The Development of The Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals Association (Icmi): A Study On The Political Participation Based On Spirituality

Transcription

1 Available online at Scinzer Journal of Humanities, Vol 3, Issue 1, (2017): DOI: /SJAM ISSN The Development of The Indonesian Moslem Intellectuals Association (Icmi): A Study On The Political Participation Based On Spirituality Dr. Muhtar Solihin, M.Ag Activist of ICMI-West Java Branch in Indonesia; Professor, and Vice-Rector of the State Islamic University Sunan Gunung Jati Bandung, Indonesia Abstract : Indonesia is the largest muslim country in the world. In this country appears "Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals" (ICMI). Many of the members of ICMI is the politicians who are religious. Therefore, this paper describes the movement ICMI's political participation based religious spirituality. This theme was chosen to look at the political character of these Islamic organizations, since the first general chairman is BJ. Habibie until now under the leadership Jimly Ashiddiqy. Many administrators ICMI become bureaucrats and participate in the democratic process in Indonesia. Hence the presence of ICMI as an indication of the Islamization of the bureaucracy, which is thick with a cargo of Islamic spirituality since "The New Order" to "reform order". ICMI emerged as a modern Islamic political representative in Indonesia. ICMI was born when President Suharto was still in power, so that their political aspirations are influenced by New Order. After the fall of Suharto, political aspirations ICMI spread, not only the Golkar Party, but also other parties. ICMI development as an indication of the revival of Islamic-oriented middle classes establishment of "civil society" (civil society). Thought "civil Socety" deemed Indonesia can solve many problems, especially the problem of politics, economy, culture, and morality of the nation of Indonesia. Keywords: ICMI, politic, aspiration, civil society, spirituality The Government of New Order and ICMI s Political Activity The establishment of the ICMI on December 1990 is one of the most consequential political event of recent years. ICMI s creation has had a profound impact on political and ideological discourse in It is as loosely organized, newly established association represented by numerous people. The head of ICMI was B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology. He was prominent figure and Golkar s activist in The Government of New Order. ICMI is backed by powerful Research and Technology Minister B.J. Habibie, a close associate of Suharto's and a contender for the succession. When ICMI was formed in 1990 it invited Abdurrahman Wahid [the most prominent and NU s leader] to join. But, Wahid refused. Ever since, Wahid and Habibie have been at logger heads. According to Wahid and some scholars, that ICMI s activities is influenced by political decision of Golkar Party. When ICMI was established in 1990, Wahid mentioned the sectarian issue regarding the association. Criticism of ICMI and, implicitly, of Suharto henceforth came mostly from secular intellectuals, from non- Moslems and only a small number of committed Moslem spokesmen. Abdurrahman Wahid, who warned of the danger of sectarianism and anti-pluralist Moslem fundamentalism. In Wahid s perception (as well as that of many others in the NU), ICMI was dominated by reformist Moslems and was unlikely to grant the traditionalists a fair share. Wahid refused to join ICMI and instead established, together with a number of intellectuals of secular backgrounds, the Forum for Democracy, a small NGO that brought issues of civil rights, human rights and democracy into the public sphere. Within ICMI one found the entire range of reformist Moslem positions, from liberal neo-modernists, but the organization was dominated by Moslem bureaucrats. The radicals saw it as a vessel to achieve their Leninist objective of getting control of the state (either directly or in the form of having more non- Moslems in the state apparatus replaced by Moslems of ICMI affiliation), the liberals saw it as crowning the process of the emergence of a Moslem middle class, and for most bureaucrats it was simply an important means of benefiting their personal careers. All had an interest in keeping Suharto in power for a few more years even those who, I am sure, disliked or even despised him. With few exceptions Amien Rais being one of them ICMI s Moslem intellectuals remained loyal to Suharto almost to the end and only deserted him when Habibie, their chairman and Suharto s first successor, did so. Those who jumped on the bandwagon of the reformasi movement (and reformasi, political reform, the keyword of those days, meant to most demonstrators primarily getting rid of Suharto) were reluctant to let reformasi run its full course and break down the entire New Order. Din Syamsuddin, an ICMI advisory council member and part of Golkar's central board, says many Moslems back Habibie and ICMI because they feel technocrats were too influential in government for too long. "We ask for a proportional role in accord with our demographic presence," he says. To Rustam Ibrahim, Suharto's decision to align

2 himself with Islam at the end of the 1980s "coincided with the desires of the people. Now there is a feeling that ICMI has given Moslems a role." While ICMI has done much in promoting education and research posts for young Moslems, it is also widely seen as a political vehicle for Habibie and his supporters who hold high-level positions throughout the bureaucracy. Admits Nurcholis Majid, head of Jakarta's Paramedina Institute and a co-founder of ICMI: "Because of the dominance of Habibie's personality, ICMI has become dependent on his life force." Given the high-level backing, Syamsuddin asks: "Are we the horse or the rider? It's difficult to conclude." But the more important point, he says, is that fulfilling Moslem aspirations "needs a political foundation." ICMI s Political Aspiration After Suharto s Downfall Suharto s fall was precipitated by a grave economic crisis and violent riots in Jakarta, in which numerous peoples were killed (many of them burnt alive in shopping centres that they appeared to be looting). The riots resulted in the flight of most Chinese businessmen and of their capital a development that some of the people radicals were known to consider as desirable, but that also meant the virtual bankruptcy of the Indonesian economy. The final months of Suharto s rule and the transition period imposed major realignments on political Islam. Many Moslem politicians, remained loyal to Suharto until the very end, fearing that change might cause them to lose the access to power they had so recently gained. Of ICMI s leading figures, Amien Rais was the only one to publicly criticize Suharto before his position had significantly weakened. Amien, who was the chairman of Muhammadiyah and a leading member of ICMI s Council of Experts, was forced to resign the latter position in This, and the silence of all other senior figures, made him the natural leader of the emerging anti-suharto coalition and the Reformasi movement. Students constituted the major force of this movement; senior public figures were late in joining. Of the nation-wide Moslem student organizations, neither the modernist HMI (Islamic University Students Association) nor the traditionalist PMII (Indonesian Islamic Students Movement) took visibly part in the movement. A new Moslem student association, KAMMI (Action Unity of Indonesian Moslem University s Students), was established in early 1998 and rapidly rose to prominence due to its active role in demonstrations. KAMMI was founded by da`wa groups from sixty campus mosques and had links with the Moslem Brotherhood-influenced Tarbiyah movement. KAMMI incorporated numerous HMI members (especially from the dissident wing, HMI-MPO) too, but its leading activists tended to consider HMI and especially its alumni association, KAHMI, as too close to the regime. PMII activists, on the other hand, tended not to join this Moslem student front but to ally themselves with their secular colleagues in action committees that were more radical in their rejection of the New Order. The Reformasi movement was united over the demand that Suharto should step down. The unity disappeared as soon as Suharto resigned his position on May 21 and handed power to his vice president, Habibie, whom many Moslems saw as representing their interests and who installed a cabinet in which ICMI personalities and the Islamic wing of the Armed Forces were strongly represented. The secular wing of the Reformasi movement considered Habibie as too much part of the New Order to be acceptable, and it demanded total reform. Especially the left-leaning student movement demanded the complete overthrow of the New Order and all of Suharto s collaborators. KAMMI and other Moslem student groups did not taken an open stand against Habibie but kept demanding that Suharto and others guilty of largescale corruption be tried. A broad spectrum of secular and non-moslem groups, from long-time opponents of the New Order to former establishment figures, were concerned that Habibie s presidency would further empower radical Moslems and therefore opposed him. They put Megawati Sukarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and the Sultan of Yogyakarta none of whom had, for different reasons, been much in evidence in the Reformasi movement forward as leaders capable of voicing the demands of the people. Amien Rais and the public personalities who had come to associate themselves with the reformist front that he led steered a middle course, maintaining relations with Habibie and his cabinet (many of whom were, after all, old friends) while with holding full legitimatization and calling for economic, political and legal reform. Background the mass reform movement in Indonesia during the past two years had brought about atremendous political change in this country. Reformation, as the movement is popularly known in Indonesia, was successful in bringing down President Soeharto and his New Order regime in May At the beginning of the movement, there was a deep skepticism among analysts of Indonesian politics about whether the movement would be able to last long enough to cause a dent on the regime s structure, let alone toppling Soeharto. Such doubt asunderstandable, bearing in mind that for more than thirty years, Soeharto had been able to consolidate his power not only through the elimination of virtually all political contenders but also through economic development that had won him a widespread legitimacy. The success of the Reformation Movement has led many analysts to believe that the Indonesian politics have fundamentally changed, that new political forces have replaced theold ones, and that identities and loyalties have shifted. This is the fruit of economic development carried out by the New Order regime, which has indeed created higher prosperity, improved health care system, and better schooling system. As a result, the new Indonesian generation, especially the new middle class in ICMI, is a generation of modernity, seemingly detached from the old primordial loyalties that have divided their forefathers. Globalization, which Indonesia has been actively seeking to be a part of, has also made the younger generation more familiar with the ideas of democracy. Even though democracy is interpreted differently by different political forces and actors in Indonesia, Reformasi was launched in the name of democracy. 70

3 Suharto s Downfall has influenced to ICMI s political activity. Thereafter, part of ICMI s elites became run away from Golkar Party, and built Islamic parties. The ideas of democratization is appeared that moment. Generally, they were influenced by Reformation Movement. The downfall of Soeharto has brought about a sense of democratic euphoria among the public. After being tightly regulated for almost four decades since the introduction of Guided Democracy by Sukarno in 1959, the Indonesian polity seemed to make the most of its new found freedom. After President Habibie, who replaced Soeharto in May 1998, announced that a general election would be held in 1999, 160 political parties were established during the period of May 1998 to February However, the General Election Commission (KPU) later decided that only 48 parties had the sufficient level of support and number of branches to be eligible to participate in the 1999 election. The MPR decided on new elections in June 1999, after which a new MPR was to elect a new president. For the first time since the 1950s, there was an almost unlimited freedom for parties with any sort of platform to contest the elections. If the elections showed anything it was that political Islam had little appeal among the population at large. Out of 48 parties contesting the elections, 14 defined themselves as Moslem, but among them only the PPP, the Moslem party of the Suharto period, received a significant percentage of the vote, ending as fourth with around 11 percent. The Crescent-and-Star Party (PBB), which claimed to be the true successor of Masyumi, and in which KISDI (Moslem Solidarity) leaders played a role, did not rise above 2 percent, and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan), which represented what I have called campus Islam and which was one of the very few parties with a proper program, got only 1.5 percent. The other Moslem parties did even less well. Thereafter, ICMI s members spreaded into those parties and Golkar Party. The three New Order parties, not surprisingly, made a better showing than the recently founded ones, especially outside Java, for they were the only ones that could count on a well-functioning party apparatus down to the district level. The great winner of the elections was Megawati, who had taken over the leadership of the most important wing of the Indonesian Democratic Party (the PDI-P), and won 35% of the vote. The New Order s government party, Golkar, though considerably weakened, came second with 23%, and the PPP, as said, ended just after the PKB with 11%. Perhaps more than for any single party, the elections were a great victory for the Moslem student union (HMI); a large number of HMI alumni were voted into parliament on the tickets of various parties. Part of HMI alumni was activist of ICMI, and still became the power of Golkar, especially in green wing. In Golkar, the green wing, most of whom (including the new chairman, Akbar Tanjung) were HMI-affiliated, had won an internal power struggle with the nationalist wing, led by retired generals. Many PPP politicians too were HMI alumni, and even in the PDI-P there were a few. Even in Java and Madura, the PKB s real strongholds, entire communities were split between these two parties, which in some cases even led to bloodshed. Golkar also attracted a part of the NU vote since 1984 many local NU leaders had established close and profitable relationships with this government party. There were moreover two newly established parties that specifically targeted the NU constituency (but these did not perform too well). Finally, quite a few young NU activists opted for Megawati s PDI-P, which was more clearly associated with resistance to the Suharto regime. The Muhammadiyah vote was even more dispersed. In the 1950s, Masyumi had been the obvious party for Muhammadiyah members to vote for, but none of the parties that pretended to be Masyumi s legitimate successor had a wide appeal. The largest of them, the Crescent-and-Star Party, placed itself in an extremist corner by including the KISDI activists. Amien Rais [ICMI s elite], who probably commanded the personal loyalties of significant numbers of Muhammadiyah members, had declined joining up with the Crescent-and-Star and led instead the deliberately pluralist National Mandate Party (PAN). This party s poor showing indicated that most Muhammadiyah votes probably went to the older parties, PPP and Golkar, between which they had been divided for most of the Suharto period. The strong association between Muhammadiyah and Golkar reflected the fact that many Muhammadiyah members were civil servants. The only party with an explicitly Islamic political ideology was the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan). Most of its leaders and cadres had been raised in the Islamic students movement and its ideology mirrored that of the Moslem Brotherhood. It combined a strong desire for democratisation and overthrow of the old power structure with explicit ideas on Islamic economics and Islamization of the polity. Its poor performance in the voting booth (1.5 percent) should be seen in perspective: many of its voters were highly educated, and the party represents an influential segment of society. Since no party had won an absolute majority, the election of a new president was to be the result of complicated negotiations between the parties and other relevant actors, including the military. In the aftermath of the elections, Amien Rais forged an alliance of his PAN with the three major Moslem parties, PPP, Crescent-and-Star, and Justice, called the Central Axis (Poros Tengah), which appeared to have as its chief aim to prevent Megawati from becoming president. Habibie, whose Golkar remained strong and who had the power of office, was the strongest alternative to Megawati and had the goodwill of many reformist Moslems, who believed that he was genuinely interested in empowering them. He was too clearly linked to the Suharto period, however. Amien made the unlikely but statesmanlike move of allying with his old rival Abdurrahman Wahid and supporting the latter s bid for the presidency, causing a brief lull in the usually uneasy relations between traditionalist and reformist Moslems. At least during the first year of its establishment, ICMI s appeared as an effort to build a civil society in Indonesia was quite strong. But ICMI could also be viewed in terms of its relations with Soeharto. Its establishment was perceived by some analysts as an effort of Soeharto to gain a new mass-based support after a series of rows with some military officers who were critical of the first family s involvement in business. The appointment of B. J. Habibie, Soeharto s 71

4 protégé, as ICMI Chairman seemed to confirm such notion. ICMI s establishment was openly opposedby some officers. A number of traditionalist Moslems, including Abdurrahman Wahid, also opposed ICMI, because it had too much modernist flavour in it. Despite the opposition anddespite its non-political pronouncement, ICMI s political influence was growing quickly. In 1993, three years after its establishment, ICMI was able to penetrate deeply into Golkar. As a result, many modernist Moslems came to the parliament on Golkar s tickets and many viewed the cabinet of the same period as an ICMI Cabinet. As a result of ICMI s rise, interesting changes also occurred in the internal composition of the Indonesian Army (TNI). In this period, a new faction emerged within the TNI. This faction was led by a number of Moslem officers with modernist inclination, such as Prabowo Subianto (the son of Sumitro), and the two Sumatrans, Feisal Tanjung, and Syarwan Hamid. They grew closer to the modernist Moslems. At the same time, the Javanese officers with nationalist inclination, such as Moerdani and Try Sutrisno appeared to lead theother faction. Such factionalism within ABRI was known as the Red-White and the Green factions. Another interesting phenomenon in this period was the modernization of NU. Under Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU became closer to the ideas of liberal democracy, namely minority rights as well as civil and human rights protection. This was the fruit of educating the young traditionalists in Western educational institutions. Also responsible for this advancement was the close relationship that Gus Dur enjoyed with the NGO communities, both at home and abroad. As a result, the image of NU, especially of Gus Dur himself, shifted from that of rural Santri advocating an Islamic state to a cosmopolitan one with astrong leaning toward the protection of the minority groups. The appearance of ICMI can t be separated from cultural and intellectual dynamics of Islamic thinkers and activists since They try to develop Islamic political format spealized more on the substance rather than form. By this model like Islam and Indonesian problems that both vital elements had given cultural and structural legimitation to the Nation-State constract could be better synthesized and integrated. Islam in the New Order is reminiscent of the policies advocated by Snouck Horgronje, the famous Dutch advisor to the colonial regime who argued that Islam as cultural and spiritual force was to be encouraged and nurtured while political manifestations of faith were to be suppressed. ICMI leaders identify three basic purposes of the organization. First is to help Moslems educationally, culturally, and economically. Second is to unify Indonesia Islamic movement and to break away from historic splits for example modernist versus traditionalist --, and third is to implement a number of specific political objectives. The beginning of new educated Moslem generation grow up to push to become new midlle class as social, economic and politic entity. Their mobilization that horizontally spread into many sectors and professions. Vertical mobility is the rise of their position from low strata and midlle strata to higher strata. They have both Islam and Indonesian commitment. Nurchloish Madjid concludes that healthy development of an Islamic society in Indonesia is seen by the new generation of educated, primarly urban-based Moslems to be perfectly compatible by Pancasila. The difference in the 1980s and 1990s is also that Moslems wish to see a government that reflects the value of Islam. Inharmony with Islam and State relation in the beginning of New Order Government, Islamic thinkers and activists have new midlle class tried to problem solving by spreading idea for solution. Three discourses of their agenda since two decades ago: (1) solution about Islamic reformation; (2) Reformation of politic and bureaucracy and; (3) The need of social transformation as doversivication Islamic political meaning inclusively. Because of that in 1990s there were indications that the relationship between Islam and State has become very alleviate as modification and integrated. State has begun to alleviate Islamic Political discourse be wrapped around with Islamic intellectuals and their activities in structural, legislative, infrastructur and cultural government policy. Indonesia has been enjoying an Islamic cultural revival over the past two decades. This cultural revival has been paralleled by the strict proscription of explicit Islamic political activity in the New Order. Prohibiton of political organization in the New Order on the basic of religious, ethnic, racial, or class affiliations is a key element in the regime s conception of a Pancasila Democraty. However, many view the cultural, spiritual, and educational flowering of Indonesian Islam as partly of concequence of Moslem energies directed away from Islamic politics. That matter looks like about become different government policy giving power acces for Islamic thinkers and their activists at large. The lucky position used to struggle Islamic policy. Since the birth of ICMI until the present is one of the struggles. The background of this problem on the state acomodation to Islam can be seen from two paradigms: The first, after 25 years New Order development, Islamic community has mobilization as social, economic and politic must be account of proportional. The second, the idea of transformation and political attitude of new Islamic generation which more acomodative by not being formal legalistic but more substantial. Islamic political reorientation achieved its peak in 1990 with the birth of ICMI, it has grown up of expect and optimism but cause appehension. In one side ICMI hopes to play a role democratization in social-politic, but cause appehension to ICMI because being inhibited Indonesia political democratization process. By the way, ICMI dilemmas at present is how to articulate people aspiration and Islam. Inclusive attitude into intellectualism and exclusive into Islam need moderation to its continuity. 72

5 The problem at this present is how to articulates the struggle for democracy regarding that ICMI itself has many group consist with different background. ICMI s elites of various convergence from Islamic categories; progressive, concervative and moderate. But, all they intend to build Indonesian society. ICMI and Adi Sasono s Leadership Thereafter, Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises Adi Sasono was elected chairman of ICMI on Sunday, November 12 th, He replaces former president B.J. Habibie, who had held the post since the association was established in Malang, East Java, in In Habibie s ICMI, Adi Sasono as secretary-general, and was key figure of Habibie s presidency. Adi Sasono was founder of CIDES (Center for Information and Development Studies), a political think tank established by ICMI. The congress also elected communications expert and Golkar Party legislator Marwah Daud Ibrahim as secretarygeneral. Adi Sasono, defeated a number of other candidates, including Muslimin Nasution, Marwah daud Ibrahim and Jimly al-shiddiqy, in the early Sunday morning election. Adi Sasono [alumni of the Bandung Institute of Technology, ITB] was known as founder and chairman of the Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka), after his the People's Sovereignty Party (PDR) failed to get seat in 1999 election. He also was chairman of Sharia Economic Society (Masyarakat Ekonomi Syariah, MES), and was Chairman of board of commissioners of PT Abdi Bangsa, publisher of Republika (newspaper closely related to Moslem readers and scholars, where Habibie also the founder). Before as the chairman of Partai Merdeka and PDR, Adi Sasono was an executive member of Golkar, but he has left the party and said that he will not campaign for it, cutting short rumors that he was using public funds (his ministry has received 18 trillion to help small businesses and is expected to get a further 20 trillion for 1999) to gain political mileage for the Golkar. Adi Sasono would give moral support to a new party, Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR) that will target the lower classes, such as street vendors and small vendors, cutting into the constituency of the National Awakening Party (PKB), the political arm of Adburrahmann Wahid's Nahdlatul Ulama and the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Amien Rais. The 57-year-old Adi said under his leadership the ICMI would concentrate on four main agendas, including programs dealing with the people's economy and humanitarian issues. "The economic development of the people is significant for the country's economic recovery," he said during a media conference after closing the congress. He said the association also would help contribute to the settlement of humanitarian problems in the provinces of Aceh, Maluku, West Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. Under Adi Sasono s command, ICMI was talking about the People s Economy concep. This idea was trying to break monopolies, as the cause of the corruption and inefficiency of the Soeharto's system. Dr. Sri Mulyani and Dr. Anwar Nasution (the Dean of the Indonesian Faculty of Economics) have the most practical solutions to the nation s economic problems. Indonesia economy must be tied to the international economy in general. Although we may have a few things we need to do our own way, our economy should broadly be based on the market mechanism. In that sense, they would be able to drive our economy into the right track. Sasono's policy is to rebalance the economy which is heavily weighted today in favour of conglomerates and monopolies. Adi Sasono has hatched a controversial plan to extend cheap credit to poor Muslims in an effort to redress the socio-economic imbalance between Chinese and Muslims. His concept has been dubbed "the people's economy." ICMI leaders share is an abiding belief in proportional representation - that Muslims, as the majority, should dominate all fields, from government to business. "This is our era," says Moh Jumhur Hidayat, executive director of ICMI's think-tank CIDES, where the "people's economy" concept was incubated So is 'the People's Economy' yet another form of political funding? Many analysts think so. 'Adi Sasono is Habibie's flaming brand,' says head of research at a Jakarta securities firm. 'It [the People's Economy] is a tool so that Golkar can win the elections,' says political economist Alexander Irwan. But Adi Sasono may be a wild-card for Habibie. 'He has a policy power far beyond his portfolio,' says political risk consultant Kevin O'Rourke, of Van Zorge Associates. Adi Sasono advocates a so-called people's economy an attempt to appeal to anti-chinese sentiment by calling for the redistribution of the wealth of large, mainly ethnic Chinese conglomerates to small, indigenous Indonesian businesses. The government focus on the so-called "People's Economy" rather than large projects. The problem with Adi Sasono s program is that it might have a political agenda: to win the election. What the government is saying to the indigenous ordinary citizens is now I give you the money. We have got rid of the Chinese, it is your turn, and next time, if you elect me, I ll give you more. He was seen as consistent with his long involvement in developing small-scale entrepreneurs. In this aspect his orientation may have not changed much as he now campaigns his concept of a people's economy through his new party, the Freedom Party. The party's booklet still describes the theme of his aforementioned 1981 book -- the alliances among the local elite and political and economic interests, alliances perceived to be mainly responsible for a country that remains dependent and largely poor. Adi Sasono denies being anticonglomerate, the image of him drawn not only from his championing of a people's economy but also because he was an ICMI founder and executive. He was also ICMI chairman from 2000 to 2005, but he 73

6 resigned to set up the party. And a few years before the war on terrorism he was considered dangerous, particularly among non-muslims and the outside world, as he advocated a bigger role for Muslims in the country, politically and economically, given their suppression under the New Order regime. He made his position clear during a recent visit to The Jakarta Post by saying "I'm anti-crony and pro-market. I'm not a Muslim extremist nor anti-chinese." The party has Non-Muslims, such as those in East Nusa Tenggara, as constituents, he adds. Adi promotes an updated version of the people's economy -- now the party calls it a "digital economy", popularizing the use of the Internet to shatter the "monopoly of information" held by those who manipulate people with no access to crucial know-how. But just as before, Adi's new party faces the challenge of marketing ideas in a landscape in which people are either fed up with politicians or who prefer parties that offer more familiar identification. ICMI and Marwah s Leadership In Reformation Era, ICMI become the representative of modern Islam politics in Indonesia. Nowadays, the chairwoman of ICMI is Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Ph.D. She was elected by participators of ICMI Conference in December 7 th, 2005 in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Marwah graduated from the Department of Communication, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Hasanuddin University, Makasar, South Sulawesi, in She received her Ph.D from the American University, Washington DC, in She is a politician, a prominent fugure in the Golkar Party, one of the biggest political parties in Indonesia. She serves on the national board of the party and as a member of the Indonesian parliament. In the 2004 Indonesian presidential election, she was the running-mate of one of the presidential candidates, Abdurrahman Wahid. Under Marwah Daud Ibrahim s leadership, ICMI is opened with the political ideas, democracy, economy, human right, culture, etc. She also builds ICMI s unity, in spite of ICMI s members come from variant background. Nowadays, ICMI s members can be generally divided into three groups: First, Islamic theologian and scholar who experts conceptualize cosmopolitan Islamic civilization. Among the prominent scholars of Islam that represents these sequences include Nurcholish Madjid, Azyumardi Azra, Dawam Rahardjo, and Nanat Fatah Natsir, which together with Abdurrahman Wahid (outside ICMI) is probably the most "revolutionary" Islamic scholars in Indonesia since the year They had a great idea to introduce a rational Islam and Islam are full of spiritual values. Second, Islamic activists and politicians. The Islamic activists and politicians form the most vocal component group of ICMI. Politicians also include some current members of the Unity Party (PPP), the National Mandate Party, (PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), The Crescent-and-Star Party (PBB), etc. Members of this activist group considered in greatest detail include Amin Rais, Fakry Gaffar, Jimly al-shiddiqy, Adi Sasono, and Syamsuddin. Third, government bureaucracts. ICMI is a government-sponsored organization under the patronage of Marwah Daud Ibrahim, and many bureaucrats has joined, these include such figures as Ginandjar Kartasamita (member of Parliament), Hatta Rajasa (Minister of Transportation), Sugiharto (Minister of Country Companies), Haryanto Danutirto, Muslimin Nasution (bureaucract), etc. Furthermore, the ICMI voice is not dominated by one distinctive person or perspective. All groups have the voice in discussion obout ICMI programes, activity, and its political thoughts. Thus, under Marwah Daud Ibrahim, ICMI was actually an amalgamation of scholars, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, student and NGO activists, professionals, as well as underground and establishment politicians. Although initially meant as an umbrella organization for Moslems of all stripes, most of ICMI s members came from the modernist persuasion. In addition, many of its members also came from the younger generation of middle class families. Most of them were the Reformation Era, growing up in urban areas and in an environment where peoples were not the main theme of politics. ICMI s appeal seemed to be the openness within the organization amidst the environment of political stiffness; aspiration for more political openness; and as a mediation between modern and religious values. Under the command of this Marwah, ICMI's elite to be aware that the Indonesian people in need of political stability, economic, legal, etc. Even Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he became president of Indonesia never entrust some of its programs to ICMI, for example, social welfare development, technology development, economic recovery and social, good governance, finding energy solutions, prevent terrorism until everyone feels safe to stay in Indonesia, and build the image of Indonesia in the international world. As an intelligent woman activist, Marwah also bring ICMI to remain reaffirm the commitment of intellectuals to remain on track practice and understanding of intellectual unites with religious spiritual intelligence. In this century, the elite ICMI predict the threat of instability in the Indonesian nation does not lie in political Islam and Muslims in Indonesia, but a dangerous threat is the weakness of the nation's economy, violation of the law and law enforcement are inadequate, corruption, and economic injustice, all of which can lead to instability Indonesian politics. For that ICMI holds that the political elite of power must be focused and responsive to finding solutions to those problems. ICMI criticized the political elite who only seek personal gain, while the people suffer. Furthermore, ICMI continues to campaign for human social life, tolerance, courtesy, and non-violence, as this provides a strong basis for positive change for the nation of Indonesia. 74

7 ICMI and Jimly Ashiddiqy s Leadership Ashiddiqy Jimly leadership in the era of today, ICMI are in Indonesian leadership political era dominated by nationalist parties that tend to separate religion and politics. Although there are Islamic parties supporting the government now, but its role is not as big as the nationalist parties. Therefore the leadership era Jimly Ashiddiqy, ICMI face a tough test, that test to survive in the movement nuanced religious spirituality organizations facing an era of government tended to avoid the role of religion. In the era of Jimly Ashiddiqy leadership, ICMI still see religion and politics have a relationship of mutual influence, so that they can not be separated and it should be mutually reinforcing. Religion with values higher spirituality is seen will be able to resolve the issues, including the issue of national morality. Religion and politics that affect each other, the national policy should also obtain the justification of religion, if there is no charge of religious spirituality it will cause various problems of nationality. ICMI from birth until now still look at religion, Pancasila, and the country sustain and reinforce each other everything. ICMI loyalty to Pancasila evidenced by rejecting religious radicalism. Instead ICMI also rejected the secular radicalism which does not allow religion to interfere. In fact, religion and politics that there should be strengthening, while if not, there will be conflict. Because it must be mutually reinforcing, but not in the sense of religious radicalism, because religious radicalism that can be destructive to the life of the nation. ICMI s Civil Society In Arabic Language, according to Nurcholish Madjid, the term of civil society is the same with madani, tsaqafah, hadharah. These term make a reference to Madinah City in the Prophet Muhammad era. The most general definition of civil society runs as follows: the idea and concept of civil society refer to that broad class of institutions between the family and communal groups on the one hand and the state on the other, as well as the forums in and through which there is an attempt to harmonize, where necessary, the conflicting demands of individual interests and social groups. ICMI s elites agree in describing civil society as an arena of friendships, clubs, business associations, unions and other voluntary organizations that mediate between the vast expanse between the household and the state. It is generally recognized in the literature on the topic that the existence of an active civil society in a country is linked to the vitality of the political democracy. The concept of civil society is thus linked to a whole range of other concepts, such as citizenship, democracy, constitutionalism, social capital, trust and also to political economic ideas about liberties and private property. The literature on the subject emphasizes that civil society has a number of functions fordemocracy:1) protecting the citizens against state arbitrariness;2) maintaining a balance between society and the state, based on the rule of law; 3) disseminating the democratic values of tolerance, honesty and mutual acceptance; 4) the creation of a public sphere of discussion; 5) and finally that of moderating social conflicts, by creating overlapping networks of organizations and crisscrossing socio-cultural loyalties. According to Marwah, the concept of civil society can be begun by the building of human resource, democracy, economy networking. For example, ICMI has created a credit system for small entrepreneurs and the poor called the Baitulmal Wa Tamwil financing system. Even, according Agus Salim Dasuki (ICMI s General Secretary), ICMI has the MoU (the Memorandum of Understanding) with some instances, i.e. with Muamalat Bank, Republika Newspaper, Takaful Insurance, Telecommunication Company, Angkasa Pura II Company, Madani Capital for Investment (PNM), RNI, PTPN VII, Gas Company, Heart Management, and ESQ Training Center. 1 Thus, under Marwah s leadership, ICMI creates the civil society and democratic society (madani). Those program as the building of civil society, and unity of ICMI s politic and democracy. The characteristics and functions of a civil society are very important elements for the democratization of the contemporary Indonesia. These characteristics and functions are based on organizations in traditional society which have characteristics in common with civil society. A civil society may promote democratization, support a dictatorship, or it may have little influence on either of these phenomenon. Therefore, in order to clarify how a civil society functions, it is necessary to research the functions of organizations in traditional society which have characteristics in common with civil society. Of course civil society is a concept based on the western model of history and society. Therefore, it is necessary to strip the term of its western nuances. In order to achieve this, "popular society" is possible alternative term for "civil society". ICMI explained the present status of civil society movements in our areas of expertise. A summary of civil society is shown below. First, The ICMI s members distinguished two important points concerning their understanding of the concept of "civil society". Because "civil society" is a concept stemming from the processes of modern history, it is not difficult to use it in the framework of Islamic societies. If the term is stripped of its modern nuances, it is possible to use it as a framework for the analysis of Islamic societies. Second, the relationship between Islam and "civil society". In the civil society movement, Islam is used as methodology. It is necessary to deduce what an Islamic "civil society" is by examining Islam itself. 75

8 Islamic societies are often perceived as "something special" for the life of modern civilized society full of strong Islamic spirituality. In the future, people like these that will be able to bring human civilization better, because the intelligence community life, political intelligence and economic intelligence in community life is always accompanied by intelligence spirituality. Conclusion ICMI is an organization of Muslim intellectuals were growing rapidly in Indonesia since its birth to the present. Although not a political party, but ICMI has represented the political role of modern Islam in Indonesia. ICMI's political participation in Indonesia is taken into account so many ICMI figures play an active role in government. Likewise the presence of ICMI figures in Parliament is very prominent since the New Order era to reform. After the fall of President Soeharto, ICMI's political aspirations not only in the Golkar Party, but the spread of Islamic parties and even some that sit in the National Party. Therefore, ICMI activists since the Habibie leadership, Adi Sasono, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, until Jimly Ashiddiqy often speaks of Indonesian politics, democracy, economic democracy, and others according to the background of their party. However ICMI has made a positive contribution to democratization in Indonesia. ICMI consistently fought for the soul of Islam in political life in Indonesia. ICMI seeks to make Islam as the foundation of human spirituality that serves as a means of controlling the practice of politics in Indonesia, and eventually will be formed "civil soceity". Civil society is a society that practiced clever politics, economy equitable, fair laws, and culture was polite, because based on good Islamic spirituality. From here will form a moral Indonesian society, high and noble civilization References Syafi i Anwar, Islam Negara dan Formasi Sosial dalam Orde Baru, Ulumul Qur an, No. 3, Vol. III, 1992, p. i. See See Snouck Horgronje, Surat-Surat Snouck Horgronje, (Jakarta: INIS, 1992). Douglas E. Remage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, London and New York, Routladge, 1995, p About that, Nurcholish Madjid was intervied by Tempo Magazine, December, 8 th, 1990, and see Nurcholish Madjid was intervied by Prisma Magazine, Number 5, VIII-th, 1988, p See Bachtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran Islam (Prisma, Number 5, May 1995). Nurcholish Madjid, Islamic Integration, Jakarta: Paramadina, See Fachry Ali, Keharusan Demokratisasi Dalam Islam Indonesia, Ulumul Qur an, Number 1, vol. VI, 1995, p Ade Armando, Democratization Movement According to ICMI, Ulumul Qur an, Number 1, vol. VI, 1995, p Cf CF Republika Newspaper, December, 8 th, 2005, p. 1. Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p Cf: See Nurchloish Madjid, Islam dan Politik: Suatu Tinjauan Atas Prinsip-Prinsip Hukum dan keadilan, dalam: Paramadina, Jakarta, Vol. 1, No. 1, Juli- Desember, 1998, p. 52. Cf. Merkel and Lauth, De rol van civil Society in Het Democratisch proces, Oost-Europa Verkenningen, juni.1998, p See Suara Karya Newspaper, April, 21 th, 2006, p. 1; and see Kompas Newspaper, April, 21 th, 2006, p.1. See Kompas Newspaper, April, 21 th, 2006, p