Maïté Leroy PhD student Cevipol, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

Transcription

1 ECPR Joint sessions of workshop Lisbon 2009 Workshop 13: Political Parties and Civil Society Political parties and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe Social integration profile of the delegates of the Bulgarian social democratic party (BSP), the Polish alliance of democratic left (SLD) and the Czech Christian democratic party (KDU ČSL) Maïté Leroy PhD student Cevipol, Université libre de Bruxelles, Belgium Introduction Our paper aims at analyzing the ties between the political parties and the civil society in Central and Eastern Europe by a focus on the parties intermediate elite activists. While both ties and involvement of civil society with political organization arise from years of interests of the political analysts in Western Europe and North America (Katz and Mair 1994, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, Dalton 2004, Mair and Van Biezen 2001, Van Biezen 2004, Katz and Crotty 2006), these thematic remain relatively underdeveloped in Central and Eastern Europe. There are several reasons for this disengagement of scientists on this field of study (the civil sphere) and we would like to introduce two of them, which, for us, explain also in a certain way the interest showed to this case in political science. Amongst these two factors explaining this lack of empirical study of parties grassroots and political participation in Central and Eastern Europe, one is connected with the legacies of the former regime while the other has to be related to the contemporary changes in post 1989 societies. First, during four decennia of socialism regime, the political mobilization seemed false, closely surrounded by state authorities. Even if some underground organizations were created, mainly in Poland, Eastern and Central Europe s countries were nevertheless characterized by the apathy of civil society and the repression of any kind of civil representation by the authoritarian power (Berendt 1996, Goldman 1997). Moreover, these semi periphery countries were also characterized, long before World War II, by a low democratic tradition, excepted in Czech Republic (Mink 1979, Crowley and Ost 2001). Then, political organizations created after 1989 never really stood as mass parties, unlike the political parties in Western Europe. The characteristics of political organizations in CEE seem to be highly related to the pattern of catch all, electoral professional or cartel party 1

2 theorized from Western cases (Kircheimer 1966, Panebianco 1988, Katz and Mair 1995). Low membership, weak grounding in the civil society and high dependence on the state for financial and material resources appear to be the main features of contemporary political parties in Central and Eastern Europe (Ishiyama 1999, Kitschelt 1992, Kopeckỳ 1995, Lewis 1996, Luther and Muller Rommel 2002). In that sense, political parties in CEE faced similar problematic as those in Western democracies, but these ones were exacerbated by the weakness of the democratic tradition, the legacies of the communism and the rapidity of the post communism change. Seeing that the scale of the changes are still to be set up, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have known, for about two decennia, a profound social restructuring, a divided and fluid partisan system (numerous parties are created at the level of the parliament, without leaning on an organizational structure), an important electoral volatility as well as a diffuse distrust against the political actors. Now, one of the consequences of this is the crucial aspect of these thematic for democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, after decennia of political and economical system s changes led by political elites, with passive acceptance, even agreement, of the entire society, the main challenge of the democratic consolidation is to reinstate the society into the political system and to reduce the social deficit of democracy (Pridham and Vanhanen 1994, Goldman 1997, Letki 2004, McAllister and White 2001). While the democratic consolidation asked for empowerment of intermediary channels of mobilization and representation, only few authors actually focused on these representations within the organizational structure of the party. (Kopecky 1995, Lewis 1996, Szcerbiak 1999, Lukas and Stpan 2007, Karp and Banducci 2007, Gherghina and Jiglau in De Waele and Ionescu 2008). Parties are often considered as elitist and pragmatic formation, without consideration for grassroots and pattern of ideological and political mobilization. Despise the weakness of civil society s representation within the parties; it is not fair, in our view, to dismiss the analysis of those ties. Indeed, studying civil society s representation within the parties in CEE stands as particularly interesting for the thematic of democratic consolidation in this part of Europe, but also for the question of political mobilization s changing pattern in all democratic countries. 2

3 Hypothesis and questions of research Most of the literature emphasizes the weakness of the ties between the political parties and the civil society in Central and Eastern Europe. However, little empirical evidence has been put forward to confirm this hypothesis (Kopecky 1995, Lewis 1996, Szcerbiak 1999, Lukas and Stpan 2007, Karp and Banducci 2007). The main goal of this paper is therefore to empirically test the hypothesis. More precisely, the paper analyses how civil society, and more precisely one of its organizations, is represented and rooted within parties in Central and Eastern Europe. To give empirical data to evaluate this civil society s representation, we choose to look at the level of intermediary elites, the delegates. Indeed, one of the meta functions of political parties is to act as channels of participation and representation between the civil society and the State. Party members and theirs delegates constitute the active force of the party organization in the exercise of its function. They play an active role in the channel of participation and representation of civil society. In that sense, the level of social implication of the delegates provides information on how civil society organizations penetrate parties. Elected to represent the voice of the grassroots, the delegates might be seen as deformed mirror of the different current existing among membership. The profile and the political involvement of this particular kind of members will therefore be analyzed in order to understand how civil society s organization penetrated political parties from the bottom up. Looking at the delegates at party congresses, we will evaluate the level of social penetration of one particular type of social organization, the trade unions. The choice of these civil organizations is not insignificant in a context of high social cost of the passage into market economy. Moreover, the unionist system faced to a similar recomposition after 1989 than the party system (Crowley and Ost 2001). As former agent of the regime, or even actor of the change of regime as in Poland, the relations of trade unions with political power are traditionally high. Since its beginning, the labor movement in Central and Eastern Europe were used as an instrument by political authorities to avoid social protest and legitimize their power. If this statement lead, among others reasons, to unionism weakness (Crowley 2004, Ost 2002), it give also potentialities for trade union to penetrate political area and diffuse theirs owns views. We will so considerate the delegates who are also members of a trade 3

4 unions or similar organization to evaluate the penetration of such civil society s organization within political parties. Evaluating the representation of trade unionism among delegates at the party congresses implies subsequently a comparison with others groups of delegates. Precisely, we choice to compare trade unionized delegates attitudes with the ones of those who exercised a public function without union membership. In other terms, we will see if trade unions membership is a factor of political differentiation among party membership s representatives, if the fact to be involved in an organization of the civil society determines a specific consciousness and activism within parties. Our analysis will be led by two hypothesis connected with this trade unionism s representation among intermediary elites of political parties. First, we will evaluate quantitative importance of trade unionist within parties. Moreover of the numerical importance, we will take also in consideration the degree of activism of the trade unionist delegates. Considering the low share of unionism in these countries, we choice parties who have traditionally connection with civil associations, where the weakness of social implantation is less acute, in the successor parties of former regime (communist or satellite) formations. Thus, the hypothesis is that the representation and the activism of trade union in relatively good in these political parties. Second, when we speak about activism of trade unionist, we assume that these one are carrier of a particular message, of political aspirations framed by the labor union. We supposed so that trade unions are cohesive organization, with a political identity and a definite social project, or at least influencing political preferences and opinions (Leigh 2006). The second hypothesis is so that trade union membership is a determinant of political differentiation between parties delegates. We will test this hypothesis empirically by focusing on delegates socio economical conceptions. Study cases With a view to loosen the main characteristic features of the relation between political parties and organizations of the civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, we chose to use the comparative method. Our common criterion is to be explained by the will to find something in the context of low political mobilization of these societies. We chose only stable political formations (which presented candidates in all elections of the post 1989 democratic period) 4

5 characterized by a relatively high level of material and organizational resources, i.e. successor parties. Two of them are successors of the communist parties: the Polish SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Alliance of Democratic Left) and the Bulgarian BSP (Българска социалистическа партия, Bulgarian Socialist Party). Both knew different process of socialdemocratization: the Polish successor of the United Workers party (PZPR) operated a quick self transformation prepared by the moderate elites acting in the context of a negotiated transition; in Bulgaria, in a context of soft transition, the BSP operated a change of name without formerly disbanding the BKP. Both parties possessed great organizational structures which allow them a quite comfortable position in the developing party system. Both held executive function in democratic government and had the tendency to form electoral alliance (before 1999, the SLD was not a party but an electoral alliance gathering together the Polish Social democracy of Poland SdRP, direct heir party and several post communist organizations including the OPZZ trade union; the BSP formed for every election a new electoral coalition with numerous small parties of diverse ideological trends). The third party who commanded our attention is a successor of former satellite party in Czech Republic, i.e. the Christian and Democratic Union Czechoslovak People s Party (KDU CSL). This conservative, Christian democratic, centre right party is the heir of the CSL which was created during the interwar, then integrated after WWII, through the National Front, under the control of the Communist Party. The party has informal connections with the Christian Labor Confederation (KŘESŤANSKÁ ODBOROVÁ KOALICE, KOK) and developed strong ties with the sportive association Orel (eagle). The party denied all relation with the Catholic Church, presenting itself as secular defending Christian values. Those three parties, thanks to their history, possessed a good grounding of members which perhaps influenced, in each party, the development of the political structure. These three parties, thanks to their history, possessed relatively high basis of members who has, at least formally, influence in the political development of their parties. Formally, according the statute of these parties, party members, and theirs delegates at the congress, have the right to participate in discussions within the party, in the development of the program and the assumptions to the party policy; obtain information on the party s activities; be a candidate for every function in the party; nominate himself or another member of the party at the time of election of the party authorities; approve activity and financial party report; vote to decide the dissolution of the party, electoral alliance or fusion with others 5

6 political formations (Statutes of these parties available on line). These competences are implemented during party congresses, namely the delegates, excepted in KDU CSL were all representatives of the party, owning executive position in the party structure and all deputies and senators (in regional, national and European level) participate in Congress s decisions. However, the party s leadership had to make do with their ranks and files. Our choice to base our analyze on the delegates level should lead us to throw particular caution to our conclusion since it would reflect (with contortion) some common features of both labor movement and penetration of their interests in the political scene in Central and Eastern Europe. Data bases and method We based our study on the analysis of three writing survey issued during the congresses of these parties when all delegates got together to approve the programs or the nomination in the leadership function. The survey was carried out by the Cevipol (ULB, Brussels), under the supervision of Prof. Jean Michel De Waele. SLD BSP KDU CSL Membership ( ) Delegates (present in the congress) Sample (among delegates) 1569 (85.1%) 410 (61.7%) 107 (34%) The survey in Bulgaria was carried out at the 45 th congress of the PSB in April 2005 in Sofia. Among 664 delegates who attended the meeting to approve the electoral program of the party and to elect the Superior Council and the Commission of Control of the party, 410 answered our form (i.e about 61% of the delegates). In Poland, the survey was issued at 16 regional congresses held in 2008 (IV Kongresy). With more than 80% of answers, we possess an important data base with 1569 delegates who took part in the survey. In Czech Republic, the national congress held in April 2008 in Pardubice allows us to collect 106 valid surveys (34% of the delegates attending the congress). Two questions determined our study group: Are you involved in a trade union or in a similar organization? and Do you hold a public function? Those who answered yes the first 6

7 question are named trade unionist delegates, and those amongst the remainder who exercise a public function will be called public officers delegates. After this numerical review, we inquired about their subjective implication in the party: How many times have you been contacted by the party over the last year?, How often are you attending meeting of your party s local section? and What time do you actually devote to the party s activities? For the second hypothesis, we focused on their attitudes towards a set of economical statements. Considering the function of the State on the first hand and the trade unions on the second hand, both in the economy and the proposals of the politics, we will try to determine if the trade union s membership lead to the representation of specific interest inside intermediary structure of political parties. Still at the beginning of the exploitation of these databases, our study will be based on the frequencies of results of these different answers and on a bi dimensional comparison (amongst delegates of the same party first and amongst trade unionist delegates in Eastern Europe afterwards). 1. Trade Unions representation among delegates at party congress First indicator to evaluate the representation of trade unions within parties grassroots is the proportion of delegates who are members of this organization. Member of trade union SLD BSP KDU CSU N=1569 N=410 N=107 24,09 26,59 11,21 A quarter of delegates of both communist party s successors are members of a trade union, while for the Christian Democratic Party, only 12 delegates are concerned. In spite of the formal ties of the SLD with one of the main Polish trade union (OPZZ), trade unions are not more represented than in the Bulgarian brother party. If these share rates as low compared to Western cases, we nevertheless have to take into consideration the general level of trade unionism amongst the population. The important thing is not so the numerical importance of trade union in membership that, rather how much the party really wins by mobilizing people issued from this organization of the civil society. If we take into consideration the global proportion of employees in unions, the different pattern between the two kinds of successor s parties (issued from the former State party or one of his satellites) remains important: the 7

8 share of trade unionism within Polish and Bulgarian leftist parties is higher than the average share in these countries, these political parties show a good level of representation of labor movement. In Czech Republic, otherwise, the KDU CSL counts only some delegates members of a trade union, even if in this country the trade union s share is relatively high, according to its long standing democratic transition. The organizational continuity between the former dominant party and these successors is without any doubts an important factor which leads to relatively substantial ties between the trade union and the political parties. Poland Bulgaria Czech Republic Average in the EU Population 38, 537,000 7, 385,000 10, 235,000 Proportion of Employees in Unions 16% 20% 22% 25% Source: L. Fulton: Worker representation in Europe. Labour Research Department and ETUI REHS: 2007 in participation.eu. The legacy of resources from the former communist party generated a better representation of trade unions within the party grassroots. But how many among these delegates were already members of the party before the social democratization in early 1990 s? The post communist membership is much stronger in the BSP than in the SLD. If in both cases, public officer delegates count up more former communist members (92.8 and 69.5 % for Bulgarian and Polish parties), the BSP grassroots show nevertheless a greater connection with the former regime s party. It mirrors also the faster transformation that Polish post communist formation underwent in the 1990s, which led him to diversify slightly its inherited grassroots. Trade unionist delegates SLD BSP N=378 N=109 Was member of the communist party before ,2 (377) 79,8 (109) Father was member of communist party 31,1 (367) 52,8 (108) Before we speak about activism of trade unionist delegates of the congress, let us specify the sociological profile of these delegates. The political parties being essentially composed by men, it s strikes as odd to count 42.6 % of women among BSP s trade unionist delegates (against 20.6% among public office holders delegates). The legacy of the former communist party s membership is still clearly visible since the two successor parties are made out of 8

9 delegates in namely their late fifty s. But the trade unionist delegates are in both cases younger than those who held public function. The level of employment is weaker among SLD s trade unionist delegates, who are for one fifth retired and older than 60. SLD BSP KDU CSL N=378 N=109 N=12 Men 76,9 57,4 90,9 (N=355) (N=108) (N=11) <40 years old 15,3 16,5 11, , , ,9 41,7 22,2 60 and more 23,3 8,7 22,2 (N=326) (N=103) (N=9) With a job 75,3 96,3 91,7 (N=369) (N=109) (N=12) If they totalize a significant part of retirees, the Polish SLD s trade unionist delegates are dominated by intellectuals (40.2% of those who hold an employment) and senior managers (39.1%). If it seems as unexpected for people getting involved in a trade union and in a party who furthermore claim their leftist denomination (an half of unionist declare to be connected with the nebulous OPZZ organization), it is one of the paradoxes of the fast socialdemocratization, led by the party s elites: an absence of traditional leftist grassroots. Only 4.7% of the trade unionists, who actually work, call themselves blue collar workers. That is anyway a far greater worker s representation than in the two other parties (2.9% in BSP, no one in the KDU CSL). In Poland, the labor movement is characterized by its both fragmentation and high involvement in political matters. An important hostility divides the two main federations: OPZZ was created by socialist authorities after that Solidarność, the second broad movement, was definitely outlawed in Both trade unions are strongly related to political parties who held in office, leading, among others reasons, the trade unions leadership to fully support the way of economical changes in Poland. The hostility between those two main confederations on the first hand as well as the trade unionist s conviction that economical development and marketization needed weaker trade unions on the second hand led to the abortive attempt to institutionalize tripartite negotiations held since the early 1990 s (Ost, in Crowley and Ost, 2001). 9

10 Within the BSP, trade unionist delegates are for the most part public office workers; with 85% of them having a work connected to the political function. More than a half (55%) work as local executives, 20.2% are civil servants. Within the ranks of non unionized public officer delegates, they enjoy an equal representation (26.7% of civil servants and 27.9% of local executives). Among trade unionist delegates, there is also an important representation of employees (14.7%), a statute held by many women predominantly in the public sector where trade unions remain important. The dominant trade union represented among the BSP s delegates is KSNB, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria. As in Poland, they are the heirs of the trade union created in the 1980 s to refrain workers protest, the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions. But opposite to OPZZ, the labor organization claimed its independence from the communist party and all the leadership was resigned before the name changed. They are also some trade unionist delegates coming from Podkrepa, who are mainly connected to UDF and the democratic opposition to socialism. But the hostility between post communist and post opposition is not as high as in Poland, granting a better collaboration between the different organizations of the labor movement. If trade unions really strive on political matters, they have little opportunity to work in hand with reliable political partners given the tacit hostile attitude of the political elites (Gradev in Crowley and Ost 2001, Spirova 2005). It is another difference between SLD and BSP, the Polish party knew a better representation of OPZZ unionist among their deputies (Ost, in Crowley, Ost, p.87). A quiet similar pattern of delegates profile appears in the KDU CSL; employees are overrepresented among trade unionist delegates (41.7% against 8.77% for the non unionized public officers). As in the Polish SLD, but less surprisingly, given the fact that it is not a social democratic party, trade unionists count an important proportion of senior managers (33.3%). While this party collected votes in rural area, it is interesting to notice that there are no farmers among delegates (only the SLD has farmers delegates but we have to notice that the survey was carried out at the regional congresses and not at the national congress as in Czech Republic and Bulgaria). Czech Republic was the most industrialized area of the region before WWII. The trade unionist movement, as well as the democratic parties, already flourished before the regime of real socialism came along (Pollert, in Crowley and Ost 2001). Opposite to other Polish and Bulgarian trade unions, the major trade unions in Czech Republic are politically non aligned. Among KDU CSL s delegates, trade unionists usually 10

11 come from organizations connected to CMKOS (Bohemian and Moravian Confederation of Trade Union) or from Christian confederation KOK. Professional statutes of the trade unionist delegates SLD BSP KDU CSL (N=276) % (N=109) % (N=12) % intellectuals 40,2 local executives 55 employees senior managers blue collar 39,1 civil servants 4,7 employees 41, 7 2 senior managers 33, 3 20, 14, 7 SLD BSP KDU CSL (N=370) (N=109) (N=12) Secondary school or below 26, ,7 university 73, ,3 One of the expectations for these multi involved delegates, with good educational level as in the SLD and BSP, is a higher level of participation in the activities of the party. If the delegates declare themselves as very active in their party, there is no difference between trade unionists and others representatives within each party. However a difference appears between the SLD and the others considered parties, but the bigger sample of delegates questioned on a lower level of congress, calls without any doubts for this observation. SLD BSP KDU CSL N=378 N=109 N=12 Attempting meeting? (N=378) (N=108) (N=12) all meeting 67,5 85,2 91,7 often 25,1 10,2 8,3 occasionally 5,8 1,9 never 1,6 2,8 Time dedicated to the party? (N=373) (N=108) (N=12) less than 3hours a month 29 15,8 8,3 3 5 hours a month 23,9 16, hours a month 19 16,7 25 more than 10 hours a 28,2 50,9 41,7 11

12 month In summary, the representation of trade unions stands as rather weak among the delegates of the parties, even if the best organizational structure inherited from the former regime seems to have facilitated a better anchoring of the post communist successor s parties among the union members. While the KDU CSL has a long standing historical background, with stronger tradition, the satellite party during the socialism era counted only a few delegates coming from the trade union. At the opposite, the formal ties held by the SLD with unions confederation seem not to favor a better representation of such organization among the party s delegates. The trade unionist delegates are mainly old men working in public sector, well educated. The legacies of the post communist era obviously favored the weakness of trade unions, especially among the lower classes of the increasing private sector (Ost 2002, 2007). As parties who exercised executive function, our three parties count among theirs delegates an important proportion of people working for national or local administration. This is particularly the case in Bulgaria where the BSP has been ruling the country directly after the transformation of regime. If these profiles of trade unionist delegates may at first appear as strange, namely in the case of parties claiming social democratic affiliation, they correspond with the general pattern of social representation among delegates of these parties. This confirms, via the profile of membership s representatives, the elitist aspect of the party s delegates as well as the tiny difference, still noticeable, between the trade unionists and the non unionized delegates. But this overview allows us also to confirm the view that trade unions in Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by strong relation with the political actors (in the sense of an involvement in Poland, of a competition pattern in Bulgaria or by collaboration in Czech Republic) faces actually highly ideological questions since the role of labor unions diminished as a consequence of the economical change (Crowley and Ost, 2001). 2. Trade unions differentiation on socio economical prospect With the view to evaluate trade unions penetration inside parties, another relevant factor is the influence on the programmatic and ideological orientation of the party. In others terms, we take the hypothesis that trade unionism is a factor of segmentation among delegates, the trade unionist ones defending their own views at the party s congresses. That supposes that trade 12

13 unions, as social actors, have their own political prospects and expectations and try to spread them round in order to influence the policies held by the party in the political environment. We saw in the first part that trade unions representation among delegates is higher among BSP s and SLD s intermediate elites than among KDU CSL ones. Now, we would like to determine whether the unions membership conditions the different opinions or not and point out whose trade unionist delegates are in charge to defend in the partisan structure. We choice to focus our attention on socio economical matters, which are highly connected to the social area, in which the trade unions are due to exercise their functions. Moreover, these three parties claim social oriented goal ambitions. Considering what had been asked in the survey in our possession, we will use a set of questions; first about the aim of equality ( it is important to decrease the distance between incomes ), then the institutions acting in on the economical sphere (especially function of State and labor organizations in economy) and finally the policies in order to achieve pre supposed equality. It is important to decrease the distance between incomes Trade unionist delegates (N) agree rather agree rather disagree disagre e I don't know SLD (370) 53,2 32,4 9,5 2,7 2,2 BSP (108) 55,6 38 4,6 0 1,9 KDU CSL (11) 9,1 45,5 27,3 18,2 0 The majority of trade unionist delegates are in favor of more equality between the people s incomes. In the social democratic parties, BSP and SLD, nearly all the delegates agree on this assumption. Even if the approval of the necessity to reduce the difference of incomes appears as lower among KDU CSL trade unionist delegates, those ones nonetheless showed themselves more deeply involved on that matter than public officers delegates (58.9% of them rejected the sentence, against 45.5% among trade unionist). Trade unionists delegates seemed also to fully agree on the urge to reduce the gap of incomes than public officer delegates in the BSP (only 4.6% disagree with this statement, against 16.6% among non unionized public officers). No difference is observed among SLD s delegates. If globally all delegates stood in favor of the urge to solve the problem of incomes inequalities, the line of action differs noticeably from traditional social democratic guidelines on socio economical politics. 13

14 Less the State intervenes, better goes the economy Trade unionist agree rather agree delegates (N) rather disagree disagree I don't know SLD (368) 24,7 41,6 19,3 10,3 4,1 BSP (107) 11,2 31,8 41,1 15,9 0 KDU CSL (11) 8, ,7 0 0 The Bulgarian BSP is the only party in our sample where delegates plebiscite State s intervention in economy. Given the fact that the majority of delegates originate from the public sector, it s no wonder that they precisely find this support on the governmental power of regulation in the economical sphere. If this approval is lower among members of trade unions (57% among trade unionist delegates, 65.2% among non unionized public officer delegates), we might find an explanation in the endorsing of the trade union s influence on economic decisions (more than 90% of the delegates, without differentiation of unionism, approved the statement that trade unions should have greater influence on important economic matters).we suppose that the trade unionist delegates do want to preserve their own grasp on the economics decision s that are to be taken without the state intervention. In the two others parties, a widespread consensus is visible, among the delegates, against the state interventionism on economy matters. Trade unionists delegates did not differ in this view from other delegates, even if in for the ones from KDU CSL this support is weaker than among those from public officer delegates (58.3% of trades unionists are against State s intervention in economy, 78% among public officers). The positions about trade union s function to manage important economical decisions between these two groups in the Czech political formation are to be seen as completely opposite. 72.5% of the trade unionist delegates really stand for the importance of their organizations in economy while a majority of public officers (80.8%) do think that his role has to keep it quiet if not to be reduced. The same pattern of differentiation according to union s membership appears among SLD s delegates: the trade unionist delegates are slightly less in favor of the state s intervention and consequently fully endorse their own position on economic decision s (73% in favor of greater influence for industrial relation, 57.8% among public officers). Trade unions should have greater influence in important economic decision Trade unionist rather agree rather agree delegates (N) disagree 14 disagree I don't know SLD (363) 35,8 37,2 19,3 5,8 1,9 BSP (107) 50,5 43,9 3,7 1,9 0

15 KDU CSL (11) 9,1 63,6 27,3 0 0 We also asked two questions on politics which have to are to be implemented by political parties on the socio economical matters. One concerning a measure against the unemployment, the other one, the coverage of social benefits to family. Temporary jobs are a good mean to fight against unemployment. Trade unionist I don't agree rather agree rather disagree disagree delegates (N) know SLD (347) 25,6 37,2 20,7 16,4 0 (108 25,9 36,1 28,7 8,3 0,9 BSP ) KDU CSL (10) Given the role of workers defense of the trade unions, we expected to have a high level of disapproval for this proposition among trade unionist delegates. It is the case for the Czech party, in which half of trade unionists delegates are opposed to the statement while only 23% of public officer delegates endorsed it. The KDU CSL standing as an exception, the reality in others countries is definitely different. In the BSP, both trade unionist and non unionized delegates are for an half favorable to employment flexibility. In the SLD, trade unionist delegates, besides the 62.8% of them who approved the statement, are more divided on this question than public officers delegates, since 16.4% totally disagree on the appeal for this type of works. The value of the familial allocations does not have to depend on the income of the parents. Trade unionist rather agree rather agree delegates (N) disagree disagree I don't know SLD (362) 57,5 26,5 8,6 6,6 0,8 BSP (108) 64,8 21,3 8,3 5,6 0 KDU CSL (11) 18,2 18,2 45,5 18,2 0 On that matter also, answers differed between post communist social democratic delegates and those from the Czech Christian democratic party. Christian democrats delegates rejected for the whole this statement and in particular the trade unionists. (63.7% rejects it; 54.5% among non unionized public officers). In the two others parties, delegates give support to linear social benefits/allowances. 15

16 If the SLD s public officers delegates share the same opinion, it is blatantly not the case in the Bulgarian socialist party in which the majority of trade unionist fully supports the principle of equal social allowances (64.8%), 39.2% only fully agreeing on this statement, and a quarter of them (25.7%) standing against this assumption (only 13.9% among trade unionist delegates). Conclusion In this paper, we aimed to evaluate the penetration of trade unions with political parties. We focused our attention to membership s representatives, the party s delegates at the congress. This approach implies prudence in the interpretation of results. Indeed, literature emphasizes the elitist character of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, with a weak membership and the empowerment of leadership in the party s structure. But even if we cannot produce reliable conclusion on the reality of ties between political parties and organizations of the civil society, the scale of analysis allow us to formulate general assumptions on these ties and the state of trade unionism representation in political arena. The delegates are essential link in the process of representation and aggregation of the political preferences of the party grassroots and, thus, of the electorate. But, our conclusions have for sure to be confirmed with studies focused on others aspects and level of representation of political organization and with a deeper analysis of these citizens organizations. Our study of trade unionism s rooting among party delegates lead us to a conclusion: the representation of trade union in political party is not low as literature emphasizes. But this conclusion do not avoid that trade union s representation is weak within parties given the weakness of labor movement in these societies (and the limits inherent in our delegates based approach). In others terms, the weakness of trade unions in terms of membership and social consciousness, as well that the question concerning its role in post 1989 democratic regime is reflected in the profiles and the political attitudes on socio economical statements represented at the delegates level. First, trade unionist delegates do not differ strongly in theirs profiles of other non unionized delegates. They are mainly old men working in public sector, well educated. Because our three parties acceded several times to government, they rank, among theirs delegates, an important proportion of people working for national or local administration. This is particularly the case in Bulgaria where the BSP remains in power during the transformation of regime. The parties appear to particularly well corresponded to catch all party model, since they collect membership as well in upper classes of intellectuals and senior managers and in 16

17 public sector and among employee, who are more vulnerable to the social cost of economic change. Second, among our sample, the main difference appears between post communist social democratic parties and the Christian democrat party. The share of trade union representation is different; higher of the national average in Bulgarian and Polish parties; lower in the Czech one. The legacies of communist period are supposed influenced the contemporary situation on this question also, since both post communist parties beneficiated of better organization structure and stronger ties with labor movement than the former satellite party. It is interesting to note that formal ties between trade union and party do not increase trade union s representation among delegates in the case of the SLD. Third, even the share of quantitative representation is better in post communist socialdemocratic parties, we can put in question the real influence of trade union s membership on the political development of these parties, since the opinions of trade unionist delegates differ only slightly from their non unionized colleagues. If all the delegates of these socialdemocratic parties strongly and obviously support the necessity to decrease incomes difference, their opinions are also close between unionist and non unionized delegates on the appeal to the temporary jobs to fight the unemployment or on the redistribution of the social benefits. Especially in the SLD, the delegates, both unionized or not, claimed for less State s intervention in economy, supported flexible employment and did not want to see familial allocation depending on the family s income. In the Bulgarian party, trade unionist delegates are divided about State s intervention, and supported more than public officer delegates the use of temporary jobs and equal familial allocation independent of income. That led us to the fourth point: the unexpected conception of socio economical matters among social democrats. We assumed that, as social oriented, our parties will be in favor of social redistribution, State s interventionism and empowerment of social partners. The situation is very different when we look at delegates opinions. If they all agree on the aim of equality, the politics supported a conception of equality far different of the traditional socialdemocratic model, closer to liberal view; an equality of treatment, more of an equality of chance. And the trade unionist ones did not diffuse others values in party congress. The situation is different in the case of Czech Christian democrats, but we cannot really lead to conclusion given the weakness of trade union s representation in this party. But the Czech case appear to be different; the consensus is higher in favor of trade union influence in economical decision (among both unionized and non unionized delegates) and the trade 17

18 unionist delegates seem defending more traditional leftist opinions than their non unionized colleagues (higher level of will to decrease of incomes inequalities, weaker thinking of necessity to use temporary jobs, stronger support to income depending familial benefits). Lastly, this study of trade unionism representation among party delegates confirm some of the features, already highlighted by literature, of labor movement in Central and Eastern European countries. In Bulgaria and in Poland (we assumed that Czech Republic is an exception thanks to democratic and trade unionist tradition before socialism), trade unions represented among the BSP and SLD s delegates have two main features: They are strongly connected with parties. Trade unions in Poland and Bulgaria are for their majority connected with political parties and oriented to political action. Legacies of communism seem to be a non insignificant determinant of the ties that trade unions has with contemporary political organizations. Trade unionized delegates do not present specific way of thinking about economy. We can advance two reasons to it: whether it is the sign of a good penetration of the unions values and socio economical conception among all the delegates of parties; or whether it is a sign of the weakness of the labor union, its lack of socio economical vision or its weak power of influence and mobilization of their members towards common social aspirations. It can appear as a paradox, because labor unions were tempted exactly always in the political action. But, at the opposite of Czech case, labor movement in others Central and Eastern European countries were confronted to difficulties in determining their function in the post 1989 democratic system. The difference in the level of support for trade union s activity in economical decision between our three parties reflected this difference in perception of trade unions role. In Czech Republic, the trade unions are mainly apprehended as actor in industrial relation, enclosed in workers protection, in the opposite of the two others countries, where trade unions take part to political life. In sum, we hypothesis that the main reason of relatively good representation of trade union inside parties is connected with legacies of the socialist regime and that at this opposite, the reason of the low rooting of trade unionism among political parties is a result of ideological weakness, fragmentation and uncomfortable position of labor movement in Central and Eastern countries in the post transition period. Nevertheless few authors announced a renewal of the labor movement (Mrozowicki and Van Hootegem 2008) while consolidation of the party system allow scientist to go further into the analysis of political parties, its organizational structure and the citizens mobilization. 18

19 References ALLERN, E., PEDERSEN, K., The Impact of Party Organisational Changes on Democracy, West European Politics, vol. 30, n 1, 2007, pp BERENDT, I., Central and Eastern Europe, Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery. Cambridge University Press, BOZOKI, A., ISHIYAMA, J. (ed), The communist successor parties of central and Eastern Europe, ME Sharpe, NY, London, CROWLEY, S., OST, D.(eds), Workers after Workers States, Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, CROWLEY, S., Explaining Labor Weakness in Post Communist Europe: Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspective, Londres, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 18, n 3, 2004, pp DAALDER, H., The Comparative Study of European Parties and Party System: An Overview in DAALDER, H., MAIR, P. (eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, London, Sage, DALTON, J., WATTENBERG, M.P., Parties without partisans. Political change in advanced industrial democracies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, DALTON, R., Democratic Challenges. Democratic Choices. The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, Oxford University Press, New York, DE WAELE, J M., IONASCU, A. (eds), Les élites intermédiaires dans les partis politiques d Europe central et orientale, Transitions, vol. XLVIII, n 1, FULTON, L., Worker representation in Europe, Labour Research Department and ETUI REHS: 2007 in participation.eu. GOLDMAN, M., Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe: political, economic, and social challenges, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY, GRABOW, K., The Re Emergence of the Cadre Party?: Organizational Patterns of Christian and Social Democrats in Unified Germany, Party Politics, vol. 7, n 1, 2001, pp GRZYMALA BUSSE, A., Redeeming the Communist Past: the regeneration of Communist parties in East Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ISHIYAMA, J., The Communist Successor Parties and Party Organizational Development in Post Communist Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1, 1999, pp JUNGERSTAM MULDERS, S., Post Communist European Union Member States, Parties and Party Systems, Ashgate, Aldershot, KARP, J., BANDUCCI, S., Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies, Party Politics, vol. 13, n 2, 2007, pp KATZ, R., CROTTY, W. (eds), Handbook of Party Politics, Sage, London, KATZ, R., MAIR, P., Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party, Party Politics, vol. 1, 1995, pp

20 KATZ, R., MAIR, P., Party Organizations. A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies , Sage, London, KIRCHHEIMER, O., The Transformation of West European Party Systems, in LAPALOMBARA, J., WEINER, M. (eds), Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, Princeton, KITSCHELT, H., The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe, Politics and Society, vol. 20, 1992, pp KOPECKỲ, P., Developing Party Organizations in East Central Europe: What Type of Party is Likely to Emerge?, Party Politics, vol. 1, 1995, pp LAWSON, K., ROMMELE, A., KARASIMEONOV, G., (ed), Cleavages, Parties, and Voters. Studies from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, Praerger Publishers, Westport, LEIGH, A., How Do Unionists Vote? Estimating the Causal Impact of Union Membership on Voting Behaviour from 1966 to 2004, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, n 4, 2006, pp LETKI, N., Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East Central Europe, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 4, 2004, pp LEWIS, P., Party Structure and Organization in East Central Europe, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, LHOMEL, E., L'Europe centrale et orientale : dix ans de transformations, , La documentation française, Paris, 2000, 333 p. LUKẢŠ, L., ŠTPÁN, P., Low Membership in Czech Political Parties: Party Strategy or Structural Determinants?', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,vol.23, n 2, 2007, pp LUTHER, K., MULLER ROMMEL, Political parties in the new Europe, Political and Analytical challenges, Oxford University Press, Oxford, NY, MAIR, P., Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State in KATZ, R., MAIR, P.(eds.), How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, Londre, Sage, MAIR, P., VAN BIEZEN, I., Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, , Party Politics, vol. 7, n 1, 2001, pp McALLISTER, I., WHITE, S., Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post Communist Societies, Party Politics, vol. 13, n 2, 2007, pp MEARDI, G., More voice after more exit? Unstable industrial relations in Central Eastern Europe, Londres, European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 38, n 6, pp MINK, G. (coord.), Structures sociales en Europe de l Est, Paris, La Documentation française, MROZOWICKI, A., VAN HOOTEGEM, G., Unionism and Workers Strategies in Capitalist Transformation: The Polish Case Reconsidered, Londres, European Journal of Industrial Relations, Sage Publication, vol. 14, n 2, 2008, pp

21 OST, D., The Weakness of Strong Social Movements : Models of Unionism in the East European Context, Londres, European Journal of Industrial Relations, Sage Publication, vol. 8, n 1, 2002, pp OST, D., After Postcommunism: Legacies and the Future of Unions in Eastern Europe, in PHELAN, C. (ed.), The Future of Organised Labour, London, Peter Lang, 2006, pp PANEBIANCO, A., Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, PRIDHAM, G., VANHANEN, T., (eds.), Democratization in Eastern Europe, Routledge, London New York, PUTNAM, R., The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, ROSE, R., MUNRO, N., Elections and parties in new European democracies, CQ Press, Washington, SPIROVA, M., Political Parties in Bulgaria: Organizational Trends in Comparative Perspective, Party Politics, vol. 11, n 5, 2005, pp SZCZERBIAK, A., Testing Party Models in East Central Europe: Local Party Organization in Postcommunist Poland, Party Politics, vol. 5, n 4, 1999, pp TWORZECKI, H., Social democracy in East Central Europe: Success by Default, in HARGROVE, E., (ed.), The future of the democratic left in industrial democracies, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003, 168 p. VAN BIEZEN, I., KOPECKY, P. The State and the Parties: Public Funding, Public Regulation and Rent Seeking in Contemporary Democracies, Party Politics, 13, 2007, pp VAN BIEZEN, I., Political Parties as Public Utilities, Party Politics, 10, 2004, pp