Number 133 Sept / Oct 2014
|
|
- Gavin Ross
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Number 133 Sept / Oct 2014 Editor Jacob Heilbrunn The National Interest 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 1200 Washington, D.C Phone (202) Fax (202) editor@nationalinterest.org The contents of The National Interest are copyrighted The National Interest, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of The National Interest.
2 Limited War Is Back By Jakub Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell Europe needs to rearm and defend itself to cope with a new military threat. The American security umbrella in both its conventional and nuclear forms is no longer adequate, particularly on nato s vulnerable eastern flanks. Indeed, the extended deterrent provided by the United States to its most exposed allies may not be well suited to inhibiting attacks similar to Russia s recent incursion into Ukraine, which displayed all the hallmarks of the newly popular limited conventional wars brief and decisive, violent and yet very restrained. The purpose of such conflicts is to achieve a quick fait accompli in a geographically circumscribed area through limited force in this case, paramilitary means followed by Russian regular forces. It is difficult to deter such a threat through the promise of retaliation, which by its very nature must occur after the facts on the ground have already been changed. A threat of retaliation is simply less credible when the enemy has achieved his objective through a low-intensity action. What are needed instead are strong local military capabilities a preclusive defense that increase the costs of that limited attack. Europe must start to defend its border rather than indulge in the belief Jakub Grygiel is the George H. W. Bush Associate Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University s School of Advanced International Studies. A. Wess Mitchell is president of the Center for European Policy Analysis. that the traditional formula for deterrence, based on retaliation and the extended deterrent provided by the United States, will suffice. It won t. Whereas limited warfare went out of fashion in the West after Vietnam, Russia regards it as a central part of its military doctrine. It has practiced it in Georgia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and presumably rehearses it elsewhere. It is therefore imperative to study anew the challenges presented by such a form of sanguinary behavior. Limited wars have several distinctive features. First, they are characterized by self-imposed restraint in the political objective sought and the level of force used. The aggressor could escalate the confrontation, but chooses not to. The purpose of limiting the use of force is to avoid some reaction that would undermine the political objective sought in the conventional assault. In the case of today s Russia, the purpose is to extend influence and control westward without eliciting a strong response from nato and the United States. Moscow recognizes the clear military superiority of its main rivals and consequently desires to avoid a pitched confrontation that it would lose. Hence, its use of force is calibrated to be sufficient to conquer pieces of Ukraine but not so large and violent that it would prompt a unified political, economic and military reaction from the West. Russia is as clear regarding what it wants to avoid as it is concerning what it wants Limited War Is Back September/October
3 to achieve. Moscow s objectives are limited: a small and quick territorial grab rather than a massive invasion (at least for now). There is no drive to the capital (Kiev, in this instance) or attempt at full conquest but instead a speedy push inside the neighboring state followed by a sudden, selfimposed stop. It is a jab and pause style of war fighting meant to achieve a swift and limited fait accompli. A rapid conquest of Crimea or parts of eastern Ukraine is followed by a pause and apparent openness to seek a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement. But the limited objective has already been achieved, and the quick suspension of violence is a sign of the satisfaction of the original goal. A limited war is also characterized by limited means. The aggressor state carefully tailors its methods to the goal it wants to achieve and the reaction it wants to avoid. Minimal violence is employed. The potential for escalation is made clear but held in reserve. In the case of the Crimean invasion, the Russian operation started anonymously with unmarked troops (dubbed little green men by Ukrainians), an indication that Moscow was uncertain about how local Ukrainian forces would react. In the event of determined opposition, Russia maintained the option of either escalating with larger forces or, should Western powers come to Ukraine s aid militarily, halting the operations of the unmarked troops. The aggressor, in fact, constantly has to weigh the value of the limited objective against the risk of the rivals response. The higher the value of the objective, the more risk it is willing to accept. In Ukraine, it is plausible that Moscow s desire to avoid a military clash with nato members (including in the form of Western-armed and -trained Ukrainian forces) is greater than its desire to occupy Crimea. Russian military might is impressive when compared to that of its neighbors, but Moscow cannot sustain a prolonged conflict with Westernsupported forces and certainly cannot do so against nato member states. But the risk of a Western military response was and remains negligible, and Russia achieved its objective in Crimea with ease. Two main challenges present themselves when crafting a response to a limited war waged by a rival. First, it is politically difficult to answer a restrained military attack. As the Crimea case illustrates, Western policy makers face significant hurdles when attempting to mobilize public opinion in support of a stiff diplomatic much less military response to low-scale aggression. Moreover, the tentative nature and high speed of the initial attack complicate the formation of a responding coalition, whose potential members are naturally divided as to the most appropriate answer to that limited push. The sign of a successful limited war is the absence of a strong concerted response, the reaction that the attack wanted to avoid in the first place. Russia s self-imposed restraint in Crimea gave Moscow the advantage it sought. The second difficulty is that when faced with a limited attack, the targeted country cannot trade space for time. The objective pursued by the attacking party is limited, most often geographically. The conquest of a small, carefully delimited piece of real estate is the goal of the aggressor, and if the defending country abandons that territory in the hope of buying time to develop a response, it ipso facto allows the enemy to achieve its objective. Consequently, defense in depth the practice of initially yielding territory and then counterattacking is useless in such a case. Russia does not appear interested in conducting a military conquest of Ukraine in its entirety, and seems for now to be satisfied with only Crimea 38 The National Interest Limited War Is Back
4 Europe needs to rearm and defend itself to cope with a new military threat. The American security umbrella in both its conventional and nuclear forms is no longer adequate. and perhaps parts of eastern Ukraine, if it can hold them. In this scenario, defense in depth would simply give the aggressor what he wants, one bite at a time, as the Ukrainians quickly discovered. Whatever the reasoning behind Kiev s initial decision not to defend its outer territories, this approach allowed Moscow to achieve its early objectives virtually cost-free a hard lesson that prompted Kiev to switch tactics and transfer forces eastward. These difficulties indicate that the sine qua non of a successful response to an offensive strategy based on limited war is the fielding of effective local forces capable of withstanding the initial attack. There is no alternative to local defense organized by the targeted country. Of course, it is unlikely that a country much weaker than the attacking power, as in the case of Ukraine or any other neighboring country to Russia, can defend itself alone. Local defenses only serve as a complement to not a replacement for extended deterrence. Without local defensive capabilities, extended deterrence is fragile, in particular in a limited offensive war; without an extended deterrent, local defense by small states facing more powerful neighbors is sacrificial. Shifting the strategic emphasis to local defense achieves three things. First, it increases the costs of military aggression: the more difficult it is for the revisionist state to achieve the political objective sought by the limited-war format, the more force the aggressor will have to employ and the higher the risk of a stronger response by external forces. This defeats the very purpose of limited war low-cost, low-risk revision from the outset. The role of local defense is to force the aggressor to escalate the level of violence, which adds both military and political costs. Second, in the event that the aggressor does attack, an effective local defense buys time for the target state, increasing the likelihood that external reinforcements will arrive before the offensive has succeeded. In a limited-war scenario, space cannot be traded for time, but time can be bought by local defensive actions. The longer it takes for the aggressor to achieve its limited territorial objectives, the greater the opportunity for external military aid to buttress the targeted country. Third, local defensive forces permit the conflict to remain limited, an outcome that is in the interest of all parties. As William Kaufmann wrote in 1956, To the extent, therefore, that a conflict starts with local forces clashing over local issues, to that extent will the chances of limiting it be improved. This, paradoxically, increases the likelihood of external support for the targeted party. The security patron of a targeted small country has no interest in, and very little ability to generate domestic support for, a large-scale conflict in defense of a distant ally. If the extended deterrent is predicated on a massive military response, it is less credible in the event of a limited attack. This is why Europeans especially those on the eastern frontier facing a revisionist Russia need to take their own defense seriously. The extended deterrence provided by the United States will not suffice to prevent a limited-war scenario, even in the case of a nato member. It is plausible, in Limited War Is Back September/October
5 fact, to imagine a repeat of the Crimea grab in one of the Baltic states: a lighting strike with minuscule territorial objectives pursued with limited conventional means, followed by an abrupt stop to the offensive. The larger goal of such a strike, like in the Crimean case, would be to prove that the international arrangements underwriting the targeted country s security are a house of cards. The political shadow of influence creating the incentive to defend the allied country. The loss of American soldiers to an initial attack by the enemy would, so the argument goes, create powerful pressures for Washington to respond. As French general Ferdinand Foch reportedly said when asked before World War I how many British troops would be needed for the security of France, Give me one, and I will make sure he gets killed on the first day of the that would follow such a demonstration of power would be preferable to an outright conquest for many reasons. The forward positioning of U.S. troops is useful for shoring up the effectiveness of American extended deterrence in the region and should be done immediately. But that step alone will not deter Russia. The deterrent aspect of this forward posture is that it puts U.S. assets and manpower in a vulnerable position creating a so-called tripwire thus showing commitment and war. Or, as Thomas Schelling put it in more recent times, the purpose of placing thousands of American troops on our allies territory is so that bluntly, they can die. But what if they do not die? What if they re never even involved because the attack is so limited a jab and pause like that in Crimea that it does not come near American forces? If the aggressor establishes a quick fait accompli, then the U.S. forces would have to be used not to defend an ally s territory, but rather to attack an Image: Wikimedia Commons/SFJZ13. CC BY The National Interest Limited War Is Back
6 enemy that has already achieved its territorial goal and, in all likelihood, has ceased military operations. As Henry Kissinger put it, Once the aggressor is in possession of his prize... the psychological burden shifts in his favor. The defender must now assume the risk of the first move. The aggressor can confine himself to outwaiting his opponent. There is no substitute for local forces that possess the ability to protect their own borders, even if it means merely increasing the costs of aggression without hope of winning the conflict unaided. But this will require a change from nato s current approach to defense. As implied above, it will mean a conscious move away from the exclusive emphasis on extended deterrence that has dominated alliance strategy for decades. This approach made sense when the threat facing nato was above the threshold of formal war, and in the immediate post Cold War period, when the threat was negligible. But in today s landscape, given the weak state of defenses along nato s eastern borders, overreliance on extended deterrence would confront nato with the same problem now facing Ukraine, but on a wider scale. Without the ability to defend against a limited attack in its initial stages, nato would be forced to rely on defense-in-depth techniques that would trade space for time. This is the concern that many Central and Eastern European states have that they would have to absorb the loss of territory while awaiting relief forces that, for political or military reasons, might never come. In a best-case scenario, such an event would render an alliance in nato s divided political state a dead letter. In a worst-case scenario, it would turn frontline nato members like Poland and the Baltic states into a war zone. And it also may simply let Russia achieve its limited territorial objectives, but with powerful political aftereffects. Russia does not want to march through the Fulda Gap; it simply wants to test and, if attainable at low risk, to tear down the U.S.-built and -supported European security system. nato needs a different defense strategy one that retains the best features of American military protection against unlimited war but also places greater importance on ensuring the ability of frontline states to defend themselves during the critical, early phases of a Russian limited-war attack. Without abandoning extended deterrence based on retaliation, this strategy would shift the emphasis to deterrence based on preclusive defense. While similar in the sense that both seek to prevent war by changing the strategic calculation of aggression, retaliation and preclusion are different in important ways. Where the former discourages aggressive behavior by instilling fear of retaliation, the latter discourages it by removing or reducing the gain that the opponent would have achieved from aggression. Using the analogy of a schoolyard bully, deterrence is the fear of a teacher s paddle; preclusion is equipping the weaker students with sets of brass knuckles. Preclusion works not because the opponent thinks it will lose a conflict outright the Russians can still overcome individual frontline nato states no matter how much they bulk up their forces but instead because it will take more time and effort to win than the object is worth. Preclusion reinforces the effectiveness of American extended deterrence because it signals to the attacker that the target can survive long enough for the resources of its larger patron to be brought into play. The point of the Russian jab and pause strategy is to make nato s members choose between the unsavory options of responding militarily to an already-achieved land grab (risking escalating the overall conflict) and inaction (and the resulting po- Limited War Is Back September/October
7 litical self-nullification). Preclusive defense evens the odds by forcing Russia to choose between the defeat or stalling of its limited jab, and the adoption of a higher threshold of military violence that it is unlikely to be able to sustain. Either way, it redefines the contest in ways that allow nato s advantages to come into play and exposes Russian disadvantages. It prevents Russia from being able to achieve the allimportant psychological advantage of the strategic-offense-cum-tactical-defense that it has used in Ukraine the draw[ing] of an opponent into an unbalanced advance that the military strategist Basil Liddell Hart identified as the most crucial determinant of success in warfare. For preclusive defense to work, Europeans will have to get serious about defending themselves. In particular, the frontline states of Central and Eastern Europe will have to develop a capacity and mindset for self-defense that they currently do not possess. One recent study by the Center for European Policy Analysis found that Russian military power outstrips the defenses of Central and Eastern European states in all dimensions by a wide margin in land power by a factor of three to one, in airpower by four to one and in overall defense spending by ten to one. One positive side effect of the Ukraine crisis has been to increase the willingness of these states to invest in their own defense. As the recent behavior of America s East Asian allies has shown, the return of traditional geopolitical competition has a way of awakening strategic seriousness and reducing free riding on the United States among vulnerable states. There are already some signs of this trend in nato, as European defense establishments appear to be shifting emphasis to territorial defense. Poland and Estonia are already relatively big military spenders; in the period since the invasion of Ukraine, neighboring states Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Romania have all implemented or promised significant increases, and other regional allies are considering similar options. As the behavior of some U.S. allies during the Cold War (and in Central Europe today) has shown, it is not a foregone conclusion that all frontline states free riding will decrease or that local defense will become a priority on its own even within the context of a growing threat of limited war on or near their territory. These changes are particularly unlikely if Russia maintains its low-intensity approach to the Ukraine conflict, staggers the pace of territorial acquisition in other parts of the post-soviet space, and continues its subversive campaign inside Central and Eastern European political systems. If European states are to respond to Russia s reintroduction of limited war by embracing the concept of local defense individually, much less adopting a preclusive-defense strategy as an alliance, they will need strong encouragement from the United States. While Washington cannot force nato to respond to the new environment, there are things it can do to make this adaptation more likely. To begin with, America should provide a clearer statement of its own strategy that places its requests for its allies to do more in local defense within the context of U.S. intentions and resources. At present, the widespread perception is that America is simply making it up as it goes along, trying to hold together the U.S.-led global system on an ad hoc basis with the same tools that it used in the past, except with occasional adjustments in geographic emphasis. The flat-footedness of the U.S. response to the invasion of Crimea, after years of asserting the strategic imperative of shifting attention to Asia, only deepened this impression. In such a context, and amid cuts into the 42 The National Interest Limited War Is Back
8 Whereas limited warfare went out of fashion in the West after Vietnam, Russia regards it as a central part of its military doctrine. muscle tissue of America s own capabilities, requesting allies to spend more looks dangerously close to outsourcing responsibility for problems we ourselves cannot afford (and do not wish) to confront. Such an approach creates the opposite of incentives for local defense it fuels a suspicion that America is leaving and that, rather than risking a hopeless defense on their own, vulnerable states would be better off avoiding actions that might antagonize the nearby aggressor (Russia). The perception of American disengagement, and thus of a weaker extended deterrent, will not stimulate exposed allies to engage in more serious efforts at local defense. These impressions and tendencies can ultimately only be countered by having and implementing a workable strategy. nato s Strategic Concept has ceased to carry the credibility for playing such a role. Washington can begin to address this problem by producing an umbrella concept that outlines the seriousness of new threats like limited war, states its resolve for countering them, and explains how U.S. and allied capabilities could plausibly be employed in tandem to ensure continued stability. Allies need to understand, in unambiguous terms, that while we may be cutting back, we also have a strategy for reshaping the U.S. military at a doctrinal and technological level that sustains stability in their region. It needs to be clear to them that the success of this strategy requires local defense on their part. An implicit bargain would include U.S. investments in uppertier capabilities like naval, air and nuclear assets paired with local investments in conventional land power sufficiently robust to create local no-go zones until U.S. forces arrive. Such a bargain would need to be buttressed by the physical presence of American assets and manpower small garrisons at the frontier to show U.S. commitment and make the use of its more mobile and lethal power credible. Most importantly, the United States needs to figure out how to create the right incentives for allies to invest in local defense. It is one thing to tell states to do more for their own defense, as recent U.S. secretaries of defense have done again and again, and another to give them real incentives to create robust indigenous militaries and avoid free riding. It s not enough for states to be exposed to a threat, as advocates of offshore balancing have long argued; they must also know that they have a reasonable chance of success in pursuing the option of resistance. If nato is going to persist in its current split into two tiers of the serious and the unserious, we might as well stack the incentives to make the former behavior profitable and be explicit about it. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty should remain the life insurance of a nato country s security relationship with the United States a safety net in the event of a catastrophic, full-scale assault on a member of the alliance. But, as we observed, Article 5, and the American extended deterrent that underpins it, is less credible and effective when dealing with a quick and limited incursion. Hence, the United States should devise a matching strategy a kind of geopolitical 401(k): for those allies that spend a certain amount on Limited War Is Back September/October
9 Using the analogy of a schoolyard bully, deterrence is the fear of a teacher s paddle; preclusion is equipping the weaker students with sets of brass knuckles. local defense, we will match their efforts in the form of commitments or agreements over and above our commitment to extended deterrence under Article 5. This could be broadened at an alliance level, if member politics allow, to create a new clause in which the alliance s four largest economies agree to match the defense contributions of its four most geopolitically exposed members (e.g., Poland and the Baltic states) on some basis, whether through defense subsidies, technology sharing, access to sensitive weapons or troop contributions. The matching approach increases the risk for those states that decide not to shore up their defenses. But, unlike a U.S. retrenchment that abandons allies to a more dangerous scenario, it also establishes clear rewards for those who decide to contribute in a meaningful way to their own security. An increased risk alone may tilt some frontier states toward the revisionist neighbor, Russia; the possibility of a reward restores the balance and gives a clear alternative to the local leaders. Further steps could include the offer of rebated surplus U.S. military equipment (artillery, tanks and fighters) to eastern nato members, the creation of light frontier forces to give the Baltic states time to mobilize in the event of a crisis, and over time the creation of Swiss-style self-defense doctrines among exposed allies that would deter Russian aggression by driving up the costs of conflict at the local level. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine demonstrates that nato must find an effective way to deal with the revived threat of limited war. The West faces similar tactics from China in the South China Sea. Whatever form it takes, the key is to shift the focus from extended deterrence as a solution to all the alliance s security needs to a preclusive-defense mind-set that raises the costs of limited war, mainly by incentivizing increased investments in local defense. Such an approach would prioritize the strategic resilience and survivability of nato s frontline states as the ultimate determinant of the alliance s survival. It would explicitly seek to alleviate these states reemerging security dilemmas by both their own and other members contributions in the full spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty while shifting intra-nato requirements to match a profoundly altered threat landscape. Doing so would help to support the creation of a new defense posture that, while difficult to imagine in its details now, is indispensable for ensuring the relevance and survival of nato in a new and in many ways more dangerous era. n 44 The National Interest Limited War Is Back
The Goals and Tactics of the Lesser Allies Introduction
The Goals and Tactics of the Lesser Allies Introduction Naomi Konda Research Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation On July 9, 2016, NATO decided to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture at the
More informationConventional Deterrence: An Interview with John J. Mearsheimer
Conventional Deterrence: An Interview with John J. Mearsheimer Conducted 15 July 2018 SSQ: Your book Conventional Deterrence was published in 1984. What is your definition of conventional deterrence? JJM:
More informationThe Dangers of Strategic Solitude
January 2017 The Dangers of Strategic Solitude Jakub Grygiel www.cepa.org Transition Brief No. 3 About the author Jakub Grygiel is a Senior Fellow-in-Residence at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
More informationBalance of Power. Balance of Power, theory and policy of international relations that asserts that the most effective
Balance of Power I INTRODUCTION Balance of Power, theory and policy of international relations that asserts that the most effective check on the power of a state is the power of other states. In international
More informationEMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NATO S SOUTH: HOW CAN THE ALLIANCE RESPOND?
EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NATO S SOUTH: HOW CAN THE ALLIANCE RESPOND? Given the complexity and diversity of the security environment in NATO s South, the Alliance must adopt a multi-dimensional approach
More informationCISS Analysis on. Obama s Foreign Policy: An Analysis. CISS Team
CISS Analysis on Obama s Foreign Policy: An Analysis CISS Team Introduction President Obama on 28 th May 2014, in a major policy speech at West Point, the premier military academy of the US army, outlined
More informationBack to Basics? NATO s Summit in Warsaw. Report
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR Back to Basics? NATO s Summit in Warsaw Friday, 3 June 2016 Press Centre Nieuwspoort, The Hague Report On Friday, 3 June The Netherlands Atlantic Association organized a seminar in
More informationClosed for Repairs? Rebuilding the Transatlantic Bridge. by Richard Cohen
Closed for Repairs? Rebuilding the Transatlantic Bridge by Richard Cohen A POLICY August, PAPER 2017 NATO SERIES CLOSED FOR REPAIRS? REBUILDING THE TRANSATLANTIC BRIDGE By Richard Cohen August, 2017 Prepared
More informationChapter 8: The Use of Force
Chapter 8: The Use of Force MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. According to the author, the phrase, war is the continuation of policy by other means, implies that war a. must have purpose c. is not much different from
More informationReport Rethinking deterrence and assurance Western deterrence strategies: at an inflection point? Wednesday 14 Saturday 17 June 2017 WP1545
Image: Sergeant Tom Robinson RLC Report Rethinking deterrence and assurance Western deterrence strategies: at an inflection point? Wednesday 14 Saturday 17 June 2017 WP1545 In association with: Report
More informationCONVENTIONAL WARS: EMERGING PERSPECTIVE
CONVENTIONAL WARS: EMERGING PERSPECTIVE A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able to, if challenged, to maintain them by war Walter Lipman
More informationSTRATEGIC LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
STRATEGIC LOGIC OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre Debs Sam Bleifer INTRODUCTION Security-based theory of proliferation This interaction is shaped by the potential proliferator s ability
More informationNPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30
Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30 18 April 2018 Original: English Second session Geneva,
More informationBEYOND BORDERS: TRANSITIONING NATO TOWARDS HUMAN SECURITY NATO STUDENT POLICY PAPER COMPETITION Oscar Vejen Lacoppidan
BEYOND BORDERS: TRANSITIONING NATO TOWARDS HUMAN SECURITY PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: A YOUTH PERSPECTIVE NATO STUDENT POLICY PAPER COMPETITION 2016 Oscar Vejen Lacoppidan Security Risk Management,
More informationNATO and the United States
NATO and the United States Jan. 18, 2017 The president-elect has pointed out a reality many choose to ignore. By George Friedman President-elect Donald Trump deeply upset the Europeans by raising the possibility
More informationENGLISH only OSCE Conference Prague June 2004
T H E E U R A S I A F O U N D A T I O N 12 th Economic Forum EF.NGO/39/04 29 June 2004 ENGLISH only OSCE Conference Prague June 2004 Partnership with the Business Community for Institutional and Human
More informationStrategic Intelligence Analysis Spring Russia: Reasserting Power in Regions of the Former Soviet Union
Russia: Reasserting Power in Regions of the Former Soviet Union Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Russia has struggled to regain power in Eurasia. Russia is reasserting its power in regions
More informationIntroduction to the Cold War
Introduction to the Cold War What is the Cold War? The Cold War is the conflict that existed between the United States and Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991. It is called cold because the two sides never
More informationNATO s tactical nuclear headache
NATO s tactical nuclear headache IKV Pax Christi s Withdrawal Issues report 1 Wilbert van der Zeijden and Susi Snyder In the run-up to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the future of the American non-strategic
More informationThe Washington Post Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer March 11, 1992, Wednesday, Final Edition
The Washington Post Barton Gellman, Washington Post Staff Writer March 11, 1992, Wednesday, Final Edition Keeping the U.S. First Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower In a classified blueprint intended
More informationWestern Responses to the Ukraine Crisis: Policy Options
Chatham House Expert Group Summary Western Responses to the Ukraine Crisis: Policy Options 6 March 2014 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily
More informationU.S.-Russia Relations. a resource for high school and community college educators. Trust and Decision Making in the Twenty-First Century
U.S.-Russia Relations Trust and Decision Making in the Twenty-First Century a resource for high school and community college educators Prepared by The Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard
More informationGeorge W. Bush Republican National Convention 2000 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Party Platform: Foreign Policy - Europe
George W. Bush Republican National Convention 2000 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Party Platform: Foreign Policy - Europe As a result of the courageous and resolute leadership of Presidents Reagan and Bush,
More informationUkraine s Integration in the Euro-Atlantic Community Way Ahead
By Gintė Damušis Ukraine s Integration in the Euro-Atlantic Community Way Ahead Since joining NATO and the EU, Lithuania has initiated a new foreign policy agenda for advancing and supporting democracy
More informationTHE CHALLENGE OF THE GRAY ZONE. Presentation to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment
THE CHALLENGE OF THE GRAY ZONE Presentation to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Michael Mazarr February 2016 The argument: In an era of networks and nuclear weapons, constrained military operations
More informationREVISITING THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
REVISITING THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Making Steady Progress from Vision to Action 22 nd United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues Saitama, Japan, 25 27 August 2010
More informationThe Nazi-Soviet Pact and Eastern Europe
The Nazi-Soviet Pact and Eastern Europe 63. EASTERN EUROPE 63.1 DEFINITION 63.2 NAZI-SOVIET PACT LINE 63.3 SEPARATE CONQUESTS 63.4 ENTRY INTO EASTERN EUROPE 63.5 RESTRICTIONS ON RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES 63.1
More informationIn U.S. security policy, as would be expected, adversaries pose the
1 Introduction In U.S. security policy, as would be expected, adversaries pose the greatest challenge. Whether with respect to the Soviet Union during the cold war or Iran, North Korea, or nonstate actors
More informationBriefing Memo. Limited War and Escalation
The National Institute for Defense Studies News, April 2016 Briefing Memo Limited War and Escalation 1. Foreword Kouki Kawamura Social Economy Research Division Security Studies Department Under the Cold
More informationNATO Membership Action Plan: A Chance for Ukraine and Georgia
Policy Paper NATO Membership Action Plan: A Chance for Ukraine and Georgia Indrek Elling Merle Maigre www.icds.ee NATO Membership Action Plan: A Chance for Ukraine and Georgia I Introduction NATO members
More informationU.S. foreign policy towards Russia after the Republican midterm victory in Congress
PSC 783 Comparative Foreign Policy Policy Options Paper Policy Option Paper 5 November 2014 U.S. foreign policy towards Russia after the Republican midterm victory in Congress Implications and Options
More informationIs This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia?
Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 34 (2015) DOI: 10.1515/lfpr-2016-0006 Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia? Renatas Norkus* Currently we face Russia s regime fighting a
More informationHow the United States Influences Russia-China Relations
congressional and media affairs How the United States Influences Russia-China Relations BY ROBERT SUTTER GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY The partnership between Russia and China has broadened and matured
More information4.2.2 Korea, Cuba, Vietnam. Causes, Events and Results
4.2.2 Korea, Cuba, Vietnam Causes, Events and Results This section will illustrate the extent of the Cold War outside of Europe & its impact on international affairs Our focus will be to analyze the causes
More informationImplications of the Indo-US Growing Nuclear Nexus on the Regional Geopolitics
Center for Global & Strategic Studies Implications of the Indo-US Growing Nuclear Nexus on the Regional Geopolitics Contact Us at www.cgss.com.pk info@cgss.com.pk 1 Abstract The growing nuclear nexus between
More informationVUS.13a. Postwar outcomes. Wars have political, economic, and social consequences.
VUS.13a Postwar outcomes Wars have political, economic, and social consequences. Boundary Issues Map courtesy of: 1998 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Divisions of Europe As the Soviets pushed
More informationNORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION. SACT s remarks to National University of Public Service
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION SACT s remarks to National University of Public Service A conversation on NATO s Adaptation and Projecting Stability Budapest,
More informationLithuania s Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally
By Renatas Norkus Lithuania s Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally In this essay, I will attempt to raise a few observations that stem from the experiences of a small ally.
More informationNATO Background Guide
NATO Background Guide As members of NATO you will be responsible for examining the Ukrainian crisis. NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an international organization composed of 28 member
More informationCold War Containment Policies
VUS.13b Cold War Containment Policies How did the U.S. respond to the threat of communist expansion? "Flags courtesy of www.theodora.com/flags used with permission" Origins of the Cold War The Cold War
More informationTHE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS
17.423 // Causes & Prevention of War // MIT poli. sci. dept. THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS Background questions: Would the world be better off if nuclear weapons had never been invented? Would
More informationEuropean Neighbourhood Policy
European Neighbourhood Policy Page 1 European Neighbourhood Policy Introduction The EU s expansion from 15 to 27 members has led to the development during the last five years of a new framework for closer
More informationThe Cold War Begins. After WWII
The Cold War Begins After WWII After WWII the US and the USSR emerged as the world s two. Although allies during WWII distrust between the communist USSR and the democratic US led to the. Cold War tension
More informationRevising NATO s nuclear deterrence posture: prospects for change
Revising NATO s nuclear deterrence posture: prospects for change ACA, BASIC, ISIS and IFSH and lsls-europe with the support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Paul Ingram, BASIC Executive Director,
More informationHIS311- March 24, The end of the Cold War is our common victory. - Mikhail Gorbachev, January 1992
HIS311- March 24, 2016 The end of the Cold War is our common victory. - Mikhail Gorbachev, January 1992 How does the Cold War come to an end? Reflecting upon Canada s participation in the Cold War - Multilaterally:
More informationPreserving the Long Peace in Asia
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Preserving the Long Peace in Asia The Institutional Building Blocks of Long-Term Regional Security Independent Commission on Regional Security Architecture 2 ASIA SOCIETY POLICY INSTITUTE
More informationCrimea referendum our experts react
Page 1 of 5 Crimea referendum our experts react Yesterday Crimean voters backed a proposal to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. We asked a number of experts for their reactions to the
More informationRussian Next Generation/Hybrid Warfare Study: Using Crimea to Assess the Vulnerability of the Baltic States
Russian Next Generation/Hybrid Warfare Study: Using Crimea to Assess the Vulnerability of the Baltic States July, 2015 ISMOR W. Sam Lauber, JHU Applied Physics Lab 240-228-0432 william.lauber@jhuapl.edu
More informationInterview with Philippe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court *
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS Interview with Philippe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court * Judge Philippe Kirsch (Canada) is president of the International Criminal Court in The Hague
More informationTHE IRON CURTAIN. From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent. - Winston Churchill
COLD WAR 1945-1991 1. The Soviet Union drove the Germans back across Eastern Europe. 2. They occupied several countries along it s western border and considered them a necessary buffer or wall of protection
More informationDisarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner s View
frank miller Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner s View Abolishing Nuclear Weapons is an important, thoughtful, and challenging paper. Its treatment of the technical issues associated with verifying
More informationReflections on U.S. Military Policy
Reflections on U.S. Military Policy Douglas Feith Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy U.S. Department of Defense An Interview with Jonah Shrock and Oliver Hermann Providence, RI, 8 May 2017 Douglas
More informationPosted: 04/23/ :51 pm EDT Updated: 06/23/2014 5:59 am EDT
The World Post A Partnership of the Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute Joergen Oerstroem Moeller Become a fan Author, 'The Global Economy in Transition' Maskirovka: Russia's Masterful Use of Deception
More informationThe European Union Global Strategy: How Best to Adapt to New Challenges? By Helga Kalm with Anna Bulakh, Jüri Luik, Piret Pernik, Henrik Praks
Policy Paper The European Union Global Strategy: How Best to Adapt to New Challenges? By Helga Kalm with Anna Bulakh, Jüri Luik, Piret Pernik, Henrik Praks I Context The writing of the new European Union
More informationBureau of Export Administration
U. S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration Statement of R. Roger Majak Assistant Secretary for Export Administration U.S. Department of Commerce Before the Subcommittee on International
More informationThe 'Hybrid War in Ukraine': Sampling of a 'Frontline State's Future? Discussant. Derek Fraser
US-UA Security Dialogue VII: Taking New Measure of Russia s Near Abroad : Assessing Security Challenges Facing the 'Frontline States Washington DC 25 February 2016 Panel I The 'Hybrid War in Ukraine':
More informationSuccess of the NATO Warsaw Summit but what will follow?
NOVEMBER 2016 BRIEFING PAPER 31 AMO.CZ Success of the NATO Warsaw Summit but what will follow? Jana Hujerová The Association for International Affairs (AMO) with the kind support of the NATO Public Policy
More informationINFORMATION SERIES Issue No. 427 February 7, 2018
Issue No. 427 February 7, 2018 The New US Nuclear Posture Review: Return to Realism Hans Rühle Hans Rühle headed the Policy Planning Staff of the German Ministry of Defense from 1982-1988 and is a frequent
More informationMay ELN Issue Brief: Deterrence. NATO s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Risks. Łukasz Kulesa Thomas Frear
May 2017 ELN Issue Brief: Deterrence NATO s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Risks Łukasz Kulesa Thomas Frear 2 NATO s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture NATO s Evolving Modern Deterrence
More informationCHINESE NATIONALISM AND THE MORAL INFLUENCE. Sun Tzu Explains China s Shaping Operations in the South China Sea
In the past two weeks, Filipino President Duterte has agreed to 13.5 billion dollars in trade deals with China, softened his country s claims to Scarborough Shoal, and called for the expulsion of U.S.
More informationThe Cold War. Origins - Korean War
The Cold War Origins - Korean War What is a Cold War? WW II left two nations of almost equal strength but differing goals Cold War A struggle over political differences carried on by means short of direct
More informationNATO S ENLARGEMENT POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA The purpose of this article is not to address every aspect of the change taking place in NATO but rather to focus on the enlargement and globalization policy of NATO, which is
More informationThe European Union played a significant role in the Ukraine
Tracing the origins of the Ukraine crisis: Should the EU share the blame? The EU didn t create the Ukraine crisis, but it must take responsibility for ending it. Alyona Getmanchuk traces the origins of
More informationRUSI Missile Defence Conference. 12 April Jakub Cimoradsky NATO BMD. as part of integrated approach to Air and Missile Defence
RUSI Missile Defence Conference 12 April 2016 Jakub Cimoradsky NATO BMD as part of integrated approach to Air and Missile Defence Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon to all of you. Thanks to RUSI for
More informationPoland s Rising Leadership Position
Poland s Rising Leadership Position Dec. 23, 2016 Warsaw has increasingly focused on defense and regional partnerships. By Antonia Colibasanu Poland s history can easily be summed up as a continuous struggle
More informationConflict on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the Nuclear Threat Student Readings. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ.
8 By Edward N. Johnson, U.S. Army. North Korean soldiers look south across the DMZ. South Korea s President Kim Dae Jung for his policies. In 2000 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. But critics argued
More informationOBJECTIVE 7.2 IRON CURTAIN DESCENDS THE ANALYZING THE EVENTS THAT BEGAN THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
Name Period OBJECTIVE 7.2 IRON CURTAIN DESCENDS ANALYZING EVENTS THAT BEGAN IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION Name Period OBJECTIVE 7.2 begins FOLLOWING IS A CHRONOLOGICALLY ORDERED
More informationLebon Peace Fund Proposal. The Lebon Peace Fund and its founder Derfla Lebon believe that war is a terribly
17.42 Lebon Peace Fund Proposal The Lebon Peace Fund and its founder Derfla Lebon believe that war is a terribly costly affair in both treasure and human life and because of this, it should be avoided
More informationSummary of Policy Recommendations
Summary of Policy Recommendations 192 Summary of Policy Recommendations Chapter Three: Strengthening Enforcement New International Law E Develop model national laws to criminalize, deter, and detect nuclear
More informationCanada s NATO Mission: Realism and Recalibration. by Hugh Segal
A POLICY August PAPER 2018 POLICY PERSPECTIVE CANADA S NATO MISSION: REALISM AND RECALIBRATION CGAI Fellow Prepared for the Canadian Global Affairs Institute 1800, 421 7th Avenue S.W., Calgary, AB T2P
More informationNato s continuing non-proliferation role
Wolfgang Rudischhauser, director of the WMD non-proliferation centre at Nato HQ, tells Gwyn Winfield about the continuing role of Nato Nato s continuing non-proliferation role GW: Your previous role was
More informationContents: The History of the BSR security The new security environment Main actors of the BSR Nordic-Baltic security relations The Way Ahead
Contents: The History of the BSR security The new security environment Main actors of the BSR Nordic-Baltic security relations The Way Ahead Northern Europe Baltic Sea region Western Europe Central and
More informationTheme 3: Managing International Relations Sample Essay 1: Causes of conflicts among nations
Theme 3: Managing International Relations Sample Essay 1: Causes of conflicts among nations Key focus for questions examining on Causes of conflicts among nations: You will need to explain how the different
More information1. How would you describe the new mood in Moscow in 1989? 2. What opposition did Gorbachev face in instituting his reforms?
Segment One In December 1988, Gorbachev makes a speech to the United Nations outlining his vision for the future of the Soviet Union. By 1989, Gorbachev tells the countries of Eastern Europe that they
More informationResolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.
Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations. Keith West After the tragedy of World War II and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations, the world came
More information12 November 2014 Roger E. Kanet Department of Political Science University of Miami
12 November 2014 Roger E. Kanet Department of Political Science University of Miami Russia, NATO and the European Union East-West honeymoon in early 90s Expectations of new world order Complemented by
More informationI think the title of this panel is somewhat misleading: it seems to imply that NATO has a clear nuclear preventive strike strategy;
1.7.2008 CONFERENCE NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN THE EU AND ITS SECURITY Intervenção da Deputada Ana Gomes numa conferência internacional sobre "As armas nucleares na União Europeia", por ocasião do 40º aniversário
More informationInternational Influence STEP BY STEP
Teacher s Guide Time Needed: One Class Period Materials Needed: Student worksheets, an overhead transparency, and an overhead or computer projector. Copy Instructions: Students will receive one reading
More informationDefence Cooperation between Russia and China
Defence Cooperation between Russia and China Chairperson: Dr.Puyam Rakesh Singh, Associate Fellow, CAPS Speaker: Ms Chandra Rekha, Assocsite Fellow, CAPS Discussant: Dr. Poonam Mann, Associate Fellow,
More informationDECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS *
Original: English NATO Parliamentary Assembly DECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS * www.nato-pa.int May 2014 * Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Friday 30 May
More informationAppendix 5 Deterrence as a security concept against ambiguous warfare
Appendix 5 Deterrence as a security concept against ambiguous warfare Rob Hendriks Current situation It appears time to recognise and acknowledge that a significant change has taken place in the prevailing
More informationTrade and Security: The Two Sides of US-Indian Relations
Trade and Security: The Two Sides of US-Indian Relations New Delhi is a valuable partner to Washington on one but not the other. Allison Fedirka August 13, 2018 Trade and Security: The Two Sides of US-Indian
More informationThe Ukraine Crisis Much More than Natural Gas at Stake
The Ukraine Crisis Much More than Natural Gas at Stake Øystein Noreng Professor Emeritus BI Norwegian Business School World Affairs Council of Orange County November 10, 2014 The Pattern: A Classical Greek
More informationInternational Security Problems and Solutions by Patrick M. Morgan (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006)
Global Tides Volume 2 Article 6 1-1-2008 International Security Problems and Solutions by Patrick M. Morgan (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006) Jacqueline Sittel Pepperdine University Recommended Citation
More informationThe Western Confrontation with Russia: Scenario Planning in the Area from the Baltic Sea to the Wider Black Sea
The Western Confrontation with Russia: Scenario Planning in the Area from the Baltic Sea to the Wider Black Sea Geopolitical Analysis: The Sources of Confrontation By George Niculescu, Head of Research,
More informationTHE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES December 15, 2008 SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1060 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009 (P.L. 110-417)
More informationStudent Handout: Unit 3 Lesson 3. The Cold War
Suggested time: 1 Hour What s important in this lesson: The Cold War With the end of the Second World War, a new international tension between Western Democratic countries and the Communist Soviet Union
More informationThis Week in Geopolitics
This Week in Geopolitics Isolationism vs. Internationalism: False Choices BY GEORGE FRIEDMAN MAY 10, 2016 Since World War I, US policy has been split between isolationism and internationalism. From debates
More informationTHE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS. US HISTORY Chapter 15 Section 2
THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS US HISTORY Chapter 15 Section 2 THE EARLY COLD WAR YEARS CONTAINING COMMUNISM MAIN IDEA The Truman Doctrine offered aid to any nation resisting communism; The Marshal Plan aided
More informationRUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE WEST: A NEW 9/11 FOR THE UNITED STATES
RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE WEST: A NEW 9/11 FOR THE UNITED STATES Paul Goble Window on Eurasia Blog windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com 540-886-1222 41 N. Augusta St., Apt. 203 Staunton, VA 24401 WHY CRIMEA AND
More informationEUROPE'S SECURITY PILLARS
Janusz BUGAJSKI Washington D.C., USA EUROPE'S SECURITY PILLARS At the outset, we must define the purpose of Europe's security structures at the beginning of the third millennium. This can be summarized
More informationStrategic Developments in East Asia: the East Asian Summit. Jusuf Wanandi Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation
Strategic Developments in East Asia: the East Asian Summit Jusuf Wanandi Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation Economic development in East Asia started 40 years ago, when Japan s economy developed
More informationImage: NATO. Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437. In association with:
Image: NATO Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437 In association with: Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October
More informationAlliances and Bargaining
Alliances and Bargaining POSC 1020 Introduction to International Relations Steven V. Miller Department of Political Science Puzzle(s) for Today Why do states fight other countries wars? 2/29 Figure 1:
More informationA More Disastrous World War II. World War II, the most devastating war in world history, followed the 1919 Versailles
MIT Student Professor Van Evera 17.42 A More Disastrous World War II World War II, the most devastating war in world history, followed the 1919 Versailles Peace, the most elaborate and determined effort
More informationPreparing for NATO s 2014 Summit Under the Spell of the Ukraine Crisis
Report Preparing for NATO s 2014 Summit Under the Spell of the Ukraine Crisis Friday, 20 June 2014 Press Centre Nieuwspoort, The Hague In light of the upcoming NATO summit in Wales (in September of this
More informationPreventive Diplomacy, Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution
Preventive Diplomacy, Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution Lothar Rühl "Preventive Diplomacy" has become a political program both for the UN and the CSCE during 1992. In his "Agenda for Peace", submitted
More information2. The State Department asked the American Embassy in Moscow to explain Soviet behavior.
1. The Americans become increasingly impatient with the Soviets. 2. The State Department asked the American Embassy in Moscow to explain Soviet behavior. 3. On February 22, 1946, George Kennan an American
More informationDemocracy: The Never-Ending Battle A Conversation with Lech Walesa
Democracy: The Never-Ending Battle A Conversation with Lech Walesa Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. Worldviews for the 21st Century: A Monograph Series John C. Bersia, Editor-in-Chief Johanna Marizan, Business
More informationFOURTH GEORGIAN-GERMAN STRATEGIC FORUM. Policy Recommendations and Observations
FOURTH GEORGIAN-GERMAN STRATEGIC FORUM Policy Recommendations and Observations KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG REGIONAL PROGRAM POLITICAL DIALOGUE SOUTH CAUCASUS Fourth Georgian-German Strategic Forum: Policy
More information