Are young people receptive to populist and radical right political agendas?

Transcription

1 Are young people receptive to populist and radical right political agendas? Turning Evidence into Policy MYPLACE Policy Forum, Brussels 20 November 2014 Hilary Pilkington University of Manchester

2 What s the problem? National parliamentary successes of far right/populist radical right: Golden Dawn (7%, 2012); The Finns (19%, 2011); Jobbik (20%, 2014). European Parliament (2014) successes: Golden Dawn, (10% of national vote); The Finns (13%); Jobbik (15%). Breakthroughs in previously impervious countries: Eurosceptic/nationalist parties won the European Parliament elections for the first time in France (25%) and UK (27%); In Germany: Alternative für Deutschland (7%); National Democratic Party (1%).

3 Youth receptivity? The evidence Perception that the typical extreme-right voter is young (Bakić 2009) But, existing survey data confirm only : support is weakest among highly educated professionals and greatest among manual workers, small business owners, the unemployed, housewives and pensioners; support is stronger among men than women (Kitschelt 2007). It is argued that the young are more likely to vote for the extreme right because they compete with immigrants for scarce resources (Arzheimer, 2009). In practice the impact of age on support for the far right varies widely (nationally and regionally): UK data on support for the BNP and UKIP show that these two parties are, on the contrary, supported disproportionately by those who are over 50 years of age. In East European countries support among the young is high, mirroring evidence that younger generations are less rather than more tolerant than older generations.

4 Constraints on existing knowledge Existing literature is based largely on past voting patterns or general population surveys of voting intentions in relation to formally registered political parties. This constrains our knowledge since groups of the population supporting populist/radical right parties are small and general population surveys also contain a relatively small sample of young people. Reliable data on the strength of support for a range of populist and radical right political agendas among youth in Europe are thus lacking.

5 MYPLACE survey data The MYPLACE survey is youth-focused and asked: i) For whom respondents had voted (in last national and local elections), if they had voted); ii) To which political party (if any) respondents felt close. But, the years target range meant that many respondents had not yet voted reducing the sample of voters for radical right/populist parties 59.1% of respondents reported that they did not feel close to any party. The absolute number of those reporting empathy with a far right or populist/radical right party thus is also small. This interference from the broader distrust in political parties suggests that to enhance our understanding of receptivity to the far right, we need to switch the focus from parties to ideas.

6 Exceptions to the rule The exceptions here are in Greece, Finland and Hungary. Of those who had voted in the last national election in the country: in Greece 16.7% had voted for Golden Dawn (more than twice the proportion of the general population) In Finland, 14% had voted for The Finns (5% less than the general population) In Hungary 27% had voted for Jobbik (12% more than the general population) Of those reporting they felt close to any party In Greece 20.5% felt close to Golden Dawn In Finland 22% felt close to The Finns In Hungary 47% felt close to Jobbik (although only 19% reported closeness to any party compared to 41% in Greece and 46% in Finland).

7 Measuring receptivity: Ideas not parties Greater robustness is achieved if we seek measures of support not for parties but the ideas they propagate. Conceptually we adopt here Mudde s (2007) characterisation of radical populist right ideologies as combining: nativism, populism and authoritarianism. In the MYPLACE survey: Nativism is measured by: negative attitudes towards minorities, anti-immigration attitudes, welfare chauvinism and exclusionism. Authoritarianism is measured by: support for autocratic principles (strong leader and army rule). Populism is measured by: cynicism in relation to the current political system.

8 Nativism: Restricting immigration Should [your country] have stricter border controls and visa restrictions to prevent further immigration? Of the total survey population: Strongly agree - 16% Agree - 32% Neither agree nor disagree - 22% Disagree - 22% Strongly disagree - 6%

9 Populism: Remoteness from the political elite Young people feel remote from a perceived political elite. 22% of respondents agree with the statement politicians are interested in young people like me 60% agree with the statement politicians are corrupt 69% agree with the statement the rich have too much influence in politics.

10 Cynicism and receptivity to populist/radical right

11 Authoritarianism This measure is based on support for two indicators of authoritarian rule: i) Having a strong leader who is not constrained by parliament ii) Having the army rule High scores indicate high support. In the UK locations, (mean) support for an unconstrained strong leader was 56.1% and for army rule 27.7% In the eastern Germany locations, (mean) support for a strong leader was 4.2% and for army rule, 2%.

12 Brussels, we have a problem MYPLACE survey data cannot determine whether young people are more or less receptive than the general population to populist/radical right ideas and agendas. They do show that the youth sphere is not immune from them. Patterns of support across locations show that support for populist/radical right ideas is not confined to post-socialist societies and will not be eradicated automatically with the embedding of democracy. High absolute levels of anti-immigration attitudes in locations in Greece and Portugal, and for authoritarian rule in the UK show the issues span the European political space. Young people feel remote from a perceived political elite across all survey locations. Lower levels on measures of nativism and authoritarianism in some locations (most consistently in eastern and western Germany and Denmark) provide us with some positive models. However, cynicism remains high even there.

13 What can we do? Existing policy tools Responses to the far right/radical right populism in the political sphere have typically followed three routes: delegitimizing it (due to its incompatibility with democratic values) and excluding it from the electoral process; isolating it, by excluding it from electoral or executive alliances; embracing (some) parties in the hope that, in power, they will discredit themselves (Wodak and KhosraviNik 2013). Social and psychological approaches have focused on prevention strategies designed to combat: intolerant or racist attitudes racially motivated violence and crime (Beelman 2009)

14 New evidence, new policy tools? Politically oriented policy tools work on the assumption: This is justified because they are anti-democratic; As long as xenophobic or populist views are not represented or heard then the problem is solved. Evidence from MYPLACE problematises this by suggesting that: The movements attractive to youth are not fundamentally anti-democratic; But disillusionment with the political mainstream may mean that these movements may not seek an electoral route; Exclusion from the political realm may be a cause of not a solution to the problem. Socially oriented preventative tools assume: The problem is racist attitudes based on ignorance and resolvable through education; Different approaches are required for normal youth and those with extremist views. Evidence from MYPLACE problematises this by suggesting: The targets of education often consider themselves consciously not racist. There is a continuum in attitudes, rather than a sharp break, between ordinary youth and those actively engaged in populist/radical right movements.

15 MYPLACE qualitative data Organisation Sample (no. respondent interviews) Setting (context of fieldwork) Type of activism English Defence League (UK) 35 Participant observation and interviews Social movement (anti-islamic extremism) Golden Dawn (Greece) Latvian National Front 10 Internet ethnography and interviews Officially registered nationalist political party (focus on youth pages and members) 30 Interviews and observation National social movement with theosophic roots (Latvia) Mladá Matica (Slovakia) Moral panic in Lieksa (Finland) Ragged Association (Hungary) Russian Run (Russia) Torcida (Croatia) The Finns (Finland) 30 Interviews with some observation 15 Analysis of media and official documents, interviews 26 Participant observation and interviews 23 Participant observation and interviews 21 Participant observation and interviews 15 Participant observation and interviews Youth branch of official cultural institution promoting patriotic values Anti-immigration Facebook group Paramilitary association for protecting traditions Patriotic social movement (mainly but not exclusively youth) Football supporters movement officially constituted as an NGO and patriotic leanings Youth branch of officially registered political party

16 Anti-democratic? Democracy as the lesser evil Attitudes to democracy among young activists combine profound disillusionment with the current democratic system with basic support for democratic forms of government. This is often articulated as what we have now is not democracy or that democracy provides freedom but not security: In democracy, everyone can say whatever he wants; we have freedom, but what to do with it when no one knows what is going to happen tomorrow and is afraid? We don t know how to use democracy in our favour. (Ďuro, MM, Slovakia) This characterisation of democracy as the lesser evil is very much in line with mainstream respondents. [ ] you can never be truly democratic because [ ] people who voted for Labour like at the last election aren t represented [ ] are they by the government? So it s not democratic but [ ] it s the lesser evil really isn t it, I think, this system. (David, UK)

17 Democracy: An organisation of the people With regard to internal democracy, classic understandings of far right organisations as highly hierarchically structured and disciplined and led by charismatic, strong leaders was not confirmed (except in the case of Golden Dawn). In five of the cases, young people described their organisation as an organisation of the people (Dáša, MM, Slovakia) or a leaderless movement (Ivan, RR, Russia) owned by the members. In other cases (EDL, LNF, The Finns) there were formal leaders but who were one of us (Chas, EDL, UK) and open to criticism and challenge. In this sense there is significant continuity between activists in Radical Right and Patriotic movements and those in other movements in our study such as anti-racist or anti-capitalist movements.

18 Radical alternatives? Democracy could be improved by: introducing real or direct democracy (Jarkko, Tommi, Finns, Finland; Chas, EDL, UK); or through a concentration of executive power (24, LNF, Latvia; Lisa, EDL, UK). Golden Dawn is the only organisation to fundamentally reject democracy. It proposes instead a system of meritocracy where political power belongs to people of political virtue but implemented by a strong leader. It is contrasted to democracy, which, it is claimed, is vulnerable to demagogues, corruption, anarchy and mob rule. National socialism is proposed as an alternative to democratic societies by three respondents on the fringe of the EDL (Infidels): the successful nations have never really been democratic (Nick, EDL, UK). Within the LNF there is a theosophic belief that democracy will be replaced in the future by a higher state of noocracy ( mindocracy ). Monarchy is proposed as an alternative by individuals within Russian Run, Ragged Association and the EDL.

19 Mainstream parties and politicians Exclusion of populist/radical right movements from the electoral process is ineffective if they do not seek election due to disillusionment with mainstream politics. Mainstream parties and politicians are characterised across all ethnographic cases as: dirty, corrupt and self-serving ; deceitful and hypocritical; incompetent, useless or inactive; privileged, distant and removed from real people. These motifs echo exactly those found in the follow up interviews among MYPLACE survey respondents. Corrupt: What came to my mind immediately was corruption. (Tiago, Portugal) Deceitful: [politicians] always hide something from people (Denis, Latvia) Useless: It s like talking and not getting anywhere. You have to get out there and say what you mean. (Johnny, Denmark). Removed: [there is no place in politics for me] Because [ ] my blood ain t blue [...] I think that s something they need to sort out cause I reckon if you could get somebody in there who s been to a council estate. [ ] I reckon a party would go a long way, because they know what sort of things [...] really affect the poor. (Craig, UK)

20 Politics isn t us : disavowal This conscious distancing from the political by young people who choose to define their engagement as not politics suggests less a disillusionment with politics than a disavowal of politics as young activists understand it: CHRIS: Politics are bollocks. I don t know nothing about politics. I don t follow politics. RAY: Ask me a question about politics, and I ll phone me granddad. (Ray, Chris, EDL, UK) This is often articulated by ascribing their organisation an apolitical or politically neutral position: I'm apolitical, I just don't care about political parties [ ] I think it's all fairy tales and hokum. (Paul Gascoigne, Torcida, Croatia) But this belies a passion that signals more than disengagement. Respondents express anger that the noble art of politics has been betrayed by what passes as politics today: we don t want to be dragged into politics. Why? Because, politics is like, for me, personally, the most noble thing to do, and our politicians just destroyed that, that sense of politics for me, they dragged it through the mud (Zoho, Torcida, Croatia) [ ] this is what s wrong with people like Conservatives and Labour. [ ] They re just do-gooders. They act like they re, they re so good to the public, and everything s for the people when nothing is. (Tina, EDL, UK)

21 The politics of silencing: Cause not Governments and others are said to be scared of speaking the truth while those who speak out are silenced by: Being labelled racist ; Curtailment of freedom of speech; Self censorship ( keeping your mouth shut ). People are so scared of that word, and being called a racist, aren t they, like when half the things people say and do isn t racist. (Peter, EDL, UK) solution [ ] that was the reason without censorship appeared [in the name of the Facebook group] - so that everyone could express their own views [ ] I wanted to keep it public for as long as possible so that everybody could see what we think and we didn t have to retreat to the forest to discuss them in hushed voices [laughs] (Aleksi, MPL, Finland) [ [ ] immigration policy [ ] is clearly an issue where straight away Second World War, Nazi talk, if you mention anything like, I don t know, asylum rights or something like more control or whatever. (Daniel, EG)

22 Political exclusion: An effective tool? Attempts to work with(in) the system are perceived as being met with silence or refusal to engage. [ ]when we were working in the Saeima, it was like everyone was shouting that, see; these types shouldn t be allowed to work in the Saeima [...] (23, LNF, Latvia) [...] they were elected, we had chose for that person to be elected and to stand for our and they decided not to work, that really infuriated me. [ ] It s for us, us to put in there, to say like well this is who we believe in, do you know what I mean? Not for them to say well we don t, we don t really like them. (Craig, UK) [ ] it is not a normal party [the NPD]. But I think it is difficult to ban it. [ ] I think it is important that in a democracy, that other positions, which we perhaps do not like, that they are able to exist. [ ] Banning them is not the right answer because it will not change the political attitudes of people. (Mona, EG)

23 Responses to silencing: Telling it as it is Mainstream politicians fear of addressing difficult issues is countered by attaching particular value to telling it as it is by activists. Supporters of Golden Dawn admire the party for speaking with clarity without hypocrisy (Voula, GD, Greece). EDL leaders were admired because they speak their minds, they tell the truth. If they think [ ] something s wrong then they will tell the truth. (Jason, EDL, UK) Placard at EDL demo, Rotherham, 10 May 2014

24 Not far right but not far wrong : Problematising preventative policy There are numerous examples of nuanced and sensitive educational materials and practices. However, assumptions that we need different messages for ordinary (ignorant) and radical (racist) youth may ignore significant shifts in political terrain that mean views might be more usefully viewed as on a continuum. Preventative policy approaches seek to expose unrecognised racism and/or reeducate those identified as holding such views. One finding of the MYPLACE metaethnography of radical right and patriotic organisations, however, is that young activists in these movements almost universally distance themselves from the far right and make explicit and empirically verifiable claims to being not racist. These claims include that: racists are not welcome and kicked out of the movement when encountered; ethnic (and other) minority members are welcome within the movement; and the movement distances itself from real racist parties of the traditional far right. It is important to recognise that members of these movements are highly sensitive to and reflexive about external perceptions of their organisations and hold highly ambiguous if not contradictory views that are impossible to classify simply. These positions are illustrated in the MYPLACE documentary Listening to the EDL.

25 Conclusion They [political opponents] don t want to listen. They don t want to listen to our point of view. Then later on, they come to you and say we don t want you here. Why don t you want us here? Because you re racist. No we aren t racist. Yes you are. Do you know what I mean? As soon as you start going around trying to explain. You re a racist. Boom. They don t have none of it. Get the camera. Take a picture of the racist. Put it on the internet. (Chris, EDL, UK) Do policy tools that expose and condemn rather than listen, understand and critically engage, fuel rather than prevent youth receptivity to populist/radical right agendas? If they, do what alternatives are out there? And how can MYPLACE research contribute to their development?