EU Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy

Transcription

1 EU Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy Dr. Mai a K. Davis Cross Assistant Professor of International Relations University of Southern California mkcross@usc.edu This paper is a preliminary draft. Comments are welcome! Abstract Public diplomacy is typically defined as how a nation s government and/or society projects itself to external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics perception of that nation. In the long run, successful public diplomacy should result in augmented soft power and favorable policies towards the nation that engages in it. An entity like the EU necessarily encompasses multiple levels of public diplomacy subnational, national, transnational, and supranational. Do the various aspects of the EU s multi-leveled public diplomacy form a coherent overall message, or do they work against each other to some extent? This question is important both practically and theoretically. Practically, the EU is struggling to make its presence known on the international stage as one of the most important players in world politics. It is undeniably the greatest example of voluntary international cooperation among states in modern times, and a major normative power with significant influence in the areas of humanitarian aid, climate change, multilateralism, human rights, and development, among other things. Yet, it is not yet fully on the radar for many. In a 2005 Gallup poll, for example, only 38% of those surveyed in North America had heard of the EU. This paper argues that EU public diplomacy, taken as a whole, sends conflicting messages because national-level public diplomacy rarely includes the EU in its messages to foreign publics. This limits and dilutes the visibility of the EU. On a theoretical level, EU public diplomacy provides a strong example of norm diffusion and identity creation. In the context of an evolving actor that is in many ways still very new, I suggest that the European experience shows that external image and internal identity are mutually constitutive. Introduction The nature of the European Union as a quasi-federal entity, with both state and non-state characteristics, makes it a unique actor when it comes to public diplomacy. There are numerous historical, ideational, political, and material variables that impact how Europe, as well as the states, cities, and regions within Europe, communicate and project themselves to others. Formal and informal public diplomacy is occurring at the supranational, national, sub-national, and transnational levels with little coordination between these layers. These various layers share 1

2 many of the same goals and values at the same time as they operate independently of each other. The broad questions to be addressed in this paper are: Does the EU have enough of a common basis internally to project a common image externally? Do the various aspects of EU public diplomacy form a coherent overall message, or do they work against each other to some extent? And, why? For the sake of space, in the latter part of the paper, I focus on the comparison between supranational to national public diplomacy. To go about addressing these questions, it is important to note that European public diplomacy is clearly a work-in-progress as the EU itself is still a work-in-progress. It is difficult, if not impossible, to measure outcomes of public diplomacy at this early stage of the EU s development. It would also be a mammoth undertaking given that various external audiences around the world interpret the EU s messages differently. Thus, here I focus on the processes and prerequisites of EU public diplomacy to try to draw out some practical and theoretical insights. On a practical level, the EU is struggling to make its presence known on the international stage as one of the most important players in world politics. For those who are aware of the EU s role, it is seen as a major normative and civilian power, with significant influence in the areas of humanitarian aid, climate change, multilateralism, human rights, and development, among other things. However, as I will argue, the EU s public diplomacy on a grand scale sends conflicting messages, and the result is that the impact and visibility of this effort the foundations of Europe s soft power have been somewhat limited and diluted. In other words, the EU is in fact a major player, but much of the world is unaware of this. The result is that the EU is less influential in practice as it could be. 2

3 On a theoretical level, EU public diplomacy provides a window into how norm diffusion and identity creation work in the context of this multinational actor that is gradually integrating into a more state-like entity. I suggest that for the EU identity and external image are mutually constitutive to some extent. INTERNAL IDENTITY EXTERNAL IMAGE A legitimate and believable external image is only possible if it reflects the identity of the people it represents. For norms to diffuse, they must be persuasive. In turn, as external image is tangibly brought into focus, it impacts how European citizens view themselves. They begin to imagine themselves in the eyes of others and craft messages of how they want to be perceived, and this shapes their own identity, which is still evolving and consolidating. Identity creation does not rely solely on external image, and external image does not rely solely on identity creation, but they are mutually impactful in significant ways. Given that identity is crucial in determining the messages of EU public diplomacy, I will begin with an analysis of where the consolidation of a European identity stands today, drawing upon Thomas Risse s recent study. There are many sources of identity at the local and regional levels, but one of the strongest sources of identity is national affiliation. To understand the nature of EU public diplomacy, it is important to establish the extent to which Europeans hold supranational, European identities, in addition to their national identities. As Risse argues, the growth of European identities, as secondary affiliations, is significant, and there now exist European public spheres in which citizens debate European issues as legitimate participants, using the same frames of reference. Thus, based on Risse s extensive research, I would argue 3

4 that the foundations for a strong EU public diplomacy certainly exist. 1 Moreover, the EU actively engages in a rigorous program of public diplomacy, one that is likely to be augmented through the upcoming launch of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Yet, I would argue that the EU does not achieve its potential when it comes to projecting its image to international audiences. There is a gap between all that the EU has accomplished and what it represents and how it is perceived around the world. In 2005, only 38% of people in North American had heard of the EU. It fares better in the Middle East where 86% of people had heard of it. For other regions, the percentage of EU awareness was 55% in Latin America, 56% in Asia Pacific, and 65% in Africa. The world average was 69% making it the most recognized international organization after the UN which had 83% recognition globally. 2 In terms of humanitarian aid, the EU was thought to be the worst compared to the UN, UNHCR, World Food Programme, and UNICEF, with only 41% expressing a favorable opinion of the institution. Global attitudes towards the EU more generally tend to be surprisingly neutral in some cases: 1 Although Risse writes that Conscious efforts by the authorities in Brussels to create a European identity do not seem to have much impact on identity change, I would suggest that efforts of Brussels to create an external European image do have an impact on internal identity. (Risse, 102) 2 Gallup International, Voice of the People,

5 Global Attitudes Towards the EU 3 Region/Perception Positive Neutral Negative North America 25% 54% 17% Asia Pacific 33% 52% 7% Middle East 42% 20% 29% Latin America 43% 38% 10% Africa 67% 20% 8% The EU s image is clearly doing relatively well in Africa where it focuses much of its humanitarian and development support, but it is still relatively neutral in North America and Asia Pacific. Overall, this cursory data seems to indicate that the EU s image in the international system is not dismal, but it is not as good as it could be. With developments since 2005 such as the failure to ratify the constitutional treaty, division over the recognition of Kosovo, and the financial crisis this image may even be weaker today. In addition to survey data, it is clear that international media coverage of the EU is often quite negative. Whenever the EU suffers a crisis, the media seemingly does not hesitate to predict the imminent demise of the EU. There is comparatively little international media attention to positive achievements like the European Security Strategy which was a response to division over the Iraq war, the Lisbon Treaty which overcame the impasse on the failed constitutional treaty, and the decision to appoint a pan-european regulator which would better deal with future financial crises like the one that brought down Greece. 3 Gallup International, Voice of the People,

6 What explains this puzzle, this gap between perceptions and reality? Is the problem with the delivery or the message itself? The media cannot be entirely responsible for this as journalists, like regular citizens, typically respond to their own perceptions of what the EU is about. It is the EU s responsibility to explain itself well and loudly. I would suggest that one reason the EU image suffers is that national-level public diplomacy of the EU s 27 member states tends to ignore the EU, even while their citizens increasingly identify with it. When member states neglect to reinforce the EU and their membership in it, it makes the EU a more vulnerable target for attacks both by internal and external audiences. It also makes the EU easier to ignore. In the next section, I will provide an overview of the recent literature on EU public diplomacy. In the third section, I will argue that the EU actually has what it takes to engage in a strong and successful public diplomacy because of the growing emergence of Europeanized national identities and public spheres. The fourth section will compare supranational to national public diplomacy to shed light on the gap between Europe s image and its efforts in projecting itself to foreign publics. And the final section will offer some prognosis for the future. I. The Practice of Public Diplomacy and International Relations Theory Public diplomacy is defined basically as how a nation s government and/or society projects itself to external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics perception of that nation. Standard public diplomacy strategies involve educational, informational, and cultural programs designed to attract foreign audiences. Public diplomacy must run in parallel to actual policies and reflect actual values otherwise it will not be persuasive. 4 In the long run, successful public 4 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Power, PublicAffairs,

7 diplomacy promotes national interest and achieves foreign policy goals through soft power. Public diplomacy can also occur between non-state actors such as supranational organizations, transnational networks, NGOs, corporations, sub-national actors, etc. and foreign publics with the same goals in mind. 5 Although the practice of public diplomacy is arguably centuries old, the academic study of public diplomacy is still in its infancy, especially as it pertains to international relations theory. Much of the research is historical (Cold War) and US-centric. 6 There is a dearth of both empirical research and theorizing about public diplomacy in the field of international relations. Perhaps this is because it is difficult to theorize about public diplomacy in light of the inherent challenges in measuring or evaluating the outcomes of public diplomacy. 7 To the extent that the practice of public diplomacy has contributed to IR theory, scholars have mainly focused on how public diplomacy is a tool for soft power. 8 More recent scholarship has made the connection of public diplomacy to political influence, discourse analysis, and norm diffusion. 9 Through discourse, public diplomacy actors seek to change the frames of references foreign audiences use to discuss their own country. The messages they deliver and the self-image they project are intended to persuade foreign publics. As Nick Cull has argued, public diplomacy must be a two-way street and involve listening for it to be effective. 10 This ties into constructivist international relations theory which emphasizes how dialogue is necessary for norm diffusion, and the important role of norm entrepreneurs in 5 Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy, Palgrave, Eytan Gilboa, Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, p Pierre Pahlavi. (2007) Evaluating Public Diplomacy Programmes, The Hague Journal of Public Diplomacy 2: Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice, in The New Public Diplomacy. 9 Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, Hague Journal of Diplomacy 5 (2010); and Emma Basker, EU Public Diplomacy, in Javier Noya (ed.), The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective. The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, Madrid: El Cano, Nicholas J. Cull, Public diplomacy: seven lessons for its future from its past, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2010) 6,

8 persuading others to adopt new norms. 11 The image of an actor is essentially comprised of the package of norms that reflect its identity, values, and actions in the international system. However, there are numerous other ways in which public diplomacy can contribute to our understanding of international relations. In particular, I suggest that the act of engaging in public diplomacy impacts the internal audiences of the EU and vice versa. Public diplomacy can tell us much about how a society views itself, socialization occurs at the nexus of the domestic and international levels, identity is constructed, and norms emerge. Public diplomacy lies at the intersection between identity formation and external image. Thus, in the longer term, the degree of soft power an actor acquires relies on both. The messages of public diplomacy not only shape foreign audiences perceptions, they also serve as indicators of changes within the originating society. Ultimately, looking behind public diplomacy s façade contributes to predictions about whether or not it will be successful. Messages are most believable when they actually reflect the identity and values of those delivering them. Thus, in analyzing the case of the EU, it is necessary to (1) assess whether it has the prerequisites for impactful public diplomacy, and (2) evaluate the delivery of its public diplomacy messages. The next section will build upon identity politics to argue that the EU actually has a surprisingly strong foundation for supranational public diplomacy. I seek to dispel the common assumption that the EU s image is necessarily weak because Europeans have little in common or that they do not identify with Europe. Europeans not only speak with one voice more often than not, they also identify with another and debate common issues across borders using the similar frames of reference. Moreover, as Thomas Risse argues, there is evidence to suggest that these trends are getting more robust over time. The hypothesis I put forward is that European citizens 11 Jeffrey T. Checkel. (1998) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, World Politics, 50(2):

9 have a sufficiently strong shared identity and public sphere of transnational interaction to enable the common projection of an EU image to the outside world. However, to the extent that there is a disjuncture between identification with Europe and external projection of a common European image, national-level public diplomacy is often to blame. As I will explain in section IV, public diplomacy strategies of the 27 member states typically contain little to no European dimension, especially when it really counts. II. The Prerequisites for Public Diplomacy As mentioned above, there is an overarching puzzle when it comes to the effectiveness of EU public diplomacy. Its image is much weaker than its achievements would suggest. The nature of the EU as a quasi-federal entity, with both state and non-state characteristics, makes a coherent program of public diplomacy challenging. Yet, the EU has all of the ingredients for a strong international image. The problem is that there still exists a significant gap between its place in the international system and the perception of that place. In this section, I will elaborate upon the variables that enable a strong EU image, i.e. European identities, transnational public spheres, shared norms, and well-liked policies. I rely heavily on Thomas Risse s 2010 book, A Community of Europeans?, as it is truly ground breaking in synthesizing and summarizing nearly all of the key studies to date on European identity. In the following section, I will argue that despite a moderate degree of internal cohesiveness, the EU s external image is still relatively weak because national-level public diplomacy tends to work against it. Overall, multinational entities like the EU, rely on both internal cohesiveness as well as favorable policies and norms to support effective public diplomacy. 9

10 European Identities and Public Spheres Is the EU cohesive enough to project a common image to the outside world? Supranational public diplomacy must rest on a certain degree of common identification. This is what enables the EU, as a multinational entity, to project a legitimate and believable common image to foreign publics. Recent studies have shown that European citizens still hold strong national identities, but identity is not zero-sum. As Thomas Risse finds, more than 50 percent of Europeans also hold Europeanized national identities, if only as a secondary identity. 12 Europeanized national identity means that citizens who identify with Europe do so through the lens of their national history and culture. Thus, there is no single form of European identity. European identity is often a secondary identity in that the main question is not whether someone feels either French or European, but whether that person feels exclusively French or both French and European. The Europeanization of national identities is not occurring uniformly across countries. Some countries, like those in the West and South, are more Europeanized than others, and the UK is a consistent outlier in that there is almost no identification with Europe. Scandinavian countries tend to be more exclusively nationalist, while citizens in Central and Eastern Europe more closely resemble the older member states to the West. But polls show that only a modest degree of identification with Europe leads to substantially increased support for EU membership. Risse s extensive survey of European identity research reveals many important trends beyond the main finding that the majority of EU citizens have Europeanized identities. For example, there is little to suggest that identity is driven by self-interest. The most important indicator of whether someone identifies with Europe is who you are, how you live, and how you 12 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, Cornell University Press, p

11 were brought up. 13 The Europeans tend to be cosmopolitan, have left-leaning political values, and view immigrants positively. Risse writes, If you are young, well educated, rich, and belong to the upper middle classes, chances are high that you are European in this strong sense of the term. 14 Those who are older, less educated, hostile towards foreigners, right leaning, and bluecollar tend to be less European in their orientations. Naturally, the Europeanization of national identities is more common at the elite level. European integration is an elite-led project. But for the general public, the EU is about being able to travel, work, and study all over Europe. 15 The more they take advantage of these freedoms, the more they interact with others in a transnational context, and the more they feel European. There is evidence that incremental socialization occurs over time, especially with increased coverage of the EU in the media and psychological symbols that denote Europe, such as the EU treaties, flag, anthem, passport, license, and common currency. 16 Even these symbols capture the idea of Europeanized national identities. The EU flag typically hangs next to the national and regional flags. The coins, licenses, license plates, and passports identify both national origin and the EU, conveying the message that Europe and the EU are not constructed in opposition to, but are complementary to, national identities. 17 Overall, Risse shows that without doubt there is growing identification with Europe, and that this is significant. I argue that this is an important prerequisite for the projection of a common image to the outside world. However, Risse argues that there are at least two distinct conceptions of Europe, and this could ultimately be problematic for European public diplomacy. On the one hand, there is a modern and secular vision of Europe that is inclusive. On the other 13 Thomas Risse, A Community of Europeans? p Risse, p Risse, p Risse, p Risse, p. 57. More specifically, 95% of Europeans know the EU flag, 85% consider the flag a good symbol for Europe, 54% identify with it, and 50-60% of those in the Eurozone say that the euro represents the EU. 11

12 hand, there is a white, Christian vision of Europe that is exclusive in its nationalism. It emphasizes the common cultural heritage of Europeans that is juxtaposed against those who are not from the European civilization. Although this second vision is anti-modern, it is actually not opposed to the existence of the EU and the role it plays in uniting European countries. 18 It does present a challenge though in determining which image is projected outwardly. I would contend that there is an element of both images present in the minds of the global community, and much depends on which foreign audience you ask. Nonetheless, it is clear that the modern secular vision is the one that the EU consciously seeks to amplify. This is the one that is regarded by most EU citizens as normatively good. I will come back to this issue of two competing visions of Europe in the conclusion as it will comprise a crucial component of Europe s future prognosis. Risse s study also shows that the Europeanization of national identities is intimately connected to the Europeanization of national public spheres. The European public sphere(s) is defined as a space in which actors from different member states communicate and regard each other as legitimate participants in transnational dialogue. It emerged in the mid-90s, and like with Europeanized identities, the strength of it varies across nations. In effect, it runs parallel to the Europeanization of national identities. A common misperception is that there is so much disagreement over EU policies, treaty innovations, and the integration process itself that the existence of a shared public sphere would be impossible. Moreover, many point out that there is no EU-wide media and heavy language barriers to communication. 19 Risse finds that despite many differences of opinion, Europeans increasingly use similar frames of reference to debate key issues and this strengthens the public sphere. Sharp 18 Risse, p Michalski, p

13 disagreements on policy can actually augment the robustness of the European public sphere as it gives citizens a reason to mobilize around issues. In effect, it is not so much what people are saying, but the fact that they are speaking to one another using the same points of reference. Social mobilization is occurring regardless. 20 As Risse argues, the cultural barriers and language diversity within the EU are no more substantial than those within nations. Most countries are actually multilingual, and this can often increase a sense of community. 21 European Norms & Foreign Policy The richness of transnational dialogue and citizen identification with the EU result in tangible shared norms that impact policy outcomes, and ultimately, Europe s image. To understand the EU s role as an actor in world politics, it is important to appreciate its main foreign policy areas and norms that govern its foreign policy choices. A multitude of European norms contribute to the EU s projection of itself, including respect for peace, cooperation, human rights, democracy, civilian power, and the rule of law. These norms are generally appealing to external and internal audiences alike, and they are manifested in policy through the EU s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is actually one of the areas with the highest levels of support among EU citizens. 22 Even though CFSP is less than two decades old it was implemented with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the EU now has broad-ranging policy activity under CFSP. Chief among CFSP s initiatives is the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), established in Since 2003, when the EU launched its first common military operation, there have been 24 CSDP missions and operations, emphasizing peacekeeping, crisis management, police 20 Risse, p Risse, p Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Palgrave,

14 training, humanitarian intervention, and rescue tasks, among other things. While many Brussels commentators are somewhat critical of CSDP citing reasons of weak political will, the relatively modest size of the operations, and occasional disagreement on the parameters of CSDP by most measures, CSDP has exceeded expectations in a very short time, especially in its civilian dimension. The fact that member states have agreed to and contributed to so many operations over the course of just ten years is significant. Civilian crisis management overseas is very new for most member states, and many do not even have domestic structures to deal with it. To the extent that foreign audiences are aware of CSDP, it has given the EU a reputation as a civilian power. There is a military dimension to CSDP that is also growing, especially with the advent of the European Defense Agency in 2004, and the 2008 launching of NAVFOR Atalanta, the highprofile naval operation off the coast of Somalia. Many of those in support of CFSP do not necessarily want to see the militarization of Europe, but they also recognize that the use force is an important tool among many when it comes to external action. It shows that the EU can put action behind its words. Certainly, the ability and willingness to engage in military action has a significant impact on what kind of image Europe projects to the outside world. But much of this element comes from elite decision-makers in Brussels who are often a bit removed from the everyday lives of citizens. So to understand this element of Europe s image, it is necessary to look at the elite level. Brussels decision-makers commonly argue that a military dimension to European foreign policy is important, and seek to enhance common capacity and capability. 23 The exercise of military power, however, should not be confused with the willingness to use hard power. EU military action is nearly always aimed at the achieving soft power goals, such as humanitarian aid and crisis management. This very brief overview of CFSP is just intended to 23 Personal interviews of EU Military Committee and Political and Security Committee representatives,

15 provide a bit of the flavor of what the EU does overseas. 24 Even its most successful missions go unnoticed by the international community, even its real contribution to transforming and stabilizing the Balkans. 25 In 2005, the EU had over 55,000 peacekeepers on deployment around the world. Of course, the EU s foreign policy and normative power is not restricted to CSDP. The European Commission, which also contributes to CSDP alongside the Council, deals with numerous supranational foreign policy areas, including trade, poverty, the environment, humanitarian and development aid, human rights promotion, enlargement, the neighborhood policy, and diplomatic representation. Significantly, it contributes over 55% of the world s overseas development aid. The EU has much to work with when it comes to projecting a coherent, powerful, and appealing image to foreign publics. Since 2009, it has been the largest economy in the world with over one fifth share of Gross World Product (GWP). The EU has the same share of world income as the US with just under 20% each at purchasing power parity weights, and this will likely remain the same over the next decade. 26 In 2005, the EU had 21% of global GDP, and even when the EU enlarges to over 30 member states in the next ten years, it is likely to maintain this percentage. 27 At the same time, this prosperity means that the EU must be careful that its messages about free trade and the attraction of its liberal market economy are balanced with its commitment to ensuring social protections and redistribution of wealth. Beyond specific policies and actions, the EU projects certain key norms and values that derive simply from the very fact of its history, expansion, and evolution. The EU s history of 24 For a fuller description see, Mai a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011 (forthcoming). Chapters 2, 4, and Stephan Keukeleire and Jennifer MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp Foresight 22: Economic, Industry, and Corporate Trends, The Economist Intelligence Unit, p Foresight 22: Economic, Industry, and Corporate Trends, p

16 picking up the pieces after World War II and forming the European Coal and Steel Community to bind together the core of France and Germany s wartime industrial production provides a strong example of the will to end war in Europe once and for all. Against all odds, this political will demonstrated Europeans commitment to uphold peace even in the most difficult and desperate situations. This determination and anti-war mentality is a fundamental part of the political culture across Europe today. The process of enlargement over time, from six to 27, sends a clear message to the world that the EU is inclusive, fair, and democratic. The EU is the fastest growing democratic body in the world, and the offer of membership to countries in Europe has been a tremendous source of soft power. At the same time, Turkey presents a sticking point to the otherwise rosy picture of enlargement. Ongoing resistance to Turkish accession reminds foreign publics that there is another vision of Europe, and it involves exclusivity and out-dated notions of Christian civilization as a fortress. Finally, the evolution of the EU, which is defined by its deepening integration, has served as a positive example of multilateralism, interdependence, and compromise for other regions in the world. By its very ability to continue along the path towards increasing cooperation, harmonization, and integration, the EU provides a model for others. It is the greatest example of voluntary international cooperation among states in modern times. This section concludes with the argument that the EU does indeed have a strong basis for the development of a coherent and attractive image that can be conveyed through public diplomacy. But these shared norms and policy achievements must be communicated externally for them to have an impact of the EU s soft power. 28 The next section will discuss the various ways in which the EU engages in public diplomacy, and the extent to which member states neglect to include the EU in their own strategies. 28 Michalski,

17 III. A Coherent Message? Supranational vs. National Public Diplomacy What does EU public diplomacy look like? Is member state public diplomacy complimentary to EU efforts? The European image is crafted at the elite level in Brussels and in the member states. As I have argued, there is a gap between the EU s role as an international actor and perceptions of that role. I suggest that at the supranational level the EU does pretty well at projecting a coherent image, and has a strong basis to stand on. However, elites at the level of the member states, tend to neglect the EU in their own public diplomacy strategies, despite growing identification of their citizenry with the EU. The EU s Supranational Public Diplomacy EU institutions engaged in public diplomacy have a challenging task in that their audience is both internal and external. Their attention is divided. However, the EU s communications budget shows that the EU has been much more concerned with internal than external communication. It spends around 8 million on external communication, which is only 10% of what it spends on internal communication. 29 The Commission is at the heart of EU public diplomacy, which it calls informational activities, but the Council is also a part of this in that it is involved in the European External Action Service (EEAS), planned to go into effect by the end of Indeed, the growing role of the Council in public diplomacy is reflected in the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (effectively the EU s foreign minister) who is double-hatted as the External Relations Commissioner. 30 The 29 Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, p For a detailed discussion of how the coordination of external communication occurs in Brussels institutions see: Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, pp

18 balance between devoting resources to internal versus external communications is about to change dramatically in favor of external with the advent of the EEAS. 31 The Commission has done much to project the image of the EU overseas. It publishes dozens of posters and pamphlets that are user-friendly and informative. They are aimed at people of all ages and interests. These publications are distributed widely, updated often, and available for download from the EU s official website, which in itself is an impressive and transparent avenue for public diplomacy. The EU website on YouTube known as EUTube is a Commission initiative. There are many funding opportunities for civil society organizations to engage in EU public diplomacy, as long as they promote EU values like human rights and democracy. These NGOs can be based in the EU or in third countries. There is much flexibility in terms of how these non-state actors choose to communicate their advocacy goals to others, but they must acknowledge EU finding in their disseminated work. 32 The Commission also encourages a wide-range of educational exchanges, initiatives, and visits, including Erasmus Mundus, 33 Tempus, 34 the EU Visitor s Program, and many others. The Jean Monnet program provides funding for students and scholars all over the world to research EU issues, and collaborate with their European counterparts. Two of the explicit aims of these scholarships and funding opportunities is to advance the EU as a centre of excellence in education and training, 31 The exact budget for the communications aspect of the EEAS is still unknown, but the overall budget will be around 7 billion euros. This will include development aid and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. EEAS planners have requested an additional 9.5 million euros to cover salaries, but this number might change. The creation of the EEAS will require at least 55 million euros. Chiden Balmes, Budget Overrun Puts EEAS Under Fire, Devex, July 19, Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, p As Rasmussen argues, the need to include EU acknowledgement might undermine the message about values

19 and to promote common values and closer understanding between different peoples and cultures. 35 The Commission is also heavily invested in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which addresses audiences closer to home. The ENP involves a number of policies that promote prosperity, stability, and security, as well as political dialogue and economic cooperation with the EU s neighbors (i.e. those countries that will not be candidates for EU membership, but are located close to its borders). However, it is concerned more with promoting mutual interest than mutual understanding. Any public diplomacy elements are quite weak. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, by contrast, does have aspects of public diplomacy through its work in the youth, science, and training sectors. From a more global perspective, the 136 EU delegations many of which have gained the status of embassies around the world perform the bulk of public diplomacy outreach. In fact, somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the EU s external communications budget has been allocated to EU delegations. 36 These delegations are in the midst of transition as part of the implementation of the December 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Under the old system, the delegations were the Commission s prerogative and mainly focused on media outreach, distribution of information and brochures, visitors programs, internships, speaking tours, and cultural events. Information sharing is gradually moving from a more facts-based approach to a kind of narrative, case-study approach. As Rasmussen argues, an emphasis on the latter will make it easier for the EU to link its actions to its positive effects to its values of multilateralism, democracy, and rule of law Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, p Steffen Bay Rasmussen, The Messages and Practices of the European Union s Public Diplomacy, p

20 The new system, the EEAS, will see the transformation of all delegations into embassies, and an increase of personnel to 8,000. Its composition will change from being all Commission personnel to comprising diplomats from the Commission, Council, and member states. It is clear that these embassies will be engaged in traditional diplomacy, in addition to public diplomacy. The potential outcome of this crucial transformation could be very promising in terms of augmenting the EU s image around the world, and improving the coherency of its public diplomacy function. The new embassies certainly have the potential to be more high profile, they will supersede national embassies in the same capital in terms of providing the voice of the EU, and they will together constitute one of the largest foreign services in the world. The EU s National Public Diplomacies Like the EU, member states also have multiple target audiences. However, most member states tend to focus their efforts on other member states rather than countries outside of the EU. This is especially true for newer and smaller member states. To the extent that their efforts are focused externally, they tend to prioritize former colonies, countries with a concentration of their own expats, and places that share the same language (e.g. Spain and Latin America). 38 Those with more ambitious public diplomacy efforts will often target the US, China, Russia, the Balkans, and Japan. In their survey of European public diplomacy strategies at the national level, De Gouveia and Plumridge s summaries show that certain member states are more concerned with emphasizing their place in the EU than others. In the following table, I attempt to categorize the member states according to whether or not they have more or less of an EU dimension in their public diplomacy strategies. 38 Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy, London: The Foreign Policy Centre,

21 More EU focused Less EU focused Weak PD overall Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden Denmark, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Spain, UK, Czech Republic Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, and Slovakia It is important to emphasize that this categorization is only relative. Overall, even the more EU focused of the member states are still quite weak in the Europeanization of their approaches to public diplomacy. In many cases, the European dimension is limited to EU funding for certain cultural programs, or the administration of EU educational scholarships. Indeed, participation in these common (EU-funded) public diplomacy programs is really the only time when member states seem to make an effort to represent the EU in their own national strategies. Sometimes, the European dimension is simply a matter of stating that the member state supports European integration. Most of those in the EU-focused category tend to devote more resources to European audiences than to those further away, but this does not mean that they are actively promoting the EU to their fellow European citizens. By contrast, strategies to promote member states own national images are quite diverse and robust, as one would expect of developed, wealthy democracies. They include radio programming, use of the internet, networking institutes, cultural programs, and educational exchanges, among other things. All together, these various initiatives from 27 member states make clear to the world that the EU is indeed a diverse place. This does not conflict with the overarching message of the EU which is united in diversity. The problem is more that the united part of the message is not coming through as sharply as the diversity aspect. It is clear that national-level public diplomacy practitioners are highly capable and experienced, they just choose not to emphasize the EU in their agendas. 21

22 One conclusion that can be drawn from comparing Europeanization of national identities to Europeanization of national public diplomacies is that there is little correlation. Countries like France and Spain have relatively high levels of citizen identification with Europe and yet their national public diplomacy agendas tend to ignore Europe. A case in point is the Spanish pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo. 39 World Expos have been held since 1851 as a grand-scale opportunity for countries to highlight their cultures through designing pavilions alongside other countries of the world. These events draws tens of millions of viewers and thus represent quite a bit of exposure. The Spanish pavilion at the Shanghai Expo consists of three exhibition halls that highlight Spain s past, present, and future. At no point is Spain s membership in the EU mentioned or represented in this pavilion. This is surprising considering that Spain was able to repair its former image from the Franco period in large part by defining itself as being part of modern Europe. There is so much about Spain, from economic and infrastructural development to democratization, that is firmly intertwined with its membership in the EU. Yet, at the Shanghai expo, Spain represents its future through a giant, moving statute of a baby. The EU does have good individual messages that it tries to convey to foreign publics, but in many ways it is missing a core message, and this may be the result of underlying statefocused public diplomacy strategies that sometimes work at cross-purposes to EU goals. While some scholars argue that there is no core message because there is no political consensus on the EU s objectives and interests, 40 I contend that this is not the main cause. There is plenty of evidence to establish that Europeanized identities and public spheres exist, and that they have led to shared norms and policy goals _of_continuity/ 40 Michalski, p

23 I argue that there is a weak core message in large part because member states do not feel responsible for including the EU in their own image projections. Supranational public diplomacy in the EU is quite strong, but it is not enough on its own. Member states must reinforce these messages for them to gain traction. But national politicians have long been in the habit of taking credit for the EU s successes and using the EU as a scapegoat when things do not go as well as they had hoped. This gives them flexibility in garnering votes during election cycles, but it does not help the image of Europe, both internally and externally. This problem becomes more serious when the EU faces a serious crisis. At these times, there is little in place to manage perceptions overseas through public diplomacy. It is much more difficult to draw upon long-term relationships and understandings to weather the crisis. The media then engages in EU-bashing, amplifying any negative impressions or skepticism foreign publics already hold. IV. Conclusion & Prognosis I have attempted to show that European identity is strengthening. It is not a single, homogenous identity, but it is an identity which should allow Europeans to project a strong European image to the outside world. At the same time, there are multiple conceptions of what Europe is, and this is actively debated in the transnational public sphere. There is common dialogue, persuasion, and socialization occurring within European civil society, and this also makes a believable projection of image possible. Identity formation does not explain everything, but in many ways it is a prerequisite for effective public diplomacy. Despite strong foundations for EU public diplomacy, there are a number of challenges. EU institutions must focus on both internal and external audiences, which divides their attention. And there are at least two concepts of Europe that have emerged the inclusive, modern, secular 23

24 vision and the white, Christian, traditional vision. The EU must collectively overcome the latter to successfully emphasize the former. This also requires internal and external persuasion. The biggest challenge is that national-level public diplomacy initiatives tend to sideline Europe. This works again the efforts of those in Brussels who are striving to craft a strong European foreign policy, and the two-thirds of European citizens who support the creation of a united Europe that speaks with one voice in the international arena. Although I have focused on comparing the supranational and national levels of analysis, EU public diplomacy involves many more actors, both transnational and sub-national. Further research can look into how these other non-state actors contribute to or detract from EU public diplomacy s core messages. Now that the EU has harmonized many of its policy areas in a way that reflects common values, the objective for the EU in the future might be to begin harmonizing its messages to foreign publics. This applies to all levels of analysis and kinds of actors. Naturally, there will be diversity in what individual messages say, and this is always a positive quality in terms of legitimacy. However, the various and diverse actors who are impacted by and flourish because of the EU should be encouraged to recognize this in their communication strategies without taking away from authenticity. Because measuring public diplomacy outcomes is very difficult, one can never know for certain the causes of the gap between the EU s role in international relations and its image. Through an ongoing examination of processes, especially early in the evolution of the EU, it is possible to track trends and learn lessons. Research into the nature of EU public diplomacy can also be very useful in understanding multinational public diplomacy more generally. There are numerous examples of regional organizations that may eventually want to improve their own supranational public diplomacy strategies. I suggest that strong multinational public diplomacy 24

25 must first stem from a sense of common purpose and identity. Strong supranational messages should be supported at with parallel messages from member nations. In turn, the projection of a tangible external image will likely enhance internal identification with regional communities, garnering support for integration and legitimizing it. Bibliography A Glance at EU Public Diplomacy at Work, European Commission, Blackboard. Emma Basker, EU Public Diplomacy, in Javier Noya (ed.), The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective. The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy, Madrid: El Cano, Fabian Breuer, Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints: The Reform of the German Armed Forces, German Politics, June 2006, 15(2), pp Mai a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks are Transforming the EU, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011 (forthcoming). Nicholas J. Cull, Public diplomacy: seven lessons for its future from its past, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2010) 6, Marion Demossier (ed.), The European Puzzle, Berghahn, Wendy Everett, Dinosaur, Shipwreck or Museum Piece? The Unstable Identity of European Cinema, in The European Puzzle, pp EU Focus, Delegation of the European Commission to the US, July Ali Fisher, Public Diplomacy in the United Kingdom, at the Present And Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective. The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The EU in the World, European Policy Centre Breakfast Briefing. Brussels, 2 February Eytan Gilboa (2008). Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1): Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, Ralph Grillo, European Identity in a Transnational Era, in The European Puzzle, pp Craig Hayden. (2007) Arguing Public Diplomacy, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2: