December 2007:

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1 REPEATED EUROPEAN REFERENDA: FROM MAASTRICHT TO LISBON Aušrinė Jurgelionytė VDU PMDF Gedimino g. 44, LT Kaunas Tel , The repeated referenda related to the European Union (EU) deepening (on Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993 in Denmark, Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002 and Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 2009) and the recurrent success reasons, likely (presumptive) patterns is the field neglected in respect of analysis. Therefore the analysis will investigate the development of argumentation and situation from the point of view of reasoned choice. More profound investigation is prompted by observed upsurge of criticism before the first referenda and emerging opportunity to convince the voters in the second referenda when the same voters are made again, and do not resist, to express their will on the same issues. Usually the referenda is an instrument of to solve issues by crossing the confrontation frontlines among political parties. However, the EU issue is not the subject of dispute arising between traditional parties it is rather a watershed among parliamentary and nonparliamentary parties. Consequently, the key role in the euro-referenda related to the integration deepening is not with the parties (their position will be necessarily referred to in some aspects) but with the government as a fundamental authority in a country. For this reason the position and policy of the latter will be the main focus in the subject of the analysis. Key words: European Union, referenda, campaigns Introduction The period between the Treaty of Maastricht that marked the birth of the European Union until present is loaded with dynamic developments, therefore citizens of the Member States were on more than one occasion invited to take important decisions on further destiny of the entire Union, and, at the same time, on deepening the integration. There have been cases of outstanding success (e.g., the Treaty of Amsterdam), and resounding failures (the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe). The present paper shall explore three critical cases, i.e., repeated referenda in Denmark and Ireland following which the Treaties of Maastricht, Nice and Amsterdam came into effect, even though only at the second attempt The Constitution of Denmark (Article 20) allows the signature of international treaties subject to the approval of 5/6 of the members of the Folketing or to the simple majority obtained by way of referendum. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) did not obtain the approval of the required parliamentary majority, therefore the referendum was called for. Despite the achievement of the required majority immediately before the second referendum, the referendum was nevertheless held 1, and the Treaty was finally ratified only after the public approval. Incidentally, no referenda were called in Denmark in relation to the ratification of the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon. Ireland is the only Member State of the EU that, according to its Constitution, was obliged to call the referendum concerning this Treaty. The citizens of Ireland are obliged to vote concerning amendments of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland: this is the only way, pursuant to Articles 29, 46 and 47 of the Constitution of Ireland, to enforce the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland. After the judgements of the Supreme Court were incorporated as part of the constitutional doctrine, the granting of any new powers to the EU institutions must be each time treated as an amendment to the Irish Constitution 2. On that basis the Irish in their first voting in 2001 rejected the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty of Lisbon later in June 2008 which for the time being slowed down the overall ratification process. It was renewed only after the negotiations and repeated referenda. Thus in all these cases the Government proposed its citizens to vote for the second time on the same issue. Therefore the principal object of the present analysis is repeated referenda. The objective of the analysis is to identify the reasons causing the different results of the first and repeated referenda. For this purpose the present paper will attempt to assess the impact of the evolution of argumentation, when the new persuasion methods emerged following further negotiations or as a result of conditions completely independent from those, as well as the potential influence of the governments. Based on the rational choice access the States and their governments could have taken advantage of the failures at the referenda to attain their own objectives. 1 Closa C. Why convene referendums? Explaining choices in EU constitutional politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 14:8 December 2007: Collins A. M., O Reilly J. The Aplication of Community Law in Ireland Common Market Law Review. 1990, No 27, p

2 Although during the entire existence of the EU tens of referenda have been convened, the issue of repeated referenda has been only scantily investigated. Different authors (T. Worre 3, C. Closa 4, J. O Brennan 5, M. Franklin in his discussions with P. Svensson 6, and partly Schuck et al 7 and others) in most cases dwell only upon one country (Denmark or Ireland) and its issues. First referenda: rational for and against Almost two decades ago when the Danish at their referendum for the first time dissaproved of the Treaty of Maastricht that proposed the creation of the Economic and Monetary union in the future, protection of the rights of EU citizens and a closer cooperation in the areas of justice and internal affairs, it was then that they were loudly referred to as eurocpetics 8. The arguments at that time most often referred to by the supporters of the Treaty were economic advantages offered by the Treaty and the principle of subsidiarity. The opponents arguments, however, were emotionally much heavier. They claimed that the Treaty of Maastricht created threat to the sovereignty of Denmark, its national identity and cultural traditions. An what I smoremoreover, also the threat to openess and democracy. 9 In principe, the Treaty of Nice is one of the most important instruments for further development of the European Union. It was anticipated in advance that any failure to ratify the Treaty will prevent (at least temporatily) any further enlargement of the EU. This was the question related to the elargement of the European Union. Then all major political parties, most trade organisations and different unassociated groups pronounced "yes" to the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. Their main argument was that the Treaty is a path to the enlargement of the EU and that such enlargement will be beneficial to Ireland. Furthermore, the enlargement, in its own turn, is an expression of solidarity with the Central and Eastern Europe. On the other part, the first rejection of the Treaty of Nice and the arguments of the small non-governmental parties were related to the neutrality of Ireland itself and its military position, and the growing resentment against lack of democracy in the EU. Another item specifically identified and subjected to strict criticism were the foreign, security and defence capacities of the EU with a view to achieving the perception of their negative impacts upon the Ireland s neutrality. 10 The Treaty of Lisbon is a compromise attempt after the failure of the Treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe. Efforts were devoted to eliminate any obstacles not only in terms of its contents, but also as to its ratification. Thus it was only Ireland that has to ratify the Treaty by way of referendum and rejected it having called it second-order. 11 First, the YES campaign was assessed by numerous experts as scanty and uninventive. The main arguments on supporters part were delcaration of the feeling of commoness with Europe and the statements that to support the Treaty meant to approve the EU from which Ireland is benefitting. Meanwhile the NO voters stongly believed that erosion of Ireland s neutrality, end of abortion control and the service in the European army are the constitutent parts of the Treaty of Lisbon. Also, voters were intimidated with higher taxes and the lessened role of the member of the Commission for the Irish meant the deterioration of their voice in Europe. 12 Futhermore, opponents of the Treaty heavily leaned on the argument that the text of the Treaty was incomprehensible and argued: if you do not know what is written, vote NO Worre,Torben. First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and J.Comm.Market Studies, 1995, Vol.33, No.2 4 Closa, Op.cit. 5 O Brennan, John. Ireland s Return to Normal Voting Patterns on EU Issues: the 2002 Nice Treaty Referendum. European Political Science, Spring 2003, p Franklin, M., McLaren L. Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32, 1994 ir Franklin M. N., Van Der Eijk C., Marsh M. Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support For Europe in The Wake of Maastricht. West Europe Politics, 18 (3), Schuck, Andreas R.T., de Vreese, Claes H. Reversed Mobilization in Referendum Campaigns. How Positive News Framing Can Mobilize the Skeptics? International Journal of Press/Politics, 2009, vol.14, No1, p June 1992 YES percent, NO percent.: 9 Buch R., Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, Gilland K. The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Ireland. Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research March, Turin, Italy. Rasta: 11 TAIP 46,6 proc., NE 53,4 proc., šaltinis: Holmes M. Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland. Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12 June Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September sbon%20treaty%20referendum%20research%20findings_sept08.pdf 13 Holmes, Op. cit. 78

3 Change in reasoning in repeated referenda The objective to achieve some more favourable attitude towards a deepened integration, even with all its drawbacks, for the purpose of eliminating trade barriers required some political changes and consessions in a number of areas. There were those who agrued against the idea of the common currency, some opposed the concept of the Central Bank, others opposed the common monetary policy, etc. Next to them there were individual groups supportive only of separate components of the Treaty. 14 Efforts were required to reconcile the two opposite positions. But in principle, in the course of the public campaign, on the eve of the second referendum, no new outstanding reasonings or arguments have been expressed. The YES side continued to highlight the economic benefit and the benefit brought about by subsidiarity, while the "NO" side, apart from the threats referred to in relation to the first referendum, found a new argument of the obvious lack of democracy where citizens were asked for the second time answer the same question (see Table 1). Table 1. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty of Maastricht in Denmark Treaty Principal arguments FOR Principal arguments AGAINST Maastricht Treaty, 1992 Economic advantages; Threat to the sovereignty of Denmark, its subsidiarity principle national identity and cultural traditions; Maastricht Treaty, 1993 Economic advantages; subsidiarity principle threat to openess and democracy Threat to the sovereignty of Denmark, its national identity and cultural traditions; threat to openess and democracy; it is non-democratic to invite the public to vote in respect of the same issue repeatedly. Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the article Buch R., Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, In the process of the preparation for the second referendum concerning the ratification of the Nice Treaty in Ireland, the main arguments in favour of the Treaty were related to the preparation of the enlargement of the EU and the claim that the enlargement will be beneficial for the country. Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU was conceived as a moral duty to demonstrate solidarity with the Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered from the oppression of the Soviet Union and, having liberated itself some ten years ago, now is seeking to proceed along the path of democracy (see Table 2). Table 2. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty of Nice in Ireland Treaty Principal arguments FOR Principal arguments AGAINST The Treaty of Nice, 2001 Preparation for the EU enlargement Threat to the national military neutrality; that will be beneficial to Ireland; growing deficiency of democracy in the EU; a sign of solidarity with the Central negative effects on Ireland s neutrality. and Eastern Europe. The Treaty of Nice, 2002 Preparation for the EU enlargement that will be beneficial to Ireland; a sign of solidarity with the Central and Eastern Europe. Threat to the national military neutrality; threat to the national freedom and powers. Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the article Gilland K. Ireland s Second Referendum on the Treaty of Nice, October Referendum Briefining No 1, EPERN, In assessing the preparation for the second referendum concerning the Treaty of Lisbon and its outcomes the experts have claimed they had identified two significant steps taken by the authorities of Ireland. 15 First, it was necessary in some form to identify the electoral context so that the new referendum could grant to the public a new mandate. The elections to the European Parliament and the local elections held half a year ago well served the purpose. Second move was to negotiate certain concessions and guarantees that had not been available before. It was only in this context that the Government felt entitled and justified to propose to the public to repeatedly take a decision concerning the Treaty of Lisbon. Besides, the referendum was held in the period of the economic crisis. 16 Therefore, as maintained by some representatives from Ireland, during the repeated referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the fear concerning the ratification was the main argument exploited by the YES campaign. 17 On the one hand, 14 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit. 15 Remiantis tiesioginiu susirašinėjimu su M. Holmes 16 Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland, 2 nd October Referendum Briefining Paper No 17, EPERN. Rasta: 17 Lisbon victory not endorsement for hated Government, Socialist Party. Rasta: other/260-lisbon-victory-not-endorsement-for-hated-government.html 79

4 most of the Irish population was resentful that their first democratic choice was challenged, disrespected, while at the same time in the face of the crisis they felt scared and expected some assistance and support from the EU. During the time following the first Irish referendum the economic environment in the country changed dramatically from the heights of the neo-liberal Celtic tiger to the sharp descent to the bottom. An, in the opinion of experts, there was a critical mass of the population that understood that at that time Ireland was in need of the EU custody. The view was also shared by the Head of the Government Brian Cowen who was repeatedly warning his citizens that the repeated rejection of the document at the referendum will adversely affect Ireland s efforts to recover after the deep-rooted recession and weaken its role in the political arena of Europe (see Table 3). Table 3. Change of argumentation before the referenda on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland Treaty Principal arguments FOR Principal arguments AGAINST The Treaty of Lisbon, 2008 The feeling of commonness with Erosion of Ireland s neutrality; end of abortion Europe; to approve the Treaty means control; service in the European army; higher approval of the EU from which Ireland taxes; diminishing of the influence by the substantially benefits. member of the Commission loss of a vote in The Treaty of Lisbon, 2009 Economic crisis and the fear not to receive any assistance from the EU; a repeated rejection will weaken the country s role in the political arena of Europe Europe; incomprehensible text of the Treaty. Proposal to vote repeatedly for the same issue; loss of neutrality; victory would be beneficial to the unpopular head of the Government, rather than to the country. Source: compiled by the author on the basis of the articles: Holmes M. Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland. Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12 June and Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland, 2 nd October Referendum Briefining Paper No 17, EPERN, For that purpose efforts were devoted to find some new arguments (or repeat the updated versions of the old ones), also the new methods (on-line social networks, etc.) 18. Eventually the matters that played a major role during the first referendum partly lost its significance during the repeated one. The right-winged Libertas, headed by Declan Ganley was given a clear message when the party did not win a single mandate in the EP. And, on the contrary, there were many other business leaders that looked much more influential and had declared their support to the ratification of the Treaty. 19 Rational choice, development of results and the role of the Government Rational actors are often believed to play a major role in shaping the preferences of the EU institutional policies 20. Meanwhile, the results of negotiations are attributed to the preferences of clear intermediaries. Some authors project rational choice analysis as a later stage in the negotiations concerning the Treaty, and subjects ratification to the same logics. Hence the internal pressure emerges from the impact of the internal institutional agreements and actors upon the combination of negotiation preferences. When analysing the most general reasons for the organisation of referenda C. Closa 21 identifies, among others, a rational decision of governments as a tactical manoeuvre in negotiations. C.Closa maintains that States use the argument to enhance their powers: should the electorate in the referendum refuse to approve a decision, the process of ratification will be suspended. On the other hand, alternatively, a referendum may become a battlefield of the State s internal policy. Governments may tend to use as an instrument to reinforce their electoral positions and weakening of the opposition. Nevertheless, the first argument has been rejected by Franklin et al who have considered the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark and claimed discerning a probability that even without thinking too much about Europe people actually were voting against the Government's policy 22. Or, seeing the Government inviting support us and vote YES, the difficulties that the referendum in Denmark encountered should not look surprising. 23 Pending the repeated voting on the Nice Treaty the popularity of the Government and its leader was rolling 18 O Brien C. Generation Yes campaigns on Facebook, Irish Times. Rasta: 19 Gibbon, Op. cit. 20 Moravcsik, A. Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, 31 (4): Closa, Op.cit. 22 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit. 23 Franklin, 1994, Op. cit. 80

5 down 24, and before the Lisbon Treaty referendum there were serious apprehensions that some Irish voters might choose to use the referendum as a chance to vote against the unpopular Government headed by B.Cowen. 25 Authors researching the issue of referendum do not rule out a possibility of a rational manipulation by governments in their relations with Europe. It should be noted that following all three failed referenda the respective governments managed to negotiate certain concessions from the EU. These were the conscientious moves from both sides in respect of the votes and expectation for more favourable results. On the other hand, researchers analysing the Danish referendum concerning the Maastricht Treaty claim that the rejection of the Treaties by the citizens of the respective countries largely strengthened the country s positions in the intergovernmental negotiations. 26 At the 2002 referendum concerning the Treaty of Nice 2002, the government announced three major measures requisite for winning the referendum: establishment of the European Forum; more stringent supervision of European matters in the national Parliament of Ireland; the Declaration of Sevilla. 27 In relation to the Lisbon referendum Ireland, as it has become customary in Europe, was granted a number of different exemptions and concessions. Ireland has been noted for having changed its opinion after Dublin managed to secure certain guarantees in such sensitive areas as military neutrality, the issue of abortions and taxation laws. The partners of the Community granted to the Catholic Ireland certain guarantees concerning laws on prohibition of abortions, its military neutrality and taxation policy, and promised that all members of the Community will continue having its Commissioner in Brussels. 28 In the opinion of some authors it might look agreeable that the situation evolving with the Maastricht Treaty is a consistent outcome of the public campaign that prevented the population from understanding and supporting the European project. Furthermore, ironically, the Government made its own contribution to making the "European project" difficult to market. The government parties were struggling to introduce themselves as bringing benefits to their States from the European cornucopia, and, on the other hand, defending the national interest against the attacks from Brussels. 29 This resulted in even more paradoxical situation where those better informed about Europe were less willing to vote than those who were much less informed. 30 Similar conclusions were made by other authors who have shown interest in the situation related to Ireland after the failed referenda concerning the Nice and Lisbon Treaties. Both after the first referendum concerning the Nice Treaty 31, and the Lisbon referendum 32 and the rejection of the Treaties, the Irish Government carried out the analysis of the situation and the results. The authorities concluded that insufficient attention has been devoted to the information and enhancement of awareness of citizens in general, and the principal reason for the failure was the deficiency in the knowledge and understanding of the Treaties which determined the results of the voting. As the Irish, despite the referendum, have always been known as well-disposed in respect of the EU, although even among them there was a large share of population that said NO at the referendum. This, in a way, meant a situation completely opposite from that observed during the Maastricht referendum in Denmark only because the Government had not comprehended the situation it could lose the referendum in the first case. Some experts have been claiming that the Government had been seeking victory at both referenda; though in the first referenda it failed to do its homework properly the campaign was launched too late, the message to the voters was overly obscure and the explanations of the project reached the public not frequently enough. 33 Conclusions 24 Gilland, Op. cit. 25 Gibbon, Op. cit. 26 Hobolt S. B. Direct Democracy and European Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, January 2006 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit. Franklin, 1994, Op. cit. 27 Gilland, Op. cit. 28 Gibbon, Op. cit. 29 Franklin, 1995, Op. cit. 30 Sune K., Svensson P. The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC referendumo n June Electoral Studies, 12(2), 1993: Garry J., Marsh M., Sinnott R. Second-order versus Issue-voting Effects in EU Referendums. Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums. European Unijon Politics, 2005, Volume 6 (2): Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September 2008, Op. cit. 33 On the basis of the direct correspondence with M. Holmes 81

6 The comparison of the three pairs of the first and the repeated referenda allows a conclusion that in virtually all cases the evolution of the argumentation was not prominent enough, with the same arguments and same statements prevailing. Still an essential difference could be noted a much more intensive activity of the supporters of the Treaty. The first attempts that failed was an incentive to get more mobilised, more frequently refer to the same slogans and arguments, emphasise the same advantages that had to be presented to the ordinary citizens in a more inventive but still more comprehensible way. The opponents part looked much weaker, as their emotionally loaded arguments worked well in relation to the first referendum, having lost their effect at the second. They virtually failed to find any new arguments, and the main tool available to the opponents was their attempts to cause anger among voters for being proposed to take a decision for the second time about the same issue. Still, the governments had their own reasoning in this case too: each time before the second referendum the governments managed to negotiate some concessions from the EU thus the lost referenda were used to attain own objectives. Therefore the voting could be presented to the public as a qualitatively new exercise. It could be presumed that the first defeats suited the governments' purposes specifically because of the concessions and the possibility to strengthen their negotiation positions. This subject, however, is an object of a wider-scope research and is beyond the scope of the present paper. On the other hand, not less important is the statement, that the largest impact for the success of the repeated referendum concerning the Lisbon Treaty was the general economic crisis and the belief that Ireland alone will find it much more difficult to cope with the consequences of the crisis. Irish economy was one of the most rapidly declining economies in Europe. And it was specifically billions of euro from the European structural funds and support to Irish banks that significantly reduced the number of the opponents of the Lisbon Treaty rendering their reasoning on the damage of the Lisbon Treaty much less viable. The latter conclusion is rather an exception in the overall context of the present paper. References 1. Buch R., Hansen K. M. The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 Elections, Referendums and Attitudes. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 No. 1, Closa C. Why convene referendums? Explaining choices in EU constitutional politics. Journal of European Public Policy, 14:8 December Collins A. M., O Reilly J. The Aplication of Community Law in Ireland Common Market Law Review. No 27, Franklin, M., McLaren L. Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. Journal of Common Market Studies, 32, Franklin M. N., Van Der Eijk C., Marsh M. Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support For Europe in The Wake of Maastricht. West Europe Politics, 18 (3), Garry J., Marsh M., Sinnott R. Second-order versus Issue-voting Effects in EU Referendums. Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums. European Unijon Politics, Volume 6 (2), Gibbon J. F. The Second Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland, 2 nd October Referendum Briefining Paper No 17, EPERN. Rasta: 8. Gilland K. The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in Ireland. Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research March, Turin, Italy. Rasta: jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws25/gilland.pdf. 9. Hobolt S. B. Direct Democracy and European Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, January Holmes M. Referendum on the Treaty on Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland. Referendum Briefing Paper No 16, 12 June Rasta: Lisbon victory not endorsement for hated Government, Socialist Part. Rasta: Moravcsik, A. Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (4): O Brennan, John. Ireland s Return to Normal Voting Patterns on EU Issues: the 2002 Nice Treaty Referendum. European Political Science, Spring O Brien C. Generation Yes campaigns on Facebook, Irish Times. Rasta: Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum, Research Findings September Rasta: documents/publications/post%20lisbon%20treaty%20referendum%20research%20findings/post%20lisbon%20t reaty%20referendum%20research%20findings_sept08.pdf 16. Schuck, Andreas R.T., de Vreese, Claes H. Reversed Mobilization in Referendum Campaigns. How Positive News Framing Can Mobilize the Skeptics? International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 14, No1,

7 17. Sune K., Svensson P. The Danes and the Maastricht Treaty: The Danish EC referendumo n June Electoral Studies, 12(2), Worre,Torben. First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and J.Comm.Market Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2,