Intelligence. Maritime: Intelligence Report Series. 6th January 2016 Issue: 6. MAST USA

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1 6th January 2016 Issue: 6 Intelligence Maritime: Intelligence Report Series MAST UK +44 (0) operations@mast-security.com MAST USA steve.hull@mast-security.com MAST Singapore ben.stewart@mast-security.com 24/7 Emergency Telephone: +44(0)

2 Making the maritime environment a safer place to live and work Foreword Issue 6 of the series continues to follow the developing conflicts in Yemen and Libya, as well as detailing reports on security instances and news from around the world. This issue further contains an in-depth analysis into the developing situation in the South China Sea, specifically the Spratly Islands. - The Maritime Intelligence Report Series focuses on: Areas of instability which could affect the passage or port call of your vessel; Changes or impediments to navigation/restrictions of; and Charts and analysis detailing piracy, suspicious approaches, boardings and hijackings. MAST has a global reach and presence, delivering first hand, accurate and exclusive intelligence. MAST is entrenched and committed in continuing to support and promote the awareness of the very real risks that seafarers and stakeholders face. This Intelligence Report Series is a brief snapshot of MAST s Intelligence capabilities. MAST Intelligence specialises in providing clients with a suite of products, including; detailed port and vessel security briefs, vessel passage plans, threat and risk mitigation, travel risk management. Working closely in conjunction with a host of experts, MAST Intelligence offers a market leading service pertaining to all maritime affairs. Please follow MAST on LinkedIn and Twitter to keep abreast with these insightful weekly reports and more including real time security updates! Contents Yemen - Update - Yemen Ports - Aden South China Sea Libya and Southern Mediterranean - Update - National Oil Company - Mediterranean Migrant Crisis Regional theatres of piracy, crime, terrorism and news - Indian Ocean Region - Gulf of Guinea - South East Asia - Central & South America IMO News Mast Services Editor: Alexander Farrow 2

3 Yemen UPDATE: The Saudi-led coalition officially ended the ceasefire with the Houthi rebels on the 2nd January. The ceasefire has been riddled with countless violations by both sides, and has been non -existent in some areas since its start. Tensions have escalated between Shia majority Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia over the Saudi execution of a prominent Shia clerk and the following backlash ransacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The Yemen conflict is a proxy war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Iranian backed Houthi Shia rebels. Since this most recent escalation, Saudi airstrikes against Houthi rebels have intensified. Following this weeks developments, the prospect of the planned continuation of negotiations on the 14th January is unlikely. The negotiations were postponed for a month in December in order to allow for bi-lateral in -country and regional consultations to achieve a ceasefire. Control of Yemen territory (1st January 2016) Houthi Source: Wikimedia Commons Pro Hadi Government Forces Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 3

4 Yemen Ports Port Aden: President Hadi s government and Saudi-led coalition forces continue to appear to be unable to control the reclaimed city of Aden. Lawlessness, Houthi rebels and terror groups continue to operate on a frequent basis. Capacity: (12 berths) - Ma alla Wharf (4) - Aden container terminal (3) - Currently operating at capacity, with delays due to a build up of containers. - Aden Gulf terminal (2) - privately owned - Burqia oil terminal (3) Port Hudaydah: Capacity 5 berths. Reduced vessel berth capacity from 8 to 5 due to substantial damage from air strikes in July, especially to cranes. Container vessels must be geared to operate here. Port Mokha: No recorded activity since August Port Salif: Capacity 2 berths. No container ability. Operating at capacity. Vessels experience severe delays due to minimal port equipment. Substantial delays. Aden UPDATE: A militant drive by shooting on the 31st December killed Ahmed al-idrisi, a top pro -government militia leader, just hours after he reluctantly agreed to hand over control of the cities port to government troops. MAST eyes on the ground: From the 3rd-4th January there was small arms fire and explosions around the port. Red tracer could be seen in the air from the port. The unrest was due to the local port security who were being replaced by trained government professionals. The firing was coming from the now redundant port security in protest. The protest didn t affect port operations for more than an hour. Yemen s Hadi government has declared an indefinite night time curfew commencing on the 4th January from 20:00 05:00 in order to push back recent incursion by AQAP and other militant groups. A central purpose of the curfew is to deny armed militias, individuals and groups the freedom of movement. At least 70 arrests were made on the first night of the imposed curfew. On Tuesday 5th January, A suicide bomber in a car detonated as the convoy of the governors of Aden and Lahj provinces along with the Aden security director passed through the area of Inma," Nizar Anwar, a government spokesman said. The three Southern Yemeni officials survived the attack and subsequent gun battle, but three of their guards were killed. Port Mukalla: Capacity 2 berths. Mukalla remains under AQAP control. Higher port tariffs have resulted in fewer calling vessels. 4

5 South China Sea UPDATE: China has made an unprecedented aircraft landing on Fiery Cross Island, Spratly Islands on Saturday 2nd January. The enlarging of Fiery Cross island and construction of the airstrip has been underway for several years. Vietnam is the most recent regional nation to accuse China of violating its sovereignty as a result of the aviation on Fiery Cross Island. ANALYSIS: Perspective This is a long running dispute. China does have a historical and long running claim to the islands, via historical sovereignty and also a claim known as the 9 dash line. The 9 dash line doesn t conform with the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) definitions of Territorial Waters, but exceeds them. What is changing is that previously: China didn t enforce their claim over the reefs and islands and the associated waters which contain, amongst other resources, rich fishing grounds, which surrounding countries have historically used and incorporated into their Exclusive Economic Zone s (EEZ). The EEZ s of regional countries do not recognise China s claim to the Spratly reefs/islands. The reefs/islands and associated waters are now being increasingly enforced by China. The islands couldn t support human habitation. There are reefs/islands in the Spratly archipelago, with a total land area of less than 3 square miles. Islands and reefs are being expanded and modified to further exert Chinese sovereignty and influence over the area which has been, and continues to be largely challenged. China claims the infrastructure being built is to aid navigation and search and rescue in the area as well as defending Chinese sovereignty and national interests. Regional nations see it as the militarisation of the South China Sea and expanse of China s influence and control over the area. Chinese construction in the disputed Spratly Islands Chinese claimed Territorial Waters Reef s claimed or built on by China Source: UNCLOS and CIA UNCLOS 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zones 5

6 South China Sea Legal remonstrations The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was set up for legally determining exactly these types of disputes, but to date there has not been a case brought against China by any regional nations, or by China against any regional nations. Sometimes the International Courts of Justice (ICJ) are used for maritime disputes, but again there has been no case brought against or by, China here either. Why not? If the case went to the courts under customary law, China could be granted official UN verified sovereignty over the islands. This would not strengthen any of the regional nations positions, especially since islands and reefs have been modified to now support habitation. China on the other hand may not have brought the case to the courts as it is more ambitious than what the UNCLOS or ICJ would permit as Chinese Territorial Waters - i.e. China maybe after the larger 9 dash line sovereignty. Because the Spratly Islands have been historically uninhabited, there has been unlimited freedom of navigation within the surrounding waters. This freedom of navigation has certainly been restricted to certain vessels by the Chinese now (i.e. to warships in claimed Territorial Waters, although it is continuously challenged). But once China has increased their infrastructure to enforce the Territorial Waters it claims, this may change. When UNCLOS 1982 was written the concept of island/reef expansion to support human life was not incorporated. UNCLOS 1982 Article 121 states An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. The fact that the words naturally formed are included suggests the concept of unnaturally formed islands was considered, but was not included. UNCLOS states reefs, rocks or low tide elevations can have Territorial Waters if uninhabited. But if an island is inhabited, it is entitled to an EEZ of 200NM. Trade routes The Spratly Islands are located next to vital shipping lanes. To many nations it is unclear what the Chinese intent is. It may well be innocent, while many perceive it as malicious. The shipping lanes are North West of the Spratly Islands, as commercial navigation of the Spratly Islands is considerably complex and holds a higher risk. There is little evidence to suggest that the ongoing construction of artificial islands has had much effect on merchant shipping, although stakeholders in the shipping industry voice their concerns the built infrastructure will increasingly enable China to control the waters if they do decided to impose regulations and restrictions. Military confrontation Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam claim Spratly Islands, but so far have been unable to halt or check the Chinese advance and construction of artificial islands. The more these regional countries make a claim for sovereignty over Spratly reefs/islands, the greater claim China has to sovereignty over the reefs/islands given their historical claim. Although now perhaps impossible, the best solution would be for an agreement that the Spratly Islands are not to be claimed by any nation. The US is perhaps the most likely nation to come to blows with China as they are the boldest nation to continuously protest and challenge China s assertion over the Spratly Islands and maintain the right of freedom of navigation/innocent passage within China s claimed 12NM Territorial Waters. China has stated that if the US continues to violate Chinese Territorial Waters/airspace with military warships and warplanes, military action will be taken on the infringing vessel or aircraft. 6

7 South China Sea Ex-naval Chinese frigate converted to coast guard cutters Two Jiangwei I class frigates have been converted to Chinese coast guard cutters. The majority of the naval weaponry has been removed, but it is possible there are some smaller weapon systems still installed and operational. The move to enforce disputed islands with coast guard vessels rather than naval vessels is a further attempt to try and claim international recognition over the Spratly islands. Commercial shipping in the South China Sea Both the US definition and the Chinese definition of UNCLOS articles permit merchant shipping to have innocent passage within Territorial Waters. The disagreement arises with warships and differentiating UNCLOS s interpretations. China states warships are not legally allowed in Territorial Water, the US states they are, and further presses historical navigation through these waters via customary law. The shipping lanes currently navigate around the Spratly Islands and will likely continue as usual. Any incident involving the denial of innocent passage or the freedom of navigation to a merchant vessel is likely to be quickly picked up on and used as evidence by challenging nations such as the US, making the case that China s increased influence is with the purpose of medalling with merchant shipping. With this ammunition, moves could legitimately be made against China within the South China Sea. At present this risk doesn t seem worth the potential consequences. China s Jiangwei I class frigates converted to coast guard cutters Source: The diplomat, IHS Janes. 7

8 Libya Saudi Arabia UPDATE: British SAS troops have been deployed to Libya, and are awaiting and preparing for the arrival of around 1,000 British soldiers. The overall operation will involve around 6,000 European and American soldiers with the aim of stopping the ISIS advance and reducing their grip on the area. On the 4th January ISIS clashed with the force guarding Libya s Es Sider oil terminal, as ISIS continues to push further East of Sirte. During the clash which lasted until the 5th, a 420,000 barrel oil tank caught fire in Ras Lanouf. It is thought that ISIS are pushing towards and planning an assault on Libya s oil refinery Marsa al Brega, the largest in North Africa. Mediterranean Migrant Crisis UPDATE: In 2015 there were 1,008,616 arrivals into Europe by sea across the Mediterranean. Approximately 3,771 refugees which made the crossing are missing or dead. National Oil Company (NOC): Libya s NOC appealed for aid for fighting ISIS on Tuesday. There is a real fear and danger now that ISIS will gain control of many Libyan oil facilities, similar to their manoeuvres in Syria and Iraq. 7 petroleum facility guards were killed and 25 others wounded during the ISIS attack on Monday 4th. Ras Lanuf and Es-Sider are Libya's largest oil export ports, capable of handling over 500,000 barrels per day. Migrant s crossing the Mediterranean Sea Source: UNHCR 8

9 Libya Indian Ocean Region News 1st December 2015 HRA limits Hijack Boarding Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Somalia: Al Shabaab militants temporarily captured the Lower Shabelle region s Warmahan village on January 1st. The militants attacked at night, driving the Somali National Army (SNA) forces from the town and subsequently took control of a police station. SNA forces launched a counter-attack on January 2nd and successfully recaptured the village. SNA forces killed seven militants and sustained one casualty during the clashes. Unidentified gunmen killed a Turkish national in Mogadishu s Hodan district, Banadir region on January 1st. The victim was leaving a mosque when gunmen in a vehicle opened fire, mortally wounding him. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack. Al Shabaab militants briefly seized the Qarsa village in Kenya s Wajir County on December 31st. The militants took control of the town for approximately five hours, preached to the residents, and warned them against informing the police. The militants fled the scene before police arrived. 9

10 Gulf of Guinea Incidents Nothing significant to report Hijack Boarding Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity 10

11 South East Asia Incidents Nothing significant to report News Indonesia launches a piracy prevention program. For the full article click here Hijack Boarding Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity 11

12 Central and S. America Hi-Jack Boarding Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Incidents Nothing significant to report Standing advice: The smuggling of drugs on board merchant vessels is far from a new phenomenon. For every load which is caught, countless numbers undoubtedly slip through undetected. This is very much a localised issue within South and Central America. The repercussions of a vessel being caught with drugs stowed will depend on the type, amount and national laws, but may be disruptive and costly. When and if operating in these areas, especially Columbia and Peru, it is advised that: Potential stowage areas such as rudder shafts are denied as far as possible, and/or routinely searched. Access points are closely monitored by a vigilant watch for the duration of the vessel s call at port. 12

13 IMO News Mandatory audits and other amendments entered into force on 1st January 2016: Audits under the IMO Member State Audit Scheme become mandatory SOLAS amendments Amendment to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code Carriage of stability instruments mandatory for tankers LSA Code lifejacket testing Revised IGC Code For further details on changes and amendments Click here MAST Services MAST has the experience, capability and global presence to provide comprehensive support to our clients: Counter piracy Physical security Training services ISPS services Consultancy & risk management Travel management Explosives ordnance management/disposal IMO year in review Technical security system design and installation Security prevention and response services 13

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