Explaining the Emergence of New Parties

Transcription

1 Cynical Citizens and the rise of populism André Krouwel and Onno Bosch Department of Political Science Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Paper prepared for the workshop Kwaliteit van het leven en politieke attitudes. Methodologische vraagstukken en empirische analyses. at the Politicologenetmaal 2004 in Antwerpen, Mai 27 and First draft, 11-May-04, 19 pages including this page. Please do not quote without permission.

2 Summary This paper examines three causal explanations for the emergence and electoral success of neo-populist parties. At the macro level we test the hypothesis that systemic features (electoral thresholds and the proportionality of the electoral system) influence the opportunities for new political parties to emerge. Furthermore, we test the hypothesis that ideological convergence of the major mainstream parties creates the ideological space and strategic opportunities for the emergence of new parties. Finally we assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility on the emergence of new political parties. The empirical analyses show that the systemic features and the ideological convergence of mainstream parties can only explain a small proportion of the new parties that emerge. Importantly, this systemic approach can not explain the appearance of the majority of new political parties. Alternatively, we develop a theory for the materialisation of populist parties by incorporating the level of political cynicism among the electorate into the model. As populist ideology and strategies tap into the two dimensions of political cynicism (distrust in the motivations and competence of the traditional elite and efficacy) we assume that this approach is better able to explain the emergence of new neo-populist parties. Finally we develop a typology of voters and their likelihood to vote for new parties and political outsiders (particularly populists). Introduction In recent years political scientists have increasingly taken interest in the emergence of new political parties. As a consequence a small body of literature regarding the formation and electoral success of new parties has emerged (Hug 2000; Ignazi 1996; Lucardie 2000; Rochon 1985). Due to their sheer diversity in organisation, ideology and electoral appeal, a comprehensive general theory explaining the emergence of new political parties, their electoral success and modes of competition is still lacking. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of how and why new political parties emerge by developing a comprehensive explanatory model. First we conduct a comparative analysis at the systemic level, testing the hypothesis that two systemic features in particular, electoral thresholds and disproportional electoral systems, influence the likelihood of the emergence of new political parties. In addition we test the hypothesis that convergence of the traditional mainstream parties provides ideological space and opportunities for new parties. Finally we assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility on the emergence of new political parties. These analyses can only generically explain part of the materialisation of new political competitors, but not the emergence of specific types of political parties. In an attempt to explain the emergence of a specific new party-type, namely neo-populist parties we analyse the micro level, testing the conventional assumption that the rise of populist parties is caused by popular disillusionment with the traditional mainstream parties. We use the concept of political cynicism in order to tap popular disillusionment because political cynicism incorporates a distrust in the competence of the ruling elite (to represent and serve the people) as well as distrust towards the motivations and intentions of the ruling elites. Secondly, cynical voters do have a sense of internal and external efficacy and thus feel competent and able to influence the process of political decision-making. The rise of neo-populism in Europe In 2002 the Netherlands experienced a parliamentary election that was unprecedented in many ways. A new political movement (LPF) was able to attract the support of 17 percent of the votes (and 26 seats in 1

3 parliament) even though the leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn, had been assassinated shortly before the elections. Although the 2002-election was certainly not the first time that new political parties emerged in the Netherlands (Buelens 1997; Rochon 1985), this election did mean the largest electoral victory of a new political party in Dutch political history, and also the largest defeat of a coalition-government (Praag 2003). Many observers of Dutch politics attributed Fortuyn s success to his media performances, his jarring criticism of the ruling parties or the fact that the media focussed heavily on Fortuyn s personality (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 90). Despite the fact that some specific factors (such as personality or the a- typical Purple Coalition) may have played a role in the unprecedented rise of Fortuyn and the LPF, we are not content with such an idiosyncratic explanation. The Netherlands is not the only political system that has witnessed the emergence of new political parties. Italy has seen the rise of the Berlusconi s Forza Italia, which became the largest party in its first contested elections (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) and has been the pivot party of two right-wing coalition governments. Not only parties commonly labelled populist have emerged in European party systems. Ireland has seen a new party, the Progressive Democrats, gaining nearly 12 percent of the vote in the 1987-election and participating regularly in government since. Since the second World War several hundreds of political organisations have tried to gain parliamentary representation across Europe (see This large number of parties, their diversity in organisational format, ideological and electoral appeal necessitates categorisation. Deschouwer (2004: 1-2) distinguishes between three groups of new parties on the basis of their genetic origin. Almost all European party systems saw the emergence of Green parties in the late 1980 s or early 1990 s, which obtained governmental status in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Finland. The second group consists of regionalist parties, which emerged in Italy, Belgium, Spain and Britain and participated in government in Belgium, Italy and Spain. The third group consists of new radical right parties, yet according to Deschouwer this group is very heterogeneous in its composition. We agree that this is a too broad categorisation and wish to distinguish between radical rightwing (xenophobic) parties and neo-populist party organisations. The latter of these categories has our special attention, as we will not only attempt to explain the general emergence of new political parties, but seek to understand the appearance of specific types of new political organisations, in particular neo-populist parties. General explanations of the emergence of new parties In the literature on the emergence of new parties, roughly three approaches can be distinguished. First, an institutional-formal approach in which authors focus on systemic features such as electoral laws and thresholds, requirements for registration or public party finance (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2000). Secondly, a sociological approach which focuses on the transformation of cleavage structures or changes in the value-orientation of citizens (Inglehart 1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) in an attempt to explain patterns of voting and other forms of political (non)participation. A third approach, focussing on the political opportunity structure, seeks the explanation for the emergence of new parties in more immediate and temporal developments within party systems, often looking at the level of polarisation or convergence of political parties. As an example from the latter approach, Pennings and Keman (2003) suggest that decreasing party competition, especially with respect to the decline of ideological distinctiveness of political parties, may have been conducive to the success of the Fortuyn movement. The rationale underlying this reasoning is very straightforward. The ideological convergence between the main parties creates room to manoeuvre for new parties on the wings of the party system, and makes it harder for voters to distinguish between 2

4 the offered alternatives (Pennings and Keman 2003: 53). This increases the likelihood that voters will prefer a newcomer instead of the main established parties who have become look-alikes. Using data on relative emphasis of issues in party manifesto s, Pennings and Keman claim that there has been considerable convergence between 1977 and 2003 in terms of left and right of the main political parties (Pennings and Keman 2003: 56). This convergence makes the established parties more vulnerable to newcomers and challengers. Analysing a second dimension of ideological polarisation, Pennings and Keman draw the conclusion that the main parties since 1977 have made a simultaneous move towards more conservative profiles, making Dutch parties less distinguishable to the electorate. The combination of the collective move towards conservatism and the decreasing left-right distances has led to the obfuscation of differences between political parties, in turn leading to the rise in electoral volatility which was a necessary though not sufficient condition for the success of the Fortuyn movement. The problem with this approach is that it only explains new political parties at the fringes of the political spectrum (where an ideological space is created), while the emergence of more moderate and centrist political parties can not be explicated. It is therefore that we seek to combine the three approaches, in which the systemic-institutional factors will first be used for a blanket analysis of the emergence of political parties. Thereafter we will analyse to what extent more temporal aspects (such as the level of ideological convergence or polarisation) can explain the pattern of emergence of more radical and extremist political competitors. We will also assess the effect of voter turnout and electoral volatility on the emergence of new parties. Finally, in order to increase the explanatory power of our new model, we will include the level of political cynicism in order to explain the emergence of specific types of political parties (in particular neo-populist parties). A systemic approach: thresholds and disproportionality From a systemic point of view it can be argued that more or less formal institutional characteristics of a party system exert influence on the chances for new parties to emerge. If, for some reason, electoral outcomes have little or no meaning for the fate of political parties, new challenger parties may seize the opportunity to make an electoral appeal. The newly emerging parties could thus be seen as a response to limited party competition. Katz and Mair, clearly state that limited party competition can create a window of opportunity for the emergence of new parties: One particular rallying cry, which seems common to many new parties and which seems particularly effective in mobilizing support is their demand to 'break the mould' of established parties [...] The cartel parties are often unwittingly providing precisely the ammunition with which the new protesters of the right can more effectively wage their wars (Katz and Mair 1995: 24). Bartolini (1999; 2000) identifies both systemic factors (vulnerability and contestability) and factors related to the political opportunity structure as determinants of the nature and level of party competition. On a systemic level, vulnerability, refers to the expected change that results from elections. The level of vulnerability is influenced by the proportionality of the electoral system. Proportionality of the electoral system indicates the extent to which the dispersion of the popular vote relates to the allocation of seats in parliament, and subsequently the power constellation in parliament and government. Proportional systems increase the possibilities of new political parties to enter parliament (if no effective electoral threshold exists). In a disproportional system people tend not to vote for small parties, because they know that a vote for a small party is likely to be wasted (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2001: 323). 3

5 However, the argument could also be reversed: highly disproportional systems limit the likelihood that electoral shifts make a difference for the allocations of seats. This limits the level of party competition and increases the likelihood that new political parties emerge. The lack of competition between the established parties can trigger the emergence of new political competitors. Harmel and Robertson indeed find that the systemic factors that might inhibit new party success do not inhibit new party formation. Ironically, those systems that have produced the largest number of new parties are least likely to reward those parties with votes and seats (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 517). Their findings foster the paradoxical expectation that limited party competition in terms of contestability and vulnerability creates barriers for the entry into parliament of new political parties while at the same time it increases the likelihood of new party emergence. Harmel and Robertson therefore suggest to think of new parties as falling into two categories: contender parties which have the perception that they can be electoral successful and promoter parties who realise that their chances of electoral success are not very high but who want to bring attention to a particular issue or cause. In the light of the relation between party competition and the emergence of new political parties, it makes sense to study both the emergence of new parties and their electoral success. However, in this paper we merely focus on the frequency of emergence of new parties. Empirical analysis of systemic factors Since the purpose of this part of our analysis is to determine to what extent systemic features exert an influence on the likelihood of the emergence of new parties, we adopt a rather broad definition of new political parties disregarding their ideological content or electoral strategies. Any genuinely new organisation that appoints, for the first time, candidates at a general election to the system s representative assembly will be considered a new party 1. Table 1 Electoral thresholds and the emergence of new parties Effective Electoral Threshold Low High Total No new parties 63 % (51) 65 % (11) 63 % (62) One or more new parties 37 % (30) 35 % (6) 37 % (36) Total 100 % (81) 100 % (17) 100 % (98) Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or high electoral thresholds, where thresholds below the average (5.40) in the dataset are considered low. Percentages are calculated per column, figures in parentheses are absolute numbers of observations (elections). Table 1 shows that our expectations regarding the influence of electoral thresholds on the emergence of new political parties are not confirmed by the data. There is no distinctive pattern indicating a relation between the electoral threshold and the emergence of new parties. The data presented do not allow for a 1 The proposed systemic explanation does not allow for a selection of new parties on for example the basis of their electoral strategy, as this would lead to a confusion of explanatory and dependent factors. 4

6 confirmation of either of the two mechanisms described above. Although the limitation of party competition resulting from high thresholds does not seem to produce more new parties it cannot be stated either that high thresholds constrain the emergence of newcomers. Another formal-institutional feature likely to limit party competition and foster popular dissatisfaction with the competition is the disproportionality between the votes gained by parties and the seats attributed to them. Table 2 Vote-seat disproportionality and the emergence of new political parties Disproportionality Low High Total No new parties 70 % (44) 56 % (23) 64 % (67) One or more new parties 30 % (19) 44 % (18) 36 % (37) Total 100 % (63) 100 % (41) 100 % (104) Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or high voteseat disproportionality, where disproportionality below the average (5.46) in the dataset is considered low. Percentages are calculated per column, figures in parentheses are absolute numbers of observations (elections). More proportional electoral systems do not lead to significantly more new political parties than disproportional systems. In fact, the data on the emergence of new political parties in relation to vote-seat disproportionality confirms the expectation that new parties are more likely to emerge in party systems with disproportional electoral systems where electoral competition may be more limited. The table shows that the emergence of one or more new political parties is more likely in systems with high disproportionality. These systems have seen the emergence of new parties in 44 percent of the elections, against 30 percent in elections with more proportional electoral systems. It seems as if a limitation of party competition does create an incentive for new parties to emerge, although the data presented here do not account for all new parties. Political opportunity structure: convergence and polarisation Apparently a systemic analysis can not provide us with a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of new political parties. Therefore we shall complement the systemic analysis here with data relating to the political opportunity structure, especially with regard to the level of ideological polarisation between the parties. Katz and Mair claim that parties need not be in competition for survival in the same way they once competed to determine policy. [...] It is in this sense that the conditions become ideal for the formation of a cartel, in which all parties share in resources and in which all survive (Katz and Mair 1995: 16). The cartel model describes the interpenetration of parties and the state and the increasing collusion and cooperation between competitors (Krouwel 2004). Bartolini also underlines that party collusion is rational party behaviour: in perfect electoral competition parties are supposed to converge toward the median voter and in the end their offers will be exactly the same. (...) [T]he closer we approach perfect 5

7 competition, the more likely it is that collusion would be a rational behaviour for parties (Bartolini 2000: 34). The decline in party distinctiveness diminishes competition by limiting decidability, the extent to which voters can distinguish party differences. A lack of visible distinctiveness of parties makes the decision of the voter difficult, or even meaningless. It can also lead to voters seeking (new and more radical) parties that can be distinguished ideologically or programmatically. We therefore expect convergence among the main political parties to increase the chances for the emergence of new political parties. Empirical analysis of opportunity structure as an explanation In order to test this expectation we created a measure of convergence of political parties on the dimensions of left versus right and progressive versus conservative. This measure is based on data from the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The manifesto research group approaches the ideological profile of political parties through the content of the party manifestos. In the manifesto research project each statement in a manifesto is classified into one of 54 categories, distinguishing between positive and negative references to the topic. This allows the researchers to calculate the percentage of statements referring to that category. The categories are distinguished by direction and topic, allowing for a detailed account of the relative emphasis a party puts on different topics. Grouping the topics that could be labelled left and right and deducting the percentage of left emphases from the percentage of right emphases results in a left-right scale that theoretically ranges from 100 (party manifesto consists for 100% of references to left issues) to +100 (party manifesto consists for 100% of references to right issues). In a similar fashion a scale is calculated to measure changes on the progressive-conservative dimension of political polarisation. The range of the two summed up scales for the main political parties, having at least five per cent of the votes, is then compared between elections to determine the occurrence of convergence or divergence among the main parties. We assume that voters perceive party competition to be largely determined by these main parties. Table 3 indicates that new political parties are more likely to emerge if there is convergence among the main political parties. 29 Per cent of the elections in which parties polarised compared to the previous elections displayed the emergence of new political parties. This percentage is 42 per cent for elections where the main parties converged programmatically. It should be noted though, that when we look at appendix 1 there is no clear pattern of the type of new party (in terms of their ideological and programmatic position) emerges, while we would expect the new parties emerging as a response to convergence to be situated at the fringes of a party system. Table 3 Convergence of main parties and the emergence of new political parties Ideological polarisation Polarisation Convergence Total No new parties 71 % (36) 58 % (21) 66 % (57) One or more new parties 29 % (15) 42 % (15) 34 % (30) Total 100 % (51) 100 % (36) 100 % (87) Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with divergence and those with convergence, compared to previous elections. Percentages are calculated per column, italics are absolute numbers of observations. 6

8 A sociological approach: changes within the electorate Having explored the explanatory power of the systemic approach and the influence of the political opportunity structure on the emergence of new parties we now focus on a more sociological approach. By looking at what Bartolini labels availability we consider the ability and willingness of voters to switch between parties. The Downsian approach of voters as rational actors that choose a policy alternative that best matches their preferences (Downs 1957) is somewhat beneath the actual political reality. Voters do not always switch between parties if they do not agree with its current policy position. The willingness of voters to switch between parties is affected by the way the voters are encapsulated by party organisations and the identification they have with a party. The available voter, defined as a voter who is willing to review and eventually change his party preference, may provide an incentive for new political parties to emerge. Obviously, if it is clear that no (or few) voters are willing to change their party preference, there is hardly any incentive for new political parties to emerge. Even a promoter party, that wants to bring attention to a particular issue or cause without necessarily aiming for electoral success, is unlikely to achieve its goals if it is on forehand clear the party will have no electoral success. Promoter parties do not have representation as their primary goal, but they nevertheless need a certain level of electoral support if they want to draw attention to their cause. It is therefore to be expected that electoral volatility will favour the emergence of new political parties. Electoral volatility, especially between party-blocs, indicates discontent of voters with the political parties in power and thereby the availability of those voters. At the same time switching between parties is not the only option for a discontent voter. The real exit-option consists of abstention. It is therefore expected that the combination of electoral volatility and low turnout rates indicate popular discontent with the current (main) parties, favouring the emergence of new political parties. Again, the Netherlands provides a telling example of the influence the combination of declining turnout rates and increasing volatility (both total and between blocs) have on the emergence of new political parties. The 1994 elections saw the emergence of two new parties together gaining eight seats, at a time turnout rates declined and volatility between blocs increased. As Pennings and Keman argue too, competition in the Netherlands in the 1990s was limited in several aspects. The cabinets preceding the 2002 elections comprised parties from the left and the right side of the political spectrum, which had previously excluded each other as coalition partners (Pennings and Keman 2003: 52). This makes a strong case for the expectation that new political parties emerge as a response to limited party competition and that discontent voters see two real options: abstention, or voting for a new political party. It should be noted however, that the relation between electoral volatility and the emergence of new political parties is not quite as straightforward as outlined above. It is to some extent tautological in nature because the choice of a voter to switch to a new party increases volatility, while volatility is also considered to indicate discontent and availability of voters, which in turn creates opportunities for new political parties. At the same time we argue that the conditions for effective competition require at least moderate electoral volatility because a complete lack thereof would take away an important incentive for party responsiveness to the electorate. A party would have no reason to be responsive if the voter s loyalty were unconditional. Empirical analysis of the sociological model: turnout and volatility The results that have been outlined in the previous sections above suggest that the emergence of new political parties is linked to decreasing levels of party competition. From this finding it is a small step to the suggestion that new parties are a response to growing discontent among the electorate with the functioning of parties and party systems. Below, we draw some preliminary conclusions on the relation 7

9 between changing electoral behaviour more specifically increasing electoral volatility and declining turnout rates and the advent of new political parties. Table 4 Volatility, turnout and the number of new political parties New political parties Total number In parliament Electoral volatility Electoral turnout Reported figures are correlations between the volatility / turnout and the number of new parties in an election year. Bold figures indicate that the significance level (t) is below one percent; Italic figures indicate that the significance level (t) is below five percent. Introducing the level of electoral volatility in a regression model would suggest a causal relation that can empirically not exist because electoral volatility results from the elections while the formation of new political parties precedes them, necessitating the introduction of a time lag. But considering the pace at which politics change, a possible time lag of several years (one election period) is not feasible. The data on new parties, turnout and volatility are therefore be compared for the same election year in order to allow for some conclusions on the relation between the indicators of voting behaviour and the number of new parties, without claiming that these figures indicate a direct causal relation. Indeed there is a strong significant correlation between the level of electoral volatility and the number of new political parties. This is partly due to the somewhat tautological relation between volatility and new political parties. A successful new political party will always cause increasing electoral volatility since people vote for a party that did not exist before. But considering the fact that many new parties generally have only very limited electoral success, the overall results are indicative. Electoral turnout on the other hand does not appear to be similarly linked to the emergence and success of new political parties. The correlation is less high and so is the significance of the results. This is confirmed by table 5, which shows that the likelihood of the emergence of new political parties is only slightly different between systems displaying low and high turnout rates. Table 5 Electoral turnout and the emergence of new political parties Electoral Turnout Low High Total No new parties 60 % (29) 68 % (38) 64 % (67) One or more new parties 40 % (19) 32 % (18) 36 % (37) Total 100 % (48) 100 % (56) 100 % (104) Table displays occurrence of new political parties in systems with low or high electoral turnout, where turnouts below the average (84.36) in the dataset are considered low. Percentages are calculated per column, figures in parentheses are absolute numbers of observations (elections). 8

10 Although we have to be aware that decreasing turnout rates are widespread across Europe and need not be directly related to the emergence of new political parties, we would like to stress that dissatisfied voters (with the traditional parties) have several options. The most likely is an exit-option, yet new parties provide another feasible option for discontent voters that previously abstained to return into the electorate. Voters re-entering the electorate by voting for a new party would weaken the statistical relationship between electoral turnout and the emergence of new political parties. This reciprocal relation between turnout rates and the emergence of new parties should be kept in mind while reading table 5. However, we expect the key to understanding the emergence of new parties to be found in both the nature of the discontent of citizens and the alternative appeal that new parties bring into the party system. Explaining the emergence of new parties In the previous sections we have tried to explain the emergence of new political parties by means of three approaches, which can to some extent be linked in a blanket explanation of the emergence of new political parties in general. Some of the expectations have indeed been confirmed by the empirical data, but the results fail to provide a comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of new political parties. The combined analysis of systemic factors, the evolving political opportunity structure and sociological changes performed is able to explain only a very modest part of the emergence of new parties in Europe between 1970 and Table 6 Regression models of convergence, disproportionality and threshold on the number of new political parties Number of new political parties Effective threshold -.16 Vote-seat disproportionality.13 Convergence main parties -.06 Electoral volatility.39 Electoral turnout -.21 N 82 Adjusted R 2.21 Durbin-Watson 1.96 Reported figures are standardised regression coefficients between the variables and the number of new parties. Bold figures indicate that the significance level (t) is below five percent; Table 6 shows the regression analysis of the five variables introduced in previous sections and the number of new political parties. The main findings are that this model can only explain 21 per cent of the variation and most effects are statistically insignificant. However, since we do not generalise these findings to a wider population, the other results are important in developing an explanatory model for the emergence of new parties in Europe. The systemic factors of our model (electoral thresholds and proportionality) do not stand the statistical test. Confirming our hypothesis that thresholds form a barrier to the emergence of new parties, this factor 9

11 displays a negative relation with the number of new political parties: new parties are more likely appear in systems with low thresholds. The hypothesis that high thresholds limit party competition and thereby foster the emergence of new parties does not seem to hold. Disproportionality shows a positive relation with the number of new political parties, confirming the hypothesis that new parties emerge in disproportional systems where vulnerability is relatively low, while disproving the idea that more proportional systems will lead to a larger number of new parties. The opportunity structure-model also has to be rejected. In the regression analysis the effect of convergence negative (while cross-tabulation in table seemed to show some positive effect). The sociological model seems to be the only model standing the empirical test: electoral volatility is the only statistically significant factor in this model. This leads us again to the conclusion that we need to expand our model in the direction of electoral choice of citizens. Understanding the motivations of voters that switch their support to a new party and the appeal that these new parties bring into the system is crucial in an explanatory model for the emergence of new parties. Below we attempt to formulate such a new explanatory model by linking specific political attitudes of citizens to the specific appeals of the various new types of political parties. Political cynicism and the emergence of populist parties As was shown in the analyses above, the three approaches above can only partly explain the pattern and frequency of the emergence of new political parties in European party systems. Moreover, these blanket explanations are even less capable of explaining the emergence of specific types of political parties, in particular populist parties. Defining political cynicism Political cynicism is a multi-dimensional concept (Baloyra 1979/1999; Citrin and Elkins 1999[1975]; Citrin and Luks 2000; Citrin and Muste 1999; Erber and Lau 1990; Litt 1963). Departing from the idea that political trust is the opposite of political cynicism (Citrin and Muste 1999), we argue that political cynicism consists of two elements: a deep distrust in the motivations or intentions and competence of the political elite combined with a strong belief in one s own political efficacy. First and foremost political cynicism refers to distrust in political institutions and power-holders (Citrin and Green 1986; Craig 1993). Cynics believe that most people but especially members of the elite are motivated in their actions only by selfishness and they question the sincerity of people's motives and actions. The concept of political cynicism can be traced back to the Greek Republic, where political cynics claimed that all governments are corrupt. In their eyes, this made the political leadership illegitimate and incompetent, and thus cynics concluded that the rulers did not represent them. Cynics see the political elite as standing against the people, not as representatives of the people. Cynical citizens consider the political elite as a separate body of self-interested actors that do what they want without regard for the general (or national) interest or the interests of the people. At best the traditional political elite will act for the good of society if it does not conflict with their own self-interest or continuates their control of office. However, next to this deep distrust in the motivations and competences of the elite, cynics also belief in their own competence to influence and intervene in the political process. This latter conviction that one can influence the political elite or even vote the rascals out, and that one is able to make sound political judgements for themselves differentiates the cynic from the alienated citizen. Alienated and cynical citizens share the opinion that the political elite can not be trusted to act in the interest of the people and that the elite is not competent to solve the problems that the people face, but the alienated believe that 10

12 they can not change this situation. Cynics, on the other hand, do believe that they can change their political fortune by participating in the political system or by supporting anti-establishment politicians. The trust factor of cynicism Trust is relational, meaning that in trusting somebody else or a collective body or institution, a person makes him- or herself vulnerable to others. In that sense trust is not unconditional, because only a fool would trust every individual, all collectives and all institutions. Most people trust only specific individuals, certain collective bodies and institutions in certain specific social domains (Levi and Stoker 2000). Trust is also relative, not totally dichotomous. Only seldom will we encounter people who trust a politician, a political party or a political institution for the full hundred percent. Citizens have a certain level of trust in specific political actors, collectives and institutions, mainly based on prior experiences with them. This means that the level of trust can change over time, depending on the encounters and experiences citizens have with politicians, collective intermediary organisations and institutions. The trustworthiness of persons, groups and institutions thus depends on specific attributes that they possess which assures the trusters that they will not be betrayed. These attributes can be divided into two categories. The first category of attributes refers to the performance of individuals, collectives or institutions in accordance with the normative expectations held by the public (Miller and Listhaug 1999; Miller 1974a). This moral dimension taps into the judgements about integrity of the trusted as perceived by the truster (Citrin and Muste 1999): is the actor committed to act in the interest of the truster, is the actor motivated by the interests of the truster rather than his or her own interest, is the actor reliable in terms of keeping its promise and being predictable and consistent in its behaviour. The second category of attributes bear on the judgements and evaluations of competence of the actors. On this dimension of competence trust is dependent on whether the trusted is seen as capable of acting and doing a certain thing (that has been promised to the trusters), and whether the actor is perceived as efficient, effective, able, skilful and productive in bringing about the policies and the results that the trusters expect. In sum, the trust-factor within cynicism has two dimensions: a moral dimension and a dimension of competence. Next to these, cynicism also incorporates a two-dimensional efficacy-factor. The efficacy-factor of cynicism In the literature there is a consensus that trust and efficacy are distinct concepts (Citrin and Green 1986; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Miller 1974b; Robinson and Shaver 1999). Political efficacy in general refers to the belief that citizens can have an influence on the political process (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954). Balch (1974) distinguishes an internal and an external component of efficacy (see also Craig and Maggiotto 1981). The internal component taps the belief in one s own competence to understand and participate in politics. Internal efficacy signifies that people believe that they can influence the political process because they are able to make sound political judgements for themselves and are able and justified in voicing these opinions and acting upon them. The external component relates to the conviction that people can evaluate the actions and motivations of the political elite and, crucially, that one can influence the political elite and change their course of action. External efficacy means that people believe that governmental authorities and institutions will be responsive to citizens demands and wishes. Thus, similar to the trust-factor, we consider the efficacy-factor of political cynicism also as a two-dimensional phenomenon. 11

13 Political distrust (or cynicism) and the rise of populism The literature on the effects of political trust has come up with several, sometimes contradictory, findings (for an overview see Levi and Stoker 2000). In terms of trust, the literature distinguishes between incumbent-oriented and system-oriented types of (dis)trust. Political distrust is detrimental for society and the polity if it is focussed on the entire system, but on distrust of individual actors, collectives or institutions the findings are disputed. Most authors conclude that trust-judgements are partisan and oriented towards incumbent actors. That is, people trust the government less when they didn t vote for the particular current power holders. Furthermore, trust evaluations are influenced by the dissatisfaction with the current policies and performance, as well as the evaluation of the leader qualities of the incumbents. In line with our argument of the link between cynicism and the rise of populism, the literature also finds an empirical link between a combination of political distrust with efficacy and participation (Craig and Maggiotto 1981; Luks and Citrin 1997; Miller 1974b; Tarrow 2000). Certain types of political activism are linked to political distrust. An important finding is that distrust of specific authorities can become general and this long-held generalised distrust of government can become an independent determinant of political attitudes and activities (Easton 1975; Sigelman, Sigelman, and Walkosc 1992). This shows that trust (and cynicism) is conditional and relative, as well as subject to change over time. It also suggests that (dis)trust can be used in the mobilisation of voters, which as we argue below is precisely what populist actors do. Evidence from the USA furthermore suggests that distrusting citizens are more likely to vote an antiincumbent and that distrust becomes particularly consequential for voting when one of the candidates emphasizes anti-government themes. Those who evaluate the incumbent government as untrustworthy will more likely participate in the election when they have the option to vote for an outsider candidate (Luks and Citrin 1997). Populist politicians and their electoral organisations are political outsiders in several ways: they can not be easily placed into the traditional party families in terms of their ideology and genetic origin, they are not part of the political establishment or even actively excluded from any formal power. This fits with our explanatory model for the rise of populism. We expect populism to arise in a situation where the incumbent government is distrusted by a substantial number of citizens that nevertheless feel politically competent (have political efficacy) to voice their disapproval and dissent. A populist political entrepreneur taps precisely this combination of political efficacy among voters and their distrust and dissatisfaction with the incumbent elite, as well as the distrust in the intermediary collectives (particularly political parties) and the institutions that the incumbent elite utilise (Craig 1993; Hayward 1996a, 1996b; Kitschelt 2002; Linz 2002; Norris 1999). Populists present themselves as outsiders that can oust the incumbent elite, sweep the institutions clean of corruption and incompetence and deliver what the people really want. However, populist not only passively tap existing levels of distrust in combination with efficacy. Because of its anti-establishment stance and its rhetoric against the institutions of representative democracy, populist mobilisation also boosts the level of distrust and thereby creates a dynamic process in which the existing institutional framework loses its legitimacy (in terms of mass support). Populists feed the idea that the incumbent elite is incompetent and untrustworthy and that the people are competent to do something about it: namely vote the populist into office. In order to clarify this point we will devote some words to the ideology and strategy of populist actors. 12

14 Populism as a political ideology Populism departs from the idea of the sovereignty of the people, in which the people are seen as the ultimate and only source of legitimation for political power. Departing from this concept, populist ideology incorporates two crucial dimensions (see also de Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel 2004). On the first dimension, emphasising the peoples souvereignty, populists express dissatisfaction with existing modes of elite-mass intermediation and the desire to abandon the intermediaries that stand between citizens and rulers (Kitschelt 2002: 179). Populists are dissatisfied with the horizontal guarantees of constitutional democracy and want to strengthen the direct vertical ties between rulers and ruled. They not only perceive the intermediary structures and organisations as standing in the way of the clear expression of the will of the people, but also as a mechanism through which and unrepresentative, incompetent and corrupt elite is recruited and is able to maintain power. Intermediary institutions such as political parties rob the people of their opportunity to elect their leaders directly or to put issues on the political agenda that concern the real interests of the people. Populists will therefore argue for more direct expressions of the will of the people and more direct forms of allocating political authority and mandates. In addition, populists express a preference for singular leadership rather than collective bodies of authoritative decision-making. This preference for singularity of authority and mandate derives from the second dimension of populist ideology: the perception of a unified and monistic people. Populists argue that the traditional elite not only misrepresent the people, but they also divide and segregate the people by insisting on representing specific social groups. Populist denounce this divisive pluralist view of the people and present the people as a unified and monistic entity. The emphasis by the traditional elite on social cleavages divides the people among one another and robs them of their opportunity to voice their common interest. In addition, populists also claim that the idea of pluralism that the traditional elite put forward is a false one: the traditional elite itself forms a homogeneous unity and is thus neither democratic nor representative. It merely uses the divisive and undemocratic intermediary institutions to obstruct the direct expression of the will of the sovereign people. Populism and cynicism It is now clear to see how the populist ideology can tap into political cynicism and reinforce it: cynical citizens combine distrust of political actors, groups and institutions with a sense of political efficacy, while populists argue that the incumbent elite can not be trusted in its commitment and competence to serve the real interests of the people. It is therefore crucial to construct a measurement-tool to tap the twodimensional concept of political cynicism within the electorate and analyse whether our hypothesis that cynical voters will vote for populist politicians is correct. A first step is to distinguish the cynical voter (with a sense of efficacy and distrust of the elite) from other possible voter-types. On the basis of our two-dimensional trust factor (trust in the morality of the elite and its competence) and the two-dimensional efficacy-factor (internal and external efficacy) we can distinguish four basic types of voters. At one end of the scale we can find the confident, a citizen who trusts the elite to have moral integrity and competence in running the affairs of the state. In addition, a confident also believes in his or her own capacity to influence the political decision-making process and in the responsiveness of the elite to the interests and demands of citizens. On the other extreme end of the scale we encounter the alienated citizen, who has no trust whatsoever in the moral integrity and competence of the elite. Furthermore, alienated citizens also believe that they do not have the capability to influence the political decision-making process and that they can do nothing to make the elite responsive. 13

15 Two intermediary types are the aforementioned cynic (not trusting the elite but having a sense of efficacy) and the subservient. The subservient citizen trusts the elite to be morally integer and competent to handle the affairs of the state, but he or she does not feel competent nor able to intervene in the democratic decision-making process. In table 7 we have summarised these four types of voters. Table 7 A Typology of Voter-types Voter type Trust in morality Trust in competence Internal efficacy External efficacy Confident Subservient Cynic Alienated If our model is correct, we will find that voters basically falling into the cynical category to vote for populists more frequently than the other types of voters. Alienated citizens will not bother to vote as hey neither feel competent to act, nor expect the elite to be responsive, integer or competent. For them it does not matter who controls the state. A subservient will not vote for new parties, and certainly not for political outsiders such as populists, because they are satisfied with the way in which the traditional elites are conducting their business. Moreover, they do not feel that they can independently judge and act in a politically relevant manner so a populist will have little appeal to them. Confidents will not vote for a populist either. Not only are they convinced of the moral integrity of the traditional elite and do not wish to replace them, they also feel that their political evaluations are relevant and that the incumbents will be responsive and cater their needs. Conclusion In this paper we have tested several blanket -explanations for the emergence of political parties. Neither systemic factors, nor sociological or political opportunity models adequately explain the pattern of emergence of new political parties across Europe. We suggest a new explanatory model for the emergence of specific types of political parties. Focussing primarily on populist parties, we incorporated the concept of political cynicism in our model. We would like to focus the discussion on the definition and measurement of political cynicism. Particularly our two-dimensional operationalisation of the two components of cynicism (trust and efficacy) are crucial to our explanatory model for the emergence and success of new parties of the populist type. We would also like to address the issue which indicators (items) in election surveys we can utilize to distinguish between voters on the basis of our four-fold typology. 14