Philips Vermonte CSIS December The 2014 Election and Democracy in Indonesia

Transcription

1 Philips Vermonte CSIS December 2014 The 2014 Election and Democracy in Indonesia

2 Political Reform Competitive electoral democracy Economic Reform Growth Recovery Decentralization Fiscal and Public Service Decentralization Three Reforms after the Fall of Soeharto regime

3 1. Political Reform From pseudo-democracy with restricted three-parties election system under Soeharto regime to more competitive multi-party system direct presidential and parliamentary election system in 2004

4 Barriers to entry for new political parties Require leadership board on at least 9 provinces and half of municipalities on those provinces -> prevent local based parties to join elections Electoral threshold.. and continue adopting PR close-list system in 1999 election.. yet still led to proliferation of political parties: 48 in 1999, 24 in 2004, and 38 in 2009 (resulting in 9 political parties). Down to 12 parties in 2014 (resulting in 10 parties in the parliament)

5 Two locations arena for new type of rent-seeking: Ministries (Executive Posts) more diverse The House (DPR) (Legislative Power) new locations Ministerial Post in the Presidential cabinet is now part of political contestation dynamic that reflects bargaining process between the ruling executive and other political parties =>minimum vs. maximum winning coalition. Budget process (interaction between interest groups, political parties in the cabinets, and lawmakers) is now the main locus/arena for rent seeking

6 Jokowi s electoral strength is only half of that of SBY s in ,000 candidates campaigned for their own election across Indonesia => off-setting the so-called Jokowi Effect Jokowi Effect at DPRD level in Jakarta; substantial increase in PDI-P s vote, from 14 percent in 2009 to 19 percent in Legislative Election: Jokowi Effect?

7 2014 Seats % seat PDIP Golkar Gerindra Demokrat PAN PKB PKS PPP Nasdem Hanura Seats % Seat PDIP Golkar Gerindra Demokrat PAN PKB PKS PPP Nasdem - - Hanura The Legislative Elections: Seat Distribution

8 2014 Vote % Vote PDIP 23,681, Golkar 18,432, Gerindra 14,760, Demokrat 12,728, PKB 11,298, PAN 9,481, PKS 8,480, Nasdem 8,402, PPP 8,157, Hanura 6,579, PBB 1,825, PKPI 1,143, Vote % Vote PDIP 14,600, Golkar 15,037, Gerindra 4,646, Demokrat 21,703, PKB 5,146, PAN 6,254, PKS 8,206, Nasdem - - PPP 5,533, Hanura 3,922, PBB 1,864, PKPI 934, The Legislative Elections: Vote Distribution

9 Puzzle: high level of volatility.. but actually not so surprising because literature shows that voters in new democracies: Do not identify parties as incumbent/challenger categories Can not identify what parties are responsible for bad economics condition Can not evaluate credibility of new parties without distant past Haven t yet acquired certain level of rationality/cognitive skills for reward-punish model

10 Islamic political parties get benefits from more decentralized election, as it also allows for implementation of Islamic agenda in some Islam-friendly regions But, Buehler (2008) finds that the rise of Islam sentiments and policies are not always initiated by Islamic parties, but more by, mostly, Golkar politicians to consolidate power in the region Tend to decline over time Disconnection between vote and voices: while supports for Islamic parties continue to decline; two CSIS surveys (January and July 2012) indicated that Indonesians tend to be more conservative from time to time => Islamic parties cannot capture the Islamic voters. Islam and Electoral Politics

11 Islamic Parties Votes and Seats

12 2. Can you trust these people.? (CSIS Survey 2012) All the time Sometime Never

13 83.4 No objection Better not DK Neighboring with other ethnic group Neighboring with different religion Other religion worship place Inter-religion marriage Level of Tolerance CSIS Survey 2012

14 Pure instrumentalism is occurring. Being rational, voters see that the Islamic parties are too fragmented so none of the parties has a clear chance to win the election. As a result, voters throw their support to other parties. Muslim voters may have chosen alternative channels outside the electoral arena to pursue their interest. Indeed, non-party Islamic organizations have mushroomed since the fall os Suharto in 1998 and they are more articulate. Political parties tend to always shift to the center, trying to project the image as parties that are not too secular or too Islamic as to find the middle ground. All in all => moderating effect of electoral politics Why declining/volatile?

15 The opposition party is gaining the power back only through electoral means. Democracy is the only game in town. Money Politics is getting worse, the locus had shifted, no rewardpunishment mechanism in sight: 50% re-election rate out of 90% of incumbents of the DPR 2014 Legislative Election: Consolidation of Indonesia s Democracy

16 Battle between the party oligarch /rogue elites and nonparty elites; new vs.old The future of party cartel?: the parties are not afraid to lose in the election=> minimum-wining coalition is the solution? No internal democracy within the political parties 2014 Legislative Election: Consolidation of Indonesia s Democracy (?)

17 Permanent coalition of the opposition? Issue-based coalition? New electoral and party laws are coming >> Jokowi-JK were winning by the margin of 8 million votes. Depending on the internal dynamic of political parties (new chairmen/women are coming). Jokowi is in need of his own power-base, his not the strongest man in PDI-P (imagine 2019). Looking ahead: Problem and Prospects

18 New election law(s) coming up, Indonesia has a large number of sub-national legislative members: around 17,560 people at the city and regency level (average of 29 per city or regency) - city councils in the US have an average of 7-10 members, with Los Angeles as the second largest city (3.8 million people) having only 15 council members, each representing one electoral district (Amri, 2014) => constituency-based politics, electoral engineering. How to finance democracy: lack of political trust leads to expensive election, state subsidy to political parties,

19 Continuation Moderation Learning to choose/vote: a divided government may be good in the long run. Keywords

20 Thank you