The 2007 General Elections: Overview of a System in Transition

Transcription

1 The 2007 General Electins: Overview f a System in Transitin Frm Seven Keys t Change: A Technical, Plitical and Legal Analysis f the 2007 Electral Prcess Eduard Núñez Vargas

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3 Table f Cntents I. Intrductin and acknwledgements... 1 II. Overview f a system in transitin... 3 Refrms and their distinguishing features... 4 III. Impact f the refrms in specific areas Cnsistency and effectiveness f the legal framewrk Impact f refrms n the perfrmance f electral institutins Level and quality f electral participatin in Plitical parties: electral behavir and institutinal perfrmance Plitical party and campaign financing Rle f jurnalists, media and pinin plls The electral system and electral districts IV. Recmmendatins fr a secnd generatin f refrms... 20

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5 I. Intrductin and acknwledgements This publicatin presents Part One f the reprt Seven Keys t Change: A Technical, Plitical and Legal Analysis f the 2007 Guatemalan Electral Prcess. The reprt cnstitutes a natural extensin f the cncerted effrts by internatinal and dmestic actrs t ensure the hnesty and legitimacy f the 2007 electins. These were the first electins rganized under the new standards established by refrms t the Law n Electins and Plitical Parties in 2004 and 2006, which affected the electral mdel as well as the basic rules fr the plitical party system. The plitical bjectives that give rise t electral refrm are transfrmed t a greater r lesser extent in the practical applicatin f the refrms, and the desired results are nt always achieved. There is n linear r unequivcal relatinship between the tw sides f the equatin. Fr that reasn, an analysis f the impact and results f certain legal refrms n key institutins such as the Supreme Electral Tribunal and plitical parties is imprtant fr understanding lessns learned and ensuring a cntinuus effrt tward the perfectin f electral demcracy. The analysis and evaluatin f electins after their cmpletin is nt a frequent practice, nr is it in any way institutinalized. Hwever, sme Latin American cuntries, such as Panama, cnduct jint evaluatins between the electral institutin and plitical parties, and even cnvene an electral refrm cmmissin t cnsider the results and create agreements n eventual mdificatins t the legal, regulatry and institutinal framewrk. Evaluating the way key actrs rganize and cnduct an electral prcess, using rigrus technical criteria is an imprtant factr in the decisin making prcess. Fr that reasn, the Srs Fundatin Guatemala, the Dutch Institute fr Multiparty Demcracy, Assciatin f Scial Studies and Research (Assciación de Investigación y Estudis Sciales, ASIES), Assciatin fr Sci Cultural Develpment, Organizatin, Services and Studies (Asciación para el Desarrll, la Organización, Servicis y Estudis Sciculturales, DOSES), Latin American Faculty f Scial Sciences Guatemala (Facultad Lainamericana de Ciencias Sciales, FLACSO Guatemala) and the Natinal Demcratic Institute fr Internatinal Affairs (NDI) designed this prject t systematically analyze the electin based n tw fundamental questins: What made the 2007 electins different frm the five previus general electins, and what cncrete impact did the 2004 and 2006 electral refrms have n the electral prcess and n the behavir f the key actrs? T answer these questins, the authrs analyzed seven key aspects f the electral prcess, which cnstitute parts tw thrugh eight f the full reprt. These aspects, alng with the authrs f their crrespnding sectins f the reprt, were: The cnsistency and effectiveness f electral law and its regulatry framewrk (César Cnde Rada, Latin American Department f Scial Sciences, FLACSO Guatemala); The rganizatinal, technical and lgistical prcess f the electins (Pala Ortiz Laiza and María Alejandra Eraz, Latin American Department f Scial Sciences, FLACSO Guatemala); Citizen participatin in the electins (Ivnne Slórzan, Latin American Department f Scial Sciences, FLACSO Guatemala); 1

6 Plitical parties electral behavir and institutinal perfrmance (Ligia Ixmucané Blanc, Assciatin fr Research and Scial Studies ASIES); The system f plitical party and campaign financing (Alejandr Balsells and Míriam Gramaj, Assciatin fr Research and Scial Studies ASIES); The media s electral behavir and influence n the campaign (Gustav Berganza, Silvia Sánchez and Carmen Castilla, Scicultural Develpment, Organizatin, Services and Studies DOSES); and The electral system and electral districts (Carmen Ortiz and Javier Frtín, Assciatin fr Research and Scial Studies ASIES). These seven dimensins prvide a reasnably cmprehensive view f the 2007 electral prcess. Methdlgically, the analysis begins with the establishment f precise bjectives and guiding questins fr each dimensin; the wrk was divided amng the institutins t assure the quality f the research as well as its timely cmpletin. ASIES was respnsible fr analyzing the party system, the financing system and the electral system; FLACSO fr the analysis f legal cnsistency, the TSE s wrk and the analysis f electral participatin; and DOSES fr the media analysis frm the perspective f media cverage, jurnalist behavir and pinin pll analysis. The technical crdinatin fr the prject was carried ut by the NDI Guatemala team. The quality f the teams frm each f the participating institutes deserves mentin. Frm ASIES, Karin de Maldnad and Marc Antni Barahna served as crdinatrs, with Ligia Blanc, Alejandr Balsells and Carmen Ortiz writing the sectins n plitical parties, plitical financing and the electral system, respectively. Frm FLACSO, Isabel Rdas served as the initial crdinatr, and Virgili Álvarez later assumed this rle, with César Cnde, Pala Ortiz and Ivnne Slórzan cnducting studies n legal cnsistency, the TSE s behavir and electral participatin, respectively. Frm DOSES, Gustav Berganza served as crdinatr, and Silvia Sánchez and Carmen Castilla cnducted the research. Als deserving mentin is the active participatin and supprt prvided by Juli Dnis f NDI, Ott Zeissig f nimd and Renz Rsal f the Srs Fundatin, as well as the institutinal and plitical supervisin f Elena Diez Pint, directr f the Srs Fundatin, and Dris Cruz, representative f nimd. As nted abve, this publicatin presents nly Part One f the full reprt, intended as a general but nt exhaustive verview f the subject matter. This sectin was translated and revised at NDI s Washingtn headquarters, with substantial assistance frm Juli Dnis at NDI s Guatemala ffice. Finally, it is imprtant t reiterate that this study has benefited frm multiple prjects supprting the electins, frm the technical assistance prgrams implemented by IIDH/CAPEL and the OAS, t the internatinal bservatin missins f the OAS and the Eurpean Unin, as well as the dmestic bservatins f Miradr Electral, the Indigenus Missin fr Electral Observatin, and thers. These missins prvided a fundatin fr the research cnducted as a part f this prject. This effrt is meant t cmplement, rather than replace, the wrk f varius dmestic actrs and internatinal rganizatins in the last electins. In that sense, like the final prducts f thse effrts, this dcument and the full reprt are public gds, available t Guatemalan sciety fr its study and cnsideratin. 2

7 II. Overview f a system in transitin The 2007 Guatemalan general electins were different frm any f the cuntry s previus electral prcesses. The distinct characteristics exhibited in 2007 were the result f partial yet imprtant refrms t the legal framewrk regulating electins, the electral system and the plitical party system, a framewrk that had been highly stable ver its 23 years f existence. The refrms, passed in 2004 and 2006, addressed several persistent, fundamental issues that explain the current levels f electral and party institutinalizatin: i. The high levels f centralizatin in the electral mdel, while prviding stability and certainty t electins, acted as a radblck t citizen participatin and influenced the parties lw gegraphical presence. ii. iii. The prblems f security and the ability t verify citizens in the persnal dcumentatin system whse fundatin the residency card (cédula de vecindad) had demnstrated limitatins in verifying persnal identity and, as such, abut the peple wh cmpsed the electral registry. The plitical party system s lw level f institutinalizatin was the result f a diverse cmbinatin f factrs, including: a permissive legal framewrk regarding the creatin f parties and cnservatin f parties legal registratin; a high level f dependency n private funds fr party peratins and fr electin campaigns; and a lw level f versight by independent, trained institutins. These three characteristics are the expressin f a fundamental cntradictin in the develpment f Guatemala s electral demcracy. While the electral system and rganizatin have develped effectively, cnferring security and cnfidence in the yung demcracy, the party system has demnstrated instability and a lack f institutinality. The varius cmpnents f Guatemala s demcracy have develped unequally: the strictly electral dimensin is mre chesive, but the party system displays marked institutinal weakness. This, alng with a lack f cmpetence and effectiveness that have characterized the system f gvernment, creates reasnable dubt abut the sustainability f the demcratic system and its ability t respnd t the cuntry s challenges. While laws cannt unilaterally change plitical realities, they can act as incentives r cnstraints that drive imprtant actrs t bring abut this change. Fr that reasn, electral refrm affects the structure f pwer relatins, trying t cnserve, adjust r transfrm them, nt nly in inter party relatins but in the verall relatinship between citizens and the plitical system. That being said, what substantive mdificatins did the 2004 and 2006 refrms intrduce t the electral rganizatin, the electral system and the plitical party system? And what did these refrms try t achieve in terms f the desired stability and develpment f Guatemala s electral demcracy? This summary tries t answer bth questins by presenting a general verview f the reprt. Fr that reasn, it brrws substantial elements frm the reprt s ther sectins t give a cmplete picture f the 2007 electral prcess and hw it was influenced by the electral refrms f 2004 and Whether r nt this bjective was achieved is the 3

8 authr s respnsibility, and des nt speak t the quality f the reprt s ther sectins, which are the wrk f the varius institutins and authrs. Refrms and their distinguishing features The electral refrm addressed five principal dimensins: three relating t the electral rganizatin mdel and tw relating t the party system. The mst decisive refrm was the decentralizatin f the Electral Cmmittees (Juntas Receptras de Vts 1, JRVs), imprtant nt nly as an attempt at gegraphical inclusivity, but als fr the effect it had n all rganizatinal aspects f the 2007 electins. Decentralizatin required the placement f JRVs in all lcatins with mre than 500 registered vters, with the exceptin f thse areas where fr technical reasns r security purpses the Supreme Electral Tribunal (Tribunal Suprem Electral, TSE) did nt cnsider it pssible. It clearly aimed t reverse the centralizatin f the electral rganizatin inherited frm the transitin t demcracy, itself a respnse t the legecy f electral fraud in rural areas. This refrm fcused n increasing the gegraphical inclusivity f the electral rganizatins and the levels f electral participatin in rder t increase the legitimacy f electins. The decentralizatin prcess had mdestly psitive effects n the turnut f the rural vte and gegraphical inclusivity f electral system, hwever it created a difficult, large scale technical adjustment prcess fr the TSE and ther institutins. Decentralizatin impacted crucial areas f the electral prcess such as updating the electral map, updating and cleaning up the electral registry, administrative and lgistical planning fr Electin Day, the number f electin wrkers needed, and the system fr transmitting results, t name nly the mst prminent. Plitically, it facilitated the access f rural citizens t the plls in substantially mre favrable cnditins; technically, it subjected the TSE and the plitical parties t a different scale and type f wrk. A secnd fundamental refrm, which did nt affect the 2007 electins, was the creatin f the persnal identificatin dcument (Dcument Persnal de Identificación, DPI) and f the Natinal Civil Registry (Registr Nacinal de las Persnas, RENAP) as the institutin respnsible fr administering the DPI. The creatin f the DPI was the cncrete utcme f a lng effrt t generate cnfidence nt just in the electral system, but in all natinal institutins; the prblems f quality and accuracy f the infrmatin in the municipal civil registries, as well as the pr quality f the residency cards, created prblems in verifying identity f all Guatemalans, including thse n the vter registry. Fr that reasn, the cnslidatin f civil registries in t a single database is a psitive step, making it mre feasible t crrect varius types f technical incnsistencies and issue new identity dcuments. While the creatin f the DPI was a step frward, assigning respnsibility f this functin t a new institutin built frm scratch cast dubts abut its plitical viability and technical feasibility. Additinally, it implied a break frm the framewrk f the Peace Accrds, which envisined the TSE as the institutin with this respnsibility. The decisin t pstpne the DPI s effective date until after the electins sught t attenuate the pssible effects f this refrm n the prcedural rules in effect fr 2007, but did nt prevent difficulties frm emerging due t the cmplex 1 The Juntas Receptras de Vts are lcal electral cmmittees which mnitr and cunt the vtes cast. There are typically several JRVs lcated at the same vting center. 4

9 institutinal settings as the functins f civil registratin and dcumentatin are dispersed amng 333 municipalities. An atmsphere f resistance t the change inherent in RENAP s creatin accmpanied the 2007 electins and caused, indirectly, a greater level f cmplexity in the rganizatin f the electins. Unfrtunately, the electral impact f the creatin f the DPI and RENAP was lst when the Cnstitutinal Curt decided nt t endrse the change in name f the Registry f Citizens (the riginal refrm renamed it the Electral Registry f Citizens), which was intended t eliminate the requirement f duble registratin t be able t vte: registering with the civil and lcal registry t btain the residency card, and then with the Electral Registry fr vting purpses. This requirement, which cnstitutes ne f the mst imprtant barriers t electral participatin, remained unreslved at the time f publicatin. The third area f refrms cncerned mdificatins t the prcedural rules f the plitical party system; it included changes t the rules fr legal party frmatin, t the electral threshld r barrier and t the establishment f internal party leadership bdies, amng thers. The refrms in this area sught t reduce the number f plitical parties, trying t create incentives fr stabilizatin f the party system, which is plagued by the frequent emergence and disappearance f plitical parties. The furth area f refrms was aimed at cnstructing a system f plitical financing with mre public supprt, better regulatin f private financing and a clear mandate fr versight. The refrms increased public financing frm tw quetzals ($.25) per vte received t tw U.S. dllars per vte, decentralized public financing, limited campaign expenditures and private cntributins, mandated institutinal changes within parties t imprve their internal financial cntrls and administratin, established a registry f dnrs and private dnatins and gave the TSE the authrity t cnduct versight f private party financing. The practice f disbursing public financing in fur annual amunts, which gives public supprt a permanent structure, was maintained. In general, the purpse f this set f refrms was t strengthen a system f mixed but primarily public financing. This refrm was applied in tw phases: all rules regarding private financing tk effect befre the 2007 electin, and the public financing refrm was implemented after the cmpletin f the electral prcess. A fifth area f relevant refrms dealt with adjustments t the electral calendar, shrtening the length f the electin campaign and mving up the electin date. The abbreviatin f the campaign is meant t reduce its cst and, cnsequently, parties need t seek financing. Advancing the electin date respnded t the idea f lengthening the transitin perid between gvernments, which have been quite shrt given that electins nrmally require a secnd presidential rund. This summary, while nt exhaustive, shws that the electral refrms intrduced significant mdificatins t the party system and, t a lesser extent, the electral system and the way that electral institutins are rganized t ensure the effective exercise f citizens plitical rights. This was nt a cmprehensive refrm, nr did it have the scpe f the prject that was riginally prpsed by the Electral Refrm Cmmissin created by the Peace Accrds. Hwever, despite the issues with scpe and cherence, the refrm is generally beneficial fr electral and party institutinalizatin. 5

10 III. Impact f the refrms in specific areas 1. Cnsistency and effectiveness f the legal framewrk The Law n Electins and Plitical Parties (Ley Electral y de Partids Plítics, LEPP), despite its psitive aspects, has prblems with balance, cnsistency and effectiveness. The prblems with balance refer t the fact that, althugh the LEPP is a single law that regulates everything relating t the party system, the electral system, electral institutins and the electral prcess, its regulatin is disprprtinate; the regulatin f electral matters is substantially mre develped than the regulatin f the party system, which reveals several imprtant gaps. While legal prvisins cannt exhaustively delineate plitical party activities, 2 they d serve as a general standard fr defining parties institutinal nature and ffering incentives fr their effective and demcratic functining. It is wrth cnsidering if this imbalance in the law des nt t sme extent explain the cntradictin between the higher level f electral institutinality and the insufficient develpment f the party system. It wuld therefre be pertinent t cnsider the further develpment f the party law in areas such as the effective rights f party members, regulatin f electral campaigns and pre campaign perids, financing fr plitical parties and campaigns, versight f parties and campaigns, prcedures fr candidate selectin and internal party electins, and regulatins n gegraphical party presence, t highlight the mst imprtant. The refrms, while signifying prgress, were still insufficient. Cnsistency refers t the ability f the rules t cmplement each ther, in frmal aspects legislative drafting and technicalities as well as in fundamental r substantive ways. The refrms had, withut a dubt, prblems f frmal cnsistency, explaining in large part the later need fr harmnizatin f the LEPP. Beynd thse, thugh, there are prblems f fundamental cnsistency that impact the refrms effectiveness. We will examine sme cases that deserve mentin. All f the regulatins regarding the creatin f parties and minimum requirements fr maintaining their legal registratin affect the size f the party system. Permissive rules encurage very pen systems, pssibly tending tward fragmentatin, while stricter rules influence the develpment f a smaller and mre clsed system. The latest electral refrms aimed t make the rules stricter: the minimum membership was increased, the frequency f party assemblies and electin f internal institutins was changed, and the electral threshld was increased frm 4 percent t 5 percent. It was hped that the number f parties wuld crrespndingly decrease. Hwever, nly tw parties were unable t cmply with the new rules, and anther three were canceled after the electins. This failure is a result f sme f the law s ther prvisins. In the case f the electral threshld, 5 percent natinally is nt effective because the electin f ne deputy in any district is sufficient t preserve legal registratin; meanwhile, a party can chse nt t participate in the electins and preserve its registratin. 2 In reality, there is an ample range f party activities which take place within infrmal institutinal structures. 6

11 The regulatins n the minimum membership required fr a plitical party t preserve its registratin respnded bth t the idea f having mre demanding requirements as well as imprving parties presence amng citizens. Hwever, that refrm by itself des nt reslve the prblem f the parties weak gegraphical presence; in this area, the decentralizatin f JRVs was mre effective. The refrm als remains incmplete, as the increase in membership was nt accmpanied by an increase in the number f municipalities where legal rganizatin is required, meaning that while parties increased their membership, this did nt necessarily result in a greater gegraphical distributin r a greater presence in thse members cmmunities. The abbreviatin f electral campaigns as a frm f reducing parties csts and financing needs was rendered less effective by the lack f precise regulatins abut the pre campaign perid and by the establishment f vague limits n campaign expenditures. Assuming that a campaign will spend all available resurces in the absence f clear restrictins n expenditures, the vague and general character f the limits established by the LEPP US$1 per registered vter starting n December 31 f the year befre the electins renders it ineffective. Prviding clear authrity t the TSE fr versight f party finances and electin campaigns presumes the TSE s ability t cnduct this versight, and in particular that the TSE has the enfrcement mechanisms necessary t frce plitical parties t meet accuntability requirements and pen themselves t external cntrls. The language as passed did nt specify the scpe f versight leaving this task fr subsidiary regulatins and lacked an effective framewrk f electral vilatins and infractins which, alng with the apprpriate penalties, wuld discurage plitical rganizatins frm cmmitting transgressins. The incnsistencies in the electral and party rules are accmpanied by cncerns abut the cnsistency f the LEPP and ther legal prvisins pertaining t electins. Tw cases can be identified in this regard: RENAP and the prcess f appealing the TSE s decisins. While the pssible cntradictins within RENAP did nt affect the 2007 electins, they are f great cncern fr the next electral prcess. It is fundamental t clarify which institutin has the respnsibility t establish residency r citizenship, in additin t reslving the principal prblem f the duble registratin necessary fr a persn t participate in electins registratin at RENAP as well as at the Registry f Citizens which is a fundamental institutinal bstacle t electral participatin. The intentin, bth in the riginal LEPP refrm and in the RENAP law, was fr all citizens receiving their DPI t immediately be listed n the electral registry; hwever, as this wuld require cnstitutinal refrms, it remains incmplete. This means that while citizens may receive a mre secure and reliable dcument, it will nt eliminate the need t register with the TSE s Registry f Citizens. There is als a fundamental cntradictin regarding the appeals prcess. While the Cnstitutin and the LEPP establish the TSE s supreme nature, all f its reslutins can be appealed, with appeals heard by the Supreme Curt f Justice in the first ccurrence and by the Cnstitutinal Curt in the secnd ccurrence. While it is nt in principle questinable fr the TSE s decisins t be appealed in the interest f prtecting citizens cnstitutinal rights, it is illgical that if the TSE is supreme, its reslutins are subject t the review f the Supreme Curt f Justice. In practical terms, this cnstitutes a restrictin n the TSE s supreme character and weakens its psitin vis à vis ther Guatemalan institutins. It is imprtant t review the LEPP, frm at least fur basic perspectives: 7

12 1. The internal cherence f the LEPP s prvisins, in terms f assuring its effectiveness. 2. The technical cherence f the electral cde, t prevent its frmal aspects frm generating cnfusin r being interpreted in cntradictry ways. 3. Cnsistency between the LEPP and the regulatins derived frm it. It is imprtant nt t try t cmpensate fr deficiencies in the law by issuing regulatins, given the subsidiary nature f the latter. 4. Cnsistency between the electral cde and ther legal prvisins that affect it r are affected by it; the cases f RENAP, the appeals prcess and the Penal Cde are nly sme f thse which merit immediate attentin. 2. Impact f refrms n the perfrmance f electral institutins The ability f electral institutins t safeguard citizens right t elect their representatives evlves in large part frm their systematic repetitin f technical, administrative and lgistical prcedures. Citizens cnfidence in the TSE is explained in gd measure by the effectiveness f its rganizatin in guaranteeing electins, an area where repetitin is fundamental. This systematic repetitin nrmally faces tw bstacles: changes in a cuntry s gegraphical and demgraphic realities and technlgical innvatin. With the LEPP refrms in , the TSE underwent the first serius change t its electral rganizatin prcedures in its 25 years f existence: the decentralizatin f JRVs. Practically all f the technical, lgistical and administrative structure f the TSE was built n the principle f the centralizatin f vting centers and JRVs in the cuntry s 333 municipal centers (cabeceras). Decentralizatin became the tuchstne fr a readjustment in the scale and cmplexity f rganizing electins in Guatemala. The TSE had t adjust the electral map t place new vting centers, innvate by creating a new administrative unit (the municipal electral district (circunscripción electral municipal, CEM)), restructure the electral registry based n address and nt municipality, adjust the lgistical scale f electin day rganizatin, substantially increase the number f electin wrkers n electin day and redesign the system fr transmitting electin results. The primary factr distinguishing the 2007 electins frm the five previus general electins is decentralizatin. But what prduced decentralizatin? What was its impact? What lessns were learned? Plitical impact f decentralizatin Decentralizatin had tw fundamental gals: facilitating citizens access t vting, especially in rural areas, and increasing vter turnut. The secnd did nt depend exclusively n the decisin t decentralize JRVs, but was dependent n the TSE s ability t update the electral registry. Hwever, the expectatin was that greater prximity t the plls wuld increase peple s interest in participating. What were the results? 8

13 Decentralizatin favred mre gegraphic inclusivity and an increase in the rural vte. The rural vte did behave differently than the urban vte, thereby affecting the electin results. Hwever, there was nt a substantial change in the weight f the rural vte cmpared t the verall vte, and it is difficult t establish with certainty that decentralizatin influenced the turnut rate. While participatin rse 2 percent cmpared t 2003 and has cntinued t grw since 1999, this is nt directly related the level f decentralizatin. If the tw were crrelated, the cst benefit rati wuld be pr, as the increase in turnut has been mdest in cmparisn with the investment required. A cmplementary, and n less imprtant, element in terms f plitical impact was the variatins in parties campaign strategy prmpted by decentralizatin. Instead f a strategy based n transprting vtes frm different areas t the plling places in municipal centers, in 2007 parties had t develp at least sme gegraphical presence in the 681 municipal electral districts in rural areas. This meant a greater effrt at territrial rganizatin than in previus electins. Technical impact f decentralizatin On the technical side, decentralizatin impacted the respnsibilities and perfrmance f the TSE in several areas, detailed belw. New electral gegraphy: The need t decentralize meant changes t the electral map and the applicatin f criteria t place the new JRVs. This criteria needed t recgnize nt nly strictly gegraphic and plitic administrative factrs, but als sciecnmic variables and lcal accessibility. The prduct f this effrt was the creatin f the CEMs, which gruped villages and rural areas t facilitate the placement f vting centers. 681 CEMs were created, resulting in a ttal f 2,060 vting centers and 13,756 JRVs. This represented an increase f almst 50 percent in the number f vting centers and 35 percent in the number f JRVs. The electral rganizatin in rural areas was represented by 687 vting centers and 3,477 JRVs, apprximately ne third f the ttal. Structure f the electral registry: The electral registry had been based n the municipal residency cards, with citizens listed based n the municipality f residency. Decentralizatin made this type f rganizatin bslete, and required the TSE t update the electral registry t include addresses in rder t assign them t the clsest JRV. While the decentralizatin f JRVs was nly partial, the updating f the registry was a huge technical challenge; the results are mixed and deserve t be evaluated by the TSE itself. Currently, the electral database cntains tw types f data, updated and nn updated, with differing levels f accuracy, in part due t the surce f the data the civil registry and in part because there was nt enugh time t update the entire registry. This pens a debate abut the reliability f the Guatemalan electral registry. While it is clear that the registry has functined and has vercme pssible bjectins frm interested actrs, there are substantive disagreements abut its quality. The TSE references an audit carried ut by the Organizatin f American States (OAS) which indicates a cnfidence level ver 95 percent, which wuld make it ne f the mst updated and accurate in the regin, but Miradr Electral (Electral Watch) cnducted anther audit which gave less encuraging results, with 9

14 clear differences between data fr updated and nn updated vters. 3 The TSE shuld cnduct a new evaluatin f the entire electral registry and increase the pace t clse the gap between updated and nn updated vters, especially given the desire t cntinue the decentralizatin prcess. Increase in electin wrkers: The grwth in the number f JRVs and, t a lesser extent, the creatin f CEMs, required the TSE t recruit and train at least 73,000 peple t serve n departmental and municipal electral bards, CEMs and JRVs. It was a difficult task t train all f these peple, in particular given the abbreviated electral calendar. Given the shrter calendar, the TSE pted t recruit peple with prir experience, especially fr the departmental and municipal bards. This was crucial fr rganizatinal effectiveness, but it explicitly discregarded the LEPP s prvisins requiring electin wrkers t be selected under criteria f gender and ethnic balance. This prmpts the questin: Can an electral institutin disbey a legal prvisin in rder t guarantee the rganizatinal effectiveness f the electral prcess? Lgistical and administrative prcedures: In 2003, the electins were rganized in 332 lcatins (the municipal centers), increasing t mre than 1,000 lcatins in 2007 (the municipal centers plus the new CEMs). The result was highly successful, as the electin materials were prduced and distributed in a highly efficient and effective manner and the vting centers and JRVs perated nrmally. The TSE s lgistical mechanisms and thse f its subsidiary bdies were able t cpe with the increase in scale. Transmissin f results: As with lgistics, the prblem with transmitting results was ne f scale, in this case the increase in the number f lcatins gathering and sending infrmatin. The result was highly successful; data flwed rapidly and securely and the TSE was capable f prviding results n electin night. There were n bjectins t the transmissin system and the results were accepted by the varius cntenders. Tw factrs cmbined t create this utcme: the capacity f the members f the JRVs t cunt vtes and send their ttals in the predetermined manner, and the technlgical mdel supprted by GBM fr the rapid and secure transmissin and ttaling f the data. In all, the utcme f the TSE s effrts was psitive, despite initial questins abut its institutinal weakness. Hwever, the path t this result was plagued with prblems and uncertainty: a late start t the decentralizatin prcess, in the cntext f a debate abut the ideal scpe f the prcess; a delayed prcess f updating the electral registry, resulting in a database cntaining updated and nn updated grups with differing levels f accuracy; hiring f electin wrkers using criteria ther than that legally established; and a high level f dependency n the technlgical capacity f third parties t transmit results. Added t this is the debate abut the cst f the electins. The data available and presented in the third part f the full reprt indicates that in 2003, the cst f the electin per registered vter was Q24.24 ($3.25); in 2007, the cst was Q68.28 ($9), almst three times the amunt in nly fur years. The cst was Q113 ($15) per vte cast. The fact that the cst tripled, while the electral registry nly increased by 18 percent and the number f JRVs by 35 percent, indicates that the budget shuld be reviewed. 3 It shuld be nted that the OAS audit has been impssible t cnsult, and the statistics given are frm declaratins by electral fficials. 10

15 All f these elements pint t tw substantive questins: What is the TSE s mdel fr institutinal develpment and what is its independent technical capacity? Respnding t these questins will be imprtant fr safeguarding the next electins and will require effective leadership n the part f the Tribunal s new members. 3. Level and quality f electral participatin in 2007 Guatemala has relatively lw levels f electral participatin; abstentin in recent years has been clse t 40 percent in the first rund f the presidential electin and slightly higher in the secnd rund. There are tw measures f electral participatin used in analyses: primary participatin, referring t turnut as a percentage f the vting age ppulatin, and secndary participatin, referring t turnut as a percentage f registered vters. This difference is nt insignificant, given that duble registratin is required t vte. Primary participatin is determined by varius factrs. These include the accuracy f census statistics n the number f peple f vting age; the capacity f the civil registry system t incrprate civil data, especially births; and the capacity f the civil identificatin system t issue dcumentatin. In these three areas, there are imprtant issues: there have been technical bjectins t the latest census, making its infrmatin unreliable; the decentralized civil registry used until the creatin f RENAP, cultural prblems (including citizens desire t register civil acts) and registratin techniques mean that the system s riginal surce is weak; and the lack f a unified natinal identificatin database, the decentralized issuance f identity dcuments and the lw security f the dcuments mean that reasnable dubts exist abut peple s identity. As a result, it is difficult t be certain abut levels f primary participatin. All f the preceding factrs als influence secndary participatin, as n ne can register t vte withut having their residency card. Tw ther factrs als influence secndary participatin: mtivatinal barriers, referring t peple s will t register in the TSE Citizens Registry, which is a cnstitutinal bligatin, but withut any enfrcement mechanisms; and institutinal barriers, meaning the TSE s capacity t maintain registratin systems permanent (Delegatins and Sub delegatins f the Citizens Registry) and temprary (registratin campaigns) that permit citizens t register, as well as its capacity t maintain the resulting data. An analysis f electral participatin in 2007 reveals the fllwing characteristics: The grwth in secndary participatin cntinued, increasing 2 percent frm Primary participatin increased even mre ntably, by 15 percent, but as indicated there are dubts regarding the census figures used fr this estimate. The data fr secndary participatin cme with questins that are nt currently pssible t answer: Hw much f the electral abstentin can be explained by registered vters wh have emigrated? Hw much is assciated with prblems in revising the electral registry and failure t remve deceased r ineligible vters? The answers will nly cme frm a thrugh audit f the entire electral registry, based n a methdlgy aimed at physically cnfirming persnal data. 11

16 Wmen s participatin remained lwer than men s. Wmen cast percent f vtes, and in n municipality did wmen s turnut surpass 62 percent. There are mre wmen than men in the ppulatin, but a majrity f the electral registry is male. Lwer female participatin must take int accunt the institutinal barriers t wmen s registratin and civil dcumentatin as revealed by sme indicatrs. It wuld als be valuable t identify any behaviral differences between rural and urban wmen, and between wmen f varying ethnic backgrunds. This wuld allw RENAP and the TSE t design specific registratin prgrams fr the 2011 electins. It is difficult t measure and evaluate indigenus participatin, as it is nt measured in the registry r the turnut statistics. The third part f the full reprt, based n data prduced by Miradr Electral, identifies the 95 municipalities with mre than 90 percent indigenus ppulatin. The participatin in these municipalities averaged 70 percent, arund 10 percent higher than the natinal level. Hwever, added tgether, these municipalities cnstitute nly 19.2 percent f the electral registry and the vtes cast there are ne fifth (20 percent) f all the vtes cast natinwide. Participatin by age bracket is als difficult t measure, as data fr vter registratin by age is nt available. Hwever, there is sme evidence that the highest vting ppulatin is between 26 and 45 years f age, which reveals little abut the behavir f yung peple aged 18 t 25. Anther variable f interest is rural participatin, especially in evaluating the effects f the decentralizatin f JRVs. As indicated in the previus sectin, there are n grunds t relate the grwth in secndary participatin with decentralizatin; this means that it was principally assciated with greater access and facilitatin f the rural vte, nt necessarily with increasing it. In the same way, althugh decentralizatin supprts the rural vte, it des nt fundamentally change its weight, with urban areas still predminant. As seen abve, the Natinal Statistical Institute s census data is unreliable, and there are prblems with the TSE s prductin and presentatin f data n vter registratin and electin results. Fr this reasn, it is difficult t design apprpriate plicies and actins t address the varius sectrs that are under registered, including yuth and indigenus peple. In the case f wmen, it is clear that under equal cnditins access t vting centers, apprpriate dcumentatin and registratin t vte wmen participate as much as r mre than men. Hwever, the cntinuing cncern is assciated with institutinal barriers, including difficulties with dcumentatin. Indigenus peple shw a higher tendency t vte than nnindigenus, at least based n the study f municipalities. There als culd be a relatinship between this higher indigenus vte and decentralizatin, r between a higher indigenus vte and higher rural vte, but the analysis is nt yet cnclusive. There is little dubt that the duble registratin system is at the rt f Guatemala s lw levels f participatin. Mre mdern electral registries are cnstructed using natinal civil registry databases, with adequate dcumentatin, that autmatically place all eligible vters n the electral registry. As lng as the duble registratin requirement remains and the system lacks creative criteria fr auditing and revising the electral registry, it will be difficult t calculate 12

17 precise levels f participatin. Any technical mdificatins shuld fundamentally reflect the perspective f safeguarding citizens plitical rights. 4. Plitical parties: electral behavir and institutinal perfrmance Guatemalan electral demcracy is characterized by an immature plitical party system. The system has prblems f stability and institutinalizatin, reflected in the cntinual emergence and disappearance f plitical parties. Varius research prjects cnducted by natinal and reginal institutins, such as ASIES and FLACSO, have prvided ample infrmatin describing these prblems. The party system needs t be analyzed frm different angles, taking int cnsideratin the peratin f the party system, the peratin f parties as institutins, and parties electral behavir. A quick review f fundamental characteristics indicates that the party system remains characterized by instability. The average number f parties in nn electral perids is 15, increasing t 18 in electral perids, and the average life f a party is less than 10 years. Electral vlatility accmpanies party fragility and is deepened by a sciety with lw levels f partisan r idelgical self identificatin. These factrs are mutually reinfrcing, since it is hard t develp stable partisan self identificatin withut stable parties, and equally difficult fr citizens t define themselves idelgically when there is little idelgical distinctin between parties. The LEPP refrms f 2004 and 2006 in large part fcused n party peratins; they included mdificatins in the rules regarding legal registratin, peratins and cmpsitin f internal bdies, management f private plitical financing and versight. These mdificatins have prduced adjustments in the party system, althugh its effects n structure have yet t be seen. The changes in registratin requirements and the electral threshld, which sught t reduce the number f parties, did nt prduce the desired results. Only tw parties culd nt cmply with the new legal requirements and nly three did nt reach the electral threshld. The changes in financing had mre effect after the electins, but thse applied during the electins were ineffective. Indicatrs f campaign expenditures shw that the spending limit was nt respected and that, while there was prgress in the registratin f private cntributins, this was nt accmpanied by effective versight n the part f the TSE. Regarding party internal peratins, while parties vary in their rganizatinal structure and practices, they are clearly maintaining a centralized mdel with little territrial presence, at least frmally. In general, frmal rganizatin is smaller than actual rganizatin, and des nt exceed 30 percent f the cuntry s municipalities. This is aided by the lse legal framewrk that requires legal rganizatin in nly 50 ut f 333 municipalities (15 percent). This explains why the increase in membership has nt necessarily been accmpanied by an increase in territrial presence, prducing the phenmenn f members withut a legal rganizatin and therefre withut explicit rights. Issues f plitical inclusin, even mre than centralizatin and lw territrial activity, demnstrate the still incipient nature f party institutinalizatin. In Guatemala s highly diverse sciety, party membership includes few wmen and yuth, and a lwer percentage f 13

18 indigenus peple than their prprtin f the ppulatin. These lw levels f inclusin culd be related t parties lw territrial presence, mtivatinal factrs and citizens lack f desire t participate, parties lack f strategies t appeal t these sectrs, and party mdels that d nt emphasize inclusin and accept limited participatin f these grups in electral prcesses. Candidate selectin prcesses deserve special mentin, as parties have little ability t prduce internal candidates fr public ffice. A cmmn practice is fr parties t lk fr leaders in the cmmunity r self financed candidates t run fr cngressinal, mayral and municipal cuncil psitins. This practice is reinfrced by the cntradictin between parties mdest territrial presence and their attempts t present candidates in all municipalities. The electral refrms did nt aim t significantly alter parties internal activities; rather they fcused mre n general systemic rules. Hwever, sme f the changes intrduced internal mdificatins t the pint where the party system culd be cnsidered in transitin between an individual and grup mdel. The decentralizatin f JRVs bligated parties t increase their territrial rganizatin arund the new rural vting centers, resulting in a larger territrial presence during electins and smewhat changing traditinal strategies based n bringing vtes t municipal centers. The changes t the legal requirements fr preserving party registratin, while achieving little reductin in the number f parties, did change parties internal dynamics, since parties had t increase their membership. Parties als nw must hld annual departmental and municipal assemblies fr registratin and candidate selectin, thereby increasing the activity f these bdies, and seek mre cmmitment frm departmental and municipal members in rder t create mre permanent structures. The plitical finance system is a factr that helps t explain parties weak institutinalizatin. While it is frmally a mixed public and private system, in practice there is a clear dependence n private funds fr party peratins and campaigns. This dependency makes it difficult fr parties t functin as independent institutins n an nging basis, given the tendency fr private financing t cncentrate n the mst viable electral ptins and nly at the time electins take place. The cncrete impact f the refrms has yet t be seen, as the public subsidies have nt yet taken effect. The mst imprtant change in parties electral behavir was the change in their electral strategies. Parties, previusly fcused n transprting vtes t municipal centers, had t create party rganizatin in rural areas that nw cntained vting centers. While the decentralizatin was nt cmpleted in time fr the previus electins, this was a significant change. A secnd relevant pint related t parties platfrm effrts. Despite the lw levels f idelgical identificatin and prgram frmulatin that characterize the Guatemalan party system, abut 10 parties presented plitical prgrams in 2007, albeit with differing levels f detail. This cmpared favrably t 2003, when nly three parties publicly presented prgrams, and 2001, when nly ne party did s. Anther central element in evaluating electral behavir is parties adherence t the rules. There is evidence that parties did nt adhere t sme prvisins, fr example thse relating t the fficial beginning f campaign perids and limits n campaign expenditures. While n party frmally admits t having vilated these restrictins, independent mnitring clearly demnstrated that vilatins tk place. This reflects bth ld style plitical practices as well as lphles in the electral legislatin, which lacks effective enfrcement mechanisms. 14

19 In general, the party system and individual party peratins reflect lw levels f institutinality. The system is in a prcess f adjustment and transfrmatin, in particular due t the 2004 and 2006 electral refrms. These changes can be viewed in a frmal sense hw parties react t the new legal prvisins as well as an infrmal sense what unfreseen cnsequences are refrms having n party activities? This adjustment prcess may deepen nce the new public financing system enters int effect and if a new legal refrm is implemented t supprt these changes. 5. Plitical party and campaign financing As indicated in the previus sectin, the finance system is frmally a mix f public and private funds, but in reality is dependent n private surces. This system was very lenient fr many years due t a lack f versight. The amunt f funds and their rigin were unknwn; state supprt 2 quetzals ($.25) fr each valid vte received was insufficient given the cst f maintaining a party and participating in electin campaigns. The 2004 refrms intrduced imprtant changes in the system: first, increasing state supprt t US$2 per vte, while keeping the system f fur annual payments; secnd, establishing limits n expenditures f US$1 per registered vter; third, establishing limits n private cntributins; furth, intrducing institutinal mdificatins aimed at the transparent management f party finances; and fifth, giving the TSE the authrity t versee private financing. In practice, hwever, these changes have prved insufficient. State supprt has nt yet taken effect; since the limit n expenditures was general, it is unviable and unrealistic given the cst f electins. Parties applied the institutinal mdificatins in an effective way, but as the electins apprached, the learning prcess was interrupted and the mdificatins were nt cnslidated. Limits n private cntributins were vague, as much f this supprt was self financing r in kind, and therefre difficult t mnitr. In additin, the TSE s versight capacity was insufficient, despite its effrts, in part due t lw institutinal capacity and in part due t an inadequate enfrcement framewrk. While the refrms had the crrect intent, their applicatin is in the early stages and must be refined, bth legally and institutinally. As with practically all financing systems in the regin, there is evidence f duplicitus behavir: while it is easy t prve that mst parties cmply with their legally established respnsibilities, practices persist that are nt legally reprted and fr which the TSE lacks versight ability. This is demnstrated by the mnitring cnducted by Citizens Actin (Acción Ciudadana) fr Miradr Electral, indicating that at least three f the larger parties surpassed the campaign spending limit during the pre campaign perid as well as the fficial campaign perid. Any versight system must fulfill several basic requirements: clear and effective legal prvisins, institutinal capacity fr their applicatin and effective enfrcement mechanisms. These three requirements are nt met in Guatemala. Sme legal prvisins are frmulated incrrectly, such as a generic expense limit fr a general electin really cmpsed f five distinct electins. The necessary institutinal capacity is lacking, partly due t the delays in apprving the harmnizatin f the LEPP, and partly due t the TSE s delay in issuing financing regulatins and its crrespnding difficulty in develping the institutinal capacity t mnitr cmpliance 15