namibia outstryders, working-class white voters, black empowerment India Pension now seen/claimed as a right Bangladesh and the dual contract National: destitute mothers & state responsibility Local: relies on traditions of customary obligations of elites plus active lobbying of recipients

15 Moving forward Overall, the key challenge is to build, strengthen and extend contracts for social protection in Africa, and to avoid undermining them Involves strengthening the state and the public sphere Elites need to be convinced that the poor face significant constraints that require public action: poverty analysis? Closer engagement with political society and discourses Political analysis can help SP advocates to identify entry points, including the form of SP (e.g. is cash always the answer?) Build capacity of SP advocates AND relations with finance ministry

16 DFID and the politics of influence Key policy influencing objectives: 1. Influence international partners to gain greater commitment to the use of social transfers (ST) in the poorest countries including the re-focusing of social protection (SP) 2. Influence national governments to support ST and the development of national strategic frameworks for SP So, has DFID been successful in promoting ST/SP? Has their strategy been well-attuned to the politics of social protection in Africa (Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda & Zambia)?

17 DFID s strategic approach Take a lead role in the SP sector under donor harmonisation Develop national strategies for SP, often via PRSP review processes Use ST projects as a basis for lobbying for national SP programmes & strategies (except M) Prefer a more transformative/rights-based approach to SP (e.g. rather than the Bank s social risk management approach)

18 Key activities Facilitation Formation of new policy spaces: sector/donor working groups Workshops, tours (promote SP as an African success story) Fund CSOs, e.g. to research and advocate around SP Advocacy Direct/indirect (through SWGs/via CSOs, media) Formal/informal (SWG/one-to-one discussions/cocktail circuit) Information and knowledge Commission studies (research, fiduciary risk assessments etc.) Technical assistance (drafting policy proposals, M&E etc.) Relationship-building (institutional & personal) With government actors With development partners, especially WB and UN agencies

19 Resource inputs Difficult to estimate, but according to DFID: Financial resources Projects: 93m in E; 10m in Z; 770k in M Influence & Technical assistance 1m in E k in M, U & Z over 2-3 years Human resources as a % of one advisor s time Ethiopia: 90% declining to 60% over 3 years Uganda: 15-20% since 2006 Zambia: 20% on meetings alone for 3-year period

20 Progress to date (1): on ground? Very little actual impact on the ground as yet, although: Starting from a low baseline of activity Growing evidence of positive impacts from PSNP in Ethiopia & ST pilots in Zambia

21 Progress to date (2): upstream? SP policies/programmes now a possibility Growing awareness of SP in policy circles (e.g. via workshops) Improved informational basis for SP interventions (also WB on Vulnerability Assessments) Improved quality of policy debates on SP (evidence-based) and moving towards a reality Dedicated policy spaces formed (all, DFID as lead/co-lead) Policy commitments in place, often in PRSPs (all) Some increased government spending & extension of programmes (E) Pilot projects in place (with technical assistance) A dedicated budget line (Z) Government ownership? Some evidence of this but limited to weak ministries

22 Progress to date (3) BUT Strong resistance from several Ministries of Finance So: gains could be rolled back quite easily SP is not politically entrenched in Africa

23 Key lessons Evidence needs to be delivered to the right people at the right time The strategic sequencing of activities matters Relationship-building is critical, across policy tendencies Institutional characteristics of donors matter too Strong for SP within the hierarchy? Responsive, flexible approach to funding and technical assistance Reputation: long-term presence; credibility Again: promoting SP is a difficult & long-term challenge, beyond the normal time-frames of donors do they have the stomach for this fight? South-south influencing more effective

24 Influence or ownership? Donors need to decide their priorities more clearly: these goals are not always compatible e.g. strong government ownership in Ethiopia and relatively little influence growing ownership elsewhere but only within marginal policy actors Donor harmony can foreclose debates/squeeze out alternatives