CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY
|
|
- Godwin Harrington
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY ERIC M. USLANER* Introduction Corruption flouts rules of fairness and gives some people advantages that others do not have. Corruption transfers resources from the mass public to the elites and generally from the poor to the rich (Tanzi 1998). It acts as an extra tax on citizens, leaving less money for public expenditures. Corrupt governments have less money to spend on their own projects, pushing down the salaries of public employees. In turn, these lower-level staffers will be more likely to extort funds from the public purse. Government employees in corrupt societies will thus spend more time lining their own pockets than serving the public. Corruption thus leads to lower levels of economic growth and to ineffective government (Mauro 1997; 5, 7). Most accounts of the roots and remedies for corruption are institutional. Corruption, most academic and policy analysts argue, stems from bad governmental institutions especially the lack of democracy, free and unfair elections, and an ineffective judiciary. I argue that institutional accounts of the roots and the solutions to corruption are lacking (Uslaner 2008). In an extensive six-equation model of corruption across a wide range of societies, I find little support for institutional accounts of corruption. Corruption is not shaped by democracy, the structure of a country s electoral system, whether government is centralized or decentralized (measured by federalism) or by the share of a country s government expenditures spent at the local or national level. *University of Maryland College Park. Inequality and corruption The link between inequality and corruption seems compelling. Corruption is exploitive. Inequality breeds corruption by: (1) leading ordinary citizens to see the system as stacked against them (Uslaner 2002, ); (2) creating a sense of dependency among ordinary citizens and a sense of pessimism for the future, which in turn undermines the moral dictates of treating neighbors honestly; and (3) distorting the key institutions of fairness in society, the courts, which ordinary citizens see as their protectors against evil-doers, especially those with more influence than they have (Glaeser, Scheinkman and Schleifer 2003; You and Khagram 2005). Economic inequality creates political leaders who make patronage a virtue rather than a vice, since it provides jobs for ordinary citizens. These leaders help their constituents, but more critically they help themselves. Inequality breeds corruption and leads to a dependency of the poor on the political leaders. Inequality leads to clientelism leaders establish themselves as monopoly providers of benefits for average citizens. Ordinary people do not approve of corruption: Those at the bottom of the economic (and often social) ladder see it as necessary for survival. Corrupt leaders form the key line of defense against other groups in society that exploit you. The inequality trap Inequality thrives when there is low trust in out-groups and high trust in your own group, as Gambetta (1993) argues with respect to the success of the Mafia in southern Italy, widely known for low trust among its citizens (Banfield 1958). Unequal relations between groups in society whether they are economic, religious, racial, or some combination reinforce ties to your in-group. High levels of inequality are the single major factor driving down trust in people who are different from yourself (generalized trust), as Uslaner (2002, chs. 6, 8) and Uslaner and Brown (2005) have shown in several different contexts: in the United States over time, across the American states and across countries without a legacy of Communism. CESifo DICE Report 2/
2 Generalized trust has many positive consequences: at the individual level, it leads to more acts of altruism for people of different backgrounds as well as greater tolerance. At the aggregate level, it leads to greater economic growth, to more redistribution from the rich to the poor and to less corruption (Uslaner 2002, chs. 7, 8; Uslaner 2008). Across countries, the correlation between inequality and corruption is weak. But there is strong support for the argument that inequality leads to greater corruption through trust. My model suggests the following dynamic of a vicious circle that makes it difficult to end corruption: inequality low trust corruption more inequality. Corruption not only thrives under conditions of high inequality and low trust, but in turn it leads to more inequality (and thus less trust). For many countries, the trap is inescapable. Corruption aggravates inequality: The well-off can afford bribes, but the poor often do without basic services. And corruption robs the state of resources for providing basic services to all citizens, but especially the poor. People who turn to the informal economy have few legal rights (their employment is not legal and there are no contracts or unions representing workers in the informal sector). Corruption is rampant in those services the poor most depend upon: the police, the schools and the medical sector. Countries with high levels of corruption have poor service delivery. The failure of corrupt states with rising inequality to provide basic services illustrates the inequality trap: the wealthy have options to protect themselves against the failure of public services. They may bribe local authorities to ensure that their services are fixed first. They may not have to rely exclusively upon state-provided services. The poor cannot afford bribes. Nor do they have the option of using alternative services. When governments do not have the resources to provide services, the poor will suffer more. In the former Communist countries of central and eastern Europe there are strong statistical linkages between levels of inequality, corruption, and the perceived quality of service delivery. Poor service delivery in turn leads to lower levels of trust in government which then leads to greater tax evasion and fewer resources in the treasury to fund basic services (Hanousek and Palda 2007; Uslaner 2010; Uslaner in press). Inequality, trust and corruption form a vicious circle that is very difficult to break. Inequality, trust and corruption are all sticky. They do not change much over time, so that countries that were unequal (low trusting, corrupt) in the past remain so today. The correlations over time for trust (from 1980 to 1995), economic inequality (1963 to 1996 for one measure and for another), and corruption (1980/85 to 2010) are all very powerful, providing strong support for the inequality trap argument. I estimated a crossnational aggregate statistical model allowing for reciprocal effects of inequality upon corruption, trust upon corruption and inequality upon trust and found very strong evidence in favor of the inequality trap argument (Uslaner 2008, chs. 2, 4). What about institutions? Social scientists do not have the luxury of laboratory experiments the way physical and natural scientists do, so we largely have to rely upon cross-sectional models. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s we had a rare opportunity to observe a natural experiment, as Communist governments fell in central and eastern Europe as well as Asia and democratic governments emerged in many other parts of the world as well. Either cross-sectionally or especially over time, the relationships between democracy and corruption are very weak. Most notably, the correlations between changes in the Freedom House measures of democracy (political and civil rights indicators) and changes in the Transparency International indicator of corruption from 1980 to 2004 are essentially zero. Moving the start date closer to the fall of Communism 1988 does nothing to change these correlations. Greater democratization simply does not mean less corruption. Not only does democracy not matter, but almost all other institutional causes of corruption fall to statistical insignificance in my model: parliamentary systems, type of electoral list, the type of executive, the level of pay to government workers, and centralization of government. Nor does a free press act as a bulwark against corruption: many people are likely to see the press as just one more competitor for power with corrupt leaders not necessarily any more moral. There is one institutional factor that has a big impact on corruption: the fairness of the legal system. This is an institutional measure of inequality: whether the courts and the police treat people of different backgrounds and incomes as equals before the law. It is not the same as a measure of judicial quality or the number of courts or how efficient they are. What matters for the courts is the perception that they are fair (Tyler 1990). 21 CESifo DICE Report 2/2011
3 Democratization seemed to promise a new era for people in transition countries in particular. Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbs and others in central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet states in Asia saw the emergence of market democracy as their ticket to prosperity, to making their countries just like Luxembourg. But the reality was very different: in virtually every transition country, inequality, the size of the informal sector, and corruption increased while trust remained low. Democracy and the market were not cure-alls. Newly enfranchised voters cast their ballots for corrupt leaders (as Americans did for many years and people in many other countries. Advanced democracies such as Italy and Japan as well as Third World nations still do. Markets were often dominated by the old oligarchs of the Communist regimes who continued to pillage the country under capitalism as they had done under socialism. Arrests of corrupt business people such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Russia were political vendettas more than they were drives toward greater transparency. Inequality and corruption: the direct links The inequality trap argument would be more compelling if there were some evidence that there is a direct linkage from inequality to trust rather than simply an indirect one. Where corruption is high (in Africa and central and eastern Europe), there is strong evidence for such a direct linkage in public attitudes. Where corruption is low (the Nordic countries, the United States and Singapore), people do not see a direct tie between corruption and inequality (Uslaner 2008, chs. 4, 5, 6, 7). Inequality is a persistent problem in Africa. Williams (1987, 130) argues, In the conditions of underdevelopment, with their attendant shortages and paucity of resources, corruption tends mostly to accentuate and aggravate the political and economic inequalities which have characterized so may African states for so long. While historically low in transition countries, inequality rose sharply after the fall of Communism. In transition countries, most people believe that the only way you can become rich is by being dishonest. In the 1999 International Social Survey Programme, 51.8 percent of the respondents in the nine transition countries surveyed believed that to get to the top, you must be corrupt compared to 28.3 percent on average in the other 18 countries (mostly Western democracies). Former Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin said of corruption: There is a small group of people getting rich and I mean really rich in Kazakhstan while the rest of society remains really poor. The leadership is not interested in pushing a market economy. They keep two sets of books, one for themselves and another for everyone else (Stodghill 2006, BU9). Using data from the Afrobarometer and surveys from the World Bank, the government of Estonia, and a Romanian colleague, I show that: (1) the public is far more likely to see high levels of corruption than are elites; (2) people see a clear link between both economic and legal inequality, on the one hand, and corruption on the other hand; and (3) grand corruption, but not petty corruption, leads to lower levels of trust. Grand corruption involves extending the advantages of those already well endowed. Petty corruption does not affect how people judge each other. Small bribes to see the doctor earlier, to get out of a traffic offense, to obtain a permit or a public service, or even to get a good grade from university professors do not enrich the recipients. They may reap enough to take their spouse out to dinner, but not to own mansions in Europe or to have hefty bank accounts in Switzerland or the Cayman Islands. Petty corruption may even be seen as rational bargains for the average citizen: it may well be worth your while to Figure Pickpocketing frequency (ICVS) 1.0 UA CN BG RS SK TN 0.8 GE EG CO LV HU BY BR RU UG RO PL LT AR ZA IT IN 0.6 ID PH HR CR CZ BW PICKPOCKETING AND CORRUPTION CA NZ r 2 = N = a) West Germany TI corruption perceptions index 2005 Source: International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) and Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International (IT). SI EE PT ES BE JP US FR AT DE a) NL AU UK NO DK CH SE FI CESifo DICE Report 2/
4 pay a small bribe rather than to spend a day in court or wait hours at the doctor s office. The political boss George Washington Plunkitt in nineteenth-century New York City distinguished between honest graft and dishonest graft (Riordan 1948). Grand corruption, not small bribes, upsets people and leads to lower levels of trust in fellow citizens. I obtained similar results using different surveys in Romania and Africa (Uslaner 2008, chs. 5 and 8). A 2008 cable from the American Embassy in Tunis to the State Department in Washington, made public by WikiLeaks and entitled, What s Yours Is Mine, found the same dynamic underlying the unrest that ultimately toppled the government of Tunisia: Although the petty corruption rankles, it is the excesses of President (Zine el- Abidine) Ben Ali s family that inspire outrage among Tunisians (Shane 2011). Grand corruption reinforces the argument of the (late) comedian George Carlin that honesty is the second best policy. A corrupt political culture goes hand-in-hand with other economic crimes but not crimes of violence. Notably, there is a powerful correlation between the level of corruption in a society and the frequency of pickpocketing (Uslaner 2008, ch. 3; see Figure 1). Where corruption is relatively low, people do not see a direct connection among inequality, trust and corruption. Using surveys from the Nordic countries (the World Values Survey 1995), the American National Election Study (2004), the General Social Survey in the United States (1987) and the Asian Barometer 2004 for Singapore, I find no relationship between perceptions of inequality or social trust and corruption. And this is exactly how it should be. Low corruption was not born with American independence. Stories of malfeasance were common, especially in large cities and the South, in the United States and it reflected high levels of inequality. Using data on historical inequality in the United States from Emmanuel Saez and Claudia Goldin s time series estimates (with Edward Glaeser) of corruption from press reports, I find that inequality explains 45 percent of the variance in inequality over 59 years ( ). Is there a way out of the inequality trap? Most countries that are highly unequal, with low trust and corruption remain so. But not all do so. There are at least three exceptions: Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana three places that do not immediately come to mind as having much in common. But all three conquered corruption and two (Singapore and Hong Kong) are not democracies. How did they do it? Of course, each had strong anticorruption commissions. Hong Kong s and Singapore s commissions are widely known. But Nigeria has had many anti-corruption commissions, and most people see these commissions as facilitators, not obstacles, to corruption. The common elements in the struggles against corruption in Singapore, Hong Kong and Botswana are: Small size, so that it is easier to monitor corruption. Relative wealth, so that conquering corruption was less costly. More critically, government policies designed to engage the public in the anti-corruption campaign, from lessons in morality in elementary school, to mass campaigns to report illegal acts and, especially, government programs to enhance the welfare of ordinary people all aimed at reducing inequality, so that the public felt little need to support corrupt leaders. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all three places faced external threats: Botswana was surrounded by South Africa and (then-called) Rhodesia. Singapore and Hong Kong faced threats to their economic and political systems by radical unions supported by China. Their leaders may have seemed enlightened, but enlightenment is easier when the survival of your regime is at stake. To gain the support of their publics against their opposition, the leaders had to make the lives of their citizens better. To do so, they needed to increase public welfare and to make the investment climate stronger. Singapore and Hong Kong became rich (and Botswana relatively well-off) by being honest and improving the lives of their citizens. The way out of the inequality trap, then, is to free ordinary people from having to depend upon corrupt leaders for their livelihood. Universalistic social welfare programs, as practiced in the Nordic countries, are the most likely to reduce inequality and make the lives of all citizens better as well as to increase social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). And the universal social welfare program that works best to reduce inequality is universal free public education. The biggest successes in the fight against corruption throughout history from the Nordic countries to the United States and South Korea 23 CESifo DICE Report 2/2011
5 have occurred in countries that have adopted universal public education (Uslaner 2008, ch. 9). This is a daunting task for at least two reasons. First, when people see the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, they are more likely to demand redistributive social welfare programs rather than universalistic policies. If the rich get rich by being corrupt, why should they or their children share in the bounty of programs Rothstein and I have called all for all? Second, universal public education is extremely expensive. Wherever I talk about this remedy, policy-makers and academics alike shake their heads and say that their (poor) country simply cannot afford it. I ask them how long they can afford high levels of corruption. Williams, R. (1987), Political Corruption in Africa, Gower Publishing, Aldershot, UK. You, J. and S. Khagram (2005), A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption, American Sociological Review 70 (February), References Banfield, E. (1958), The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Free Press, New York. Gambetta, D. (1993), The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Glaeser, E. L., J. Scheinkman and A. Shleifer (2003), The Injustice of Inequality, Journal of Monetary Economics 50, Hanousek, J. and F. Palda (2006), Quality of Government Services and the Civic Duty to Pay Taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other Transition Countries, in N. Hayoz and S. Hug, eds., Trust, Institutions, and State Capacities: A Comparative Study, Peter Lang AG, Bern, Switzerland, Mauro, P. (1997), Why Worry About Corruption? Washington: International Monetary Fund. Riordan, W. (1948), Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.. Rothstein, B. and E. M. Uslaner (2005), All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust, World Politics 58, Shane, S. (2011), Cables from American Diplomats Portray U.S. Ambivalence on Tunisia, New York Times, January 11, 1&scp=5&sq=corruption%20tunisia&st=cse (accessed January 24, 2011). Stodghill, R. (2006), Oil, Cash, and Corruption: How Influence Flowed Through Political Pipeline, New York Times, Washington edition (November 5), BU1, BU8 BU9. Tanzi, V. (1998), Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures, IMF Staff Papers 45, Tyler, T. (1990), Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press, New Haven. Uslaner, E. M. (2002), The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press, New York. Uslaner, E. M. (2008), Corruption, Inequality, and the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, New York. Uslaner, E. M. (2010), Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Social Contract in Transition, in J. Alm, J. Martinez-Vazquez and B. Torgler, eds., Developing Alternative Frameworks for Explaining Compliance, Routledge, London, Uslaner, E. M., The Inequality Trap and Trust in Government, in M. Hooghe and S. Zmerli, eds., Political Trust: Why Context Matters. Causes and Consequences of a Relational Concept, ECPR Press, Essex, UK, in press. Uslaner, E. M. and M. Brown (2005), Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement, American Politics Research 31, CESifo DICE Report 2/
Consumer Barometer Study 2017
Consumer Barometer Study 2017 The Year of the Mobile Majority As reported mobile internet usage crosses 50% 2 for the first time in all 63 countries covered by the Consumer Barometer Study 1, we look at
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 470. Summary. Corruption
Corruption Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not represent
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 354. Entrepreneurship COUNTRY REPORT GREECE
Flash Eurobarometer 354 Entrepreneurship COUNTRY REPORT GREECE Fieldwork: June 2012 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry and co-ordinated
More informationENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE EU AND BEYOND
Flash Eurobarometer 354 ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE EU AND BEYOND COUNTRY REPORT GERMANY Fieldwork: June 2012 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry
More informationEU Coalition Explorer
Coalition Explorer Results of the 28 Survey on coalition building in the European Union an initiative of Results for ECFR May 2017 Design Findings Chapters Preferences Influence Partners Findings Coalition
More informationINTERNATIONAL KEY FINDINGS
17 5 45 INTERNATIONAL KEY FINDINGS 8 4 WWW.MIPEX.EU Key findings 00 nearly 20 million residents (or 4) are noneu citizens The loweducated make up 37 of workingage noneu immigrants in EU Employment rates
More informationEU Coalition Explorer
Coalition Explorer Results of the 28 Survey on coalition building in the European Union an initiative of Results for ECFR May 2017 Design Findings Chapters Preferences Influence Partners Findings Coalition
More informationEU Coalition Explorer
Coalition Explorer Results of the 28 Survey on coalition building in the European Union an initiative of Results for ECFR May 2017 Design Findings Chapters Preferences Influence Partners Findings Coalition
More informationEU Coalition Explorer
Coalition Explorer Results of the 28 Survey on coalition building in the European Union an initiative of Results for ECFR May 2017 Design Findings Chapters Preferences Influence Partners Findings Coalition
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 455
EU Citizens views on development, cooperation and November December 2016 Survey conducted by TNS opinion & social at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-General for International Cooperation
More informationENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE EU AND BEYOND
Flash Eurobarometer 354 ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE EU AND BEYOND COUNTRY REPORT JAPAN Fieldwork: July 2012 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 431. Summary. Electoral Rights
Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not represent the point of view
More informationHB010: Year of the survey
F4: Quality of life HB010: Year of the survey Year (four digits) Flags 2018 Operation 158 F4: Quality of life HB020: Country Reference period Constant Mode of collection Frame BE Belgique/Belgïe BG Bulgaria
More informationData Protection in the European Union. Data controllers perceptions. Analytical Report
Gallup Flash Eurobarometer N o 189a EU communication and the citizens Flash Eurobarometer European Commission Data Protection in the European Union Data controllers perceptions Analytical Report Fieldwork:
More informationEuropean Parliament Flash Eurobarometer FIRST RESULTS Focus on EE19 Lead Candidate Process and EP Media Recall
European Parliament Flash Eurobarometer FIRST RESULTS Focus on EE19 Lead Candidate Process and EP Media Recall STUDY - Public Opinion Monitoring Series Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the European
More informationSeptember 2012 Euro area unemployment rate at 11.6% EU27 at 10.6%
STAT/12/155 31 October 2012 September 2012 Euro area unemployment rate at 11.6% at.6% The euro area 1 (EA17) seasonally-adjusted 2 unemployment rate 3 was 11.6% in September 2012, up from 11.5% in August
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 431. Report. Electoral Rights
Electoral Rights Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not represent
More informationA. The image of the European Union B. The image of the European Parliament... 10
Directorate General for Communication Direction C Relations with citizens PUBLIC OPINION MONITORING UNIT EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 2009 25/05/2009 Pre electoral survey First wave First results: European average
More informationThis document is available on the English-language website of the Banque de France
JUNE 7 This document is available on the English-language website of the www.banque-france.fr Countries ISO code Date of entry into the euro area Fixed euro conversion rates France FR //999.97 Germany
More informationINTERNATIONAL KEY FINDINGS
7 5 INTERNATIONAL KEY FINDINGS 8 4 WWW.MIPEX.EU nearly million residents (or 4) are noneu citizens The loweducated make up 7 of workingage noneu immigrants in EU Employment rates (aged 64) dropped 6 points
More informationThe Rights of the Child. Analytical report
Flash Eurobarometer 273 The Gallup Organisation Analytical Report Flash EB N o 251 Public attitudes and perceptions in the euro area Flash Eurobarometer European Commission The Rights of the Child Analytical
More information"Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU 2018"
"Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU 2018" Innovation, Productivity, Jobs and Inequality ERAC Workshop Brussels, 4 October 2017 DG RTD, Unit A4 Key messages More robust economic growth
More informationEUROPEANS ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECURITY
Special Eurobarometer 432 EUROPEANS ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECURITY REPORT Fieldwork: March 2015 Publication: April 2015 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration
More informationEuro area unemployment rate at 9.9% EU27 at 9.4%
STAT/11/76 April 2011 Euro area unemployment rate at 9.9% EU27 at 9.4% The euro area 1 (EA17) seasonally-adjusted 2 unemployment rate 3 was 9.9% in April 2011, unchanged compared with March 4. It was.2%
More informationINTERNAL SECURITY. Publication: November 2011
Special Eurobarometer 371 European Commission INTERNAL SECURITY REPORT Special Eurobarometer 371 / Wave TNS opinion & social Fieldwork: June 2011 Publication: November 2011 This survey has been requested
More informationPUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
Special Eurobarometer 419 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION SUMMARY Fieldwork: June 2014 Publication: October 2014 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General
More informationThe "Value" of Europe in the World of Global Value Chains. Signe Ratso Director DG Trade, European Commission
The "Value" of Europe in the World of Global Value Chains Signe Ratso Director DG Trade, European Commission Outline Europe's role in World Trade Changing Nature of World Trade Main factors of Competitiveness
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 461. Report. Designing Europe s future:
Designing Europe s future: Trust in institutions Globalisation Support for the euro, opinions about free trade and solidarity Fieldwork Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General
More informationThe European Emergency Number 112. Analytical report
Flash Eurobarometer 314 The Gallup Organization Gallup 2 Flash Eurobarometer N o 189a EU communication and the citizens Flash Eurobarometer European Commission The European Emergency Number 112 Analytical
More informationThe European emergency number 112
Flash Eurobarometer The European emergency number 112 REPORT Fieldwork: December 2011 Publication: February 2012 Flash Eurobarometer TNS political & social This survey has been requested by the Directorate-General
More informationAlternative views of the role of wages: contours of a European Minimum Wage
Alternative views of the role of wages: contours of a European Minimum Wage Europe at a crossroads which way to quality jobs and prosperity? ETUI-ETUC Conference Brussels, 24-26 September 2014 Dr. Torsten
More informationDirectorate General for Communication Direction C - Relations avec les citoyens PUBLIC OPINION MONITORING UNIT 27 March 2009
Directorate General for Communication Direction C - Relations avec les citoyens PUBLIC OPINION MONITORING UNIT 27 March 2009 EUROPEANS AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS Standard Eurobarometer (EB 71) Population:
More informationEU, December Without Prejudice
Disclaimer: The negotiations between the EU and Japan on the Economic Partnership Agreement (the EPA) have been finalised. In view of the Commission's transparency policy, we are hereby publishing the
More informationERGP REPORT ON CORE INDICATORS FOR MONITORING THE EUROPEAN POSTAL MARKET
ERGP (15) 27 Report on core indicators for monitoring the European postal market ERGP REPORT ON CORE INDICATORS FOR MONITORING THE EUROPEAN POSTAL MARKET 3 December 2015 CONTENTS 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 464b. Report
Europeans attitudes towards security Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document
More informationWomen in the EU. Fieldwork : February-March 2011 Publication: June Special Eurobarometer / Wave 75.1 TNS Opinion & Social EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Women in the EU Eurobaromètre Spécial / Vague 74.3 TNS Opinion & Social Fieldwork : February-March 2011 Publication: June 2011 Special Eurobarometer / Wave 75.1 TNS Opinion & Social
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 471. Summary
Fairness, inequality and intergenerational mobility Survey requested by the European Commission, Joint Research Centre and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 430. Summary. European Union Citizenship
European Union Citizenship Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 469. Report
Integration of immigrants in the European Union Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 469
Summary Integration of immigrants in the European Union Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication
More informationThe Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent Court. Dr. Leonard Werner-Jones
The Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent Court Dr. Leonard Werner-Jones Background The Past: No centralization at all Prosecution country-by-country Litigation country-by-country Patents actions 2 Background
More informationEUROBAROMETER The European Union today and tomorrow. Fieldwork: October - November 2008 Publication: June 2010
EUROBAROMETER 66 Standard Eurobarometer Report European Commission EUROBAROMETER 70 3. The European Union today and tomorrow Fieldwork: October - November 2008 Publication: June 2010 Standard Eurobarometer
More informationThe catching up process in CESEE countries
The catching up process in CESEE countries Gertude Tumpel-Gugerell Institutional quality and sustainable economic convergence 7th ECB conference on central, eastern and south eastern European (CESEE) countries
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 467. Report. Future of Europe. Social issues
Future of Europe Social issues Fieldwork Publication November 2017 Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication and co-ordinated by the Directorate- General for Communication
More informationGeographical mobility in the context of EU enlargement
Employment in Europe 2008 Chapter 3: Geographical mobility in the context of EU enlargement Contents Transitional arrangements on the free movement of workers How many have come and how many have left?
More informationSpecial Eurobarometer 428 GENDER EQUALITY SUMMARY
Special Eurobarometer 428 GENDER EQUALITY SUMMARY Fieldwork: November-December 2014 Publication: March 2015 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and
More informationConvergence in the EU: What role for industrial relations? Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead and Rosalia Vazquez, International Labour Office
Convergence in the EU: What role for industrial relations? Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead and Rosalia Vazquez, International Labour Office The goal of convergence as part of EU construction Economic integration
More informationEUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
Standard Eurobarometer 78 Autumn 2012 EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP REPORT Fieldwork: November 2012 This survey has been requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication.
More informationCITIZENS AWARENESS AND PERCEPTIONS OF EU REGIONAL POLICY
Flash Eurobarometer CITIZENS AWARENESS AND PERCEPTIONS OF EU REGIONAL POLICY REPORT Fieldwork: June 2015 Publication: September 2015 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General
More informationLABOUR MARKETS PERFORMANCE OF GRADUATES IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
LABOUR MARKETS PERFORMANCE OF GRADUATES IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE VIEW Dr Golo Henseke, UCL Institute of Education 2018 AlmaLaurea Conference Structural Changes, Graduates and Jobs, 11 th June 2018 www.researchcghe.org
More informationLooking Through the Crystal Ball: For Growth and Productivity, Can Central Europe be of Service?
Looking Through the Crystal Ball: For Growth and Productivity, Can Central Europe be of Service? ARUP BANERJI REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES THE WORLD BANK 6 th Annual NBP Conference
More informationEU DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Special Eurobarometer 405 EU DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT Fieldwork: May - June 2013 Publication: November 2013 This survey has been requested by the European Commission,
More informationEarnings, education and competences: can we reverse inequality? Daniele Checchi (University of Milan and LIS Luxemburg)
Earnings, education and competences: can we reverse inequality? Daniele Checchi (University of Milan and LIS Luxemburg) 1 Educational policies are often invoked as good instruments for reducing income
More informationData Protection in the European Union. Citizens perceptions. Analytical Report
Gallup Flash Eurobarometer N o 189a EU communication and the citizens Flash Eurobarometer European Commission Data Protection in the European Union Citizens perceptions Analytical Report Fieldwork: January
More informationConvergence: a narrative for Europe. 12 June 2018
Convergence: a narrative for Europe 12 June 218 1.Our economies 2 Luxembourg Ireland Denmark Sweden Netherlands Austria Finland Germany Belgium United Kingdom France Italy Spain Malta Cyprus Slovenia Portugal
More informationI m in the Dublin procedure what does this mean?
EN I m in the Dublin procedure what does this mean? B Information for applicants for international protection found in a Dublin procedure, pursuant to article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 1 You have
More informationExperiences of European countries with health workforce migration
Experiences of European countries with health workforce migration Implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel and applicability of its principles
More informationReport on women and men in leadership positions and Gender equality strategy mid-term review
EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMO Brussels, 14 October 2013 Report on women and men in leadership positions and Gender equality strategy mid-term review 1. New Report on Women in Decision-Making: What is the report
More informationThe Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare Attitudes towards welfare deservingness
The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare Attitudes towards welfare deservingness Wim van Oorschot Centre for Sociological Research University of Leuven Belgium ESPAnet-Israel Annual Conference 22 Februari
More informationAn anatomy of inclusive growth in Europe*
An anatomy of inclusive growth in Europe* Zsolt Darvas Bruegel and Corvinus University of Budapest * Based on a joint work with Guntram B.Wolff Inclusive growth: global and European lessons for Spain 31
More informationMigration as an Adjustment Mechanism in a Crisis-Stricken Europe
Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in a Crisis-Stricken Europe Martin Kahanec Central European University (CEU), Budapest Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn Central European Labour Studies
More informationStandard Eurobarometer 89 Spring Report. European citizenship
European citizenship Fieldwork March 2018 Survey requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication This document does not represent the point of view of the European
More informationComparative Analysis of Inequality, Corruption, and Trust Studies in Modern Societies
Research Article 2018 Yana Ardelyanova and Olga Obryvalina. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
More informationThe Rights of the Child. Analytical report
The Gallup Organization Flash EB N o 187 2006 Innobarometer on Clusters Flash Eurobarometer European Commission The Rights of the Child Analytical report Fieldwork: February 2008 Report: April 2008 Flash
More informationMalta-Valletta: Provision of interim services for EASO 2017/S Contract award notice. Results of the procurement procedure.
1 / 10 This notice in TED website: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=ted:notice:241884-2017:text:en:html Malta-Valletta: Provision of interim services for EASO 2017/S 120-241884 Contract award notice Results
More informationEUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP
Flash Eurobarometer EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP REPORT Fieldwork: November 2012 Publication: February 2013 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General Justice and co-ordinated
More informationAcquisition of citizenship in the European Union
Population and social conditions Authors: Katya VASILEVA, Fabio SARTORI Statistics in focus 108/2008 Acquisition of citizenship in the European Union The act of acquisition of citizenship is often viewed
More informationFP7 ex-post evaluation PEOPLE Specific Programme ( ): Rationale, implementation and achievements by Dr Dragana Avramov
FP7 ex-post evaluation PEOPLE Specific Programme (27-213): Rationale, implementation and achievements by Dr Dragana Avramov ANNEX 1 Figures and Tables Figure 1: Distribution of the budget (MCA 27-213)
More informationImmigration process for foreign highly qualified Indian professionals benchmarked against the main economic powers in the EU and other major
Immigration process for foreign highly qualified Indian professionals benchmarked against the main economic powers in the EU and other major countries around the world Brochure / report title goes here
More informationI. Overview: Special Eurobarometer surveys and reports on poverty and exclusion
Reflection Paper Preparation and analysis of Eurobarometer on social exclusion 1 Orsolya Lelkes, Eszter Zólyomi, European Centre for Social Policy and Research, Vienna I. Overview: Special Eurobarometer
More informationImmigration process for foreign highly qualified Brazilian professionals benchmarked against the main economic powers in the EU and other major
Immigration process for foreign highly qualified Brazilian professionals benchmarked against the main economic powers in the EU and other major countries around the world Brochure / report title goes here
More informationLabour market integration of low skilled migrants in Europe: Economic impact. Gudrun Biffl
Labour market integration of low skilled migrants in Europe: Economic impact Gudrun Biffl Contribution to the Conference on Managing Migration and Integration: Europe & the US University of California-Berkeley,
More informationMalta-Valletta: Provision of interim services for EASO 2017/S Contract award notice. Results of the procurement procedure.
1 / 8 This notice in TED website: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=ted:notice:339167-2017:text:en:html Malta-Valletta: Provision of interim services for EASO 2017/S 165-339167 Contract award notice Results
More informationOxfam Education
Background notes on inequality for teachers Oxfam Education What do we mean by inequality? In this resource inequality refers to wide differences in a population in terms of their wealth, their income
More informationWhat does the Tourism Demand Surveys tell about long distance travel? Linda Christensen Otto Anker Nielsen
What does the Tourism Demand Surveys tell about long distance travel? Linda Christensen Otto Anker Nielsen Overview of the presentation 1. The Tourism Demand Survey 2. Data 3. Share of respondents travelling
More informationEntrepreneurs out of necessity : a snapshot
Entrepreneurs out of necessity : a snapshot Markus Poschke McGill University, Montréal QC, Canada H3A2T7 E-mail: markus.poschke@mcgill.ca August 2012 Abstract Entrepreneurs out of necessity as identified
More informationCHAPTER 12: The Problem of Global Inequality
1. Self-interest is an important motive for countries who express concern that poverty may be linked to a rise in a. religious activity. b. environmental deterioration. c. terrorist events. d. capitalist
More informationCould revising the posted workers directive improve social conditions?
Could revising the posted workers directive improve social conditions? Zsolt Darvas Bruegel Conference of think tanks on the revision of the posted workers directive, European Parliament 31 January 2017,
More informationEUROPEAN YOUTH: PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC LIFE
Flash Eurobarometer 375 EUROPEAN YOUTH: PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC LIFE SUMMARY Fieldwork: April 2013 Publication: May 2013 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General
More informationFirearms in the European Union
Flash Eurobarometer 383 Firearms in the European Union SUMMARY Fieldwork: September 2013 Publication: October 2013 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Home
More informationCOMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT
EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 28.9.2017 SWD(2017) 320 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical operation of the European arrest warrant
More informationCOUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Brussels, 2 May /12 COPEN 97 EJN 32 EUROJUST 39
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 2 May 202 9200/2 COPEN 97 EJN 32 EUROJUST 39 NOTE From : General Secretariat To : Working Party on Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Experts on the European Arrest
More informationTable 1-1. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 and Corruption Perceptions Global Corruption Barometer 2004: Correlations
Table 1-1 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 and Corruption Perceptions Global Corruption Barometer 2004: Correlations Global Corruption Barometer Variables TI Corruption Perceptions
More informationYoung people and science. Analytical report
Flash Eurobarometer 239 The Gallup Organization The Gallup Organization Flash EB N o 187 2006 Innobarometer on Clusters Flash Eurobarometer European Commission Young people and science Analytical report
More informationRegional Focus. Metropolitan regions in the EU By Lewis Dijkstra. n 01/ Introduction. 2. Is population shifting to metros?
n 1/29 Regional Focus A series of short papers on regional research and indicators produced by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy Metropolitan regions in the EU By Lewis Dijkstra 1. Introduction
More informationEUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
Standard Eurobarometer 81 Spring 2014 EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP REPORT Fieldwork: June 2014 This survey has been requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication.
More informationMigration Survey Results. Response period: September 2015
Migration Survey Results Response period: 10-16 September 2015 Q1 Sample size 1 AT AUSTRIA 2 BG BULGARIA 3 CZ CZECH REPUBLIC 4 GERMANY 5 DK NMARK 6 ES SPAIN 7 FI FINLAND 8 FR FRANCE 9 GR GREECE 10 HR
More informationin focus Statistics How mobile are highly qualified human resources in science and technology? Contents SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 75/2007
How mobile are highly qualified human resources in science and technology? Statistics in focus SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 75/2007 Author Tomas MERI Contents In Luxembourg 46% of the human resources in science
More informationEUROPEANS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CRISIS
Standard Eurobarometer 80 Autumn 2013 EUROPEANS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CRISIS REPORT Fieldwork: November 2013 This survey has been requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General
More informationThe limits of diversity in European unity: European identification and preference for internal migration
The limits of diversity in European unity: European identification and preference for internal migration LSEE Lecture Democratization, European integration, and Identity London, November 20, 2017 Dr. Aleksandra
More informationPosted workers in the EU: is a directive revision needed?
Posted workers in the EU: is a directive revision needed? Zsolt Darvas Bruegel Posted Workers and Mobility Package, Challenges for Enterprises from Central and Eastern Europe Conference organised by European
More information14328/16 MP/SC/mvk 1 DG D 2B
Council of the European Union Brussels, 17 November 2016 (OR. en) 14328/16 COPEN 333 EUROJUST 144 EJN 70 NOTE From: To: General Secretariat of the Council Delegations No. prev. doc.: 6069/2/15 REV 2 Subject:
More informationPUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Standard Eurobarometer 81 Spring 2014 PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION FIRST RESULTS Fieldwork: June 2014 Publication: July 2014 This survey has been requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission,
More informationDANMARKS NATIONALBANK
DANMARKS NATIONALBANK TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE DANISH LABOUR MARKET Niels Lynggård Hansen, Head of Economics and Monetary Policy May 22, 218 Outline 1) Past trends 2) The Danish labour-market model
More informationA TOOLKIT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN PRACTICE. 100 initiatives by social partners and in the workplace across Europe
A TOOLKIT FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN PRACTICE 100 initiatives by social partners and in the workplace across Europe CLOSING PANEL Promoting and fostering gender equality at the workplace A TOOLKIT FOR GENDER
More informationEUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP
Standard Eurobarometer 80 Autumn 2013 EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP REPORT Fieldwork: November 2013 This survey has been requested and co-ordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication.
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 430. Report. European Union Citizenship
European Union Citizenship Survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication This document does not
More informationFlash Eurobarometer 364 ELECTORAL RIGHTS REPORT
Flash Eurobarometer ELECTORAL RIGHTS REPORT Fieldwork: November 2012 Publication: March 2013 This survey has been requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General Justice and co-ordinated by Directorate-General
More informationWith the financial support of BTD. A Regional MIPEX Assessment of the Western Balkans
With the financial support of BTD A Regional MIPEX Assessment of the Western Balkans Thomas Huddleston Migration Policy Group 9 June 16 i With the financial support of BTD INTRODUCTION What is the Migrant
More informationStandard Eurobarometer 85. Public opinion in the European Union
Public opinion in the European Union Fieldwork: May 2016 Survey conducted by TNS opinion & social at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication Survey coordinated by
More information