23rd World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) July 19-24, 2014, Montréal, Québec, Canada.

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1 23rd World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) July 19-24, 2014, Montréal, Québec, Canada. Electoral governance and legislative elections in South America - Research Notes 1 Gabriela Tarouco Universidade Federal de Pernambuco Abstract Party competition, essential to the understanding of the dynamics of party systems, cannot be analyzed by taking into account only the incentives offered by major institutions. The management of the game rules (electoral governance models) can be as important as its content itself, and may be an explanation for the many variations that distinguish the dynamics of the party systems in countries with very similar electoral systems. Some institutional variables, other than those relating to the electoral systems traditionally addressed in partisan studies, have enormous potential to affect the expectations of political actors regarding the electoral competition. Specific legal provisions and characteristics inherent to the functioning of the institutions managing the electoral processes produce effects on the confidence in the electoral process and, therefore, on the decisions of the parties about their participation in the race. Considering this debate, the paper analyzes 101 legislative elections in South American countries after redemocratization and describes the model of electoral governance that was in force in each one. Keywords: electoral governance; electoral competition; elections. 1 This paper is a draft of some partial results of a research in progress at University of Pittsburgh, with financial support from CAPES Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento do Pessoal de Nível Superior, Brazil, and from Fulbright Foundation.

2 Electoral governance and legislative elections in South America Research Notes Gabriela Tarouco Universidade Federal de Pernambuco Introduction Electoral governance, or electoral management, has been increasingly studied around the world, either as dependent or as an independent variable. The rules and institutions related to the conduct of the elections could explain the trust of the actors in the electoral process, the commitment of oppositions with the results, the functioning of party systems (Elklit and Reynolds 2005), the quality of democracy (Lehoucq 2002; Hartlyn, McCoy et al. 2008), its consolidation (Monte 2011) and the trust in democratic institutions in general (Molina and Hernández 1998). Also, the vulnerability of the different models to fraud and manipulation seems to be a necessary condition for postelectoral protests from opposition parties in Latin America (Tarouco 2014). Many studies have focused on the EMBs (Electoral Management Bodies) across different countries. They would be responsible for the legitimization of political authorities and the clear definition of winners and losers in electoral disputes. Also, these institutions end up being responsible for promoting trust in public opinion and even for the credibility and legitimacy of all the election process. The way they operate, their performance in the management of elections and their autonomy affect the reactions of the actors, their propensity to accept adverse outcomes, as well as their support for the system and the rules of the game in general. In this paper, two of these aspects that are impacted by the electoral governance models will be discussed for the South American cases: the party competition and the trust in fairness of the electoral process. Electoral competition in South America Competitive elections have been seen as a signal of quality of democracy. The more competitive is an election, more relevant - and valued - the role of different groups of voters (Altman 2011). Among many measures of competitiveness, the Effective Number of Parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) is one of the more used. In this paper, I compute the Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) for all legislative elections (for low or unique chambers) in South American countries since the third wave of

3 democratization (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan 2013). 2 The sources of electoral data are the websites of the Electoral Management Bodies in each country, and the literature. 3 An election may be more or less competitive, according to the number of parties involved in the dispute, the electoral and parliamentary strength of each party and the degree of uncertainty about the outcome. The number of competitors is a crucial aspect of the electoral arena. The more parties, the more candidates, the more dispersed the electoral support, and the more complex the competitors' decisions regarding the electoral strategies. The fragmentation of the party system (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) is an indicator usually employed to measure the competitiveness of elections (Altman 2011) and will be calculated for each election examined here. The uncertainty regarding the outcomes, even when reduced by polls on voting intentions, tends to increase with competitiveness, being a key to identify the fairness of the electoral process, on which depends the confidence in the rules of the game and the institutions managing them. The number of effective competitors in legislative elections varies among countries and also in time, as can be seen in the table 1. Table 1: Effective Number of Electoral Parties in the Legislative Elections. Country Number of elections Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Argentina 17 2,60 (1983) 15,32 (2009) 6,80 3,77 Bolivia 8 2,23 (2009) 6,20 (2002) 4,41 1,44 Brazil 7 3,56 (1986) 11,21 (2010) 8,74 2,53 Chile 6 6,56 (2001) 8,09 (2013) 7,06 0,60 Colombia 20 1,95 (1960) 9,09 (2006) 3,58 2,35 Ecuador 15 2,72 (2007) 11,38 (1986) 6,98 2,26 Paraguay 6 1,68 (1989) 4,28 (2008) 3,15 1,11 Peru 5 3,29 (1995) 7,25 (2006) 5,38 1,69 Uruguay 5 2,49 (2004) 3,38 (1989) 3,02 0,39 Venezuela 12 2,16 (1999) 7,10 (1998) 4,17 1,44 Total 101 1,68 (Paraguay 1989) 15,32 (Argentina 2009) 5,36 2,86 2 Except for the election for the Constitutional Assembly in 1991 in Paraguay for wich there is no consistent data available. 3 The ENEP was computed with the numbers informed in the sources, which usually add list votes and nominal votes with no ponderation (except for the 2006 and 2007 elections in Ecuador, for wich the EMB informs the votacion consolidada ).

4 Trust in the Fairness of elections A model of electoral governance can be more or less vulnerable to fraud and manipulation, and so it can produce more or less credibility, trust in the fairness of the electoral processes and legitimacy. The trust of political actors can be accessed through their behavior before, during and after the election. Opposition parties that see the process suspiciously can denounce fraud, protest, boycott or even adopt violent strategies. In South American elections, these kind of situation hasn t been rare, as can be seen in the table 2. The data show answers provided by coders of NELDA project to several questions regarding the context of elections. Table 2: NELDA variables for legislative elections in South America n11) Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair? n13) Were opposition leaders prevented from running? n33) Was there significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election? n45) Were international monitors present? yes no unclear/ NA no information 4 15,8 75,2 2,0 6,9 7,9 85,1 0,0 6,9 13,9 79,2 0,0 6,9 32,7 53,5 6,9 6,9 Source: National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset. Total 100,0 (N=101) 100,0 (N=101) 100,0 (N=101) 100,0 (N=101) Despite the answers no are more often, the yes is not rare. Almost 16% of the legislative elections in South America after redemocratization were coded as occurring in a context of significant concerns about their fairness. It is reasonable expect that the way how elections are conducted impacts the evaluation of political actors. 4 There is no data in NELDA Database about the following elections: Argentina 2011 and 2013; Chile 2013; Colombia 2014; Ecuador 2013; Paraguay 2013; Peru 2011.

5 Electoral governance: The concept of electoral governance, according to Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) comprises six dimensions: a) Centralization in the conduct of electoral processes; b) Bureaucratization of the institution in charge of the process; c) Independence of electoral institutions regarding the executive branch; d) Specialization of institutions based on the functions to be performed; e) Degree of delegation to non-partisan actors; f) Regulation of procedures and relationships among the actors. A model of electoral governance is each different combination of these dimensions. After redemocratization, South American countries rebuilt their models of electoral governance, in a way that varies widely among countries and also between elections in the same country. In some countries, the reforms in the model of electoral governance were made through new ordinary electoral laws. That is the case of Bolivia in 1991, Paraguay in 1990, 1995 and 1996, Peru in 1997 and Venezuela in 1970 and In other countries, reforms resulted of the adoption of a new Constitution, like in Colombia in 1991, Ecuador in 1998 and 2008, Paraguay in 1992 and Venezuela in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Brazil had no change in their models of electoral governance during the entire period. Beyond that, there were some other formal changes that didn t modify the model. For example, Bolivia changed the name of its EMB in 2009 from Corte Nacional Electoral to Tribunal Supremo Electoral but the model remained the same. It is the same case for Colombia, that changed the name of the EMB from Corte Electoral to Consejo Nacional Electoral in 1985, but didn t change the model. The next paragraphs describe each one of the six dimensions that were in force at the time of each legislative election (for lower or unique house) in South American countries since redemocratization. Independence from executive branch: Some countries locate the management of elections in a ministry of government, as in Argentina, whose EMB - the Dirección Nacional Electoral - is part of Ministerio del Interior. That is a case of no independence. In others countries, the electoral management is performed by institutions formally independent of the executive power, as it occurs in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador since 1998, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Models with EMBs not belonging to the executive branch but with some members appointed by the government were classified as partially independent. These are the cases of Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador before Independence matters as it

6 avoids the electoral manipulation by the government, which always has interest in the dispute (Lehoucq 2002; Mozaffar 2002). Regulation: Some countries put electoral management norms in their Constitution, beyond the ordinary laws, as are the cases of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia since 1991, Ecuador since 1998, Paraguay since 1992, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela since In other countries, all the electoral management procedures are regulated by ordinary law, as in Argentina, Colombia before 1991, Ecuador before 1998, Paraguay before 1992 and Venezuela before Regulation matters for two reasons: first, more regulated models limit discretion and so the chance of ad hoc decisions; second, constitutional norms are not easily changed by the actors with immediate interests (Chernykh et al 2014). Specialization: Some countries separate the administrative and judicial functions in different institutions, like Argentina, Chile, Paraguay between 1990 and 1995, Ecuador since 2008, Peru since 1997 and Venezuela since The institutions responsible for the adjudication of issues and conflicts are the Electoral Dispute Resolution Bodies (EDRB). In other countries, the same institution performs both tasks, like in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador before 2008, Paraguay before 1990 and after 1995, Peru before 1997, Uruguay and Venezuela before Specialization matters because it allows to competitors the right of contest the electoral management itself (Orozco- Henriques 2010). Centralization: The management of all elections in the country can be responsibility of one central EMB, as happens in Colombia, where there are provisional electoral local commissions, but the central EMB holds all powers, through its local delegates. In all other countries in this sample, there are decentralized agencies in the districts with responsibilities for the local elections. These models combine a central institution with national jurisdiction and local institutions with at least some autonomy at least as the first instance. They were coded as partially centralized. In this sample, there is no case of decentralized electoral management; of what the US model would be an example. Centralization matters because it withdraws power from local bosses over the electoral process at the local level and also because it allows uniformity of rules and procedures (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). Bureaucratization: The level of bureaucratization refers to the degree of professionalization and lastingness in the EMBs. The electoral governance institutions can count on permanent members and staff or can work through temporary and ad hoc electoral commissions. Among the cases analyzed here, only Paraguay after 1996 is coded as fully bureaucratized. In many countries, even those with stable and professionalized staff, the members of the EMB have temporary terms. Because of that, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,

7 Paraguay before 1996 and Venezuela before 1999 were coded as partially bureaucratized. Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela before 1970 and after 1999 are examples of non bureaucratized EMBs. Bureaucratization matters because it allows identifying the long-term responsibilities and also it gives technical approach to the electoral processes, in opposition to personalized one (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). Delegation to non-partisan actors: The level of the partisanship of the electoral institutions varies among the cases analyzed here. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador after 2008, Paraguay after 1996 and Peru, the management of the party competition is delegated to non-partisan actors, as the judicial branch, for example. In other countries, there is no delegation, and the political parties themselves indicate the members of the electoral organizations, as is the case in Bolivia before 1991, Colombia, Ecuador before 2008, Paraguay before 1996, Uruguay and Venezuela before Models where only some of the members of the electoral institution are appointed by parties or the legislature, as Bolivia after 1991 and Venezuela after 1997, were coded as partially delegatory. Delegation matters because, even when the partisanship of EMBs means to share and balance the decision power, it still allows competitors use election management in its own interests (Lehoucq 2002). The table 3 bellow summarizes the distribution of these data. Table 3: Percentage of legislative elections under each category/dimension of electoral governance. Dimension Level Absent Partial Full Total (N=101) Independence 16,8 23,8 59,4 100,0 Centralization 0,0 79,2 20,8 100,0 Bureaucratization 22,8 73,3 4,0 100,0 Delegation 48,5 10,9 40,6 100,0 Specialization 67,3-32,7 100,0 Regulation - 49,5 50,5 100,0

8 Final considerations In this paper, I cannot yet test the causal effects of electoral governance model on the trust in fairness or on the competitiveness. That is the next challenge in this research. However, there are some interesting correlations that suggest that the argument can make some sense. First, when analyzed across the different levels of each dimension of the electoral governance, the concerns with the fairness of elections reveals an unexpected association: the answers no are more frequent where the EMB is not independent of the executive branch. On the other hand, none of the elections that happened in fully delegatory models was under concerns about their fairness, exactly as expected. Table 4: Cross tabulation between dimensions of electoral governance and the variable Nelda 11: Nelda 11) Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair? Dimension Level % No % Yes % No answer Total (N=101) Absent 88,2 0,0 11,8 100,0 Independence Partial 79,2 12,5 8,3 100,0 Full 70,0 21,7 8,3 100,0 Centralization Partial 77,5 12,5 10,0 100,0 Full 66,7 28,6 4,8 100,0 Absent 78,3 17,4 4,3 100,0 Bureaucratization Partial 74,3 16,2 9,5 100,0 Full 75,0 0,0 25,0 100,0 Absent 69,4 24,5 6,1 100,0 Delegation Partial 63,6 36,4 0,0 100,0 Full 85,4 0,0 14,6 100,0 Specialization Absent 75,0 19,1 5,9 100,0 ful1 75,8 9,1 15,2 100,0 Regulation Partial 76,0 18,0 6,0 100,0 Full 74,5 13,7 11,8 100,0 Total 75,2 15,8 8,9 100,0 Source: National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset. As independence from the executive branch avoids the access of an actor with interests in the dispute (the incumbent), it was expected that independence was seen as an assurance against fraud and manipulation. However, at least in this sample, governmental EMBs don t seem to be related with concerns about fairness of the elections.

9 Delegation to non-partisan actors, on the other hand, is a safeguard against fraud and manipulation because hinders that those who have an interest in the process interfere favoring allies in detriment of adversaries. Second, the mean number of parties competing in the legislative elections is significantly different across the different levels of each dimension of the electoral governance. As can be seen in table 5 below, the bigger mean is among those elections ruled by non-independent EMBs and the smaller one is among those with a centralized model of electoral governance. Of course, there are many other variables, particularly the electoral system, which affects the number of parties running in elections and are not being considered here. Because of that, this data intends to be only a description, not an explanation. Table 5: Cross tabulation between dimensions of electoral governance and Effective Number of Electoral Parties Dimensions Independence Centralization Bureaucratization Delegation Specialization Regulation Effective Number of Electoral Parties ANOVA Mean N Std. Deviation F Sig. absent 6,8 17 3,8 partial 6,5 24 2,0 7,624 0,001 full 4,5 60 2,5 partial 5,8 80 2,8 full 3,6 21 2,3 11,462 0,001 absent 4,3 23 1,4 partial 5,8 74 3,1 3,141 0,048 full 3,6 4 1,0 absent 4,6 49 2,6 partial 4,2 11 1,7 6,662 0,002 full 6,5 41 3,1 absent 5,0 68 2,7 4,149 0,044 full 6,2 33 3,0 partial 5,3 50 3,3 full 5,5 51 2,4 0,1 0,752 Total 5, ,9 The relations between the models of electoral governance and the competitiveness of elections remains to be tested. The same applies to the relationships between the electoral governance and the quality of elections. Further developments of this research agenda should include other measurements and variables and also other countries. For now, the descriptions above intended to support the ongoing debate.

10 References: Altman, D. (2011). Political Competition. International Encyclopedia of Political Science. B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser and L. Morlino. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE. Chernykh, S. et al. (2014). Constitutions and election management. In: Norris, P. et al. eds. Advancing Electoral Integrity. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Elklit, J. and A. Reynolds (2005). "A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality." Democratization 12(2): Hartlyn, J., J. McCoy, et al. (2008). "Electoral Governance Matters: Explaining the Quality of Elections in Contemporary Latin America." Comparative Political Studies 41(1): Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera (1979). "'Effective' number of parties: a measure with application to West Europe." Comparative Political Studies 12(1): Lehoucq, F. E. (2002). "Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization." International Political Science Review 23(1): Mainwaring, S. and A. Pérez-Liñan (2013). Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America - Emergence, Survival, and Fall. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Molina, J. and J. Hernández (1998). La credibilidad de las elecciones latinoamericanas y sus factores. El efecto de los organismos electorales, el sistema de partidos y las actitudes políticas. XXI Congreso Internacional de la Asociación de Estudios Latinoamericanos, Chicago, Illinoi, US, LASA. Monte, F. B. (2011). Gestión Electoral Comparada y Confianza en las Elecciones en América Latina. México, INAP. Mozaffar, S. (2002). "Patterns of Electoral Governance in Africa's Emerging Democracies." International Political Science Review 23(1): Mozaffar, S. and A. Schedler (2002). "The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance Introduction." International Political Science Review 23(1): NELDA (2012) National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset Version 3. Available at Orozco-Henríquez, J. (2010). Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, \Which Elections can be Lost?" Political Analysis, 20(2), Tarouco, G. (2014). Electoral governance in Latin America and the behavior of oppositions Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, IL, Latin American Studies Association.

11 Consulted legislation: Argentina. Codigo Electoral Nacional (Ley of 1983) Argentina. Constitución Argentina. Ley (1971) Bolivia. Constitución Bolivia. Constitución Bolivia. Ley 1984 (1999) Bolivia. Ley Electoral 1246 (1991) Bolivia. Ley Electoral 531 (1980) Bolivia. Ley Electoral 857 (1986) Brazil. Constituição Brazil. Constituição Brazil. Lei 4737 (1965) Brazil. Lei 9096 (1995) Brazil. Lei 9504 (1997) Chile Ley (1987) Chile Ley (1988) Chile. Constitución Chile. Ley (1985) Chile. Ley (1986) Colombia. Constitución Colombia. Constitución Colombia. Ley 2241 (1986) Colombia. Ley 28 (1979) Colombia. Ley 89 (1948) Colombia. Ley 96 (1985) Ecuador. Código de la Democracia (2012) Ecuador. Constitución Ecuador. Constitución Ecuador. Constitución Ecuador. Constitución Ecuador. Ley de elecciones 2661 (1978) Ecuador. Ley Electoral 59 (1986) Ecuador. Ley Organica de Elecciones (2000) Paraguay. Código Electoral (1990) Paraguay. Constitución Paraguay. Constitución Paraguay. Ley 635 (1995) Paraguay. Ley 834 (1996) Paraguay. Ley 886 (1981) Paraguay. Leyes 3166, 3212 and 3273 (2007) Peru. Constitución Peru. Decreto (1994) Peru. Ley (1994) Peru. Ley (1995) Peru. Ley (1995)

12 Peru. Ley Organica de Elecciones (1997) Peru. Ley Organica de Elecciones (1997) Uruguay. Constitución Uruguay. Ley 7690 (1924) Venezuela. Constitución Venezuela. Constitución Venezuela. Ley Electoral (1959) Venezuela. Ley Organica de procesos electorales (2009) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Poder Electoral (2002) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Sufragio (1970) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Sufragio (1977) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Sufragio (1988) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Sufragio (1992) Venezuela. Ley Organica del Sufragio y participacion política (1997) Sources of Electoral Data: Argentina: es_2011_total_pais.pdf Bolivia: Corte Nacional Electoral (1997) Estadisticas Electorales Corte Nacional Electoral (2007) Compendio Electoral. Tribunal Supremo Electoral (2012) Atlas Electoral de Bolivia Tomo I. Brazil: Nicolau, J. (1998) Dados Eleitorais do Brasil ( ). Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ- Revan. Chile: Colombia:

13 Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas a data handbook. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Nohlen, D. ed. (1993) Elecciones y Sistemas de Partidos en America Latina. San Jose, Costa Rica, IIDH-CAPEL. Ecuador: = Mejia Acosta (2002) Gobernabilidad Democratica sistema electoral, partidos políticos y pugna de poderes en Ecuador. Quito, Fundación Konrad Adenauer. Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas a data handbook. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Paraguay: Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas a data handbook. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Riquelme, M. A. (1994) Negociación de corredores democráticos em El Paraguay. Pittsburgh, Latin American Studies Asociation. Peru: l.pdf escanos Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (1995) Elecciones Generales 1995 Resultados Nacionales. Lima, IFES/USAID.

14 Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas a data handbook. Oxford, Oxford University Press. ONPE (2002) Peru, Elecciones Generales 2001 Informe de Resultados. Lima, ONPE. ONPE (2006) Peru, Elecciones Generales 2006 Informe de Resultados. Lima, ONPE. Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando (2004) Elecciones. Lima, ONPE. Uruguay: Bottinelli et al (2000) Elecciones Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda oriental. Câmara de Representantes (1991) Elecciones generales de 26 de noviembre Montevideo, Camara de Representantes de La Republica Oriental Del Uruguay. Câmara de Representantes (1999) Elecciones generales de 27 de noviembre Montevideo, Camara de Representantes de La Republica Oriental Del Uruguay. Marius, L. and W. Gimenez (2004) Primera Eleccion uruguaya del siglo XXI. Montevideo, Ediciones de la Proa. Venezuela: Gutierrez, Edgard (2007) Fijando las reglas del juego: elecciones, partidos y leyes electorales en Venezuela Universidad Central de Venezuela Kornblith, M. and D. Levine (1993) Venezuela: the life and times of the party system. Working paper 197. Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas a data handbook. Oxford, Oxford University Press.