15th June 2016 Issue 29

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1 15th June 2016 Issue 29 Issue 29 of the series reviews, analyses and threat assesses the fragile and conflict affected coastal states Libya, Somalia and Yemen. The Mediterranean migrant crisis, incidents affecting maritime security and influencing maritime news are also reported and analysed, focusing on the keys theatres of maritime instability. The Maritime Intelligence Report Series focuses on: Contents: Page Areas of instability which could affect the passage or port call of your vessel; Changes or impediments to navigation/restrictions of; and Charts and analysis detailing piracy, suspicious approaches and hijackings. MAST has a global reach and presence, delivering first hand, accurate and exclusive intelligence. MAST is entrenched and committed in continuing to support and promote the awareness of the very real risks that seafarers and stakeholders face. Indian Ocean Region 2 Somalia 3 Yemen 4 Yemen Ports 5 Mediterranean 6 Libya 7 Gulf of Guinea 8 South East Asia 9 Central & South America 10 Mast Services 11 This Intelligence Report Series is a brief snapshot of MAST s Intelligence capabilities. MAST Intelligence specialises in providing clients with a suite of products, including; detailed port and vessel security briefs, vessel passage plans, threat and risk mitigation, travel risk management. Working closely in conjunction with a host of experts, MAST Intelligence offers a market leading service pertaining to all maritime affairs. Follow MAST on LinkedIn and Twitter to keep abreast with these insightful weekly reports and more including real time security updates. Editor: Alexander Farrow Business Intelligence Officer alex.farrow@mast-security.co.uk MAST UK +44 (0) operations@mast-security.com MAST Singapore ben.stewart@mast-security.com 24/7 Emergency Telephone: +44(0)

2 Indian Ocean Region HRA rebrand possibility It is understood that BIMCO is looking to replace the HRA with a Piracy Risk Area, which will equate to the UKMTO reporting area, which is in line with the HRA prior to the 1st December 2015 reduction. Drones in the Suez Canal A vessel has been detained for using a drone whilst transiting the Suez Canal. Shortly after the drone had been launched, reportedly in order to photograph the vessel, the master was requested by the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) to drop anchor. During the SCA s subsequent inspection, they confiscated the drone and it s memory card and the vessel was detained in anticipation of further investigations by the Egyptian authorities. The vessel is registered with Scandinavian P&I Club Gard which has since warned its members on the dangers of using drones at sea and issued advice. It is likely that the SCA was concerned the drone was being used for malicious surveillance, although the actual intent was innocent. This raises concerns about the future use of drones and the varying laws in different countries (both written and unwritten) as this small photographic stunt incurred delays and inconvenience to the vessel. Threat Assessment Recent concerning incidents in the HRA have included; a tanker in the IRTC (12Jan16), MSC Clara in the Bab el Mandeb (27Jan16), an MV in the Arabian Sea (15Apr16), an MV off Al Mukalla (24Apr16) and an MV in the IRTC (16May16), all previously reported in this series. Precisely what happened in several of these incidents in not entirely clear and they have subsequently been branded as suspicious approaches. This discounts the fact that in most cases the armed security teams on-board sighted weapons and ladders demonstrating clear intent for acts of piracy. The recent UN Contact Group on piracy off the coast of Somalia, highlighted concern that Somali government officials have been unwilling and unable to prosecute investors, while concurrently many convicted pirates are completing prison sentences. Equally EUNAVFOR has stated that there has been a general reduction of; BMP 4 vessel hardening measures, naval presence and armed guards. All of these issues point to an increased opportunity for Somali pirates and leads us to be concerned for the future security of the region. Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1st December 2015 HRA limits 2

3 Somalia Mogadishu Security It has been reported that sporadic fighting continues in Mogadishu including gunfire, mortar fire and terrorist activity. Details, as is often the case in Somalia, are hard to verify at this stage. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab has stated that it has executed 4 individuals accused of espionage, specifically leaking information to the US. Al Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the shootings of a Somali Government official and driver in Mogadishu on 15th June. It is likely Al Shabaab will seek to disrupt the upcoming Federal elections. Somali Pirate Sentences It has been reported that five Somali pirates have been sentenced by the Seychelles to 12 years imprisonment. The offences were said to have been committed in the Gulf of Aden between the 1st and 18th January These convictions conclude all outstanding piracy cases for Somali pirates. In conjunction with these final convictions, many previously convicted pirates are completing their sentences and being released. There has been little substantial change in Somalia s employment prospects in the last decade and it is likely many released pirates will return to piracy on release, as is the case with criminal reoffenders around the World. Threat Assessment: The Somali National Army and AMISOM continue to struggle to maintain security over Mogadishu. This is largely the status quo and Mogadishu Port continues to be operational, with no serious setbacks. However it should be noted that In March 2016, Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) stated that Al Shabaab was planning a major attack on the main ports in Somalia, after receiving credible intelligence. According to the Somalia National News Agency, Al Shabaab militants seen at the small town of Grarad were planning to attack the port of Bosaso. The NISA stated that it had implemented all security measures in ports to ensure port safety and business continuity. The effect to which this has been implemented however cannot be confirmed. Under control of Al Shabaab and allies Under control of neutral forces Under the control of Government and allies Somaliland Government Control of Somali territory (10th June 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 3

4 Yemen UN Saudi Arabia: Following UN allegations of violating children's rights in Yemen and subsequent blacklisting, Saudi Arabia threatened this week to break relations with the UN and cut hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to its humanitarian relief and counterterrorism programs to strongarm the U.N. into removing Riyadh and its allies from a blacklist of groups that are accused of harming children in armed conflict. For further reading click here. Peace Talks Threat Assessment It has been reported that the UN s special envoy to Yemen, Esmail Ould Shaikh Ahmad, is to present a 3 point comprehensive plan to Yemen s warring factions in order to end the civil war. It is understood that the first point will pertain to preliminary procedures including the abolishment of the Houthi militia imposed Constitutional Declaration. The second point will centre on creating on internationally recognised and backed military, led by commanders who have not taken sides in the civil war. The capital, Sanna, and the surrounding area must also be returned to the recognised government within 2 months. The third point forecasts a 2 year transition period to reinstate a political process. We advise vessels to conduct a risk assessment and maintain increased levels of security when in the vicinity of Yemen or in Yemeni ports. As predicted by CMF at the 3rd May Oceans Beyond Piracy conference, the eastern section of the IRTC near the Yemen coastline has had reported piracy attempts. There have been 2 instances of gun fire exchange and 1 instance of evasive actions taken by an MV within the last few months. There is still a considerable AQAP presence in the region and although Al Mukalla has been liberated, AQAP and pirates are not reliant on the use of a port to launch skiffs, which may present a false sense of increasing regional security. Houthi Pro Hadi Government Forces Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Control of Yemen territory (22nd May 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 4

5 Yemen Ports Maritime Combined Coalition Command (MCCC) advises that all vessels operating in and around Yemen maintain AIS at all times and use approved UN Location Codes. UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) The UN s Secretary-General has decided to institute a UNVIM for the facilitation of commercial imports to Yemen, at the request of the Government of the Republic of Yemen and in line with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015). UNVIM is operational with immediate effect. Shipping companies or vessel owners shipping commercial goods or services to any port not under the direct control of the Government of Yemen (Salif, Mokha, Hudaydah and associated oil terminals) need to apply for permits upon departure of the port of origin of their cargo. For further details click here. UN arms embargo imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 2216 of 2015 is in place. Port Aden: The port of Aden is under the protection of the Republic of Yemen security forces. Curfew in effect for Aden, daily. Merchant vessels wishing to enter Yemeni ports must first apply for a permit through the Yemeni Ministry of Transportation; contact: yemen.transport@gmail.com for more information. Final clearance to enter Yemeni ports (with permits in place) is authenticated by the coalition guard ship. Aden is the only port in Yemen currently able to facilitate container vessels. The container terminal has it s capacity. recently increased Port Salif: Capacity 2 berths. Operating at capacity. Vessels experiencing severe delays due to minimal port equipment. Port Hudaydah: Capacity 5 berths. Reduced vessel berth capacity from 8 to 5 due to substantial damage from air strikes in July, especially to cranes. Only 1 of 5 shore based cranes in partial operation, container vessels highly recommended to have their own internal cranes. RSNF is utilizing a holding area 60 NM west of the port of Hudaydah for all vessels attempting entry into Salif or Hudaydah. Inbound vessels should plan on holding within this area prior to receiving clearance from port control warships. Port Mokha: No recorded activity since August Port Al Mukalla: Capacity 2 berths. Al Mukalla port was liberated on the 23/24 April by the Saudi-led coalition and southern resistance. Port officials have advised that port operations resumed on the 26th April. MCCC Notice: Following open source reporting of increased military activity in and around the Yemeni port city of Mukalla and the maritime security incident on the 24th April, where an MV was fired upon, please be advised that the security situation in the vicinity of the port has changed. Vessels using the port or operating nearby are advised to take additional security measures and proceed with caution. Coalition warships are patrolling in the area and should be hailed on VHF Channel 16 by any vessel witnessing or subject to threatening behaviour. 5

6 Mediterranean UNHRC: The UN refugee agency stated it expects 248,000 refugees and migrants to arrive in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean this year, far lower than the "up to 1 million" previously predicted. This downgraded prediction is attributable to the EU Turkey deal, which has largely closed this migrant route. However, migrant crossings from North Africa to Italy have increased on last year and it is this route that affects merchant shipping being roped into SOLAS operations. Migrant Rescues Italy's Coast Guard stated 1,348 migrants had been rescued in 11 rescue operations between Sicily and North Africa on 11th June, bringing the total number of people saved over a 3 day period to over 3,000. Threat Assessment Following the likely IED rigged life raft in May on the Turkish Syrian border, MAST is concerned that Islamist extremists may use a migrant vessel as a Trojan horse. We advise that any migrants being rescued should not be allowed onto a vessel carrying belongings. At the recent SCEG meeting, BIMCO re-enforced this, and advocate the same advice. It is known that human traffickers often carry small arms in order to maintain control over their vessel if the need arises. The weight of migrants may impact on the freedom of navigation if too many vessels are obliged by SOLAS to conduct rescue operations. At present many rescued migrants are disembarked in nearby Italy, but this depends heavily on the continued goodwill of the Italians. SOLAS operations in the Mediterranean can be complicated by the numbers of migrants involved, the nature of the migrant craft, the safety of the vessel s crew, medical issues or the potential for a terrorist incident. MAST can advise and provide training for crisis management and SOLAS operations, as well as on-board security advisors for port operations and assistance and guidance with rescue missions. 250, , , ,000 50,000 0 Analysis Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Migrant crossings Source: UNHRC It has been suggested by Professors from Italy s Palermo University in Sicily that the international warships deployed to disrupt human traffickers operating out of North Africa are in fact assisting the operating of human traffickers as they are often involved in migrant SOLAS solace operations., playing into traffickers hands. This problem is likely to persist for the foreseeable future unless a change is made to the mandate warships are operating under. Warships are unable to effectively blockade Libyan migrants at present as their mandate doesn t include Libyan Territorial Waters. Rescued migrants are not welcomed by the Libyan Government to return to Libya as the vast majority do not originate from Libya. Map depicting major migrant routes in the Mediterranean (14th June 2016). Source: UNHRC 6

7 Libya Libya Coast Guard The Netherlands and IOM Libya have signed an agreement for an 18-month project aimed at enhancing the Libyan Coast Guard s capacity to save lives at sea and supporting the humanitarian repatriation of vulnerable migrants from Libya. For further reading click here. UN Security Council (UNSC) The UNSC has extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for a further 6 months. The mandate was set to expire on the 15th June. For further reading click here. The UNSC further unanimously authorised a clampdown on arm smuggling on the high seas off Libya, following several reports last week that militias were being supplied arms by sea. EU s response to North African migration to Europe On the 7th June, Frans Timmermans, the deputy head of the European Commission, told the European Parliament in Strasbourg "we propose to use a mix of positive and negative incentives to reward those countries willing to cooperate effectively with us and to ensure that there are consequences for those who do not". Financial incentives including the diversion of African aid will be used to curb migration across the Mediterranean, in a similar way to the EU Turkey deal, which has been effective. However the coastline off North Africa is considerably larger than Turkey s coastline where migrants would depart from, and it will not be possible to police all of it. Migrant vessels will still depart and will require Libyan Coast Guard vessels and an international naval presence to blockade, to reduce the incidence of SOLAS events. Assault on ISIS held Sirte It has been reported that Tripoli government forces launched a land, air and sea operation on 9th June to liberate Sirte. Libyan forces claim to have captured the Sirte port and much of the city. Threat Assessment The NOC is responsible for securing oil port facilities with their own armed force, the PFG. To date the PFG have been highly effective at repelling ISIS and have even gone on the offensive while ensuring business continuity at open ports. The oil industry is integral to Libya s economy and is appropriately safeguarded. Divisions between the east and west NOC branches and the control of ports has not yet impacted on the security of a vessel. Many Libyan ports are operational, but not without risk. MAST is able to provide risk assessments and crew training to improve situational awareness and risk appreciation. Controlled by the Government of National Accord Controlled by the Tobruk led government Controlled by Tuareg forces Controlled by local forces Controlled by ISIS Control of Northern Libyan territory (10th June 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 7

8 Gulf of Guinea EU Nigeria security initiative: It has been reported that the head of an EU delegation, Mr Philippe Peyredieu, has stated that the EU will invest in maritime security within the region to stabilise the flow of trade. Incidents: Nothing serious to report MTISC GOG Closure: It is understood that upon closure of the MTISC, the reporting centre will be re-located to Brest, France. The centre will be a joint UK and French operation, manned by French naval reservists with ex-merchant marine backgrounds. There will also be a fall back office in the UK. The office has had the name Maritime De-confliction Awareness Centre proposed. Analysis The closure of the MTISC GoG and the shifting of responsibilities to Brest in France removes GoG States from a key component of maritime security within their region. In other maritime security initiatives, it has been reported that French warships will patrol the GoG at all times and other nations are being encouraged to contribute. It has also been suggested in some quarters that it may be necessary to revert to UN action to pressure Nigeria into securing Nigerian waters and the EEZ. Threat Assessment All vessels operating in the GoG should conduct a thorough risk assessment and practice emergency drills. Locally procured patrol boats can, in the right circumstances, enhance a vessel s security. MAST advises against the use of embarked armed Nigerian Navy personnel. Under contact from pirates, embarked armed Nigerian guards will draw increased fire towards the bridge of the vessel which can result in the death or injury of crew members and damage to the vessel. The Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) off Lagos provides effective protection for drifting and waiting vessels and the area has been piracy free for several months. It has also been reported that there is an unofficial, but operational SAA off the Bonny River. MAST can advise on risk assessments, the most effective countermeasures and on the most effective locally procured Nigerian patrol vessels to escort vessels to and from operation in Nigeria to 150nm offshore Militant Sabotage Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 8

9 South East Asia Incidents 1. Bangladesh: 13Jun16. Five robbers boarded an anchored container ship at 0140 LT in Chittagong Anchorage. Security watchmen noticed the robbers with long knives on poop deck and informed the Duty Officer. He immediately informed the Master who raised the alarm, whistle sounded. Hearing the alarm and the crew alertness the robbers escaped with ship's stores. War risks removed from The Straits of Malacca The Lloyd s Market Association Joint War Committee has removed Malacca from a war risk zone, partly due to the joint efforts of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia to improve regional maritime security. sustained manner. A trilateral meeting between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia on the 26th May was held to draft Standard Operating Procedures on maritime security in the Sulu Sea. The US are providing $50M of aid to the region but most of this will be allocated to the South China Sea. Abu Sayyaf s cause is a long running religious and extremist feud in the region, one that is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Abu Sayyaf Threat Assessment Abu Sayyaf has executed Canadian hostage Robert Hall in the southern Philippines after ransom demands were not met. Abu Sayyaf has traditionally targeted small slower vessels such as fishing vessels, passenger vessels, yachts, tugs and vessels It is clear Abu Sayyaf have a proven maritime capability and under tow with the intent of kidnapping crew for ransom. conduct surveillance at sea prior to an operation, and Vessels operating in the Sulu Sea should adopt security reportedly posed as undercover fishermen prior to the kidnap measures. of crew from the Ocean View Marina in Abu Sayyaf launches operations from the Sulu Sea, but are also active in Threat Assessment the Celebes Sea. Opportunistic theft of ships stores and equipment continues to be sporadically spread across the archipelagos of SE Asia. The Philippines does not have the resources to adequately Thieves tend to be non violent and will escape when spotted. police their own waters or deal with this insurgency in a 1 Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 9

10 Central and South America Incidents the duration of the vessel s call at port. 1. Columbia: 3 robbers climbed up the anchor chain of Marshall Islands-flagged heavy load carrier at 0700 UTC in Cartagena anchorage. They broke through the hawser pipe cover and stole ship s property. On discovering the theft the Master doubled security duties and replaced a new unbreakable hawser pipe cover. Standing advice: The repercussions of a vessel being caught acting as a mule with drugs stowed will depend on the type, amount and national laws, but may be disruptive and costly. When and if operating in these areas, especially Columbia and Peru, it is advised that: Potential stowage areas such as rudder shafts are denied as far as possible, and/or routinely searched. Access points are closely monitored by a vigilant watch for Hi-Jack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1 10

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