Somalia humanitarian crisis roundtable, Thursday 9 February 2017, Overseas Development Institute

Transcription

1 Somalia humanitarian crisis roundtable, Thursday 9 February 2017, Overseas Development Institute This roundtable was convened by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to explore the challenges humanitarian actors and policy-makers face in responding to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Participants included humanitarian policy makers, analysts and practitioners in London, Nairobi and Mogadishu, among others. Somalia is on the brink of its second famine in six years. The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNet) has warned that famine is likely if the upcoming Gu season rains fail. The roundtable centred on reviewing the current situation and drawing on lessons from the past to inform the current and planned humanitarian response. Situation overview Since September, the number of Somalis in need of humanitarian assistance has increased from five million to 6.2 million. Almost three million people are facing an acute food security crisis. About 363,000 acutely malnourished children are in desperate need of critical nutrition support, including more than 71,000 who require life-saving treatment. Hunger, drought and war have already displaced two million Somalis, and the threat of famine is likely to force even more people from their homes. The limited governance and infrastructure in place will further exacerbate the situation. In the most recent famine, in 2011, it took agencies two and a half months to fully scale up their operations. In 2011, the worst-affected areas were at Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 Crisis before a famine was actually declared. The situation today is the same as it was then in terms of the number of people in need, meaning that urgent action is required. The clearest indicator of decline in 2011 was the collapse of household

2 purchasing power in October Thankfully, so far in 2017 this stage has not yet been reached. Current concerns lie with the speed and scale of implementation of the response, and coverage. It is worrying that many of the areas hardest hit in 2011 have still not recovered. Current and planned response While the situation on the ground is undoubtedly bleak, in comparison with 2011 humanitarian organisations appear to have better access (though this was questioned by some roundtable participants) and more accurate analysis through the use of technology and greater reach thanks to cash transfers. Coordination is better as more organisations are based in Mogadishu, rather than across the border in Nairobi. Issues raised at the roundtable included: The importance of being mindful of the different groups affected (pastoralists, farmers and agro-pastoralists), and their different needs. The noticeable increase in female-only and female-led households across the country also needs to be incorporated into the response plan. The need for increased livelihood support, using cash transfers to enable people to purchase food and water to keep livestock alive, while also monitoring the effects of cash transfers on market prices. Emergency preparedness programming must begin now and prepare for the worst-case scenario. The importance of local and international coordination on the ground, including with national drought committees, while avoiding putting too much pressure on local organisations to scale up. The importance of not concentrating all available resources in one region when the whole country is in need. Donors must show greater flexibility in allowing agencies to intervene where they are needed. Participants also raised issues around access in rural areas, particularly with regard to checkpoints and roadblocks. Counter-terrorism legislation and corruption pose legal, fiduciary and reputational risks, further complicating the response.

3 Action points Donors and the UN: Starting with the worst-case scenario: the donor landscape has changed dramatically, especially with the arrival of a new administration in the United States. It is reasonable to assume that the US will not make the same level of resources available to respond to this crisis as it has in the past. It will be more important to explore resources outside of traditional channels, including from Turkey and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and diversify the use of media/nontraditional media more effectively to reach out to Gulf newspapers, Al Jazeera and Middle Eastern channels for fundraising. Participants also felt that the UN needs to relinquish control and become more inclusive in its coordination efforts and in disbursing CERF resources. The role of Somalis: The role of Somalis including the diaspora must be recognised: much of the response in 2011 came from communities and their own social networks. It is critical to be more inclusive and expand traditional humanitarian networks. Humanitarian organisations need to work with local structures, social networks and telecommunications businesses like Hormuud, integrate them into their risk management processes and call on them for funding. It will also be important to examine accountability and the political economy and politicisation of aid in Somalia. The role of the government: Bearing in mind that the crisis will impact the whole country, even if mass mortality is unlikely in the north efforts should not be limited to South-Central Somalia. There was a detailed discussion of the role that the government should play in the response, with participants expressing different views as to its ability to lead the humanitarian effort. While the leadership of the new president should be encouraged, there is a need to further discuss areas where the government should take the lead in distributing aid. Some areas may need strong government involvement, while others may not. Coordination: Compared to 2011 we are seeing greater collaboration amongst international organisations. Participants referred to the DFID funded resilience consortia, which enables donors to channel resources more quickly, allowing aid actors to scale up more rapidly. However, it is not clear whether these consortia operate in areas of greatest need, or how they could make resources available to other organisations with access to more critical areas. Better coordination is also needed

4 between NGOs, the government and donors. The role of local businesses was stressed, both as providers of funds and as key players at this preventative stage, though the mechanisms to engage businesses in the response are unclear. Other issues to consider include: Invest in livelihoods: Protecting livelihoods and people s productive capacity is worth the long-term investment. With displacement one of the main concerns in Somalia, properly targeted livelihoods support may enable people to remain in their home areas and reduce the need for them to relocate. Be realistic: The problems Somalia faces are endemic and will not be resolved in the upcoming months. However, there is a window of opportunity now to avert mass mortality. Considering that resources are limited, it is critical to plan on the basis of respective organisations roles, capacities and level of access. Promote resilience: Resilience is a small investment relative to needs. Existing resilience programmes (building capacity or strengthening local institutions) need to continue: resilience-building cannot be an afterthought or only considered during the non-famine stages of the response. Bring in regional perspectives: A regional perspective was lacking in the 2011 response. This is an important lesson. Planning must include organisations based in Ethiopia and Kenya. There has been plentiful resilience programming in these countries, and this should be harnessed. Ways forward It was felt that meeting informally under the Chatham House rule encouraged frank and open discussion about current shortcomings and how to overcome them in the interests of affected people. It was agreed that ODI will continue to convene these discussions; organisations in Mogadishu and Nairobi must also explore ways to continue the conversations in situ, and turn talk into concrete action. The roundtable also recommended setting up a working group to improve accountability. Participants discussed whether it would be valuable to meet and work outside the parameters of the UN Country Team, where interactions are invariably driven by agency interest and there is less incentive in building on the strength of the collective, including local and international NGOs.

5 Further attention to the crisis should also be encouraged, such as through the donor meeting held in London on 23 February by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to discuss the donor response or through messaging on Arab and regional media to catalyse funding from the public.