Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1

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1 Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1 The four key elements of the 45 years long existence of Yugoslavia were: a) the communist resistance movement during World War II along with carrying out an authentic revolution (though under the Soviet influence); b) the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a federative republic (and not as the pre-war centralised kingdom); c) the introduction of an alternative form of socialism (socialist self-management) after the break-up with the Informbiro in 1948; d) the bipolar division of Europe and indeed, of the world in which Yugoslavia found the so called "third" way (non-alignment) with the role of Josip Broz Tito as a charismatic leader who - possessing absolute and undisputed authority - functioned within Yugoslavia as a third "institution" (along with the Communist Party and the army). Tito's Rise, Charisma, and the Personality Cult Tito became a public figure as early as in the twenties when he was sentenced to several years of imprisonment in a court trial in Zagreb. In the second part of the thirties he became the organisational secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. 2 The few members of the leadership he had appointed (though he removed some of them, for example Milovan Djilas and Aleksander Ranković in different periods) were then leading the Communist Party, the liberation movement, as well as the state for several decades. Nevertheless, it was the war, which helped Tito to transform from a secretary of a relatively unimportant Communist Party into a legendary leader of the Yugoslav partisan movement and a leader of Yugoslav state. With an extraordinary persistence he managed to bring together parts of the broken Yugoslavia. At that time neither Britain nor America, nor the Soviet Union believed Yugoslavia could ever be restored. With his motto about the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nations he tried to prevent the bloody fights between the Serbs, the Croats and the Moslems and at the same time connect the resistance with the revolution. Though maintaining a permanent contact to Moscow, he exhibited a great deal of independence and autonomy even at that time. In the spring of 1943 when the pragmatic Britains realised who was really fighting in Yugoslavia, Tito was given military missions, arms as well as international fame. Churchill didn't like him since he was a communist but he valued his contribution to the war and even sent his son to Tito's military headquarters. Even before the end of the war, when he got reconciled with 1 Tito in retrospective views on the break up of the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Repe, Božo (not published): predavanje na konferenci Midnight Sun II, May 2000, Harstad College. Harstad, Several tens of books in English and other languages were published about Tito, among others several biographies which presented him from different angles. In Yugoslavia, the first major work about Tito was published in Josip Broz -Tito. Contributions to the biography was written by Tito's official biographer Vladimir Dedijer, who then fell out of favour and lectured for several years at foreign universities. Numerous other books, presenting Tito as a revolutionary, statesman, hunter, etc. Towards the end of the seventies, The Complete Works of Josip Broz Tito started to appear which included virtually all the documents associated with his work. Over twenty volumes comprising the period from the mid-twenties till the end of World War II were published. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the collection ceased to appear. In 1981, after Titos's death Dedijer published New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito. Discussing unpleasant details from Tito's life and diverse backgrounds of his decisions, the book provoked frantic reactions. With this book, Tito's myth gradually ceased to be seen as a taboo in Yugoslav historiography. Later several other books, describing single elements of Tito's life (i.e. his romantic affairs, memories of one of his personal doctors, etc.) were published. However, a critical biography by a historiographer from former Yugoslavia remains yet to be written. 1

2 the political development in Yugoslavia he admitted to the British Parliament that Tito was the undisputed ruler of Yugoslavia. Tito's charisma in the west during the war was rooted in his resistance which was urgently needed by the allies, after the Royal Minister and Draža Mihajlović had failed in this role, though the latter was persistently favoured by the West and Tito's military achievements were attributed to him. Western statement were much more reserved towards Tito on political level since they believed that he was under a strong ideological influence of Moscow. Apart form that, Tito didn't show much interest for the deals between the major powers. Without informing the allies, he convened the second meeting of the anti-fascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 3 and proclaimed the new revolutionary government for the only legitimate government of Yugoslavia. Though Tito's popularity in the West was limited to his resistance, even during war, the "normal" charisma of a leader grew into a proper personality cult in the home country. This was not only due to a (though effective) systematic propaganda, it was also rooted in the spontaneous reaction of the people who needed a kind of a saver in the circumstances governed by the occupation of the country and religious massacres between the nations. "Beloved leader comrade Tito dear, unite us, make us strong and fierce" and "here he made an end to religious hate, instead he established the first proletarian brigade", were among the first of the numerous folk songs which expressed the emotions of the people for Tito, gradually creating a legend out of him. In the summer of 1942 when only burned houses and the bodies of the killed were left behind after the Kozara offensive, the cult song about "Tito's way" was created. Expressing devotion to Tito and his political ideas, its different versions were frequently sung even after the war (particularly in the moments of crisis). The song was written by the peasant woman Persa Ristić, from a village in the vicinity of the Bosnian town Bosanska Dubica. During the offensive she lost over 30 of her relatives and while collecting their bones, the following verses came to her spontaneously: "The wheat fields strewn with graves / Kozara swears to Tito / Comrade Tito we shall never depart from your course" 4 (free translation). Her surviving colleagues immediately adopted the verses. The end of the war found Tito as an undisputed Yugoslav leader. Although a follower of the Soviet Union (his unannounced visit to Moscow and his agreements with Stalin at the end of September and the beginning of October 1944 particularly annoyed the western allies), he understood to keep a certain distance to it. The Red Army didn't exceed its activities on the Yugoslav territory over the extend that was demanded and accepted by Tito, after that it had to withdraw. He was able to draw the maximum from the agreements with the emigrant government: he became the Prime Minister of the temporary government 3 AVNOJ (the antifascist council of the national liberation of Yugoslavia) presented the central political and representative body of the national liberation movement of Yugoslavia. As a political body it was set up in November 1942 in Bihać (Bosnia). Its second assembly, which was held on 29 November 1943 and was attended by elected delegates of all the Yugoslav nations, proclaimed itself for the supreme legislative, executive and representative organ of the new Yugoslavia. The assembly concluded that the future Yugoslavia would be a federal state and that King Peter would be forbidden to return to Yugoslavia. The assembly further elected its government (The National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia) and appointed Tito for the president. By request of the allies gathered at the Jalta conference, AVNOJ had to be extended by the last pre-war members of the parliament and the representatives of political parties. A compromise was made between the Prime Minister of the royal government Dr. Ivan Šubašić and Tito. In August 1945 AVNOJ was renamed into a temporary national assembly in which Tito kept the "revolutionary" majority which made it possible to adopt the laws on agrarian reform, nationalisation and elections. The elections were then carried out in November 1945 (without the participation of the opposition which boycotted them) and were convincingly won by Tito and his People's Front of Yugoslavia. 4 Vladimir Dedijer: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito), Liburnija, Rijeka, 1982, p

3 of the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Further he was the commander-inchief of the Yugoslav Army, which arose from the former partisan army, and kept the majority in AVNOJ and then later in the temporary National Assembly. The People's Front, which he started to set up in the spring of 1944 as a beginning of the future people's front democracy, was the most numerous political organisation within Yugoslavia. His young, loyal political adherents who arose from the lowest working and farming classes were full of energy and political power and willing to "storm the sky". It was easy for them to do away with the fragmented opposition. In such circumstances it was possible for Tito to bring the revolution to an end 5 after the war, which can to a greater extend be attributed to his intuition than to his modelling after the October revolution. The transitional phase between capitalism and communism was a short one; it took only a few years for the system of administrative socialism according to the soviet model to be fully functioning in Yugoslavia. However, repression, shortages and absolute party control caused the popularity of the new leadership and Tito to start fading (particularly in Serbia, where Tito had never been as popular as in other parts of Yugoslavia - a fact on which the British were counting unsuccessfully towards the end of the war. Since the country was formally a federation, its centralism led to a certain disappointment, though Tito maintained a national balance within the leadership. On the outside, this unpopularity could not be noticed, since the politics encouraged mass mobilisation for the reconstruction of the country, fast industrialisation and the building of socialism. In some parts of the country, particularly in Slovenia and in Croatia, Tito was highly esteemed also because of his determination to solve the questions of the frontier (although the allies made him withdraw from Triest and Carinthia). After the war Tito displayed another characteristics, which couldn't find expression during his leadership of the illegal party and only to a limited, extend during the war: namely his good feeling for the masses. He could easily establish contact with the masses, find the right words and fill his audience with enthusiasm. Mass meetings with tens of thousands and even several hundred thousand people became a part of the post-war political ritual, which was preserved until his late years. However, he was only able to use his intuitive contact and the ability to speak freely until the end of the sixties; later he lost them due to the burden of his age and the fact that his speeches were written in advance. The silent decrease of his popularity, which he must have noticed since he was always very well informed, was accompanied by the difficulties with Moscow. They were increasingly suffocating him, since they prevented him from spreading his ambitions, dating from the wartime, over the entire Balkan peninsula. 6 On the contrary, in setting up Balkan associations, Stalin saw an opportunity to place Tito in the same line with other eastern European leaders who were mostly appointed by Moscow. Tito was further unnerved by the Soviet interventions into Yugoslav internal affairs. He attempted to preserve the autonomy without completely breaking up with Moscow to which he remained ideologically loyal. However, during the conflict with 5 On the founding congress of the Serb Communist Party, which was held in May 1945 in Belgrade Tito said, that there would be no "standard" second phase of the revolution according to the Russian model, because the circumstances in Yugoslavia were different from those in the Soviet Union. According to him it was not possible - due to the war - to develop clearly first the bourgeois and immediately afterwards the proletarian revolution. In spite of that "we are already entering this second phase so smoothly that it can hardly be noticed". (Hronologija ratne djelatnosti Josipa Broza Tita / Chronology of the war activities of Josip Broz Tito/, Export-Press, Belgrade, 1978, p. 92) 6 In the middle of 1943 Tito tried to established a joint Balkan headquarters which were meant to co-ordinate the liberation movements in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, however, his plan failed. At the end of the war he attempted to establish a federation with Albania (which was completely under Yugoslav control) and Bulgaria. Stalin first opposed the plan but then changed his mind and even demanded it to be carried out since he counted on Bulgaria to take the role of the Trojan horse through which he could discipline or even replace Tito. The Yugoslav side therefore gave up the plan. 3

4 Informbiro 7, Stalin who could never endure any competition, no matter how limited it was, forced Tito to make a drastic decision: either submission or resistance. Tito was well aware what resistance meant since he possessed several years of Moscow experiences. Apart from that, Stalin was rather popular in Yugoslavia (particularly within Serbia and Montenegro); his personality cult seemed to grow along with Tito's. The border disputes with the west (which hadn't been solved until the mid-fifties) presented another burden. However, his own rebellious nature and his ambition for power prevailed. The victories, which were by no means achieved softly, but moreover by applying Stalinist methods, brought him a new reputation in the west. For Yugoslavia they meant a specific form of self-managed socialism which was given the name "titoism" by the western sociologists. Titoism - a real or a fictitious difference? In the first years after World War II there were no major differences in the social order between Yugoslavia and eastern European countries (with Stalin's permission, eastern European countries even imitated the Yugoslav system of "people's democracy" - the transitional phase between the pluralistic and monistic political system. 8 Hoping that the relations between the two countries would be based on equality of both partners, Yugoslavia was a most consequent ally of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia expected that the Soviet Union would offer protection to the socialist Yugoslavia and assistance with the industrialisation of the country. Some members of the Communist Party leadership even considered the possibility of Yugoslavia joining the Soviet Union. The beginning (and the core) of the quarrel with the Informbiro was the different comprehension of the equality of both states and parties and Yugoslav (Tito's) resistance to the hegemonic Soviet (Stalin's) policy. In Yugoslavia, the dispute provoked a critical analysis of the Soviet system which in consequence led to the development of an alternative model of the social development which was to be neither a capitalist nor a state-socialist one. It was given the name self - management. This new model originated from the Marx thesis on the union of the free producers and the Lenin thesis on self-management (which he elaborated in his book The State and the Revolution). Based on the evaluation which regarded the state ownership as a failure and the new bureaucratic class created by the party as dangerous, the decision about the introduction of self-management was made. The factories were to be managed (through workers' councils) by the workers themselves. The corresponding legislation was adopted in June In the changed circumstances, more attention was to be paid to the business independence and the mechanisms of the market, whereas the influence of the state planning was to be reduced. The role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was to be changed as well; it was to give up the immediate commanding and concentrate instead on the ideological function at planning the social development. This change was also demonstrated in renaming the Communist Party of Yugoslavia into the League of 7 Informbiro (Informational Bureau of Communist Parties) was established on 30 September 1947 in Skljarska Polemba, Poland. The members were communist parties of the Soviet Union, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, France, Italy and Yugoslavia. Informbiro was meant to replace the international communist organisation Komintern, which was abolished during the war. It was expected to serve the purpose of reinforcing the influence of the Soviet Union in eastern European countries as well as in Yugoslavia and at the same time through the strongest western communist parties (the French and the Italian) exert influence upon the turbulent, almost revolutionary conditions in those two countries. Such orientation quickly led to a conflict with the orientation of the KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia). Yugoslavia found itself on the verge of a war with the socialist countries. Yugoslavia was thus forced to come closer to the west. In accordance with the motto "keeping Tito afloat," the USA provided limited assistance, which helped Yugoslavia overcome the worst crisis. 8 Božo Repe: The System of People's Democracy in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje (The Magazine for History and Ethnography), Maribor, Volume 69, Issue 2, p

5 Communists of Yugoslavia (ZKJ). The change of the name was adopted on the 6 th congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (2-7 November 1952 in Zagreb) 9. Numerous members of the leadership opposed this decision and even Tito himself stated on several subsequent internal meetings that the 6 th congress had been a mistake. The essential differences between Yugoslavia and the eastern European countries were the independent national liberation war and the authentic revolution (the only one carried out in Europe apart from the Soviet and the Albanian), as well as a relatively short postwar period of Stalinism (though its relapses continued to turn up until the mid-eighties). Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, which allowed it a more independent search for alternatives. Since the sixties, other major differences had been in the decentralisation, in the introduction of the market economy, the existence of mixed ownership (though state ownership prevailed), orientation towards consumerism, certain forms of pluralism in economy, culture and even ideology of national parties, in relative openness of the information system and in free transition of people. The limitations of Yugoslav model were rooted in the prevailing way of thinking of the leading party cadres, which arose from the Comintern school as well as from the Leninist type of party and had a crucial role at planning the social order. Other common points with eastern European type of socialism further lie in the one-party system, the domination of political elite over other centres of power (i. e. economic), bureaucratic type of management, indivisibility of power, the dominating role of ideology in any kind of arbitration. Titoism thus appealed to the Marxist ideology, the power was seized through a revolution led by professional revolutionaries "in the name" of the working class, the leading role of the party was never questioned, though it formally renounced power. Yet, in terms of foreign policy, it insisted on the principles like respecting sovereignty, independence, integrity and equality, acknowledgement and development of the peaceful co-existence among the nations, regardless of their ideological differences - everything on the principle of mutual help and non-intervention in internal affairs of each country. The position of Yugoslavia in terms of international and inter-party relations was - due to "Titoism"- completely different from the position of other eastern European countries, which possessed only a limited sovereignty. Through the development of non-aligned movement, Yugoslavia was able to strengthen its foreign policy influence, which by far exceeded its territorial, economic and military power. In terms of internal policy it allowed decentralisation as well as a gradual appeasement of repression since the fifties. Further it introduced partial liberalisation of economy, approved increased production of consumer goods, which resulted in constant growth of the standard of living, and allowed partial democratisation. These processes were perceived as the reintroduction of the capitalist system by a part of the leadership. Whenever the party monopoly seemed to be questioned it was Tito himself who interrupted the process of democratisation. For the first time it happened in the mid-fifties when he rudely refused the suggestions according to which self-management should have been granted traditional middle-class rights, though with a socialist label (at the beginning of the fifties Milan Djilas namely suggested the introduction of a two-party socialist system). Further he retaliated the so-called "party liberalism" which advocated in favour of market economy in the mid-sixties. In spite of that, "titoism" was quite different from the system of the state socialism in eastern European countries, which was particularly the case in the sixties and in the seventies. In two decades Tito managed - though forcefully - to set up basic modernisation processes; something that the former political elite hadn't managed to achieve, namely: 9 The History of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Komunist, Ljubljana,

6 the agrarian reform, industrialisation, the separation of the church from the state, and - at least formally - the emancipation of women (in Yugoslavia women were given the right to vote only after World War II). There was a major increase in the level of education; the nations, which previously hadn't possessed its own educational system at all, were able to introduce their own schools (including universities). However, there were still major differences between individual republics and provinces - from different reasons they were even getting bigger in the course of time. In terms of home style, clothing, arts (particularly music, theatre, film) as well as organisation of leisure time, people were imitating the west; in return they made use of the benefits of the socialist system like free education, good health care, full employment) 10. For some time, the democratic processes in the east, particularly in Czechoslovakia, had been exercising a stimulating effect on Yugoslavia. Some politicians (Edvard Kardelj) even feared, that Czechoslovakia with its formula "socialism with a human face" could overcome Yugoslavia and its reforms and thus take away the primacy of "titoism" as relatively most democratic form of Leninist type socialism. The occupation of Czechoslovakia had a certain influence on restraining democratic processes in Yugoslavia. For the purpose of the state security, ZKJ (The League of Communists of Yugoslavia) started to curb the democratic rights and suppress the media again. The Yugoslav leadership was again in the position to determine by itself - without any competition from the other socialist states - what level of democratisation it would allow. "Liberalisation" of Yugoslavian society reached its peak in the end of the sixties but was defeated at the beginning of the seventies. Due to its extreme nationalism, it was first destroyed in Croatia, then in Slovenia, and finally in Serbia where the conflict was particularly serious so that Tito, using informal ways, had to intervene personally. Serbia had offered the strongest opposition to Tito. Some intellectuals had publicly opposed his lifelong presidency and demanded him to give up the power due to his old age. Conflicts appeared in other republics too (Macedonia). Along with the retaliation for the liberalism, the system of "self-managed agreements and social consultation" was introduced in Yugoslavia. Officially founded in the 1974 Constitution, the new system gave up the market economy and introduced the so called "economy by agreement" instead, according to which the companies were not to compete each other but negotiate about who would produce what and according to what price. The so-called policy of realistic socialism with its huge industrial complexes, unskilled working force, egalitarianism and emphasising the leading role of the party, prevailed again. The system was not in a position to survive by itself, without substantial financial support (cheap western loans in the seventies). Due to the blockades within the delegate system (in which elected delegates were increasingly replaced by combined delegations, which should have allowed maximal political involvement of the people), the mandates were increasingly taken over by the executive and managerial organs. A kind of "silent" centralisation carried out past the official system. The compensation for the resumed complete ideological and personnel control by the ZKJ (League of Communists) was a fictitious social peace. However, numerous achievements of "liberalism" were preserved, a complete return to the old positions was simply not possible any more. As long as it had existed, "titoism" had not renounced the leading role of the party and the small group of leading people respectively. It had therefore never managed to overcome the magic barrier between the attempts of "democratisation" and the real democracy. This 10 For more information on the issue see: Božo Repe, Das Besondere an "Titoismus" - seine Gewaltherrschaft und sein Zerfall (The Special Characteristics of Titoism - its Tyranny and Decline), Aufrisse, Wien, Nr. 3/1992 in Božo Repe: Confini aperti e stile di vita in Slovenia doppo la seconda guerra mondiale (Open Borders and the Slovenian Style of Life after World War II) Qualostoria, Trieste, Anno XXVII, n) Giugno 199, p

7 was due to its strong ideological orientation, which didn't allow it to carry out the concept of market economy (which was regarded as a restitution of capitalism by the leaders) and introduce political pluralism, which would have resulted in the loss of party monopoly. The relations between the nations until Tito's death The relations between the nations were re-established during World War II. The centralist Kingdom of Yugoslavia only recognised the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes as the "three tribes of the same nation". The Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Moslems were not acknowledged at all. The national minorities were being repressed and the country was constantly threatened to fall apart because of the national conflicts (particularly between the Croats and the Serbs). On the second meeting of AVNOJ (the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) which was held on 29 November 1943 (this day was later celebrated as the National Holiday of Yugoslavia), the representatives of Yugoslav nations (resistance movements) reached an agreement according to which Yugoslavia was to become a federative state, consisting of six republics, one autonomous province (Vojvodina) and one autonomous region (Kosovo and Metohija), both within Serbia. Many rejected this solution, but it had been preserved throughout the existence of Yugoslavia although numerous questions remained unsolved. 11 Among others, the unsolved problems referred to the position of the Serbs in Croatia and on the territory of Sanđak (the territory predominantly populated by the Moslems, geographically situated in both Serbia and Montenegro). The communist leadership was of the opinion that the revolution would also solve the national question, either within Yugoslavia, or, as Tito hoped, within a Balkan federation or confederation respectively. After the war, the Serbs opposed the communist vision for the solution of the national question (federative regulation and acknowledgement by other Yugoslav nations) in the Constitutional Assembly, but they were too weak to prevent it. 12 Federative regulation was declared by the 1946 Constitution, yet Yugoslavia was actually functioning as a centralist state until the mid- sixties. This constitution (and all the others that followed) acknowledged each Yugoslav nation the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. The leadership was convinced that the revolution had solved the national question forever. Towards the end of the fifties the unity of the Yugoslav leadership came to an end. The dispute did start on the issue of social questions (the first major post-war strikes of coal-miners in 1958 in Slovenia), yet it soon extended to the problems of relations between the nations. 13 Tito somehow managed to calm it down, yet it broke out again at the beginning of the sixties, on the occasion of the discussions about the new constitution. 14 The dispute between the centralist and the federalist line had not been solved until the mid-sixties. Edvard Kardelj, the Slovenian politician overtly said on occasion of a meeting of Yugoslav leaders, that there were three options for the future development of Yugoslavia, after the revolutionary generation ("the ten of us here") would 11 Especially the Serbs later opposed the decisions of AVNOJ. Due to specific circumstances (the prevailing influence of Chetniks), the Serb delegation for AVNOJ was not elected but appointed from military units. The Serbs therefore claimed that the new Yugoslavia was conceived without their participation and that the decisions of AVNOJ were detrimental to them (they were particularly referring to the formation of both autonomous provinces). 12 Slobodan Nešović: The Third Session of AVNOJ and the session of the temporary people's assembly of the Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 7-26 August 1945, Komunist, Ljubljana, Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing, Zagreb, 1999 p ). 14 Božo Repe: Some Thoughts about the year 1962, Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana, Volume XXVI, 1989, Issue 11/12 and Volume XXVII, 1990, Issue 1/2 7

8 be gone. The Slovenian and the Croatian would demand as much independence as possible; the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia would favour the centralist option, since they expected advantages for themselves from transferring the means from the developed to the underdeveloped parts of the country, and finally, the hegemonstic Serb option. Kardelj believed that the Serb option was the one most likely to succeed and therefore wanted the individual republics to become rather independent actual states. According to him, the federation was to have the role of some kind of a "round table" where the republics could discuss common issues (the common economic and monetary policy, common defence and foreign policy). Tito agreed to that concept, because Kardelj has preserved the three main safety elements of "titoism" in it. 15 The reform that followed led to the so-called party liberalism, which emerged particularly in the more developed republics. The republic leaders demanded a higher level of democracy (yet, within the socialist system), market economy (within a welfare state) and more independence for individual republics. 16 Several national disturbances and conflicts with the federal centre started to appear (the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, the so-called mass movement in Croatia in 1971, Slovenian demands for a radical reform of the federation). Tito assessed that the federation, the monopolistic position of the party, as well as his own position were threatened and therefore annihilated them. However, he did abate about the national question, which allowed individual republics to build up their own sovereignty within the Yugoslav federation (i.e. introduction of republic presidencies, republic governments had their own ministries for international collaboration and defence, as well as national banks). Since there was no real democracy within the republics, the federalisation led to the formation of republic oligarchies that were able to exercise unlimited power within the competencies they had achieved. The new constitutional order had therefore never really started to function and the decisions were mainly made outside the bodies of the republic assemblies. Yugoslavia after Tito's death - the Failure of the "After Tito - Tito" Policy When Josip Broz - Tito got seriously ill in 1980 and could not leave the hospital any more, the condition of the state he was the head of was hardly any better than his own, the only difference being that the latter had been held secret. However, hardly anyone would have approved with such assessment of the situation at that time. Yugoslavia gave the impression of a peaceful, stable state with a decent standard of living, solved national question and high level of international reputation which by far exceeded its economic power. Even foreign analysts were surprised by the peaceful transition and other statesmen gave Tito one of the most magnificent funerals of the 20th century. The great powers, particularly the USA and the western countries were interested in the further existence of Yugoslavia. In this terms democracy had a subordinate role. Upon his death Tito hadn't said anything in the style like "preserve me Yugoslavia" (words ascribed to the Yugoslav king Aleksander Karađorđević when he was dying upon his assassination in Marseilles in 1934). Neither had Tito left behind any kind of a political will (nor a personal one, for that matter, since he hardly had any personal possessions). Different statements that he had - often resigned because of his poor health and suspecting that the end was coming - made on several occasions for diverse delegations or individuals that had visited him towards the end of 1979 were afterwards pronounced as his political will. 17 A fierce 15 Dušan Bilanžić: Hrvatska moderna povijest (The Contemporary History of Croatia), Golden Marketing, Zagreb, p Božo Repe: "Liberalism in Slovenia", Borec, Ljubljana, The last delegation he had seen shortly before he was admitted to the hospital on 24 December 1979 was a Slovenian one. On that occasion he criticised excessive consumerism and expressed his preference for short, only one year long political mandates, which the Slovenians opposed on the grounds that they were 8

9 struggle for the change of the relations within the federation - yet from different angles - started immediately after Tito's death. Centralist oriented politicians, army leaders, as well as Serb intellectuals perceived the federalisation of Yugoslavia in the seventies as Slovenian construct. In the policy of Slovenian leadership they saw national pragmatism and a tactics of gradual, yet persistent realisation of its national objective: attaining of independent Slovenian state. According to the Serb author Dobrica Čosić, the Slovenians were applying methods that he called "intelligent machiavelism". As long as Tito was alive, the Serbs were reluctant to utter that publicly, although a silent agreement between some Serb politicians and the army was made in the seventies, according to which the 1974 Constitution was to be abolished. 18 The Slovenians, and after them the Croats were also beginning to see the federation - though from different motifs - with mixed feelings. Their attitude was based on economic crisis, gradual dwindling of fear from former enemies (Germans and Italians) and the growing concern about the aggressive Serb politics. In the first phase, however, Slovenians restricted themselves to the protection of the constitution and thus Tito's heritage regarding the relations between the nations. Due to the political turmoil and the struggle for power within individual republics (i. e. in Serbia between Slobodan Milošević and Ivan Stambolić, the then head of the Serb presidency) there were hardly any major changes in the functioning of Yugoslav federation until the mid-eighties. The people who came to power after the so-called "party liberalism" had been destroyed in the seventies were rotating on the top state and party positions since then. Mostly these were the experienced, old revolutionary cadres whose biological strength was definitely in decline (in the first part of the eighties a joke about a politician was making rounds, who upon arriving to the airport, allegedly asked his companion: are we leaving somewhere or have we arrived?), and politicians of younger generation who had sensed in time who the winner would be. 19 After Tito, there had been no other politicians with a Yugoslav charisma. This was also due to the system which didn't have any "exclusively" federal functions left, which would be occupied by people, not delegated by the republics. Obviously, the political and economical premises of "titoism" were officially not questioned in the first half of the eighties. The self-managed socialist system was described as being good; however it required consequent implementation. The controversy between the officially proclaimed socialist patriotism, brotherhood and unity (expressed through the motto "after Tito - Tito"), which remained a stable part of political programmes, party declarations, textbooks and celebrations, and the way Yugoslavia was actually perceived was enormous. Cultural and economic differences (7:1 between Slovenia and Kosovo), poor knowledge and stereotype ideas about each other seemed to have become even bigger in the eighties, in spite of several decades of life together. Informational systems were only functioning within individual republics; and economic agony became worse. The Rise of Nationalism irrational. (The discussion between president Tito and the Slovenian delegation on 24 December 1979, Slovenian Archives) 18 Veljko Kadijević, the last Defence Minister of Yugoslavia explicitly admitted that in his memoirs with the title Moje viđenje raspada (How I See the Disintegration), Politika, Belgrade Tito had to a large extend removed the "middle-aged technocratic" generation who did take part in the war and revolution, yet was not as burdened with ideological patterns as not to be able to see what major changes were going on in the world (the change of social structure of the society, gradual disappearance of the traditional working class and the growth of middle classes, emergence of "welfare state" in Scandinavian and western European countries, the transition to the post-industrial society). The members of the middle generation didn't manage to assert themselves against a too strong pre-war generation of revolutionaries and therefore perceived themselves as being "lost". In the seventies it was gradually replaced by the youngest generation of upstarts from the party and the state structures who on the one hand did appeal to the "revolutionary traditions", but had neither any emotional attachment to them nor did they want to change them in any way. They simply adapted to the situation, made a career for themselves and led a comfortable middle class life. 9

10 After Tito's death, the balance between the nations as well as political balance within the federation became very fragile. The previously suppressed national (as well as nationalistic) demands were beginning to arise. In 1981 there was an uprising of the Kosovo Albanians which seemed to be quite irrational, since the autonomous province possessed virtually the same rights as the republics (towards the end of the eighties another, this time justified rebellion took place, since the new Serb constitution abolished autonomous provinces). On the other hand, the centralist pressure increased. The 1974 constitution, which represented the culmination of Yugoslav federalism, was something between a federation and a confederation. The federal constitution didn't hold any superior position; it was more or less placed on an equal level with the constitutions of individual republics. Yet on the other hand - though acknowledging a high level of rights to individual republics - the federal constitution didn't fully observe the principle of authentic sovereignty of individual republics; Yugoslavia was not defined as a federation of states (confederation), but as a federal state (federation). As all the other post-war constitutions, it did recognise the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. However, there were no regulations about how the nations and republics respectively were to realise that right. Legal interpretations of that issue differed a great deal: some jurists thought that this particular right was exhausted with the foundation of the socialist Yugoslavia, whereas the others thought that this right was permanent and inalienable. The system based on the 1974 constitution could only function as long as all the three previously mentioned security mechanism continued to exist: the unified League of Communists was based on the principle of democratic centralism which spread its leading role to the other segments of society; unified army with Tito as the highest authority, Commander in Chief, the president of the state and the president of the League of Communists. In the second half of the eighties, the three options, announced by Kardelj as early as in the mid-sixties, became clearly crystallised: the demand for confederation (Slovenia, later followed by Croatia), a federal Yugoslavia with a strong centre which was to keep transferring money from the developed to the underdeveloped parts of the country (Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and as the third option, the centralised Yugoslavia under Serb dominion, the so-called Srboslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Serb intellectuals were the first in Yugoslavia to write a national programme - the so-called Programme of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences (SAZU). The programme became public in 1986 when one of the newspapers (Večernje novosti - Evening News) published parts of the text. A complete memorandum was first published by the Serb Diaspora in the USA. A committee of 16 members of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences defined the situation of the Serb nation as catastrophic. According to the members of the Academy, the Serbs outside Serbia, particularly those in Kosovo, were undergoing a process of assimilation; in terms of economy they were completely subordinated to Slovenia and Croatia, they had no state of their own and they were losing their cultural identity because of communism. For the authors of memorandum, the solution was in the change of the 1974 constitution and in the introduction of the "democratic federalism", which basically meant abolishment of sovereignty of individual republics. They demanded a "total unity of the Serb nation" 20, irrespective of the division of Yugoslavia into republics and provinces. This actually meant a unified Serbia (without autonomous provinces), the final consequence being the implementation of the "Great Serb" programme, according to which all Serbs should be living within the same state. In case Yugoslavia continued to exist, this would lead close to the concept of the three ban's dominions (provinces), i. e. administrative units that had already existed in the Kingdom Yugoslavia in the late thirties. This was not a realistic 20 Memorandum Srpske akademije nauka i umjetnosti (The Memorandum of the Serb Academy of Arts and Sciences), Belgrade, September 1986, Serbian Literary Association, New York. 10

11 option, since the Slovenes and the Croats, as well as the Macedonians and the Moslems had already achieved much more than that. After the faction of Slobodan Milošević emerged victorious from the 8 th meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in September 1987 the members of the Serb Academy supported the new Serb leadership (May 1988) which then started to implement the programme of the Academy, the first measure being the subordination of the Albanians in Kosovo, and of the autonomously oriented politicians in the second autonomous province of Vojvodina. The project was continued by replacing Montenegrin leadership and destabilisation of the conditions on the territories, populated by the Serbs (the Knin region in Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). To achieve this, Serb nationalists made use of the pressure from the street: they organised mass meetings, which forced politicians in certain areas to resign. The consequence was, that other republics started to protect their national interests as well (Slovenian intellectuals published their national programme in February 1987). The first conflict thus emerged between Slovenia and Serbia. More than a conflict between the two nations, it was a conflict between two different visions of the future development of Yugoslavia: the Slovenian, which was oriented towards market economy, scientific and technological development, European and global integration; and the Serb, patriarchal, inwards oriented, centralist society based on pre-modern patterns of the existing society. Whereas the Slovenians wanted to negotiate with the European Economic Community and adopt European criteria, the Serbs were convinced that the question of democracy was a Yugoslav internal affair and that Milošević would join the European Community with "beat of drum and flourish of trumpets". With energetic economical and political measures, Slovenians managed to defend themselves from the pressures of the Serbs, yet the conflict between the Croats and the Serbs was intensified. This was the first real conflict between the nations; the media and the political war gradually grew into a real war. Slovenia and Croatia carried out national referendums which resulted in their declaration of independence and consequently, in the war. Why Tito could hold Yugoslavia together and why it fell apart after his death After the war, Yugoslavia was going through periods of crises which - in the final consequence - could have led to the break up of the state: i. e. during the dispute with Stalin in 1948, further in the early sixties when the first serious national conflicts emerged which led to a deep crises within the leadership, and finally during the seventies when the liberally oriented communists in Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia were suppressed. There were also several occasions in which a foreign intervention seemed quite close, the first one emerging even before the end of the war (the question of Triest). Afterwards there was a risk of an attack from the Soviet Union on several occasions; at least twice Yugoslavia was immediately threatened: in 1948 and in 1968, after the suppression of the Prague spring. The political and the national structure within the socialist Yugoslavia could be preserved for over four decades. Firstly that was due to its international position which suited both blocks, secondly, due to the three internal pillars: the unified state Communist Party, the strong, centralised army which exercised a strong political influence and thirdly, due to Tito as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest posts (the party, the state and the military) even enjoyed the support of Moscow after the reconciliation with the Soviet Union (1955 and 1956), with the exception of 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the "Prague spring" and thus jeopardised its own position. In spite of his independence, Tito seemed to be more acceptable for Moscow than any of the possible successors who could have brought Yugoslavia even closer to the west. Through occasional internal purges, Tito managed to preserve and control the process of democratisation and keep the republics 11

12 under control, though the latter were governed by their own communist oligarchies. He never allowed the national demands to go beyond the limit, which could have jeopardised the very existence of Yugoslavia. With a mixture of his political and statesmanly skills, personal charisma and personality cult, demagogy, as well as with the provision of a relatively good standard of living he managed to preserve affection of the people. The good standard of living in the last period of Tito's reign was not a result of economic effectiveness of the country it was rather a result of its specific median position, which provided the country with strong financial injections and cheap loans, while preserving an advantageous position within eastern markets. The internal and external conditions, which consequently led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, became synchronised for the first time when towards the end of the eighties socialism and along with it the Soviet Union with the entire socialist block fell apart. From the three "protective" mechanisms, Tito was the first to go; then the League of Communist fell apart (at the beginning of 1990) and finally, (after an unsuccessful intervention in Slovenia), the Yugoslav Army. The key question is, whether Tito and his actions had impeded a more successful course of development in terms of relations between the nations in Yugoslavia, or was it the other way around: had he "frozen" an inevitable catastrophe through his authority? At least theoretically, it would have been possible for the Yugoslav nations to regulate their relations on the grounds of common interests, instead of on insisting (on Tito's demand) on the - in the meantime empty - ideological motto about the "brotherhood and unity", dating from the wartime. As an optimal solution, this could have been a federation, based on the market economy and the welfare state. However, this wouldn't have been a socialist state any more; the revolution carried out during the war would have lost its sense and Tito his integrative function. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito" which could have prolonged the existence of Yugoslavia. Apart from that, there is a justified doubt whether a confederation could have existed over a longer period of time because of the huge cultural and economic differences. Political pluralism would have caused emergence of national parties, which would have - as it indeed happened in the early nineties - had a disintegrative role. "Titoism" could only emerge due to specific historic circumstances (both internal and external) after World War II and was a unique phenomenon. There was no universal recipe according to the motto "after Tito - Tito" which could have preserved Yugoslavia. Yugoslav nations should have found a different recipe for the post-communist period after the end of bipolarity in Europe, which they had failed to do. SUMMARY In his contribution the author reflects upon the reasons which made it possible for Yugoslavia to exist under Tito's leadership for over four decades and a half. He concludes that this was possible because of the international position Yugoslavia managed to obtain and which obviously suited both blocks, and because of the three internal columns: the unified communist party, the strong, centralised army with a major political influence and Tito as the highest authority. Tito who held the three highest positions within the state (the presidencies of the state and of the party respectively, as well as the command over the army) enjoyed the support of Moscow after his reconciliation with the Soviet Union (1955 and 1956). The exception was the year 1968 when Yugoslavia defended the "Prague Spring" and consequently jeopardised its own position. The Yugoslav system based on the same political premises as the state socialism in the east European countries (a single party system, predominance of ideological criteria within the society), yet it 12