EVOLUTION OF THE EU: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Transcription

1 CHAPTER III EVOLUTION OF THE EU: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

2 78 Introduction The European Union has strengthened its status as the champion of regional integration in Europe over the past six decades which has moved towards to embrace all countries from the Baltic Sea to the southern shores of the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the western borders of Russia (Bhutani 2004: 45). The history of European integration can be traced in successive waves and divided into three epochs. First, the Luxembourg compromise 1 period that is between 1958 and During this phase the Council was a futile collective institution with the system of national vetoes protecting the sovereignty of member states. On the other hand, legislative grid-lock in the Council facilitated Court activism and the freedom of the Court to interpret the Rome Treaty was thus the prime force impelling European integration all through the Luxembourg compromise. The second episode of European integration began with the ratification of Single European Act 2 (SEA) explicitly 1987 to At this time the Council became a successful legislative institution at the cost of national sovereignty of individual governments. The ratification of SEA effectively removed national vetoes in the Council which enabled the Commission 3 to act as a leading force behind European integration. At the same time its legislative proposals respected the preferences of the crucial members of the Council 4 under Qualified Majority Voting 5 (QMV) and the Parliament 6 under the cooperation procedure (Hancock and Guy 2002: 473). The third and current era of European integration began with the Treaty of Maastricht in The Parliament is now a powerful legislator, coequal with the Council under the reformed co-decision procedure. In this present epoch all the four major institutions of the EU such as the Council, the Parliament, the Commission and the Courts occupy vital positions in the functioning of the European Union (Tsebelis and Geoffrey 2001: 359). Neo-realism, Functionalism, Neo-functionalism, Intergovernmentalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Transactionalism, Federalism, Constructivism and Multi-level Governance are the major theories of European Integration. Each school of thought enlightens significant elements of the integration process as well as working together

3 Figure 2.1 Map of the European Union 79

4 80 and they will more fully capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in contemporary Europe. Neofunctionalism has been regarded as the foremost integration model of European integration. The process of spill over is the prominent feature most closely associated with the neofunctionalist approach to the study of European integration. In Haas formulation spill over refers to a situation where 'policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded'. Neo-functionalism explained the process of integration as a set of functional (i.e. economic) spill overs, leading to economic and political integration, with actors transferring their expectations, and loyalties to a supranational central authority. Historical Development of European Union Robert Schumann, the then French Foreign Minister made an indirect suggestion in 1950 that the process of integration and the formation of a new Europe would take place in a gradual manner by saying that the single Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single comprehensive plan. Rather, it will be built through a series of concrete achievements, each of which will create a de facto solidarity (Johari 1986: 167; Pinder and Simon 2007: 9). After the war, there was a strong desire among policy planners to turn towards both regional and functional areas of narrower concern in their endeavours to overcome the inability of the individual national states to achieve economic well being and military security on the basis of its own strength. As noted down by Jean Monnet, the French technocrat, success of this new approach is evident in the new relationship between European countries which for centuries have been locked in rivalry and strife and this new relationship is already transforming the international scene as a whole. It is the fact that within each regional system their exist forces of tension and conflict as well as factors of cohesion and cooperation. Furthermore it is the degree to which adjustment of these forces can be achieved that determines the degree of viability of each system (McLellan et al. 1974: 69). The beginning of the European integration venture has come out into view in the western part of the European continent after the Second World War. Since the Second World War, European politicians established institutions such as the Western European

5 81 Union (WEU) in 1947 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 6 (OECD) in 1948 (Berend 2010: 12). In 1951, six countries namely France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) through the Treaty of Paris, that was an incarnation of the designs for a united Europe envisioned by Jean Monnet and influentially proposed by Robert Schuman (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2; Nau 2012: 505). For the first time, this interstate cooperation had opened the door to a formula of integration or put differently, some of the powers of the member states had been transferred to a community organ (Johari 1986: 168). Founders of the ECSC pursued the intention that the community should contribute to the economic prosperity, increasing employment and living standards in all member states. Coal and steel industries were removed from full national competencies and placed under supranational authority which had built a decision centre for production, investments, social conditions and to a certain extent prices as well (Suchacek 2002: 4). Then the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were finally signed at Rome in 1957 (Aust 2010: 431). The Treaty of Rome is known as the bible of the European Community, which provides the ultimate authority for the greater part of its decisions and responsibilities. Under the Treaty of Rome, four main institutions were established to give effect to the provisions of the treaty namely; the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice 7 (ECJ). Subsequently, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has adopted in 1962 by the European Council to establish a single market for agricultural products. It has aimed at the managing of EC s market for agricultural products (Boyd and Joshua 2007: 39). The Merger Treaty of 1965 successfully blended the three Treaties of Rome namely ECSC, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) which provided for a Single Commission and a Single Council of the then three European Communities (Moga 2009: 798). They became

6 82 jointly known as the European Community (EC) although the abbreviation EEC remained in common use to denote the combined organization. In the 1960s the European Community (EC) dealt with a wide range of economic and related policies through an institutional framework constituted under the Treaty of Rome (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2-3). During this period intra-community trade leapt ahead, increasing by 28.4 percent annually and the average increase of imports from third countries was 10 percent. International economic crises and recession of the 1970s exposed some of the limitations of the European economies and signalled the need for a change for example, in the structures of capital and labour markets in order to overcome barriers to knowledge transfer due to different national technical standards (Hudson 2003: 52). During these years all the member states suffered from mounting inflation and unemployment, and most of them saw their balance of payments fall into severe deficit. Furthermore, efforts to co-ordinate energy policies of the member states proved vague, besides the attempts to find a common economic strategy to enable the Community to hoist itself out of the recession. The member governments all felt constrained to implement austerity policies in their own countries, and it became increasingly difficult to persuade them to release resources for the introduction of new common policies under the auspices of the Community. In the 1974 Paris summit of EC an agreement was reached on the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund, whose purpose was to help close the gap between the most disadvantaged and the more favoured regions within the Community. It also instituted the European Council to consider important foreign policy questions as well as the affairs of the Community and decided that the European Parliament should be elected by direct universal suffrage from 1978 onwards (Leonard 2005: 14-15). The EC s focus on monetary affairs in the 1970s resulted in the establishment of a European Monetary System 8 (EMS) in 1979 (Berkofsky 2004: 6). It was devised primarily as a means of stabilizing currency fluctuations within the EC. The processes of deepening economic integration and creating a common market in a virtual sense

7 83 entered a new phase with the functioning of a new treaty called the Single European Act 9 (SEA) of 1987, the EMS that supported the stability of European currencies and the Schengen arrangements 10 to facilitate intra-eu migration and promote labour mobility etc. The pace of the process of European integration thus once more accelerated from the 1980s onwards via new forms of supranational regulation in response to growing tendencies of globalization (Hudson 2003: 52). In addition the SEA called for the completion of a single European market and undertook significant institutional reforms, including a return to majority voting in the Council of Ministers and an enhancement of the powers of the EP, the members of which had been directly and democratically elected since 1979 (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2-3; Hudson 2003: 52). These were the first substantial amendments to the Treaty of Rome in its first 30 years in operation. The 1992 Treaty on European Union popularly known as Maastricht Treaty expanded the socio-political ambitions of the new European Union (EU) and outlined a future Economic and Monetary Union 11 (EMU) resulting in the 1999 adoption and 2002 circulation of a new single currency named Euro (Wood and Wolfgang 2008: 6). Other provisions extended or defined more precisely the Community s competences in other policy areas. It amended the powers of various EC institutions thus once again empowered the EP, renamed the Council of Ministers into the Council of the EU, institutionalized the European Council for the gathering of heads of state and government of EU member states and laid the groundwork for expanded membership (Curtis and Joseph 2011: 2-3). It introduced the development of common foreign and defence policies as a new concept of EC institutions. The Maastricht Treaty established three pillars for the European Union. The Pillar structure comprises the European Commission, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 12 (CFSP) and the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (Table 2.1) (Stevens 2000: 147). The first Pillar embraced the three existing European Communities treaties such as the ECSC, EC as well as Euratom, second Pillar contained new provisions on a common foreign and security policy, and third Pillar provided for cooperation between the member states on justice and home affairs. The first and second

8 84 Pillars are not subject to the EC institutions and are organized on an inter-governmental basis (Leonard 2005: 43). This treaty undoubtedly represented the most important development in the EC s history since the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Other European countries began to take note of the economic success of the Community. Thus the EEC, initially had six member states enlarged with its early success by incorporating Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (UK) in 1973 (Nicholson 1998: 38), followed by Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in Again it expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, ten Mediterranean and Central or Eastern European countries in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and lastly Croatia in 2013 (Axelrod et al. 2011: 214) (Table 2.2). Table 2.1 Institutional Structure of the European Union European council (heads of state & government); Council of ministries (representatives in policy areas) CFSP (intergovernmental arrangements for foreign, security & defiance policy) European commission (nominated by member states; administers community policies) European Central Bank (Common monitory policy for EMU members) European parliament (via European elections) European court of justice (formally independent of other institutions; overrules national legislation in defined areas Source: Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser (2008): The New European Union The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 was an amendment to Maastricht Treaty which has given much emphasis on citizenship issues and individual rights and its major achievement lies in the reform of legislative process and the consolidation and

9 85 renumbering of the separate texts of the treaties (Aust 2010: 431). Amsterdam spreads over into four policy areas: the first major policy area attend to inequalities between men and women in a cadre of legal areas, which comprise employment, immigration, asylum, and visas. The second policy area addresses the issue of developing the rights of a European citizen by essentially creating rights for citizens ensured by the EU. The third policy area dealt with the creation of a harmonized external or foreign policy, concentrating on the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP). The final policy area consolidated institutional questions by including national parliaments more in EU decision-making (Hancock and Guy 2002: 477). Nice Treaty of 2001 focused on the consolidation of EU institutions for an eastward expansion as well as recalculating voting weights in the Council of the European Union to make the EU more democratic and transparent (Paxton 2002: 675). The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 took most of the changes that would be made under the EU constitution and made the Charter of Fundamental Rights permanent. This Treaty fostered the transparency of the EU decision making process, the role of EU Parliament in policy formation and a closer relationship between the EU Parliament and the EU Council. Moreover, the Lisbon treaty stood for a conciliatory approach in continuing integration without ruffling too many nationalist feathers (Berend 2010: 73) (Table 2.3). The EC institutions continue their function under the Treaty on European Union or the Maastricht treaty and the Amsterdam treaty. In addition, powers have been acquired by the European Union that are not subject to the institutions of the EC, but are dealt with on an inter-governmental basis. These include a common foreign and security policy and co-operation over judicial, police and immigration issues. Now, the EU is a hybrid organization consisting of the EC, with its carefully defined division of powers between its constituent institutions, and an additional inter-governmental component (Leonard 2005: 45).

10 86 Table 2.2 Enlargement of the EU Original member Enlargements states First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh (1951) Belgium Britain Greece Spain Austria Czech Republic Bulgaria Croatia France Denmark Portugal Finland Cyprus Romania West Germany Ireland Sweden Hungary Italy Estonia Luxembourg Latvia Netherlands Lithuania Malta Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia Source: Steve Wood and Wolfgang Quaisser (2008): The New European Union

11 87 Table 2.3 Milestones in the European Union Event Year Content Achievement Formation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 1951 Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands became members Treaties of Rome 1957 Creation of Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) Merger Treaty 1965 Merging of three European communities namely; ECSC, EURATOM and EEC European 1979 A system to manage Monetary System monetary affairs (EMS) Single European 1987 Partially liberalizes EU Act economic space Plan for 1989 Exchange Rate Economic and Mechanism (ERM) Monetary Union (EMU) The power to make decisions about the coal and steel industry in these countries was placed in the hands of an independent body called the High Authority The member states set about removing trade barriers between them and forming a common market. It provided Single Commission, Single Council and the European Parliament Created an area of currency stability throughout the European Community Free flow of capital, goods, labour and services Member countries agreed to keep their government borrowing and spending under control with low inflation and low interest rates. European Economic Area (EEA) 1991 European Community and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) agree to form EEA Single European economic area for free trade among members

12 88 Maastricht Treaty 1993 Pillar structure in the European Union Amsterdam 1997 Amendment to Treaty Maastricht Treaty It comprises European Commission, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters Emphasis on citizenship issues and individual rights European Central 1998 Administration of An authority to manage Bank 13 (ECB) monetary policy monetary affairs Euro 1999 Common currency Replaced national currencies of EMU countries Treaty of Nice 2000 Consolidation of EU institutions Laying down new rules on the size of the EU institutions and the way they work Treaty of Lisbon 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of Brought changes to EU constitution and made European Union (TFEU) Charter of Fundamental Rights permanent Source: Gerhard Wahlers (2007): India and the European Union Theoretical Perspectives on European Integration Most of the theories in the study of regional cooperation or integration process are developed to explain European integration. Europe is a region of the world, where regional integration initiated in the early 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 (Laursen 2008: 3). Most of the regional integration theories present a macroscopic view of the dynamics and consequences of integration and they reflect on the pattern, logic and implications of increased interactions among nation states within a regional setting founded on systematic conceptual explanation (Amin 2010: 1070). Andrew Moravcsik s edifying statement on integration process is that any general explanation of integration cannot rest on a single theory but must rest on a multi-causal framework that orders a series of more narrowly focused theories (Moga 2009: 805). Recently, there is a swift growth of studies of the external dimensions of

13 89 European integration that can be seen as an obvious consequence of 1) the growth of foreign, security and defence policy agenda 2) the emerging status of the Euro as an alternative reserve currency 3) the widening issue base of international trade that has forced issues of European integration such as the Common Agricultural Policy onto the agenda of the WTO (Rosamond 2003: 5). Each school of thought enlightens significant elements of the integration process as well as working together and they will more fully capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in contemporary Europe (Checkel 1999: 546). These theories of European integration are based on assumptions and leading to explanations that are supported as strongly as possible by their proponents against the challenges raised by their opponents. This debate is definitely important for researchers because it is about the ups and downs in the process of European integration (Puchala 1999: 318). In a successful integration processes states voluntarily hand over part of their decisionmaking powers to a supranational level and set up a new level of political power, which supersedes the state. Neo-realism In the late 20th century, Kenneth Waltz formulated the influential neorealist theory of international politics which premised on the primacy of states and on a structural analysis of an anarchic international system that required states to focus on security, power, and relative gains (Choi and James 2002: 486; Pollack 2011: 3). Waltz explained European integration as a side effect of the structural condition of US-Soviet bipolarity. Again he argued that European integration became possible only after the political power of the European states had started to decline. And the United States had emerged as the guarantor of West European security in the face of the Soviet threat, leaving the member states of the European Community free to pursue integration without concerns about security threats from their European partners. In this circumstances security was dependent on an external actor and the risk of war was decreased among the European states (Archer 2000: 24).

14 90 John Mearsheimer assumed relatively pessimistic assumptions about the implications of anarchy, arguing that the security dilemma necessitates each state to attempt to maximize its own power, seeking not only security but also hegemony, and distrusting the intentions of other states. In Mearsheimer s analysis of the prospects for the EU after the Cold War, he predicted that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the going away of the United States from the defence of continental Europe would direct to an increase in concerns about relative gains among EU member states, most notably with respect to German power and intentions, and place a significant check upon the future course of European integration (Pollack 2011: 3, 7). Neorealism may be capable of explaining the international context of the beginning of the European integration process precisely, but as a general theory of integration it encounters problems (Heinonen 2006: 62). The neorealist interpretations on the outcomes of the end of the cold war foresaw problems for the European integration process. However, in reality the European integration process continued to intensify after the end of the cold war and the illustrative power of neorealism in relation to European integration process reduced. It exposed the inability of the neorealist approach to explain further integration efforts of the EU (Sangiovanni and Daniel 2005: 102). They saw the process of European integration as a temporary arrangement between European nation-states seeking to secure or to target strategic objectives and as a sophisticated arena for intergovernmental negotiations. In their perception national governments will always be the only key players in the process because they would not delegate any of the functions to European supranational level which prevents them from following their own national agenda (Lazea 2011: 3; Pinder and Simon 2007: 6). So it has difficulties to explain the phenomena where states voluntarily hand over part of their sovereignty to an international organization in an irreversible manner (Heinonen 2006: 62). Furthermore these assumptions have minimized the theory s relevance even though later theories have not replaced or subsumed the validity of neorealism, which have continued to develop in recent years and remain more or less viable as theories of European integration and EU politics.

15 91 Functionalism Functionalism and neofunctionalism are considered as the progenitors in the field of regional integration. Functionalism is believed to represent the theoretical impulse that preceded the drive to European integration. David Mitrany, the father of functionalism published his famous work on the theory of functionalism A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization in 1943, which underpinned the ideas of Jean Monnet s and Robert Schuman on European integration (Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). Mitrany warned against the logic of territorial organization at the regional level and projected a universal rather than a regional solution to collective problem that should weld together the common interest of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each (Choi and James 2002: 482). The successful creation of ECSC in 1952 and EEC or Common Market in 1956 spurred the interest in David Mitrany s functionalist theory and integration because EEC seemed to hold out the promise for eventual political integration of Western Europe. Moreover Mitrany held that economic unification would contribute to the development of political integration as international integration based on cooperation in functional plus non political areas developed, the chances for international peace would be enhanced (Viotti and Mark 1987: 207). Functionalism defied the state-centric worldview and was anxious that whether nation-states are the optimal form of an organization to fulfil human needs. Though, according to functionalist reasoning the most significant objective was not international integration as such, they somewhat believe in the motto of form follows function. They proposed to establish flexible task-oriented international organizations because human needs change over time as well as vary across space and the design of institutional solutions had to be open-minded. This could better accomplish human needs than nation-states and at the same time, the probability of international conflict would be considerably reduced. Charles Pentland generally defined integration as 'the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor'. Functionalists accepted this definition by taking nation-states as original actors and the new actor needed not to be a state in the

16 92 same sense (Heinonen 2006: 55). Functionalism presumed that the absolute existence of a mismatch between the territorial scale of human problems and of political authority brings forth pressures for jurisdictional reform. And regional integration is a response to the collective benefits of extending the territorial scope of jurisdictions, albeit the divergence between collective welfare and the structure of authority does not speak for itself. But Mitrany thought that the welfare benefits of supranationalism would propel reform (Hooghe and Gary 2008: 3). Functionalism has been criticized on the grounds that it is too naive, paying no attention to the political side of arranging international functional organizations and having a poor record of prediction (Heinonen 2006: 55). Anyway functionalism is still important today not as a separate research programme but as an influential one on other theories. It permits a strong autonomous role for international institutions and provides a space for domestic actors to influence regional organizations as well as policies directly. Also it provides a rival to realist explanations. In addition its messages has been absorbed into theories of institutions as well as theories of preference formation which are based on asset ownership, leading sectors and the distribution of economic capabilities (Choi and James 2002: 486). Neofunctionalism Neofunctionalism has been regarded as the foremost integration model of European integration which stemmed from functionalism. Ernst Haas, founding father of neofunctionalism in 1958 through his book The Uniting of Europe elaborated the theory of neofunctionalism for the first time. It was a theoretically oriented case study on the ECSC and further elaborated the theory in his 1964 work Beyond the Nation-State (Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). His new vision focused specifically upon the regional integration project in Europe. Neofunctionalism has been looked upon as a composite theory with three components such as background conditions, process conditions and conditions that are likely to encourage or discourage task expansion. The background conditions observed that integration was most likely to emerge first among countries with a certain type of

17 93 domestic environment; for instance, liberal democratic countries with advanced capitalist economies, differentiated social structures and highly pluralistic interest group structures. The process condition implicates solid networks of economic exchange, trade, labour migrations, tourism and free flows of productive factors. The third phase involves spill over in which once integration begins in initial settings, there are prospects for expanding cooperative habits into other areas. This process of task expansion is labelled as spill over that could be purely functional with linkages among different sectors serving as the transmission belts of integration (Choi and James 2002: 485). Neofunctionalism has been viewed as the most insightful and helpful reflexive theory that has been developed and refined over time in understanding European integration s underlying dynamics. It espouses a transformative ontology where it is assumed that both the actors and the games that they play will change significantly during the integration process (McGowan 2007: 3). Neo-functionalism explained the process of integration as a set of functional (i.e. economic) spill overs, leading to economic and political integration, with actors transferring their expectations, and loyalties to a supranational central authority. Important elements in the theory included the role of political actors (national and supranational), and the transfer of expectations to a supranational institution that would be expected to meet the demands of actors and economic agents (Farrell 2005: 7). The process of spill over is the prominent feature most closely associated with the neofunctionalist approach to the study of European integration plus a significant advance upon functionalism. In Haas formulation spill over refers to a situation where 'policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded' (Falkner 2011: 6). Another milestone in the history of neofunctionlism was Leon Lindberg's The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration of According to Lindberg spill-over refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth (Laursen 2008: 4).

18 94 Neofunctionalism perches on two inter-related claims. The first maintains that integration happens when organized economic interests pressure governments to manage economic interdependence by centralising policies and creating common institutions. In this background neofunctionalists identified economic transactions and welfare needs as the real source pushing positive inter-state co-operation and common endeavours. The second core argument emphasizes that any initial decisions to integrate in the above fashion produces, and unintentionally, both economic and political spill overs that push regional integration forward (Frankel 1973: 55). Haas offered an analysis of the process and progression of European integration through supranationality, sub-national actors and spill over. Spill over takes place on account of the impact it has on differentiated actors, including multinationals, interest groupings, the Commission and national organizations. These actors form alliances to enhance EU decision-making in new sectors and increase integration in sectors where agreements have already been attained. In most cases spill over is the result of past policies created by Member States and remains central to the integration process and continues to make crucial policy decisions in the EU (Howell 1998). The general reproach against this school of thinking is that it is deficient in a deeper understanding of the important role of EU level processes and institutions beyond the Council as a result the governments power is overrated, at least for day-today politics of the EU which in turn tends to be underrated vis-à-vis the grand bargains. In addition it has come to mean different things to different people so its successors held increasingly ad hoc reformulations, internal disagreements, and very selective and narrow interpretations. But later on neofunctionalism failed to identify the causal relationships between economic and political integration and between social values and political behaviour (Falkner 2011: 6-7). Intergovernmentalism The intergovernmentalist school of integration theory emerged with Stanley Hoffmann s claim that the nation-state is far from being obsolete and has proven to be obstinate (Pollack 2011: 12). Through his intergovernmentalist approach, he underlined

19 95 the importance of national governments and their roles in shaping the EC s structure. He emphasized that national governments would always endorse their interests within a broader system (Lelieveldt and Sebastiaan 2011: 35). Intergovernmentalism comprehends that states are basic actors in the integration process and regional organizations are mere facilitators or agents carrying out the collective will of the national governments. Again it implies that the member states are more authoritative to the union than the EU institutions themselves, since no autonomous power is assigned to these institutions (Miles 1995: 4). In this state-centric outlook, states act together to realize common objectives and the will of the states are expressed through national governments. Besides states are considered as centres of identity and are independent to decide on major internal as well as external issues. In this situation no outside decisions can be thrust upon them and no organization including regional organization can replace the states. Therefore, intergovernmentalists argue that regional organization could have forward march only if states consent it for common benefit indicating the centrality of states in the integration process (Amin 2010: 1071). When intergovernmentalism is applied to European integration, it explains the direction and pace of the integration process mainly by reference to decisions and actions taken by the governments of the European states. In addition there is an appreciation that other actors, both within and beyond states, can exercise some influence on developments that may not be crucial and influential. This focus on states and their own distinctive national interests which they vigorously defend, especially in the spheres of high politics such as foreign policy, security and defence resulted in intergovernmentalists tending to emphasize on the logic of diversity rather than on the logic of integration as Hoffmann put across years before (Nugent 2003: 482; Fabbrini 2012: 13). In the observation of intergovernmentalists like Paul Taylor, the few decisive political agreements of the 1970s such as the formation of the European Council in 1974 and the creation of the European Monetary System in 1979 had actually taken the Community back to a traditional intergovernmentalist style of decision-making because

20 96 these agreements retained the national veto and minimized the role of supranational actors like the Commission (Pollack 2011: 12). According to Hoffmann, the transnational logic of integration had not replaced nation states and national interests in Europe, even if the first years of integration had been promising. Instead he drew attention to the significance of national interests in European politics and integration. His views rest on the perceptions that states are basic units of the international system and their main objective is to promote their national interests. Intergovernmentalism put the state at the centre of integration process and no longer considered the integration as a process with its own logic, but viewed it as a process that member states tried to control according to their own interests. (Heinonen 2006: 61). Intergovernmentalism undermines the nuances involved in the integration process and treats regional integration exclusively as state directed one. This denial to admit the role and significance of other actors influencing integration process as well as failure to look at organizations like EU from a discourse distinct from state versus supranational and as a new entity constitute a clear limitation of intergovenmentalism. Moreover EU possesses its own identity and the activities of its central institutions nowadays influence the policies of the member states to a significant level (Amin 2010: 1074). Intergovernmentalist theorists reasserted the primacy of the nation-state within EU institutions especially when the EC seemed to run into trouble in the 1960s. For a second time this approach has given further impulse in the 1990s by the liberal intergovernmentalism of Andrew Moravcsik, which remains influential even as other scholars have attempted to build more complex institutional models on the core assumptions of earlier theories (Pollack 2011: 1). Liberal Intergovernmentalism The founder and prominent exponent of liberal intergovernmental view of regional integration is Andrew Moravcsik. In his 1993 work Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach, he outlined the major aspects of liberal intergovernmentalism (Choi and James 2002: 488). Liberal

21 97 intergovernmentalism has obtained the status of a baseline theory in the study of regional integration and an essential first cut explanation against which other theories are often compared. The first characteristic makes it a baseline theory is that: it has founded on broader social science theory and draws up insights from traditional schools in European integration studies that treat the European integration as a unique or sui generic activity. Secondly, it is a grand theory that tries to find the broad evolution of regional integration by linking together multiple theories and factors into a single coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of integration over time. Thirdly, it is parsimonious due to its simplicity and multi-causal explanation. It deliberately seeks to simplify EU politics via stressing the essential but excluding certain secondary activities. At the same time it elucidates integration with a minimum of three theories, arrayed in a multistage model- one each of preferences, bargaining and institutions. These characteristics make it a successful theory to an extent (Moravcsik and Frank 2009: 66-67). The three step model of Moravcsik s liberal intergovernmentalism combines (1) a liberal theory of national preference formation with (2) an intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining and (3) a credible commitments model of institutional choice. In the book The Choice for Europe of 1998, he addressed this model by investigating the evolution of the EU from 1955 to 1992, from Messina to Maastricht (Pollack 2011: 14; Moravcsik and Frank 2009: 68). In the first stage of the model, national heads of government aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies as well as their own interests, and articulate their respective national preferences toward the EU. Hence, national preferences are complex, reflecting the distinctive economics, parties, and institutions of each member state, and they are determined domestically, not shaped by participation in the EU. In this circumstance, Moravcsik argues in substantive terms that national preferences are driven by issue-specific and generally economic interests, with at best a secondary role for geopolitical interests or ideology. In the second phase of bargaining, national governments fetch their preferences to the bargaining table in Brussels, where agreements reflect the relative power of each member state, and where

22 98 supranational organizations such as the Commission exert little or no influence. At last in the third stage, Moravcsik puts forward a rational choice theory of institutional choice, arguing that EU member states adopt particular institutions such as Council, Commission and the Court in order to increase the credibility of their mutual commitments as pooling and delegating sovereignty through international organizations allows states to commit themselves credibly to their mutual promises (Pollack 2011: 14). Liberal intergovernmentalism comprises of two components: a liberal theory of how economic interdependence influences national interests, and an intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation. In the first component it believes that national governments are not the only important decision makers in the EU and the Commission of the European Communities as well as the European Parliament also plays important legislative roles. It is only by evaluating the results of institutional rules on the interactions among these institutions that one can understand the policies that are produced every day in the EU and thus the nature of the integration processes itself. In the second component it perceives that the governments as the sole crucial decision makers in the process of European integration. The outcomes reflect their interests, and there is a great danger that non-decision or clearly sub-optimal policies evolve a situation of joint decision trap (Falkner 2011: 7, 20; Heinonen 2006: 64-65). The main achievement of Liberal Intergovernmentalism lies in the apparent accuracy of the substantive assumptions and empirical predictions it advances about European politics (Moravcsik and Frank 2009: 68). It is more sophisticated than previous theories but ignores the timing of certain decisions. For instance, the identification of the national preferences of the main countries at the time of the grand bargains is made retroactive. And the theory fails to say something about why and when a new one should occur. Another shortcoming of liberal intergovernmentalism is the reduction of the relevant actors to the most powerful member states (Castaldi 2007: 22).

23 99 Transactionalism/Communication Transactionalism is firmly associated with the works of Karl Deutsch, who was a leading researcher on the theory. His pioneering work on transactionalism produced the landmark publication of Political Community at the International Level in In this book, he argued that international community can be ascertained and measured through the volume, content and scope of international transactions between its hypothesized members (Frankel 1973: 53). His subsequent empirical work on transactionalism in 1957 which resulted in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area validated his thesis. Its theorizing was not based on any particular historical experience or occurrence; instead it tried to draw its reasoning from an extensive body of historical evidence. So it has more scientific rigour than any other classical models of political integration (Tooze 1978: 229). Integration in transactionalism denoted foremost the creation of security communities. For Deutsch, integration is the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its populations. He has concentrated upon the formation of security communities to terminate war as social institution. Therefore a security-community is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways. Thus, integration means the establishment of a securitycommunity (George 1997: 178). Deutsch differentiated two types of security communities: the so-called amalgamated and pluralistic. In amalgamation, integration had more or less the same meaning as in other integration models. So it was a merger of two independent units into a single larger unit, which would have a common government after amalgamation. In pluralistic security communities, its constituent parts retained their independence. However they were able to establish a security community, of which the Nordic countries are a leading example. The desirability of pluralistic security communities came up from the fact that they were easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts (Deutsch 2000: ). Deutsch and his group pointed out

24 100 five essential requirements so as to enable the establishment of a security community: 1) the compatibility of the main values 2) social communication between integrating units 3) mobility of persons between participating units 4) multiplicity and balance of transactions 5) mutual predictability of behaviour. From the above formulations, one can easily conclude that transactions and communications were important in the achievement of a security community (Heinonen 2006: 52-53). The state system is an actuality in the present international system. Simultaneously transactional flows are a visible phenomenon in international life. Transactionalists recognize that the state system cannot be abolished so easily while other approaches try to dismantle the state system. This approach made an effort to elucidate how such an unavoidable development can be channelled towards the creation of peace and security in the relations among states. In other words, if the state system cannot be abolished, then the only way to deal with the situation is to accept it as a fact and work with developments over time. And it is assumed that a rise in the flow of transactions can bring states closer and reduce the rivalry among them (George 1997: 194). Deutsch s socio-causal paradigm of political integration holds that political integration cannot occur until a process of social assimilation creates a homogeneous transnational population. In order to illustrate the levels of political integration in Western Europe, he argues that it needs only examine the data relating to the levels of social homogeneity which characterize that region. For the purpose of measuring the extent of social assimilation in Western Europe Deutsch examined the transaction flow rates of trade, mail, travel, migration, and student exchange data and studies the responses of mass and elite population samples to a complex series of survey questions. These analysis of varied data leads to conclude that the levels of social assimilation in Western Europe have i) remained constant for the past decade and 2) are too low to permit institutional political integration to occur (Fisher 1969: ; Sullivan 2001: ).

25 101 Donald J. Puchala brought a balanced judgment upon the relevance of international transactions for regional integration (Frankel 1973: 62) through polishing and widening the analysis by isolating indicative channels and patterns of political transaction (Tooze 1978: 224). He observed that transaction flows indices are restricted to available quantitative data therefore they exclude many transactions which are not readily quantified such as informal political consultation and coordination carried out between national governments. Besides, the transaction flows themselves are but a reflection of integration rather than a cause of it. Thus they are useful to monitor the progress of integration in various fields, but not particularly reliable for predicting future systemic behaviour. Nevertheless, Puchala s own findings indicate that since the formation of EEC in 1958 the convergence in attitudes and a modest rise in transactions have continued, and that European integration has not stagnated (Hodges 1978: ). Deutsch has contended that since the mid-1950s the structural or institutional, political integration of Western Europe has come to a halt that means the halt of political integration in Western Europe is the ending of any trend towards the development or the expansion of the authority of supranational institutions to make major policy decisions. So, political decisions will continue to be made by sovereign nation states and not by any supranational European institutions. Deutsch did not make any conscious endeavours to directly measure the decision making capability of any Western European supranational institution even if institutional political integration is the central variable in his analysis (Fisher 1969: 254). Transactionalism and the foundation of security communities still remain fundamental in the field of integration theory because European states have succeeded in the establishment of a security community and cooperation within the EU which has consolidated the means of peaceful cooperation (Sullivan 2001: 150). Federalism Federalism is a political ideology which supports the foundation of a political life on such a model and it can also be applied to regional integration. Federalism has the tendency to act as a political project as well as an academic approach to regional

26 102 integration. It has played an important part in the thinking of pan-european and resistance movements before and during the Second World War. The first initiative to start an integration process after the War was made by the federalists that led to the formation of Council of Europe (Heinonen 2006: 51). In the European integration process, federalism usually refers to the idea of taking the process of integration forward and increases the powers of the European Union. On the other hand, in federalism the division between central and regional authority can also be found from the principle of subsidiarity (Hodges 1978: 241). Federalists identified the crucial role of national governments and political considerations in the European integration process. They accept the possibility of European institutions to play a specific role in the process including in the European Parliament. The federalists have a political goal and organization which forces them to continuously develop their analytical tools to make a realistic assessment of the integration process in order to try to direct it towards their goal (Castaldi 2007: 4). Two starting points can be differentiated in federalist discourses. The first foresee that progress and peace are the outcomes of the interaction of peoples. The second predicts that stability and harmony will be the upshot of enlightened constitutional design. These two starting points lead to a clearly defined supranational state and federalists are likely to view statehood as a desirable or inevitable mode of governance. The endeavour is to achieve balance between rival levels of authority as well as efficiency and democracy on the other. In the course of constitutional means multiple sovereignties are achieved by the devolution of authority in certain selected policy domains (Tirkos 2010: 40). Federalism engages in a multiplicity of established human beliefs and practices at different levels both within and beyond traditional state boundaries. Yet again it is regarded as a pact deriving from trust and implying an agreement that is freely and mutually consented to, whereby each party surrenders a degree of autonomy in exchange for some compensating advantage. Larry Siedentop, in his Democracy in Europe published in 2000 speaks out that in principle, federalism should offer a means of combining the advantages of different scales of political organization offering small