August 26, The awful sight of young children wasting away is something a better world

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1 Back to the Present: How the U.S. Continues to Learn the Lessons of Somalia Prepared by Jerry Kenney for the Norman Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture August 26, The awful sight of young children wasting away is something a better world should have long ago eliminated. Our world has not. Appalling images and stories continue to come forward from Somalia as tens of thousands have starved, more are in the process of starving, and millions remain at risk for starvation. Stories of women forced to abandon their babies on the roadside are of a sort so unimaginable that it precludes empathy. 1 Upon hearing this news, Americans may be forgiven for feeling an unsettling sense of déjà vu. There was a time before when televisions showed us similar images from the same place. These images were accompanied by buzzwords like conflict, poverty, drought, famine, refugees, violence, multilateral intervention, logistics, and mandates. Some have credited the media portrayals of the famine in Somalia and the ensuing public response with pressuring a reluctant George H. W. Bush administration to act in The Bush administration did act and this intervention was largely successful. 3 Yet almost two decades on, the enduring memory from the U.S. intervention in Somalia is not Operation Restore Hope which saved hundreds of thousands of lives 4 but rather U.S. soldiers being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. This image has since been reinforced by Black Hawk Down, which functions as shorthand for describing and understanding the dangers of America s role in humanitarian interventions. 5 The attitudes and popular narratives adopted by the American public following humanitarian interventions shape the way elected leaders consider foreign policy. 6 It would follow then that 1

2 the perceived success of past humanitarian interventions would beget support for similar foreign policy decisions while perceived failure would reduce the political will to intervene. 7 Inevitably, debate then focuses on the central issues of constructing the popular narrative and identifying the proper lessons. 8 The U.S. experience in Somalia from serves as a convoluted benchmark for U.S. interventions abroad due to several factors: 1) its place in history as the world searched for a new paradigm for international relations after the end of the Cold War, 2) its management by two U.S. administrations with different objectives and interests, 3) its complex coordination among multiple agencies, international humanitarian organizations, and multilateral bodies, 4) and its shifting missions and mandates each resulting in respective successes and failures. 9 Some have blamed the outcome of the U.S. intervention in Somalia on the failure to learn the lessons of previous U.S. interventions 10 and some have blamed the outcomes of more recent interventions on the failure to adequately adopt the lessons of Somalia. 11 Therefore, each U.S. humanitarian response is considered within the parameters of public attitudes about the outcomes of previous interventions. 12 For better or for worse, the lessons derived by the public and policymakers from the U.S. intervention in Somalia in the early 1990 s has shaped debate about potential responses to this most recent disaster in Somalia and humanitarian crises more generally. The most explicit evidence of this impact is the continued absence of any call for a U.S.-led intervention in Somalia to secure delivery of food assistance. As the American public and policymakers continue to digest the current tragedy unfolding in Somalia, the de facto response seems to be a tentative hope that multilateral organizations such 2

3 as the U.N. World Food Programme may be effective enough to allow the U.S. to be both compassionate (by offering millions of dollars in support) and noncommittal (by remaining on the periphery rather than on the ground). Prior to predicting the outcome of the current famine in Somalia, it is useful to explore the trajectory of similar events and different decisions that culminated in the commitment of U.S. ground forces to Somalia twenty years ago. Why did President George H. W. Bush decide to send U.S. ground troops to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief? Equally important is an effort to understand how the lessons from our previous encounter with Somalia continue to frame decision-making about the current situation in Somalia. Background: Decades of colonial rule left Somalia without the institutional capacity to support democratic self-governance following independence in In the aftermath of President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke s assassination in 1969, the Soviet-backed Somali military instituted rigid authority under the leadership of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. Clan identities served as the basis for Somali society and Barre was a member of the Marehan clan. However, his regime initially imposed Somali nationalism as an alternative to the clan structure. 13 As part of this effort the Barre administration launched a literacy campaign centered on replacing the colonial languages Italian and English with the newly created written Somali in all schools. 14 Barre s regime relied upon the Soviet Union for military support and modernizing economic development strategies, thereby souring relations with the West. 3

4 An indulgence of nationalist appeals and a miscalculation of military power and external support led Siad Barre to declare war against Ethiopia to settle a border dispute in October Alliances quickly shifted, as the Soviet Union delivered equipment and advisors to the Marxist Ethiopian regime. Lacking Soviet support, the Somali army was routed by March Spurned by the Soviets, defeated militarily, and witnessing the collapse of the collectivist Somali economy and agriculture base, Siad Barre decided to warm relations with the United States. 16 From the desk of an American Cold War strategist, recent world events must have been troubling: a resurgent Ethiopia was receiving Soviet backing, the Soviet military had surprised the U.S. by invading Afghanistan, and the future of Iran after the overthrow of the Shah remained uncertain. The larger picture revealed Soviet advances, U.S. vulnerabilities, and the need to secure sea lanes and oil reserves. Within this larger picture, Somalia assumed strategic importance to the United States. This assessment induced the U.S. to reorganize and expand its military forces and infrastructure in the region. 17 The U.S. initiated ambitious economic assistance programs in Somalia in coordination with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and European donors. 18 In order to assure continued aid flows, Siad Barre made guarantees to pursue future democratic and free-market reforms. In the mid-eighties economic indicators and agriculture production had risen sharply. 19 However, [b]y the late 1980s it was clear that indications of long-term reform had turned out to be deceptive. 20 The diffusion of power that accompanies economic and political reform threatened to undercut the elites of Siad Barre s Marehan clan. Somalia abandoned reform initiatives as corruption and fraud reversed previous economic gains. 21 After a coup attempt by 4

5 members of the rival Mijerteen clan following Somalia s defeat to Ethiopia during the Ogaden War, Siad Barre punished the entire clan, forcing them to flee into exile. In exile, the Mijerteen clan joined fellow armed groups to form the basis of a future consolidated opposition. 22 Siad Barre s authoritarian regime had succumbed to the pressure of the clan system that it had tried to uproot from Somali society. The regime s shift spurred a corresponding rise in disputes with other regional clans left outside the state s patronage system. The mechanisms of Somali state power were co-opted by one clan against a rising multi-clan insurgency. Thus began a vicious cycle of repression and opposition that devastated Somalia. In fact, [b]y the time international attention focused on Somalia in 1992 through ghastly pictures of starvation and death, the Somali state had ceased to exist and the people had fallen back on the only security they could find, the clan system. 23 Civil war engulfed all of Somalia in the final months of Clan-based insurgent groups pushed closer to Mogadishu. In January 1991 General Mohamed Farah Aideed and his branch of the United Somalia Congress (USC) entered the city and assumed control of critical government buildings. On January 27 th Siad Barre plundered Mogadishu and fled south to his clan s homeland. 24 Siad Barre s forces continued operations against Aideed to retake Mogadishu until they were resolutely defeated in May During this time Siad Barre s forces decimated Somali infrastructure as part of a scorched earth policy. 25 As the clan leader who defeated Siad Barre, Aideed believed he was entitled to future leadership of Somalia. Rather than form a united governing structure after Siad Barre s defeat, opposition groups exploited clan loyalties and perpetuated the civil conflict in Somalia. Only northern 5

6 Somalia enjoyed relative stability as the Isaaq clan consolidated the region and declared independence in 1991 as the Somaliland Republic. 26 In the capital of Mogadishu fellow members of the USC began an internecine battle that would split the city. Ali Mahdi Mohamed assumed control of northern Mogadishu while Mohamed Farah Aideed directed the south. The battle for Mogadishu inflicted terrible damage on the infrastructure and citizens of the city beginning in November Context The disintegration of state institutions forced Somali citizens to rely on clan identities for basic security. As such, the concept of Somalia as a nation or a state in any technical sense was an allusion to a disputed past or an unlikely future. While officials attempted to direct the U.S. government s attention to the plight of Somali civilians, the violence and starvation remained a third tier issue for the administration. 28 After its rise to strategic significance during the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, Somalia now possessed little interest to U.S. foreign policymakers. With drought exacerbating an already critical humanitarian situation in which hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees faced imminent death, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751 in April Negotiations with the major clan factions limited the UN presence to fifty observers who began to arrive in July to monitor a tenuous cease-fire in Mogadishu. The resolution also agreed to the possible deployment of a peacekeeping force of 500 if conditions allowed in the future. Humanitarian organizations working on the ground in Somalia complained about the inadequacy of international measures as worsening conditions overwhelmed their capacity to respond. 6

7 In July, vivid pictures of starving children displayed in the media and an emotional telegram from the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya that highlighted the scale of suffering in Somalia prompted President Bush to order a policy review and instruct his administration, become forward leaning with regard to Somalia. 29 In August UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali announced that the contingent of 500 peacekeepers would increase to 3,500 to deploy to Somalia to guard humanitarian shipments and supplies. This force became United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Over the hesitations of the Joint Staff, President Bush then approved the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee decision for the Department of Defense to commence emergency airlifts of food aid for Somalia and provide transportation to the UN peacekeepers. 30 This initiative became Operation PROVIDE RELIEF. After Bush s announcement of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF the U.S. media enhanced its coverage of Somalia and the American public perceived the administration as dedicated to successfully alleviating the humanitarian crisis. 31 However, increased delivery of food aid in the absence of security resulted in widespread looting of supplies and an informal Somali economy based on the monetization of stolen goods. Even with rampant looting, warehouses were full of food but distributing the items to the targeted population proved impossible. 32 As the volume of food aid increased, the percentage actually reaching the Somalis in most need declined precipitously. 33 The 500 man Pakistani peacekeeping force arrived in September but, due to limited mobility and restrictive rules of engagement, were forced by armed factions to remain at the Mogadishu airport. 34 7

8 The inefficacy of U.S. current efforts to meet the demands of the security challenge in Somalia and the mounting humanitarian crisis put pressure on the Bush administration to react more forcefully. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, and National Security Council staff called for increased U.S. engagement in Somalia, while the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted calls for U.S. involvement in a quagmire with no end-point in which little U.S. interests were at stake. 35 Overall momentum was moving towards greater U.S. engagement. 36 NSC Deputies Committee meetings in August and September centered on the need to establish points of security around critical infrastructure to secure ground convoys carrying food aid to feeding centers. 37 In October and November the administration assessed plans for the additional UN peacekeeping force of 3,000, proposed by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in August and approved through Security Council Resolution 775, to establish four security zones in Somalia, each protected by a UN force of 750 peacekeepers. 38 A Central Intelligence Agency report indicate that the peacekeeping force was far too small to provide for food shipments to reach the now millions of starving Somalis. 39 Consensus emerged in the administration that more action was needed. Bush Administration Decisionmaking: Operation Restore Hope As pressure mounted, the NSC Deputies Committee continued to meet through November to flush-out U.S. response options. Separating information and ideas into what was likely Known, Unclear, and Presumed 40 by the officials involved in this process may better illuminate the factors contributing to President Bush s decision. 8

9 Known The humanitarian crisis was exacting terrible suffering on the Somali people and President Bush felt deeply for their suffering and was concerned about the legacy of Somalia on his presidential record after failing in his recent re-election campaign. 41 The Bush Administration was under intense and mounting pressure from the American public, the media, Congress, and international organizations to introduce U.S. military forces to provide security for humanitarian relief in Somalia. In addition, President Clinton, as a presidential candidate had criticized the Bush Administration s lack of initiative. 42 President Bush s Administration believed fully in the need to use decisive military force if force was to be applied. 43 Unclear How would Somali armed factions respond to the introduction of U.S. combat forces? How would the transition from Operation Restore Hope to UN command of peacekeeping forces go forward? 44 Presumed Only the U.S. had the military and political clout to act decisively. 45 Operation Restore Hope would be short. 46 Intervening in Somalia would be less costly than in Bosnia and may placate criticism for lack of engagement in the Balkans. 47 9

10 Available Options After review by the NSC Deputies Committee, President Bush convened a meeting with senior advisor s on November 25 th 1992 to consider the following options: Option 1: Continue the current course, although with more US air and sealift. Option 2, which was favored by the State Department: Push the UN to move more quickly and commit more troops (10,000 to 15,000 instead of 3,500). The United States would provide logistical support units and deploy a Marine Amphibious Ready Group to deter Somali attacks upon UN forces. Option 3: Organize under UN auspices a US-led coalition, equal to a division in strength and containing US ground forces. 48 President Bush chose Option 3, the most forceful action presented. In a December address to the American people President Bush outlined the objectives for Operation Restore Hope: First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created that secure environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a regular UN peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay one day longer than is necessary. 49 The Enduring Impact of Operation Restore Hope Operation Restore Hope was largely successful in assuaging the security situation that prevented the delivery of food supplies in Somalia and likely saved the lives of thousands of Somali citizens. 50 However, the operation s limited scope may account for its success as well as the failure of subsequent missions. Lack of economic or political progress contributed to a 10

11 deteriorating environment in which Somali resentment was exploited by clan leaders and redirected towards international peacekeeping forces. 51 Eventually dreaded mission-creep and the horrific display of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after an October 1993 assault by Somali factions proved too much for the Clinton Administration to stomach. A straightforward attempt to secure relief had gotten too messy. 52 The current crisis in Somalia differs in important ways from the crisis the resulted in the George H. W. Bush administration s decision to intervene. After a decade of avoidance, U.S. engagement with Somalia has been defined by counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts. These efforts differ from humanitarian missions in their motivation and logic. Additionally, the media landscape has changed in the last twenty years. In our current era of instant accessibility everything competes for the U.S. public s interest, perhaps diminishing the significance of each constituent issue. Consider the high-profile quagmires that currently challenge U.S. foreign policy: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Somalia, and Yemen. These issues are nested within wider uncertainties, such as the Arab Spring, U.S.- China relations, and the global economic system. Perhaps the images of starvation in Somalia no longer hold the same power as before. However, some things remain the same. The same cost-benefit calculations that the Bush and Clinton administrations employed in Somalia continue to reverberate in contemporary foreign policy debates. How to get food to starving people is a short-term logistical question for which the instruments of U.S. foreign policy are well-suited. The questions of how to disseminate the food and what happens after the people are fed to prevent starvation in the future assume 11

12 political dimensions which are more difficult and require more time. U.S. policy sometimes reflects the more noble desires of the American people not to tolerate humanitarian catastrophes, but only as the long as the intervention produces quick results and doesn t get messy, which are two qualities antithetical to nation-building and long-term development. 53 As was evident in Somalia twenty years before, foreign populations are not homogenous and intervention forces inevitably inject themselves as a powerful new player among numerous existing factions in a constantly evolving political game. While each player has relative strengths and weaknesses, the qualities of the U.S. as an intervention force are consistent and easily identifiable: military and technological superiority paired with a lack of staying power or strategic patience. This American impatience in humanitarian situations is the result of a process in which U.S. goodwill spirals into resentment and demands for withdraw when the public watches portions of the population they thought they were helping turn against their benefactors. 54 The fundamental equation for humanitarian interventions remains the same: adding ambitious goals, limited resources, and risk aversion to a rapidly fluctuating and unknown environment equals disaster. Examining the circumstances and decision-making that contributed to the first U.S. intervention in Somalia provides insight into the current humanitarian crisis. As the U.S. public continues to interpret the tragedy unfolding in the Horn of Africa and policymakers attempt to formulate a response, the events in Somalia two decades prior serve as an indicator for assessing how far we ve come and how far we have yet to go to eliminate mass famine and starvation. 12

13 Endnotes: 13

14 1 2 For a detailed analysis of the representation of Somalia in the news prior to the U.S. intervention see: Ogundimu, Folu and Jo Ellen Fair Before Hope was Restored : News Media Portrayals of Somalia Prior to the U.S. Intervention. Northeast African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, Although they did not carry out the more ambitious goals of U.N.-sponsored nationbuilding, U.S. forces sent to Somalia clearly did execute their missions successfully, relieving untold suffering through humanitarian assistance and executing their military responsibilities with skill and professionalism. Kenneth Allard. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. p.xviii, And Chester A. Crocker, May/June The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong, Foreign Affairs, The intervention in Somalia was not a failure as measured by the standards first set by President Bush. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has been averted. How large a tragedy it is impossible to know, but, judging by the Somali death toll of 1992, one could reasonably estimate that upwards of a quarter of a million Somali lives were saved. Chester A. Crocker, May/June The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong, Foreign Affairs, 2-8. p Put more bluntly, the two main lessons that America absorbed from the Somalia debacle 1. Nation-building is bloody, costly and futile. So if people in piddling third-world countries want to tear each other apart, let 'em. 2. Casualties are completely unacceptable in American military operations. At the first sign of blood, politicians abandon missions and generals are retired. Nicholas D. Kristof. February 5, The Wrong Lessons of the Somalia Debacle. The New York Times, 6 a mounting body of evidence suggests that the foreign policies of American presidents and democratic leaders more generally have been influenced by their understanding of the public s foreign policy views. Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection. Annual Review of Political Science. 9: , p The halo or hangover effect is a useful construct. See: Lyon, Alynna J. and Mary Fran T. Malone Was Woodrow Wilson Right? Assessing American Attitudes towards Humanitarian Intervention. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue Lessons derived by policymakers involve political pressure and will and thereby differ importantly from operational lessons, such as after action reviews conducted by the actors themselves. For a comprehensive example of operational lessons-learned see: Kenneth Allard. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. 9 Over 15 years ago, in his Foreward for a book about the experience, Chester A. Crocker, who served as Assistant Secretray of State for African Affairs from , recognized then that, [c]ommentators, policymakers, and scholars will look back on America s Somalia enterprise of as setting the tone of this transitional era. Hirsch, John L. and Robert B. Oakley Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. vii. 14

15 10 Based on the outcome of this disaster, it was apparent, the US political and military leadership had not learned its lesson from previous, similar operations, namely Beirut. Day, Clifford E Critical Analysis on the Defeat of Task Force Ranger, p See: Dobbins, James. Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond, Testimony Presented before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on September 23, pubs/testimonies/2005/ct212.pdf 12 Put simply, we cannot understand Rwanda without consideration of Somalia; likewise, involvement in Kosovo is part of the Somalia and Rwanda legacies. Lyon, Alynna J. and Chris J. Dolan American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution. Foreign Policy Analysis. 3, p Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p Ibid. 15 Ibid, p Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid, p Ibid. 20 Ibid, p Ibid, p McMaster, Jeffrey The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War: Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti, Academie universitaire Louvain, p Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p Ibid, p Ibid. 26 Ibid, p Ibid, p Glanville, Luke Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, p Ibid, p Poole Walter S The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p

16 31 Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p Ibid, p Ibid, p. 37. and Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p. 8. And As Bush began to speak out on the crisis in Somalia, there was little enthusiasm in the Pentagon for the employment of overwhelming force in the absence of vital material interests. Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p Although President Bush kept himself informed, NSC Principals did not meet about Somalia until late November when a major decision had to be made. By then, incremental decisions below that level had led the administration toward intervention. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid, p This approach is based on a standard method to help categorize the factors that influence decisionmaking proposed by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. See: Neustadt, Richard E. and Ernest R. May Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. New York: The Free Press. 41 By October 1992, an estimated 300,000 Somalis had died since the civil war began. A further 4.5 million of a population of only 6 million were threatened by severe malnutrition and disease. At least 1.5 million of these Somalis were deemed to be at mortal risk. In: Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p there was pressure from many quarters Capitol Hill, the media, and presidential candidate Bill Clinton for greater action. In: McMaster, The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War: Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti, p. 48. And As public distress about the situation in Somalia mounted, pressure on the Bush administration to act came from three main sources the media, Congress, and the humanitarian relief agencies operating in Somalia. In: Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p. 35. And General Colin Powell and his doctrine advocating overwhelming force and limited objectives so dominated both administrations that no other vision of the Somali operation could be enunciated. In: Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. March April Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, Foreign Affairs, p See: Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p And Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March President Bush questioned, whether conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth handoff to a UN peacekeeping force after a relatively brief U.S. deployment In: Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p

17 45 Only the United States possessed the capacity to act promptly. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p. 20. And The Bush administration was aware that only the US could mount an operation, alone or leading a coalition, that could bring dramatic improvement in a short space of time. Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p The President wanted US troops to enter Somalia as soon as possible and then be replaced by UN peacekeepers in the shortest feasible time. In: Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p See: Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p. 42. And See: Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p Glanville, Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention, p In: McMaster, The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War: Iraq- Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti, p The efforts of UNITAF could be rated a success in the sense that, when UNOSOM took over on 4 May 1993, Mogadishu was calm, heavy weapons had been stored in cantonments, and marauding gangs were suppressed. Food supplies were flowing, starvation practically had ceased, drought eased, and seeds and livestock were being replenished. The clans still had their customary arsenals of small arms, however, and the warlords showed little willingness to compromise or negotiate in good faith. Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March p Without a stable government, functioning police forces, and long-term economic aid, Somalia would slide back toward disaster. As matters turned out, the humanitarian task was accomplished, but security steadily eroded and political reconstruction was stillborn. Ibid, p Never has this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in 1992 when the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war in the east African country of Somalia. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the impression of chaos and disaster. In: Richard W. Stewart The United States Army in Somalia, U.S. Army Center of Military History. p The international community should discard the illusion that one can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence without affecting domestic politics and without including a nation-building component. Attention must be devoted to rebuilding the institutions whose collapse helped bring on disaster. Stopping a man-made famine means rebuilding political institutions to create order. No intervention in a troubled state such as Somalia can succeed in a few weeks. Unless development aid and external assistance address the long-term political and economic implications of an intervention, it is doomed. Clarke and Herbst, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, p

18 54 The American people gave their unqualified support for the intervention in Somalia initially when the mission was perceived as a quick, low-cost undertaking primarily aimed at providing relief. After American forces began incurring casualties as a result of expanding the operation s objectives, however, the priority of the public became military withdrawal. Klarevas, Louis J The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia, Public Opinion Quarterly, 64: p