O~laham4,1 Political Science A~Aciation

Transcription

1 O~laham4,1 Political Science A~Aciation

2 President, OPSA President Elect Founding Editor, Oklahoma Politics Editors: Book Review Editor: Business Manager OKLAHOMA POLITICS Keith Eakins. University of Central Oklahoma Michael Sharp. Northeastern State University Bob Darcy, Oklahoma State University Jan Hardt. University of Central Oklahoma Loren Gatch, University of Central Oklahoma Richard Johnson. Oklahoma City University Saundra Mace. University of Central Oklahoma Sponsoring Institutions Carl Albert Research Center, OU Northeastern State University Oklahoma City University Oklahoma Baptist University Rose State College Southeastern OK State University Tulsa University University of Central Oklahoma University of Oklahoma Editorial Board Robert Darcy. Oklahoma State University Gary Copeland. University of Oklahoma Edward Dreyer. University oftulsa Terry Garrett, University of Texas Pan American Loren Gatch. University of Central Oklahoma William Gorden, Redlands Community College Jan Hardt. University of Central Oklahoma Richard Johnson. Oklahoma City University Creorge Largent, Northeastern OklahomaA&M College Tony Litherland. Oklahoma Baptist University Kirk Rodden, Murray State College Philip Simpson, Cameron University Kaye Tatro, Nort.hwestern Oklahoma State University Christine Pappas, East Central State University Rick Vollmer. Oklahoma City Community College ISSN: I Oklahoma Politics. an annual publication of the Oklahoma Political Science Association. publishes political science articles that have a significant Oklahoma component as well as reviews. notes. and data on subjects relating to Oklahoma politics. Submissions should be sent to Jan Hardt. Department of Political Science. university of Central Oklahoma. Edmond. OK Subscriptions arc $15 per year from the University of Central Oklahoma. Department of Political Science. Edmond. OK Oklahoma Political Science Association members receive copies of the annual journal as part of their memberships. The contents are copyrighted 2004 by the Oklahoma Political Science Association.

3 OKLAHOMA POLITICS Vol. 13 November 2004 ARTICLES SHOW ME THE MONEY: Campaign Finance in the 2000 and 2002 Oklahoma Elections Jan Hardt OKLAHOMA'S STATUTORY CONSTITUTION Michael K. Avery Ronald M. Peters, Jr. 47 TWO "PARTIES" AMONG REGISTERED OKLAHOMA DEMOCRATS: The Clark, Edwards and Kerry Constituencies James A. Davis Ravi Shankar Byrraju Met/a V. Sai Sekhar 67

4 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 103 BREACH OF TRUST: How Washington Turns Outsiders into Insiders Tom A. Coburn Thomas H. Clap per 105 BORN TO RUN: Origins of the Political Career Ronald Keith Gaddie C. A. Taylor 109 THE CHEROKEE CASES: Two Landmark Federal Decisions in the Fight for Sovereignty Jill Norgren Bill Gorden 113 CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: The Politics oftribalacknowledgment Renee Ann Cramer Blue Clark 117 DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life Theda Skocpol Kenneth Hicks 121 CONTRIBUTORS 125 REVIEWERS 127

5 SHOW ME THE MONEY: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN THE 2000AND 2002 OKLAHOMA ELECTIONS JAN HARDT University of Central Oklahoma To understand Oklahoma's elections, one needs to examine campaign finance. Campaign finance information not only reveals which candidates might win the race, but it will also reveal how candidates get their money, which candidates are getting more money, whether the political parties are competitive, and how active interest groups are in Oklahoma. This essay examines Oklahoma campaign finance for both the 2000 and 2002 elections using both data readily available from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission on the candidates, but also data that was gathered on the political action committees who contributed to the candidates. These two sources of information reveal that incumbents do better than challengers and that many races became more competitive in Oklahoma as seats became open as a result of term limits. However, there are substantial differences between not only the Oklahoma House and Senate candidates in terms of the donations they receive, but also between the Republicans and the Democrats. Particularly noteworthy was the substantial decline of the Democratic Party in 2002 compared to 2000 in raising funds. Hence, it was not a surprise that Republicans were able to capture the state House in 2004, and this does not bode well for the Democrats in 2006.

6 2 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Never has there been a more important time to study campaign finance in Oklahoma than right now. Oklahoma is on the precipice of a new era of elections as a result of the state's decision to enact term limits on its state legislative offices. Oklahomans began to see the impact of these term limits in the 2004 elections as numerous incumbents were forced out of office, creating open seats in both the state house and the state senate. This has a direct impact on the amount of money candidates need to run for office. Open seats are usually more competitive because candidates know that this is their window of opportunity to run, i.e. the one chance when they wiii not have to face a deeply entrenched, sure-to-win incumbent. As a result, candidates from both parties usually file heavily for these races producing large numbers of candidates on both sides. Many of these candidates will either be inexperienced candidates or new to this particular office and thus will need to spend more money on these open seat races to make themselves known to their voters. By examining past elections, i.e. those prior to 2004, we can see the impact of money in those elections, so that we have a baseline with which to judge future campaigns in Oklahoma. To do this, it is important to examine campaign finance law, for this provides the legal guidelines under which candidates can raise money. There are really two distinct sets of campaign finance laws in the United States, both of which apply to Oklahoma. Presidential and congressional seats are governed by the federal campaign finance law commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Bill, or more formally known as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of The two most important provisions of the BCRA law are the limits it places on contributions raised from individuals ($2,000 per campaign per election) and political action committees, or PACs ($5,000 per campaign per election). The purpose of the BCRA was to encourage candidates to raise their money in small amounts from lots of donors. BCRA, being a federal law, would thus apply only to the presidential, U.S. House, U.S. Senate races in Oklahoma. All the other contests in Oklahoma are governed by the second set of campaign finance laws, those produced by the state of Oklahoma. Oklahoma campaign finance law was created by the Oklahoma legislature and is now administered by the Oklahoma Ethics Commission established in The state of Oklahoma like the other forty-nine

7 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 3 states had a choice when it created its campaign finance law. It could have made a system that was either stronger or weaker than the federal law. Oklahoma in fact chose a compromise position, with some aspects of its law tougher on candidates than the BCRA law, while some aspects are weaker. One of the weakest aspects of the Oklahoma law is the ability of corporations to give to candidates by creating political action committees. Thus, in Oklahoma there is a Chesapeake Energy Corporation PAC, an Oklahoma Phillips Petroleum Company PAC, and a Conoco Inc. PAC. These types of PACs are strictly prohibited under federal law which also prohibits electioneering communications by corporations or labor unions using treasury funds ( / pdf). Yet, the limit on the amount PACs can give reveals another difference. In Oklahoma, the PAC limit is $5,000 per campaign in a calendar year, while in federal elections PACs can only give $5,000 per campaign per election. Since most candidates will typically compete in two or even three elections, given a primary, a general, and perhaps a runoff election, PACs in Oklahoma can donate less than under federal law. Oklahoma's law is also different from the federal law when it comes to individual donations. Individuals in Oklahoma can give the same amount as PACs, or $5,000 per calendar year, yet under the federal law, that amount is $2,000 per campaign per election. Yet studying campaign finance at the federal level is much easier than studying campaign finance in Oklahoma. There is a simple reason for this. The federal law requires that candidates and PACs submit their campaign finance information electronically. Thus, there are various websites available such as or wwwfec.gov where anyone with a computer can access the campaign finance information for federal candidates. This information is completely sorted by computer so one can look up an individual contributor, a PAC, or a specific candidate, and find out information on both the receipts and expenditures. In Oklahoma, this is a much more arduous task, despite the fact that Oklahoma was one of the first states to require mandatory electronic filing from most of its candidates. This program began on July 1, 1997, with $700,000 spent on the system. Ironically, $135,000 of that money came from former Governor David Walter's campaign as part of his 1994 plea agreement for ethics laws violations. But alas,

8 4 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 this was a system not meant to last. Less than one year later, at the end of the 1998 legislative session, the Oklahoma legislature voted to make electronic submission of campaign finance information voluntary, instead of mandatory. There were many reasons for this including glitches in the computer software and the realization by many incumbents that they might be putting their own careers at risk by making their campaign finance information available to their challengers. As a consequence, any student of Oklahoma campaign finance must be willing to do some serious digging. The only comprehensive information (i.e. that includes more than one race) available from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission is a report available after every election cycle starting in This report lists the candidate, the seat, the level of race sought, the money raised, the money spent, and the amount of cash-on-hand. Thus, the report, while incredibly useful, is much more noteworthy for what it does not include, rather than for what it actually contains. This report does not mention the party identification, the incumbency status, the vote percentage, nor the gender of the candidate, among other items. This makes it much more difficult to make comparisons across races or to look at campaign finance in Oklahoma as a whole. Even more difficult is gathering individual contributor, expenditure, or PAC information in Oklahoma. Obtaining this type of information requires going through every single file for a given election year at the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. Fortunately this study has done just that. This study examines the 2000 and 2002 elections by looking at three different sources of information: 1) the easily accessible information on Oklahoma congressional candidates; 2) data from the comprehensive report with additional variables added, such as party identification, gender, whether the candidate won the race, whether the candidate was an incumbent, and the vote percentage obtained; and 3) information hand-gathered from the last two election cycles, 2000 and 2002, on PAC donations in Oklahoma. Only then, can we get a full picture of Oklahoma campaign finance before term limits were enacted.

9 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 5 FEDERAL RACES IN OKLAHOMA Oklahoma's congressional campaign climate is fairly similar to that of most states across the country. The incumbents already in office are fairly entrenched and rarely lose. Nationally, only 3-5% of incumbents have lost their seats. Yet, in 2002, because of redistricting and running for higher office, three of Oklahoma's five U.S. House seats changed hands. These seats vacated by incumbents became open seats attracting numerous candidate with large sums of money spent. Yet, of the three open seats in Oklahoma in 2002, only one was truly competitive, the Fourth District seat between Republican Tom Cole and Democrat Darryl Roberts. This seat became open in 2002 when Representative J.C. Watts Jr. (R-OK) decided to retire to pursue other interests. What followed was a very competitive race for the seat, with two primaries featuring a total of seven candidates, and a heated general election. The general election featured Tom Cole, a Republican, who was a former Oklahoma State Senator, had held key posts with the Republican National Committee, and was a familiar figure in Oklahoma Republican politics. His opponent was Darryl Roberts, a Democrat, who had competed for this same seat in Most of Roberts' funds, or $309,000 of his $560,038, came during the last three weeks ofthe campaign, when the Democratic Party and labor organizations decided that he had an opportunity to win (Casteel 2002). There was also a very active advertising campaign conducted by both candidates with Roberts accusing Cole of dodging the draft, and Cole refuting the charge by showing documentation that he registered for the draft but wasn't called (Hinton and Casteel 2002). In the end, Roberts was unable to overcome his slow start. Representative Cole defeated Roberts, 54% to 46%. Much of the victory could probably be attributed to the substantial difference in fundraising; Representative Cole was able to raise more money, $1.19+ million to the $560,038 raised by Roberts. The two candidates, though received their money from very different sources. While 47.4% of Representative Cole's PAC money came from business, only 6.2% of Roberts' PAC money came from business. Roberts instead raised most of his PAC money, or 64.4% from labor organizations (

10 6 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 The other 2002 congressional races were much more predictable. Each had victory margins of greater than 10%. For Oklahoma's other four congressional seats, the three who faced major party opponents (Frank Lucas in the 3rd did not) each spent $ million on average, while their opponents spent $275,006 on average. The outcome of Oklahoma's U.S. Senate seat was never really in doubt; James Inhofe, the Republican incumbent, outspent David Walters, the former Democratic governor, $3.6+ million to $2.4+ million and defeated him, 57% to 36% ( The 2000 elections were also fairly drama-free. Oklahoma had six congressional seats contested that year, but only one was competitive, the 2nd District seat, which featured a contest between Representative Brad Carson and Republican Andy Ewing. Carson outspent Ewing $1.2+ million to $988,161, and thus it is not a surprise, that Carson won that seat, 55% to 42%. All the other seats featured incumbents who won their races by more than 20% of the vote. The incumbents outspent their challengers, $749,134 to $103,814, with the largest gap coming with the 3rd District seat, where Representative J.C. Watts, Jr. (R OK) outspent his challenger, Larry Weatherford (D), $1,827,649 to $57,455 ( Thus, most of the drama and suspense in Oklahoma has not been in the federal races. Rather, state races have experienced most of the excitement. But again, studying campaign finance at the state level is not an easy experience because of the lack of electronic campaign finance data. This study seeks to remedy that by using both the information that is readily available from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission as well as the author's comprehensive database of PAC and contribution information for the 2000 and 2002 races to provide a clearer picture of campaign spending in Oklahoma. STATE RACES IN OKLAHOMA- FROM READILY AVAILABLE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION The Oklahoma Ethics Commission since the 1998 election has created a report which does provide some comprehensive campaign finance information for the state of Oklahoma. Interested citizens can find in a tabular form for each of these election years the name of the

11 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 7 candidate, the type of race, the specific seat, the money spent by the candidate, the money received, and the amount of cash on hand. This information suggests that the type of race makes a difference in Oklahoma as shown in Table 1. As would be expected, the higher the prestige of the race, the more money that is raised and spent to win the seat. Races for Governor, Attorney General, Lt. Governor, Insurance Commissioner, and Corporation Commissioner are the most prestigious state-wide seats. Thus, it is not surprising that candidates have raised more money for these seats. Yet, the elections reveal an anomaly. Even the most prestigious seats may not require that much money to win the seat. This can be seen in the substantial discrepancies in the amounts for Governor, Lt. Governor, State Auditor and Inspector, and Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1998 and What made the difference in these races was the amount of competition. The 2002 election versus the 1998 election for governor is a good example of this. In 2002, there was a highly competitive race TABLE! 1998/2000/2002 Average Money Spent by Type of Seat Sought ) 1998 Elections Elections Elections Attorney General $584, Corporation Commissioner $148, $53, District Attorney $30, $32, Governor $998, $577, House $24, $26, $25, Insurance Commissioner $185, $168, Associate District Judge $30, $67, District Judge $11, $19, Labor Commissioner $63, $102, Lt. Governor $236, $843, Senate $71, $47, $57, State Auditor & Inspector $79, $224, Sup. Public Instruction $71, $2, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission.

12 8 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 between a former U.S. House member, Republican Steve Largent, and a member of the State Senate, Democrat Brad Henry. Also in the race was an Independent, Gary Richardson, who scared away many early opponents, despite being an Independent, by running a series of highly expensive television ads. He ended up spending $2.63 million, while Largent spent $3.18 million and Henry spent $2.28 million. This was the closest gubernatorial election in thirty-two years, with Henry getting 43.2% of the vote, Largent42.6%, and Richardson with 14.2% of the vote. In 1998, the race was different. Republican Frank Keating, a well-liked incumbent, ran against Democrat Laura Boyd. Keating won with 57.9% of the vote, while Boyd received only 40.9%. Boyd, however, only spent about $500,000 for the race, while Keating spent about $2.6 million (English and Hinton 1998). Unlike the statewide races, the House and Senate races were more true to form. Those with the most prestigious offices usually spent the most money, and thus as expected, candidates for Oklahoma Senate seats spent 2/3rds more than their House counterparts. In 2002, for example, Senate candidates spent $71, on average, while House candidates spent $24, on average to win their seats. In 1998 and 2000, the gap narrowed somewhat, with Senators only doubling the amount that House candidates spent. Thus, in 1998 House candidates spent $26,495.00, while Senate candidates spent $47, and in 2000 House candidates spent $25,959.55, while Senate candidates spent $57, The difference in the amount of spent in 2002 compared with the earlier years probably can be explained by the number of open seats, or races without an incumbent candidate. In 2002, there were more open seat races because of redistricting at the state level, which forced some legislators to compete against each other and created some new districts where there would be open seats. Also, many of the candidates were aware that term limits would effectively begin in 2004 for some legislators, and they might have decided to retire or run for another office early. Open seat candidates are more likely to spend larger sums of money because these races feature more candidates and are thus more competitive. In 2000, there were only 14 candidates competing in open seats for state legislative races in Oklahoma, while in 2002, there were 83 open seat candidates.

13 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 9 Yet in one sense, state House and Senate races have not followed a typical pattern. Nationwide, each year of elections has brought more and more campaign spending in the states, making each year more expensive than those in the past (Schultz 2002). In Oklahoma, however, House candidates actually spent less on average in 2002 ($24,062.36), than they did in 2000 ($26,495.00). For the Oklahoma Senate, the opposite was true; Senators' races were more expensive in 2002 ($71, on average) than in 2000 ($47,349.00), as shown in Table I. Given the propensity for Senate candidates to spend more money, particularly in 2002, it is not surprising that most of the top fundraisers in 2000 and 2002 were Senate candidates. In 2002, nine of the top ten recipients of campaign contributions among legislative candidates were Senators, and in 2000 it was eight out of ten, as shown in Table 2. The top campaign fundraiser in 2002 was Senator Stratton Taylor who raised $413, and spent $488, on his 2002 Senate race, while in 2000 the top fundraiser was Senator Mike Morgan who raised $257, and spent $239, By adding a few additional variables to the information provided by the Oklahoma Ethics Commission, more can be learned about campaign finances in Oklahoma. For example, with the addition of party identification, one can find out whether Democrats or Republicans raise and spend more money on their campaigns. Until the recent 2004 election, the Oklahoma legislature has been consistently majority Democrat in both houses except for 1921 and Thus, one would expect that Democrats should receive more contributions and spend more money on their campaigns than Republicans. This is indeed the case. Republicans on average raised only $28, in 2000 compared to the Democrats' $41, A similar gap appears in 2002 when the Republicans raised only $33,871.05, while Democrats raised $46, The expenditure figures show a similar difference, with $25, being spent by Republicans in 2000 and $39, spent by Democrats in In 2002, Republicans spent $29, and Democrats spent $42, For the third party candidates, it becomes immediately clear why very few run for state legislative office, and why they are almost never successful. None ofthe five third party candidates in 2000 and the four third party candidates in 2002 had a chance, at least looking at the amount of money raised and spent. Compared to the major party

14 10 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 TABLE2 2000/2002 Top Recipients/Spenders in State Legislative Races Party Office Received Spent For 2000: Morgan, M Democrat Senate $267, $239, Henry Democrat Senate $233, $225, Adair Democrat House $176, $189, Martin, P Democrat Senate $173, $168, Benson Democrat House $161, $247, Williams Democrat Senate $160, $183, Helton Democrat Senate $150, $174, Robinson Democrat Senate $143, $114, Long Democrat Senate $138, $130, Snyder Republican Senate $136, $123, Brown Democrat Senate $117, $117, Milacek Republican Senate $l12, $87, For2002: Taylor, S Democrat Senate $413, $488, Hobson Democrat Senate $383, $200, Easley,K Democrat Senate $362, $259, Walker,J Democrat Senate $242, $222, Branan Republican Senate $236, $233, Crutchfield, J. Democrat Senate $220, $163, Harry Democrat Senate $173, $158, Boren Democrat House $169, $165, Herbert Democrat Senate $162, $161, Coates, H Republican Senate $161, $139, Smith, Joe Democrat Senate $153, $152, Gumrn Democrat Senate $142, $131, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. candidates, these candidates raise and spend paltry sums of money, raising $1, on average for House candidates, and $17, for Senate candidates in This was better, however, than the third party candidates did in 2000, when they raised only $ on average for House races, and $1, for Senate races.

15 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 11 In most races, whether across Oklahoma or even the nation, incumbents typically are more successful in both raising and spending money than are their challengers, or those that run against incumbents (Jacobson 2004, Hardt 2005). Most individuals and PACs tend to give to incumbents because they have better name recognition, they have a track record, and they can provide more services to their constituents (Jacobson 2004). As shown in Table 3, incumbents are the clear winner in the money race. On average, incumbents raise and spend three times more than their counterparts, with incumbents raising $49, and spending $43, on average, while their challengers raised only $17, and spent only $16, These figures are for 2002, and as can be seen in Table 3, the figures are similar for Clearly, the financial advantage alone gives incumbents a major advantage. TABLE and 2002 Average Expenditures and Contributions, by Type of Candidate 200) 200) Type of Average Average Average Average Candidate Expenditures Contributions Expenditures Contributions Republicans $25, $28, $29, $33, Democrats $39, $41, $42, $46, Third Party $ $ $ 5, $ 6, Incumbents $46, $48, $43, $49, Challengers $15, $16, $16, $17, Open Seats $51, $57, $37, $40, Winners $45, $49, $49, $55, Losers $18, $19, $21, $24, House $26, $27, $24, $25, Senate $43, $53, $71, $84, Male $29, $31, $34, $39, Female $41, $45, $28, $29, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission.

16 12 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 With more money, the incumbents can hire more staff, produce more campaign flyers, create more campaign advertisements, etc. But it is also instructive to compare incumbents and challengers for either House seats or Senate seats, instead of lumping them together, because of the substantial difference in money raised/spent by House and Senate candidates. This is when the true advantage (or disadvantage, as is the case for challengers) can be seen. Most of the disadvantage as shown in Table 3, is not with the House candidates; the House incumbents generally raise and spend about twice as much as their challengers. But in the Senate, the disadvantage is huge, with incumbents raising and spending about ten times more than their challengers. Just looking at 2002 alone, Senate incumbents raised $116, and spent $90, on average, while their challengers raised $11,902.25, and spent $10, Candidates for an open seat, where there is no incumbent in the race, typically do better than challengers, and sometimes even spend more money than incumbents. This is because open seats are the most competitive. Open-seat candidates know that they will not face an entrenched incumbent with name recognition, a huge financial war chest, and years of constituent service. Yet, at the same time, there is a Catch-22 with these open-seat contests; usually there will be more candidates in the race (Jacobson 2004). Oklahoma seems to follow these national trends. Most state legislative open-seat races in 2000 and especially 2002 typically featured 7-8 candidates, with typically a very competitive primary at least in one party with 5-6 candidates, and then a competitive general election with two high-quality candidates. A good example of this is State House District 98 in The incumbent, Tim Pope (R), had his original district eliminated by redistricting, and now that district represents Broken Arrow, instead of Mustang, Pope's home base. As a result, he ran in an unsuccessful bid to unseat State Labor Commissioner Brenda Reneau. The Republican primary was thus a free-for-all with five candidates competing, including Melissa Mahan, the winner of the primary, and John Trebilcock, the second-place finisher. Because of the closeness of this race, Oklahoma law dictated a runoff election, and Trebilcock defeated Mahan. In the general election, Trebilcock faced a third close contest, defeating Michelle Sutton (D) for the victory. The campaign finances for this race were similarly competitive.

17 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 13 Competing in three contests, Trebilcock raised $64,218 and spent $62,008, while Michelle Sutton raised $43,313 and spent $36,370 for only the general election, since she did not face an opponent in the Democratic primary. Overall, open-seat candidates elsewhere in the state fared just as well in their campaign fundraising efforts. Open seat candidates in 2002 were able to raise $40, and spend $37,146.92, roughly two times more than challengers, and just a little less than that of incumbents. Yet in 2000, open seat candidates were actually more successful than incumbents, raising $57, and spending $51, on average. Also, as expected, winners generally do better than losers, both in raising and spending money. With more money, candidates can buy more campaign circulars, more campaign advertisements, and more staff to better publicize their campaigns. Generally speaking, winning state legislative candidates tend to raise and spend about 2.5 times more money in Oklahoma than their competitors. Thus, in 2000 winners raised $49, and spent $45,755.69, while losers raised only $19, and spent only $18, on average. For 2002, the difference between winners and losers is fairly similar. Winners spent $49,010.68, and raised $55,559.22, while losers spent only $21, and raised $24, Another issue that can be looked at is whether male or female legislators are better at raising money in Oklahoma. This is an issue because of the relatively small number of female legislators in Oklahoma. In 2004, only 12.7% of the legislators, or 19 out of 149, in Oklahoma were women, compared with 22% nationwide. After the 2004 election, the number of female legislators did increase to 22, but this still ranked Oklahoma 49th, in terms of the percentage of women legislators nationwide (Council of State Governments 2004). Perhaps there are fewer female legislators in Oklahoma because they are not as successful as the men in raising and spending money on their campaigns. Well, in 2000, this was not the case. Female candidates for the Oklahoma legislature actually raised and spent more money than their male colleagues, raising $45, and spending $41, on average, compared with $31, and $29, for the male candidates. Given that there was only one female versus female race during these years, this could have given females an edge in terms of competing against their male colleagues. Yet, there wasn't a significant

18 14 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 difference in the percentage of males versus females in terms of winning their races, with females winning fewer of their races with only 40.6% won, compared with the males who won 42.9%. In 2002, there was both good news and bad news for female candidates. The good news was that there were more female candidates in 2002, 37 as compared with 32, and fewer male candidates (228, as compared with 259). Yet, females did much worse when it came to both raising and spending money. Females were able to raise only $29, and spend $28, on average in 2002, yet males were able to raise $39, and spend $34, on average. Moreover, only 32.4% of the female candidates were able to win their races in 2002, compared with 45.6% of the male colleagues. Thus, it looks like the small percentage of females in the Oklahoma legislature will continue for some years to come. GOING BEYOND READILY AVAILABLE DATA- THE WORLD OF PAC MONEY While the readily available data do provide information about aggregate campaign spending in Oklahoma, giving us detail about whether House members spent and received more money than Senators for example, it does not provide any detail about specific individuals or groups who have spent and received money in Oklahoma. Thus, many of the important questions that political scientists often ask about campaign finance are left unanswered by the readily available data. For example, nationwide Democrats generally receive more money from labor groups and Republicans generally receive more money from business groups (Herrnson 2004). But is this true in Oklahoma as well? One would expect, for example, that labor groups in Oklahoma might be more limited in terms of their financial donations because of the fact that Oklahoma is not a very pro-labor state (Hardt 2005). Moreover, some groups might decide that they want to distribute their money in a bipartisan manner and provide smaller donations to more members. Other groups might decide that their best strategy is to maximize their influence by giving larger donations to a smaller cadre of candidates. But the readily available data tell us nothing about which groups spend the most money in Oklahoma or how those groups spend their money.

19 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 15 Thus, this study seeks to go further than the readily available data by doing something that has never been done before in the state of Oklahoma- gathering comprehensive group and candidate campaign finance information for multiple years. As previously mentioned, for Oklahoma this is an almost painful process. Unlike California and other states that have computerized their campaign finance information and made it available online, Oklahoma still does its campaign finance using paper and pencil. Thus, in order to get any comprehensive information, every campaign document must be examined and recorded by hand in order to look at all the candidates. This is a painstaking process because each candidate may have anywhere from four or five pages (typically these candidates received no contributions) to over 1000 pages for some candidates. With 292 Oklahoma House and Senate candidates in 2000 and 277 candidates in 2002, that is a lot of pages just to get comprehensive information for just two election cycles. Nevertheless, that is what this study has done. Now for the first time, Oklahomans can find out which interest group gives the most money in Oklahoma, and find out whether certain interest groups or corporations give more money to Republicans or Democrats, House members or Senators, winners or losers, and incumbents, challengers, or open-seat candidates. One can also get a comprehensive picture of the PACs formed by these interest groups and corporations. Do they have particular patterns of giving? Are there numerous PACs in Oklahoma or just a few? What sector of the Oklahoma economy seems to have the most PACs? Do candidates get more money from in-state PACs or out-of-state PACs? These questions can finally be answered. PERCENTAGE OF THE BUDGET AND AVERAGE PAC DONATION One of the first basic questions to answer is the number of PACs in Oklahoma. If there are few PACs in Oklahoma, or if they don't give very much money, then they might not even be interesting to look at. Alas, this is not the case. PACs are a very significant player in Oklahoma's elections as shown in Table 4. In 2000, there were 416 PACs that gave $3,490,313 in contributions to 293 candidates, for an average candidate contribution of $11,912. In 2002, the PACs actually

20 16 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Table and 2002 Percent PAC/N on-pac By Type of Candidate All Percent Percent Average Contributions PAC PAC Non-PAC PAC$ 2000 Democrats $4,267, $2,133, $15, Republicans $5,307, $1,356, $8, House $6,414, $2,491, $10, Senate $3,160, $593, $9, Winners $6,350, $2,410, $19, Losers $3,224, $1,080, $6, Incumbents $6,018, $2,441, $19, Challengers $2,482, $762, $5, Open Seats $798, $285, $20, Female $1,461, $535, $16, Male $8,113, $2,955, $11, Democrats $4,030, $2,164, $13, Republicans $5,859, $1,423, $11, House $5,443, $2,453, $11, Senate $4,588, $1,135, $19, Winners $6,611, $2,676, $20, Losers $3,420, $911, $6, Incumbents $5,370, $2,662, $23, Challengers $1,106, $540, $6, Open Seats $3,315, $386, $4, Female $1,794, $358, $9, Male $8,926, $3,229, $13, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. gave more money in contributions, $3,675,764 to fewer candidates (277), but there were also fewer PACs with only 318 PACs giving money in 2002, for a smaller average donation of $ PAC money also constitutes a substantial portion of a candidate's budget, depending on the type of candidate. Because Democrats have

21 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 17 had majority control of the Oklahoma legislature except for 1921 and 1922, and more recently in , it is understandable that the Democrats not only received more PAC money than Republicans both in total and on average, but that it also constituted a greater proportion of the Democrat's campaign budget. In 2000, PAC money constituted only 25.6% of the Republican candidates' budgets, but 50.0% of the Democrats' budgets. Democrats also had a huge advantage in the average amount of money received compared with the Republicans in 2000,$15, as compared to $8, Thus, it is not surprising that the Democrats were more successful in their campaigns with an almost 2:1 advantage in terms of PAC money received. Yet, the tides began to change in For the first time, Republicans had a legitimate chance to capture majority control of the House. Although they fell short by three seats, making up the difference in PAC money seemed to help. While the percentages for PAC money as a part of the campaign budget were fairly similar to what they had been in 2000, 53.7% for the Democrats as compared with 24.3% for the Republicans, Republicans were able to get more money from PACs on average than they did in Republicans had almost made up the difference receiving $11, on average from PACs as compared with the Democrats who received $13, on average. Alas, the winners were still winning and the losers were losing, at least in terms of the PAC money race. In both 2000 and 2002, the losers faced more than a 3:1 disadvantage in terms of the average PAC money given to campaigns. The losers received only $6, on average in 2002, and $6, on average in 2000, compared with the winners who received $20, and $19, on average, respectively. Unfortunately for the losers, this is typical PAC behavior. PACs are much more likely to give money to winners because they have a greater chance of being successful and voting on public policy once they are in office. Most of the winners are also incumbents, meaning that they have proven track record for the PACs to examine (Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1994). Not surprisingly, this trend continues when looking at how the challengers did versus the incumbents in raising PAC money. Here, though, the results are a bit more mixed. Particularly in 2002, challengers were successful in keeping the percentage of PAC money in their campaign budgets comparable to those of incumbents, with incumbents

22 18 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 receiving 49.6% of their money from PACs, and challengers 48.8% of their money. Yet, there was more of a gap in 2000, with 40.6% of the campaign budget coming from PACs for incumbents, but only 30.7% for challengers. But the real difference in both elections was in the average amount of PAC money received. Here, challengers just cannot compete, receiving only $6, on average in 2002, compared with the incumbents who received $23, In 2000, the gap was only marginally better for challengers, $5, on average for them, versus $19, for incumbents. One of the most striking changes in 2002 as compared to 2000, came with the open seat races. Remembering that 2002 was the beginning of numerous open seat races because of redistricting and then later term limits, this change is reflected in terms of the PAC money that was given and the percentage ofthe candidates' budgets. There were only 14 open seat candidates in 2000, versus 83 in The PACs actually gave over $100,000 more in 2002 than they did in 2000, but with the greater number of candidates, each candidate actually received much less on average. Thus, in 2000, open seat candidates were not only able to get more money on average from PACs, or $20, as compared with $4, in 2002, but PAC money also constituted a much larger portion of their budgets in 2000, or 35.8% versus 11.6% in The PACs were less consistent in 2000 and 2002 in terms of giving to male or female candidates. In 2000, the percentage of the campaign budget coming from PACs was almost equal, with 36.6% for females and 36.4% for males. Yet, in 2002 there was a tremendous difference, with males staying fairly consistent at 36.2%, but females dropped to only 20%. Likewise, the average amount of money given by PACs to males and females was also inconsistent, with females getting less money average in 2002, $9, versus $13, , but more money in 2000, or $16, as compared to $11, DO OKLAHOMANS GET MORE PAC MONEY FROM IN STATE OR OUT-OF-STATE? One of the issues that frequently comes up during various campaigns is whether the candidate is being supported by his/her

23 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 19 constituents or by people that cannot even vote for the candidate. In the Carson-Coburn U.S. Senate race in 2004, for example, it was noted during the race that both candidates relied heavily on out-ofstate donations. Thus, it is not surprising that over 50% of their donations came from out-of-state contributors. In 2002, Oklahoman members of Congress were much more mixed in terms of receiving out of state contributions, with a high of 46% for Representative Ernest Istook (R-OK), and a low of 4% for Representative John Sullivan (R-OK), for an average of 26.2% for all members of Congress. One would expect that state and local races would feature mostly in-state donations. That is the case in Oklahoma. Only 12.1% of the donations in 2000 and 18.5% of the donations in 2002 were from outof-state PACs. Candidates in Oklahoma received roughly six times more donations from in-state PACs than they did from out-of-state PACs in both 2000 and The average donation from in-state and out-of-state PACs was also remarkably similar, particularly for 2002, with candidates receiving an average donation of $ from instate PACs and $ from out-of-state PACs in Most of the out-of-state PACs for Oklahoma state legislative candidates include the Telecommunications PACs and the oil/gas PACs, mainly based in Texas. These include such corporations as BP Amoco, Duke Energy, Koch Industries, Conoco, and AT&T Communications. Many of the other out-of state PACs are almost a who's who list of major corporations in the United States, including Bank of America, Eli Lilly, and Glaxo Wellcome. But some of the out -of state PACs are national party PACs or leader PACs, which are PACs started mostly by members of Congress. These PACs are more ideological in nature and tend to give mostly to one party, and only when the race is competitive. These include such PACs as the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) PAC and the American Renewal PAC. In checking the location of the PACs, it is important not to rely on the title of the PAC alone, but rather the address of the PAC because all of the following, despite their names, are out-ofstate PACs for Oklahoma candidates: Phillip Morris-OK PAC, Texaco Oklahoma PAC, and Oklahomans for Better Government.

24 20 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 THE BIGGEST PACS AND THE AMOUNT OF MONEY GIVEN In looking at the size of PACs in Oklahoma, PACs can be ranked on three different dimensions: the total sum given, the average donation given, and the number of donations given. PACs may choose to give a limited number of large donations, thus hoping to maximize the impact of each donation. So thus, PACs may only give to the most competitive races, hoping to get a legislator that is more amenable to their public policy position. Or PACs may decide to curry favor with as many legislators as possible, thus giving very small donations, but giving lots more of them. These three dimensions can thus truly illustrate which are the most active PACs in terms of the amount of money given and the size of the contribution. With the top ten PACs, certain PACs do seem to get noticed. The most active PACs seem to be the ideological and party PACs, such as the Republican Majority Fund, the Oklahoma State Republican Senate Committee, the Oklahoma Republican Party, and the Working Oklahomans Alliance PAC. These PACs not only rank consistently high in terms of the average donation given for both the 2000 and 2002 elections (as shown in Table 5), but are also giving the most money, as shown in the total amount donated in Table 6. Many of these organizations are giving fairly close to the maximum PAC donation possible to an Oklahoma candidate, which is $5,000. They are also giving substantial sums of money overall. What is interesting about these tables, though, from 2000 to 2002 is the groups that have declined in terms of their giving. Most of these groups, such as the Oklahoma State AFL-CIO, the Oklahoma House of Representatives Democratic PAC, and the Transportation Workers Union of America, consistently support Democratic candidates. Moreover, the Oklahoma Democratic Party in particular dropped from third largest PAC in average donations in 2000, to off the list in The reason for this is fairly simple: the Democrats had less money to spend on campaign assistance in 2002, than they did in When the contributions from the Oklahoma Democratic Party, the Oklahoma House of Representatives Democratic Caucus, and the Democrats of the Oklahoma State Senate are combined, the Democrats only gave a total of $31,500 in contributions in 2002, compared to the $248,600

25 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 21 TABLES 2000 and 2002 Top Ten PACs by Average Amount of Donation (minimum 20 donations) Name of Average Name of Average 2(XX) PAC Donation 2002 PAC Donation 1. Republican I. OK State Republican Majority Fund $3, Senate Committee $3, OK State Republican 2. Republican Majority Senate Committee $2, Fund $2, OK House of Rep 3. Oklahoma State Democratic Caucus $2, AFL-CIO $2, OK Republican Party $2, Transportation Workers Union $2, House GOP PAC $2, House GOP PAC $2, New Leadership Fund $1, OK Republican Party $1, The New Oklahoma $1, Chesapeake Energy Corporation PAC $1, Working OK Alliance $1, Center for Legislative Excellence $1, Transportation 9. legal $1, Workers Union $1, legal $1, Working OK Alliance $1, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. given in Making their situation even worse, similar organizations on the Republican side actually improved from 2000 to 2002, contributing only $166,050 in 2000, but $232, in To add even more financial misery for the Democrats, the Republican Majority Fund continued to give strongly to Republicans in 2000 and 2002, providing the largest average donation in 2000 ($3,041.66) and the second largest average donation in 2002 ($2,537.00). Fortunately, the Democrats did get some help in The OklahomaAFL-CIO, which typically gives to Democrats, only gave $ on average to 103 candidates, ranking it 19th on the list of average donations for 2000.

26 22 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 TABLE and 2002 Top Ten PACs by Total Amount Donated Name of Total Name of 200) PAC Donation 2002 PAC Total Donation I. OK House of Rep I. OK Independent Democratic Caucus $184, Energy PAC (OKIEPAC) 2. Republican Majority 2. Center for Legislative Fund $109, Excellence 3.WINPAC $81, Chesapeake Energy Corporation PAC 4. OKAGC Fund 4. Republican Majority (General Contractors) $80, Fund 5. OK Republican Party $79, LEGAL 6. Working OK Alliance $78, HouseGOP 7.HouseGOP $77, OK StateAFL-CIO 8. OK State Republican Senate Committee $77, OK Republican Party 9. OK StateAFL-CIO $71, SW Bell Employees PAC 10. The New Oklahoma $62, Transportation Workers Union $164, $161, $133, $104, $98, $82, $77, $74, $71, $64, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. But in 2002, it was ranked 3rd on the list of average donations, providing $2, on average to candidates. Also notable is that Table 7 showing the total number of donations given by PAC features almost entirely a different list of PACs. These PACs obviously want to demonstrate their influence by giving to as many state legislative candidates as possible. Many of these PACs are vocational or professional PACs including the OK Optometric PAC (#1 in 2000, and #6 in 2002), the Oklahoma Osteopathic Association (#9 in 2000 and #2 in 2002), and the Certified Public Accountants (#7 in 2000 and #5 in 2002). Another set of PACs on this list are the PACs interested in energy issues, although not the oil and gas companies.

27 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 23 Table and 2002 Top Ten PACs by Total Number of Donations Total# of Total# of 2000 Name of PAC Donations 2002 Name of PAC Donations 1. OK Optometric OK Assn of Career & Tech Education OKC Firefighters PAC OK Osteopathic Association OK Independent Energy 3. Speak Up for Rural PAC (OKIEPAC) 156 Electrification (SURE) OK Vocational Assoc OK Independent Energy PAC (OKIEPAC) SW Bell Employees PAC Certified Public Accountants Speak Up for Rural Electrification (SURE) OK Optometric PAC Certified Public Accountants Public Service Co. PAC OK UAW PAC Council Farmers Employee/ Agent PAC OK Osteopathic As soc Center for Legislative Excellence Public Service Co. PAC 120 IO.OKAGC (General Contractors) 133 Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. These include Speak Up for Rural Electrification (#6 in 2000 and #3 in 2002), the Oklahoma Independent Energy PAC (#3 in 2000 and #4 in 2002), and the Public Service Company PAC (#10 in 2000 and #7 in 2002). Although the PACs giving the most donations were fairly similar from 2000 to 2002, there were some interesting absences in the two elections. The OKC Firefighters were #2 in 2000, but did not make the top ten for A similar story is true with the Oklahoma Association of Career and Tech Education which made the list at #1 in 2002, but did not make the list two years earlier. Not surprisingly, the lists comparing the total number of contributions donated by PACs and the total amount donated by PACs

28 24 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 for 2000 and 2002 are similar as well, as shown in Table 8 and Table 9. These lists reveal that most of the PACs in Oklahoma contribute to only a few candidates and give fairly small contributions. This is particularly true for 2000 when there were 193 PACs which gave one or two contributions, but only 69 that gave this amount in Thus, although there were more PACs in 2000 than in 2002, much of the difference came from PACs that gave only a few contributions. This explains why the total amount given from the PACs was remarkably similar in both years, with $3,391, given in 2000 and $3,399, given in This is despite the fact that although candidates for House races spent roughly the same amount on average in 2000 and 2002 ($26, and $24,062.36, respectively), there was greater than a $24,000 increase in the average cost of Senate campaigns during this time (from $4 7,349 to $71,954.59). The number of contributions given by the PACs also was fairly similar, with 7,405 different contributions in 2000 and 7,695 in TABLES Number of Contributions Donated by PACs in 2000 and 2002 Contributions # ofpacs in 2000 # ofpacs in Contributions 193 (f) 3-9 Contributions Contributions 38 ' Contributions ro Contributions Contributions Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission.

29 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 25 TABLE9 Total Amount Donated by Number ofpacs in 2000 and 2002 Amount Donated # ofpacs in 2000 # ofpacs in $ $ $1,000-4, <:() $5,000-9, $10,000-14, $15,000-24, $25,000-49, $50,000-99, $100, Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. THE AVERAGE PAC DONATION To both the candidates and the PACs, the size of the PAC contribution does matter. For candidates, obviously, they are trying to secure as many campaign funds as possible, because candidates with more money are generally more likely to win their elections. But the size of the contribution also matters to candidates because if that candidate is successful, the legislators may pay more attention to PACs that gave them larger contributions once they are in office. For PACs, this can result in anything from more access to the member to getting favorable public policies passed. Thus, both candidates and PACs pay attention to whether a PAC has "maxed out" for a candidate, or given the maximum donation. Both also need to take notice for legal reasons; a donation over the maximum would put both in violation of campaign finance laws. In Oklahoma, the maximum donation possible for a PAC is $5,000. Some PACs try to set themselves apart through their campaign finance donations. Most notable among these was the Phillips 66 Oil and Gas Company which made it a practice to give either $ or $ to each of its candidates. The Oklahoma Federation of

30 26 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Republican Women gave the rather strange amounts of $ in 2000 and $ in Most of the PACs, though, seemed to have some strategy in mind when giving. Some PACs, for example, gave a set ladder of donations (i.e. $100,$250,$500, and $750). This example is actually the most common ladder used, and was the strategy exercised by such PACs as the ABC PAC of Eastern Oklahoma, Public Service Company PAC, and the Household International PAC (HOUSEPAC). Other organizations followed a more consistent pattern of giving, giving the same contribution across the board (i.e. $1,000). The Oklahoma Nurses Association, for example, gave $200 to each of its chosen candidates in Most of the party/ideology PACs relied on the same strategy, although their contributions probably got more attention because of the size of the contribution. The Oklahoma Values Coalition, for example, gave exclusively to Republican candidates in 2002, and its contributions were in the $1,000-$1,500 range, while DRIVE (Democrats, Republicans, Independents for Voter Education) despite its title gave exclusively to Democrats in 2002 and gave a $1,000 contribution to all of its chosen candidates except Kenneth Fulbright who received $4,000. As is already apparent, most PACs in Oklahoma give far less than the maximum donation possible, but those that come close can really make a substantial difference. This becomes evident when Table 10 is examined which shows the average amount of PAC donations per type of candidate for both the 2000 and 2002 elections.' House candidates typically receive substantially less than Senate candidates. At the congressional level, races for the House are seen as having less prestige, they occur more frequently, and typically may be less competitive than those for the Senate and thus PACs typically give House candidates less money (Jacobson 2004). The same is generally true for state House and Senate candidates (Schultz 2002). Thus, the average PAC contribution for a House candidate was $ in 2000 and $ in 2002, while the average PAC contribution for a Senate candidate was $ and $571.00, respectively. The most surprising outcome with the average PAC contributions was the difference between winners and losers. The traditional literature suggests that winners tend to receive more PAC contributions because they are more capable of putting the public policies desired by the PACs into place once in office (Jacobson 2004). Yet, in Oklahoma,

31 Hardt / SHOW ME THE MONEY 27 Table 10 TheAverageAmount of Each PAC Donation Compared by Type of Candidate in 2000 and CXXJ 2002 House $ $ Senate $ $ Democrat $ $ Republican $ $ Winner $ $ Loser $ $ Incumbent $ $ Challenger $ $ Open Seat $ $ Male $ $ Female $ $ Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. losers received more in average PAC contributions than did winners, with an average contribution of$ in 2000, and $ in Yet the winners received only $ and $407.37, respectively. But it is important to note that these are average PAC donations, not the total PAC donations. In 2000, for example, the winners received an average total of $19, versus the losers' average total of $6, Yet, still this difference between winners and losers was curious. Much of the difference is accounted for by the type of contribution. Winners tended to receive money from all different kinds of PACs, including party/ideology PACs, health PACs, telecommunications PACs, employee PACs, and oil/gas PACs. Yet, losers received much more of their money from party and ideology PACs, not the other types of PACs. Party and ideology PACs have a different donation strategy that they tend to share. These PACs tend to give large donations

32 28 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 ($2,000-$5,000) to a small number of competitive races, hoping that they can be efficient in their spending by contributing to races where the seats have the greatest possibility of changing parties. The other PACs, particularly the employee PACs and the energy PACs (especially not oil/gas PACs), distributed their funds more widely, giving contributions of roughly $200-$500, as opposed to just smaller contributions. Given this discrepancy between winners and losers, it is not a surprise that the same gap arises between incumbents and challengers. Once again, the challengers received larger individual PAC donations on average ($ versus $ in 2000, and $ versus $ in 2002), yet still received fewer PAC donations overall (getting only $5, on average versus $20, for incumbents in 2000). In fact, the challengers resembled open seats when it came to the average PAC donations. Open seat candidates received an average PAC contribution of $ in 2000 and $ in Once again, the PAC contributions to open seat candidates were less diverse, with those candidates receiving more ofthe big-money contributions from the parties and the ideological PACs. Since many open seats can be captured by either party, it makes sense for the party and ideological PACs to target these seats. Somewhat surprisingly, there was not a huge gap between Democrats and Republicans in terms of the average PAC donation for 2000 and The Democrats received $ on average in 2000 and $ in 2002, while the Republicans averaged $ and $456.27, respectively. This is despite the fact that the Democratic Party did substantially better in contributing money in 2000 than it did in 2002, as noted previously. Yet, the Democrats were obviously able to compensate by getting funds from other sources other than the party/ideology PACs, such as the AFL-CIO, the Transportation Workers Union, and other PACs which give more to Democrats. The average PAC donations for male and female candidates were also fairly similar with females doing better in 2000 ($ for females versus $431.49) and males doing better in 2002 ($ for males versus $429.93).

33 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 29 CLASSIFYING THE PACS INTO CATEGORIES The type of PAC does seem to have made a difference. Certain types ofpacs, namely those with an ideological or partisan bent, seem to follow a different strategy of giving than other PACs. But is this really the case? To determine this, it makes sense to take the 416 PACs in 2000 and the 318 PACs in 2002 and to classify them according to categories. This way, it can be determined if different types of PACs employ different strategies of giving. Also, one can look at the major industries in Oklahoma and see if they give in large amounts to candidates. Much of the literature on PACs seems to rely on a classification system that has five categories: association, corporation, labor, party ideology, and other. Relying on this scale, as shown in Table 11, the marked decline in giving by the Democratic Party in Oklahoma is very noticeable. Party/ideology PACs made up 32.6% of the PAC donations in 2000, but only 16.3% in Labor PACs also declined from 2000 to 2002, giving 18.5% of the donations in 2000, but only 7.2% in Yet, much of the difference was made up by the donations from corporation PACs and association PACs, which gave 16.2% and 9.9% more of the PAC donations in 2002 than in Some of these PACs gave almost exclusively to Democrats, such as Lawyers Encouraging Government and Law (LEGAL), helping Democrats to compensate for the loss of party funds in Yet the five-fold classification system seems to confuse more than it seems to illuminate. Using this classification system, it is impossible to tell, for example, whether oil/gas PACs gave more than agriculture PACs, both major industries in Oklahoma. Of course, the only way to ascertain this information is to divide these categories even further. Table 12 shows the different categories of PACs, the total amount given, the number of donations given, the percentage given of the total PAC donations, and the average amount given bythat type of PAC. 2 In looking at the average PAC donation given by the type of PAC, two types of PACs should be noticed: ideological and party PACs. These types of PACs had the highest average PAC donation, averaging over $1,000 each for both the 2000 and 2002 elections. Most of these PACs relied on the ladder strategy of giving, typically donating from $1,000 to $5,000 in thousand dollar increments.

34 30 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 TABLEll PAC Donations by Type of PAC for 2000 and 2003 Elections % 19% rm-~~~ i IIIIISSSOCiation j I l l olabor ; oparty/ideo I L~~h:r - i % 43% j iacorp Ia association lolabor 119 party!ideo ther Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. Typically, these are the donations that candidates rely on for winning their seats. After all, this is the goal of these PACs. They want candidates in office that can further their agendas, and strengthen the party's position.

35 TABLE 12 Types of PACs in the Oklahoma 2000 and 2002 Elections by Total Amount Given, Percent Given, Number of Donations Given, and Average Donation 2000 ELECTIONS 2002 ELECTION TypeofPAC Sum Percent Count Average Sum Percent Count Average Agriculture $42, $ $32, $ Banking $138, $ $189, $ Business $122, $ $199, $ ::r: Construction $156, $ $126, $ , "" 0.. Education $72, $ $127, $ Environment $2, $ $4, $ _ Guns $19, $20t74 $24, $ CIJ Health $375, ,377 $ $377, ,211 $ ::r: Ideology $168, $1, $361, $1, Insurance $92, $ $81, $ ~ Labor $410, $ $251, $ s::: Oil and Gas $271, $ $540, $ trj Other $26, $1, $18, $ , Party $889, $1, $468, $1, ::r: trj Professional $82, $ $263, $ Pub Employee $59, $ $80, $ s::: 0 Senior $24, $ $2, $ z Telecommunication $110, $ $211, $ trj Utilities $151, $ $157, $ >< Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission. V.l

36 32 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Thus, the ideological PACs typically give to only one party or the other. Examples of these include the New Leadership Fund, the New Oklahoma PAC, and the Oklahoma Conservative PAC, all of which gave exclusively to Republicans. The Democrats, unfortunately for them, had smaller ideological PACs, such as the Advancing Oklahoma PAC which only gave $20,800 to its chosen Democratic candidates. Compared to Party PACs, ideological PACs make up a small percentage of the total PAC money given, only 4.96% in 2000 and 5.68% in 2002, but they are important funds for candidates, because of the large average donation. These ideological PACs also give Republican candidates a substantial edge over Democratic candidates, since most of the PACs give to Republican candidates. Yet, it is worth noting that there is one ideological PAC which gives substantial donations to both parties. This is the Center for Legislative Excellence which gave $161,7 50 to legislative candidates in 2002, almost equally to both parties, for an average donation of $1,108. But in 2000, this PAC did not even exist. The political party PACs are those created by the political parties, either at the local, state, or national level. Examples of each include the Okmulgee County Republican PAC at the local level, the Democratic Party of Oklahoma at the state level, and the various congressional district PACs at the national level. These party PACs also include leader PACs, which are PACs created by current leaders, whether in the state legislature, or beyond. An example of this, and one of the most prolific givers, is a national PAC, the Republican Majority Fund, which gave $104,000 in 2002, for an average donation of $2,537. The Republican Majority Fund was created by U.S. Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), who at the time was the majority leader of the U.S. Senate. There was a marked change in party PAC giving from 2000 to These party PACs continued to give the highest average donations, with $1, on average in 2000 and $1, on average in These PACs also gave the largest percentage of the PAC money to candidates in 2000, making up 26.2% of the PAC money. Yet in 2002, the party PACs gave only the second highest percentage, with only 13.3%. This represents a drop in political party money of over $400,000 from 2000 to Most of this difference came from the decline in Democratic PAC money in 2002, with the Democrats giving $382,255 in 2000, but only $82,791 in Instead, oivgas gave

37 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 33 the highest percentage of PAC money in 2002, providing $544,011 to candidates, or 15% of the PAC money. Looking at the traditional interests in Oklahoma, there are some surprises. Oklahoma, for example, is known as being an oil and gas state. Yet although the oil and gas industries were the largest contributor of PAC money in 2002, in 2000, they only contributed 8% of the PAC money in Oklahoma state races. Even more surprising is the average PAC donation for the oil/gas industries, with only $ on average in 2000 and $ in These are much smaller average donations than the amount given by either the parties or the ideological PACs. Even more of a surprise is the agriculture industry. Oklahoma is a major agricultural state, producing large amounts of wheat and pork, in particular. Yet, agriculture PACs donated only a paltry amount in 2000 and 2002, with only 1.2% and.91% of the PAC donations, respectively. Even the average donation was really low, with only $ given in 2000 and $ given in These agriculture PACs seemed to follow their own pattern of giving, with small donations (typically $100 or $250) given to almost every candidate. The gun PACs were also not a big contributor in Oklahoma, despite Oklahoma's reputation for being a "gun and pickup" state. Gun PACs only gave $19,450 in 2000 and $24,250 in Most likely, gun PACs gave only these small donations because they knew that most Oklahoma legislators would already be sympathetic to their pro-gun agendas. Most outsiders would probably be surprised by the donations by two other types of PACs: health and labor. Most outsiders when they think of Oklahoma probably do not see Oklahoma as a state brimming with hospitals and physicians. Yet, there are a lot of health PACs in Oklahoma ( 42 in 2000 and 25 in 2002), and they are consistently the most active. In 2000, health PACs gave the second largest PAC amount in Oklahoma, or $375,020.00, and in 2002, health PACs gave the fourth largest, or $377, Health PACs include both in-state PACs such as the Chiro PAC, and out-of-state PACs such as the Eli Lilly and Co. PAC. Many of these PACs gave small contributions (typically $100- $500) to a large amount of candidates. Thus, the average contribution for these health PACs is relatively small, only $ in 2000 and $ in The other noteworthy finding is the significant amount of PAC money given by labor organizations. Oklahoma does not have the

38 34 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 reputation for being a pro-labor state. In fact, Oklahoma has enacted a number of measures that were not supported by the major national labor organizations, including the Right to Work State Question adopted in Thus, it is probably not a surprise that labor organizations gave more PAC contributions in 2000 than they did in 2002, in an effort to fight this measure. That is indeed the case. In 2000, labor organizations gave $410,360 or 12.1% of the PAC contributions, and in 2002, they gave $251,850 or 7.0% of the PAC contributions. What is a surprise, however, is that the average donation was actually higher in 2002 ($883.69) than it was in 2000 ($587.91). Obviously, the labor organizations in their effort to defeat the measure were more concerned about giving contributions to as many candidates as possible (698 in 2000, but only 285 in 2002), rather than with the size of the contribution. Finally, certain types ofpacs seem to follow a consistent pattern of giving small donations ($1 00-$500) to a large number of candidates, with an average donation typically between $250 and $350. In Oklahoma, these include the banking PACs, the business PACs, the utility PACs, the education PACs, and the insurance PACs. These PACs typically give to 300 to 600 candidates in a given election year. In 2000, the telecommunications PACs also fit into this category, giving 576 donations for a total of $110,127 with an average donation of $ But in 2002 there was a large jump in contributions, both in the total amount and the average amount donated, with $157,441 given through 600 contributions donations in 2002, for an average donation of$500. COMPARING PAC CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF CANDIDATES Political action committees do give contributions to candidates, but does the type of candidate matter? Do PACs give more to House or Senate candidates? Do they give more to Democrats or Republicans? Do they give more to incumbents, challengers or candidates in open seat races? These so far are the questions that remain unanswered. The only way to investigate these questions is to examine the PAC contributions for a given election, but then divide them by the type of candidate. This study has done just that by looking

39 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 35 at the PAC contributions for the 2002 election. 3 For all of these calculations, the Republican and Democratic Party PACs have also been examined separately because these PACs give exclusively to members of their own parties, and because there are distinct partisan differences. One clear obvious trend as shown in Table 13 is that House candidates received less PAC money than Senate candidates on average from all different kinds of PACs. In fact, only the firefighter PACs (Oklahoma Fire PAC, Tulsa Firefighters PAC, Oklahoma City Retired Firefighters Association PAC, etc.), gave more to House candidates than Senate candidates in 2002, and it wasn't by much, with $ going to House candidates and $ going on average to Senate candidates. With all the other PACs, Senate candidates received more PAC money on average from each type of PAC. In some cases, it was substantially more. Transportation PACs, Public Employees PACs, Professional PACs, Labor PACs, Ideology PACs, and Construction PACs all gave Senate candidates almost twice as much as they gave House candidates on average. There were also differences between the political parties here. While the Democrats gave $1, and $1, to House and Senate candidates, respectively, the gap for the Republicans was much narrower with $1, going to House candidates and $1, on average going to Senate candidates. With Democratic and Republican candidates in Table 14, the story was more the same, but with Democrats in general receiving greater PAC contributions on average than their Republican colleagues. There were only a few exceptions to this, and these were expected. Business PACs and Gun PACs traditionally give more to Republicans than to Democrats (Biersack, Herrnson, Wilcox, 1994). 4 Even here, though, the gap between the Democrats and the Republicans was very small with Republicans getting almost $12 more on average from Business PACs. As stated previously, the 2002 election was not a good year for the Democratic Party PACs. Not only did they give fewer donations ($82,971 for the Democrats, $384,255 for the Republicans), but they also gave substantially smaller donations on average to their candidates ($1, for the Democrats, and $1, for the Republicans). Fortunately for the Democrats, they were able to compensate by receiving more from almost every type of PAC.

40 TABLE PAC CONTRIBUTIONS DIVIDED BY CATEGORY HOUSE SENATE 0 Percent Swn Count ofsum Average Swn Count Average Swn Count Average '"0 0 l'... Agriculture 32, $ , $ , $ ::l () Banking 189, , ,000 lffi en Business 192, , , Construction 126, , , z 0 Education 127, , , m < Environment 4, , I s::: Fire 46,150 (f) , , t:c m Guns 24, , , :;o N Health 377,518 1, , , Ideology 103, , , """" Insurance 81, , ,000 <xl Labor 251, , , I, Oil/Gas 540, , , Other 283, , , , , , Party -Republicans 384, , , , , , Party - Democrats 82, , , , , , Party -All 468, , , , , , (.H 0'\ 0 ~ l' >- ::r: s::: >-

41 TABLE 13 (cont'd) 2002 PAC CONTRIBUTIONS DIVIDED BY CATEGORY HOUSE SENATE Percent Swn Count ofswn Average Swn Count Average Swn Count Average -- Professional $ $ $ Public Employees <x) ::r: Senior e; -0.. Telecomm Tobacco Transportation Utilities Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission C/l ::r: 0 ~ ~ trj..., ::r: trj ~ 0 z trj >-<: t,;.l -...)

42 38 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 TABLE PAC contributions- Democrats vs. Republicans REPUBLICANS DEMOCRATS Sum Count Average Sum Count Average Agriculture 13, $ ,750 <xl $ Banking 79, , Business 77, , Construction 34, , Education 21, ,5491 3<xl Environment , Fire 1, , Guns 5, , Health 115, , Ideology 103, Insurance 36, , Labor 10, , Oil/Gas 218, , Other 129, , , , Party All 384, , , Professional 68, , Pub Employee 15, , Senior 1, , Telecomm 30,350 (J) , Tobacco 7, , Transportation 11, , Utilities 53, , Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission.

43 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 39 TABLE PAC Contributions- Winners vs. Losers WINNERS LOSERS Sum Count Average Sum Count Average Agriculture 24, $ , $ Banking 163, ,785 (f) Business 155, , Construction 97, , Education 89, , Environment 3, , Fire 28, , Guns 21, , Health 339,586 1, , Ideology 44, , Insurance 75, , Labor 139, , , OiVGas 482, , Other 199, , ,378 ({) 1, Party All 231, , , , Professional 209, , Pub Employee 56, , , Senior 3, Telecomm 78, , Tobacco 16, , Transportation 79, , Utilities 136, , Source: Author's calculations on data gathered by the author from the Oklahoma Ethics Commission.

44 40 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 The largest advantage for the Democrats came from three types of PACs: labor, public employee and transportation, with these PACs giving 3-4 times more on average to Democratic candidates. Contrary to what some might expect, losers received more PAC money in average donations in 2002 than winners as seen in Table 15. Winners typically receive more PAC money because they tend to be a safer bet for most PACs who want to get their policies enacted. Thus, as reported previously, winners do receive more PAC money overall. Yet, most Oklahoma PACs gave more in average PAC donations to losers than winners. This was particularly the case for the agriculture PACs, the labor PACs, the professional PACs, and the transportation PACs. Only six types of PACs gave more to winners than losers: environmental PACs, firefighter PACs, gun PACs, health PACs, insurance PACs, and the Republican Party PACs. The last one is the most interesting because although the gap was not gigantic, $1, to winners compared with $1, for the Republican losers, the Democratic PACs actually gave more on average to losers than they did to winners. With incumbents and challengers, the picture is much more mixed. Incumbents did better in getting large average donations with some types of PACs more than others. Fortunately for incumbents, they were more successful in getting money from the "big money" PACs. These include the party PACs and the ideology PACs. The incumbents received $1, on average from these PACs combined, while the challengers received only $1, Yet, the challengers were still competitive with these big money donations. Obviously, the party and ideology PACs were attempting to win as many seats as possible, whether held by the incumbents or the challengers. The challengers, though had even more successes, getting more money on average than incumbents from other "big money" PACs, including labor, public employees, firefighters, and transportation PACs. The biggest gaps appeared with the donations made by the public employee PACs and the transportation PACs. These PACs gave only $ and $ on average to incumbents respectively, but gave $1, and $ to challengers. Apparently, these PACs want to see some changes in the makeup of the state legislature! Open seat candidates are the most fortunate when it comes to PAC money. With most PACs, they receive more PAC money on

45 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 41 average than either incumbents or challengers. The most notable differences came with the labor PACs and the party PACs. The labor PACs gave $1, on average to open seat candidates, but only $ to incumbents, and $ to challengers. With party PACs, the two parties seemed to have completely different strategies. The Republicans gave $1, on average to incumbents, $1, to challengers, and $1, to open seat candidates, thus giving the most to incumbents. The Democrats, on the other hand, gave $1, to incumbents, $1, to challengers, and $1, to open seat candidates, thus giving the most to open seat candidates. Since incumbents compete against challengers, this put the Democratic challengers at $752 disadvantage compared to the Republican incumbent colleagues. Thus, the Democrats with their limited spending seemed to target the open seat races, spending $618 more on average on their candidates than their Republican colleagues. SOME CONCLUSIONS This study of Oklahoma campaign finance shows that while some outcomes are predictable, others are not. It was predictable that most congressional candidates in Oklahoma faced fairly safe roads to get their congressional seats. It was also predictable that the more prestigious the race, the more money raised and spent. Thus, congressional seats are more expensive than those for governor, which are more expensive than those for the state Senate, and so on. Given the composition ofthe legislature throughout Oklahoma's history (or at least until 2004), it was also expected that Democrats would raise more money than Republicans. Likewise, winners were more successful in both raising and spending money overall than losers, and incumbents were more successful than challengers. Yet, spending money in Oklahoma elections can also become unexpected. This was certainly the case with certain races in Oklahoma, such as the Lt. Governor races where $843, was spent on average in 1998, but only $236, was spent in But probably the most surprising was the ability of losers to obtain larger average PAC donations from most PACs than winners. Just looking at 2002, for example, winners had an average PAC donation of $407.37

46 42 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 overall, compared to the losers' $ This oddity could only be explained by the looking at the type of donations received by both types of candidates, and the amount of the total donations. The losers received most of their donations from the "big money" PACs, particularly the party and ideology PACs, while the winners received donations from all PACs, including a large group of PACs that only gives $100 or $200 average donations. Moreover, the losers also received fewer PAC contributions overall, receiving only 4.5 PAC contributions on average compared to the 7.8 received by the winners. This makes it very difficult for losers to be competitive, despite the higher average PAC donation. Similarly, the challengers and open seat candidates also did better than the incumbents in receiving higher average PAC donations. For the open seat candidates, that is not a surprise. The political parties and other PACs know that these seats are the most competitive, featuring the most candidates. They also know that these are seats that could give their group more power if captured. The open seat candidates received, however, most of their contributions from the political party and ideological PACs, averaging only 13.2 PAC donations. Yet, the difference between incumbents and challengers in terms of the average PAC donation was again a surprise. Once again though, when the type of donation and the total amount given are examined, the world makes sense again. Like the losers, the challengers generally received less PAC money overall, but had higher average PAC donations because more of their money came from "big money" PACs. Like the losers, the challengers received only a paltry number of donations, averaging 5.1 donations compared to 45.5 average donations for the incumbents. What does all of this mean for the 2006 elections and beyond? Both the candidates and political parties know that the enactment of term limits in 2004 means that the number of open seat races will only increase. This will make races more expensive, both for the candidates and the PACs that support them. The PACs, facing more candidates needing money, will have to be more strategic in how they donate money, either donating smaller amounts to the same number of candidates, or using a selective targeting strategy, giving only to the races that matter most to them.

47 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 43 Given the campaign finance of the 2000 and 2002 elections, this is probably more bad news for the Democrats. The Democratic candidates did not receive the financial assistance the Republicans received from either their party or ideological PACs. Thus, Democrats will have to find a way to overcome this disadvantage. In 2002, they managed to do that by securing more contributions from other types of PACs. They will need to continue to do this or the Democrats just may see a continuation of what happened to them in 2004 when they lost their majority in the Oklahoma State House. The Oklahoma Republicans, on their part, are just hoping that this trend will continue and even have dreams of taking over the Oklahoma Senate in 2006 and Whether that will happen, we will just have to wait and see.

48 44 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 NOTES 1These averages only include those candidates who actually received PAC donations in 2000 and ne might notice that Native American groups are missing from this list. Although several Oklahoma tribes gave substantial amounts in both the 2000 and 2002 elections, legally they are not treated as PACs by Oklahoma election law. Thus, the only way find out information for Indian donations is to look at each candidate's contribution list. The accuracy of these donations is thus more suspect because it is highly dependent on the individual listing his/her tribe. Forthe 2000 election, for example, Native Americans gave $147,775 to state legislative candidates. Most active was the Chickasaw Nation with $97,675 in donations, the Choctaw Nation was second with $34,450 in donations, and the Absentee Shawnee Tribe was third with $13,150 in donations. 3For simplicity, this part of the study only looks at the 2002 election. Similar calculations have also been completed for the 2000 election. For information on that election, see Jan Hardt, "The Fuel Behind Oklahoma's Politics- The Role of Money," in Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform Law in the States, ed. by David Schultz, (Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press, 2002). 4Republicans also got more from senior PACs and the other category, but given the small number of donations in the senior category and the difficulty of classifying the PAC contributions in the other category by definition, these are not discussed above.

49 Hardt I SHOW ME THE MONEY 45 REFERENCES Biersack, Robert "Introduction." In Risky Business: PAC Decisionmaking in Congressional Elections, edited by Robert Biersack, PaulS. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. Casteel, Chris "Cole collects enough funds to carry over." The Daily Oklahoman, December 7. Currinder, Marian "Campaign finance: funding the presidential and congressional elections." In The Elections of 2004, edited by Michael Nelson. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. English, Paul and Mike Hinton "Keating's victory viewed as less than presidential." The Daily Oklahoman, November 5. Hardt, Jan C "Interest groups and campaign finance in Oklahoma." In Oklahoma Government and Politics: An Introduction. edited by Christopher L. Markwood. Dubuque, 10: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company "The fuel behind Oklahoma's politics: the role of money." In Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform Law in the States, edited by David Schultz, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Herrnson, Paul Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Hinton, Mick and Chris Casteel "Negative advertising: It works or it doesn't." The Daily Oklahoman, November October 7, 2005.

50 46 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER Author's calculations from campaign information taken on August 18. Jacobson, Gary C The Politics of Congressional Elections. New York: Pearson/Longman Press. Letter to Ms. Dinh from the Campaign Legal Center re: Comments on Notice : Definition of "Electioneering Communication." Dated September 30, < (October?, 2005). Schultz, David "Money, politics, and campaign financing in the states." In Money, Politics, and Campaign Finance Reform Law in the States, edited by David Schultz, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

51 OKLAHOMA'S STATUTORY CONSTITUTION MICHAEL K. A VERY RONALD M. PETERS, JR. University of Oklahoma The Oklahoma Constitution retains its original and historic character as a combination of constitutional and statutory provisions. This article traces the Constitution's evolution through the use of the initiative and referendum processes and sets that evolution in the context of the state's political culture. It concludes by considering efforts to reform the Constitution and the reasons why they have failed. In brief, the article finds that Oklahomans have not recognized the importance of the distinction between fundamental and statutory law. Constitutional reform has been stymied by a variety of political forces that prefer an accessible constitution and fragmented governmental authority to the efficiencies that might result from a streamlined constitutional order. From the early Progressives to modern conservatives, Oklahomans have distrusted government and their Constitution reflects that fact. Until changed by the Legislature, the flash test provided for under the laws of Oklahoma Territory for all kerosene oil for illuminating purposes shall be 115 degrees Fahrenheit; and the specific gravity for all such oil shall be 40 degrees Baume. Oklahoma Constitution, Article XX, Section 2

52 48 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 This provision of the Oklahoma Constitution is not as silly as it may first appear. During the territorial period unscrupulous venders mixed gasoline with kerosene in order to make more money, and in the years leading up to statehood there had been unsuccessful attempts to strengthen the regulation of kerosene. In one instance, gasified kerosene had exploded, destroying a substantial part of the town of Orlando, Oklahoma (Goble 1980, p. 1 08). It is not surprising, then, that the drafters of the Oklahoma Constitution wanted to take out a little constitutional insurance to prevent such accidents and the skullduggery that led to it. But in this respect, the Oklahoma Constitution's notorious kerosene provision is emblematic of the Constitution itself. Among American state constitutions, Oklahoma's is now a remaining exemplar of the "statutory" constitution, one that blends structural and statutory provisions. Oklahoma's statutory Constitution was initially the product of the state's progressive tradition, and has subsequently endured due to the political schisms that have defined state politics. Fundamental to its history is the role of the initiative and referendum as the sole means by which it has been (frequently) altered. In this chapter we describe the Constitution as it was originally drafted, discuss its evolution through the use of the initiative and referendum, consider why fundamental constitutional revision has not been attained in Oklahoma, and assess the Oklahoma Constitution in light of the fundamental purposes that constitutions serve.' THE ORIGINAL OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION During the territorial period, Oklahoma politics was dominated by the Republicans, who controlled such patronage as was available in the Oklahoma Territory due to the party's control of the national administration. The Democratic Party first took root in Indian Territory where, in 1905, a convention was held in Muskogee that produced a draft constitution for a new state that would encompass the Indian Territory and be called Sequoyah. The Roosevelt administration turned aside this step toward separate states, and in 1906 Congress passed the Enabling Act, which provided for a constitutional convention including delegates from the Indian Territory, the Oklahoma Territory, and the Osage Nation. In the elections for seats at the constitutional convention, the Republicans paid the price for their reliance on federal patronage rather than grass-roots organization. The Democrats, drawing on their

53 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 49 organizing experience at the Sequoyah Convention, elected 99 of 112 delegates, and were in a position to dictate the terms of the new constitution. Inspiration for the Democrats came from many sources. Though heavily influenced by a letter to the convention by William Jennings Bryan and a state Democratic Platform, they took much of their direction from the "Shawnee Demands". These demands came from the August 1906 meeting dubbed the Fourth Annual Convention of the Oklahoma State Federation of Labor. These sixteen Legislative Demands and eight Prohibitive Demands laid out a Progressive agenda for the convention with goals ranging from direct democracy to consumer and worker protection from corporations (Goble 1980, p. 218). On November 20, 1906, the delegates met in Guthrie at the Brooks Opera House to convene the Oklahoma Constitutional Convention. After having swept the delegate elections, the Democrats were eager to use their super majority status. They were easily able to control the proceedings, and as a result the only major fight at the convention was over the designation of county lines and seats. The bulk of the document was written and adopted by a convention of delegates who were mostly Progressives. The result of this unanimity was a document rich with the protections Progressives sought to provide "the people" from their government and from industry. The Oklahoma Constitution created a legislature hamstrung by statutory constitutional provisions, a weak executive with little power over the executive establishment, an elected judiciary vulnerable to public opinion and equally the captive of constitutional specifications, and a far-flung array of independent boards and commissions destined to empower and reflect local areas and special interests. The most obvious manifestation ofthe progressive mood lay in the provisions governing corporate activity. These restrictions are found in both Article 2 (The Bill of Rights) and Article 9 (Corporations) of the document. Article 9 was devoted entirely to corporate regulation and grants the enforcement powers to a Corporation Commission, created by Section 14. The powers granted to the commission are sweeping and often exact. Article 9 shows the Constitution's framers thinking like the policy makers they were. They recognized that it was necessary for the railroads to cooperate in order to extend transportation routes throughout the state, but they did not trust the railroads and wanted to

54 50 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 make sure that they did not combine in restraint of trade. Thus, article 9 presented two contrary tendencies, one to insist upon cooperation, the other to prevent consolidation. The framers wanted to make sure that the national railroad companies ("foreign companies" in their parlance) would be subject to Oklahoma law and regulation. Action by both the legislature and the corporation commission was required before one company could acquire the assets of another, and all corporations doing business in the state were required to maintain offices in the state with open records. In another famously statutory clause of the Constitution, Section 40 of Article 9 declares that, "no corporation organized or doing business in this State shall be permitted to influence election or official duty by contributions of money or anything of value." Article 9, Section 47 of the Oklahoma Constitution grants the government the right to revoke the articles of corporation for any business, at any time it sees fit, so long as they do not deem their action injurious to any of the incorporators. Perhaps the most bizarre feature of the Constitution, when taken from the point of view of constitutionalism itself, is Article 9, Section 35, which granted to the legislature itself the power to "from time to time, alter, amend, revise, or repeal sections from eighteen to thirty-four, inclusive, of this article, or any of them, or any amendments thereof." Drawing on this grant of power the legislature has itself amended the Constitution on several occasions, the legislative acts having been incorporated into the body of the Constitution itself. In this provision, as in the case of the kerosene provision, it is apparent that the Constitution's framers were torn between the desire to do what they then thought right, and the recognition that some allowance had to be made for future contingencies. The distinction between constitutional and statute law was apparently blurred. For all of this, it was the Bill of Rights, or Article 2, that represented the greatest triumph of the Progressives. The Oklahoma conception of rights extended to matters that elsewhere might be regarded as matters of policy. Here again, it is affirmed that corporate records must be open to the state (Section 28). In Section 31, the state threatens to go into business against corporations because the right "to engage in nay occupation or business for public purposes shall not be denied or prohibited" (Section 31, agriculture excepted). Section 32 rails against monopolies. Section 25 restricts corporate access to injunctive relief

55 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 51 against labor strikes. Section 27 provides immunity for testimony against corporations. Other articles of the original Oklahoma Constitution appear more "constitutional" even if somewhat convoluted due to the state's entry into the Union and its prior territorial history. Article 1 lays out federal relations. Article 2, the Bill of Rights, offers the usual fare augmented by a number of curious provisions in addition to those affecting corporations. Article 3 provides for the initiative and referendum. Article 4 simply states the principle of separation of powers. Articles 5, 6, and 7 set out the three branches of government. Most noteworthy was the creation of the "long ballot" in Article 6, with its long list of secondary positions and constitutionally established agencies. Article 7's provision for an elected judiciary would lead to a demand for judiciary reform a half-century later. Article 8 dealt with Impeachments and Removals from office, Article 9 with Corporations, Article 10 with Revenue and Taxation, Article 11 with State and School Lands, Article 12 with Homestead Exemptions,Article 13 with Education, Article 14 with Banks and Banking, Article 15 with Oath of Office, Article 16 with Public Roads and Highways, Article 17 with Counties, Article 18 with Municipal Corporations, Article 19 with Insurance, Article 20 with Manufacture and Commerce, Article 21 with Public Institutions, Article 22 with Alien and Corporate Ownership of Lands, and Article 23 with a variety of miscellaneous provisions that the convention wanted to ensure in fundamental law, such as child labor, convict labor, definition of races, and so forth. This constitutional potpourri includes elements that might obviously been left to legislative determination, but many others that the founders might reasonably have assumed to be their obligation. State governments are, after all, possessed of general sovereignty (unlike the enumerated powers given under the federal Constitution) and have an obligation to deal with fundamental questions like the structure of local and county government (Szymanski 2001 ). The most important stamp the Progressives would leave on the Oklahoma Constitution centered on its future amendment, in Articles 5 and 24. In its most explicit provision, the Constitution called for a popular referendum every 20 years on the calling of a constitutional convention. As discussed below, this provision has never led to the calling of such a convention. Instead, except for the occasional legislative amendments, the Oklahoma Constitution has been amended only through the initiative

56 52 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 and referendum processes. At the time of the Oklahoma Convention the concepts of initiative and referendum were gaining favor across the country as the Progressive agenda spread. However, they were a relatively unknown quantity because of they had not as yet been implemented in many states or countries. Article 5 lays out the basic procedures of initiative and referendum, and provides in Section 1 that these processes can be used for the purpose of amending the Constitution. Article 24, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution lays out the method by which the legislature is able to propose amendments to the Constitution via referendum. Measures proposed by the legislature as constitutional referenda are to be voted upon in the next general election unless a two-thirds majority in each house declares a special election necessary. It is in Article 5, Section 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution that the people are empowered to amend the document using the popular initiative. If fifteen percent of the voters sign an initiative petition and the government certifies that number, the proposed amendment is placed before the voters. Initiatives petitions are by default placed on the general election ballot unless the governor declares a special election necessary. Both of these measures were considered highly progressive at the time of their inception into Oklahoma politics. As this article will detail, their use since statehood has dominated the landscape of Oklahoma Constitutional politics. REVISIONS TO THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION Revision of the Oklahoma Constitution has been undertaken entirely via the initiative or referendum processes, and often. Since 1908, when the first referendum proposing to alter the Constitution was proposed, Oklahoma voters have been asked to address 336 initiative or referendum proposals to alter the Constitution, and have approved 172. However, 5 of these amendments were struck down by federal or state courts, leaving applied to the Constitution 167 of 331 amendments, as Table 1 indicates. These statistics suggest that the number of state questions submitted and approved have been more numerous in more recent decades than during the first decades of statehood, when the progressive instinct was

57 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 53 TABLE 1 Amendments to Oklahoma Constitution, Percentage Decade Rejected Approved Total Approved / / / Xl Tl (XX) Total / / /51.2 Sources: Oklahoma Department of Libraries, Directory of Oklahoma, 1992; Oklahoma Department of Libraries, Oklahoma Almanac, ; Oklahoma Secretary of State web site, List of State Questions initlista1l.asp. Table 1 indicates the 5 successful constitutional ballot initiatives between 1910 and 1936 that were subsequently invalidated by federal or state courts and did not become part of the Constitution by placing them to the left of the slash marks, and showing the total number of amendments and percentage approved accordingly. predominant. The actual extent of Oklahoma voters' willingness to make changes in their Constitution is even greater than these statistics suggest. Until changed by a constitutional amendment in 1974, the courts had held that ballot questions must receive a majority of the votes cast at that election, taking as the appropriate number the total votes cast for the office recording the highest vote total. Since many voters chose to vote for contested political offices but cast no vote on the ballot questions, such voters became in effect silent opponents of the ballot questions on which they chose not to vote. The "silent vote" led to the defeat of 31 constitutional amendments that received a majority of votes cast on the amendments themselves. This means that of the 336 constitutional

58 54 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 amendments considered by Oklahoma voters, 203 received a majority of votes cast, or 60.4 percent. 2 Thus, Oklahomans have been quite willing to alter their Constitution. But behind these statistics lies a tale of two Oklahomas: one agrarian, the other industrial; one rural, the other urban; one progressive, the other corporatist; one Democrat, the other Republican. These schisms, which reflect Daniel Elazar's distinction between traditional and modernist cultures, have pervaded Oklahoma politics (Elazar 1984). This fundamental and overlapping set of cleavages has defined Oklahoma since statehood, and has shaped the path of its constitutional evolution. The interplay of these forces has produced a dynamic governing the process of constitutional change: since statehood, the people have not trusted the legislature, the legislature has not trusted the executive, the executive has not trusted subordinate state officials, and subordinate state officials have not trusted independent agencies. Oklahoma politics has been the politics of distrust, not in the Madisonian sense of distrusting human nature, but in the more specific sense of some Oklahomans not trusting others. Efforts to amend the Oklahoma Constitution began before its ink was dry. During the state's first decade the battles were over the state's progressive, anti-corporatist provisions and over restrictions on the suffrage. Underlying these debates was a fight for political control of the state. One fight was between the Democrats and the odd coalition of Republicans and Socialists. The Democrats had sought to disenfranchise Blacks in the Constitution itself, but President Roosevelt would not allow it. As soon as the legislature organized under Democratic control, it proposed a constitutional amendment to impose a grandfather clause/literacy test for voting. Socialists opposed this provision out of principle. Republicans opposed it because most Blacks would vote the party of Lincoln. The amendment passed, but was later struck down by the United States Supreme Court. A subsequent amendment shorn of the grandfather clause but adhering to the literacy test survived judicial scrutiny. A second fight was between the Democrats and the railroad interests, also allied with the Republicans. Here the issue was whether the national railroads would be able to operate in Oklahoma at all under the Constitution's various restrictions. Local carriers shared this concern because they wanted to be able to sell unprofitable lines to the big companies, and the Constitution required both legislative and Corporation

59 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 55 Commission approval. A series of amendments sought to revise the manner in which the Constitution treated corporations, but the only change actually adopted removed the legislature from the process of approving corporate acquisitions, leaving that to the Corporation Commission. The original concern animating Title 9, railroads, diminished as the railroad system was nationalized under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Thereafter, the Corporation Commission became a more significant power center in regulating corporate activities in Oklahoma, especially public utilities and energy interests. 3 By 1940 only 16 amendments had been adopted, reflecting the fact that Oklahoma remained a rural state dominated by the Democratic Party. There was little incentive to change the Constitution in a largely agrarian state with little in the way of state governmental activity. After 1940, amendments and proposed amendments to the Constitution came much more frequently in response to three principal forces: the force of federal policy, including the New Deal's transformation of the relationship between the federal and state government; the need to raise revenue to meet the needs of an increasingly urban and industrial state; and scandal in state administration. With respect to federal policy, the state came into compliance with suffrage for women and 18 year old voters, desegregation of schools, and reapportionment. Confronted by the New Deal, the state resisted implementation of federal welfare programs through two gubernatorial administrations before finally amending the Constitution to create a state welfare department in Thereafter, ballot initiatives sought to enhance various pensions provided by the state. With respect to revenue, a variety of revenue bonds, new sales taxes, enhanced sales taxes, and millage levies were submitted to popular vote, some making their way into the Constitution. In order to win voter approval, bond issues and tax increases were typically designated for particular purposes, most notoriously the earmarking of the 2 percent state sales tax for the welfare department in Each such earmarking made necessary new ballot initiatives to meet other needs (Scales and Goble 1982, p ; 246). Overtime, state tax policy became deeply embedded in the Constitution, such that attempts to raise new revenues for schools, construction, welfare needs, or transportation, often required voter approval. One force driving this pattern of development was the

60 56 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 division between the rural and urban areas. After World War II urban areas sought to expand their municipal services in such areas as public libraries and health care, and were thwarted by the rural forces controlling the legislature. This dynamic applied to industrial development proposals as well. This resulted in ballot initiatives designed to enable urban majorities to override the legislature's truculence. 4 0f course, the initiative could be used to restrict as well as to expand the revenue power of government. The interface of revenue policy and the Constitution culminated in 1992 with the passage of State Question 640 which denied to the legislature the power to raise income tax rates or initiate new taxes without a super-majority vote or a vote of the people. This amendment differed from previous amendments in that it sought to restrict the state's capacity to tax. It was a Republican-inspired measure that reflected the modem GOP belief that economic development is better served by a low tax base than by the provision of public services or development incentives. The scope of constitutional preoccupation with revenue and finance issues is best indicated by a simple statistic. The original Oklahoma Constitution devoted 28 pages to Article 9, dealing with corporate regulation (essentially railroads and utilities). Article 10 oftoday's Oklahoma Constitution, labeled "Revenue and Taxation," runs to 62 pages. Response to scandal and abuse of power occupies its own chapter in the ongoing evolution of the Oklahoma Constitution. Beginning in the 1940s, a series of constitutional amendments were enacted designed to clean up state government. Facing evidence that paroles were being purchased by political or monetary favors, a state Pardon and Parole Board was created in When governors Murray and Phillips intruded upon the independence of the state's colleges and universities, an independent higher education system with appointed but independent regential boards was established in Confronted with evidence of bribes and kickbacks in the purchasing of school textbooks, a State Textbook Commission was founded in In the 1960s, charges of bribery and corruption led to comprehensive reform of the state judiciary. A decade later, abuse of office by the state Labor Commissioner led that and several other subordinate state offices to become appointive rather than elective positions, thus shortening the Oklahoma ballot. 5 Steps to make structural change in state government were only occasionally successful unless attached to scandal or initiated as the

61 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 57 result of the expansion of governmental responsibilities due to federal policy. The state legislature was affected by several constitutional provisions directed to the salaries oflegislators, the legislative calendar, and legislative term limits. The large number of executive boards and commissions led to constitutional tinkering. Government regulatory policy shaped the state Corporation Commission's powers by constitutional amendment on occasion. State finance was a recurring focus of constitutional change. ATTEMPTS AT FUNDAMENTAL REVISION Why have the people of Oklahoma remained wedded to their statutory Constitution? An answer to this question requires consideration of the several attempts to bring about fundamental reform. The Sooner state's first century witnessed several comprehensive studies each of which recommended fundamental reform. In the 1930s, Governor Marland commissioned (and paid for) a lengthy study by the Brookings Institution (Brookings Institution 1935). In the 1940s, the state League of Women Voter's chapter produced a study and pamphlet recommending basic changes (Galley 1946). In 1950, the University of Oklahoma's Bureau of Government Research published a detailed study and recommendation sponsored by the State Legislative Research Council (Oklahoma State Legislature). In the 1960s a legislatively commissioned state constitutional task force called for fundamental change (Thornton 1968). In the 1980s Governor Bellmon established a commission that conducted an in-depth study and brought forward three ballot initiatives (Goble 1991). In the 1990s, Governor Keating commissioned a study from a national accounting firm (Governor's Commission on Government Performance 1995). The Oklahoma Constitution stands firmly (if not proudly) in refutation of all this work; reports come and go, but the Oklahoma Constitution just keeps rolling on. Several of these reports were undertaken in anticipation of possible calls for a state constitutional convention. As noted, the Constitution provides for a referendum every twenty years on a convention call. Referenda were in fact undertaken in 1926, 1950, and All were defeated. Governor Bellmon decided on a set of ballot initiatives in the

62 58 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 I 980s rather than to launch a drive for a constitutional convention in Reluctance to call a constitutional convention derives from the fear of what such a meeting might produce. During most of the state's history, rural forces had every reason to resist changes in governmental structure that might empower their urban counterparts. After the New Deal, liberal defenders of the welfare state sought refuge in constitutional provisions that funded and empowered the state welfare department. Throughout the state, the political collaboration of state legislators and county courthouse rings was protected by a Constitution that limited executive power. Democrats feared the influence of the Republican urban press; Republicans feared the power of the Democratic courthouse rings. In Oklahoma, nobody has trusted anybody else. This mistrust has led to a general attitude best expressed by one observer as follows: "Having a convention would be like putting a patient on an operating table and opening him up when you don't know what you are going to find or what you are going to improve"(szymanski 2001, p. 15). Absent the sort of comprehensive reform that only a constitutional convention could rationally produce (assuming, that is, rationality on its part), Oklahoma has been forced to settle for incremental change. Aside from the numerous policy-oriented changes in the Oklahoma Constitution, some constitutional amendments have sought to improve the operation of state government in one way or another, as we have seen. The most fundamental reform issues, however, relate to the basic allocation of power by the Constitution between the legislature and the governor. The original Oklahoma Constitution set up a weak executive, and the major thrust of serious reform efforts have aimed to strengthen the executive branch. To some extent, these efforts have cut across party lines: the arch-conservative populist "Alfalfa Bill" Murray; the New Deal liberal, E.W. Marland; Democratic New Frontiersman J. Howard Edmundson; Republican moderate Henry Bellmon (in the 1960s and again in the 1980s); moderate Democrat David Boren; and conservative Republican Frank Keating- all of these governors have bent their oars attempting to strengthen the governor's office viz-a-viz the legislature and/or viz-a-viz the secondary state offices (Mager 1992). At the same time, abuses by governors such as Murray and Leon "Red" Phillips led governor RobertS. Kerr to support constitutional revisions reducing the Governor's power over pardons and paroles and the state's higher education system.

63 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 59 A major obstacle to comprehensive constitutional reform is the "one subject rule," in which Constitution provides that constitutional amendments can address only a single topic (Article 24, Section 1, adopted in 1952). Although the language of section 1 would appear to provide that a single article of amendment might broach a general subject that deals comprehensively with, say, the executive branch, the state Supreme Court in 1989 ruled otherwise. Since this episode appears to fore bar any systematic constitutional change absent a convention, it is worth explicating. Governor Bellm on's constitutional revision commission came to the same conclusions as all of its predecessors: the Oklahoma Constitution is too long, too cumbersome, too infused with statutory detail, and sets up a weak government in which executive power and efficiency is sacrificed to the inevitably more parochial interests of the legislature. While the commission recommended a variety of structural changes in the Constitution, as a strategic matter it was decided to focus on just two: reform of the executive branch (Article 6) and revision of Article 9 to modernize the state's approach to corporate governance. These were the two most urgently needed reforms, in the commission's view. However, at the last minute, it was decided to add a third measure creating a state Ethics Commission. The addition of the Ethics Commission as a new article to be attached to the Constitution, was largely strategic. In a state whose history was dotted by scandal and corruption, there was no scandal in the news in It was thought that the aura of reform would attach to all three proposals and thus enhance the prospects for voter approval of them all (Goble 1991 ). The voters were not given the chance. In a surprising decision, the state Supreme Court ruled that the proposed revisions of Articles 6 and 9 violated the "one subject" rule of Article 24 and were thus unconstitutional. Since these proposed amendments sought to systematically revise entire articles of the Constitution embracing single broad topics, it is difficult to see how any fundamental constitutional revision can be attained by the amendment process, since comprehensive change of any article would perforce violate the one subject rule. Ironically, the judges let the Ethics Commission proposal go to the voters, and it was approved. Thus, the effort to tighten the Constitution led only to an extension of its length, and in the process the Court placed an

64 60 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 apparently insuperable obstacle to fundamental constitutional reform. Future reformers will have to amend Article 24, Section 1 (once again) before having a shot at other articles (Henry 1992). The fact remains, however, that there is not now and has never been an appetite for serious and systematic constitutional reform. During the state's early decades, constitutional squabbles focused on the legacy of progressivism. During the state's middle decades, local interests sought advantage through the Constitution. In the last three decades, two-party competition has emerged, and the Constitution has been availed to advance partisan or policy objectives, as witness the term limit and tax limitation provisions. At each step along the way, concern for constitutionalism as such has been subordinated to partisan or other political objectives. Because the Oklahoma Constitution fuses statutory and constitutional functions, Oklahomans simply view it as an alternative (and often a preferred mechanism) for attaining political or policy goals. If one were to imagine that, at halftime of a University of Oklahoma football game, it would be possible to circulate an initiative petition among the crowd leading to a vote to change the rules for the second halfthat would be constitutionalism, Oklahoma style. Does Oklahoma's statutory Constitution matter? How important is revision of it? While the Constitution's statutory character is the usual focal point of criticism, in fact, the statutory features do not appear to matter much. If these provisions were shipped into statute, policy debate would be less constrained by the Constitution, but difficult decisions would still likely be sent to the people given the state's long reliance on initiative and referendum. It is the structural provisions of the Constitution that matter. Oklahoma's progressive founders distrusted government and distrusted executive power. The state's fragmented system of authority and its weak executive have led to an inefficient governmental system, one that often does not respond to the needs of the people. Constitutional revisions that would modernize and streamline state government would matter; unfortunately, many Oklahomans are indifferent or even hostile to a more efficient and effective government. THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION IN PERSPECTIVE On November 2, 2004, the good citizens of Oklahoma flexed their muscles at the polls and approved six amendments to their state

65 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 61 Constitution. These amendments dealt with issues as diverse as a state lottery, same-sex marriage, the constitutional "rainy day" fund, economic development, and property tax exemptions for elderly voters. Whether these various alterations to the state's fundamental law will endure, or whether they will improve the quality of life for Oklahomans, cannot now be known. What can be known is that the Oklahoma Constitution is now, once again, longer than it was before. As Donald Lutz has observed, constitutions serve many purposes, and an array of purposes is revealed in these emendations to the Oklahoma Constitution. Like other states, Oklahoma had to define its evolving relationship to the federal government, had to adapt to changing social and economic circumstances, had to overcome the legacy of Jim Crow, and had to cope with the legacy of the state's progressive roots. Progressivism in Oklahoma is a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, the progressive traditions and institutional arrangements that have marked the state since its territorial days remain embedded in the Constitution, often, it seems, at the expense of effective and efficient government. On the other hand, the principal means for revising the Constitution has been by the initiative and referendum. So, Oklahomans have had to rely on progressive arrangements to address the defects of progressivism itself. The length and complexity of the Oklahoma Constitution testifies that reform has been only imperfectly achieved. Constitutions do more than put in place institutional arrangements. They also serve to define values and express the sense of the community. Over the past half-century, Oklahoma has evolved from its progressive roots and Democratic tradition to become an increasingly conservative and Republican state. The name "Oklahoma" comes from the Choctaw, "Red People"(Debo 1987). In the old days, the University of Oklahoma's mascot was a Native American character called "Little Red." Little Red went away a long time ago, but in today's parlance Oklahoma is a very red state. Oklahoma's progressive Constitution has facilitated this transformation in political culture by enabling conservative majorities to define values, practices, and arrangements in the state's fundamental law. Thus, the Oklahoma Constitution, like an ancient and gnarled oak, continues to grow even as many of its older branches fall into desuetude. It stands today as an evolving expression of the character of the people of Oklahoma, and this is clearly what Constitutions are supposed to do. It is old and it is cumbersome; but it is ours.

66 62 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 NOTES 1 0ur discussion will, of necessity, touch upon only major analytical points. One byproduct of Oklahoma's statutory Constitution is that it is not possible to tell the Constitution's story without recounting the entire political history of the state. Readers excessively stimulated by this discussion may consult the raw inventory of Oklahoma's constitutional development at / 2 This figure includes the 5 amendments later disqualified by the courts. 3 Has Title 9 proven a vehicle to extend the power of the courts over the Corporation Commission? The Constitution assigns original jurisdiction over the Corporation Commission to the state Supreme Court. A search of the court's case data base produces only 25 cases dealing with the Corporation Commission. The court has generally upheld the Corporation Commission's jurisdiction and decisions. While public utility, oil, and gas cases dominate the Corporation Commission's work today, it still occasionally takes up the railroads. As recently as 1983 the courts declined to override a decision of the Corporation Commission relating to railroad agents. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.Co. v. Corporation Commission (658 P.2d 479). 4State questions addressing ad valorem questions prior to World War II generally sought to place limits on or provide for exemptions to ad valorem rates. Beginning in 1944, a series of ad valorem questions (e.g. SQs 314, 319, and 327) were approved by voters that generally increased millage levels or permitted local jurisdictions to increase millages by a limited amount. In 1959, voters approved two state questions. State Question 391 provided for the creation of industrial development authority. State Question 392 provided for funding for public libraries. Both were responsive to the needs of more urbanized areas. The impact of the Oklahoma Constitution on the state's economic development continues to be a matter of discussion. A recent discussion is found in Oklahoma 2000, "State Policy and Economic Development in Oklahoma:

67 AveryandPeters I STATUTORYCONSTITUTION (Oklahoma 2000, Inc., Oklahoma City Oklahoma ). This study concludes that the state's populist tradition, expressed through its Constitution, has placed severe constraints on the state's capacity for economic development. 5 In the 1970s the offices of Labor and Insurance Commissioners were once again made elective. In 2004, the elected Insurance Commissioner resigned after being impeached and prior to a Senate vote on removal. And so it goes in Oklahoma.

68 64 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 REFERENCES Brookings Institution Report on a Survey of Organization and Administration in Oklahoma. Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company. Debo, Angie [ 1987]. Oklahoma: F oat-loose and Fancy-Free. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Elazar, Daniel American Federalism: A View from the States. New York: Harper and Row. Galley, Margret K The Need for Constitutional Revision in Oklahoma. Oklahoma City: League of Woman Voters. Goble, Danney The Oklahoma State Constitution: When It's Broke, Fix It!. Oklahoma City Law Review 16:3, (1980). Progressive Oklahoma. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Governor's Commission on Government Performance A Government As Good as Our People. Henry, Robert H The Oklahoma Constitutional Revision Commission: A Call to Arms or the Sounding of Retreat. Oklahoma City University Law Review 17:1, Mager, Melissa Revision of the Executive Branch Articles of the Oklahoma Constitution: An Overview. Oklahoma City Law Review 17:1,

69 Avery and Peters I STATUTORY CONSTITUTION 65 Oklahoma State Legislative Council. Oklahoma Constitutional Studies of the Oklahoma Constitutional Survey and Citizens' Advisory Committees. Szymanski, Ann-Marie Oklahoma Constitutional Revision, Revisited. Oklahoma Policy Studies Review Volume II, No. I, Spring/Summer: Scales, James R. and Danney Goble Oklahoma Politics: A History. Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press. Thornton, H.V Oklahoma Legislative Council. In Revising the Oklahoma Constitution edited by H. V. Thornton. Guthrie, OK: Cooperative Publishing Company, 1950.

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71 TWO "PARTIES" AMONG REGISTERED OKLAHOMA DEMOCRATS: THE CLARK, EDWARDS AND KERRY CONSTITUENCIES JAMES A. DAVIS Oklahoma State University with RAVI SHANKAR BYRRAJU SAl SEKHAR METLA Oklahoma State University This research is based on a sample of 807 registered Democrats who voted in the 2004 presidential primary.lt seeks an answer to the question of why Oklahoma was unique in the "third round" of the nomination process in putting two candidates ahead of national front runner Senator John Kerry. The data suggest one reason is that many registered Democrats do not identify with the Democratic Party in Oklahoma. Instead, they identify themselves as independents through strong Republicans despite still being registered as Democrats. While Kerry won most of the strongest Democratic identifiers, he lost support among the lighter shades of blues as well as among independents and plums. So one reason Oklahoma put two candidates ahead of the front runner is that registered Democrats, especially conservative Democrats, prefer to vote their individual preference rather than for the Democrat seen as most likely to win the presidency.

72 68 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 The late state Senator Keith Leftwich (D, OKC) introduced a bill in the 2003 Oklahoma legislature that established the first Tuesday in February as the date of the state's presidential primary (e.g., February 3, 2004 ). 1 Senator Leftwich's measure put Oklahoma back in the presidential nomination game (Jenkins n.d.). Prior to 2004, Oklahoma had been invisible in the vast "Super Tuesdays" held in March that included California and New York as well as Texas and Florida. 2 Oklahoma's presidential primary would now occur only one week after New Hampshire's primary on January 27, 2004 and about two weeks after the Iowa caucuses on January 19th, In 2004, Oklahoma's presidential primary was held along with the Arizona, Delaware, Missouri, South Carolina primaries and the New Mexico and North Dakota caucuses. 3 While Democrats in Iowa and New Hampshire together provide only a very small portion of the delegates to the national Democratic convention, they have for decades been very powerful cue givers for other states. In fact, Iowa alone probably cued the whole nation as to the likeliest Democratic presidential contender when they put Kerry way ahead of the then frontrunner Howard Dean (Lawrence and Page 2004). A central fact in Oklahoma politics is that the state is realigning away from the Democrats toward independency and Republicanism. If registered Democrats in Oklahoma are in flux, how would they vote? Would they vote party - i.e. for the Democrat with the best chance of winning the presidency- or would they vote for their favorite contender regardless of what the media were saying about who was the Democratic frontrunner? 4 In the end, Oklahomans voted for their favorites. Unlike any other state, Oklahoma put two contenders ahead of frontrunner Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. General Wesley Clark (Arkansas) came in first with percent of the vote (N = 90,526) followed by Senator John Edwards (North Carolina) with percent of the vote (N = 89,310). National front-runner John Kerry ran third in Oklahoma with percent of the vote (N = 81,073) (Oklahoma State Election Board 2004). While South Carolina put North Carolinian John Edwards ahead of frontrunner John Kerry, only Oklahoma put two candidates ahead of Kerry (Roper Center 2004).

73 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 69 Why? Our hypothesis is that there are actually two "parties" among registered Democrats in Oklahoma. Oklahoma has been in transition from a one-party Democrat state toward a two-party state throughout the latter half of the last century. This change began at the presidential level and is still continuing toward the less visible or "low stimulus" elections at the state and local levels. We shall call one of the two "parties" "blue." These Democrats are quite similar to Democrats nationally. However, those registered Democrats who identify themselves as either independent, independent leaning Republican or weak or strong Republican identifiers are not like national Democrats. They are moving right - i.e. away from the Democratic Party toward the Republican Party in both their voting and in their self-identification. They remain registered Democrats in many instances, however, because changing one's registration often lags far behind either voting behavior or self-identification in changing one's party preference. We call these latter voters "plums" because they tend away from some hue of blue to a blue/red mixture - i.e. plum. A purplish or plum color results when Democratic blue and Republican red are mixed. If the color white represents independency, exactly between deep blue and deep red, then some hue of plum would represent the independents leaning Republican or weak or strong Republicans. Ergo, the two "parties" among registered Democrats in Oklahoma are the "blues" and the "plums." Method: We surveyed Oklahoma presidential primary voters beginning the night of the presidential primary (February 3, 2004). 5 The chief means of finding out why Oklahomans voted for their favorites as opposed to the national frontrunner was to characterize the different contender constituencies demographically and attitudinally. The list we used on the heels of the presidential primary was furnished through the State Election Board with phone numbers added by Blaemire Communications. These sources and services were purchased by the DemocraticParty of Oklahoma (ODP) and we purchased the resulting list of names and phone numbers from the ODP. Because a current list would not be available for some time after the presidential primary, we were obliged to use the latest list of voters available. This was a list of state primary voters from Unfortunately,

74 70 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 this 2002 list of state primary voters was composed of "heads of households" and would provide a disproportionate number of males as a result. We finished polling with the 2002 list about March 3rd. There were 508 completed interviews in this first sampling. Whereas every voter had an equal chance of being selected in this list, it was, in fact, not representative by gender and among the youngest voters, because the 2002list was two years old. We would do a second survey of presidential primary voters more than a year later (i.e., May 7 through mid-june 2005). This second list composed of 368,288 primary voters was used to offset the large male and small age biases in the list from The second survey was a quota sampling. That is, we polled enough females and youngest voters to make the combined sample representative by gender and age. Although the second sample was a quota sample, there was no male or age bias in it since it included all primary voters along with nearly all of their individual telephone numbers. The second survey yielded 299 sufficiently completed interviews (those giving their candidate choice plus enough additional information to be useful). When we combined the first and second samples, the total number of respondents with sufficiently completed interviews was 807. In our combined sample of 807 completed interviews, 55% were females and 45% were male. Among all primary voters there were 54% who were female and 46% who were male. So our combined sample is only about 1% off. The average age of the combined interviewed samples (807 respondents) was almost exactly the same as the population of registered Democratic voters in the presidential primary. The average age among voters was for males and 57.6 years for females and 57.7 years combined. The average age of our interviewed male respondents was 57.9 years. For females it was 57.5 years. The average age for all our respondents was 57.7 years. So the difference in the average age of our combined sample and the population was never more than about five months. We also found the percentage of males and females in four different age groups (18-29, 30-44,45-59 and 60+). The percentages of male voters were either identical or within.5% in each of the four age groups in our combined sample of 807 and the male Democratic

75 Davis,ByrrajuandMetla I TWOPARTIES 71 presidential voting population. The females within each age group varied from only.5% to 1.5% across the sample interviewed and the universe of female Democratic presidential primary voters. The figures from the State Election Board established Clark as the winner with 29.94% of registered Democrats voting. Our sample of 807 put Clark at 30.48%. Edwards won 29.54% of the registered Democrats according to the State Election Board whereas he won 28.38% of our sample of 807. Kerry won 26.81% according to the State Election Board figures whereas 28.38% of our sample remembered voting for him. So there is slight evidence in the second sampling that people remembered voting for the eventual nominee Kerry slightly more often than they actually did. There was not much evidence of an aftermath effect for the other two contenders, however. In any case, our sample of 807 respondents produced percentages for the three leading candidates that were within.5 to 1.5 percent of the Oklahoma State Election Board figures. 6 As with the actual primary results, our combined sample of 807 respondents demonstrated that registered Oklahoma Democrats tended to vote for their favorite rather than for the Democrat with the best odds of winning the presidency, except for Senator Kerry's constituents. Kerry's constituents favored voting for the Democrat with the best odds by a slight margin. Whereas registered Democrats in Iowa caucuses thought in terms of picking a president, registered Democrats in Oklahoma voted for their favorite, especially among the Clark and Edwards constituents. Let's take a look at some of the demographic characteristics (age, gender, SES and minority /majority membership )1 of the Clark, Edwards and Kerry Oklahoma constituents. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CLARK, EDWARDS AND KERRY OKLAHOMA CONSTITUENCIES As may be seen in Table 1, Kerry was the most attractive of the three candidates among the youngest voters. The appeal among those voters hitting their stride occupationally (30-44 years) is similar for all

76 72 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Table 1 Age Cohorts Related to Candidate Preference Age Clmk Edwards Kerry Others Total % 23.3% 39.5% 11.6% 100% (N=11) (N=IO) (N=17) (N=5) (N=43) % 31.6% 29.8% 11.4% 100% (N=31) (N=36) (N=34) (N=13) (N=l14) % 32.0% 24.0% 14% 100% (N=75) (N=80) (N=60) (N=35) (N=250) 31.8% 25.9% 29.4% 12.9% 100% (N=119) (N=97) (N=110) (N=48) (N=374) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. three candidates although Clark is very slightly behind the other two and Edwards slightly ahead. Things change a bit among voters from 45 to 59 years of age. Edwards and Cark are well ahead of Kerry among this age group. However, Kerry is only very slightly behind Clark among the oldest voters ( 60+ ). Edwards, the youngest of the three candidates, trails both Clark and Kerry among this oldest age cohort. Perhaps the 45 to 59 year olds and some of the 60+ respondents disapprove of Kerry because of his anti-war protest after returning from Vietnam. John E. O'Neill, the leader of what would become the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth during the general election, was publicly antagonistic toward John Kerry as soon as he himself returned from Vietnam. O'Neill's book, Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry (O'Neill and Corsi 2004), was published in August 2004, just a few months before the general election in November. Film footage about Kerry's anti-war protests, supplied by both the news and paid political ads, was plentiful. Even coverage of O'Neill's earliest criticisms of Kerry, such as their debate on the Dick Cavett

77 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 73 Show in 1971 would be publicized again once Kerry became a candidate for president (Amazon.com.2004, p. 3). Maybe the sum effect of such coverage hurt Kerry's standing among Oklahoma voters between 45 and their mid-60s, especially the males as evinced in Table 2. As noted, males preferred Clark and Edwards to Kerry. However, females liked Clark and Kerry better than Edwards. Males may have been more supportive of General Clark's military background than Lieutenant Kerry's. But why did males prefer Edwards to Kerry? As will be demonstrated shortly, self-designated conservatives preferred Clark or Edwards over Kerry whereas Kerry had the support of more liberals. Our data also indicates that Oklahoma males are somewhat more conservative than females. 8 So, males may have preferred Edwards to Kerry because of Edwards' more conservative appeal. Working class voters tended to favor General Clark. The middle row of socio-economic (SES) scores is quite similar for all three constituencies although Clark is slightly behind the other two. Voters with the highest SES scores favored Kerry. Clark and Edwards constituents had similar proportions with the highest SES scores. Why is Clark's constituency more working class? Respondents who felt service in the military was important or who resided in cities or counties with a large military installation tended to favor Clark. 9 Respondents in the easternmost counties of Oklahoma where Clark ran Table2 Gender Related to Candidate Preference Gender Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Males 31.1% 30.9% 24.5% 13.5% 100% (N=113) (N=112) (N=89) (N=49) (N=363) Females 30.0% 26.4% 31.5% 11.4% 100% (N=133) (N=117) (N=140) (N=54) (N=444) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

78 74 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Table3 Socioeconomic Status (Occupational Prestige Scores) Related to Candidate Preference SES Clark Edwards Kerry Others Total Lowest Scores: % 27.7% 28.8% 9.9% 100% (N=l25) (N=l03) (N=l07) (N=85) (N=420) Middle Scores: % 28.3% 28.6% 15.4% 100% (N=88) (N=90) (N=91) (N=50) (N=319) Highest Scores: % 27.9% 30.9% 14.7% 100% (N=18) (N=19) (N=21) (N=lO) (N=68) Source: Authors' calculations of data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. fairly well, albeit second to Edwards in most cases, are more likely to be working class than in other regions of the state. Moreover, respondents who believe service in the armed forces is important are more likely to be working class or middle class than upper class. 10 Thus, Clark's coalition would tend toward a significant working class component. What of minority versus majority status among voters? Two Oklahoma minority groups with sufficient numbers in our sample of 807 include the Native-Americans and Afro-Americans. A third group of minorities include members of various religious minorities. The latter included Christian fundamentalists for the most part although not exclusively (four were Muslim). Members of various minority groups tended to favor Clark. Kerry had the second highest proportion of minority members and Edwards the least (Moore 2004). Why does Clark have the highest percentage of minority members among his supporters? Although the numbers of each minority are relatively small, Table 5 indicates that Native-Americans tended to favor Clark while Afro-Americans favored Kerry. Religious and "other"

79 Davis, Byrraju andmetla I TWO PARTIES 75 Table4 Minority/Majority Group Membership Related to Candidate Preference Ethnicity Omk Edwards Kerry Others Total Minority Members 36.6% 18.8% 31.7% 12.9% 100% (N =37) (N = 19) (N=32) (N=l3) (N=l01) Majority Members 29.6% 29.7% 28.0% 12.7% 100% (N =207) (N =208) (N = 196) (N=89) (N=700) Source: Authors' calculations of data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. TableS Native-American, Afro-American Related to Candidate Choice Ethnicity/ Race Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Native American 37.0% 28.3% 23.9% 10.8% 100% (N= 17) (N= 13) (N= 11) (N=5) (N=46) African American 29.0% 6.5% 41.9% 22.5% 100% (N=9) (N=2) (N =13) (N=7) (N=31) Majority Members 29.6% 29.7% 28.0% 12.7% 100% (N=207) (N=208) (N= 196) (N=89) (N=700 Source: Authors' calculations of data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

80 76 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 minority members are excluded because their numbers are quite small. Ifthey suggest anything it is that Clark and Kerry are similarly favored as compared with Edwards. Candidate support tends to vary with different minority concentrations in different counties. For instance, Native-Americans tend to occur most frequently in the eastern part of Oklahoma. Perhaps this is why they tend to favor Clark over Kerry. African-American Oklahomans are more urban than Native-American Oklahomans. Urban counties were more supportive of Kerry according to the Oklahoma State Election Board data (See Appendix II. "Results by County"). 11 Senator Edwards does not lead among any minority cell of Table 5 with the exception of a slightly higher frequency of Native-American supporters compared to Kerry. Ifthese relatively small cell populations can be trusted and Edwards actually does have more support among Native-Americans than Kerry, why does he? Perhaps it is because Edwards, like Clark, was strongest in those eastern, less urban counties where Native-Americans are most concentrated. The demographics of each of the Democratic contenders' constituencies may be summarized as follows: SUMMARY OF CONSTITUENCIES DEMOGRAPHICALLY Constituency Characteristics Clark Edwards Kerry Age Oldest Middle Youngest & Oldest Male/Female Balance Male Male Female SES Scores Lowest Middle Highest Native-Americans Most Middle Least Afro-Americans Middle Least Most Majority Support Tied Tied Lowest Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

81 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 77 POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE CLARK, EDWARDS AND KERRY CONSTITUENCIES We asked respondents whether Oklahoma Democrats should vote for their favorite Democrat or for the Democrat most likely to win the presidency, 12 The strongest Democratic partisans would probably think in terms of backing the Democrat with the best odds whereas less partisan respondents and those leaning toward Republicanism would prefer to vote for their personal favorite. Other attitudes or opinions that serve as voting criteria include the respondent's ideology, which candidate was believed to be "right on the issues," certainty about one's issue priorities and which foreign and domestic issues were most important. Opinions were also sought on the importance of a candidate being from the Sunbelt or having served in the armed forces. There was one behavioral question - i.e., did the respondent decide early or late on which candidate to support? As Table 6 evinces, a strong plurality of blue Democrats preferred Kerry. Among weak Democratic identifiers or light blues (i.e., "not-sostrong" Democrats and independents who leaned toward the Table6 Partisanship Related to Candidate Preference Partisanship Oark: Edwards Kerry Others Total Strong Democrats (blue) 24.8% 21.2% 44.7% 9.3% 100% (N=77) (N=66) (N=l39) (N=29) (N=311) Middle Scores: % 32.5% 20.1% 13.1% 100% (N=l30) (N=123) (N=76) (N=50) (N=379) Highest Scores: % 33.9% 11.3% 20.9% 100% (N=39) (N=39) (N=13) (N=24) (N=ll5) Source: Authors' calculations from data from samples of 807 presidential primary respondents.

82 78 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Democrats), there are significantly more Clark and Edwards supporters than there are Kerry supporters. The registered Democrats identifying themselves as independent leaning Republican or Republican are plums. Plums produced three times the rate of support for Clark and for Edwards as for Kerry. Clearly the blues favored Kerry whereas light blues and, most especially, plums favored either Clark or Edwards. Our data also indicates that the strongest Democrats are also the most likely to vote for the Democrat with the best odds of winning the presidency. 13 The strength and direction of partisanship is related to approval or disapproval of President B ush. 14 Those most disapproving of President Bush favored Kerry. Constituencies who were balanced in their views of the President or who, in fact, approved of him were more likely to support either Clark or Edwards. Kerry supporters were more likely than either Clark's or Edwards' to favor the "candidate most likely to win." In fact, according to our data, more than half of the entire sample of 807 (56.8%, N = 458) believed Kerry had the best chance of winning the presidency. Only about one in eight respondents (12.8%, N = 103) felt Clark would win and less than one in five (18.8% N = 152) felt Edwards would. Respondents who voted for the Democrat most likely to win the presidency cast a "party vote." That is, their first concern was a Democratic victory. Those who voted for their favorite Democrat voted individualistically. Thus, all of the variables that underline strength of Democratic partisanship favor Kerry. In plain words, Kerry's support Table7 Approval/Disapproval of President Bush Related to Candidate Preference Attitude Toward Bush Omk Edwards Kerry Others Total Approve of 30.2% 35.5% 16.5% 17.8% 100% Bush (N=73) (N=86) (N=40) (N=43) (N=242) Disapprove of Bush 30.6% 25.3% 33.5% 10.6% 100% (N=l73) (N=l43) (N=l89) (N=60) (N=565) Source: Author's calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

83 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 79 is the bluest. There is much more plum coloration in both Clark's and Edwards' support. Conservative voters preferred Clark and Edwards to Kerry. Liberal voters preferred Kerry to the other two contenders. 15 Edwards supporters are the most conservative and the least liberal. Clark is in the middle. As with partisanship, Kerry supporters are more distinct from Clark and Edwards than the latter two are from one another. There is not much difference in candidate preference among those voters who identified themselves as "middle of the road." TableS Voting Criteria Related to Candidate Preference Voting Criteria Omk Edwards Kerry Others Total Vote for most likely to win 25.6% 18.3% 45.9% 10.2% 100% (N=63) (N=45) (N=l13) (N=25) (N=246) Vote for Favorite 32.7% 32.9% 20.4% 14% 100% (N=181) (N=l82) (N=ll3) (N=77) (N=553) Source: Author's calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. Table9 Voter Ideology Related to Candidate Preference Ideology Clark Edwards Kerry Others Total Conservative 30.4% 30.8% 23.9% 14.9% 100% (N=88) (N=89) (N=69) (N=43) (N=289) Middle of the Road 31.2% 29.5% 29% 10.3% 100% (N=115) (N=I09) (N=I07) (N=38) (N=369) Liberal 29.9% 20.1% 34.7% 15.3% 100% (N=43) (N=29) (N=50) (N=22) (N=l44) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

84 80 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 As might be expected, Oklahoma voters believed their candidate the middle. As with partisanship, Kerry supporters are more distinct from Clark and Edwards than the latter two are from one another. There is not much difference in candidate preference among those voters who identified themselves as "middle of the road." was "right on the issues." This is hardly surprising in itself, but Kerry is not distinctive in this regard. Nearly ninety percent of those who felt Clark to be right on the issues (88.9%) voted for him. A little more than eighty percent (81.8 %) of those who felt Kerry was right on the issues supported him. A little more than three-quarters (77. 1%) of those feeling Edwards was right on the issues gave Edwards their vote. So Clark's issue appeal appears to be the strongest and Edwards the weakest. Voters who were most certain of their own issue priorities (i.e., felt either foreign or domestic issues were more important rather than being unable to decide) favored Kerry. Voters placing foreign affairs over domestic affairs were almost as likely to favor Clark as Kerry whereas Edwards was the least likely to get the vote of those stressing foreign affairs. Voters stressing domestic affairs were about as likely to favor one contender as another. Table 10 Foreign/Domestic Issues Related to Candidate Preference Foreign vs. Domestic Issues Oarlc Edwards Kerry Others Total Foreign Affairs More Important 30.5% 23.5% 32.0% 14% 100% (N=61) (N=47) (N=64) (N=28) (N=200) Domestic Affairs More Important 29.8% 28.2% 28.9% 13.1% 100% (N=132) (N=l25) (N=128) (N=58) (N=443) Couldn't Decide 31.7% 34.5% 23.4% 10.4% 100% (N=46) (N=50) (N=34) (N=15) (N=145) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

85 Davis,ByrrajuandMetla I TWOPARTIES 81 Table 11 and Table 12 explore specific issues within the domains of domestic and foreign affairs. Domestic issues are the responses given to the question "What was the single most important domestic issue (i.e., within the country) at that time?." Foreign affairs priorities were evinced through the question "In your opinion, what was the single most important issue in foreign affairs (international issue) facing the country at the time?." Responses were coded into six compound categories for domestic issues and three categories for foreign affairs. Tablell Voter Concerns in Domestic Affairs Related to Candidate Preference Domestic Affairs Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Economy/Jobs /Aliens 32.7% 29.4% 26.2% 11.7% 100% (N=140) (N=126) (N=ll2) (N=50) (N=428) Health care/ Social Security 25.9% 25.9% 32.4% 15.8% 100% (N=44) (N=44) (N=55) (N=27) (N=170) Homeland security 43.8% 25% 21.9% 9.3% 100% (N=14) (N=8) (N=7) (N=3) (N=32) Quality of Life 30.0% 28.0% 29.0% 13.0% 100% (N=30) (N=28) (N=29) (N=13) (N=IOO) Taxes/Prices 10.5% 47.4% 26.3% 15.8% 100% (N=2) (N=9) (N=5) (N=3) (N=19) Government Deception/ 13.3% 26.7% 46.7% 13.3% 100% Malfeasance (N=2) (N=4) (N=7) (N=2) (N=15) Source: Author's calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

86 82 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Table 12 Voter Concerns in Foreign Affairs Related to Candidate Preference Foreign Affairs Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Iraq Involvement/ Deception 27.7% 28.1% 32.7% 11.5% 100% (N=l42) (N=144) (N=168) (N=59) (N=513) Terrorism/ WMD Proliferation 35.1% 29.0% 17.6% 18.3% 100% (N=46) (N=38) (N=23) (N=24) (N=l31) Internationalism /Trade 37.1% 29.3% 22.4% 11.2% 100% (N=43) (N=34) (N=26) (N=l3) (N=116) Source: Author's calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. National front-runner Kerry led among those respondents most concerned with health care or social security. This issue domain combined concerns for affordable drugs and health care, wide spread diseases such as aides or cancer and the soundness of such programs as Medicare or Social Security. Kerry also led among respondents most concerned with "Government Deception/Malfeasance." This category of issues included unkempt promises and dishonesty generally in government and among politicians, particular agency malfeasance, mismanagement of agricultural or welfare programs, government itself, corruption/money, drug lobbyists, judges making law, etc. This may be a consequence of Kerry focusing on the Republican President and governmental malfeasance and deception more than his Democratic opponents by this stage of the game. Edwards led among those most concerned with taxes or the high price of necessities. "Taxes and high prices" also included taxes being burdensome on making a living, especially with the middle class, tax breaks for wealthy, too much dependence on government by poor, price of fuel, particularly gasoline, etc. Edwards appeal among those concerned

87 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 83 with taxes and/or high prices of necessities may be due to his appeal among conservative voters who were most concerned with the imposition on individual circumstances by both the public and private domains. General Clark somewhat among respondents most concerned with the sluggish economy or the scarcity of jobs, with deficit spending or with aliens taking jobs away from U.S. citizens or with the outsourcing of jobs abroad. Clark also led among those most concerned with the homeland security (e.g., domestic terrorism, safety of the country, dealing with nation's own acute problems, etc) Although these particular issues are domestic, they may also be those concerns most related in the voter's mind with our country's relations with other nations. Clark had slightly more supporters among respondents concerned with such "quality of life" issues as education, decline of moral values, freedom and protection of civil liberties, religious divisions and conflict, drug abuse, crime, safety of children, immigration, poverty and welfare culture, intrusion of homosexual life style, mistreatment of minorities, high costs of living and the environment. He is followed by Kerry who had a slight lead over Edwards. Thus, "quality of life" issues did not evince strong distinctions across candidate constituencies. What of foreign issues and the pattern of support among the three leading contenders? Foreign affairs were divided into three issue domains. These included U.S. involvement in Iraq and/or governmental deception about that involvement. The second issue domain dealt with terrorism internationally and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The third issue, "Internationalism{frade" dealt with respondent concerns about "going it alone" in Iraq and about internationalism in terms of the imbalance of trade. General Clark was favored by Oklahomans who were most concerned with international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or with the nation's international relations and trade. As suggested above, these issues in foreign affairs may be related to those domestic concerns most affected by our relations with other nations. Thus, General Clark is favored by Oklahomans most concerned with this country's economic security as well as with the security of its interests abroad. Former Vietnam Navy Lieutenant John Kerry was favored, albeit not by much, among those respondents who opposed the war in Iraq.

88 84 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 This appeal may stem from Kerry's experience in Vietnam and from the attention focused on his latter opposition to the war. Perhaps Democratic voters felt Senator Kerry had seasoned judgment on what sort of wars the U.S. could get into and those it should avoid. Perhaps Senator Kerry focused more attention on the war in Iraq. Not surprisingly, Table 13 suggests that General Clark was the favorite of those respondents who felt that service in the armed forces made a "great deal" or "some" difference in their voting decision. Not too surprisingly, Lieutenant Kerry was second in this regard. Edwards, who had not served in the military, was third. The pattern is reversed for those feeling military service made "not much, if any" difference in their decision or "none." Coming from the "Sunbelt" (the South or the Southwest)" made little felt difference in the voter's estimation of a candidate according to Table 14. Around 85% said coming from the Sunbelt made little or no difference. Still, as might be expected, Clark, the Arkansan, led in this regard. Senator Edwards of South Carolina was second and the Senator from Massachusetts third. The figures given for Sunbelt origins being unimportant do not show a lot of difference across the three constituencies. Some 29.3%, 27.1% and 30.9% chose Clark, Edwards and Kerry respectively among respondents feeling Sunbelt origins were not important. While these figures reverse the sequence evinced by those feeling such origins were Table 13 Importance of Service in the Military Related to Candidate Preference Service in the Military Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Some/ Great Deal 35.4% 23.3% 30.5% 10.8% 100% (N=l44) (N=95) (N=124) (N=44) (N=407) Little/No Deal 25.0% 33.8% 26.3% 14.9% 100% (N=99) (N=l34) (N=104) (N=59) (N=396) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters.

89 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 85 Table 14 Importance of Sun belt Origins Related to Candidate Preference Sunbelt Origins Importance Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Some/ Great Deal 37.2% 36.3% 12.4% 14.1% 100% (N=42) (N=41) (N=14) (N=16) (N=113) Little/None 29.3% 27.1% 30.9% 12.7% 100% (N=202) (N=187) (N=213) (N=87) (N=689) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. at least somewhat important, the differences seem to be no more important than the voters themselves suggest. As may be seen in the appended map entitled "Per County Rankings of Clark, Edwards and Kerry...," Edwards support is often even higher than Clark's in those eastern counties proximate to Arkansas. Why? Although Clark visited Oklahoma several times, Edwards campaigned even more diligently, especially in the eastern counties proximate to Arkansas. Roughly speaking, electoral success tended to follow Edwards' tracks at the county level and, very nearly, at the state level as a consequence. Clark won more of the western counties of Oklahoma (excluding the panhandle) than anyone else. Early polls indicated that Clark was the frontrunner in Oklahoma. (American Research Group, Inc., 2004) Therefore, Edwards' first priority in Oklahoma was to beat Clark (By and For The People, n.d.). Probably Edwards' stress on the eastern part of the state was intended to overcome Clark where Clark was presumed to be strongest. Besides the effects of Edwards' rigorous campaigning, there was a last minute rush in Oklahoma for Kerry in the wake of his victories in New Hampshire and Iowa. These effects were quite sufficient to overcome the original preference for Clark in Oklahoma although they came very close.

90 86 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 Table 15 Late vs. Early Voting Decision Related to Candidate Preference. Oark Edwards Kerry Others Total Late Deciders 25.3% 30.7% 37.3% 6.7% 100% (N=84) (N=l02) (N=124) (N=22) (N=332) Early Deciders 34.1% 26.9% 22.2% 16.8% 100% (N=l60) (N=126) (N=104) (N=79) (N=469) Source: Authors' calculations from data produced by samples of 807 presidential primary voters. Kerry supporters were much more likely to be "Late Deciders." Late deciders in Oklahoma may be most like the Iowan voters in this regard. Polls indicated that Howard Dean was the leader before the last-minute rush toward Kerry (Lawrence and Page 2004). In fact, Kerry's support rushed upwards in Oklahoma shortly after Iowa and New Hampshire (Keep Media 2004).

91 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 87 SUMMARY OF CONSTITUENT PROFILES ATTITUDINALLY Oark Edwards Kerry Constituency Characteristics Partisanship Weak Weak Strong Right on the Issues Highest% Lowest% Middle% Voter Ideology Conservative Conservative Moderate to Moderate to Moderate to Liberal Approve/Disapprove Bush Balanced Approved Disapproved Certainty of Issue Priorities Middle Least Most Domestic Issues Economy /Jobs/ Aliens Most Often Less Often Least Often Health Care/Social Sec Less Often Less Often Most Often Homeland Security Most Often Less Often Least Often Quality of Life Most Often Least Often Less Often Taxes/Prices Least Often Least Less Often Gov. Decept/Malfeasance Least Often Less Often Most Often Foreign Issues Iraq Involvement/Deception Least Often Less Often Most Often Terrorism/WMD Prolifera. Most Often Less Often Least Often Internationalism/Trade Most Often Less Often Least Often Military Serv. Importance Highest Lowest Middle Importance of Sunbelt Origins Highest Middle Lowest Late/Early Deciders Earliest Somewhat Later Latest Vote Favorite/ Likely Likely Winner Favorite Favorite Winner CONCLUSIONS A TALE OF TWO "PARTIES:" BLUES AND PLUMS AMONG REGISTERED DEMOCRATS IN OKLAHOMA Oklahoma's unique role in the 2004 presidential primaries is actually a tale of two "parties." As the grassroots of the Oklahoma Democratic Party shift toward the right and Republicanism, two "parties" are created among registered Democrats. The first includes strong Democrats and

92 88 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 to a lesser degree the not-so-strong Democrats along with those independents who lean toward the Democrats. This "party" is most like the Democrats at the national level, especially the strong Democrats. For our purposes, we have referred to this "party" as the Oklahoma "blues." The other "party" among registered Democrats in Oklahoma is composed of self-described independents, independents who lean toward the Republicans plus weak and even strong Republican identifiers. These are not yet as red as Republicans are nationally because they are still registered as Democrats (i.e., blue). However, it might be considered light to dark plum. So we have dubbed them Oklahoma plums. Oklahoma blues feel comfortable in the national Democratic Party whereas Oklahoma plums do not. The latter may change their registration some day but, as yet, they have not gotten around to it. In realigning their party loyalties, voters typically change their behavior before anything else- that is, they vote increasingly for the "other" party. After a while, they decide they do, in fact, belong to the "other" party (i.e., attitudinal). The last step the voter typically takes is to change their party registration. The fact that many registered Democrats in Oklahoma feel closer to the Republican Party may be fairly unique to Oklahoma, but it is not surprising. Most states in America have already developed resilient blue or red tendencies in presidential politics. Oklahoma is still shifting from blue to red. This might be due to the "social agenda" of Ronald Reagan given the degree of religious fundamentalism in Oklahoma. Our data demonstrates that Senator Kerry's Oklahoma supporters are most like Democrats nationally. The national Democratic Party is attractive to both the youngest and the oldest voters. Females are more supportive of the Democrats at the national level as are minorities and, particularly, Afro-Americans (Jones 2004). As may be seen in "Summary of Constituencies Demographically," Kerry's Oklahoma blues are quite similar to Democrats across the country in these regards. Across the country there is rising support for the Democrats among young white-collar professionals. The largest portion of the highest SES scores in our sample was composed of professionals and they favored Kerry. However, Clark had more blue-collar support than did Kerry (or Edwards). Union households and other working-class voters tend to support the Democratic Party nationally (Jones 2004). Thus, national Democrats and Kerry's Oklahoma blues are, with one exception (i.e., SES), quite similar demographically.

93 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 89 How do they compare attitudinally? By definition, the starkest differences between Oklahoma blues and plums involved the strength (and direction) of partisanship. Kerry's Oklahoma blues were much stronger Democrats than were the Clark or Edwards plums. Democrats across the nation could be expected to be especially critical of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president (Jones and Carroll 2004). The same was true of Kerry's Oklahoma blues. Kerry's Oklahoma blues were also way more inclined to vote for the Democrat with the best chance of winning the presidency. Voting for the Democrat most likely to win is a party vote whereas voting for one's favorite is individualistic. Thus, unlike Kerry's Oklahoma blues, Clark and Edwards's Oklahoma plums were cued more by candidate appeal than party appeal. Given that Kerry's Oklahoma blues are stronger partisans, how do they compare attitudinally otherwise to the national Democratic Party? Like the national Democrats (Jones 2004), there are more liberals among Kerry's blues than among Clark or Edward plums although Kerry had impressive support among moderates and even conservatives in Oklahoma. The Democrats are the out-of-power party nationally and so stress governmental malfeasance and deception in domestic affairs. There is also more opposition to the war in Iraq among Democrats (Jones and Carroll 2005) in part because of their perception of President Bush as being deceptive about weapons of mass destruction as a rationale for getting involved. Like the national Democrats (Jones and Carroll, 2005), Kerry's Oklahoma blues were more likely to stress health care and social security. However, Clark and Edwards supporters were more inclined than Kerry's to stress traditional Democratic issues such as the economy and jobs (Jones and Carroll 2005). As may be seen in "Summary of Constituent Profiles Attitudinally,"Kerry's Oklahoma blues are very much like Democrats across the country attitudinally with the exception of a similar emphasis on the economy and jobs. It is the peculiar balance between blues and plums among registered Democrats in Oklahoma that produced its unique voting pattern in the 2004 Democratic presidential primaries. To the extent registered Democrats in Oklahoma are unique in their shift towards independency and the Republican Party, they will continue to produce voting preferences that are uniquely Oklahoman and atypical of the nation.

94 90 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 NOTES 1 Senator Keith Leftwich served in the Oklahoma Senate from 1991 to September 19, 2003 when he passed due to cancer. It was he who took the responsibility for putting the Oklahoma primary earlier in presidential primary season. This article is dedicated to Senator Keith Leftwich for his foresight, service to Oklahoma and civic responsibility. 2 There are only three primaries or caucuses prior to Oklahoma's. These are the District of Columbia Presidential Primary (January 13th), the Iowa Presidential Caucuses (January 19th) and the New Hampshire Presidential Primary (January 27). Those states holding their presidential nomination events with Oklahoma (February 3rd) included the Arizona Primary, the Delaware Primary, the New Mexico Caucuses, the Missouri Primary and the South Carolina primaries. ("2004 Presidential Election Primaries Calendar," n.d.) John Kerry (Ma) came in first in Iowa and New Hampshire as well as in Arizona, Delaware, New Mexico and Missouri. Senator John Kerry (Ma) was second to Senator John Edwards (NC) in South Carolina and third behind Wesley Clark (Ark) and John Edwards in Oklahoma. ("How Our Approved Candidates Have Fared and Presidential Primary Dates," n.d.) 3The states having nomination events on Super Tuesday (March 2, 2004) included California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington. State primaries held one week later on March 9 include Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Thus, the nation's first and third largest states- i.e., California and New York- hold their nomination events about a month after Oklahoma and the six other "Super Seven" states). The second and fourth largest states (Texas and Florida) hold their primaries on week later. ("2004 Presidential Election Primaries Calendar," n.d.). 4See question number 10 on the questionnaire in the Appendix I.

95 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES 91 5These students include Lori Allen, Matt Barnard, Mac Boyle, Dan Branum, Cody Brown, Cory Burkett, Mike Carnuccio, Clay Cooper, Travis Crocker, Jessica Cuellar, Monica Dudley, Jeremy Espinoza, Matt Fracek, Summer Cummins, Catarina DeAraujo, Hillary Elliott, John Filonow, Jeremy Fulda, Nikki Godwin, Robert Goodbear, Mimi Helton, Michelle Kogler, Robert H. Hill, Jerad Lindsey, Rebekah Long, Jessica Lover, Kassie McCoy, Scott Miller, Dustin Morgan, Paula Ogunbanjo, Tim ONeil, Kyle Riddle, Rachael Rummage, Jessie Sikich, Jon Sobey, Meghan Spears, David Stanford, Jane Ann Stinchcomb, Aaron Switzer, Natalie Trissell, Calvin Wahn, Amanda Wilkerson, Caroline Wilson, John Wood. 6 0ur original list was derived from a list of 469,171 secured through from the Oklahoma Democratic Party (ODP). The first calling with the 2002list produced 507 completed interviews (i.e., include the respondent's voting choice and most of the other information called for). The margin of error was ±4.4%. The second list was purchased from the same sources. It included all voters in the presidential primary of February 3, This list also included nearly every voter's phone number whether they were the head of the household or not. 7 This demographic information was provided by questions 14 through 21 on the appended questionnaire. 80ur data indicates that nearly 40% (39.7%) of the male respondents consider themselves conservative as compared to about one-third of the females (32.7% ). Females are somewhat more inclined to consider themselves moderate or "middle of the road" (M = 42. 7%, F = 48.2% ). Liberals have the smallest percentage among these three ideological self-designations ( C = 35.8%, N = 289; M = 45.7%; N = 369; L = 17.8%, N =144). There is not much difference between percentages of males and females who identify themselves as liberal (M= 17.1%,N =62; F= 18.5%,N = 82) 'There are major military installations in Comanche County (Fort Sill), Jackson County (Altus Air Force Base) and Garfield County (Vance Air Force Base). These three counties put Clark fust. There is a large U.S. Army Ammunition Deport in Pittsburg County in eastern Oklahoma. Clark came within 4 7 votes of Edwards in Pittsburg County (2,292 to 2,245) The largest payroll in the state is Tinker Air Force Base which is proximate to Midwest City and Del City. Both of these are part of greater Oklahoma City in Oklahoma County. Our calling gave us an impression of strong support for Clark in Midwest City and Del City although we do not have figures specific to cities. 10Whereas low and medium SES scores yield a slightly greater preference for a background in the military, high scores yielded over 60% saying military service made little or no difference.

96 92 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 lithe most urban counties in Oklahoma include Oklahoma, Tulsa and Cleveland counties. Kerry was first in each of these, as may be seen in the appended "Per County Rankinr;s of Clark, Edwards and Kerry... " 12 Political attitudes or opinions are evinced by questions 1 through 13 of the appended questionnaire. 13Stronr; Democrats were about as likely to vote for the Democrat with the best odds as they were to vote for their favorite Democrat. (50.0% to 48.7%). However, among weak Democrats and non-democrats, very strong majorities favored voting for their favorite over the Democrat with the best chance of winning the presidency. (weak Democrats= 19.0% to 82.6%, non Democrats = 16.5% to 82.6% ). These data clearly suggest the Democratic registrants in Oklahoma are now in a state of flux. 14 The percent of strong Democrats who disapproved of President Bush is 97.4% (N = 303). Among weak Democrats the percentage disapproving of President Bush is 64.1% (N = 243). Among the non-democrats (i.e., independents, independence leaning Republican as well as weak and strong Republicans) the percent disapproving of Bush is only 14.8% (N = 17). Conversely, strong Democrats were quite unlikely to approve of the President (2.6%, N = 8). Weak Democrats were more inclined toward approval (35.9%, N = 136). Non-Democrats tended toward whole hearted approval of the President (85.2%, N = 98). 15Some 13.91% of our respondents considered themselves to be "very conservative," 18.81% "somewhat conservative" and 6.75% to be "slir;htly conservative." Only 6.13% considered themselves to be "slightly liberal," 5.11% "somewhat liberal" and 2.26% "very liberal." All other respondents considered themselves to be "middle of the road" (47.03%)

97 Davis,ByrrajuandMetla I TWOPARTIES 93 REFERENCES Initiative (2005 n.d.). How Our Approved Candidates Have Fared and Presidential Primary Dates. Retrieved June 27 from Amazon.com (2005). Editorial Reviews: Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. About the Author, p. 3. Retrieved July 7, 2005 from ref=ase joyfulchtisti-20/ American Research Group, Inc. (2004, February 2). Clark Holds Lead Among Democrats in Oklahoma. Retrieved June 23, 2005, from By and for the People. (2005 n.d.) The Edwards Campaign. Retrieved June 30, from Jenkins, R. (2003). After moving up primary, Oklahoma gets new attention from Democrats. Retrieved June 27, 2005 from_http:// Jones, J. (2004). How Americans Voted: Bush owes victory to support from conservative-leaning Groups. Retrieved July 8, 2005, from poll/content/default.aspx?ci= Jones, J. and J. Carroll. (2005, June 3). Changing Minds in the 2004 Election? A Report on Gallup's Post-Election Panel Survey. Retrieved July 8, 2005, from_http://gallup.com/poll/content/default~aspx?ci=16576&pg=l

98 94 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 Keep Media. (2004). Kerry running strong in Tuesday's primaries: polls. Retrieved June 28,2005, from 0 I /30/363650?from=search&criteria= Kerry+running +strong&refinepub TypeiD=O Lawrence, J., and S. Page. (2004, January). Top candidates strategize to pin down nomination Retrieved March 28,2005, from news/politicselections/nation/ candidates-cover_x.htm Moore, D. (2004). A Kerry "Buzz Saw" on Super Tuesday? Retrieved July 8, 2005 from Oklahoma State Election Board. (2004 ). Presidential Preferential Primary Results. Retrieved June 23, 2005 from 04ppp.html Oklahoma State Election Board. (2004) Presidential Preferential Primary Results by County. Retrieved June 25, 2005 from -elections/04_d_ppp.pdf O'Neill, J., and J. Corsi. (2004,August). Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. Roper Center. (2004). Election 2004: Democratic Primary Dates and Results. Retrieved June 27,2005 from primaries.htrnl

99 Davis,ByrrajuandMetla I TWOPARTIES 95 APPENDIX I QUESTIONNAIRE for OKLAHOMA PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (February 3, 2004) Hello. This is at Oklahoma State University. May I please speak with? (Mr or Ms (same name). I teach American Politics at Oklahoma State University. Last year my students and I conducted a poll of Democratic Presidential Primary voters as a class project. We are now trying to make the sample a little more representative with some follow-up calling. May we ask if you were registered as a Democrat at that time? If they say "YES" say: May we have 2 or 3 minutes of your time? If they say, "No" OR "I voted in the Republican Primary," thank them courteously and end the conversation. If they say, ''I'm a Republican," ask, Were you registered as a Republican at that time? If they say "Yes," thank them courteously and end the conversation. If they say "No" thank them courteously and end the conversation. If they say".. bad time" or "_is not in," ask When would be a better time? If they say "YES," say Great, thank you very much and begin with: The contenders for the Democratic nomination for president included: General Wesley CLARK 1 Governor Howard DEAN 2 Senator John EDWARDS 3 Senator John KERRY 4 Congressman Dennis KUCINICH Senator Joe LIEBERMAN ReverendAl SHARPTON DON'T KNOW REFUSED TO SAY Congressman RICHARD GEPHARDT Other (e.g. Lyndon LaRouche, Jr)

100 96 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 NOTE: Circle answer on the following questions. 1. Whoever your choice was at that time, which Democratic contender did you think had the best chance of being elected President? General Wesley CLARK I Governor Howard DEAN 2 Senator John EDWARDS 3 Senator John KERRY 4 Congressman Dennis KUCINICH 5 Senator Joe LIEBERMAN 6 Reverend AI SHARPTON 7 DON'T KNOW 8 REFUSED TO SAY 9 Congressman RICHARD GEPHARDT 10 Other (e.g. Lyndon LaRouche, Jr) Whoever your choice was at the time, which Democratic contender did you think was most often right on the issues (i.e., Who did you find yourself agreeing with most)? aark DEAN 2 EDWARDS 3 KFRRY 4 KUClNICH 5 LIEBERMAN 6 SHARPTON 7 ANYORMOSTOFTHEM 8 DON'T KNOW /REFUSED 9 RICHARD GEPHARDT 10 Other(e.g.,Lyndon LaRouche, Jr How much difference did it make to you if a candidate was from the Sunbelt (i.e., the South or Southwest)? A GREAT DEAL SOME NOT MUCH, IF ANY NONE DON'T KNOW /REFUSED

101 Davis, Byrraju and Met! a I TWO PARTIES How much difference did it make to you if a candidate had served in the armed forces? A GREAT DEAL SOME 2 NOTMUCH,IFANY 3 NONE 4 DON'T KNOW /REFUSED 5 5. If we may ask, whom did you vote for in the Democratic presidential primary? (Note: You may have to clarify that you are talking about the Democratic presidential primary, NOT the general or presidential election) ClARK 1 DEAN 2 EDWARDS 3 KERRY 4 KUCINICH 5 LIEBERMAN 6 SHARPTON 7 DON'T REMEMBER 8 REFUSED TO SAY 9 GEPHARD 10 Other e.g., Lyndon LaRouche About when did you decide to vote for (candidate's name)? Was it in the last week before our Oklahoma primary OR Was it earlier (i.e. before New Hampshire)? 2 7. While there were a number of very important problems facing the country at the time, which did you think were the most important? Foreign affairs (e.g., international issues) 1 OR Domestic affairs (e.g.,., within the U.S.)? 2 If they indicate they were equally important or can't decide: 3 8. In your opinion, what was the single most important issue in foreign affairs (i.e., international issue) facing the country at that time? 9. What was the single most important domestic issue (i.e. within the country) at that time?

102 98 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER Which of the following two statements do you tend to agree with more? At that stage in the Presidential Primaries (i.e., after Iowa and New Hampshire, about the third round), Oklahoma Democrats should have voted for their favorite CR At that stage of the game, Oklahoma Democrats should have voted for the Democrat most likely to win Do you usually think of yourself as conservative, middle of the road or liberal? If conservative ask: would you consider yourself: VERY Conservative SOMEWHAT Conservative 2 SLIGHTLY Conservative 3 If moderate or middle of the road, just put MIDDLEOFTHEROAD 4 If liberal, Would you consider yourself: SLIGHTLYliberal 5 SOMEWHAT Liberal 6 VERYliberal 7 DON'TKNOW 8 REFUSEDTOSAY Whatever your formal party registration, generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent or what? If Democrat, ask Would you consider yourself a: STRONG DEMOCRAT 1 NOT-SO-STRONG DEMOCRAT 2 If Independent or Other, ask Do you consider yourself: CLOSERTOTHEDEMOCRATS 3 INDEPENDENT /NO PARTY 4 CLOSERTOTHEREPUBLICANS 5 If Republican, Would you consider yourself a: NOT-SO-STRONG-REPUBLICAN 6 STRONG REPUBLICAN 7 If "other" or "another party," ask which one?

103 Davis, Byrraju and Metla I TWO PARTIES How strongly would you say you approved OR disapproved of the way George Bush was handling his job as president? STRONGLY APPROVED 1 APPROVED SOMEWHAT 2 DISAPPROVED SOMEWHAT STRONGLY DISAPPROVED DON'T KNOW, NO OPINION REFUSED TO SAY 14. What is (or was) the occupation ofthe main "bread winner" in your household? (If they say "RETIRED," try to get their occupation before retirement. If they say something too general- e.g., "worked for the government," gently try to get them to be more specific. You may try to get both the husband's and wife's occupation.) In any case, put the best answer you can get here: 15. Do you consider yourself a member of a minority group? (They may say "Baptist" or "Methodist" whereas we are looking for such religious minorities as Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or even Catholic. If they give you a main-stream Protestant faith, circle "NO" but write the faith in the blank provided.) YES 1 NO 2 If"YES" ask which minority group and PRINT IT HERE) If the person says "Native American," ask what tribe: Conclude with: Thank you so much for your time THE INTERVIEW IS OVERBUTbesuretoCODE IN FOLLOWING PAGE:

104 100 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER NAME: COUNTY: (Note: We will not code in their name. But it helps us at this point because it allows us to look up information to add below from the original data base.) 17. From the respondent's voice or name or the data, were they: MALE 1 OR FEMALE 2 18.From the list, put the RESPONDENT'S AGE TIME DATE INTERVIEWER'SPRINTEDNAMEandSIGNATURE (Interviewers: You are now finished with your part of this particular interview) (POLLING ADMINISTRATORS FILL IN THE FOLLOWING) 19. CENSUS CLASSIFICATION 20. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS: 21. MARITAL STATUS 22.STRAIGHTTICKETVOTER? YES 1 OR NO ELECTION PERCENT AGE 24. GENERAL ELECTION PERCENT AGE 25.PRIMARYELECTIONPERCENTAGE

105 PER CtJUNTY FhNh1~~'.;s C:LJ'd:~h- l::uf"jli..hd~1- AND PHL5lOENTIAL_ PN.iFJAH'i ~ 2>)04} K c ~ f ~:-'~ I ' K g c ~~~ K E c C "'CLARK E "' EDI'Il>RDS K '~ KERRY!Ranked Top to!lottoml ~I'TH C0tK1HBSS:lQNE.L DlSTP.lCTS (;I'JEN l ~~~E ( c K ~ rh- - - \...-:-~ c K 0 1'0 < (i;' to '< :::1 ~. :::: 1'0 ::l 0.. ~ & 1' >--3 ~ 0... ~ ttl (/) GkL:dtot~td nrnrd ~ He-su

106

107 BOOK REVIEW SECTION

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109 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 105 Tom A. Coburn with John Hart (and a Forward by Robert Novak). Breach of Trust: How Washington Turns Outsiders into Insiders. (Nashville, TN: WND Books, 2003), pp $24.99 (ISBN ) he Medical doctors are becoming more prominent in American politics. Earlier this decade Dr. Bill Prist became Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate. Dr. Howard Dean was for a few months in 2004 the leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States. Then there is Oklahoma's own Dr. Tom Coburn, Oklahoma's newly elected United States Senator, who, with some acknowledged help, has written a semi-autobiography of his three terms of service in the United States House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. Interspersed throughout Coburn's book are ten observations about what the U.S. Congress doesn't want you to know about how it spends your tax dollars. As imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I am adopting his template for this book review, listing ten observations (reflecting my own humble personal opinion) that you, as a professional political scientist, might find useful to know about either U.S. Senator Tom Coburn and/or his book, Breach of Trust: 1. Tom Coburn is more a libertarian (or even an anarchist) than a conservative. Liberals build schools and hire teachers. Conservatives build prisons and hire police. Libertarians close down public institutions and privatize any remaining jobs. Senator Coburn's agenda has always

110 106 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER 2004 been to shrink and reduce government, rather than to make it work or to carry out an ideological agenda. Likewise, he is more a radical or revolutionary than a Republican. Coburn is more interested in limiting (if not eliminating) government than he is in his political party, directing or controlling it. 2. Ideological purity is more important to him than party loyalty. Remember, this book is an attack by Coburn on his own Republican Party in Congress (not the Democrats in Congress) because the GOP opted for political expediency rather than ideological purity. Who else would lead a revolt against Newt Gingrich because he believed the Speaker to be too liberal or not confrontational enough with the Democrats? Most of us learned in our "Parties and Pressure Groups" class the difference between the two. The political parties seek to control the governmental process while the pressure group wants the government to adopt a specific policy. Using this distinction, Dr. Coburn is a member of a pressure or interest group rather than a political party. 3. As if reinventing the wheel or rediscovering fire, Senator Coburn has stumbled upon "The Iron Law of Oligarchy" as originally promulgated by Roberto Michels in his 1911 volume Political Parties. This concept is well known and easily recognized by any public administrator or student of administrative theory. Dr. Coburn's Republican Party (GOP) behaved just like Michels' German Social Democratic Party (SDP) did approximately 100 years earlier-the party compromised its principles to retain political power. Specifically, Senator Coburn's Congressional Republicans favored lots of federal spending and big federal deficits as they viewed it as a key to being reelected and retaining if not expanding their political power. Likewise, the Republican leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives took a position on term limits that shocked Coburn but would be immediately recognized by anyone familiar with Michels: now that we are in power, there is no real immediate need to adopt term limits. Hence, this explains the title of Coburn's book. As recounted by Coburn, this devotion to institutional self-interest is not just limited to the Republican Party but the American Medical Association (AMA) as well. Dr. Coburn reports AMA lobbyists knew next to nothing about the medical profession or about the problems or needs facing the practicing medical doctor-the

111 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 107 clients whose interests they were supposedly promoting. Dr. Coburn was surprised that the AMA hired lawyers as lobbyists. 4. This is a buddy book, not the tale of a lone wolf defying the powers that be. Whenever Tom Coburn takes political action in the Congressional arena, it is in alliance with Tulsa Congressman Steve Largent. The two fight their political battles side by side, arm-in-arm, and in lockstep together. They are political Siamese twins in any partisan skirmish or fray. 5. This is not the first (or even the best) tale of a naive, very conservative Republican being elected to the legislature, becoming dismayed by its operations, and penning a tell-all expose. H.L. "Bill" Richardson did it earlier (and better) chronicling his experiences in the California State Senate beginning in the 1960s. What Makes You Think We Read the Bills? is not only better written but far more entertaining and enlightening about the legislative process. (The book has since been reissued.) 6. What I learned from the book that I didn't already know was that Congressman J.C. Watts represented Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (page 99). True, Oklahoma City had been dismembered in a gerrymander that gave nearly every member of the Oklahoma Congressional delegation a portion within the city limits but, silly me; I thought the core of OKC was represented during that time by Ernest "Jim" Istook while Watts represented mostly southwestern Oklahoma. 7. Unlike fellow Republican Teddy Roosevelt, who supposedly said the first duty of a statesman is to be re-elected, Tom Coburn, a firm advocate of term limits, did not seek re-election after three terms as he had promised. Like Teddy Roosevelt, who said he would not run for reelection ( 1908) and then later explained it to mean only at that specific time-but not later (1912), Coburn never promised not to seek a higher office at a later date. Unlike TR, Coburn was successful in his efforts.

112 108 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER Despite its length of 254 pages of text, there is far less to this book than meets the eye. It is padded with lengthy quotes, excerpts of editorials, snippets of articles, and speeches from Coburn and other's who agree with or praise him or his position. Having examined a few padded term papers myself, I recognize one when I read it. However, those works were never offered for sale to an unsuspecting public. Note: there is no index, bibliography, or appendix, although in the conclusion Senator Coburn does provide a plan for action and there are two addendums in the middle of the volume. 9. Dr. Coburn writes from the perspective of a businessman who wants the government to deregulate and untax his efforts so he can run his business the way he wants and make a profit, not as a medical doctor who is dedicated to the welfare of his patients. (However, I am equally dismayed, as was Dr. Coburn, that his offer of advice on matters of medical policy was rebuffed by the leadership of his own party and I personally applaud his efforts combating AIDS/HIV.) 10. If I was requested to recommend a book that is an autobiography of a young, idealistic, maverick Republican, who is elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, does not compromise his principles, battles the leadership of his own party, and eventually is a victorious candidate for the U.S. Senate, I would not hesitate for a moment. The book I heartily recommend is Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris. Thomas H. Clapper Oklahoma State Legislature Thomas H. Clapper has been employed by the Oklahoma State

113 BOOKREVIEWSECTION 109 Ronald Keith Gaddie. Born to Run: Origins of the Political Career. (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), pp $26.95 ISBN he Born to Run details nine case studies in the pursuit for elective office to the state legislature from five states, Georgia, Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wisconsin. All the candidates are young. It is part of a new series of books devoted to both the theory and practice of politics, Campaigning American Style, Rowman and Littlefield publishers. Dr. Gaddie provides an insider's view of campaign life, the emotional rollercoaster, where you are only as good as your last speech, ad, flyer, or knocked door. Professor Gaddie may have borrowed the title of his book from Bruce Springsteen's album, he also could have used either "Thunder Road", or "Backstreets". It is a report from the campaign trail and is the story, or stories, of the very beginning of the political career with a unique look forward, rather than the more typical backward career mapping. Dr. Gaddie follows each race through the lens of the candidate's youth which is a rarity, yet within the context of today's political environment, diffused and fragmented political power, candidate centered races, ambition, weakened parties, term limits, and important groups and individuals. He builds upon the important work and observational research of his mentor, Richard Fenno, in Home Style, by observing the political process first hand. This is reality political science. I know. I was 27 years old when first elected to the Oklahoma House of Representatives and served four terms.

114 110 OKLAHOMA POLillCS I NOVEMBER 2004 His work includes an analysis of the important question of why young people run in the first place and related considerations such as nativity, which he states, is highest in Oklahoma. The author finds that political ambition, especially progressive political ambition, is most prevalent among the young, especially the activists, and these early starters who get into office before they reach thirty-five are the ones who go farthest in American politics. Brad Carson, Dan Boren, Kalyn Free, Brad Henry, and others this election year could provide excellent local examples for added discussion. Gaddie believes that all of the young politicians described in his book are closer to professionals than amateurs. "They are making career choices because they want to be in government, but not on the basis of any one issue," he states. While all nine candidates and their districts vary widely- male, female, urban, rural, Democrat, Republican, single, married - commonality is found in the following observations. All candidates benefited from a core inner circle of support that provided financial connections, as well as emotional and political advice with established networks. Most had strong civic ties and mentor type relationships with well known politicians. They had a head start with the powers that be and they planned and began their campaigns as early as possible. The candidates largely managed their own campaigns and were self-motivated. All ran intense grassroots campaigns that were issue-oriented. And all knew their districts well enough to allow the uniqueness of the district help dictate the style and mode of the campaign. Once elected, policy concerns were simply an extension of the campaign and the needs of the district as well as the ambition of the newly elected legislator. Gaddie observes how age quickly can cease to be an issue within a legislative body given individual personality, talent, dedication, and hard work as he follows freshmen in their first years of office. He concludes with a discussion on the evolution of ambition as observed in the profiled young candidates and elected officials. For interested readers and scholars, Professor Gaddie continues to provide a tracking of the progress of those he has labeled "The Young Guns," all 27 candidates for legislative office in the state of Oklahoma under 30 this year, on his website Born to Run could easily inspire any undergraduate or graduate student of politics, much in the same way Keith Gaddie describes his

115 BOOK REVIEW SECTION Ill reaction, as an undergraduate at Florida State University, to reading Home Style by Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "That is what I want to do." C.A. Taylor Rogers State University

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117 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 113 Jill Norgren. The Cherokee Cases: Two Landmark Federal Decisions in the Fight for Sovereignty. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), pp.212. $21.95 ISBN Some books transcend a discipline and make themselves available for use to several academic and even the general reading public. This work is of use to historians primarily, of some use to those engaged in legal history, and perhaps a little less use to political scientists. The book is a fine chronological development of the background to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia. These two cases set the pre-civil War federal stance as to interactions between Native American tribes and the states, and even today cast a long shadow as to how tribes are considered in the governmental sense. The setting for each case, then, is crucial to the understanding of the outcomes in each case. The cases, however decided, would have various ramifications on such issues as states' rights and the slavery question. The growing issue of slavery as well as the issue of nullification as raised by John Calhoun during this time made the milieu surrounding the cases as important as the legal precedents involved in the decisions. There is a fine description of the growth of the Cherokee Nation, its interaction with the colonial powers, and the United States through the Revolution, preparing for the main inquiry. More could have been made of the totally different view of ownership of land as between the Native Americans and the Euro-powers. There is a good description of the Cherokee's unfortunate alliance with the British during the Revolution and the consequences of that alliance. The description of the Compact

118 114 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 of 1802 between Georgia and the United States, wherein the Georgians ceded land claims in return for some assurance that the U.S. "as soon as possible" would oversee the extinguishment of Cherokee land claims is correctly isolated as a critical turning point against the Native Americans. Once the Louisiana Purchase was made, and there was a place further west for the tribes, the long term outcome was not in doubt, unless the law would provide differently. The portions of the book which concern the method of the Georgians in acquiring the land are likewise succinct. Georgia claimed jurisdiction over the land as a prelude to ownership, hoping to run the natives off "legally" instead of buying them out, since the Cherokee themselves would not resort to the violence which would have triggered the raw exercise of military power. The description of Andrew Jackson and his sway over the country and this particular problem is a little too heavy, and the treatment of Chief Justice Marshall is a little too light. Granted, Jackson was a huge figure in government, politics and even society, but without the surrounding consensus of whites, particularly in the South, his beliefs on these matters might not have held sway in spite of the law. Marshall, though in his twilight, is still treated too lightly. His motivations for his viewpoint are not given the depth accorded Jackson, and perhaps not enough to forestall the reader asking why Marshall acted and then reacted as he did in the cases. The author pins Marshall's partial giving in to the Georgian case in Cherokee Nation, in agreeing that the rights of the "discoverers" of the New World flowed to the U.S., by saying that he needed to protect the Court. There is not enough development of the threats to the Court to fully help us understand this development. While a historian will be satisfied with a description of the characters and the broad flow of events, a political scientist will of necessity be more interested in motivations, triggering events, and individual, as opposed to overall, causation. This is why we need to know more about Marshall, especially as he is as big a figure in American history as Jackson. The description of the attorneys in the book, their attachment to payment for their work, and their ultimate defection after obtaining somewhat favorable judgments for their native clients might be a good book on its own. It is apparent from the book that the lawyers' main concern was payment for their services, and it is ironic that they were

119 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 115 mostly paid less than they wanted after defecting to the side of Jackson and the Georgians. Their defection is disturbing, leaving the reader with a question as to whether everyone in the drama was just sleepwalking, with the outcome never in doubt regardless of the law churned out by the Court. There is not a thorough study of the cases from a lawyer's point of view, but that is not the purpose of the work. It would be of use to provide the setting for the cases, but in today's legal atmosphere with regard to Indian sovereignty, Marshall's black letter law will be much more important than the historical setting. This is an excellent reference for those of various disciplines doing work in this area, most notable for its apparent lack of bias in telling the story, something not always available in works on this subject. Bill Gorden Redlands Community College

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121 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 117 Renee Ann Cramer. Cash, Color, and Colonialism: The Politics of Tribal Acknowledgment. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), pp. 234.$24.95 ISBN he Renee Ann Cramer has produced an engaging treatment of a controversial topic. In the wake of tribal gaming expansion and American Indian tribal fuel and tobacco revenue threatening Anglo-American retail sales, political opposition has risen among voters and in Congress. Cramer, who teaches political science at California State University Long Beach, surveys tribal acknowledgment within the federal system. She used a wide range of sources including local, state, and federal documents, interviews, and primary and secondary published information. She assesses the establishment of the federal process as currently codified in 25 CFR Part 83, the theories underlying the attainment of it, and the rocky road involved for tribal groups seeking it. She concludes with an examination of three tribes, the Mowa Choctaw and Poarch Creek in Alabama and the Mashantucket Pequot in Connecticut. Congressional authorizing legislation set up what would ultimately be referred to as the Branch of Acknowledgment and Research. It is now called the Office of Federal Acknowledgment. She examines the long, expensive, and slow process which federal acknowledgement entails. Only fifteen tribal groups have thus far been federally recognized out of hundreds clamoring for it. Federal acknowledgement can bring with it federal dollars and trust land status for tribal territory. Her work looks at the latter aspect because of its importance for gaming income. Her assessment also stresses the importance of the U. S. colonial legal

122 118 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 legacy in Indian Country, racial attitudes, and the growth of Indian gaming revenue and influence leading to a backlash. The author views Indian racial identity and gaming as "points of crystallization" (p. xv) for federal acknowledgment. In a sense her work is about the popular reaction to Indian gaming (the "cash" in her title) even though the focus is on federal recognition of tribal groups. Cramer takes the reader through a survey of the fundamentals of Federal-Indian legal history, then notes reformist tendencies that jolted the Bureau of Indian Affairs into action in the 1970s. The Branch of Acknowledgment and Research (1978) created criteria for federal recognition, which were modified in 1988 and The author examines roadblocks along the path to acknowledgment, especially what Cramer terms "cash and color." She also sets forth scholarly critiques of tribal governmental structures and assesses federal acknowledgment procedures. Cramer's recent work and that of Mark Miller the year before underscore the increasing scholarly interest in the topic. Cramer then moves to the bulk of the work, an examination of acknowledgment centered on the experiences of the Mowa Choctaw Tribe near Coffeeville and the Poarch Band of Creeks near Atmore in Alabama, as well as the Mashantucket Pequot in Connecticut and the consequences that arose from their recognition. Gaming successes have made everyone more aware of the acknowledgment process. Gaming colors federal recognition procedures. A welter of tribal, local, state, and federal interests come into play along with civic, political, religious and other competing forces over recognition issues because of gaming as the focal point. The author points out that gaming success ignited a fierce backlash against American Indians in general and against acknowledgment in particular. Rising stakes fuel increasing litigation. The author notes that the Mowa Band efforts have thus far been frustrated in their attempt to gain federal recognition. Cramer details how Poarch Creek public relations efforts won over initial local white hostility and gained unprecedented respect and support for economic development projects that now benefit all residents of the surrounding Escambia County. Compared to the relative quiet with which the Poarch were recognized, the Mashantucket met a firestorm of controversy attending their recognition and casino activities. For some, excesses of the Fox woods Casino (and the nearby Mohican Sun Casino) in terms of congestion, crime, and impact exemplify all the problems over federal

123 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 119 recognition. In Connecticut, Cramer zeroes in on the Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Tribe and the Eastern Paucatuch Pequot prior to their merger (2002) to illustrate racial hysteria in reaction to Mashantucket recognition. Membership rolls had a tortured history, especially given the factionalism and racial language used. Factionalism was instrumental in the rejection of the Eastern (Paucatuck) Pequot Tribe petition for federal acknowledgment (2000). As a recent example of the complexity ofthe process, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs subsequently reversed the holding, recognizing the tribe, only to have the Interior Board of Indian Affairs reverse the decision (2005) in an unprecedented action. Similar hurdles of proof bedevil the Golden Hill Paugussett (located just south of Colchester, CT) in their petition prospects. Connecticut voter and property owners' backlash fed opposition and litigation against federal recognition and have further complicated and politicized the federal recognition process. Cramer briefly examines suggested "fixes" proposed to rectify the acknowledgment process. She concludes that, instead of attempting to exclude politics from the procedures, everyone should acknowledge the pressures of political, social, economic, and racial issues and take them into consideration when making decisions. Her conclusion about inclusiveness as a proposed solution will appear to some as too simplistic. The acknowledgment landscape in the United States is very broad and some might criticize the author's focus on only a few tribal examples. However, those examples ably illustrate the major points she makes. This is a solidly done work whose three examples illustrate the successes and problems inherent in contemporary tribal acknowledgment. Blue Clark Oklahoma City University

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125 BOOK REVIEW SECTION 121 Theda Skocpol Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), pp $18.87 ISBN pb Theda Skocpol once again dares to occupy highly contested ground that intersects a number of important contemporary dialogues. Diminished Democracy, part of the Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture series, challenges conventional conservative wisdom that pits 'good' local institutions against 'bad' collectivizing national programs, while simultaneously chiding liberals for succumbing to precisely the kind of managerial elitism that would alienate liberalism from its core working-class constituencies. Given the provocative and ambitious nature of the project, even a partial success must be judged as an important contribution, and a worthy addition to Skocpol' swell-deserved reputation in the fields of sociology and political science. Skocpol's thesis is that America's democratic promise lay in the many cross-class, mass-based national groups that formed in local chapters throughout the early republic, and acted as vital intermediary institutions linking local to national politics. This book challenges core assumptions guiding the liberal-communitarian debate with political theorists, the liberal-conservative ideological debate (potentially on a number of levels), and the general debate concerning the nature of interest groups within democratic theory. Skocpol also addresses the relative utility of interest groups as a vehicle for participatory politics. Skocpol's analysis also offers an instructive contrast to her fellow Harvard colleague Robert Putnam and left-leaning communitarian

126 122 OKLAHOMAPOLITICS I NOVEMBER2004 thinkers like Michael Sandel, who have argued that the revitalization of civic life should take place primarily at the local level. Skocpol contends that scholars like Putnam "misdiagnose the civic challenges America faces today, for they have forgotten that national community, active government, and democratic mobilization are all vital to creating and sustaining a vibrant civil society"(p.12). These mass groups facilitated upward mobility for working-class Americans, and agitated for important redistributive programs that raised millions of Americans from the working class into the burgeoning middle class. Additionally, national associations like the Loyal Order of the Moose brought political elites into close contact with working- and middle-class members in ways that contemporary politicians can only superficially and, for Skocpol, inadequately emulate. She cites the (somewhat) apocryphal example of Warren G. Harding being inducted into the Loyal Order of the Moose by his chauffer to illustrate the degree to which the powerful were compelled to pay heed to the needs of their less fortunate brothers as a result of these memberships. Much of the narrative Skocpol develops is archival and historical in nature. She painstakingly amasses evidence to support her thesis of the generally beneficial role these groups played, while looking cleareyed at the frequent chauvinism and bigotry that often drove these groups' policies. Certainly, Skocpol is not advocating a nostalgic return to a time when groups could with impunity segregate and discriminate against ethnic minorities, Catholics, and women. However, she notes that many ethnic minorities, rather than attacking the segregationist policies of these national groups, often created parallel groups and counter-mobilized in eminently democratic fashion. For example, Irish-Americans created the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, and African-Americans began chartering Masonic chapters as early as 1775 in the northern states (p. 35). Her somewhat paradoxical conclusion is that the counter-mobilizing impulses of Americans led to more overall participation in these organizations than may be possible in these more enlightened times, when groups face serious formal and informal pressures to be inclusive in ways that many Americans find discomforting. Skocpol advances a number of reasons why the tumultuous events of the 1960's eroded faith in these larger groups, which succumbed to a professionally managed elite style of politics. The reforms of the Progressive Era, which she characterizes as 'Neo-Mugwump reforms'

127 BOOKREVIEWSECTION 123 had the unfortunate byproduct of inhibiting the kinds of mobilizing politics that insured high voter turnout (but also created an avenue for corruption by political machines, as Skocpol rightly notes). Likewise, Vietnam's lack of unpopularity inhibited veterans' mobilizations that normally punctuated American politics between wars. Similarly, the civil rights and feminist movements - even as they opened avenues for political participation on behalf of disenfranchised groups - created powerful disincentives for membership in the somewhat parochial national groups like the Knights of Columbus. Interestingly, Skocpol offers evidence that professional memberships have not been seriously eroded over time, and suggests that elites remain relatively mobilized, which she suggests as contradictory evidence to Putnam's Bowling Alone thesis: social capital has eroded, but not necessarily among elites, who are more naturally attuned to networking than members of the lower socioeconomic strata (pp ). Skocpol' s remedy to these problems is primarily political rather than institutional. Recommending that many regulations distinguishing between partisan and non-partisan activities be tom down, she believes that elites must eventually return to the kinds of mobilization-driven politics that insure high voter turnout. Her conclusion is that political discourse that is segregated by class is every bit as sterile and superficial as a discourse in which people may be arbitrarily excluded on the basis of their race, religion, or gender. A book so ambitious can hardly be flawless. In some cases, the evidence provided does not always appear to fully support the claims Skocpol makes, particularly in earlier chapters on how the United States became a civic nation. Largely, this problem is simply a reflection of the paucity of evidence available, rather than an indictment of Skocpol's methods, which in some instances are quite novel and innovative. Overall, the flaws in this book are far outweighed by its virtues. Diminished Democracy should be required reading for democratic theorists, and is highly recommended for anyone worried about the future of democracy in the United States. Dr. Ken Hicks Rogers State University

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129 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER CONTRIBUTORS Michael K. Avery is a Carl Albert Fellow at the University of Oklahoma. Ravi Shankar Byrraju works as a graduate research assistant in the Department oflndustrial Engineering at Oklahoma State University. James A. Davis teaches American and Applied Politics at Oklahoma State University. Jan Hardt is a professor of Political Science at the University of Central Oklahoma. Ronald M. Peters, Jr. is professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. Sai Sekhar Metla works as a graduate research assistant in the Department of Industrial Engineering at Oklahoma State University.

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131 OKLAHOMA POLITICS I NOVEMBER REVIEWERS The editors appreciate the careful reading and helpful comments of the following reviewers for this issue of OKLAHOMA POLITICS. Grant Aquirre James Davenport Brad Morelli Ann-Marie Szymanski

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136 OKLAHOMA POLITICS ARTICLES Show Me the Money: Campaign Finance in the 2000 and 2002 Oklahoma Election Jan Hardt Oklahoma's Statutory Constitution Michael K. Avery Ronald M. Peters, Jr. Two "Parties" Among Registered Oklahoma Democrats: The Clark, Edwards, and Kerry Constituencies James A. Davis Ravi Shankar Byrraju Met/a V. Sai Sekhar BOOK REVIEW SEaiON Contributors Reviewers