INDONESIA (Aceh) Population: million inhabitants (2005) Aceh:

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1 Population: million inhabitants (2005) Aceh: 4 million inhabitants GDP: 287,217 million dollars (2005) GNI per capita: 1,280 dollars (2005) HDI: (108 th ) (2004) An armed conflict broke out in 1976 between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) over religious divisions and calls for independence for the Aceh region in the North of the island of Sumatra. The government deployed a heavy military force against the armed opposition group, committing serious human rights violations (extra-judicial executions and the systematic use of torture). The GAM has claimed that the Aceh region is being marginalised, with the failure to provide natural products, particularly oil and gas. Some 15,000 deaths have been recorded and around 48,000 people have been displaced. The overall humanitarian situation was further worsened by the impact of the tsunami at the end of On 15 August 2005, the two sides signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki (Finland), the main stipulations of which included the application of new legislation in the region and the drawing of the borders as they were in The main points considered are as follows: - Establishment of local political parties and holding of local elections in April Establishment of a system of independent courts, a Human Rights Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. - Amnesty for 2,000 political prisoners and detainees, as well as for 3,000 former combatants. - Help in land distribution, jobs and social security for former combatants, political prisoners and affected civilians. - Collection and destruction of 840 weapons from the GAM. At beginning 2006, Government and GAM met again in Finland in order to evaluate the peace agreement implementation. Both parts were satisfied on its application and showed optimism to the future, specially on a Wide autonomy for Aceh and agreed to postpone the elections previewed by April until May or June. 1

2 A Monitoring Mission, AMM, has been established in the region comprising 300 representatives from the EU and ASEAN. This is charged with controlling and monitoring the disarmament and demobilisation of the GAM, relocating government armed forces and police, reintegrating members of the GAM, overseeing the human rights situation in the region and the change in legislation, investigating violations of the Memorandum of Understanding and establishing and maintaining a good level of cooperation between the two sides. The Mission was extended until 15 th September Background to the DDR process: The disarmament and demobilisation stage should have begun in February 2003, and was planned to last 5 months, during which time the members of the GAM would hand over their weapons at 32 agreed locations (which were not publicly revealed) and government armed forces would regroup in strictly defensive positions. However, the introduction of this stage was delayed by several weeks and not fully implemented, amid mutual accusations of violations of the cessation of hostilities. At the end of April 2003, as a condition for meeting round the negotiating table, the Indonesian government gave the GAM 15 days to disarm and withdraw its claims for a referendum on independence. The GAM rejected this ultimatum, accusing the government of a coercive and authoritarian approach. Type of DDR: Disarmament of guerrilla forces in return for the demobilisation of government armed forces. Basic principles: Agreement and withdrawal of the majority of the 50,000 Indonesian army troops in the Aceh region. During the first six months, 30,000 troops will be withdrawn from the region and 3,000 members of the GAM will be disarmed. Under the agreed timetable, militia members will hand over 20% of their weapons as 20% of army troops are withdrawn every two months. An information campaign is also planned in order to explain the peace and reintegration process and encourage reconciliation and the acceptance of returning fighters by their communities. Enforcing bodies: The Indonesian government, with international supervision from the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and assistance from the OIM. Initially, the AMM was established in 12 of 21 region districts, while the Aceh reintegration Agency were in the 21 districts. The government is responsible for implementation of the MoU. The National Planning Board (BAPPENAS, which comprises the Information, Interior, Justice and Human Rights Ministries) has designed the DDR programme and short-term reintegration processes, as well as taking care of donor coordination, with supervision from the AMM. Groups to be demobilised: Members of the GAM, estimated to number around 3,000 combatants. About 2,000 detainees and prisoners with links to the GAM will also benefit from an amnesty. The Indonesian negotiator, Information and Communications Minister, Sofyan Djalil, announced in mid-november that the government had not yet received a list of the GAM s 3,000 members, required in order for the government to begin paying out funds for their integration. 2

3 Vulnerable groups: It is estimated that around 15% of combatants are female. A large number of these are children who joined the GAM voluntarily and for financial reasons and who now wish to return to school as part of the reintegration process. Mention should also be made of the people who are associated in some way with the GAM, for whom there is as yet no reliable selection process. UNICEF is also operating a Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation Programme for Child Soldiers (in conjunction with the South East Asia Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers) on the island of Nias. In September 2005, the 2 centres established for children in Gunung Sitoli and the 3 set up in Teluk Dalam have taken care of 3,000 beneficiaries. 67 children have been reunited with their families. Budget: The European Commission has donated 4 million euros (through its Rapid Reaction Mechanism) for the reintegration into civilian life of political prisoners and GAM combatants, though the AMM s budget is 15 million euros, of which 4.1 million has been given by Sweden, with 9 million drawn from the EU s budget. These funds are intended to cover the basic needs of 2,000 prisoners and 3,000 former combatants and their families (estimated to total 25,000 people in all) for a period of six months (medical care, subsistence allowances, return to their communities) and the establishment of a framework for long-term reintegration. Totally, it has been allocated 170 million dollars from the national budget on conflict victims assistance. The UNDP has been developing new programmes to provide aid for the first stages of DDR during the next six months through the implementation of its ERTR programmes (Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery, programme for Aceh) and the provision of technical support to the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR). This involves: - Creating jobs and rehabilitating work places. - Restoring ordinary living conditions. - Restoring housing, settlements and associated infrastructure. - Strengthening governance capacity. - Strengthening the technical capacity of the BRR in the development of policies and programmes, controlling and monitoring the implementation of programmes and strengthening participation from civilian groups and the private sector, local government, donors and other parties involved in the planning, implementation and assessment of these programmes. The UNDP s budget (40 local staff) for these projects is: ERTR: 72.1 million dollars. BRR: 14.7 million dollars. In addition, the government is using the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) as a programme to combat poverty, financed by the World Bank. This programme provides assistance for 70% of the people in the region and comprises a network of around 15,000 local facilitators who ensure community participation at a local level and reduce the risk of corruption. This is the only development and governance programme that continued to function in the region during the armed conflict. OIM shown its support to the Government on the peace consolidations and construction efforts, security and communitarian stabilisation with 8.6 million dollars funded by the Government of Japan. In February 2006, the Aceh Reintegration Agency was created with a 20 million dollar budget. Timetable: From 15 September 2005 to June

4 Other issues: Justice: Amnesty for around 2,000 members of the GAM, although this will exclude anyone who has been involved in criminal activities that are not directly related to the GAM s operations. During the process evolution, more victims have asked for justice or compensations, without solving clearly this aspect and with the fear that the disbursement for the former combatants was used to rebuild a military base. However, they were more likely to concentrate on building up a political and economic infrastructure. Security Sector Reform: The EU has created a programme to train the Indonesian police force in human rights issues. USAID and Japan have also developed similar programmes for the Indonesian police and have undertaken to implement them in Aceh. Disarmament: Weapons handovers as government armed forces are demobilised in the Aceh region. It is estimated that around 14,000 government troops and a further 7,000 members of the police will remain in the region. The weapons handovers will take place at 12 centres set up for the disarmament of militia members. These will be manned by 300 observers from ASEAN and the EU. With completion of the last of the four phases on 31 December 2005, a total of 840 weapons should have been handed in. The whole stage is to last 3 months in total. Demobilisation: Cash payment of 639 dollars to each combatant, along with information on the peace agreement and possible forms of reintegration. Former combatants will receive 2 hectares of land per person and material resources for agriculture or fishing. Reintegration: It seems clear that the number of former members of the GAM was more than the 3,000 troops (according to the International Crisis Group, the figure should be more like 6,145) declared in the peace agreement, which led to problems of inclusion in this list of 3,000. A Solomonic decision was to share out the benefits proportionally with the number of years membership in the armed group. 1,000 of these ex-combatants were remunerated in the 2005 financial year, while the other 2,000 are expected to be in the 2006 financial year. Problems continued to arise in terms of the economic needs of the demobilised troops, due to a lack of work in many areas in the region. This aspect has led to a change in the distribution of cash payments. These began with three rounds of 84 euros each, which was shared out between the members of the GAM from the highest authorities to the rank and file. Thus, the average provision of between 14 and 22 euros per person was arrived at. A report from the WB concerning the assessment of the requirements for reintegrating the GAM ex-combatants set out three main goals: to assess the reintegration process focusing on the potential obstacles for peace, to assess the needs and aspirations of ex-combatants, prisoners and receiving communities, and to help in developing programmes aimed at satisfying these needs. Generally speaking, the acceptance level of ex-combatants among the communities is very high (around 90%), as they are returning to their original communities, accompanied by traditional reconciliation ceremonies. The incidents detected in this study have been isolated cases. More specifically, the report is based on the profile of the reintegrated combatants and their needs: 4

5 - Distance between the tsunami affected areas and return of GAM members. - 75% of GAM former combatants were between 18 and 35 years old, and very few of the prisoners were younger than 18. Less than 4% were women. - 95% had some previous employment, most of them in rural areas (only 2% in a urban area). On their preferred reintegration options, choices were: returning to their former job (43.1%), returning to the same community but with a different job (26%), moving to both new location and job (1.3%), and 23.5% did not know what to do. People younger than 25 showed no predilection on education. - 85% of the interviewed combatants had a high level of confidence on the reintegration process. There were few incidents with the Government. - 72% of the interviewed combatants had already received support from their families and 62% had return to them. Most of the community members were aware of the existence of the MoU, but not so much of its contents. Finally, this report has identified several recommendation lines in order to provide an action framework and for the peace consolidation, answering to some challenges identified: Peace process support: - Sustainability and achievements revision process. - Support to the judiciary agencies capacities. - Socialization efforts. Reintegration: - Rural focus. - Short term transitional assistance to fulfil the diary necessities and facilitate the reinsertion. Individual benefits: - Housing assistance and its reconstruction. - Ensure the health assistance to the Excombatents and conflict victims. - Training focused on the employment search. Community benefits: - Community priorities at small and medium scale. - Private sector enhancement. - Long term development of community projects. Goals and delivery mechanisms: - Incorporate all involved collectives, former combatant and vulnerable groups. - Individual and community support programs inclusion. The following diagram shows the individual and community reintegration programs, distinguished by the kina of beneficiaries and goods. This reintegration programs still has to be discussed. 5

6 September 2005 saw the opening of the disarmament phase, during which it is expected that a quarter of the GAM s arsenal (840 small arms) will be handed in, with disarmament completed by 31 December In exchange, the Indonesian government will withdraw 6,000 military troops. The handover and public destruction of weapons is being carried out at four centres monitored by the AMM, which is also responsible for investigating possible violations of the Agreement. Stage Hended by Denied Arms final Refused Accepted GAM Government number I (September 05) II (October 05) III (November 05) IV (December TOTAL It is surprising the low number of arms (1 arm for each 3 combatants) and combatants to demobilize, allegedly due to the former martial law. Moreover, due to the lack of GAM lists, it can be done an individual delivery. The own group aims to reward widows and sons, which has supposed the protest of several combatants for having received les quantity. However, it seems that the number of GAM members is higher than 3,000 (according to ICG, the figure would reach 6,145 persons) assumed in the peace agreement, which leaded to the inclusion problems in this list. A Solomon decision was sharing the benefits proportionally taking in account the seniority. The problems still appeared with the economic necessities of the former combatants die to the lack of job opportunities in several regions. Here is presented the Armed Forces withdrawal process. It must be taken in account that are non-organic troops, expressly displaced on the fight against GAM: 6

7 Stage AAFF Police TOTAL I (September 05) 6,671 1,300 7,971 II (October 05) 6,097 1,050 7,147 III (November 05) 5,596 1,350 6,964 IV (December 05 7,628 2,150 9,778 TOTAL 25,890 5,791 31,681 In general terms, demobilisation and disarmament process has resulted as it was planned on the Memorandum of Understanding, probable due to the fact that it has been done on the precise moment: GAM weaknesses alter martial law, exhaustion and reconstruction necessities alter the tsunami, between others. Peace process: - Tension between Jakarta and Banda Aceh Governments. - Lack of public access to the contents of the agreement, meaning that it has been restricted to the political sphere. - Local elements could be encouraging illegal activities in the region, meaning that greater regional control is required. - Control and monitoring capacity: given that these duties are entrusted to an external body (AMM), this could hinder local knowledge, given the more than likely partiality of both the GAM and the government (it is impossible to create a Joint Implementation Unit, for example). - Reintegration of the GAM: erosion of trust and deterioration of relations between the communities and the state, and between the communities and the GAM, which raises doubts about the reconciliation process. Planning: - Absence of a clear demobilisation stage. Lack of psychological and social assistance, vocational training, etc. - GAM doesn t give the exact data on combatants to demobilize. - Lack of planning for the reintegration stage. - Financing and structure still to be arranged for the reintegration stage. Reconstruction work following the tsunami of 26 December 2004 could represent a source of job creation. - The communitarian and civilian victims reintegration seems an attractive aspect, but the demonstration degree difficult sensibly. International: - Aceh Monitorin Misión in < - ICG: Aceh A New Chance for Peace. ICG, August 2005, at < a_new_ch ance_for_peace.pdf>. - ICG: Aceh: now for the Hard Part. ICG, marzo 2006, at < _the_hard_part.pdf>. - European Union Council: Foreign Policy, at < Pag e.asp?id=957&lang=en>. 7

8 - European Union. External Relations. The EU and ASEAN, at < ternal_relations/indonesia/intro/index.htm>. - EU Information Centre, at < - International Alert: DDR: Supporting Security and Development. The EU s Added Value, September 2006, at < - The World Bank: GAM Reintegration needs Assessment. Enhancing peace through Community-level development Programming, March 2006, at < This briefing has been prepared by Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas and Eneko Sanz.