ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA. Rizal SUKMA CSIS, Jakarta. Johannesburg, 19 June 2007

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1 ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN INDONESIA Rizal SUKMA CSIS, Jakarta Johannesburg, 19 June 2007 Introduction The Asian financial crisis of 1997, despite its devastating effects on Indonesia s economy, also resulted in fundamental political transformation in the country. The economic crisis, which disrupted the upward trend in economic growth enjoyed by Indonesia since early 1970s, soon eroded the legitimacy of the New Order government led by President Suharto since Mounting opposition from students, pro-democracy forces, and civil society groups, finally forced President Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998 and ended his 32 years of authoritarian rule. With the departure of Suharto from power, Indonesia soon entered a period of difficult transition towards democracy characterised by a combination of dramatic breakthroughs and moments of great optimism 1 and occasional frustration. At the same time, the fall of Suharto opened up new opportunity for Islam to once again come to the centre stage of national political life. Under the New Order government, the relationship between Islam and the state had always been characterised by mutual suspicion and antagonism. Islam, especially in its political form, was subject to a politics of marginalisation by the New Order regime. Nevertheless, Islam managed to preserve its social influence within the society, and the New Order government never succeeded in curbing a sense of entitlement among segments of the Muslim community to seek a formal political role. With the opening up of the political system since 1998, Islam has once again become a potent political force in Indonesian politics. Indeed, the move towards democracy and the revival of Islam --as social and political force-- constitute two significant developments in Indonesia s domestic politics since the collapse of Suharto s New Order. And, as Indonesia s foreign policy has always been the function of its domestic politics, 2 the effects of these two significant political changes in domestic 1 Edward Aspinall, Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2005), p For an excellent discussion on the extent to which Indonesia s foreign policy has been subject to changes in domestic politics, see Michael Leifer, Indonesia s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 1

2 politics are bound to be felt in foreign policy as well. This paper examines progresses and challenges facing Indonesia in the process of democratisation, the role and the place of Islam in that process, and the extent to which these two domestic factors have influenced Indonesia s foreign policy. Democratisation in Indonesia: Progress and Challenges In evaluating the current status of democratisation process, one would be tempted to focus the attention on what has not been achieved so far. However, one should also realise that the business of building democracy is not an overnight project. Moreover, the path towards democracy in the developing world has always been susceptible to either democratic backsliding or even the return of authoritarianism. Within Southeast Asia, for example, the case of Thailand is illustrative. Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive picture, it is also equally important to consider what Indonesia s politics was like before the democratisation process started in In other words, the state of Indonesia s democratisation process needs to be understood as a work in progress rather than a complete project. In this regards, there have been six main political changes in Indonesia s politics since First, Indonesia has moved away from a system of government based one man rule. For more than three decades, President Suharto built a centralised pyramid of power with strong patrimonial character as the basis of his rule. He built a political system where he stood at the apex of the pyramid; his appointees sat in each of the key executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. 3 As no other political force could effectively challenge his position, Suharto s rule became personalised. Indeed, the Indonesian political system had altered laws at will to give advantages to Soeharto s family and friends 4 Until his downfall, President Suharto acted as the sole decision maker in almost every aspects of the country s life. Now, such a system has been discarded and politics has become a competitive field. Unlike during Suharto s period, political power is no longer concentrated in the hand of a single hegemonic political force. More importantly, the amended Constitution of 1945 now limits the terms of presidency to two five years terms only. Second, the move towards a genuine multi-party system also constitutes a significant change in Indonesian politics. In the past, only two opposition political parties and one government s party (Golkar) were allowed to exist. Political parties were strongly and tightly controlled and supervised by the government. Unlike Golkar, they were not permitted to 3 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, , Monograph Series no. 64, (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p Anthony L. Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia s Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002), p. 29 2

3 open branches below the municipal level so that their influence at the grassroot level was almost non-existent. Now, there are more than 200 political parties have been formed. However, in the 2004 elections, only 24 political parties were eligible to compete. Out of 24 political parties, only few parties received significant support. These include, among others, the ruling party Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), the Democratic Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), and Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS). Third, Indonesia has now enjoyed freedom of speech. The press is no longer subject to tight governmental control and the right of the government to revoke the publication license has been curtailed. The government can no longer unilaterally ban any publication without proper, fair and open trial. The same can also be said with regard the freedom of expression. Any public event, for example, no longer needs special permission from the police. The organiser is now only required to notify the police three days before any public event, including public demonstration, is held. Within this new open political environment, the role of civil society organisations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) has increased tremendously. The relationship between the sate and the society has indeed restored to a balance. Fourth, other aspect of New Order s politics that has been discarded is the obsession of the central government in Jakarta to maintain absolute control of the region. New Order regime believed that Indonesia should be structured and governed in a high degree of uniformity in which the centre would define what was good and bad for the regions. With the fall of the New Order, Jakarta was forced to concede more autonomy to the regions. In 2001, Indonesia passed a new law which guarantees a high degree of autonomy to local government at district level. In a federal-like arrangement, the central government now only enjoys the authority over the conduct of foreign policy, defence, fiscal and monetary policy, judiciary and religious affairs. Fifth, the military, once a key pillar of New Order s authoritarian regime, is now subject to reform and is undergoing several changes. The most important one is the withdrawal of the military from politics. Unlike during the New Order era, it no longer occupies reserved seats in the parliament and has largely stayed neutral in national politics. Active military officers are banned from occupying public offices, and required by law to resign if they want to contest in elections. Its business empire is in the process of being taken over by the government. The military is now under the oversight of the Parliament. In other words, the process of establishing the principle of civilian supremacy and a democratic civilian control of the military constitutes a significant change in Indonesia s politics. Sixth, after two general elections since the democratisation started, first in 1999 and then in 2004, Indonesia has proven itself of being capable to 3

4 conducting a peaceful political succession. On contrary to what many foreign pundits expected to be violent-prone elections, the two elections demonstrated the readiness of Indonesians to move towards democracy. Albeit imperfect, the process had been smooth and relatively trouble-free. When disputes occurred regarding the results, all participants in the elections agreed to refer the case to the newly-established Constitutional Court, which in turn adjudicated the disputes. The maturity of Indonesians in exercising democracy was clearly proven when the decisions by the Court were all accepted by parties to the disputes. Indeed, the first and the most important aspect of Indonesia s elections, especially in 2004 elections, has been the willingness of all participants to abide by the rules of the game, and resolved conflicts and disputes through the court of law. All these developments clearly demonstrate the resurgence of democratic practices in Indonesia. After more than three decades of political suppression and control, Indonesian society is now keen to reassert itself and play a greater role in politics. Initial developments in post-suharto s Indonesia s political system, as discussed above, clearly contribute to that process. Political reform undertaken during the transition period between , especially the new laws on politics, has put in place an institutional framework for political competition and participation. 5 Most developments discussed above suggest that the year 2004 and beyond constituted the beginning of the end of transition, and paved the way for Indonesia to begin democratic consolidation phase. However, a number of problems --such as economic hardship, weak judicial system and law enforcement, corrupt bureaucracy, incomplete military reform, religious radicalism and intolerance, and now terrorism will continue to pose challenges for Indonesia s struggle in consolidating its democracy. The ability of Indonesia to address those problems would determine the quality of democracy in the country. In other words, a democracy to be called consolidated requires not only the capacity of the state to enforce the law and deliver policies 6 but also the presence of strong democratic culture within the society. 7 Indeed, in the first two years of democratically-elected Yudhoyono s government, Indonesia has been struggling to address those problems. Even though those problems do not yet pose immediate threats to the continuity of democracy in Indonesia in the near term, they in the long run 5 Koichi Kawamura, Political reform in the Post-Suharto Era, in Yuri Sato, ed., Indonesia Entering a New Era: Abdurrahman Wahid Government and Its Challenge (Tokyo: IDE-JETRO, March 2000), p Jusuf Wanandi, Indonesia: A Failed State? The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25 No. 3 (Summer 2002), p International IDEA, Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment (Stockholm: IDEA, 2000), p

5 could create popular dissatisfaction with democracy which in turn may pave the way for the return of authoritarian politics. The ability of the government to address these problems would provide a stronger ground for reducing and eradicating antidemocratic behaviour, encouraging greater public acceptance and support of democracy, and strengthening the socioeconomic and institutional bases of democracy. Indonesia s brief records in preserving democratisation amid turbulent economic and political transition during suggested that there are some grounds to expect that the country would continue to be resilience in facing the threat of democratic regression or back-sliding. Islam and Democracy: Asset or Liability? The second most important development in Indonesia has been the return of Islam as a political force. Political aspirations of Islamic groups became manifest in strong desire to participate in practical politics through party politics. Out of 48 political parties eligible to compete in June 1999 general elections, for example, around 20 parties either adopted Islam as their ideological basis or rely on mass-based Muslim organisations as the primary basis for electoral support. 8 Indeed, the proliferation of Islamic political parties constitutes one of the remarkable developments in Indonesia since the collapse of Suharto s New Order. In some quarters, this phenomenon is seen as a clear manifestation of the resurgence of political Islam in Indonesia s politics. 9 Does the emergence of Islamic politics in Indonesia serve as a liability or hindrance to democracy? There are reasons to believe that the role of Islam in Indonesia would be crucial to the development of democracy in the country. First, the democratisation movement itself would not have been possible without active participation by Muslim leaders themselves. For example, Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah 10, played an instrumental role in challenging President Suharto s authoritarian rule and in bringing down the regime in May The call for democracy was also the core agenda of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 11 during the 1990s. These two organisations have also been instrumental in advocating a tolerant brand of Islam in 8 Azyumardi Azra, The Islamic Factor in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, in Chris Manning and Peter Van Diermen, eds., Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), p The precise meaning of political Islam has been subject to vigorous debate among scholars and also within the Islamic community itself. For the purpose of this paper, political Islam simply refers to the Islamic parties that aimed in to capture the reins of government through their participation in party politics and by using constitutional means. 10 Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organisation with approximately 30 millions members. 11 Nahdlatul Ulama is the largest Islamic organisation with approximately 40 millions members. 5

6 Indonesia. Muslim intellectuals, such as those within the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), also played significant role in preparing the ground for democratisation within Muslim community in urban areas. 12 Second, it is important to note that none of Islamic political parties in Indonesia advocates the creation of an Islamic state as its primary objective. They, instead, endorse the idea of a nation-state based on the need to preserve Indonesia s nationalism and democracy. For these parties, the role of Islam in politics is no longer defined solely in terms of the formalisation of Islam as party ideology, but more in terms of the extent to which Islamic values serve a source of inspiration in democratisation discourse. 13 Indeed, despite their Islamic identity, these Islamic parties also declared themselves as inclusive parties which uphold the commitment to serve the interests of not only the Muslim community but also those of the entire nation. Some even open the membership to non-muslims. Third, Muslim politicians clearly understand that it is democracy that has created the opportunity for them to take part in politics and political process. As demonstrated clearly during the Suharto era, and the Sukarno era before that, Islam was not allowed to manifest itself as a political force. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the authoritarian state of Suharto s New Order was hostile to any Islamic political expression. The political role of Islamic political parties, and the space within which they could articulate Islamic political aspiration, would only be guaranteed if democracy continues to be the only game in town. Of course, Islam could also be a dominant form of politics if Indonesia becomes a theocratic state. However, any attempt to change the identity of Indonesia from a Pancasila state into an Islamic state would create tension within Indonesian polity and might prompt military intervention in politics. And that means the end of democracy. Therefore, it is clear that Muslim politics has a high stake in the continuation of democracy in the country. The growing importance of Islamic political role at formal level, however, has also been accompanied by a worrying development regarding religious extremism within the Islamic community and the emergence of terrorism. These two problems have been made possible by the collapse of New Order s security control and the opening up of political system. Indeed, since the fall of Suharto, there has been the proliferation of Islamic militant groups. These groups are increasingly assertive in advancing their agenda of securing Islamic interests and bringing the people back to genuine Islamic 12 For the role of ICMI in particular and Muslim groups in general in democratisation process in Indonesia, see Robert Hafner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Domocratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 13 Fahruddin Salim, Anatomi Kekuatan-kekuatan Politik Islam, (An Anatomy of Islamic Political Forces), Kompas, 5 April

7 teaching and identity. 14 Using the pretext of guarding Islamic morality and ethics, these groups emerged as a movement that challenges the existing social structure perceived as being incongruous with Islamic teachings. The problem, however, is that in responding to what they see as social ills in the society, these groups often take the law into their hands. They often raided places accused of sanctioning prostitution, gambling or drugs dealing. Due to the violent nature of their activities, these groups are often seen as an impediment to democracy in Indonesia. In terms of its agenda, the radicals demand a quick and dramatic change in social, political, and economic life of the country. They believe that Islam provides an answer to the current crisis, and the implementation of Islamic syariah would serve as the first step towards that direction. For these groups, Islam should be observed in its totality (kaffah), not through partial and selective imposition. 15 Islam is also seen as a belief system which includes all aspects of life and should become the only source of guidance for both the society and the state. In this perspective, Islam does not recognise the separation of state and religion. In fact, they believe that Islam should serve not only as the ideological basis of the state but also as the core element of state identity. By implication, this line of interpretation strongly believes that the establishment of an Islamic state (Daulah Islamiyah) based on the sovereignty of God becomes imperative. They argue that only through an Islamic state that the ideals of Islam can be realised. And, in such system, democracy is generally seen as incompatible with Islam. 16 In a more practical sense, the emergence of militant Islam is meant to achieve at least four agendas. 17 First, radical Islam serves as a vehicle that puts a pressure on the state to recognise and adopt the Jakarta Charter. They believe that the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter would provide a constitutional basis for Indonesian Muslims to obverse the Syariah law. Second, it strives to eradicate vices and social ills in the society. It that context, raids over and the destructions of café s, karaoke bars, gambling houses, and prostitutions by organisations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) were seen by their members as a means to eradicate vices and social ills in the society. These activities reflect the radical Islam s agenda to create a society free from unislamic elements. Third, radical Islam also emerges as a response to social and political injustice, 18 especially in conflict areas. It becomes a response to what they perceive as ongoing oppression of Muslims by the state 14 Centre for Languages and Cultures IAIN Jakarta, Religious Radicalism and Social Change in Jakarta, research report 2000, quoted in Chaider S Bamualim, Komunalisme (Fundamentalisme Islam), Rekonstruksi Identitas dan Prospek Demokrasi di Indonesia, unpublished paper, Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Radical Islam: The Struggle of Hard-line Islamic organisations in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p Ibid., p Ibid., p Gerakan Islam Radikal Bukan Ancaman, Bulletin Laskar Jihad, 14 th edition, 2001, p. 9. 7

8 and other forces. Finally, forging a worldwide solidarity among the Islamic ummah is also high on the agenda of militant Islam. This agenda is often shown through a periodic display of support for the plight of the Palestinians and an opposition to U.S. foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Terrorism even poses a more serious problem to the future of democracy in the country. Terrorist attacks had in fact started to occur since However, it was only after the the Bali Bombing in October 2002 that Indonesia has become a frequent target for terrorist attacks. Despite initial reluctance, Indonesia s government has now responded swiftly to the threat. It moved to dismantle the network of Jamaah Islamiyah, the main terrorist group in Indonesia. The government also took initiatives to strengthen counter-terrorism legislations enabling the security authorities to combat terrorism more effectively. Cooperation with other countries, especially Australia and the US, has also intensified. Indonesia s counter-terrorism capability improved significantly due to the government s willingness to receive international assistance and forge closer international cooperation in capacity-building program. More importantly, the government s counterterrorism initiatives have now enjoyed a wide support from the mainstream Muslim community. However, the possibility for an increase in the number of people attracted to and sympathised with the ideology and world-view of radical Islam should not be discounted entirely. The radical appeal would increase if the state fails to bring the economy into a speedy recovery, and the country fails to consolidate its democracy. As Sydney Jones has put it, that scenario can be prevented not merely by cracking down on radical Muslims, but by providing alternatives to the way of life they offer. 19 That alternative clearly requires the ability to make democracy works effectively. The growth of radicalism, which creates a favourable environment for terrorism, can be checked if Indonesia manages to accelerate the economic recovery and establish a solid democracy, based on the rule of law, that guarantees freedom every citizen. Oppression is not the answer to radicalism, and will only lead to more radicalism. The experience during more than three decades of New Order s rule has clearly demonstrated this. Despite all the difficulties and challenges the country is currently facing, no Indonesian would want to repeat the history of New Order s authoritarianism. Concluding Remarks: Islam and Democracy in Indonesia s Foreign Policy It is evident that after more than 9 years since the opening up of political system in Indonesia, democracy and Islam have become two 19 Sidney Jones, Indonesia: The Fear factor, Le Monde Diplomatique, internet edition, November 2002, at accessed on 19 January

9 important elements in Indonesia s emerging national identity. While these two elements are certainly still fraught with problems, they nevertheless serve as important context and assets for Indonesia s foreign policy. Indeed, Indonesia s foreign policy since the beginning of reform movement in 1998 has to operate within these two new domestic context. It also has to incorporate the two factors into the making and conduct of foreign policy. Several changes in Indonesia s foreign policy, therefore, have begun to take place. First, unlike during the last four decades, the current government can no longer ignore the people s aspiration and views in formulating and conducting foreign policy. Like in any other sector, foreign policy has also become a public domain where everybody has an equal right to articulate his or her interests and even participate in the policy-making process. Within a democratic order, foreign policy is no longer an exclusive domain for the few policy-making elites. In the context of Indonesia s democratisation process, foreign policy has to be formulated within a complex power structure where the government is no longer the only dominant actor. As democracy begins to consolidate, the role of the public and non-governmental actors has increasingly become more important. For a foreign policy initiative to be legitimate, the state is required to allow and incorporate the participation of the society and other stake-holders in policy-making. Within this new context of domestic power structure, Foreign Ministry can no longer preserve its monopoly as the only institution where foreign policy is made. The way by which foreign policy is now made has undergone significant changes. Second, the intention to project the values of democracy in foreign policy is certainly new. Indonesia s new identity as the third largest democracy in the world has served as a hallmark that distinguishes it from other members of ASEAN, with the Philippines as an exception. With the collapse of democracy in Thailand after the military coup in September 2006, Indonesia has even felt more obliged to defend the fate and the merit of democracy in the region. Indeed, in the wake of military coup in Thailand, Indonesia sees itself a bastion of democracy in the region. Indonesia believes that Southeast Asian nations should over time become more democratic. The inclusion of democracy into foreign policy has a domestic function as well. By promoting the values of democracy abroad, Indonesia s foreign policy has also served the function of strengthening the barrier for those anti-democratic forces who want to reverse the process of democratisation and the advance of political freedom at home. Third, Indonesia s understanding of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference has also begun to change. In the past, Indonesia had been an ardent defender of the principle of non-interference in its strictest and narrow form. Indonesia, for example, was instrumental in watering down the proposal by Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan of Thailand s that ASEAN 9

10 adopted the principle of flexible engagement ; an euphemism for a more relax understanding of ASEAN s strict notion of non-interference principle. Since reformasi, however, Indonesia began to realise that the notion of sovereignty could no longer be understood strictly in its Westphalian sense. Within an interdependence world, Indonesia began to realise that the solution to one country s domestic problem could not always be found within the domestic boundaries of the state. Outside interference could also provide the much needed solution. Indonesia s decision to invite the European Union, and members of ASEAN, to participate in the search for a peaceful solution to the separatist problem in Aceh Province, and also in monitoring the implementation of the peace accord, clearly reflects this changing understanding of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. In this case, Indonesia learned that foreign involvement in its internal problem has not undermined its sovereignty. On the contrary, it has in fact strengthened Indonesia s domestic sovereignty over Aceh. Fourth, Islam had never entered Indonesia s foreign policy as a determining factor. 20 In fact, during Sukarno and Suharto s rule, the government had not allowed foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic considerations. As Islam has began to reclaim its place in domestic politics since 1998, its effects on Indonesia s foreign policy has been increasingly felt. Demands that Indonesia began to identify itself with the Arab-Muslim world have been increasingly voiced by segments of Muslim community. In the post-911 world, Indonesia government felt it has found a middle way by which Islam could be incorporated into its foreign policy. Islam, in its moderate form, then entered the vocabulary of Indonesia s foreign policy as an asset. The expression of Islam in foreign policy is formulated in terms of Indonesia s image and role as a moderating voice within the Muslim world and between the Muslim world and the rest. Indeed, Indonesian wants to project itself as a moderating force in the Muslim world, which would play a bridging role between the Muslim world and the West. This, among other things, has been manifested in the initiative in 2006 to set up an Islamic Advisory Council between Indonesia and the United Kingdom tasked with a formidable mission of promoting a moderate form of Islam in both countries. The initiative to bring Shiite and Sunni Muslim scholars from all over the world to Indonesia in April 2007, to discuss ways to bring an end to the sectarian conflict in Iraq, is also based on the desire by Indonesia to play such a role. Over the last three years, Indonesia has been an active promoter of regional and global inter-faith dialogues. Despite the intention to project democratic values and moderate Islam into its foreign policy, Indonesia s foreign policy continues to show a degree of continutity as well. For example, Indonesia continues to feel that it is 20 For a comprehensive discussion on Islam in Indonesia s foreign policy, see Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 2003). 10

11 entitled to exercise a leading role in shaping not only the future course of ASEAN but also the directions of regional politics. This is not merely derived from Indonesia s own interests in the region, but also dictated by the expectation from other ASEAN members. During the height of the economic crisis of , when ASEAN s apparent paralysis was in part blamed on Indonesia s preoccupation with domestic problems, its regional partners encouraged Indonesia to once again serve an engine of ASEAN. Indonesia s proposal on the Asean Security Community (ASC), for example, should be understood as a positive manifestation of such sense of regional entitlement. Despite the growing important of Islam in Indonesia s politics, Indonesia s foreign policy establishment continues to avoid that the conduct of foreign relations that is based exclusively on Islamic considerations. Indeed, the conduct of Indonesia s foreign policy has never been expressed in terms of serving national interests at home rather than the interests of fellow Muslim states somewhere else. The problems in Muslim Mindanao, Rohingya s Burma, Patani of Thailand, Muslim Xinjiang in China, and anywhere else remain on the margin of Indonesia s foreign policy priorities. Its policy towards these issues remains dictated by the universal principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of other states. The fact that Islam is a majority religion in the country has not obliged Indonesia to tilt its foreign relations with Muslim states in the Middle East. The focus remains on East Asia and the West, especially the US. 11