Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society 1

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1 Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society 1 Slovenes are faced with two basic problems in modern history: the issue of democracy and the national issue (which political elites usually place in the foreground). The development of democracy was only partially determined by our own selves, in so far as its primary characteristic was the induction of mutual intolerance and the exclusion of those with different opinions. 2 The position of the Slovene nation during the individual state formations was usually evaluated "in retrospect" from the standpoint of current political needs, while the newly formed situation was at the same time euphorically praised. This is how after World War I, Austria suddenly became "the jail of nations" even in the eyes of those Slovene politicians and intellectuals who, only a few years prior, claimed to be loyal to it. Illustrations: 1 Repe, Božo. Historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society. Österr. Osth., 2001, jhrg. 43, hf. 1/2, str Ilustr. 2 The Slovene political mentality developed in its basic elements at the end of the 19 th century and grew from the fact that opponents have to be either totally subjugated or forced to be part of the national enemies' camp. This remains a basic characteristic in all three political camps (catholic, liberal and socialist or communist) throughout the political history of the 20 th century. The exception is the period of attaining independence during the second half of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s. As far as parliamentarism is concerned, only the "fragmentary" development of particular periods from the second half of the 19 th century onwards can be discussed. The Slovene parliament, in the modern sense of the word (with a universal franchise and multi-party system), is in operation without intermission for only 10 years as of yet; this is also a time - probably the only one in Slovene history - of "absolute" independence, as before, it had only local significance or it was subordinate to bodies above the national level, as will also be repeated once incorporated in the European Union (more on the subject: Božo Repe: Pravne, politične podlage, okoliščine in pomen prvih demokratičnih volitev" in: Razvoj slovenskega parlamentarizma", Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Ljubljana, 2000 page

2 Fig. 1: The glorified page on Franz Jozef honor for his birthday (Tedenske slike- Weekly Pictures,, August 16, 1916). Picture with the grand- son and patriotic song Got live the Austria. It was similar in all newspapers in the long time of his regime. Till his death and even later practically till the end of First World War, for the majority of the Slovenes Franz Josef was synonymous for so called good old times. - feeling otherwise spread through all empire. Loyalty to Hapsburg Monarchy was one of the basic characteristics of Slovene consciousness, especially expressed among politicians and clergy, but not less at ordinary people. It was systematically built through school system, public life, especially celebrations, holidays, anniversaries etc. 3 Fig. 2: Slovenes supported hardly Austro-Hungarian Declaration of War to Serbia and propaganda was very strong. Serbien muss sterbien, well known motto from postcards and cartoons (published in Hans Weigel, Walter Lukan and Max Peyfuss book Jeder Schuss ein Russ, Jeder Stoss ein Franzos, Edition Christian Brandstätter, Wien 1983). In Slovene oral version this motto was rather changed to even more cahuvinistic way : Srbe na vrbe, which means Hang Serbs to willow trees (Erhängen Serben um weiden). Such devices were latter in Yugoslavia the subject of many disputes and one of the proofs for Serbian side, that Slovenes were part of occupiers and Serbia with incorporation to The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a matter of fact saved them and of course, that they should be grateful for that, stay in silence and pay the price, economical and political one, for that. 3 Vasilij Melik, Božo Repe, Franc Rozman: Zastave vihrajo ( The Flags are Fluttering). Spominski dnevi in praznovanja na Slovenskem od sredine 19. stoletja do danes (selection of illustrations and subtitles Darja Kerec). Modrijan. Ljubljana The text was originally published in the book Öffentliche Gedenktage in Mitteleuropa, Böhlau Verlag Wien, 1997, edited by Emil Brix and Hannes Stekl). 2

3 Fig. 3: When things changed during the war Austria and Hapsburgs slowly but certainly became antagonist and then the enemy. One of first signes is announcement that omnipotence German bridge to Adriatic coast is rocking. Caroon made my Hinko Smrekar, published in Kurent's album in 1918 shows Slovene farmer, tied like Gulliver, chained on the ground. Tied giant wants to stand up. Over him are passing troops of Germans and their adherents («nemškutarji«), but their carriages and coaches are folling down. The subtitle is: Roar, roar Adriatic see, you was and you will always be Slavic. Fig. 4: At the same time you can notice removal from former idols. Slovene solder before the end of the war in 1918 far- sightednessed subtitled propagandistic postcard with portrets of Austrian millitary leaders with comment: Greatnesses of former Austria«(Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page

4 Fig. 5: Very soon later triumphant and ironical feelings are shown like in this obituary, published in satirical journal Kurent in 1918, which says: After a long, painful disease expired Austria it's dirty soul Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201). Fig. 6: And variation on the same topic. Finnis Austriae. Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 201). 4

5 Fig. 7: Pro - Austrian or pro- German feelings became shameful, slightingly named as avstrijakarstvo Slovene intellectuals were turned toward France, German language was almost no subject in schools between both World Wars. But on the other side - as shows this caricature from Hinko Smrekar made in 1921, when new, centralistic constitution was accept - expectations from new state were great, idealized and naive, there was little knowledge about Serbs and in general about South Slavic nations in new state. Fig. 8: This simple mindedness passed quickly, as illustrate another caricature United Yugoslavs (Slovenska kronika 20. stoletja, part I., Nova revija 1995, page 223). 5

6 After World War II, a similar fate befell the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although here situation was something different. Namely, resistance movement and also allies didn t recognize dismemberment of Yugoslavia and annexation of occupying territories to enemy states, at the end of the war there was compromise between Tito and predsident of royal government Ivan Šubašič, so the criticism was turned toward inside problems - political system and national relation-ships. Naturally, a negative thought pattern developed concerning the former state; even after the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, which became synonymous with Balkanism, Byzantinism, etc. It was a state, which during the time of its existence, economically and politically limited the Slovenes and prevented their attaining independence, and in a cultural sense kept them on a lower cultural level, i.e. in a different cultural circle, one to which the Slovenes were not supposed to belong. This was all the easier since Yugoslavia was a communist, or rather a socialist state and thereby an excellent target for a double criticism: national as well as ideological. Fig. 9: Poor, exploited Slovenia (Milan Maver newspaper Delo, September 29, 1986). Cartoon represented Slovenia as hen which would be beat from Yugoslav federation. Fig. 10: Because of geographical image of Slovenia hen is one of its symbols. You can explain it also as naive, a little slow mind, typical animal which is waiting for its destiny. 6

7 This cartoon was created at the end of the eighties by Mat'kurja one of the first domestic internet servers which is still operating on the web. Fig. 11: Slovenia, stripped to the nakedness, rest just with coif (national cap) Milan Maver, Delo, September 29, Fig. 12: After national plebiscit in december 1990 discourse with Serbian (Yugoslav) solder is represented completely different as on the previous cartoon from the times of establishment of Yugoslavia when he was great deliverer of the Slovenes. Drunken, brutal solders says: Lets, go home! And Slovene girl answered: Oh don t be ridiculous! (Franco Juri, Delo, December 24., 1990). 7

8 Fig. 13: Innocent Slovenia, supposed to be raped by Yugoslav soldier (Mladina, June 25, 1991) Fig. 14: Oh, that Balkan, said Slovenia, self sufficient, clean and reborned girl and slammed the door behind her (Franco Juri, Delo, October 12, 1991). It is already forgotten, that Slovenes believed in Yugoslavia for a long time and they had invested a lot of energy in its planning and development. But on the other side, the Yugoslav federation had never been able to function in the course of its existence without compulsory cohesive measures from outside or internal factors. When these fell away (the decline of socialism and the lifting of the Iron Curtain, the disintegration of the party and of the army) it could not find a democratic alternative for its existence. From this experience is originate the fear and opposition against establishing any institutional ties with the Balkan states. It is general opinion that, such a process might cause the country to slip from its status of state bordering on the conflict area to the group of countries that 8

9 constitute the conflict area. In any proposition (as for example Stability pact) politicians see the aim that Slovenia has being "pushed" back to the Balkans to help to stabilize and democratize the region. It was quite a shock when in the beginning of 1994, the special envoy of the American President Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who came to Europe to explain the initiative for a Partnership for Peace, classified Slovenia as a "Balkan democracy" together - can you emagine - with Romania, Bulgaria and even Albania. 4 Changes in Croatia and Serbia in the last time, accompanied with proposals of Western politicians about creation some sort of association of Balkan states caused new similar anxiety. In Slovenia, critical assessment of the national position in different periods slow in forming, and it is even slower in becoming a part of the historical consciousness. Here I am referring to the acknowledgement that Slovenes did not only suffer the negative sides, but were also faced with a positive experience. For example, in the multinational milieu of the Danubian monarchy they were able to form, besides the regional, also a national consciousness; Slovenes acquired political culture and, at least in limited form, became accustomed to parliamentarism. They achieved a sort of informal cultural autonomy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, despite it being centralistic and non-democratic. Communist Yugoslavia rendered it possible for the Primorska (coastal) region (i.e. one third of the Slovene population and more than a quarter of the territory) to be joined with Slovenia; and last but not least, Slovenes were given federal status, a constitution, their own national assembly and other state agencies, and under the specific circumstances of the Communist Party state, implemented the delayed processes of modernization that former elites either could not or wanted not to bring to effect, for example, the agrarian reform, industrialization, separation of Church from State, women's emancipation, a more balanced social structure. 5 What differentiates the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s from the previous historical periods is the simultaneousness of the two processes, i.e. the gradual democratization, which ended in the installment of a multi-party system and the fight for national emancipation which ended with the formation of the Slovene state. 6 Namely, in earlier periods the development of democracy does not always correspond with the current position of the Slovene nation; it is often even stands in opposition to progress in resolving the national issue (as I mentioned before: in centralistic kingdom of Yugoslavia they have made enormous cultural progress including establishing first university which Austria didn t allowed in all the time of its existence, communistic Yugoslavia successful solved the question of Western border etc). Among the political elites and factors of development in the 80s there were, in fact, differences concerning priorities. The League of Communists, for example, was quick to find common ground with the opposition as regards Yugoslavia, but much slower as to the issue of democratization. The majority of alternative movements, in part also the League of Socialist Youths, placed democratic civil rights before the national issue. The Slovene Democratic Alliance and some other parties conceded the same importance to both issues. 7 Differences were existent even after Demos (Democratic opposition) came to power in the spring of 1990, since it was evident that a part of the political forces primarily wished to consolidate their position in power, take control over the social capital, while 4 Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji, Delo, January 15 th, More on the subject in abridged form: Božo Repe: Slovenci v XX.stoletju, Katalog stalne razstave Muzeja novejše zgodovine v Ljubljani, Ljubljana, 1999, pp Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, Aleš Gabrič, Božo Repe: The Repluratization of Slovenia in the 1980s (with an Introduction by Dennison Rusinow), The Donald W. Treadgold Papers No.24, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, February Koga voliti? Programi političnih strank in list na pomladnih volitvah v Sloveniji, Ljubljana, March 1990, Jugoslovanski center za teorijo in prakso samoupravljanja Edvard Kardelj, Ljubljana, See also: Nastajanje slovenske državnosti, Slovensko politološko društvo, Ljubljana

10 independence would follow later. Nonetheless, it can be assessed that the political gravitation in Slovenia at the time leaned towards the simultaneousness of both processes. In Yugoslavia, generally speaking, a strong opposition to both processes is discernible; and as regards international circumstances, the western forces, especially the USA, supported democratization but were against secession. 8 Choosing in between both processes they were prepare to sacrifice democracy for geostrategical interests and they allowed to Yugoslav president Ante Marković so called limited intervention with army in Slovenia (which changed to the real war). The independent Slovene state was a result of political and social changes in the 1980s. These took place in the context of a global crisis of communism, disintegration of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union and a deep political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia, as well as a crisis in the relationships among the different nations within the state. Independence would not have been possible without these external changes and likewise, the internal process of democratization would also have been very different. Incorporated among the basic internal characteristics, upon which Slovenes themselves could influence, was a relatively open political scene which enabled a circulation of ideas and meetings between those in power and those in opposition, a strong civil society, supremacy of a reformist movement within the Communist Party and a high level of consent concerning basic national issues. The processes of social democratization and of national emancipation were tightly intertwined. This situation enabled a smooth transition from the one-party to a multi-party system and successful preparations for attaining independence. Consensus between the socialist government and the opposition was settled upon through a confederation status, a fact that is nowadays all too often forgotten. Even when Demos came to power the evaluation of a confederation as the maximum achievement possible under such circumstances did not alter. It was only after the Yugoslav National Army attacked Slovenia that the standpoint and situation shifted. 8 The USA held this position until the final collapse of Yugoslavia, most decisively in the spring of American Secretary of State James Baker had, only a few days before the proclamation of Slovene independence in Belgrade on June 21, 1991, told Slovene representatives that the USA wishes to retain the unity of Yugoslavia and that they will not recognize the independence of Slovenia, nor would any other country do differently, but that they wish to help with the democratization of Yugoslavia (Note of the discussion between the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kučan and James Baker III, Secretary of State of the USA, Belgrade, June 21st, 1991, Arhiv Predsedstva Republike Slovenije, see also Warren Zimmermann: Origins of a Catastrophe, Random House, New York 1996, p.71). 10

11 Fig. 15: Yugoslavia an orphan girl, poor child, is waiting before the draw breed of European fortress. (Milan Maver, Delo, February 20, 1989). General opinion at the end of the eighties in Slovenia was, that it will not be able to enter to European Community as a part of Yugoslavia. That was the point of quarrel with federal center and especially with Serbia. Conflict with Serbia was not conflict of two nationalisms, as it was usually interpreted, but split between two evolutional concepts: Slovenian towards Europe and modernization and Serbian, patriarchal, intorverted and turn to the past. In Brussels over Ljubljana and not over Belgrad was popular phrase at the end of eighties and start of ninghties. Fig. 16: But all the others in Yugoslavia are chatching her foots when she is nocking ot the European's doors. (Milan Maver, Delo, May 25, Following the proclamation of independence, there was a continuance of shifts in the Slovene political sphere, polarization was re-established and parties continued to fall apart and merge. This process is ongoing already more than a decade. The 10-year economic balance demonstrates that, on the whole, Slovenia underwent a successful transition and it continues to make progress (nowadays bgp. for example, is more than dolars, purchasing or buying power even more, about at the end of Yugoslavia was in all country less than 3000 and in Slovenia about 5000), two third of former Yugoslav market was replaced with western markets etc. But there is the high price of social differences and unemployment (about 12%), which is turning increasing numbers of young people, educated people, into second-rate citizens, as well as many other side effects, all influencing the augmenting unbalanced social structure. One of the basic characteristics of Slovene society is its tendency towards particracy, a growing ideological intolerance, and due to the small size of the country, the formation of clientages and clans. The once powerful civil movements have been sucked into the various parties and no longer play an important role. The new political ideology, which developed following the proclamation of independence and is shared by the majority of the political parties, could be labeled as a "rush towards Europe". But the course is directed by European Union and proceeds more in accordance with the Latin proverb sestina lente (eile mit Weile) "more haste, less speed". Characteristically, it presents the so-called Europe as an internally non-differential notion, which can generally adapt to particular political interests (following a self-serving 11

12 principle, for example, educational systems that correspond to a particular line of argumentation would be used, and the same holds true for the relationship between Church and State adherents of confessional religious subject in schools are alleging as European example which should be following Austria or Italy, opponents France, etc.). In this "rush towards Europe" Slovene politicians are, as always throughout history, overly compliant, even servile, and prepare to make smaller or larger concessions as a sign of "good will": closing duty-free shops, instating visas for Balkan states, signing of the so-called Spanish compromise 9, indifference reaction to unofficial or half official demands from Austria about closing atomic nuclear power in Krško, recognizing so called Old Austrian minority, recalling of some AVNOJ decrees and codes or maybe even its basic resolutions and decisions on which federal Yugoslavia was created. Fig 17. Proceeding from such situation there is also another perception toward European Union which is: persuasion that Slovenia experience unfairness waiting before Europeans door with no clear condition what she has to do enter. Slovenia feels like angranted lover (Amor), who will run out of arrows shooting in seductive EU (Marko Kočevar 9 In 1993, Italy, as a condition for not impeding the signing of the Association Agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, demanded different concessions of Slovenia. The key one concerned the property issue of Italian refugees - after World War II - from Istria and the Slovene Primorska (coastal) region (this issue being already resolved with Yugoslavia). The direct Italian demands were initially comprised in the so-called Aquileia Agreement, signed by Secretary of State Lojze Peterle, but refused by the Slovene parliament. In a milder and more general version (the so-called Spanish Compromise, made after the Spanish Intervention), parliament passed the Italian demands in April Slovenia obligated itself to open the real-estate market after the ratification of the Association Agreement for all those citizens of the EU, who lived in the territory of Slovenia for at least three years (at any time in the past). Even though Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek, as well as President Milan Kučan, interceded on behalf of the Spanish Compromise, they later labeled it as an example of conditioning and extortion (Kučan even did so in his speech before the European Parliament). 12

13 One of the consequences of the newly formed situation within the state was that Slovenes were again faced with dilemmas and situations from the turn of the century or even earlier; this is when they were marginalized, during either the Yugoslav or communist periods, and for which it had appeared that they would never need dealing with again. Relations between the larger neighboring nations (Austrians - or Germans, Italians, Hungarians) and Slovenes, which could be characterized as having been traumatic for the past centuries, are being established anew (or old models in new disguise). Incorporated among these is the extraordinary persistence of regional identities, which in many ways prevents the development of a nation; at the same time there is a revival of former regional centers beyond the present Republic of Slovenia (Graz, Klagenfurt, Trieste, also Wienna in a broader context), which are slowly but reliably becoming gravitational points for a large part of the working force from bordering regions and also having a growing importance in education. The transitional character of the country, its economic periphery, the influence of different cultures and a linguistic endangerment seem permanent features in the historical development. 10 In psychological terms, self-assertion should be added, a belief in self-sufficiency and prejudices towards anything different, all of which only strengthened after attaining independence (it is easy to substantiate through historiography, how difficult it was for "the Carniolan mind" to get used to the "different" character of those people from the Prekmurje and Primorska (Coastal) regions, integrated into Yugoslavia after World War I and II; prejudices and stereotypes about regional affiliations proved to be one of the most persistent elements of the psychosocial make-up of Slovenes). 10 Peter Vodopivec: Glavne poteze in stalnice v slovenskem zgodovinskem razvoju in poskus zgodovinarjevega pogleda v prihodnost, Slovenija po letu 1995, razmišljanja o prihodnosti, Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana, 1995, pp

14 Fig. 18: The map, made by caricaturist Marko Kočevar, ironically stressed this feeling with showing Slovenia as a center of the world. Another discernible syndrome conditioned by history and arising from the lack of state tradition is "snitching" on the opposing political option abroad and the search for an external arbiter for internal conflicts. Where Slovene politicians previously turned to Vienna and Belgrade, they now turn to Brussels. 11 This demonstrates that the processes experienced in this state during the last decades are superficial and that the permanent features did not change in their essence after attaining independence. An evaluation of historical consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia over Slovene Society, the formation and the 10-year existence of the Slovene state, as well as the democratic processes within, are for the moment only transitional, as were the estimates of past situations. A more objective evaluation can be established once Slovene society is integrated in the European Union; what the integration process contributed and how Slovenia will be able to handle the loss of a national state, while it is actually still enduring its puberty, shall only then be clarified. Doubtless, the Slovene State was a tremendous and necessary historical achievement, especially as regarded from the circumstances in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Nevertheless, the fact remains that independence was achieved at a time when the classic national state, based on 19 th century patterns of the national economy, defense system, foreign policy, proper currency and other attributes ranging to a legitimate aviation company, is in decline in Europe. This is also at a time when the (national) state, at least in the west, no longer represents the determining factor in protecting democratic rights, since these are of course becoming universal. Fig. 19: It is not possible to say, that in Slovenia is not such awareness and self irony. On this cartoon, titled»famous«(mladina ) Slovenia and Croatia are exposed in the time when they were togehther with Bosnia accepted in United Nations. It says:»go on, numbers 176 and 177, Oh, good boys..«cartoon also stress on the different psycho-social approach between Slovenia and Croatia - predsident Kučan with a small bench and predsident Tuđman with royal armchair. 11 The most recent instance, but not the only one, was the pursuit for arbitration with the so-called Venice Commission - the "Democracy through Law" commission of the European Council - concerning the election system just before the elections in October The conflict was instigated by the Prime Minister at the time, who did not agree with - an otherwise perfectly legal - decision of the Parliament. 14

15 New solutions are needed for these new challenges, although it seems that this type of realization hardly affected Slovene social sciences. History is still in great measure evaluated from the viewpoint of a national state, arising from the belief that the Slovene state should be the ultimate goal of successive Slovene generations, even though historiography does not offer empirical proofs for such claims. Historians critical of this sort of approach are labeled as "a-national." 12 This sort of claim is of course logical in a political sense, since it offers the possibility of appropriating the so-called "independence capital", be that in an historical sense (demonstrating the "farsightedness" of particular political forces or individuals in various historical periods) or in view of the current political situation. Scientifically speaking it is also very convenient as it limits research to finding the earliest possible "proofs" justifying a Slovene state-forming mentality. There is no need to take much interest in the broader historical context, various sources can be interpreted "in retrospect", there is no need for comparisons with other and similar nations, and it is possible to avoid confrontation with the determinations of researchers concerned with the social sciences of other nations. However, this of course only occasions putting off a problem that will have to be faced sooner or later anyway. 12 The evaluation that there is "an extremely loud and influential a-national movement" present in Slovene science, was noted by Dr. Stane Granda), Zgodovinski časopis, 1999, volume 53, No.4, pg.612). 15