Christian KEUSCHNIGG. Europe after Brexit

Transcription

1 Christian KEUSCHNIGG Europe after Brexit Executive MBL-HSG & HSG Alumni, Zürich, 13. September 2016 Wirtschaftspolitisches Zentrum Wien St. Gallen

2 Plan of Talk Brexit a historical event 1. How Brexit came about 2. Economic and political consequences 3. Future of EU a more normative and personal view WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 2

3 I. How Brexit came about 1957, March 25: Treaty of Rome, 6 countries creation EC (European Economic Community), start , July 21: Stockholm convention creation EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, CH, and U.K. 1972, July 22: EC EFTA free trade agreements EC with Austria, Iceland, Portugal, Sweden and CH 1973, January 1: first enlargement, from 6 to 9 DK, Ireland and U.K. join EC, referenda U.K. yes, Norway: no 1992, February 7: Maastricht treaty creates EU 1992, May 2: creation of EEA (Eur. Economic Area) EEA extends single market to EFTA countries must adopt acquis, free movement of workers extended to people 2002, January 1: Euro cash starts to circulate 2016, June 23: Brexit WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 3

4 I. How Brexit came about 300' '000 UK s trade in goods and services, In Million, ' '433 million 200' '000 When UK joined EU in 1973, 33% of exports to EU. Today, 44% of exports to EU, 55% of imports from EU. 100'000 Source: Office for National Statistics, The Pink Book 2016 (Chapter 9). 60'955 50'000 44'755 32'073 29'328 26'085 39'288 0 Total EU28 Germany France Netherlands Ireland Rest of the world United States of America WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 4 China

5 I. How Brexit came about UK s FDI outflows, assets in billion, billion Source: Office for National Statistics, 2016, The Pink Book 2016 (Chapter 10) Total EU28 Netherlands Luxembourg France Ireland Spain Germany Rest of the World USA WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 5

6 I. How Brexit came about UK s FDI inflows, liabilities in billion, Research suggests: 28% of FDI in UK are motivated by EU membership! billion Source: Office for National Statistics, 2016, The Pink Book 2016 (Chapter 10) Total EU28 Netherlands France Luxembourg Germany Spain Ireland Rest of the World USA WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 6

7 I. How Brexit came about Source: HM Treasury, 2015, European Union Finances 2015, p. 16. WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 7

8 I. How Brexit came about Importance of Financial Center, 2014 Source: UK Trade and Investment, 2016, UK Financial Centers of Excellence, p WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 8

9 I. How Brexit came about Immigration to UK by Citizenship, in thousands Source: Office for National Statistics, 2015, International Migration Data British Citizenship EU Citizenship Non-EU Citizenship WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 9

10 I. How Brexit came about Foreign Nationals in % of Total Population, Source: House of Commons, 2016, Briefing Paper Migration Statistics, p. 22. WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 10

11 I. How Brexit came about Reflections on the vote, June 23 politically very divisive vote 73% of voted remain, 60% of 65+ voted leave majority of employed voted remain, those without jobs leave Scotland, City voted remain, rural areas leave Motives fears of immigration and globalization loss of national sovereignty, too much centralization distrust of experts/elite, didn t believe negative consequences costs of «remain»: short-run, highly visible, benefits: long-run, more diffuse, less certain organization of vote: leave option vague, not clearly defined WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 11

12 II. Economic and political consequences What is alternative to EU? voters not informed about which alternative to EU! for same reason: consequences difficult to predict 2 extreme outcomes 1. Norway model: cooperative outcome 2. WTO model: non-cooperative outcome pursue common interest, or not WTO model a non-cooperative, negative outcome greatest autonomy, greatest damage, economic, and political? complete separation, EU treats UK like third country all EU law to be replaced by national law WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 12

13 II. Economic and political consequences WTO model the shock consequences market access : external tariffs, rising non-tariff barriers market access: financial services regulation (Citi) some fiscal savings in net contributions (compensation?) more control over migration less inward FDI, more outward FDI WTO model consequences for UK slow process: lower productivity, less investment & growth estimates: 6-8% poorer in long-run, e.g. corresponds to.5 pp slower annual growth over 15 years political cohesion of UK (Scotland, border controls Ireland) WTO model consequences for EU Research: without EU integration, GDP per capita 12% lower UK 65 Mio. people, 13% of EU population, 16% of EU28 GDP 16% of single market, 16% smaller gains from integration WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 13

14 II. Economic and political consequences Norway model a cooperative, positive outcome smallest economic losses, smallest gain in autonomy largely keep market access and common EU law, but e.g. exclude agriculture limited gain in migration control, if at all must continue to pay contributions, small fiscal savings might be required for political cohesion of U.K. (Scotland) Disappointment of Brexit expectations little fiscal savings, little gain in autonomy not much migration control (unless EU changes) loss of influence on EU developments and internationally difficulties in market access of financial sector WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 14

15 III. Future of EU Future of EU: a more normative, personal view consider reasons and motives for Brexit vote, also elsewhere limits to immigration, fiscal burden, distrust, loss of autonomy heterogeneity requires decentralization, subsidiarity principle voters: balanced debate, mutual gains & costs of integration Brexit: continued Brussels bashing did not help Huge tension: EU and Eurozone in EU, voters want less integration/more autonomy in Eurozone, stability requires more integration/less autonomy Eurozone crisis resulted further loss of sovereignty fiscal compact, much stricter since government debt more risky ESM, managing fiscal crisis and default, forced reform banking union, central oversight, resolution, deposit insurance this loss in autonomy required for stability of Eurozone WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 15

16 III. Future of EU Eurozone defines core of EU largest loss in autonomy: Euro & common monetary policy optimal currency area: stability of Euro need more wage flexibility, fiscal insurance, labor mobility to replace national exchange rate adjustments labor mobility important within Eurozone, less outside Principles of cooperation reward cooperation to sustain stability of EU punish deviations (exit) from cooperative strategy deny special deals for each one (UK, CH, Norway ) keep exclusive rights and benefits for core members Two layers of Europe Core EU: all (prospective) Eurozone countries EEA: no Euro, more limited integration, more autonomy WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 16

17 III. Future of EU Core EU economic & monetary integration, Euro & related institutions all 4 freedoms without restrictions, including internal migration full representation in joint decision making (exclusive right) need more reform: in migration and other areas EEA prevent fiscal externalities of migration (portability of benefits) would be consistent with some entry tax, instead of quotas reinstate subsidiarity principle: review federal assignments Norway model: economic, but not monetary integration access to common market (like FTA), without CAP contribution payments, with transparent and universal rules more autonomy, migration less important outside Eurozone no representation, but consultation (acquis communautaire) enforcement by EU / EEA courts some package for all, no special deals WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 17

18 III. Future of EU Conclusions countries would have to choose between clear alternatives (unlike with Brexit vote) enhanced EEA: for those not willing or ready to adopt Euro UK, CH, Norway, Eastern Europe, Turkey cooperation: full representation is exclusive to core EU incentives to move up from EEA to core EU past examples: Austria, Finland, Sweden from EFTA to EU if not, EEA for common interest and equitable cost sharing WPZ Wien St.Gallen Prof. Dr. Christian Keuschnigg 18