Somalia NGO Consortium Drought-Update. Informal Humanitarian Donor Group February 15, 2017

Transcription

1 Somalia NGO Consortium Drought-Update Informal Humanitarian Donor Group February 15, 2017

2 Discussion Points Lessons Learned & Context Updates NGO Drought Response Operational Constraints Localization

3 (More) Lessons Learned & Context Updates IPC Map Forecasts Can Change Fast Is a Dry Shabelle a Game Changer? Prepare for IDPs, but Early Cash is Still King!

4 IPC Can be Change quickly and non-linearly Jan. 28 th 2011 FSNAU Post Deyr 2010 Jan. 28 th 2011 FSNAU Jan Jun 2011 Projection Jul FSNAU Post Gu 2011

5 Shabelle River Historic Low January 11 th 2017 Shabelle River at Afgoye Town

6 Resilience Working Group Recommended Actions Product includes activity recommendations and considerations around two main strategies, both urgent: Strategy 1: To prepare for and respond to newly displaced populations Strategy 2: To limit further displacement and support pre-existing IDPs RWG Drought Field Monitoring Questionnaire

7 Cash Now is Life Saving in July Non linear curve represents collapse in coping strategies. Early response Objective is not mitigation or pre-famine, it to reduce the peak of mortality/morbidity in July Possible Timeline for Evolution of 2017 Crisis. Linear Famine timeline Possible crisis timeline. M A G N I T U D E Mortality Reduction Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

8 NGO Drought Responses NGO Early Actions Sectoral Break-Down So Far Challenges and Gaps

9 NGO Early Actions to Drought 27 Major NGOs, including 16 Local partners, provided inputs on current funding for drought response.

10 Health Nutrition

11 WASH Education

12 Food Security

13 SNC and Member Advocacy RWG Early Warning Presentation (Sep `16) Early Action Press Release + Call to Action (Nov `16) Global: Call for Action Letters (Ongoing) & Weekly Global Calls with NGO Advocacy Focal Points UK: Somalia Advocacy Group (SAG) (Ongoing) US: InterAction Horn of Africa WG (Ongoing) Geneva: ICVA (Ongoing) Regional: IAWG (Ongoing)

14 Challenges and Gaps Cash Coordination of beneficiaries needed now! Likely to be big talking point over the next year Coordination in general No clusters in Somaliland Weak utilization of 3W Matrix Surge Capacity Limitations Reduce Quality of Work Particular issues in non-cash sectors Donor/Director-level overwhelmed now, Field level overwhelmed soon Lack of Local NGO Leadership in the Response

15 Operational Constraints Access still a major issue Check point transaction costs Registration Fees Risk Thresholds & Counter Terrorism Remittances

16 Working on Islands of Access: Approx 85% South Inaccessible June 2011 February 2016 *Humanitarian Access Maps: Please contract for sources

17 Isbaaro (Static Checkpoints) February 2016 The security forces do not follow orders. Some are not well trained. They behave like gangs or clan-militias sometimes even killing each other (name withheld) Transparency Solutions Report

18 NGO Registration Fees *All costs in USD

19 Risk Thresholds As situation worsens, the likelihood that organizations can reach formerly inaccessible locations to register beneficiaries for cash transfers will greatly increase. For this opportunity to be fully realized, donors must update and communicate their acceptable risk thresholds to partners. The IHDG is a good forum to begin discussions on which donors may be open to higher risk humanitarian investments. And to designate locations where those donors can make higher impact investments.

20 Counter-Terrorism Legislation NGOs may negotiate humanitarian access with Al Shabaab without this violating UN sanctions, or any major donor s domestic laws, provided that no material or financial compensation is involved. Should NGOs negotiating access intentionally make payments to Al Shabaab-affiliated personnel, they would commit a criminal offense under counter-terrorism laws in donor countries. The liability of individual staff members of these organizations could be engaged. In some situations, through clauses in funding agreements, donor governments impose a no- or limited-contact rule with individuals/groups they have listed. This is the case with some donors for operations in Somalia. Such clauses may also require that organizations refrain from working in Al Shabaab-held areas. Such counter-terrorism clauses usually stipulate specific consequences in case of non-compliance (typically, the loss of the remaining amount of the grant, and/or the obligation to reimburse the amount already spent).

21 Remittances With the closure of bank accounts in the US for the Somali money transfer companies, they are forced to move money in bags from the US to Dubai. They legally declare their money at Customs at US airports and then the staff travels with that bag. However, with lack of electronic transfer of funds we are concerned that with increased remittance and diaspora funding cannot be absorbed by the current logistics heavy system. Also, with the new US administration and the Muslim travel ban, there is concern that this mode of transport will soon be stopped by the US Government for alleged security concerns.

22 Localisation Lessons From 2011 Current Situation

23 Lessons from 2011 Local NGOs were the primary actors used in responding and scaling up by UN and INGOs. No long term investment in institutional capacity of these partners and no investment in short term capacity as part of the response. Financial problems a few are deliberate cases of fraud but majority are lack of poor management and capacity gaps in managing risks. 100% transference of the risk to local NGOs they do bulk of the work, risk their lives and when a problem occurs they were blacklisted, not the INGOs or UN agencies that partnered with them, destroying organizations that are over 10 years old. Created a pull factor - most INGOs and UN agencies did not have access, pumping majority of cash and other interventions into urban centers.

24 Current Situation Grand Bargain commitment on localization of 25% target Somalia is doing poorly on this (e.g. Adeso). SHF is not the solution to meeting the 25% target. Support to long term investment in the capacity of both local NGOs and local/national government institutions such as SODMA, HADMA, NERAD, etc should be a priority going forward. Scale of the problem is national and not limited to South/Central Somalia thus in the North access is possible, monitoring is easy. Mobile money transfer technology is now more available throughout the country.

25 Local Actor s Cash Response Local NGOs that have strong capacity in the North should lead in the response in SL and PL where mobile money transfer reduces risks, monitoring/access is easier and capacity is higher. Requesting UNICEF in resurrecting the cash and vouchers monitoring group where UNICEF can lead on behalf of a large national NGO response in SL/PL. Planned response in SL and PL by Adeso and local NGOs targeting 60% of the total need at 714,947 people through cash transfers in PL and SL approximately $40 million.

26 INGO Response Cash Response In the South, reactivating the Cash Consortium (ACF, Adeso, DRC and Save the Children) led by INGOs in partnership with local NGOs. Prioritizing access to rural villages and reducing the pull factor to urban centers. Innovative ways to register and access households through religious leaders and traders using mobile money transfers. Targeting 60% of those in need in South/Central approximately 1,088,400 people.

27 Somalia NGO Consortium Thank you.