Pathologies of Rational Choice 林 林

Transcription

1 參 玲 兩 理論 北 1996 年 (Hans Michael Baumgartner) 理 讀 (Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft :Anleitung zur Lektüre) 李 北 聯 1988 年 (Jeffrey M. Schwartz) 利 (Sharon Begley) (The Mind and the Brain) 北 2003 年 李度 (Joseph E. LeDoux) The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life) 蘭 北 流 2001 年 (Morton Hunt) 理 (The Story of Psychology) 李 北 2000 年 勒 (Todd Sandler) (Economic Concepts for the Social Science) 葉 北 2003 年 林 Donald P. Green 羅 Ian Shapiro 理 理論 Pathologies of Rational Choice 林 林 2000 年 劉 理論 北 88 年 理路 北 理 2001 年 Mancur Olson 行 邏 (The Logic of Collective Action) 北 流 72 年 北 82 年 121

2 論 理論 -- 理論 年 理論 兩 ( ) 論 79 年 理論 年 林 理 年 理論 1941 年 諒 年 理論 論 年 復 理 年 論 玲 理 論 立 論 76 年 6 Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little Brown, Anatol Rapoport. Fights, Games, and Debates. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Arrow, Kenneth. Social Choice and Individual Value. New York: Wiley, Axelord, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Book Inc

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8 Chicago Press, Payne, James. The American Threat: The Fear of War as an Instrument of Foreign Policy. Chicago: Markham, Powell, Robert. Nuclear Deterrence Theory: the Search for Credibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Pruitt, Dean G., and Richard C. Snyder, eds. Theory and Research on the Causes of War. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Riker, William H. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, Rosenau, James, ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence. New Heaven: Yale University Press, Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflicts. Cambridge: Harvard University press, Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. Analyzing Politics. New York: Norton, Shubik, Martin. Game Theory in the Social Science. Cambridge: MIT Press, Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Snyder, Craig A., ed. Contemporary Security and Strategy. New York: Routledge,

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