Chapter 1. Realism, Alliances, Balance of Power: A Theoretical Perspective

Transcription

1 Chapter 1 Realism, Alliances, Balance of Power: A Theoretical Perspective The discipline of International Relations has been dominated by several major theoretical traditions that have emerged mostly in the United States as well as in continental Europe. There exists a multiplicity of views concerning how one studies international relations. Such views are essentially the reflections of the scholars values, personal backgrounds and the nature of their academic training. In other words each individual s work will be influenced by a particular doctrine, image of the world, ideology, paradigm or perspective. As the German scholar once argued: All knowledge of cultural reality is always knowledge from particular points of view. 1 Thus different perspectives on international relations naturally generate debates. In fact, the academic analysis of international relations has been characterized by a wide range of shifts, contests, dialogues and discoveries. Over the last two decades a popular way of accounting for this matrix of intellectual development has been the notion that the field has evolved through a chronological sequence of Great Debates. There have been two most prominent debates ever since International Relations became an academic subject at the end of the First World War. The first major debate is between Liberal Idealism and Classical Realism and the second is between Neorealism and Neo-liberalism. This chapter is organized into two main sections. The first section of the chapter will review the nature and scope of such debates and organize the various interpretations of it into a framework with an effort primarily to present the outlines of each theory and analyze the sustainability of each theoretical trend through arguments and counter arguments. The second section of the chapter will focus essentially on realist notion of balance of power and alliance formation. 1 Weber, Max, Methodology of the Social Sciences, ed. Shils, E.A. & Finch, H.A., Free Press, New York, 1949, p.81. ~ 11 ~

2 The chapter deals with the said topics as this research work concentrates on the understanding of balance of power system and alliance formation and their functioning in the South Eastern Asian region during the Cold War. In other words the research work aims at exploring the kind of situation prevailed in the South Eastern Asian region during the Cold War was it apparently stable despite few frictions or generally anarchic? It also seeks answers to such questions as whether the functioning of the balance of power system and alliance formation was a key element of security cooperation in the pre-eminent anarchy-stability scenario in the region. The research also explores the nature of super power relations in South Eastern Asia and what role they played in maintaining the regional balance of power and alliance formation affected by the local actors. To find appropriate answers to these questions the first and the foremost thing that needs careful attention is the understanding of realist theory as well as its contending theories. This is because balance of power is the cornerstone of realism and alliances are its necessary functions. The chapter then gradually takes its own course in the understanding of balance of power and alliance formation. Thus the first chapter deals with theoretical aspects of the discipline of International Relations whose applicability can be tested in the subsequent chapters. Section One Liberal Idealism Liberal Idealism in international relations usually refers to the school of thought personified in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is sometimes referred to as Wilsonianism. Wilson s idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the institution-builders after World War II. Idealism is also marked by the prominent role played by international law and international organizations in its conception of policy formation. One of the most wellknown tenets of modern idealist thinking is democratic peace theory which holds that states with similar modes of democratic governance do not fight one another. Wilson s idealistic thought was embodied in his fourteen points' speech, and in the creation of ~ 12 ~

3 the ill-fated League of Nations. Idealism transcends the left-right political spectrum. Idealists can include both human rights campaigners (traditionally, but not always, associated with the left) and American neo-conservatism which is usually associated with the right. Idealism finds itself in opposition to realism, a worldview which argues that a nation s national interest is more important than ethical or moral considerations. The decisive push to set up a separate academic subject of International Relations (IR) was occasioned by the First World War ( ), which produced millions of casualties; it was driven by a widely felt determination never to allow human suffering on such a scale to happen again. 2 That desire not to repeat the same catastrophic mistake led to the shaping of the first dominant academic theory of IR that was profoundly influenced by liberal ideas. Academic IR developed first and most strongly in the two leading liberal-democratic states: the United States and Great Britain. The most important vision of liberal thinkers was by reforming the international system and also by reforming the domestic structures of autocratic countries major disasters in future can be avoided. The two most prominent liberal idealists of the era were the former US President Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell. The fourteen point program of President Wilson which was delivered in an address to Congress in 1918 influenced the Paris Peace Conference that followed the end of hostilities and tried to institute a new international order based on liberal ideas. Wilson s peace program calls for promotion of democracy and self determination; to end secret diplomacy while encouraging agreements to be subject to public scrutiny; to grant freedom of navigation and removal of trade barriers; and to create an international organization under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of great and small nations alike. Such an organization would put relations between states on a firmer institutional foundation than the realist notion of the Concert of Europe and the balance of power had provided in the past. The idea of an international organization would promote peace found its path through the formation of the League of Nations. Wilson s liberal faith that an international organization that could bring an end to war and guarantee permanent peace is clearly reminiscent of the thought of the most famous classical liberal IR theorist Immanuel Kant in his pamphlet Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 2 Jackson, Robert & Sorensen, George, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, U.K., 2003, p.35. ~ 13 ~

4 Sketch. 3 Norman Angell in his book The Great Illusion (1909) argued the illusion is that many states-people still believe that war is beneficial and profitable for the winner. But in reality it is exactly the opposite as war disrupts international commerce. This viewpoint of Angell is essentially the forerunner of later liberal thinking about modernization and economic interdependence which involves a process of change and progress which renders war and the use of force increasingly obsolete. The liberal idealism of both Wilson and Angell provide an optimistic approach to world politics where they consider human beings to be rational. When reason is applied to international relations, international organizations are established based on mutual cooperation that would bring about peace and justice. Moreover liberal ideas such as free trade and modernization, open diplomacy could also claim success in an attempt to end war and call for peace. However the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 indicating the failure of the League and Wall Street Crash in 1929 followed by severe economic crisis in developed countries proved liberal idealism was not a good intellectual guide to international relations in the 1930s while Wilsonian ideals and Angell s optimism gradually sunk into oblivion. Academic IR thus began to speak the realist language of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes where the notion of power became central to any IR theory. Classical Realism Although realism as a formal discipline in international relations did not arrive until World War II, its primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. Some of the prominent classical realists are Reinhold Niebuhr, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Classical realists often termed liberal idealism as utopian liberalism as the arguments put forward by the liberals often seemed a little more than the projection of wishful thinking. This point of view of the realists gained justification when the League of Nations failed to prevent the rise of authoritarianism in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy as well as in some states of Central and Eastern Europe for example Poland, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The outbreak of the Second World War finally brought the decisive end of the League serving as an international organization based on peace and cooperation. Thus contrary to Wilson s hopes for the spread of democratic civilization what happened 3 Ibid. ~ 14 ~

5 was the spread of the very sort state that provoked war: autocratic, authoritarian and militaristic states. Thus quest for a new approach to study the discipline of International Relations from a different perspective altogether began. Gradually new ideas emerged, or more accurately re-emerged, since many of them would be familiar to pre-1914 thinkers. Classical realism gradually gained center stage in any attempt to explain international relations. Classical realists believe that mankind is not inherently benevolent but rather selfcentered and competitive. This Hobbesian perspective contrasts with the liberal approach to international relations which views human nature as selfish and conflictual unless given appropriate conditions under which to cooperate. Further, they believe that states, the unitary actors in an anarchic international system, are inherently aggressive (offensive realism) and/or obsessed with security (defensive realism); and that territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing power(s). This aggressive build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma where increasing one s own security can bring along greater instability as the opponent(s) builds up its own arms. Thus, security is a zero-sum game (zero-sum describes a situation in which a participant s gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other participant(s)) where only relative gains can be made. The radical American theologian and critic Reinhold Niebuhr in his book Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) stated: Liberals widely exaggerated the capacity of collectivities of humans to behave in ways that were truly moral. Niebuhr held that men had the capacity to be good, but that this capacity was always in conflict with the sinful acquisitive and aggressive drives that are also present in human nature. These drives are given full scope in society and it is unrealistic to think that they can be harnessed to the goal of international peace and understanding in bodies such as the League of Nations. 4 The most comprehensive and penetrating critique of liberal idealism was that of realist E. H. Carr, a British IR scholar. Carr launched an attack on the liberal principles that had marked the young international relations theory of the inter-war years. According 4 Brown, Chris, Understanding International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, US, 2004, p.28. ~ 15 ~

6 to Carr, every field of study passes through a naive phase of utopianism. He offered as an example the efforts of early alchemists, which eventually gave way to the physical sciences. Carr argued that the antidote to utopianism was realism : The impact of thinking upon wishing, in the development of a science, follows the breakdown of its first visionary projects, and marks the end of the specifically utopian period, is commonly called realism. Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stage, realism is liable to assume a critical and somewhat cynical aspect. In the field of thought, it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. 5 Carr in his Twenty Years Crisis (1939) argued that liberal idealism misread the facts of history and misunderstood the nature of international relations and concluded that it is erroneous to believe that such relations could be based on harmony of interests between countries and people. Rather according to Carr the liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests glosses over the real conflict that is to be found in international relations, which is between the haves and the have-nots. 6 A central feature of the world is scarcity, some are the privileged section or the haves who want to preserve their position and therefore promote law and order policies, attempting to outlaw the use of violence. The have-nots, on the other hand, have no respect for the law, nor is it reasonable that they should, because it is the law that keeps them under the domination of the haves. Thus Carr labeled the liberal position utopian as contrast to his own position which he labeled realist. Carr considers his realism to be a more correct analysis of international relations that confirms conflicts between states and people is an ongoing process, which needs to be managed rather than wished away. To him it is utopian to imagine that the League of Nations can have the real power that can bring about war free world. Rather states are the most important actors that regulate international relations and are always in conflict. 5 Dunn, Martin, An introduction to the realist tradition in International Relations, dated See Brown, Chris, Understanding International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, US, 2004, p.28. ~ 16 ~

7 Yet while Carr, argued his case strongly, he saw that as the discipline matured there was scope for the blending of realism and utopianism. The other significant realist statement from this period was produced by a German scholar Hans. J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau in his Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948) stated that human nature is at the base of international relations and as humans are self centered and power seeking it could easily result in aggression. Morgenthau thus explains: Political Realism believes that politics, like society in general is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature Human nature, in which laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece endeavored to discover these laws.. The main signpost that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept interest defined as power.. Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. 7 To him international politics like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. There is no world government. Rather there is a system of sovereign and armed states facing each other. World politics is an international anarchy where there is perpetual struggle for power and survival. The 1930s and 1940s situation confirms this proposition. The quest for power certainly characterized the foreign policies of Germany, Italy and Japan. During the Second World War Britain, France and the United States were the haves in Carr s terms, the satisfied powers, while Japan, Germany and Italy were the have-nots. The post war period essentially a status quo (haves) arrangement that denied any kind of privileges to the have-nots who in turn would try and redress the international balance through the use of force. In sum, classical realism of Carr and Morgenthau 7 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, Mc Graw - Hill, New York, 1948, p.29. ~ 17 ~

8 combine a pessimistic view of human nature as against the optimism of the liberals, with a notion of power politics between states which exist in an international anarchy. They see no prospect of change in that situation: for classical realists, independent states in an anarchic international system are a permanent feature of international relations. Following realist analysis, the sole appropriate response to such attempts is the creation of countervailing power and intelligent utilization of that power provide for national defense and to deter potential aggressors. In other words, it was essential to maintain an effective balance of power as the only way to preserve peace and prevent war and to protect the states security. This would then make the security dilemma a regular phenomenon in international politics while the balance of power is a natural demand by countries in the security dilemma. Thus the necessary outcome is the alliance formation which is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states military capabilities. In other words alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple state system. Realists thus share a pessimistic view of world politics unlike the optimism of liberals. Realists, though not supporters of war, believe in inevitable continuity of war and find balance of power mechanism as the only way to prevent war. To them functioning of international organizations and rule of law as propounded by the liberals cannot be considered as justified mechanisms to bring in peace. This difference in opinion naturally generates debate between the realists and the liberals, each justifying its own position. The following discussion essentially deals with the nature of the Great Debate and analyzes whether the discipline of International Relations is to be studied from the realist or the idealist perspective. The Great Debate Whether the discipline of international relations is to be studied from the realist or the idealist point of view is oft disputed. In fact, the realist/idealist debate runs through international relations discourse. The three key assumptions of realism are; 1. States are the key units of action; 2. They seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and ~ 18 ~

9 3. They behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms. Whatever its relationship to international politics, realism dominates intellectual and academic politics. Realist rhetoric is very much a part of the world that it constructs. Not only the states, but also the speakers, in the guise of theorists, contest for power with their rhetorical brilliance and the power of their arguments. Realist rhetoric is the hegemonic conversation of international politics. Keohane notes that World War II elevated this realist perspective to the new orthodoxy in Anglo-American thinking on international affairs and that during the postwar years, political realism swept the field in the United States. 8 Realism constructs and defines itself in its difference to idealism, which in turn has also constructed as its rhetorical opponent. Realism s political conquest validates its scientific claim to represent the real world. Realism thus subordinates it s identified opposite with the label idealism, successfully stigmatizing it as unrealistic and utopian. The story of this debate however lacked a detailed account of a thoroughly researched and formally presented argument about ideational change. Despite these problems scholars identify three contentions while recounting the debate between the liberals and realists; (a) an idealist orthodoxy in international thought during the interwar years which (b) was challenged and defeated by a new school of realist thinkers (c) during or around the years leading up to and including, the Second World War. This debate however presents the triumph of the realist school over the interwar idealists as a catalytic turning point in the history of a nascent discipline. Over the last decade a number of authors have problematized various elements of the Great Debate. Peter Wilson was the first to develop a detailed version of this line of argument. His main critical contentions were that an idealist/utopian school never existed, a debate never occurred, and realism did not emerge from this period victorious. According to Wilson, the idealist/utopian label is better understood as a construct developed by E. H. Carr for the purpose of polemic. 9 Carr used the term 8 Keohane, Robert O., Neorealism and Its Critic, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p.9. 9 Wilson, Peter, The myth of the first great debate, Review Of International Studies, vol. 24, April, 1998, pp ~ 19 ~

10 utopian to refer to a broad category of thinkers that stretched so wide as to be untenable as a school of like-minded scholars. 10 Unsurprisingly, none of Carr s contemporaries accepted the label of utopian thinker. Perhaps more importantly, Carr himself was not decisive regarding the relative merits of realism and utopianism. He presented international thought as a dialectic in which elements of, and an equilibrium between, both realism and utopianism were necessary for successful policy. While Wilson documented a number of critical responses to Carr s work, he also noted that Carr never issued a rejoinder to these critiques. 11 The concept of a First Debate is best regarded as a half-truth or a myth, rather than a complete fiction. 12 Wilson labeled the First Debate a myth because his research denied the popular notion that an argument between realist and idealist schools had dominated international thought in the interwar years. However, even as Wilson emphasized the flaws in this story he also, somewhat paradoxically, helped to establish the First Debate as a partially valid tale. His work proved that The Twenty Years Crisis had indeed sparked a controversy, and had also led to a volley of responses from some of the scholars that he had associated with utopian thought. Since none of the scholars who have endorsed the story of a First Debate have provided any detailed research to support it, Wilson s work provided the strongest case to date for considering the First Debate to be a valid account of past work in the discipline. Lucian Ashworth has recently expanded upon the notion of the First Debate as a partial truth. While his work reiterated Wilson s argument that the association between the First Debate and the interwar years is highly inappropriate, he also identified the two separate points at which a contention between realism and idealism could be said to have existed in the interwar years, and conceded that a controversy vaguely replicating the realist/idealist divide occurred within the realist camp in the post- 10 Peter Wilson and David Long s edited volume provides texture and meaning to the work of interwar idealists. Long, David and Wilson, Peter, eds., Thinkers Of The Twenty Years Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, Oxford University Press, U.K Wilson, Peter, Carr and his early critics: Responses to the twenty years crisis, , in Cox, Michael ed., E. H. Carr: A critical reappraisal, St. Martin s Press, New York, 2000, pp Booth, Ken, 75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject s Past - Reinventing the Future in Smith, Steve, Booth, Ken and Zale ski, Maryssa,(eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.328. ~ 20 ~

11 Second World War era. 13 Given this conditional acceptance of the concept of a realist/idealist controversy, Ashworth contend that the story ought to be regarded as mythical in the sense that it refers to a real set of academic events and texts while both exaggerating the usefulness of the realist/idealist dichotomy as a classificatory device for intellectual history, and misrepresenting the chronology of the events that it purports to explain. From both Wilson s and Ashworth s work we build upon this notion of the First Debate as a half-truth and identify the way in which historical errors have been incorporated into disciplinary orthodoxy. Hence, the myth is not only responsible for the ossification of two major traditions of international thought; it should also take some of the blame for the paucity of progressive scholarship in the discipline. Thies used his findings to dispute Wilson s claim that the First Debate is responsible for a paucity of progressive work in the discipline. 14 While the First Debate has had a defining impact upon the broader IR discipline, post-war realists were ultimately unsuccessful in their disciplinary agenda, because they made serious historical errors, particularly with regard to the notion of a unified idealist interwar paradigm. Hence, shades of an idealist/ realist debate continue to resurface in the discipline. Thies argued that the persistence of unacknowledged goals in realist theory, and the recurrence of the tensions between idealism and realism in the neorealist neoliberal debate was evidence of the failure of the First Debate concept to garner acceptance for the modern realist version of the past. 15 Our findings suggest a set of conclusions that differ from those of both Wilson and Thies. First, while our analysis concurs with Wilson s claim that the First Debate has been partially responsible for the paucity of progressive work in the discipline, we do not believe that this was the result of the mistaken branding of interwar scholarship as idealist. Second, while we agree with Thies argument that post-war scholars were 13 Ashworth, Lucian M., Did the realist idealist great debate really happen?, International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2002, pp Thies, Cameron G., Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2002, p Ibid, p.170. ~ 21 ~

12 largely responsible for constructing the debating concept in the shape of neorealistneoliberal debate, we disagree with his decision of the failure of the First Debate. The final analysis of our viewpoint is suggestive of the fact that the Great Debate was clearly won by the realist thinkers. Yet it is important to emphasize that liberalism did not disappear. This is evident from the fact that post war period was not only about the struggle for power and survival between the two superpowers, but was also about cooperation and international institutions such as the United Nations and its special organizations. Thus trends of realism and idealism seem to coexist in the postwar period which finally took its turn in the direction of commencing the second set of debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Neorealism More than fifty years have passed since Hans Morgenthau introduced realism as an approach to the study of international relations. Since then, the approach has withstood not only a steady assault from such external quarters as liberal institutionalism, the democratic peace school, and constructivism but also a marked divisive tendency. Splinter groups thus emerged within the domain of what came to be known as neorealism, each waving an identifying adjective to herald some new variant or emphasis. Neorealists base their understanding of the world upon four key assumptions. First, anarchy (the absence of any common sovereign) is the distinguishing feature of international politics. Without a central authority to guarantee states security, a selfhelp system exists, where states must rely upon their own means to protect their interests. In this anarchic international system, security is the highest goal of states. Second, states are the most important actors in the international system. While non state actors, like corporations and multinational organizations, do play an important role, the state is paramount. Neorealism is often criticized for overlooking the importance of non state actors. But this is a mischaracterization of neorealism. As Waltz says, "The importance of non state actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious. States are not and never have been the only international ~ 22 ~

13 actors. But then structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them, but by the major ones". 16 Third, states are rational actors. Robert Keohane explains this term: "To say governments act rationally... means that they have consistent, ordered preferences and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality". 17 Neo-realists point out that the preferences of states are strongly constrained by the anarchy in the international system, which makes security the most important preference of any state. Although states are rational, they may miscalculate from time to time because they operate in a world of imperfect information. 18 Fourth, states are unitary actors. States do not speak to the rest of the world through multiple voices. Although there may be domestic disputes over a particular policy direction, only one policy will be directed internationally. For this reason, neorealists argue that domestic dynamics are inconsequential for explaining state interaction. This does not mean, however, that analysis must always remain at the structural level. Neorealism freely admits that to get a complete explanation of any event a unit level or individual level of analysis may be used. In fact, Waltz insists that a complete understanding of international politics cannot be reached without looking at domestic factors. Beyond these four assumptions, there are differences of opinion within neorealism. This is particularly the case regarding the role of institutions and the prospect of cooperation between states. Dividing neorealist scholars into offensive and defensive composites captures this variation of thought well: those who argue that states are security maximizers (defensive realism) and those who argue that states are power maximizers (offensive realism). The first of these came in the late 1970s, when 16 Waltz, Kenneth N., Political Structures, In Neorealism and Its Critics, Keohane, Robert O. (ed), Colombia University Press, New York, 1986, p Ibid, p Mearsheimer, John, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, Vol. 19, No.5, 1994/95, p ~ 23 ~

14 Kenneth Waltz's neo-realism or structural realism marked a major split from Morgenthau's traditional realism, which henceforth became known as classical realism. Neorealism is largely the work of Kenneth Waltz (who actually called his theory structural realism ). While retaining the empirical observations of realism, that international relations are characterized by antagonistic interstate relations, neorealists point to the anarchic structure of the international system as the cause. They reject explanations that take account of states' domestic characteristics. States are compelled by relative gains and balance against concentration of power. Unlike realism, neorealism seeks to be scientific and more positivist. What also distinguishes neorealism from realism is that the former does not accept the latter's emphasis on the behavioral explanation of international relations. Morgenthau s work formed the basis for many other authors in the realist tradition. Yet it was not until 1979 that Kenneth N. Waltz attempted to reformulate realism in a new and distinctive way. His aim was to construct a theory of international politics that remedies the defects of the present theories, 19 including classical realism, by applying a more scientific approach. The approach he took in Theory of International Politics (1979) became known as neorealism. Neorealism was Waltz's response to what he saw as the deficiencies of classical realism. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, neorealism and realism share a number of fundamental differences. The main distinction between the two theories is that classical realism puts human nature for the urge to dominate, at the center of its explanation for war, while neo-realism stakes no claim on human nature and argues instead that the pressures of anarchy shape outcomes regardless of human nature or domestic regimes. While classical realists saw international politics in terms of the characteristics of states and their interaction with each other, Waltz believed that there was a level above this. According to Waltz, the idea that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure is neorealism s fundamental departure from traditional realism. The conditions of the system as a whole influenced state behaviour, not just state level factors. 19 Waltz,, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979, p.1. ~ 24 ~

15 By concentrating on the nature of the system-level structure, Waltz avoided the need to make assumptions about human nature, morality, power and interest. Neorealism or structural realism of Kenneth Waltz takes a different approach to explain the nature of the conflicts between the actors in international relations. It considers state conflict is rooted in the absence of a central authority that can enforce rules and agreements, absence that originates an insecure self help situation in which all policy makers are pressured to act competitively, regardless of their individual natures or personal preferences. This situation is called anarchy, not in the sense of chaos, but in the sense of absence of world government which can enforce rules in international relations. In short, anarchy originates in an insecure international system, and states must act to reduce or eliminate this insecurity. This is achieved through forming alliances whereby the states balance against the superior power capabilities of other states. Thus the only type of security cooperation that really plays a major role in neorealist account is the alliance which falls within the broad compass of balance of power arguments. Neorealists were thus able to see power in a different way. For the classical realists power was both a means and an end, and rational state behaviour was simply accumulating the most power. Neo-realists found a better guide was provided by assuming that the ultimate state interest was in security, and while gathering power often ensured that, in some cases it merely provoked an arms race. Yet while power was no longer the prime motivator, its distribution was the major factor determining the nature of the structure. Waltz s neorealism is essentially defensive in nature. Thus the kernel of Waltz s neorealist or structural perspective is contained in the following propositions: Ordering principle of the system: The ordering principle of the system is anarchical, not hierarchical. The absence of a central authority leads to a SELF-HELP SYSTEM where quest for survival requires states to seek security through the accretion of military power. The ordering principle of the system forces states to perform the same primary function regardless of their capacity to do so. The functional differentiation of units: In this anarchic system each state is a separate, autonomous and formally equal unit and to realize its interests it must count only on its own resources because no one else can be counted on to do so. Then all the important functions must be performed by each and every state. ~ 25 ~

16 The distribution of the capabilities of the units of the international system: States cannot be differentiated by its functions but they differ vastly in their capabilities. This distribution of capabilities which is unequal and shifting defines the relative power of the states and predicts variations in states balance of power behaviour. This means that one international system can be distinguished from another by the distribution of capabilities between states, in other words international order vary according to the number of great powers. Another notable neorealist thinker is John Mearsheimer, the proponent of a branch of realism called offensive realism. Offensive realism is a structural theory which, unlike the classical realism of Morgenthau, blames security conflict on the anarchy of the international system, not on human nature. In contrast to another structural realist theory, the defensive realism of Waltz, offensive realism believes that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security. Mearsheimer summed this view up in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001): Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to become hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive. 20 The author's argument is based on his contention that in an anarchic world composed of sovereign nation-states, each great state tries to acquire the maximum amount of power feasible under the circumstances. This struggle for power may at times subside for practical reasons, but it never ends. This is so because the first goal of every great power is to survive, and the more power a nation-state has, the greater its chances of survival in this anarchic world. According to Mearsheimer, the only circumstance in which a great power will stop trying to gain more power is when it has achieved global hegemony, a circumstance that has never occurred in world history. Great powers that 20 Mearsheimer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton, New York, 2001, p.35. ~ 26 ~

17 strive for regional or global hegemony, he argues, inevitably provoke other great and lesser powers to form coalitions designed to counter the potential hegemon. Mearsheimer supports his theory of offensive realism by analyzing great powers in action from 1792 (the beginning of the wars of the French Revolution and Empire) to the end of the Cold War in He contends that all great powers, regardless of their form of government, seek to expand their power in relation to other nation-states. He dismisses the notion that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than other forms of government. He discerns little difference, for example, in the current and future power relationships among states in Asia and those in Europe. Mearsheimer is surely correct that in geopolitical terms it would have made no significant difference to the other powers whether it was Hitler's or the Kaiser's Germany that dominated Europe; Napoleon's or Louis XIV's France that dominated Europe; or Stalin's or Nicholas II's Russia that dominated Europe. That explains why Great Britain and the United States have followed similar security strategies with Eurasia. Mearsheimer rightly calls them offshore balancers, meaning that both Great Britain and America, being insular powers separated by water from the Eurasian land mass, have--in the famous words of Sir Eyre Crowe--sided with whatever power or group of powers that opposed the most powerful state on the continent. From the late eighteenth-century to the early years of the Second World War, the British formed, joined, or supported coalitions opposed to potential Eurasian hegemons. When British power waned during World War II, the United States became the geopolitical successor to the British Empire. Henceforth, Washington would play the role of offshore balancer of Eurasia. In his analysis of how great powers behave, Mearsheimer pays tribute to his realist predecessors Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and Kenneth Waltz. But his theory of offensive realism is closer to the thinking of Yale's Nicholas Spykman, who like the author, emphasized the anarchical state of international relations and the never ending struggle among nation-states for global domination and survival. Mearsheimer argues that the structure of the international system affects the behavior of great powers. The balance of power within a bipolar or multipolar world also affects the relative stability of the international system. Global stability and peace are more likely to be maintained, he asserts, in a bipolar world of two dominant powers rather than in ~ 27 ~

18 a multipolar world of several competing global powers in which at least one is a potential hegemon. In recent years the most powerful challenge to neorealism has been mounted by neoliberal institutionalists. The term distinguishes these scholars from earlier varieties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican liberalism and sociological liberalism. Commercial liberalism refers to theories linking to free trade and peace; republican liberalism refers to theories linking democracy with peace; and sociological liberalism refers to theories linking transnational interactions and international integration. In the study of international relations, neoliberalism refers to a school of thought which believes that nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains (economic, strategic, etc.), rather than relative gains to other nation-states. The notion is often connected with neoliberal economic theory. Neoliberalism Neoliberalism is a response to neorealism; while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated. The neoliberal argument is focused on the neorealists' underestimation of the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within a decentralized system. The neoliberal scholars usually have a benign attitude towards international institutions and cooperation among states. Institutions, according to them, play the main mediating role and act as the principal means to achieve and maintain cooperation between states. Mutual interests of states minimize differences, pave the avenues for cooperation. States become willing to cooperate once institutions (sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity and shape the expectations of actors) are seen as beneficial. States are rational actors; they maximize absolute gains through cooperation and are less concerned about relative gains made by other states. To put it briefly, institutions are treated as independent variables having significant impact on state behavior in terms of formulating or reformulating preferences and choices. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are considered the founders of the neoliberal school of thought; Keohane's book After Hegemony is a classic of the genre. Another major influence is the hegemonic stability theory of Stephen Krasner. There are three important works of the neoliberals on the special issues of international organizations ~ 28 ~

19 such as Transnational Relations and World Politics (1971) of Keohane and Nye; Keohane and Nye s Power and Interdependence (1977); and International Regimes (1982) by Krasner. The first raised the question about the state-centric focus of realism and discussed such non state actors as the Roman Catholic Church, the Ford Foundation and the multinational business enterprises. In the second, Keohane and Nye, in their introduction and conclusion to the published book, explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state as actor assumption, the relative importance of military security on foreign policy agendas, the role of military force in international politics, and the fungibility of power resources among issue areas. The third, edited by Stephen O. Krasner, set forth both realist and liberal views on international cooperation and institutions. 21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub "Complex Interdependence". Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, complex interdependence sometime comes closer to reality than does realism. 22 In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the three assumptions in realist thought: first, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; second, force is a useable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, the assumption that there is a hierarchy of issues in international politics. 23 The heart of Keohane and Nye s argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels assumed by realists; transgovernmental relations occur when one relaxes the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when one removes the assumption that states act coherently. It is through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited interstate channel as championed by realists. 21 Baldwin, David A., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, Colombia University Press, New York, 1993, p Keohane, Robert, and Nye, Joseph, Power and Independence: World Politics in transition, Brown & Company, Boston, 1977, p Ibid, pp.22, 23. ~ 29 ~

20 Secondly, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important to that alliance s political and military relations with a rival bloc. Finally, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a states agenda, but that there are a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations The emergence of the study of international regimes was a significant change in the study of international organization by marking a shift away from an exclusive focus on formal international organizations. Although the term was coined in the 1970s the study of regimes really took off with the publication of a special issue of the journal International Organization in In the issue, Krasner articulated a definition of regimes that has stuck with us. He defined regimes as implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations. 24 Regimes "are more specialized arrangements that pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of international society." 25 Examples of regimes include CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna), the Basel Convention which governs the international movement of hazardous waste, and the U.S.-Canada Great Lakes water quality regime. Regimes may or may not take the form of international organizations. Realists contend that the nature of anarchy in the international system causes states to be primarily concerned about relative gains, i.e. their position vis-à-vis other states in the system. As a result, states will be reluctant to enter into any agreement that leaves them in a worse position relative to others, whether due to the distributional consequences or due to the costs of maintaining the regime. Despite the potential risks of entering into cooperative arrangements, realists have to theoretically account 24 See Krasner, Stephen D., International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, Ibid. ~ 30 ~

21 for the fact that regimes are relatively common. Krasner start from the same assumptions as realists as to the anarchic nature of the international system. However, in contrast to realists, he posits that states are concerned primarily with absolute gains. As a result, when deciding whether to cooperate, states will evaluate what is in it for them, rather than how they will come out relative to others. Therefore, the main concern for states is whether they are getting the best deal possible. Regimes can be useful in reassuring them of this. In terms of the scope of international theory, the debate between neoliberalism and neorealism is an intra paradigm one, as both theories are positivist and focus mainly on state as the primary unit of analysis. The Second Debate Although there are significant differences between neorealism and neoliberalism they basically share the same view of the world (ontology), and, crucially, the same view of what counts as reliable knowledge about that world (epistemology). Thus, although Charles Kegley has argued that the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is the hottest topic in international relations theory today 26 he ultimately argues for an amalgamation of the two. In a fascinating discussion of the main features of neorealism and neoliberalism, Kegley concludes that, despite their different assumptions about human nature, the nature of war, and the character of international society, the two approaches are basically similar. 27 He wants that hybrid combination of both realist and liberal concepts around which a new paradigm might be organized [one] that integrates the most relevant features of both theoretical traditions. 28 A similar point emerges out of Robert Powell s detailed critique of the differences between neorealism and neoliberalism. Powell argues that: The three issues at the center of neorealist - neoliberal debate are the meaning and implications of anarchy, the problem of absolute and relative gains and the tension between 26 Kegly, Charles, Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neo-liberal Challenge, St. Martin s Press, New York, 1992, p Ibid, p Ibid. ~ 31 ~