Electoral Dynamics and the Social-democratic Identity

Transcription

1 Gerassimos Moschonas Electoral Dynamics and the Social-democratic Identity Socialism and its changing constituencies in France, Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I wish to provide some basic statistics on the electoral performance of the main socialist/social-democratic parties, from the 1950s to the present. Second, I wish to present some core sociological data in order to identify the main features in the evolution of social-democracy s electoral space. My emphasis will be on the social-democratic influence on the working class, on the one hand, and the middle classes, on the other. Four cases namely, the Swedish SAP, the Danish SD, the French PS and the British Labor Party are in the focus of my analysis. The time frame I consider ranges from the 1960s to the beginning of the new century. Such an extended reference frame is necessary in order to delineate the dynamics of social-democracy s bases of support. Last and this, in fact, is my major objective, I wish to integrate these statistical and sociological data into a wider discussion of the strategic dilemmas and identity of contemporary social-democracy. This paper (focused as it is on the electoral dynamics and social support of social-democracy) is organized into two complementary parts: the first treats electoral developments, the second the social bases of social-democratic influence. PART I ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS Tables 1, 2 and 3 measure the electoral strength of the main socialist / socialdemocratic parties (grouped in three categories) from the 1950s to the present. -1-

2 The parties in the first group (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) possess more of the distinctive characteristics of the classical social-democratic model than the others. These parties represent governmental social democracy par excellence: they are formations with a very high competitive status, fluctuating in the zone of influence which usually exceeds 35% of the electorate. The second group contains parties which, although preserving most identity traits of the first group, are distinguished from it by their intermediate competitive status (Belgium, Netherlands, Finland). The third group (Greece, Spain, Portugal), commonly referred to by the inclusive term southern European socialism, comprises parties different from classical social democracy on account of their overall constitution and history. Finally, the marked specificity of the French socialism, which, by its identity traits and history, forms a unique case, completes the picture of this study. Several conclusions emerge from these data. Main Trends 1. Overall, the period is as a phase of significant electoral retreat for the parties which historically represent classical social-democracy. This retreat becomes more pronounced during the first decade of the 21st century (see the first group of parties in table 1; see also table 2). In comparison with the golden age of , these parties clearly lost strength during the years Their electoral retreat appears as a slow, steady almost without interruption slide that is still operative. For the full period, the average losses, compared with the period, come near to ten percentage points (9.6, to be precise), which means that the large social democratic parties have lost (in relative terms) more than 20% of their previous strength. This electoral weakening is too strong to be politically and socially insignificant. 2. In the period , none of the parties in the first group ( classical social democracy ) received more than an average of 38% of the vote, whereas during the 1960s none of them averaged less than 38.7%. This is a clear indication of banalization of their electoral influence. None of these parties (compared to the 1960s) performs particularly well in elections, not even the British Labor Party, which -2-

3 nevertheless has stood out as having the greatest electoral strength within this first group (despite - or perhaps because - of its adoption of a more aggressive, original and innovative neo-liberal stance). 3. In particular, the exceptional electoral influence of the Swedish and Austrian social-democrats and, to a lesser extent, of the Norwegian Labor Party, belongs to the past. Their electoral performances today are far below 46.8% won by the Swedish social democrats (on the average during the period ) or the 46.3% won by the Austrians (48.1% during the period !). Such mediocre performances by two of the most eminent representatives of European social democracy, such a banalization of their electoral impact, is certainly due to the fact that the socialdemocratic image of society is no longer dominant. 4. The electoral results for parties of the second group confirm the general retreat, although the speed and scale of this decline are overall less pronounced, and gentler. We should note the remarkable stability throughout these years of the Fins and, in particular, the electoral instability of the Dutch social democrats (examples : 15.1% in 2002, but 27.3% in 2003) The parties of Southern Europe, which posted excellent electoral results in the 1980s, consolidated their strong positions in the 1990s (despite a clear but ultimately limited decline) and even improved their average in the first decade of Today these parties, which were not working-class in origin (with the partial exception of the Spanish party), constitute by far the strongest electoral pole of the European socialist family. This new pole represents a remarkable change; it is a new important component of the electoral landscape of European socialism. 6. In addition, in the first decade of the 21st century the pressure exercised by poles to the left of the social-democrats (communists, ex-communists, greens, etc.) generally appears higher than in the past (data under elaboration by the author). 1 The cases of significant decline or abrupt increase in electoral losses (Danish SD, Norwegian DNA, and the Dutch PvdA) are bound up with issues highlighted by right-wing populism. -3-

4 The overall image is nuanced: contemporary social democracy is electorally a weakened, ordinary force (without exceptional performances), a vulnerable force (an electorally vulnerable force can suffer considerable and rapid losses, and then it can make up the lost ground sometimes just as rapidly); but it remains a central force (one of the two principal forces in national political systems, unlikely to be out of power for long). The mixed and contrasting character of the socialist electoral record does not support the hypothesis of a historical decline of social democracy. Nevertheless, a destabilization and weakening peculiar to the most classically social-democratic parties, or those close to them, appears to influence their role and perspectives. There is indeed an electoral crisis of classical Social democracy (for a different approach see Delwit 2005). In addition, currently, this historical force is confronting, more so than in the recent past (1980s and 1990s), right-wing and left-wing polarizers : this fact will not be without impact on social-democratic identity. PART II BASES OF SUPPORT Results -4-

5 Sweden The evolution of social-democratic influence in the working class makes it possible to distinguish three phases, which might be described as follows: (a) decline (1970s); (b) stability ( ); and (c) decline (1991 to the present). The SAP moves from a degree of influence placed around 75% during the 1960s to 65% in the 1970s and 80s, and then, more recently, to 55%. Thus, an initial, rather moderate, decline occurred in the 1970s, followed by a remarkable stability for a period of twenty years (since the social-democrats obtained two-thirds of the working-class vote, which is an excellent performance compared to other countries), and then a new decline from 1991 to the present (Tables 1 and 2). In the same period, the SAP maintained its positions among the middle classes and even progressed slightly, despite a significant drop in its national electoral influence (Figure 1). Thus, the slight advance among the middle classes in absolute terms is much more important in relative terms. In contrast to developments elsewhere, it is important to stress that most of the working-class voters who abandon the SAP turn to the Left Party: in Sweden the sociological tidal wave of class de-alignment is limited, at least as regards the working-class vote. Denmark As in Sweden, in Denmark the gap between the curve of the social-democrats working-class influence and the curve of their influence among the middle classes has been significantly reduced. For the whole of the period (which was one of major electoral decline for the Danish social-democrats), losses within the different sociodemographic categories were not equally distributed. The erosion in the electoral penetration of the SD, compared with the average for the 1960s, when looked at by decade, is systematically more pronounced among workers than white-collar employees (Table 6). In addition, if we broaden the picture to the whole of the Danish Left, the socialist bloc resists much better among non-manual wage-earners than workers (Table 7). What clearly and qualitatively distinguishes the Danish case from the Swedish one is the fact that the social-democrats losses in the working class predominantly benefit the parties of the Right and, in particular, the populist Right. -5-

6 The Danish case is clearly and emphatically one of class de-alignment; and this has been so since the 1970s. This de-alignment is still operative, and even accentuated, today. Great Britain Observation of the whole period, which is not homogeneous, reveals that Labor s positions within the working class have been weakened. The party became considerably more vulnerable within its natural electorate than previously, while it progressed significantly among the most peripheral sections of the natural electorate of its Conservative opponent (particularly the lowest group of non-manual workers, those designated Cl). Here, too, observation of Labor s penetration of the working class makes it possible to distinguish a process of evolution in three phases, which might be described as follows: (a) decline (1970s); (b) accentuation of the decline (1980s); c) recovery of influence ( ), which re-establishes Labor s penetration at the level of the 1970s hence at the level of the first phase of decline. Thus, as regards the Labor vote among workers, a return to the level of the 1960s has never materialized. However, the most striking fact of the period (the Blair years) is the Labor Party s exceptional performance among non-manual categories of the population (Table 10). This improvement (much stronger than in Sweden and Denmark) is explained by Tony Blair s modernization strategy. More so than elsewhere, New Labor s adoption of an aggressive and intelligent version of neoliberalism (in other countries it was much more defensive and moderate) enabled British social-democrats to penetrate part of the Conservatives natural social base. The British case demonstrates, if needs be, that ideas count; that political factors are important in establishing new class alignments. The Main Trends 1. The tendency to working-class disaffection is present in every country. The scope, the phases, the highs and lows these differ. But the tendency is everywhere similar, without exception, and without any significant reversions to the status quo ante. This tendency has lasted for nearly forty years; and forty years is a long time. Can we -6-

7 speak of a crisis in the bond between social-democracy and the working class? A crisis that lasts for forty years a stable crisis is not a crisis. It is a new situation that indicates a non-conjunctural decline in, or attenuation of, the bond of mutual confidence between socialist parties and working classes. What is involved is a class de-alignment, not a conjunctural change in behavior. 2. The working-class influence of social-democracy oscillates around 80% of its level in the 1960s. The drop is not a spectacular one; there is nothing cataclysmic about it. It is therefore not the end of class voting by workers or the end of the democratic class struggle (to recall a celebrated expression by S. M. Lipset). Unquestionably, the electoral loyalty of the working class no longer has the energy, the power, the duration and stability of yesteryear. But it exists. 3. Workers votes, when abandoning social-democratic parties, can be cast for the classical Right, the radical Right, or the radical Left. The main beneficiaries are the populist Right or the radical Left, the former more so than the latter. In so far as part of the working-class vote is cast for the radical-populist Right, it can be said that approaches which refer to a cultural vote by workers (as opposed to an economic or a class vote) are confirmed (cultural conservatism). However, to the extent that this vote is directed to the radical Left, such approaches are certainly not confirmed, given that the parties of the radical Left are constituted as vectors of cultural liberalism (in this case, the electoral switch by workers seems instead to be the expression of a class attitude). Generally speaking, working-class disaffection does not have an altogether clear political character: ambiguity persists. 4. For the last forty years, we can clearly see a greater penetration (in relative terms, but often also in absolute terms) by social-democracy among the middle classes, notwithstanding the fact that the electoral performance of socialist parties is generally less good. This trend is universal including, therefore, countries that do not form part of this presentation (e.g. France, Norway, Germany, etc.). Social-democratic influence among the middle classes is essentially concentrated in the new middle classes or the salaried middle strata. To simplify, the category of the so-called routine non-manuals and the educated or intellectual professions are the epicenter of social-democratic influence among the middle classes. -7-

8 5. Notwithstanding the neo-liberalization of its ideological and programmatic profile, social-democracy does not succeed in penetrating the milieux of the so-called traditional (and less traditional) petty and middle bourgeoisie. Thus, if we take as point of reference the classical Marxist division between bourgeoisie (petty, medium and large) and working class, we observe that class de-alignment is a phenomenon exclusive to the political behavior of the working class. We are dealing with a unilateral class de-alignment. Certainly, if we consider the middle classes as a bloc, if, in other words, we regard managers, professionals, petty bourgeois and routine non-manuals as a statistical set (if not as a single sociological constellation, for certainly this is not the case), then class de-alignment is generalized. 6. From the perspective of electoral sociology, it is no longer a valid generalization to say that social-democratic parties are parties of the working class. Compared with their own past, contemporary social-democratic parties are constructed on the basis of a profoundly interclassist format, by far the most interclassist in the whole history of social democracy. Their natural sociological inclination is their definitive mutation into leftist catch-all parties. This new morphology of the social-democratic electorate, confirmed over the last forty years, already has a certain historical depth. It is here to last. PART III DISCUSSION PERSPECTIVES 1. It was with the end of the Keynesian equation that social-democracy s positions were weakened, both electorally and in the working-class milieu. This reinforces the political explanation of the working-class disaffection, contrary to a straightforwardly sociological explanation. It is the decline in the politics of growth and (re)distribution that largely explains the decline of working-class leftism. 2. The class structure of social-democracy has changed in such a way that two social poles of almost equal arithmetical importance now co-exist within social-democratic electorates: the working class and salaried middle strata. The potential for tension -8-

9 between these two economically and culturally distinct groups drastically reduces the ability of social-democrats to adopt coherent policies. This also provides some indication of how much more difficult the management of political options becomes in the light of such diverse constituencies. 3. From a strategic standpoint, the current structure of social-democratic electorates renders the adoption of a more neo-liberal strategy too costly in electoral terms (because of the still strong presence of social-democracy among popular strata and public sector wage-earners). In addition, the electoral strengthening of radical Left and Green parties increases the cost of neo-liberalism. The adoption of a left-wing populism (Cuperus, 2003), notably: cultural populism, by social-democratic leaderships would be equally too costly (because of the increasing electoral implantation among salaried middle strata, particularly educated strata, strongly attached to cultural liberalism). Here too, the on-going strengthening of Greens (mainly), but also of the radical Left (in its great majority a sympathizer of multiculturalist cause) increases the cost of such a turn. 4. Historically, all major social-democratic revisions were geared towards increasing social-democratic influence among the middle classes. Today, this has been accomplished, at least in large part. Henceforth, assigning strategic priority to the middle classes (or: assigning them even more priority) is a strategy whose electoral value added risks being marginal. At the same time, abandoning this priority and turning in reality, returning to the popular classes amounts to a risky leap in the dark. The effectiveness of this turn, which cannot be merely rhetorical, depends upon the ability of social-democrats to re-establish the conditions for more egalitarian policies in contemporary societies. Yet to re-establish these conditions in the current framework of national and international economic constraints will be no easy matter. In the absence of a new, clear winning option, strategic inertia usually prevails. For today s social-democratic élites, to continue on past lines seems the least risky course in terms of electoral calculation. 5. The whole history of social-democracy, from the Erfurt Programme to the Stockholm School, from Austro-Keynesianism to the more recent achievements of socialists in the South, demonstrates that social-democratic parties established -9-

10 themselves as central, majority forces when they took an ideological lead over their right-wing opponents; when they produced or adopted ideas which the latter were not yet ready to accept or implement (like universal suffrage and the political rights of the working class, or the welfare state and Keynesianism, or the institutionalization of the role of trade unions, or, more recently, the deepening of democracy and modernization of mores in Southern Europe). The excellent electoral results of PSOE and PASOK, the electoral success of New Labour in Great Britain are in large part the effect of an ideological and political ascendancy. Also, the social-democratic gains among educated middle strata are largely explained by the social-democratic domination in the domain of cultural liberalism/libertarian orientation. Overall, the problem of the socialist leaderships is neither one of tactics concerning electoral target groups (middle classes or popular classes) nor one of classical political strategy (positioning oneself more to the left or more to the right). It is rather a basic ideological and programmatic problem: how is the ideological and programmatic ascendancy of social-democracy to be restored? Now, globalization and European integration lead to a drastic reduction in the programmatic freedom of political parties all the political parties, of Left and Right alike. If the situation does not represent a particular drama for social democracy (Callaghan, 2005: 190), it affects social democracy more than conservative, or liberal parties (Ladrech, 2000 : 73) Programmatic innovation in a (global and European) context of reduced programmatic autonomy is a puzzle that contemporary socialdemocratic parties will not easily resolve. Given this difficulty, the pessimistic views about their future dynamic seem to be justified. -10-

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12 Electoral performance (legislative elections) of socialist parties in Western Europe Austria Denmark Norway Sweden Germany Great Britain Averages Belgium Netherlands Finland Averages Spain Greece Portugal Averages France Source : : Merkel; : Moschonas -12-

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14 Table 2 Electoral performance (legislative elections) of socialist parties in Western Europe (averages per decade) Classical Social Democracy Denmark 40,2 39,1 33,6 30, ,8 Sweden 45,6 48,4 43,7 44,5 39,8 37,5 Great Britain 46, ,1 29,6 38,8 38 Austria 43,3 43, ,4 37,3 35,9 Norway 47,5 45,5 38,8 37, ,5 Germany 30,3 39,4 44,2 39,4 36,9 36,4 Averages 42,2 43,6 41,6 37,9 37,5 33,9 Sources : Moschonas and Spyropoulou -14-

15 Table 3. Electoral performance (legislative elections) of socialist parties before and after 1973 (averages per decade) Austria Denmark Sweden Germany Great Britain Belgium Netherlands Finland Luxembourg Ireland France Norway Averages (including Spain. Portugal and Greece) Source : Moschonas and Spyropoulou -15-

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