CHAPTER XI THE ARMISTICE AND TREATY FOR REGULARIZA- TION OF THE WAR, 1820

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1 CHAPTER XI THE ARMISTICE AND TREATY FOR REGULARIZA- J TION OF THE WAR, 1820 T has been already mentioned that Morillo, about the time of Boyacd, was talking loudly about the new expedition which was coming from Spain. He had received notice that there was assembling at Cadiz, for the re-conquest of Spanish America, a force consisting of 20,200 infantry, 2800 cavalry, and 1370 artillerymen, with parks and supplies of every sort. When Ferdinand VII. returned from France to his kingdom in 1814, he was resolved to rule absolutely. He abolished the Regency, the Cortes, and every institution incompatible with autocratic rule. These measures being followed by various revolts, Ferdinand thought he might do a good deal towards getting rid of dangerous elements by sending them off on an expedition to South America He was also anxious to leave no opening to the French, who were intriguing for the appointment of a Portuguese prince as King of Buenos Aires. The chief command was given to O'Donnell, but he was the real soul of the conspiracy in favour of constitutional government Presently, he was suspected and replaced by the Conde de Calderon. At this moment there was an outbreak of yellow fever in Cadiz, which helped to fan the fire of discontent in the army, by adding a new terror to the prospect of a voyage to South America, A fresh conspiracy was hatched under the direction of Antonio Quiroga. On 24Z Q

2 242 SIMON BOLIVAR the 1st January 1820, two battalions, headed by Rafael Riego, broke into revolt and seized Calderon, the commander-in-chief Quiroga was voted leader of the revolution. Ferdinand now thought matters were alarming, and saw the sceptre slipping from his grasp, notwithstanding the suppression! of the revolt and the execution of Riego. He accordingly summoned the Cortes, and no more was heard of the great expedition to South America. Morillo heard of the revolutiçn at Cadiz at the end of March 1820, Bolivar not till late in April. The former naturally said little about it, and equally naturally, Bolivar was delighted at what, it was not difficult to foresee, meant the end of the idea of reinforcements from Spain for the enemy. Leaving Angostura on the 24th December 1819, Bolivar spent most of January in Apure and Guadalito, reaching Cócuta on the 8th February. After reviewing the "army of the north," and visiting some of the neighbouring towns in Merida, he went to Socorro where, on the 25th February, he received news that Santander had, on the 12th, proclaimed in Bogota the fundamental law for the union of Venezuela and New Granada. To Santander's compliments he replied in the same strain. Santander, whatever his faults, was not lacking in capacity, and had made much progress in the work of administration in, Bogota and the neighbourhood, The Congress which' Bolivar left sitting at Angostura had also been prolific in laws for the government of the republic, and in conferring honours on the Liberator. He was to be called "Liberator- President" on every occasion, his picture was to be hung in the Congress Hall, with his name and titles inscribed in letters of gold, "Bolivar, Liberator of Colombia, Father of his Country, Terror of Despotism." Finally, a law was passed regulating elections to the

3 BOLIVAR RETURNS TO NEW GRANADA 243 General Constituent Congress. The principal business of this Congress would be the final approval of the Constitution of i819, The Congress of Angostura then dissolved itself on the 19th January i82o. Bolivar, on the march once more to Bogota, reached Tunja on the 1st March, Bogota on the 4th. During the eighteen days of his stay there, he discussed with Santander the campaign both in the south and in the north of New Granada. Expeditions were sent out in all directions, and Valdés, who had arrived from the east with a division, was despatched to Neiva on the upper Magdalena, in order to guard the southern provinces, and to prepare for the advance hereafter to the liberation of what is now Ecuador, and of Peru. He had also to eject the royalists under Caizada from Popayan, which they had wrested from Antonio Obando. Cauca was constituted a new province, and Colonel Cordova, a native of Antioquia,' who had recently been employed in raising the people of that province, was now directed to do the same in the plains about Mompox. Mariano Montilla, with the Irish Brigade, had disembarked on the 13th March at Rio Hacha on the north coast, whence he had marched on Valle de Upar. Thence, however, fearing attacks on his communications by the Spaniards in Maracaibo and Santa Marta, he had returned to Rio Hacha to refit. At that place, Devereux's 2 Irishmen (óoo out of the total of 1300 'The Province of Antioquia is situated mainly in the Central and Western Cordilleras. Its population has a larger admixture of European blood than any other in the Republic of Colombia of the present day. 2 John Devereux, an Irish adventurer of some private means, had assisted Bolivar's expedition from Haiti in,8i6. He and io of his men still remained with Montilla till Cartagena was taken in In 1822 he was sent as Colombian envoy to Russia, etc. He became blind, and in 1840 was granted a small pension an Colombia, as he had apparently spent all his fortune in the service of his adopted country. Some of these Irish appear to have been ex-rcbcls of One Aylmer, at any rate, a rebel commander In Wexford, was killed at Rio Ilacha

4 244 SIMON BOLIVAR with Montilla) mutinied, These poor wretches sacked Rio Hacha (which was probably very poor sport, as it was a wretched place), and getting drunk, fired it. Montilla reported this to the Governor of Jamaica, and the British admiral, though why he should have expected them to manage his Irish mercenaries is not quite clear. Eventually the Irish were shippd off to Jamaica, and Bolivar expressed his satisfaction at getting rid of them. Of course, nothing is too bad to be said of them, according to Larrazabal, but it must be remembered that, after all, they were only mercenaries fighting for Venezuela, against the orders of their own sovereign, and they naturally expected, at least, pay and decent food. They had got neither, nor even plunder, and it is not very surprising that they, having no personal interest in the cause for which they fought, should have striven to help themselves. Rio Macha being an open roadstead, Montilla thought it unadvisable to hold on there, and that he would do better to invade the province of Cartagena. Meanwhile, Morillo the Spanish commander-in-chief had his forces distributed thus :- La Torre, with 1400 men, in Merida, watching Bolivar. Morales, with 2300 men in Calabozo. Real, in Barinas, kept open! the communications between these two. Morillo himself had 2500 at Valencia, San Carlos, and Pao. There were 1300 men in garrbon at Cumana; i 000 in Barcelona ; 4000 were distributed, in small free corps, between Maracaibo and Caracas. Altogether there were about 14,000 men, distributed over an enormous area, under Morillo's command. In addition to these, Sáano rn had 2000 in Cartagena, whilst Calzada, with 3000 in the south, was acting under orders of Aymerich, the President of Quito. The distribution was far too wide, and Morillo would have done

5 MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 245 better to keep his troops together and make an effort to destroy Bolivar, rather than aim at holding outlying places, which must fall if the Liberator and his army were finally disposed of. Bolivar, with better judgment, decided to concentrate his efforts on only two points, the destruction of Morillo, and, as a minor matter, the defence of the south, which was necessary to protect his own rear. On the 19th April, he issued a short proclamation to his soldiers, reminding them that it was the tenth anniversary of the first effort towards liberty the deposition of Empáran at Caracas and recalling the struggles since then. As for Morillo, he had for a long time deferred proclaiming the Constitution recently granted to Spain. Now, under positive orders from home, he was compelled to do so, and to release the political prisoners. These orders had been followed by instructions to open negotiations with the "disidentes" of Venezuela. The term was, as Larrazabal remarks, a considerable amelioration of those of" sedition mongers," "rebels" or" bandits," which had been generally used hitherto in orders from Spain. Morillo was disgusted, and is reported to have said: "They are fools in Madrid, not understanding what they order ; they know neither this country nor what has occurred, nor the present circumstances. They wish me to condescend to treat with those whom I have fought to undergo the humiliation of calling the seditious my friends, and recognising as brothers those whom, as enemies and rebels, I have wounded in the most sensitive place. Thus all will be lost I will obey, but it is useless to hope any longer for the subjugation of these provinces." The Count of Cartagena certainly concluded rightly. The time for negotiations and pacification had long passed, though there had surely been room for it in the days of Monteverde, or before. The struggle had now been too long and too embittered to

6 246 SIMON BOLIVAR be determined by anything but the complete overthrow of one party or the other by main force. With the prospect of the arrival of more than 20,000 Europeans there had stilt been hopes of the revolutionists being crushed now, since Riego's mutiny had brought about the abandonment of this expedition, there was no hope of reinforcements from Spain, and Morillo must have recognised that it could only be a question of time when his existing army should be worn down, if not defeated, by a hostile nation constantly recruited from the whole of its population. Nevertheless, Morillo loyally carried out his orders. He established a:" Junta of Pacification" in Caracas, and entered into communication with the various republican leaders, Bolivar, Paez, Bermudez, Monãgas, Zaraza, and many others, including the Congress of Angostura. Perhaps hb had a lingering hope that, by addressing all of them separately, dissension might arise among men whose ambitions he must have known, and many of whom he might suspect of being ready to desert the common cause in their own personal interests. Bolivar was now fully aware of the new position of affairs in Spain. He had learnt everything from Spanish correspondence intercepted in Chiriguaná. In a long letter to Soublette, dated Rosario de Cucuta, the 19th June i S2o,1 Bolivar shows that he understands the desperate position of the Spanish king, pressed by the liberals and afraid of an army which was desirous of peace. Ferdinand had no option but to negotiate for the stoppage of the war in South America. The Liberator was willing to enter into, even to facilitate negotiations, but he would insist as a preliminary condition, on the recogniton of Colombia's independence as a republic. His concluding remarks on the incapacity of his own government at Angostura are far from complimentary, I Quoted in extenso by Larrazabal, ii. 34.

7 MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 247 and he is especially furious at their neglect to send him the arms which, as he was aware, had reached Angostura. Vice-President Zea had now gone to England, and German Roscio had been elected to succeed him. The Congress, which had dissolved in January, was reassembled to consider the proposals of Morillo's delegates- Their answer had practically been dictated by Bolivar in his letter to Soublette, and it was delivered to the Spanish envoys, Cirés and Duarte, as follows "The sovereign Congress will gladly entertain all proposals of the Spanish government having for basis the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Colombia; it will admit none which differ from the principle so often proclaimed by the government and people of the Republic." Bolivar himself replied in similar terms, on the 7th July, to La Torre, and on the 23rd to Morillo. Leaving the Spanish commissioners to digest these replies, he now went off on a tour to the Magdalena, visiting Mompox, Barranquilla, and Turbaco, within a few miles of Cartagena, in order to make arrangements for the continuation of Urdaneta's campaign in those parts.' At Barranquilla he received a proposal from Torres, the Spanish governor of Cartagena, for a suspension of hostilities. Seeing, however, that Torres demanded the submission of Colombia, Bolivar angrily replied that he would have nothing to do with such proposalsy Cartagena was strictly blockaded by land by Mariano Montilla, who had been joined by Cordova from Mompox. During this campaign Lois Brion commanded the operations on the Magdalena, and eventually captured Santa Marta on the i ith November lie died shortly afterwards at Curaçao, after spending the whole of his fortune in the service of the republican cause. 2 Larrazabal defends the terms of Bolivar's letter to Tories against Restrepo, who calls them harsh-" O'Leary honestly admits that Tories was indignant at "the insults which had been hurled at the nation to which he gloried in belonging " He refers to Bolivar's angry reply. To do him justice, Bolivar was generally polite in his correspondence, even with the enemy.

8 248 SIMON BOLIVAR The Liberator was back at Ct'icuta by the middle of September to find that the Spaish commissioners had come down somewhat in their terms, for, though they still insisted on an oath of fealty to Ferdinand, and the acceptance of the Spanish constitution, they were willing that the republican chiefs should retain authority in the districts they occupied, subject to the general control of the Spanish commander-in-chief. This was refused by the Colombians. The proposal certainly seems to smack of an attempt to work upon the personal ambitions of the leaders, and thus to induce them to betray the common cause. Nevertheless, I4orillo, in proposing an armistice, had addressed Bolivar as "President of the Republic of Colombia." Bolivar's first agent in London had been Lopez Mendez, who had succeeded in ruining Colombian credit there. Probably the unfortunate envoy was more helpless than deceitful, for he had really very little basis on which to seek credit. Anyhow, the pages of Hippisley 1 show that Mendez had succeeded in making Colombian promises a byword of contempt land distrust Zea had now been sent to replace him. He succeeded in satisfying the creditors of the republic by the issue of transferable debentures bearing interest at 10 per cent. if paid in London, or 12 per cent. if paid in Colombia.2 Besides attending to financial matters, Zea attempted to open negotiations with the Duke of Frias, Spanish Ambassador in London, regarding the recognition of Colombian independence. His advances were rejected by Spain and disapproved by Bolivar. His idea was for a voluntary recognition by Spain of American independence, to be followed by a I confederation of the 1 "ANarrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Orinoco and Apure, etc.," passim. It is not necessary to recapitulate here the history of Colombian bonds. A short epitome will be found at P. 32t of the author's book, "The Republic of Colombia." The story is hardly a creditable one.

9 MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 249 Spanish-speaking peoples. In the United States, Tortes, the Colombian agent, found an advocate in Henry Clay, President of the Chamber of Representatives. But the Government held aloof. Sucre, on the other hand, had been successful in procuring from the Windward Islands the 10,000 muskets about which Bolivar was so angry with his people in Angostura when he wrote to Soublette on the 19th June. They were sent up the Orinoco in April, and on, partly by the Arauca, partly by the Meta, to Bolivar. On the 2 1st September Bolivar wrote to Morillo regarding the proposed armistice, which appeared to be intended as a preliminary of peace.' He still rode the high horse, alleging that, unless the armistice was to be preceded by an acknowledgment of Colombian independence, it would be detrimental to the interests of the republican; who, by continuing hostilities, might reasonably expect to conquer the rest of Venezuela, as well as Quito. He ended by saying his headquarters would be at San Fernando by the end of October. Meanwhile, hostilities continued. Bolivar occupied the provinces of Merida and Trujillo. On the 26th September he wrote again to Morillo, who had not yet replied that he could not go to San Fernando, and proposing conditions for the armistice. These Morillo rejected, and then Bolivar wrote to him proposing a treaty to " regularise the war of horrors and crimes which so far has inundated Colombia with tears and blood." By way, apparently, of enforcing his views, Morillo had, during this correspondence, advanced from Bar, quisemeto to Carache, with 2000 infantry and 200 cavalry. Bolivar at once wrote that he would accept no terms dictated by force, adding Your Excellency will be responsible before humanity and your nation for the O'Leary, Docta., 17, P. 449.

10 250 SIMON BOLIVAR continuation of this bloody struggle, the final result of which will be either the emancipation of the whole of America, or else its complete destruction, if it is still proposed to subdue it." Nothing could shake Bolivar's firmness. Negotiations were continued at a meeting of the commissioners of both sides on the 21st November. It lasted till the night of the 25th, when the terms were finally settled, after much discussion. The armistice was to last for six months; the usual provisions 'ere made for the delimitation of the spheres of occupation. Envoys for the conclusion of peace were to be nominated, and either party desiring to terminate the armistice before the period named must give forty days' notice of his intention. Finally, a treaty for the regularisation of the war was to be made. This treaty was signed on the 26th. 1 It provided for exchange and proper treatment of prisoners, and abolished the death penalty in the case àí deserters recaptured from the enemy. The dead in battle were to be properly buried or burnt, captured towns were not to be sacked or burnt; in a word, the war henceforward was to be carried on as if between 8vilised nations, not as among savages. The armistice and treaty being concluded, Morillo expressed a desire to make the personal acquaintance of his antagonist, to which Bolivar willingly agreed. The place fixed for the meeting was the hamlet of Santa Ana, midway between Bolivar's headquarters at Trujillo and Morillo's at Carache On the morning of the 27th November 1820, Morillo arrived there with a staff of some 50 officers, including La Torre, and an escort of a squadron of hussars. Shortly afterwards Given in full by O'Leary (ii. z). The preamble distinctly describes one party as 'The most Excellent President of the Republic of Colombia, Simon Bolivar." This is repeated in Morillo's ratification.

11 ARMISTICE AND TREATY CONCLUDED 251 O'Leary announced the approach of Bolivar. Morillo asked him what escort the republican chief brought. On being told Bolivar had only 10 or 12 officers, besides the Spanish commissioners, Morillo replied: "I thought I had adventured myself thus far with a very small guard, but my former enemy has outdone me in generosity I will order the hussars to retire," which he did. He also asked the names of any Spanish officers likely to be unwelcome to Bolivar, and ascertained that none of them were present. As the Liberator appeared in sight, Morillo, dressed in full uniform and wearing his orders, went forward with La Torre and others to meet him. Again he asked which was Bolivar, and, on O'Leary's pointing him out, exclaimed, "What! that little man with a blue coat and a military cap, riding a mule?" As they met, the two generals dismounted and embraced cordially. Then they returned to the best hut in Santa Ana, where Morillo had prepared breakfast. They spent the day together, talking over their wars, and equal harmony reigned between their officers. Both slept that night under the same roof. Morillo had proposed erecting a monument to commemorate this strange historic meeting, and a large square boulder was placed to mark the spot meanwhile. Next day the Spanish and Colombian chiefs parted on the most cordial terms, never to meet again.' Both appear to have been perfectly satisfied with their interview. A few days before signing the armistice and the treaty, Morillo had received orders from Spain relieving him of the command of the army of Venezuela, La Torre being appointed to succeed ham. Morillo handed over charge at Caracas on the 14th December 1820, and, on the 17th, sailed from La Guaira for Spain. He appears no more in this history. This account is taken from O'Leary (ii 5659).

12 252 SIMON BOLIVAR O'Leary 1 gives an estimate of Morillo which, perhaps, may be taken as a fairly imprtiai one. The Spanish commander was essentially a soldier rather than an administrator. "Without the sword in his hand his manly figure was insignificant, and it was only in the field that he felt himself in his true place." He was incapable of perceiving the great opportunity which still existed even after he was master of New Granada, for conciliation by just and humane measures of administration. His wholesale executions of men like Camilo Torres and Caldas were a grave political mistake which culminated in his appointment to the Viceroyalty of such a savage as Sámano. Morillo had done much for the liberation of Spain from the French; all the merit he thus acquired was wiped out by his enthusiasm for the enslavement of the colonies. But to his administration some credit must be given for the public works, roads, bridges, etc., which he carried dut during his short residence in New Granada. If his methods of enforcing work on them were unpopular, theywere really necessary, in order to arouse the natural indolence of the Granadians in such a cause. I In Venezuela his executions were fewer, for he incurred greater resistance, and his appetite for blood was satisfied on the battlefield. His personal courage was admitted on all hands; even the Llaneros, none too prodigal of their praises of the valour of others, used to say of him that "it was a pity he was born in Spain, and a shame that he was not a patriot." For Bolivar, after the meeting at Santa Ana, he always expressed the highest admiration, and when O'Leary and Soublette visited him in his retirement at Corunna, in 1835, he willingly supplied them with such of Bolivar's papers as had fallen into his hands during 1 IL 63, and Preface to vol. i.

13 CHARACTER OF MORILLO 253 the war. Restrepo (iii. 8o) deals more briefly with Morillo, but does not differ widely from O'Leary in his general estimate of his character. After making arrangements for the carrying into effect of the armistice, and the posting of his troops during it, Bolivar returned (22nd December) to San Christbbal, intending to go south, at least as far as Popayan. His real motive for visiting the south was to get into communication with San Martin, O'Higgins, and the other patriots in Chile, Peru, and Guayaquil. At the last-named place a revolution had occurred, on the 9th October 1820, of which information had been sent to Colombia, by ships from Guayaquil to Buenaventura, on the Pacific coast of Colombia.