A Macrolevel Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants

Transcription

1 A Macrolevel Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants Lilli Banholzer 1 Department of Politics and Management University of Konstanz Abstract The reconstruction of war torn societies constitutes an essential part of a stable peace. Especially the demobilization and social reintegration of combatants presents a great obstacle to the stabilization of post-war situations. In order to support war prone countries in this fragile transition period, demobilization and reintegration programs (DDR) are increasingly becoming integrative parts of international Peacebuilding missions. Despite the growing emphasis that is put on these interventions from politics and practitioners, social science research is lagging behind with the systematic evaluation of these measures. While several studies are concerned with the success and failure of peace missions in general, no comprehensive macro level study has yet been conducted concentrating on the presence or absence of DDR missions as an explanatory variable for the successful transformation from war to peace in war torn countries. Based on a new dataset including all DDR interventions from , this paper aims to contribute to filling the scientific gap by shedding light on the factors that are responsible for the success and failure of DDR missions. I argue in line with Doyle and Sambanis that DDR measures can only be successful in the right institutional context. I therefore specifically test whether DDR programs conducted in democracies are more effective than those implemented in other political regimes. Paper prepared for presentation at Workshop 8, ECPR 2011 Joint Session. This is a first draft. Please do not quote without the author s permission. 1 Doctoral student; Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Box D 86, Konstanz, Germany, Tel: , Fax: -2774, Lilli.Banholzer@uni-konstanz.de. 1

2 Demobilizing combatants is the single most important factor determining the success of peace operations. Without demobilization, civil wars cannot be brought to an end and other critical goals such as democratization, justice and development have little chances for success. (UN High Panel, 2004) I. Introduction Civil war is a tragedy, but one that the international community does not believe to be inevitable. International interventions and measures to ease human suffering, stop violence or hinder the reoccurrence of war, have found increasing acceptance in the last half of the 20 th century (Krain 2005). As the first world leader, Tony Blair affirmed in 1999 a moral right to get actively involved in other people s conflicts to stop the suffering of people (The Economist 2008). Six years later, at the World Summit 2005, more than 150 states adopted the responsibility to protect, signaling their willingness to intervene in foreign states to halt human suffering. Also, within the last twenty years, from 1988 to 2008, UN and non-un peace operations have tripled, while the number of countries contributing to such missions has increased in the same time period form 50 (1988) to 200 (2008) (HSR 2009/10). These vivid developments call for social science to intensify investigation on international interventions. Clearly, the field of international interventions is a broad one, varying enormously in size, scope and type and ranging from neutral humanitarian aid to the use of high-tech military means. NGOs like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch for example aim to ease human suffering by identifying, recording, and informing about human right abuses all over the world. Other non-state actors such as the International Red Cross and Médecins sans Frontières offer the provision of specific aid to the civilian population without intervening into the political processes. Lightly armed interventions such as UN observer missions are deployed in crisis areas to guard peace fire agreements and document cases of non-compliance. Peacekeeping missions, mostly led by the UN, receive stronger mandates and are more heavily armed as for example MONUC in the DR Congo. The NATO bombing of Serbia is an example of a highly militarized international intervention, reacting to severe human right abuses by the Serbian government (Schneider et al. 2010:71). Despite the increase in international engagement in crisis and civil war areas, failures to prevent atrocities from happening despite the presence of international helpers, as in 2

3 Rwanda and Bosnia to name just two prominent examples, have raised critical voices and question the effectiveness of such operations. Also, dramatic reports dominating media attention about gross human rights violations being committed virtually under the eyes of helpless peacekeepers have shaped public opinion and damaged the reputation of such missions, leading pessimists to trade the slogan never again to never intervene (Fortna 2004: 269, Collier 2007:125). On the other side, pictures of desperate humans begging for international support reach us through the lenses of international media teams in crisis areas such as Libya and Sudan. Also, in other cases, the call for interventions is loud. The UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry, for example just recently (February 2011) expressed the need for international involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian War by declaring that: the parties are unlikely to overcome the deficit of trust without a credible and effective international intervention in the peace process. The Human Security Report 2009 reports an increase in effectiveness and scope of international aid and points to the lives saved though these measures. Success stories like the peace missions in EL Salvador and Mozambique demonstrate that international action can be highly valuable to the peace process. Not only politics and media are intensely debating the effectiveness of interventions. Social science has also become increasingly interested in the topic. While the majority of studies either concentrates on lessons learned assessments and policy reports by IOs and NGOs (see ILO 2003, UN 1999, Verhey 2001) or descriptions of the success and failure of single missions (see Coletta et al. 1996, Bieber 2002), only few take a systematic approach to examine international interventions in a cross-sectional way (e.g. Gurr 1994, Reagan 1996, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, Fortna 2004, Krain 2005, Melander 2009, Hultmann 2010, Bussmann&Schneider 2010). But even those who conduct cross-county studies reach diverse results. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) as well as Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) find that multilateral and United Nations peace operations have a positive effect on Peacebuilding. In contrast, Dubey (2002) concludes that third-party peacekeeping has no significant effect on the duration of peace and Hultmann (2010) even argues that the presence of peace operations can trigger violence against civilians. In line with this methodological approach this paper aims to contribute to the crosssectional analysis of international interventions by focusing on a specific type of international post-war support coinciding with the proliferation of international involvement, namely the establishments of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs for 3

4 combatants. DDR programs are designed to facilitate the sensitive transition period in the aftermath of signing a peace agreement by providing assistance in the collection and destruction of arms as well as the return of the former combatants to their home communities. Experience shows that the large influx of mostly uneducated combatants is an immense destabilization force, or, as Kingma (1996:1) points out: frustrated former combatants may jeopardize the peace and development process. The systematic collection and destruction of combatant s weapons, as well as programs to facilitate their return to civilian life is regarded as an essential measure to reduce the risk of a renewed outbreak of war. So far, no comprehensive macro-level study has yet been conducted, looking at DDR presence in particular. This paper therefore aims to filling this gap and test under which circumstances DDR-programs contribute to a durable peace. II. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and why we should bother DDR missions have evolved as a central component and challenge of multidimensional peace missions. According to the United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre, Disarmament can be understood as the documentation, collection and control of weapons of the conflicting parties and often also the civil population. It can also entail the establishing of arms management programs (UN DDRR Centre 2009). Demobilization is defined as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces [ ]. Demobilization usually starts with the provision of reception centres, constituting a first point to go to for combatants returning from their militant groups. Demobilization programs continue with the preparation and support of former combatants for their reinsertion into a civilian life. Reintegration on the other hand implies that combatants receive a civilian status and employment and become part of normal civilian life again (UN DDR Centre 2009). UN agencies as well as international governmental and nongovernmental organisations have applied a whole variety of reintegration programmes, emphasising diverse needs such as financial assistance, family tracing, traditional measures or educational and vocational training. Formal programs for the disarmament of combatants date back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1989, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) conducted voluntary disarmament and demobilization in Nicaragua. A demobilization program in Cambodia followed these efforts in 1992 (UNTAC). It was soon realized that 4

5 collecting and destroying arms was not sufficient to prevent former combatants to hamper the peace process. Rather, in order to reduce the interest in continuing the fighting, former combatants had to be provided with a new future perspective and the possibility to start a new life as integrated members of civil society. In 1999, the United Nations started to focus in its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo not only on the disarmament and demobilization but also on the resettlement and reintegration of former combatants (Dahl Thruelsen 2006: 8). A close examination of DDR programs is worth a serious attempt for a variety of reasons. First of all, this particular type of peace intervention is extending with an incredible pace and scope. According to the Human Security Report 2009/10, the number of DDR operations has witnessed a nine-fold increase after the end of the Cold War, while the deployment of international missions in general has only tripled. DDR has evolved into an instrument on which the international community is profoundly relying not only did all of the past seven Peacekeeping Operations 2 established by the UN Security Council include a DDR program, also, the UN supports DDR missions in countries without official UN Peacekeeping operations in Ache, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Niger, Somalia and Uganda (UN 2009). Even though the UN has clearly adopted a leading role in the implementation and guidance of DDR programs, a multitude of other international organizations, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also vividly involved (see Table 1). DDR efforts in Liberia for example are led by UNICEF but strongly supported by the World Food Program, the World Health Organization (WHO), Action Aid and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Handson 2007). The largest program in the world, with a budget of over USD 240 million, is currently the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. This multi-agency program started in 2002 and aims to support 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries (Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda) (MDRP 2009). The program is funded by the World Bank, 12 industrial countries 3 and the 2 United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, 1999), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), United Nations Mission in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004), United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), United Nations Operation in Burundi (UNOB, 2004), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, 2005). 3 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 5

6 European Commission and embraces more than 30 partner organizations, including the United Nations. Table 1: Selected countries with DDR program and relevant actors involved Country Start DDR End DDR Type DDR Afganistan ISAF, UNDP, OIM, WFP, Halo Trust Ache AMM, IOM, UNDP, Unicef Angola MDRP, UNDP, Unicef, Save the Children Burundi MDRP CAR UNDP, MDRP Columbia OAS, Unicef Chad UNDP DR Congo MDRP, UNDP, ILO, IOM Eritrea World Bank, UNDP, WFP Ethiopia World Bank Ginea Bissau World Bank Haiti UNDP, World Bank, Unicef Liberia UNDP, WFP, WHO, UNFPA, Unicef Nepal UNDP, Unicef Niger UNDP Rwanda CICR, Unicef, WFP, UNDP, ILO, Save the Children, MDRP Sierr Leone Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF (United Nations Children s Fund), the World Food Programme (WFP) Solomon Islands UNDP Somalia UNDP, UA, ILO Uganda MDRP This international engagement does not come not without enormous financial costs. In 2007, USD billion were spend on DDR programs, an average of USD 1,434 per demobilized combatant (Caramels & Sanz 2008). In the same year, nine out of the 19 countries going though a DDR process ranked amongst the lowest states in terms of human development. The weighted average of the 19 programs was thus a per capita DDR cost, three and a half times that of per capita income. Taking into consideration the vast human and financial resources invested in DDR programs and observing simultaneously the continuous spread of DDR measures, a clear need for scientific literature to catch up and examine the success of these programs appears. While there seems to be an international consensus that chances for peace are considerably higher when countries receive aid during the critical transition period, Hanson (2007) claims that so far a lack of research has prevented practitioners from developing better reintegration programs. Only a balanced interplay between science and practice can help to improve existing programs and ensure that new ones are effectively designed. 6

7 III. Most needed or most wanted Where are DDR missions deployed? For answering the question, under which circumstances DDR programs are successful, we first need to take a step back as concentrate on another question, namely, in which countries are DDR programs established? In other words, we need to ask which criteria determine if a country establishes a DDR mission. This is important in two ways. First of all, there is a clear academic interest in the determination of factors that lead to the implementation of a DDR program. Secondly, this question is important for methodological reasons since DDR programs are not implemented randomly. Simply looking at the implementation and the success rate of DDR programs is not only insufficient, but can actually lead to false results, a problem that was encountered with large-n studies determining the success rate of peacekeeping operations. Several studies come to the conclusion that the presence of Peacekeepers does not help to protect civilians, or even makes matters worse. However, other scholars such as Fortna (2004) and Melander (2009) argue that these results are due to a severe selection bias and argue that a second glance is needed. By taking into account that Peacekeepers are send to particular places, where violence and war is far more likely to happen than in other settings, the picture of peacekeeping effectiveness changes completely. The problem of selection bias has also to be addressed when concentrating on DDR programs. The next section will therefor focus on the factors determining the decision to initiate DDR efforts. 7

8 Figure 1: Map indicating where DDR programs have been implemented One strand of argument claims that DDR programs are only established in fairly stable postwar setting with a low probability of a renewed war outbreak. Such situations would be characterized by the clear exhibition of the political will for peace from all conflicting parties, a comprehensive peace agreement including all relevant parties, the full halt of hostilities and possibly the presence of a well equipped international peace force. If supporters to this claim would be right, the positive effect of DDR programs would be overestimated (Fortna 2004). The first hypothesis thus captures the peace potential of any country. Hypothesis 1: DDR missions are most likely to be deployed in countries with a high potential to build up a stable democracy. Ideally of course, such considerations should only play a minor role and decisions to establish DDR missions are based on the need for support programs for returning combatants, no matter how suitable the outer circumstances are. Two factors can be regarded to define the need for a demobilization and reintegration measure. First of all DDR programs are desirable if (1) a large influx of uneducated combatants is expected to enter a weak economy. In those cases, lack of education of combatants combined with high unemployment rates will make it hard for combatants to find a new job to support themselves and their families. 8

9 Dissatisfaction and fear for their livelihood can easily lead former combatants to take up arms again and return to war. Secondly, (2) individuals who have been part of very abusive militant groups such as RENAMO in Sierra Leone, face more difficulties in the disarmament and reintegration process (Humphrey and Weinstein 2007). Having experienced severe cruelty during their time in the armed group, combatants face great difficulties in restarting a normal civilian life. These individuals are in specific need of assistant programs, not only in terms of financial aid, but also especially in terms of psycho-social support. Hypothesis 2: DDR missions are most likely deployed in countries where opportunity costs to take up arms again are low. Hypothesis 3: DDR missions are most likely deployed in countries where militant fractions have been extremely abusive. From a military point of view, demobilization of combatants can also be regarded as a strategic tool of the government party to weaken their opponents and avoid renewed uprisings. This would be especially relevant for states in which a status quo of military capacity is visible between the government and rebel groups. In cases of a hurting stalemate as William Zartmann (1989) called it, the government could be willing to make concessions but ensuring at the same time through demobilization and that the rebels will be weakened as well. Hypothesis 4: DDR missions are most likely to be deployed in militarily weak states and a stalemate between the conflicting parties. IV. Giving up Weapons when is DDR successful? After having tested the above-introduced hypothesis, we can turn to the actual question of this paper: What determines the success of DDR programs? A plethora of studies concentrate on lessons learned from past experiences in DDR interventions and analyze in depth single or multiple interventions that have taken place (e.g. Colletta et al. 1996, Özerdem 2002, Willibald 2006, Legrand 1999, Arjona & Kalyvas 2006, Pugel 2008, Humphrey & Weinstein 2007). I will incorporate the knowledge generated though these studies and test in a systematic cross-country study whether these findings can be generalized. Furthermore I will 9

10 also draw on the peacekeeping literature and include those factors that make international interventions in general successful. The international community believes that it can help. Every year, billions of dollars are spend on the international support of DDR programs. The vast financial resources devoted to this quest, as well as the hundreds of organizations involved in programs around the globe clearly exhibit the perception that international help is needed and effective. Critiques however question the vivid international engagement. Henri Boshoff and Waldemar Vray of the Institute for Security Studies for example emphasize the importance of self-determination in the form of national commissions administering the DDR process. Opponents of this view argue that national leadership is prone to corruption and inefficiency and point to the Conader national commission in Congo, which is said to be responsible for delays, lacking expertise and coordination (Handson 2007). I this contrast the two views in the following hypothesis, keeping in mind that they might not be mutually exclusive. Hypothesis 5: DDR missions are more successful if lead by an international mission. Hypothesis 6: DDR missions are more successful if ownership is developed in the form of national commissions. The most frequently blamed factor for the failure of DDR programs is insufficient funding. Poorly equipped programs can frustrate returning combatants by raising high hopes and not living up to the expectations. Disappointed combatants might lose trust in the peace process altogether and decide to return to their armed group. As demonstrated in Table 2, the total budget of the examined DDR programs varied between 1.2 million USD (Solomon Islands) and million USD (Columbia). However, the number of combatants targeted though these programs also varies enormously. In Indonesia(Ache) for example, only 3000 combatants had to be disarmed with a budget of 100 million USD and eventually, over USD was spend on average on every combatant. The other extreme constitutes the Republic of Congo, where combatants where targeted with a budget of 25 million USD, leaving only 588 USD for every combatant. I therefore derive the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 7: DDR programs are more successful if they are financially well equipped. 10

11 Table 2: Budget in relation to people targeted and average cost per demobilized person in selected DDR cases Country Budget in USD (million) People to be demobilized Average cost per demobilized person Afghanistan ,278.1 Ache Angola ,853.6 Burundi ,082 CAR ,758 Columbia ,527.4 Chad ,111.1 Rep. Congo DR Congo ,333.3 Eritrea Ethiopia Guinea Bissau Haiti Liberia Nepal Niger Rwanda ,736.1 Sierra Leone ,103.6 Solomon Islands 1, Somalia Uganda A large number of scholars postulate a strong relationship between peace and the outcome of war. Generally, peace is found to be more stable after a clear military victory of one side (Licklider 1995, Stinnett and Diehl 2001, Dubey 2002, Toft 2003, Fortna, 2004). Licklider (1995) even argues that war should be allowed to reach their natural conclusion in order to attain a durable peace. Wagner (1993) claims that only a decisive victory can weaken one side to an extent that it loses the capacity to restart the war again. This idea could also account for the willingness to disarm: If combatants feel that they have no chance to win, they might be more willing to accept their lot. I therefore hypothesis that: 11

12 Hypothesis 8: DDR is more successful in conflicts where a decisive victory has taken place. Economic stability counts to the few results that are generally accepted to be robustly related to peace (Collier & Höffler 2004). The economic constitution such as for example the unemployment rate of a country is also likely to influence the success of DDR programs since reinserting combatants into civilian jobs is a major part of these efforts. Banholzer, Schneider and Odenwald (2011) find in a multilevel analysis in Somalia that combatants living in economically stable regions are notably more willing to hand in their weapons than those living in economically unstable regions. I therefore hypothesis that: Hypothesis 9: DDR is more successful in economically stable countries Lastly, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that the institutional context is important for the success of Peacebuilding. Dixon (1994) claims that democracies have more efficient tools to diffuse conflicts at an early stage and are significantly more likely to reach peaceful settlements. I therefore argue that the level of democratization should influence the success chances for DDR. Hypothesis 10: DDR is more successful in a more democratic context. V. Data In the first part of this study we aim determine the circumstances under which the international community or the nation state decides to implement a DDR program, translating into a binary dependent variable (0= no DDR, 1=DDR). To examine in which countries DDR missions are deployed, I adapt the dataset constructed by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000). The dataset contains civil wars 4 between 1944 and Since the majority of DDR missions where implemented in the last decade, I will need to extend the 4 A conflict is observed if it has (a) caused more than one thousand deaths overall and in at least a single year; (b) it has challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; (c) it occurred within the recognized boundary of that state; (d) it involved the state as a principal combatant; (e) it included rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state; and (f) the parties were concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war (Dolyle & Sambanis 2000) 12

13 available data for at least 10 years. Before 1997, only 15 cases of DDR could be observed the reason why I can only offer very preliminary results at the moment. In order to grasp the peace potential of a civil war country, I rely on four distinctive measures offered by Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Obviously, peace is more likely to succeed if the war has come to a full end and a full halt of hostilities can be observed. I therefore test whether there was a reoccurrence of war two years after the war s end (warend2) and in addition, if low-level violence could be observed in the following two years (nonviol2). Also, the level of democratization should influence the perception of a countries peace potential. Doyle and Sambanis capture the level of democratization by using the polity score (Polity98) 5 data-set (gurr2). Lastly, I test whether a UN peacekeeping force was deployed in the respective country (un2int). 6 To grasp opportunity costs for war, I determine the socio-economic background of every country. The economic status of the country is determined though the variables GDP60 and GDP80, Gini1 and Lifee, providing information on the countries GDP per capita in 1960 and 1980, the Gini Index and the life expectancy at the end of the war. Furthermore I include the adult literacy rate (illitend) of the population to determine the general level of education. Not included by Doyle and Sambanis, however important for DDR is the unemployment rate. This will be included in the dataset at a later point of time. The abusiveness of the fractions is difficult to capture. However, Doyle and Sambanis offer three variables that could be used to account for the abusiveness of a war, namely the number of displaced persons (Ridp), the total number of civilian and battle related deaths (dead) as well as the number of military deaths (Battle). It might be possible to further include information on one-sided violence at a later point. The last hypothesis stipulates that DDR programs are used as a strategic tool. In order to examine this assumption, I will include the outcome (outcome) of the war i.e. if the war is still ongoing (0), ended in a military victory (1), a formal settlement (2) or a cease-fire (3). The dataset further allows me to differentiate (outcome2) if the war was ended by a military victory by the government (1), by a military victory of the rebels (2), an informal truce (3) or a peace settlement (4). Also, information about the size of the government army (garm) is available. (Since a logistic regression with only 15 cases on the side of the dependent variable is useless, I cannot offer any results yet.) 5 The variable ranges from 0 to 20. Maximum democracy is 20; Maximum Autocracy is 0. 13

14 After having examined the circumstances that increase the probability that a DDR mission will be deployed, we can now turn to the actual question of this study: When do they succeed? I thereby adopt Page Fortna s approach by not focusing on whether or not peace is achieved, but rather if peace lasts. The main dependent variable is therefore the duration of peace between the termination of war and the resumption of a new one between the same parties. Table 3 provides a first glance at the relationship between DDR and civil war resumption. The table is based on and extended version of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 1.0, (Harbom, Högbladh & Wallensteen 2006) and includes, opposed to Doyle and Sambanis all cases of civil war until 2005 and the majority of DDR cases (included by myself). While this table is still incomplete, it allows us to observe a first hint that DDR programs could actually matter for the prevention of a renewed civil war outbreak. Table 3 shows, that in 42% of the cases where a Peaceagreement (PA) has been singed, violence resumes within 5 year. If DDR is mentioned in the Peaceagreement, 38% still fail. However, if a DDR mission is not only mentioned but also implemented, the number of PA failure drops to 5%. This of course is just a first observation without taking into consideration other circumstances that can contribute to the duration of peace, however it encourages to dig deeper. Table 3: Relationship between DDR and resumption of violence in CW since 1945 No violence Violence with the same parties Total restarted within 5 years Peaceagreement 83 (58%) 61 (42%) 144 Peaceagreement with DDR mentioned Peaceagreement with DDR & DDR implementation/ongoing 37 (62%) 23 (38%) (95%) 7 (5%) 39 VI. Literature Arjona, Ana M. and Stathis Kalyvas. 2006: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Demobilized Combatants in Columbia. Working Paper. Available: ( ) Banholzer Lilli, Schneider Gerald, Odenward Michael. forthcoming: Hobbes vs. Mill: 14

15 Anarchy, Development, and Demobilization in the Somalian Civil War. Workingpaper. Bussmann, Margit, Gerald Schneider and Nina Wiesehomeier. 2005: Foreign Economic Liberalization and Peace: The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa. European Journal of International Relations 11: 4, Caramès, A. and E. Sanz. 2008: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace. Caramès, A. and E. Sanz. 2009: Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes in the World during Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace. Colletta Nat J. and Cullen Michelle L. 2000: Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital. Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. Colletta, Nat J., Marku Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer. 1996: Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Washington: The World Bank. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004: Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers 56: 4, Dahl Thruelsen, Peter. 2006: From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Afghanistan. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. DIIS Report Dixon William J Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict American Political Science Association. Vol. 88(1) : Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science Review, 94(4), Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. International Studies Quarterly, 48(2), Gilligan, M., & Stedman, S. J. 2003: Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? International Studies Review, 5(4), Glassmyer, Katherine and Nicholas Sambanis. 2008: Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination. Journal of Peace Research 45:3, Harbom, Lotta, Stina Högbladh and Peter Wallensteen Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements. Journal of Peace Research 43(5). Handson, Stephanie 2007: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Africa. Backgrounder. Council on Foreign Relations. Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007: Demobilization and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:4, Hartzell, C., M. Hoddie, and D. Rothschild Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War. International Organization 55(1): Krain, M. 2005: International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides. International Studies Quarterly, 49(3), Melander, E Selected to Go Where Murderers Lurk?: The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26(4), Legrand, Jean-Claude: 1999: Lessons Learned from UNICEF Field Programmes For the Prevention of Recruitment,Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers. Licklider, R. 1995: The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in CivilWars,

16 American Political Science Review 89(3): Özerdem, Alpaslan: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective. Third World Quarterly. 23(5), Pugel, James 2007: What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia. February-March UNDP Liberia. Schneider Gerald, Banholzer Lilli, van der Haer Roos (2011): Crain s Choice. In: Jakobsen, Tor (eds.) War: An Introduction to Theories and Research. Nova Science Publishers. Stinnett, D. M., and P. F. Diehl. 2001: The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development. Journal of Politics. 63(3): Spear, Joanna. 2002: Disarmament and demobilization. In: Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds.): Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Tharoor, S. 1995/96: Should UN Peacekeeping Go Back to Basics? Survival 37(4): The Economic 2008: To Protect sovereignty, or to protect lives? May 15th. Available at: ( ) Toft, M. D. 2003: The Geography of Ethnic Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre. 2009: What is DDR? Available: ( ) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 1999: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines. Lessons Learned. New York: United Nations Verhey Beth. 2001: Child Soldiers: Preventing, Demobilizing and Reintegrating. Africa Region. Working Paper Series No. 23. Walter, Barbara. 1999: Designing Transitions from Civil War. International Security, 24: 1, Willibald Sigrid. 2006: Does money work? Cash transfers to ex-combatants in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes. 30 (3) Available at: ( ) Zartmann, William. 1989: Ripe for Resolution. New York: Oxford University Press. 16