Proposal for a workshop for the 2010 ECPR joint sessions in St. Gallen

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1 Political institutions and political violence Proposal for a workshop for the 2010 ECPR joint sessions in St. Gallen Workshop directors: Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of Essex & Simon Hug, University of Geneva Thematic introduction This workshop will examine how political institutions affect the re-emergence of political violence, and how political institutions may be endogenous to, or shaped by, the foregoing conflict dynamics. Many scholars both in comparative politics and increasingly in conflict research have suggested that particular forms of domestic political institutions may mitigate societal conflicts. Similarly, it is often argued that particular institutions or institutional reform can increase the prospects for settling violent conflicts. Researchers, however, differ on the virtues or problems of particular institutional arrangements. Whereas some researchers emphasize the potential of power splitting through federal institutions or regional autonomy for solving conflict (e.g., Gurr 2000; McGarry 2004), others argue that federalism will tend to exacerbate competition and political polarization (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 2005). Similarly, while some authors suggest that power-sharing institutions allow for peaceful settlements of conflicts (e.g., Lijphart 2004; Reynal-Querol 2002), others question these institutions beneficial effects (e.g., Roeder and Rothchild 2005). These contradictory assessments attest to how no consensus have emerged on these issues and how there has been little cumulation in this research area. This is in part due to how the theory underlying arguments often have not been specified with much precision. For example, Lijphart (2008) has argued that the complex institutional arrangements of consociational democracy increase stability in heterogeneous societies while Snyder and Mansfield (2002) have pointed to the danger accompanying the introduction of competitive elections of any kind. Moreover, institutions like the media, the educational system or wealth redistributing agencies have received little to no attention although they are closely connected to conflict-inducing mechanisms, e.g. political identity building, 1

2 claims for cultural autonomy or economic inequalities. Moreover, researchers often ignore the contributions of other scholars, and debates have often failed to be constructive. Finally, the efforts to devise empirical tests of such arguments seen so far have had many limitations. Some authors even go as far as questioning whether the effects of political institutions can be determined empirically (Przeworski 2004). The limits of existing research, however, have not prevented many scholars from advocating strong prescriptive policies, and the recent decades have seen many efforts by constitution builders making recommendations of the design of institutions in new democracies of the Postcommunist world or post-conflict situations such as Iraq (e.g., contributions in Reynolds 2002). The lack of empirical verification of prescriptive claims can be attributable to the intricate connection between institutions on the one hand and the actual conflict dynamics and historical circumstances prevailing in a society on the other hand. Put differently, institutional change might be endogenous to and shaped by existing cleavages and conflict dynamics (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). For example, federal institutions may have evolved as a result of rational compromise with power sharing between groups that are unable to dominate one another. In such a case, the same factors that make a society more predisposed for peaceful resolution of a conflict also cause the particular institutional arrangement (see e.g. Wagner 2004 for an implicit argument along these lines). If this is the case, then it does not follow that efforts to introduce a similar set of political institutions in a highly polarized society will have the same consequences. This is of special relevance when considering that institutions are ascribed the power of influencing identities to become more inclusive (Horowitz 2002) or more consensus-oriented (Lijphart 2004). If however institutional change is critically affected by prior conditions then the same institutions thought to alleviate conflict might have perverse effects due to the presence of spurious background factors. More generally, if institutions are partly endogenous or not independent of the underlying conflict there may be strong limitations in our ability to change conflict through manipulating institutions, and results looking only at the observed distribution of institutions and conflict may yield highly misleading conclusions. Considering what is at stake, the exact workings of institutions need to be disentangled from confounding factors. Especially, claims about identity-shaping effects of institutions should be reassessed. 2

3 Recent research on civil wars and political violence has started to grapple with this reciprocal influence between institutions and conflict (e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002, Reynal-Querol 2005, Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008). At a theoretical level, understanding the potential role of political institutions requires that we understand the specific linkages between institutions and actor incentives, and how these may depend on the particular configurations of conflict (see for instance Hug 2005 and Myerson 2005 concerning federalism). Empirical studies thus need to consider the possible role of endogenous institutions and its implications for research design and the inferences that we can draw. This workshop aims to attract papers on the linkages between institutions and conflict, in particular studies that seek to understand the micro-foundations of what these linkages may look like or consider their possible interrelationship. We are primarily interested in theoretical and broad comparative contributions, and in particular seek innovative papers that seek to integrate existing work on political institutions with our understanding of conflict or papers that use theories of conflict to understand the perhaps unintended implications of institutions in ways that have not been recognized in the existing literature. However, more empirical papers as well as papers on specific countries and conflicts will also be considered. There have been no workshops on institutions and conflicts at recent ECPR joint sessions of workshop, and we believe that the proposed workshop is likely to appeal to a large set of scholars from the comparative study of institutions as well as individuals from conflict and peace research. In this respect, it is significant that this workshop will be directed by one expert in institutional analysis (Hug) and one scholar with a background from conflict studies (Gleditsch). We will circulate the call for paper for such a workshop through the channels of the ECPR as well as advertise the workshop in a target manner to interested parties using our established networks and contacts. List of potential participants: We will welcome relevant proposals from all interested parties, and in particular target members of the ECR standing groups on Analytical Politics and Political Geography to encourage them to solicit 3

4 proposals. Representative names of possible participants include: Bednar, Jenna (University of Michigan) Bakke, Kristin (University College London) Brancati, Dawn (Washington University) Sabine Carey (University of Nottingham) Cederman, Lars-Erik (ETH Zürich) Cheibub, José Antonio (University of Illinois) Doorensplet, Renske (Warwick University) Dorrusen, Han (University of Essex) Gates, Scott (PRIO, Oslo) Håvard Hegre (University of Oslo) Indridason, Indridi (University of California, Riverside) Ola Listhaug (Norwegian University of Science and Technology) Magnus Öberg (Uppsala University) Paskeviciute, Aida (University of Amsterdam) Reynal-Querol, Marta (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) Robinson, James (Harvard University) Roeder, Phillip (University of California San Diego) Rohner, Dominic (University of Zurich) Schneider, Gerald (University of Konstanz) Strøm, Kaare (PRIO, Oslo & University of California San Diego) Wibbels, Eric (Duke University) Biographical note on workshop organizers Kristian Skrede Gleditsch: Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Colorado, USA. Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK; Research associate, Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO; Co-editor, British Journal of Political Science. Current research focuses on local interaction and regional differentiation in conflict, peace, and democratization. He is the author of An Introduction to Spatial Regression Models (Sage, 2008) and All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (University of Michigan Press, 2002) as well as articles in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Cooperation and Conflict, Defense and Peace Economics, European Journal of International Relations, International Interactions, International Organization, Internasjonal Politikk, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Political Analysis, Political Psychology, and World Politics. Simon Hug: Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Michigan, USA. Professor in Political Science at the University of Geneva, Switzerland; Research associate, Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO. His current research focuses on how political institutions affect political decision-making and conflict resolution in particular. Recent publications include Federal Stability in Unequal Societies 4

5 (Constitutional Political Economy, 2005), Democratization and War in Political Science (Democratization, 2008, with Lars-Erik Cederman and Andreas Wenger) and Democratization and Civil War (Journal of Peace Research, 2010, with Lars-Erik Cederman and Lutz Krebs). References Gurr, Ted Robert Ethnic Warfare on the Wane. Foreign Affairs 79(3): Horowitz, Donald L Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes. In The Architecture of Democracy: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp Hug, Simon Federal Stability in Unequal Societies Constitutional Political Economy 16(2): Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements. In Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder & Donald Rothchild. Ithaca: Cornell University Press pp Lijphart, Arend Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy 15(2): Lijphart, Arend Thinking about democracy. Power sharing and majority rule in theory and practice. New York: Routledge. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. (1967 (1990)). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. In The West European Party System, ed. Peter Mair. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp McGarry, John Can Federalism Help to Manage Ethnic and National Diversity? Federations 4(1):3 5. Myerson, Roger B Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1(1): Przeworski, Adam Institutions Matter? Government and Opposition 39(4): Reynal-Querol, Marta Ethnicity, political systems and civil wars Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1): Reynal-Querol, Marta Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars? European Journal of Political Economy 21(2): Reynolds, Andrew, ed The Architecture of Democracy: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roeder, Philip G. & Donald Rothchild, eds Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Schneider, Gerald & Nina Wiesehomeier Rules That Matter: Political Institutions and the Diversity-Conflict Nexus Journal of Peace Research 45(2): Snyder, Jack and Edward Mansfield Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War. International Organization 56(2): Wagner, R. Harrison Bargaining and Conflict Management. In Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations, ed. Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer & Richard J. Stoll. Lanham: Lexington Books chapter 2, pp