MYPLACE 31 January 2015

Transcription

1 MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement) Grant agreement no.: FP WP7: Interpreting Activism (Ethnographies) Deliverable 7.2: Transnational cluster report Cluster 1: Radical right and patriotic movements Author Hilary Pilkington Version Final Date Work Package WP7 Interpreting Activism (Ethnographies) Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Dissemination level PU: Public WP Leaders Hilary Pilkington (UM), Phil Mizen (Aston University) Deliverable Date 31 January 2015 Document history Version Date Comments Modified by First draft circulated to teams Hilary Pilkington Comments on MPL and The Finns Kari Saari Comments on Torcida Ben Perasović, Marko Mustapić Comments on GD, MM and LNF Alexandra Koronaiou, Martin Priečko, Anita Stasulane Comments on RA and RR Istvan Murányi, Aleksei Zinov ev Revised report Hilary Pilkington Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 1 of 115

2 Contents 1. Introduction Scope of the data Overview of data Introduction to organisations in the cluster English Defence League (EDL) Golden Dawn (GD) Latvian National Front (LNF) Mladá Matica (MM) Moral panic over anti-immigration activism in Lieksa (MPL) The Ragged Cultural and Heritage Protection Association (Ragged Association, RA) Russian Run (RR) Torcida Youth Organisation of The Finns (Finns) Key findings How do young people inhabit, interpret and own their organisations? An organisation of the people All for one and one for all Not racist Open to all Investing in the future How do young people understand and experience their own activism? One big family Getting a buzz Self-realisation It was a rational choice Having an impact Being heard No surrender I don t care about the consequences What are young activists perceptions of politics/the political? Democracy: the lesser evil Politics is not us Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 2 of 115

3 3.3.3 Silencing Two-tier system Beyond left and right How are young people s activism, attitudes and everyday lives shaped by the past and the present? Immanence of the past: 'Honour your traditions, respect your ancestors, and behave in accordance with your history Immanence of the past: hostages of history Immanence of the present: The work s not out there Immanence of the future: preparing for the call of history It s not as if my parents haven t been patriots : the role of family in the transmission of attitudes and activism What elements of far right or populist radical right ideology and practices are articulated or adopted by young activists? Patriotism: We do it for the nation We want our country back Immigrants in our own country: Nativism Populism Euroscepticism Their way or no way : Ethnic and religious minorities as a problem Immigration Multiculturalism Gender and sexual equality Social inequality Spirituality and healthy lifestyle as means of combating moral degeneracy Conclusion References Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 3 of 115

4 1. Introduction The Radical right and patriotic movements cluster was formed on the basis of case studies scoped and proposed by Consortium members. The cluster speaks directly to one of the three key MYPLACE research questions, namely, Are young people receptive to political agendas of the radical right? The final composition of the cluster, however, included organisations that, objectively, are not primarily organisations of the classic far right while most of the organisations, subjectively, seek to distance themselves from such movements. Thus the cluster was finally constituted as comprising Radical right and patriotic movements. This proved to be an accurate descriptor as, as is shown in Section 3.5.1, the cross-cluster analysis revealed that the defining feature shared across the cases was a selfunderstanding as patriotic movements. The Radical right and patriotic movements cluster consists of nine cases from eight countries: English Defence League (UK) Golden Dawn (Greece) Latvian National Front (Latvia) Mladá Matica: Youth branch of Pro-Slovak culture organisation (Slovakia) Moral panic over anti-immigration activism in Lieksa (Finland) Russian Run (Russia) Ragged Cultural and Heritage Protection Association (Hungary) Torcida: Football hooligans as social/political actors (Croatia) Youth Organisation of The Finns (Finland) Eight of the cases are considered in this cluster only. One case (Youth Organisation of The Finns) is primarily located in the Youth sections of political, labour and state-sponsored organisations cluster. Given the prominence of The Finns as one of the most electorally successful of the new populist radical right and Eurosceptic parties in Europe, however, it was decided to include it also in this cluster analysis. 1 The relatively high number of cases included in this cluster makes it a fairly robust cluster. The challenges faced relate to its broad scope and diversity in terms of: the form of data; and the substance of data. The form of data gathered for individual cases in this cluster range from: studies that are deeply ethnographic, including extensive field diaries, visual data and respondent interviews; studies based on the same substantial interview material but affording less opportunity for ethnographic observation; to primarily document based studies using web materials and official documents supplemented by a small number of interviews or observations. The forms of data included in each case are detailed in Table 2.1. The form cases took was determined by questions of access, ethics and feasibility and is 1 A tenth case study - Homma internet forum (Finland) was designated for analysis within this cluster also but due to a computer failure, the Nvivo database and accompanying memos, on which the analysis is based (see Introduction to D7.2) were lost, preventing its inclusion. The individual case report was completed and can be accessed at: myplace.eu/documents/d7_1/cluster%201%20right%20wing%20and%20patriotic%20movements/myplace_ WP7.1REPORT_UEF_Homma_Forum%20(Finland).pdf Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 4 of 115

5 detailed in each case in the relevant D7.1 report ( myplace.eu/deliverable_7.php). In terms of substance, the cases included in this cluster range from informal Facebook groups (Moral panic over anti-immigration activism in Lieksa), through subcultural and social movements (Torcida, English Defence League, Russian Run), to official cultural institutions (Mladá Matica, Latvian National Front) and formal parties with electoral success (The Finns (Youth Organisation), Golden Dawn) and paramilitary organisations (Ragged Cultural and Heritage Protection Association). This wide diversity problematises any single definition of the type of organisation under analysis. This complexity is further enhanced by: the discrepancy between self understanding of the movement by members (who frequently distance the organisation from the far right ) and a critical reading of movements; the diversity of views within movements alongside the deprioritisation of the ideological in many of them; and the fact that existing categories and typologies of the far right are based on political parties, when only two of the case studies in this cluster are formally constituted as such. This diversity is evident in the findings of the synthesis outlined in Section 3 of this report, in the form of refutational and missing cases. However, the cluster remains robust since there are no persistent outliers. Prior to analysis the Torcida case appeared potentially most problematic since it is a football supporters group without an overt political orientation. However, it proved only to be a missing case in some concepts in Section 5.5 (far right or populist radical right ideology and practices) and much activism and experience overlapped with a number of respondents in the English Defence League (EDL) case who identified as, or had strong links with, football firms or the Casuals United movement. Golden Dawn, the most classically far right of the organisations, is also a refutational case in many instances although there is significant intersection with extreme fringes of other cases (EDL, Ragged Association). More significant here is that the interviews conducted for the Golden Dawn case were supplementary to a Internet ethnography and were with young people who voted for the party rather than with party activists; this meant data on meanings of activism and how young people inhabit their organisations were often missing. The same is true for the Moral panic about anti-immigration issues in Lieksa case, which is primarily a study of documents concerning media and institutional responses to anti-immigration views expressed within a Facebook site, supplemented by interviews with young people from the town with greater or lesser connection to the group. 2. Scope of the data 2.1 Overview of data Table 2.1 provides an overview of the scope of the data synthesised by case. The number of interviews ranged from 9 to 35, being low primarily in those cases where the primary data analysed was web-based or document based (Golden Dawn, Moral Panic in Lieksa). The most significant challenge for synthesis was the different modes of coding. Despite working to a common data analysis strategy with specific guidance on coding, the number of both first and second level nodes varied greatly: from 5 to 38 Level 2 nodes; and from 44 to 1146 Level 1 nodes. Since the primary data used for synthesis were the descriptions of these nodes and illustrative quotes included in the Node memos (see Introduction to D7.2), there Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 5 of 115

6 is clearly more data available for those cases with more extensive coding trees and this is reflected in the findings of the cross-case analysis report. Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 6 of 115

7 Table 1 Overview of data by case Case Sample (no. respondent memos) Data collection (no. nodes) Setting (context of fieldwork) Type of activism English Defence League Level 2 nodes Level 1 nodes Participant observation and interviews Golden Dawn Internet ethnography and interviews Latvian National Front Anti-Islamist social movement Political party of the far right Interviews and observation Nationalist social movement with theosophic roots Mladá Matica Interviews and observation Youth branch of official cultural institution Moral panic in Lieksa Ragged Association Analysis of media and official documents, interviews Participant observation and interviews Russian Run Participant observation and interviews Torcida Participant observation and interviews The Finns Participant observation and interviews Total Anti-immigration Facebook group Paramilitary association for protecting traditions Patriotic social movement Football supporters movement officially constituted as an NGO Youth branch of political party Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 7 of 115

8 2.2 Introduction to organisations in the cluster Below a very brief outline of the movements considered as cases in this cluster is provided. More extensive discussion of the origins and profile of the organisations as well as methodological details of data gathered including the socio-demographic composition of the respondent sets for each case can be found in the respective D7.1 reports (( English Defence League (EDL) The EDL is a feet on the street movement founded in 2009 (Luton, UK) to protest against extremist Islam and disrespect for British troops. Its leaders and mission statements distance the movement from classic far right organisations in the UK (British National Party, National Front etc) leading it to be characterised as an Islamophobic new social movement (Copsey 2010: 11), social movement with a new far right ideology (Jackson 2011a) or social movement of the populist radical right (Pilkington 2014a). The movement is typically male dominated - a Demos study of EDL supporters (based on a survey of Facebook users) found 81 per cent to be male and 19 per cent to be female (Bartlett and Littler 2011: 5). At the same time, it is untypically youthful for movements of the far right in the UK. The same survey found 72 per cent of supporters to be under the age of 30 (ibid.) and, at the start of the research period, its main leader (Tommy Robinson) was himself just 30 years of age. The movement is predominantly working-class in terms of members social backgrounds. The organisation has no formal membership making estimates of numbers difficult; the number of active members is estimated to be at least 25-30,000 (Bartlett and Littler 2011: 5). Over the course of the research attendance at demonstrations (the primary form of EDL activism) ranged from to During the early part of the research (April May 2013), the movement appeared to be in a serious crisis of leadership, strategy and recruitment (not least because the movement s co-leader, Tommy Robinson, was in prison from October 2012 to February 2013), although the movement experienced a spike in interest and support following the murder of British soldier Lee Rigby (22 May 2013) in Woolwich, London by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale (British converts to Islam) in a self-declared act of avenging the deaths of Muslims killed by British armed forces. The movement is characterised by a flat structure. Until the resignation of Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll in October 2013, this consisted of Robinson and Carroll as co-leaders supported by Regional Organisers heading up 19 geographically delimited regional organisations presiding over myriad local divisions, which are the basic units of grassroots activism in the movement. Since October 2013 the EDL has been run by a committee of the Regional Organisers with a rotating chair. There are no membership fees or obligatory donations thus finances at the divisional level, come from the sale of merchandise, collections for coach trips and from fund-raising activities such as barbecues. Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 8 of 115

9 2.2.2 Golden Dawn (GD) GD considers itself to be a nationalist political party although it employs neo-nazi rhetoric and symbolism. A marginal political force until 2009, it has experienced an extraordinary rise in electoral popularity in Greece over the last five years. Its leader was elected to the Municipal Council of Athens in 2010 and the party achieved significant electoral breakthrough in the parliamentary elections of May 2012 and June 2012; in June 2012 it won 6.9 per cent of the vote and 18 seats in Parliament. Support for GD is higher among young people than among the population as a whole; in the May/June 2012 elections the youth vote for GD was per cent for the age group and per cent for the age group. This support from the younger generation is symbolically important to GD, which repeatedly claims that this indicates the party is a rising force on the political scene and that future elections will be characterised by an intergenerational battle in which the majority of Greek youth will take the side of the party. GD is strictly hierarchically organised with the General Secretary, Nicos Michaloliakos, as leader and the most recognisable figure of the group for the last 27 years. The party has local divisions in many regions of Greece. It does not have an administratively separate youth division although from the party s website, the operation of such a division, which publishes its own periodical (Counter-Attack) is evident. In addition to electoral activity, GD is active in the provision of social services (soup kitchens, help to the elderly) to Greeks only and in providing history lessons in schools. Youth camps offer a forum for the development of a militarised ethos and training and the participation of members of the organisation in acts of violence against immigrant and ethnic minority communities is well documented. Following the killing of an antifascist musician (Pavlos Fyssas) by a GD supporter (18 September 2013), the government started criminal prosecutions against six GD MPs, including the General Secretary who are charged with being members of a criminal organisation. Two young members of GD were themselves shot dead on 1 November 2013 in an attack apparently carried out as an act of retaliation for the murder of Pavlos Fyssas. All 18 elected representatives of GD face prosecution for membership of a criminal organisation and will stand trial in early 2015; eight are on remand in prison. Despite the escalating violence and arrest and imprisonment of the party leadership and parliamentary representatives, however, GD has remained the third most popular political party in the country Latvian National Front (LNF) The Latvian National Front (Latvijas Nacionālā Fronte) is a movement articulating radical right wing ideas but remaining remote from legislative and executive power. This distinguishes it from political parties of the radical right such as the Latvian National Alliance (Nacionālā aliance) which, since the 2010 elections, has been part of the ruling coalition. Radical organisations on the Latvian political scene are characterised not only by right wing versus left wing orientation but differentiated along ethnic lines. The Latvian groups tend to direct their antipathy towards Russians and to invoke inter-war authoritarian models, while Russian groups tend to direct their antipathy against the Latvian state and the West, while glorifying the Soviet Union or contemporary Russia (Muižnieks 2005: 95). Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 9 of 115

10 The LNF was established in 1998, developing out of the theosophical movement, the Latvian Roerich Society (restored in 1988) and there remain some significant tensions between its spiritual and political wings. It is notorious for its anti-russian and anti-semitic rhetoric, as well as for its campaigns against LGBT rights. It advocates the decolonisation of the country through the repatriation of Soviet-era immigrants (around 700,000 people) and a future composition of the Latvian nation that is at least 75 per cent ethnic Latvian. The movement became widely known in Latvia in , when it organised schoolchildren s essay competitions on anti-russian and anti-lgbt themes. Collections of the essays were published under the titles: We Won t Give up Latvia to Anyone; For the De-Colonisation of Latvia; and The Rights of Nations and Homosexuality the Disgrace and Ruin of Mankind. The LNF is a formal group, characterised by a strong vertical authority structure at the head of which is the chairman of the LNF and the owner of the theosophical publishing house Vieda, Aivars Garda (b. 1955). A key activity of the LNF is the publication and distribution of its newspaper called DDD (published since May 2002 with a circulation of 5,000); the three Ds stand for De-Occupation, De-Colonisation and De-Bolshevisation of Latvia. While there are no reliable data on the current membership or socio-demographic composition of the LNF, previous field-based research ( ) on the different theosophical groups in Latvia suggests that members range in age from years old and that around two-thirds of activists are below the age of 25. Unusually, the LNF is comprised of more women than men, possibly due to the distinctive role assigned to women in the group s philosophy. Less surprisingly, the ethnic composition of the LNF is predominantly Latvian. The movement is largely middle-class in terms of social composition Mladá Matica (MM) Mladá Matica (Young Matica) is a subsidiary, youth, branch of Matica slovenská, which is a traditional cultural and enlightenment organisation established in Matica slovenská (MS) was dissolved and prohibited in 1875 as part of the centralist, nationalist policy of Hungary at that time and restored only in 1920 under the first Czechoslovak Republic. It was again suppressed by the creation of the independent Slovak Republic in 1939 and, during the post-war communist era its activities were reduced to enlightenment work with an ideological and political mission in the spirit of the propagation of socialism and communist ideology (Sedlák 2012). After the Velvet Revolution in 1989 MS was restored again, although in terms of the scope of its activities, significance and membership base, it has never regained the position attained prior to MS is currently a state supported institution, which now, in addition to a significant patriotic orientation (protection of interests and cultural expressions of Slovaks), is mandated to support Slovaks living abroad and in nationally heterogeneous regions on the borders of Slovakia. The independent youth branch of MS called Mladá Matica (MM) was established in May 1992 on the initiative of young members of the parent organisation whose numbers started to grow in this period. It is governed by the Council of Matica Youth (Rada matičnej mládeže) and the organisation has a formal structure mirroring that of the parent organisation. At the local level, the organisation exists primarily in the form of local sections of MM each of which elects a formal chairman and is governed by a committee and supervisory board. The chairman and committee are regularly confirmed or elected anew on Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 10 of 115

11 the basis of internal elections held during the annual section meeting, usually at the end of a calendar year. Institutional support of MM remains guaranteed by its parent organisation. MM adopted the agenda of its parent organisation complemented by a specific aim to support the patriotic activities of young members and thereby encourage patriotism and national pride among young people. MM seeks to distance itself from extremist nationalist groups such as Slovak National Youth (Slovenská národná mládež), Slovak Society (Slovenská pospolitosť) and Defiance of Kysuce (Kysucký vzdor) although members acknowledge that it is impossible to completely rid the movement of radical elements. There are currently about 700 members registered to MM in 46 local sections, which are evenly distributed across the country. Approximately one third of members are young women and the movement attracts primarily those in, or with, higher education Moral panic over anti-immigration activism in Lieksa (MPL) This case study is of the media, public and judicial debate surrounding a discussion group called Discussion about immigration without any censoring (Lieksa) primarily operating through Facebook. The group was formed in 2011 and grew rapidly through the autumn and winter of 2011 as over two hundred asylum-seekers were settled in the small town of Lieksa (total population of 12,500). It became notorious for its anti-immigrant discussion and this, against the background of a growth in anti-immigrant violence and crime in the town (including damage to cars, violent attacks and verbal abuse), led to a moral panic about racism in the town over the period from autumn 2011 to autumn Preliminary police hearings and investigations into the Facebook group were launched in October 2011 and as a consequence eight members of the group were prosecuted for ethnic agitation on the basis of their postings to the discussion. They were tried and convicted in May The study conducted considers the public debate over, and institutional response to, the Facebook group through the analysis of: media reports of the group s activities and police investigation (mainly drawn from Internet-based publications of North-Karelian regional and national newspaper articles; official documentation including transcripts of the questioning of those prosecuted during the police department s preliminary hearings; field notes from the trial of those prosecuted (May 2012); and interviews with young people in which opinions about the Facebook discussion group were voiced including with two young men (aged 24 and 30) who had been members of the original Facebook group The Ragged Cultural and Heritage Protection Association (Ragged Association, RA) The Ragged Cultural and Heritage Protection Association was officially registered in October It is the personal project of its leader, a former skinhead and leader of the Association of National Youth, and was inspired by the movement of The Ragged Guards. The Ragged Guards was formed in April 1919 and brought together surviving soldiers from the First World War as well as poor peasant civilians and the remnants of the Szekler Division; the term ragged was adopted as a proud appropriation of their own impoverishment. During Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 11 of 115

12 the Hungarian Soviet Republic era (March-August 1919), the goal of this self-organised armed group was resistance against the communists and the retention of the areas around Sopron that had been taken during the Treaty of Trianon. The Ragged Association operates out of a farmstead in the poorest region of Hungary and promotes the defence of the homeland through agricultural production and military training under the slogan to produce and to defend. It was officially registered only out of necessity (to qualify for a licence for firearms) and is a relatively closed organisation, accepting new members only on the recommendation of existing members. The Ragged Association is closely connected to the National Army of Guardsmen Heritage Protection and Civil Guard Organisation (henceforth National Army of Guardsmen), which was founded in 2007 and sees itself as an association for protecting traditions following the example of the radicals of the Reform Age (1848) and the National Guard of the 1956 revolution. The National Army of Guardsmen itself split in 2009 into: an official (although smaller) faction which retained its party political links with the radical right party Jobbik; and a larger, rural quasi National Army of Guardsmen independent of Jobbik and led by a close associate of the leader of the Ragged Association. There is considerable overlap in membership and ideological orientation between the Ragged Association and the quasi faction of the National Army of Guardsmen. Members of the Association interviewed ranged in age from years and more than three-quarters were male Russian Run (RR) This case study is focused on the St Petersburg branch of the organisation Russian Run, which has been active in a number of cities across Russia since January Russian Run is a sports movement which aims to promote a healthy lifestyle (especially sobriety) among young people; its primary activity is weekly mass jogs. The movement is aligned, however, with nationalist and patriotic groups as evident from the chanting of nationalist slogans and the presence of nationalist symbols on participants clothes, flags etc. Particularly notorious is the use of the Russian Imperial flag (something explained by respondents as an act of disassociation from the current Russian government under Putin). A section of the participants of Russian Run - St. Petersburg are now active in more directly nationalistic events called Russian mopping-up which conducts actions against illegal trade. The majority of participants in Russian Run are young people and organisers and participants coordinate their actions through social networks on the Internet (vk.com). The movement now has branches in more than 20 cities in Russia, as well as in Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, and Latvia. The number of participants in the events in St Petersburg reached in September 2011 although numbers began to fall following the arrest of leader of the local movement, Maksim Kalinichenko, during one of the protests in December He was subsequently charged with inciting violence against police officers and released only in February This decline intensified after June 2012 when a series of legislative amendments were passed, toughening punitive sanctions for organising unauthorised rallies and violation of the law during public events. Thereafter, Russian Run events were equated with protest (the formal reasoning for this was the use of flags, symbols on clothes and chanting pro-sport and nationalist slogans) and the police detained participants in several jogging events. This police pressure resulted in a decrease in the number of participants; Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 12 of 115

13 attendance at regular Sunday jogging events fell to around people. The movement is dominated by young men although around a quarter of participants are young women Torcida Torcida was founded in 1950 as an independent, organised group of football supporters of Hajduk Football Club. Hajduk FC was founded in 1911 by a group of Croatian students studying in Prague, inspired by Slavia Praha FC, and is currently one of the two most popular Croatian football clubs. The founders of the original Torcida, Dalmatian students in Zagreb, were later arrested and prosecuted. At the end of the 1970s, a new generation of Torcida emerged and the organisation has become an influential social actor in the city of Split and the region of Dalmatia. Although there is a high level of spontaneity among Torcida, an organisational framework also exists; since the mid-1990s Torcida has been an NGO with a formal structure and hierarchy and branches in other cities both within and outside Dalmatia. The hard core of Torcida is estimated to number between 300 and 500 members. However, at particularly tense moments for the club, the number travelling to away matches can rise to 1,000-1,500 people. At regular home matches, 2,000-3,000 people can be regularly counted on to stand and chant, rising to 5,000 at important matches. Torcida leads the chants, choreography and the general atmosphere in the north stand of the stadium, which holds up to 10,000 people. While the primary activities of Torcida concern football support, chanting, banner choreographies, pyrotechnics and, on occasion, fighting, their actions are socially engaged and carry political content even if respondents mainly declare the terraces to be a nonpolitical zone. This is evident in participation and organisation in commemorative events in Croatian history (especially related to the Homeland War) and in politically controversial chants that are occasionally heard on the terraces. Torcida has taken an active position in relation to the Anti-Modern Football movement, which campaigns against the transformation of popular clubs into global corporations and against corruption and the dominance of money in the contemporary game. This anti-global capital stance sits alongside a strongly pro-patriotic sentiment among Torcida activists. The core of Torcida mostly consists of young people between 16 and 30 years of age; however, it is not rare to meet people aged 40 or older. Members come from different social classes, but mostly belong to families that might be characterised as losers of the Croatian transition, that is, they are primarily the children of the working class and impoverished middle class, amongst whom pupils, students, and unemployed or seasonally employed individuals dominate. The vast majority are men but women are present even in the Torcida core Youth Organisation of The Finns (Finns) The Finns Party is one of a new family of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) or, arguably, populist Eurosceptic parties (see Arter 2010; Mudde 2007) that has enjoyed a significant electoral breakthrough in the last ten years. From a baseline of the 2004 elections, The Finns increased their vote by five-fold in the municipal elections of Their major Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 13 of 115

14 breakthrough, however, came in the parliamentary elections in 2011 when the party secured 19.1 per cent of the votes. The case study undertaken here is with the Youth Organisation of The Finns in four cities in Northern, Eastern and Southern Finland. The youth organisation organises a range of political events, discussions and meetings. It publishes a newspaper and provides a closed Internet discussion forum for its members. The main political activism consists of activities of the formal organisation, its official representatives and other members. To some extent organisational functions of the Youth of the Finns are funded by the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, in the locations researched, the youth organisation organises more informal activities like discussions, meetings and trips. The youth section of the party has been accused of crypto-fascism - that is of having some secret adherence to extremist, xenophobic or even racist beliefs and agendas - in the media and by other political parties. The organisation has approximately 2,000 members across Finland (2012) and the majority of the party actors and (active) members in the locations studied are young men (under 30 years old). In Northern Finland at least they tend to come from blue-collar backgrounds or be employed in technical fields, with university graduates less represented. 3. Key findings 3.1 How do young people inhabit, interpret and own their organisations? Through this first analytic question, we sought to synthesise findings across cases related to young people s own interpretations and experiences of the organisation in which they were active. The question oriented us towards respondent narratives related to: internal democracy, hierarchy and leadership; the inclusivity and degree of comfort young people felt in the organisation; the relationship between their own perception of the organisation and external representations of it; and their evaluations of the efficacy and future of the organisation. Synthesis of data across cases generated five core concepts. In three instances an organisation of the people, not racist and open to all the concepts which emerged challenge existing literature on movements of the far right that suggest such organisations are hierarchical and disciplined, closed and covert and underpinned by xenophobic or racist sentiments. The remaining concepts all for one and one for all and investing in the future tend towards the confirmation of existing literature, which points to tension between activists desire for solidarity and the tendency among far right groups towards infighting and factioning as well as a low sense of efficacy and awareness of structural constraint on the capacity of fringe movements among their members An organisation of the people The concept an organisation of the people (Dáša, MM, Slovakia) expresses a self-ownership of organisations that challenges existing literature on organisations of the far right. Radical, Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 14 of 115

15 right wing and populist parties in Europe are said to usually have a hierarchical structure with (male) leaders who exploit modern trends of the political profession to perfection (Wodak 2013: 28) while the far right movement in the United States is said to be a creation of its leaders, who combine charisma, ideology, and organizational capacity to create White racist groups and, from the groups, the movement (Ezekiel 2002: 55). It is possible that this finding results from having a relatively moderate set of organisations in this cluster for synthesis when set within the spectrum of radical to far right parties and movements. Indeed, the (partially) refutational case within the cluster is that of Golden Dawn, which is the organisation most akin to classic far right parties. However, the finding might also be the product of a simple gap in knowledge to date; as Kitschelt (2007: 1195) notes, although there is a substantial literature about the relationship between activists and party leaders, the existing radical right literature has relatively little to say about this issue due, largely, to the empirical inaccessibility of radical right wing parties and activists to empirical research. If Kitschelt is right, then the MYPLACE finding may indicate the possibility of moving beyond a rather simplistic understanding of the internal workings of organisations of the radical and populist right by employing an ethnographic method that provides unusual access to the experiences and narratives of young, grassroots activists. The expression of activism as the experience of inhabiting an organisation of the people comes from a 23 year old female ordinary member of Mladá Matica. This is surprising given that MM is one of the apparently most formally organised and hierarchically structured organisations in the cluster whose formal procedures (democratic) for the election of chairs and committee members are enshrined in the constitution of the organisation (which mirrors the parent, adult organisation Matica slovenská, see Section 2.2.4). The fact that an informal ethos of collective ownership underpins the formal hierarchical structure of the organisation is confirmed, however, by a second respondent (a 21 year old female student member) who explains that, Our section is officially led by our chairman and unofficially by every one of us. (Jana, MM, Slovakia). The organisation is thus experienced by members as one in which leadership, at least at the level of local section, is relatively informal and collective. While the elected chair represents the local section when dealing with central leadership, every member, with the support of others, can realise, lead or organise an activity of MM. This concept of a leaderless movement, owned by the ordinary members, is repeated in cases of the Ragged Association, Russian Run, Torcida and the Lieksa Facebook discussion group. Torcida members state categorically that Torcida never had one leader, and never will (Diokletian, Torcida, Croatia) or Torcida has no leader and we just couldn t have one leader (LeBig, Torcida, Croatia). Indeed, respondents described the process of decisionmaking as collective and consultative. Thus, although there was an official presidency of Torcida - to which six respondents in this study belonged all felt that they routinely took part directly in the decision making process or had been consulted directly or indirectly about decisions. The organisational structure of The Ragged Association is also described as loose, with individual groups being absolutely independent and including no ranks, only positions (Carl, RA, Hungary). Russian Run members note the important role of the organisers of actions and administrators of communities in social networks (Marina, RR, Russia) but participants deny that there are any leaders currently. In this sense Russian Run is seen by respondents as part of a global political trend towards movements without a leader Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 15 of 115

16 leaderless' (Ivan, RR, Russia). The Facebook discussion group at the centre of the Moral Panic in Lieksa case study was also described as an informal network without leaders while its founder explicitly denied his leadership role (FBGroupLieksa_News_HS ). This does not mean there are no influential people or individuals with particular status in the organisations. In Torcida the hardcore and chant leaders are valued and respected and, as is evident from existing literature on football hooliganism, football firms and groups have a form of hierarchical framework that allows the development of (alternative) careers through which young people can achieve reputations (Marsh et al 1978: 63). However, in the case of Torcida being a chant leader brings responsibility rather than power while being part of the core is open to everyone who attends all away matches. In Russian Run, a number of respondents mention specific qualities of individuals in the movement who are influential, including their ability to negotiate with the police due to their knowledge of the law (Boris, RR, Russia), their ability to give good public speeches (Oksana, RR, Russia) and simply being a very good man (Lena, RR, Russia). Slightly more complex cases are provided by LNF and EDL. Both organisations have formal structures and leaders but work on the premise that strong hierarchy and discipline stifles activism. The LNF is formally constituted as a non-governmental organisation with a partly formalised hierarchical structure. However, there are no strong hierarchical relations within the group and many of the respondents felt able to criticise the leader: those in the esoteric wing, criticised the leader s overly nationalistic views; those in the political wing expressed dissatisfaction with his esoteric ideas. In the case of the EDL, there is recognition of the qualities of the (former) leaders of the organisation, especially Tommy Robinson, while those qualities are that he is like one of us. Implicitly contrasting Tommy Robinson to mainstream politicians who are privileged and distant from reality, one 18 year old male member of the EDL stated: But the thing which I always liked about him was that he was just one of us. He would talk to you like he was one of us. He wouldn t look down on you. He wouldn t say like you don t know this, you don t know that. He would try and tell you how it is. [ ] So I always liked Tommy for that. He was a typical bloke off a council estate which most of EDL began as. (Chas, EDL, UK) Ethnographic observation revealed that Tommy Robinson s arrival at a demonstration usually produces applause and sometimes the chanting of his name or Tommy Robinson s barmy army (Field diary, EDL, 29 September 2012). Demonstrators also often pose for pictures with him. However, there is little evidence of the idolisation of a charismatic leader. While there is emotion in some respondents narratives - I will march into hell for Tommy (Declan, EDL, UK) most talk rationally about their respect for him. This respect came from the fact that he knows his stuff rather than spouting grand rhetoric and that he had carried on despite the pressures on him and his family that accompany the leadership role. At the same time, criticisms of both co-leaders were expressed including that Tommy was way over his head with his ambitions to move into politics (Michelle, EDL, UK). However, respondents repeatedly noted and valued the unmediated contact they have with the leadership of the movement. Thus, while the movement was not leaderless, its flat structure, street orientation and the approachability of its leaders created a similar sense of it being an organisation of the people. Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 16 of 115

17 This ethos is replicated at the grassroots of the movement. Thus, explaining the formal structure as consisting of leadership, Regional Organisers, admins and members, one Regional Organiser notes that there is a chain of command but not one that people necessarily observe (Ed, EDL, UK) while a 16 year old local EDL Youth Division leader envisages his role not as leader but initiator: Way I see it with the youth, I aye a leader, do you know what I mean? Everyone s in there. If I wanna do something like today I asked everyone for their opinions on doing it. Do you know what I mean? I day just go yeah we are doing it, you aye got a choice. [ ] We re all in it together. That s the way I see it. That s it really, you know what I mean? 2 (Connor, EDL, UK) The fact that the movement is not dependent on a single charismatic or strong leader was revealed most clearly, however, in the restructuring of the movement following the unexpected and dramatic resignations of Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll on 7 October At a meeting of Regional Organisers, shortly after the resignations, it was agreed that the movement should be run by a committee of the 19 Regional Organisers with a rotating chair. In this process there was a conscious rejection of the candidature of a potential replacement leader - Tony Curtis, who had been tipped to take over from Tommy while he was in prison because, according to one Regional Organiser, he s gone like some selfproclaimed messiah. [ ] he thinks he s some kind of god (Ed, EDL, UK). There are refutational cases to this concept. The Golden Dawn case study revealed that although within the party there is a strong concept of the people as a primary political force and that the people must have a direct relationship to the leader (unmediated by divisive and malicious political parties), leaders are seen as exceptional people of political virtue, selected according to the principles of meritocracy and as the means by which the people implement their political will. The excellent Leader (according to platonic ideals) who has dedicated all of his Life to National and Social battles and has been honoured by the people, is the one who will lead the Nation to success and will make the Homeland powerful. ( As the party puts it, What makes GD special is the fact that there is among its ranks absolute discipline and faith in its leadership ( In the case of The Finns, there was both recognition of the necessity of having a charismatic leader as well as the expression of concern that this breeds dictatorial tendencies: I must say that it is quite contradictory. Of course Soini [the leader of the Finns party] has worked hard to take the party forward and is charismatic and a wellknown person, but he has a lot of features of a dictator sometimes. People do not dare to question or disagree with him. I have noticed that people give him too much authority, like Soini has said this or that. (Arttu, Finns, Finland) 2 Quotes from EDL respondents are retained in their original form rather than corrected to standard English. Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 17 of 115

18 The model of leaderless movements is associated to date with movements of the Left rather than Right. Castells (2012: 170) in his discussion of the Occupy movement, for example, declares that there was no traditional leadership, no rational leadership and no charismatic leadership. And certainly no personalized leadership. In contrast, parties of the far right have been seen as attempting to delegitimize representative democratic institutions through a cult of leadership and myth of the popular will (Ignazi 2003: 106). The cross-case analysis of this cluster of nine radical right and patriotic movements suggests that, in fact, parties of the right are distrustful not only of parties and institutions but also their leaders and either adopt a leaderless structure or reserve a healthy critical attitude to their own hierarchies and leaders. Explaining this finding, we might draw on discussions of the impact of social media on political activism of all political hues. Jackson (2011b) argues that even within the groupuscular far-right party hierarchy can be undermined by the new media, breaking down more traditional leader/follower structures and leading to a decentralised, supportive culture for small-scale extreme right wing activists to develop counter-cultural spaces. It is a logical conclusion that might be drawn also from Castells (2012: 5) argument that the transformation of the communication environment specifically the rise of what he calls mass self-communication using internet and wireless networks - directly affects the forms of meaning construction, and therefore the production of power relationships (ibid.). The cases of radical right and patriotic activism discussed here, however, suggest that this shift towards the leaderless model is not a product of technological change alone. As will be discussed through other core concepts identified from the synthesis, there are many shared values and experiences - non-conformism, the sense of being outsiders, confronting authorities - that, in some although not all, cases analysed, direct activists of the Right as well as the Left away from movements with strong internal hierarchy and leadership All for one and one for all The concept all for one and one for all captures the tensions experienced by members of organisations between the desire and need for unity for the success of the movement and the everyday infighting that disrupts the achievement of its goals and undermines commitment to the group. This concept confirms existing literature that suggests that farright movements often are not well run and can be victims of infighting and factions (Jackson 2011c: 19). This can lead to calls for greater discipline and more secrecy and security in order to minimise infiltration. However, the meta-ethnographic analysis here also challenges assumptions that far right parties are covert, secretive and closed. The refutational case here is that of Golden Dawn, whose structure was sufficiently secretive not to allow researchers direct access to members in the first place. Notwithstanding this case, the synthesis of data from other cases suggest that young activists recognise the dangers of the kind of infighting that has traditionally characterised far right political scenes and call for a recognition that It ain t about power, it s about standing united all for one and one for all. (Connor, EDL, UK) Factioning and infighting is an explicit concern for two cases in this cluster - EDL and LNF. The Latvian National Front has two clear factions - esoteric and political which are in explicit tension with one another. The political faction dismisses the esoteric focus of those involved in the Roerich Centre for just sitting around reading Living Ethics while we are Deliverable 7.2 Transnational cluster report Page 18 of 115