Tight Electoral Results. Experiences and Lessons Learned

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1 Authors: Tight Electoral Results. Experiences and Lessons Learned Several authors

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4 Tight Electoral Results. Experiences and Lessons Learned SERIE CUADERNOS DE CAPEL

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6 Tight Electoral Results. Experiences and Lessons Learned IIHR-CAPEL Inter-American Institute of Human Rights Center for Electoral Assistance and Promotion 2008

7 First Edition IIHR-CAPEL, Costa Rica, 2008 The opinions expressed by the authors on CAPEL NOTEBOOKS do not necessarily reflect the point of view of IIHR/CAPEL. 324 I59-t Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos Tight electoral results: experiences and Lessons learned / Instituto interamericano de Derechos Humanos. -- San José, C.R.: IIDH, p. ; 13X21 cm. ISBN Derechos políticos 2. Derecho electoral 3. Elecciones The materials published here may be reproduced in whole or in part, provided these are not altered, the corresponding credits are assigned, and copy of the publication or reproduction is submitted to the editor. Production Team: José Thompson María Lourdes González Arias Academic Coordination Zetty Bou Carmen Gloria Valladares Walter Araujo Lorenzo Córdova Percy Medina José Enrique Molina Authors Ana Marcela Herrera Translation to English Walter Meoño Diagramming IIDH Information and Editorial Service Unit Prepress Ediciones Sanabria S.A. Printer Inter-American Institute of Human Rights PO Box San Jose, Costa Rica Tel.: (506) Fax: (506) uinformacion@iidh.ed.cr

8 Content Presentation... 9 Elections in Latin America ( ): Challenges and Lessons for the Organization of Electoral Processes José E. Molina V Tight Electoral Results: A Challenge for Latin American Electoral Democracies. Lessons Learned from an Electoral Organization Perspective: the Chilean Case Carmen Gloria Valladares Moyano Tight Electoral Results: the Case of Costa Rica, Presidential Elections, February 5, 2006 Zetty Bou Tight Electoral Results: A Challenge for the Electoral Democracies in Latin America: The Case of El Salvador Walter Araujo Tight Electoral Results: A View from the Peruvian Experience Percy Medina Competitive Elections: Lessons from the Mexican Case (2006) Lorenzo Córdova Vianello Biographical Notes on the Authors

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10 Presentation Over the last decades, in Latin America and the Caribbean, electoral bodies have been consolidating as trustworthy institutions that guarantee popular will expressed on the polls. Both their duties and the mechanisms for the designation of their members have been object of numerous legal reforms and detailed depuration, with the purpose of constituting them into legitimate entities for citizenship and of strengthening, through their action, democratic institutionality. As Jaramillo well indicates, great trust has been deposited on these organizations, with the hope that they will become instruments to cleanse electoral processes and that they will contribute to the institutionalization of political life in Latin American countries. 1 In virtue of this strengthening process, currently the duties of electoral bodies reach further than the organization of elections. They have been constituted as institutions with a wide range of administrative, registration, jurisdictional and control tasks, not only of the electoral process itself, but also in relation to the performance of political actors. Without a doubt, their labor is decisive for the strengthening of democratic coexistence. In compliance of their duties, electoral bodies in Latin America and the Caribbean have been facing different challenges: ensuring the good development of campaigns and election days; overcoming, in certain countries, the distrust derived from fraudulent past experiences; ensuring the correct application of electoral standards; ensuring equity 1 Jaramillo, Juan (2007). Órganos Electorales Supremos. In: Nohlen, Zovatto, Orozco and Thompson (edit.). Tratado de Derecho Electoral Comparado de América Latina. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 9

11 10 Tight Electoral Results in the right to electoral participation, among others. About these challenges, a challenge imposes in regards to its main responsibility: to ensure that popular will is freely expressed in the polls, and that it is respected. The last electoral processes held on the region since 2006 placed electoral bodies in a delicate position, derived from the tight results obtained in the polls. Indeed, in Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador and Venezuela, there were moments of great expectation due to the definition of the electoral contest. Electoral bodies became, starting from the scrutiny phase, the main actors of these elections, as they were in charge of settling their results in very vulnerable scenarios, in which political actors literally watched over even the last movement of electoral institutions. Clearly, a scenario of very tight results adds to the electoral process a series of elements that are not considered with the same intensity when the gap between the contenders is very high. Thus, the revision of the minutes, the contested votes, and the electoral body decisions, acquire an extraordinary relevance and become an object that requires careful vigilance. El electoral body, therefore, should act with extreme professionalism and caution, with the sole objective that its actions are legitimate and addressed to the respect of the citizenship s will. This CAPEL notebook precisely seeks to analyze the topic on tight results, from the electoral bodies experience perspective. This edition seeks to analyze technical and political performances that these bodies undertook in front of the challenges derived from the results at the polls. Likewise, it is sought that the cases analyzed become a referent and a school to other electoral bodies that could face similar situations in the future. In conclusion, we would like to reaffirm the three indispensable conditions so that the institutions in charge of the administration of the elections are strengthened from these processes: first, they should act promptly and transparently in order to avoid questioning of their actions; second, their performance should strictly adjust to that established by electoral legislation; and last, impartiality should prevail in all their actions. A performance guided by these principles, without

12 Experiences and Lessons Learned doubt, is decisive for the strengthening of the agreement around the relevance of electoral bodies and democratic institutionality. Roberto Cuéllar M. Executive Director 11

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14 Elections in Latin America ( ): Challenges and Lessons for the Organization of Electoral Processes José E. Molina V. Universidad del Zulia, Venezuela Introduction: Electoral Processes and Quality of Democracy The so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) started in Latin America in At that moment, in the region there were only three relatively consolidated democracies (Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela). Since then, and for the following XX Century decades, the discussion related to democracy in Latin America was focused on the mechanisms to foster its establishment and to consolidate its stability. On the XXI Century, and although several countries present democratic stability problems, the axis of the discussion tends to move towards the topic of the quality of democracy and the evaluations of the government s results. In a joint work with Daniel Levine, we have indicated that the level of the quality of democracy is given by the measure in which duly informed citizens participate in free, impartial and frequent electoral processes; influence political decision-making; and demand responsibility from their rulers, and by the measure in which the latter are who effectively make decisions by responding to popular will (Levine and Molina, 2007). From this decision, it is inferred that the 13

15 Tight Electoral Results quality degree in electoral processes is one of the dimensions that define the quality of democracy, and therefore, as long as these are carried out on better information, impartiality and freedom conditions, the quality of democracy will be higher. What is important in our case is that this is the dimension in which electoral bodies are called to influence, and therefore, it is our interest to determine those aspects of the electoral decision that should be still developed or adjusted to contribute to raise the quality of democracy. The electoral processes that took place in Latin America between November, 2005 and December, 2006, particularly the twelve presidential elections, 2 offer us a helpful experience to determine those important aspects in function of the quality of democracy, especially those that appear to be problematic issues and about which suggestions and recommendations are based on the events of the period. We will refer to them next. We will start, on the first place, by highlighting the aspects that seemed conflictive as a consequence of the elections with a tight result: speed counting; publication of partial results; requests for a recount of votes, and the partisan or non-partisan nature of the electoral body. In the second place, we will take into consideration the challenges that seem to derive from the instauration of the immediate presidential re-election in the region, and the advantages that this brings about for those in power, particularly in the case of democracies with a weak institutionality. In the third place, we will deal with the topic related to the duration of the scrutiny and the demands for higher speed. Finally, we will present our conclusions. I. Elections with Tight Result The presidential elections in Mexico and Costa Rica were decided by a difference lower than 1% of the valid votes cast. The second place in the first round of the presidential election in Peru was equally decided by less than 1% of the valid votes. The difference on the presidential elections in Honduras was lower than 5%. More recently, on the referendum for the constitutional reform in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, held on December 2, 2007, the decisive question that 2 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela. 14

16 Experiences and Lessons Learned included indefinite presidential re-election and the definition of the Venezuelan State as a socialist state was decided by less than 2% of the votes. These tight results put in evidence several aspects related to the regulation and administration of the electoral processes to which it is necessary to pay attention. We will now take them into consideration with the purpose to promote the debate about them and to suggest certain possible ways to deal with them, in order to increase trust in electoral processes and the quality of democracy. A. Speed Count and Election Day Exit Polls The practice of election day exit polls and speed counts financed by the political actors and the mass media is a normal fact during electoral processes. The novelty was that on those two cases these were hired by the electoral bodies (Zovatto, 2007: 43). In both cases, given the tight results in one (Mexico) and how polarized the political context was in the other (Ecuador), these counts did not generate the expected calm, and on the contrary, they ended up generating or nourishing distrust on the electoral process result. The possibility of a tight result is always present, and the speed counts, as well as the exit polls always have a margin of error that could clearly be above the possible difference. The consequence of this is that if the result is tight, as happened in certain cases, the speed counts are not trustworthy and have a very high probability to predict the wrong result, and even if they gave the right result, the candidate that is declared loser before the official count could be tempted to consider these predictions as an attempt to prepare the public opinion to disregard his triumph. In any case, the experience with speed counts hired by electoral bodies during the analyzed period seems to recommend not using this modality, and that the electoral body is only committed to spread the official results based on the scrutiny. Partial results should never be officially presented as a preview or prediction of the final result, but rather as what they are, a partial scrutiny that does not necessarily represent the total. 15

17 Tight Electoral Results Private speed counts and election day exit polls obviously do not pose a problem and should be allowed, as usually done, after the voting centers are closed or the first official bulletin is issued, without this compromising at all the electoral body. 16 B. Announcing Partial Results Another aspect that tends to be problematic in situations of tight results is the announcement of partial results. It is very probable that the order of the candidates changes once or various times. In some cases, it has been considered that this situation is harmful to the trust in the results, and that therefore, it is more advisable to be cautious and not issue bulletins until a high percentage of the ballots have been scrutinized, so that they reflect a definite tendency. The problem with this solution is that with a tight result, any percentage of the votes counted could still give a reverted result at the end. Moreover, the delay in issuing the information, could, in itself, as it has indeed happened, be a stimulus to distrust. In Venezuela, the National Electoral Council has decided to issue its first bulletin when it considers that the tendency expressed by it is irreversible. Consequently, on the December 2, 2007 referendum for the constitutional reform, in spite of the fact that the majority of the voting centers were automated, and that the last polling stations closed at about nine o clock at night, due to the tight results, the first bulletin was produced only after one o clock on December 3, when the political tensions were about to explode and all kinds of rumors were spread in the country. It is true that the political explosion did not take place, but there is always the doubt if the issue of partial bulletins would have not allowed, on the one hand, preventing the multiple suspicions produced by the delay, and on the other, conducting the publication of the scrutiny in a more serene manner to the final result. In view of this dilemma, it seems advisable to pay attention to the characteristics of each political context; however, it could be suggested, as a general rule, to issue all the information available at the same time that it is produced, always being careful to indicate the geographic areas from which the partial counts come from, and

18 Experiences and Lessons Learned warning that the calculations could vary as new data is added. In other words, the safest way to keep trust is the most transparency, by always clearly explaining that these are partial results that do not pre-judge the final result. C. Request to Recount the Votes Tight results almost inevitably come accompanied by requests to proceed to a total recount of the votes. I believe that the experience of the period under consideration tends to demonstrate that not proceeding to the recount generates suspicions and nourishes claims of fraud. It is obvious that the electoral bodies, both administrative and judicial, should abide to that established by the juridical order, but this does not prevent, in the first place, to recommend that the requirements to request a recount of the votes are reasonably accessible when there are tight results, or even that the recount is mandatory; and in the second place, that the interpretation of the standards should take into account the principles of transparency and legitimacy, in such a way that, in the measure that the standard allows it, it is given the most favorable interpretation to the performance of the recount. The recount will generate trust. To deny it will always foster suspicion. D. Nature of the Electoral Body and Credibility of the Results The events related to electoral processes with tight results seem to ratify the effect that the nature of electoral bodies have on the trust on these, particularly in moments of political tension, such as literature indicates (Molina and Hernandez, 1999; Hernandez, 2006). In a previous work we have posed and empirically supported the hypothesis in which the non-partisan electoral bodies whose members have consensus from all the political actors are in better conditions to transmit and keep trust among the electors than those partisan bodies, whose members do not have the consensus from the main political actors (Molina and Hernandez, 1999). 17

19 Tight Electoral Results In the elections of the period analyzed, the two elections with the tightest results seem to confirm this hypothesis. These are the cases of Costa Rica and Mexico. In both countries, the result of the presidential election was decided by less than one per cent. In the case of Costa Rica, the results were finally accepted by the opposition. In Mexico, on the contrary, the defeated candidate did not accept the results as legitimate, thus producing a serious problem for the country s governability. A difference between both countries, although not the only one, is that while in Costa Rica the electoral body continued to enjoy of an ample consensus and a non-disputed non-partisan nature, in Mexico the integration of the electoral body was modified without the agreement of the main opposition candidate party, which caused such distrust that it ended up with the non-recognition of the presidential election. The contrast between these two cases suggests that it is very important that the electoral bodies keep the trust of the political actors, and that this is much more feasible if these are integrated in a clearly non-partisan fashion, with the consensus of the political actors. It is good to remember that non-partisan integration implies that the body members shall have been appointed in function of their renowned capacity to act in an impartial way, and not as party representatives. This implies that the consensus of the political actors should fall on each one of the members in the sense that they trust their individual impartiality. A body whose integration is based on partisan representation could, at the beginning, have the consensus of the parties that agree on the designation of its members, but it is evident that each party trusts their own representatives, and not the others. It is more likely that a body of this type (integration based on partisan representation), derives in alliances of the representatives of some organizations to exclude the others, in such a way that it could quickly lose the trust from those who are excluded from the alliance. This is less likely to occur in the case of non-partisan bodies, such as we defined them previously. 18

20 Experiences and Lessons Learned E. Tight Results and Automated Scrutiny Tight results tend to severely affect the effectiveness of automated scrutiny, in terms of swiftness, in the case of systems that combines it with manual polling stations or booths, or automated scrutiny without online connection. At this point, we will refer to this later when we take into consideration the case of vote and scrutiny automatization. II. Immediate Presidential Reelection As of 1990, as an effect associated to the desinstitutionalization of the partisan system and the personalization of politics, in several countries in the region a constituent or constitutional reform process started to happen, which in some cases introduced the immediate reelection of the president of the republic. Contrary to situations of nonreelection or non-immediate reelection, the institution of immediate reelection generates a tension on the electoral process as the current president is a candidate at the same time. All of our countries value impartiality in electoral processes. One of the components of this principle of impartiality or equality of opportunities is that there is no official advantageism through the use of public resources in favor of the candidate officers or their parties. To prevent advantageism, to guarantee the equality of opportunities, and to prevent the use of public resources with electoral purposes, are main objectives of electoral bodies. It is possible to accomplish these objectives when there is a situation of immediate reelection? What do electoral results tell us? It is necessary to take special measures to prevent the advantage of the candidate president? In this section, we are going to examine the electoral results of the period under consideration, putting them into perspective, to see if there is an indication that the elections results are different in the cases of immediate presidential reelection. If we found that in the cases of immediate reelection the governments win the elections in a high or higher proportion than the cases in which there is no immediate presidential reelection, we should examine the cases more closely because that would suggest that in some way there could be situations 19

21 Tight Electoral Results of advantageism. We consider advantageism the utilization of, by the candidate officer or his/her party members, the institutions or public resources to promote or increase the possibilities of success of his/her candidacy. Political Science has found that the candidate officers, even on the best conditions of impartiality and honesty, have an advantage; they are usually better known than their adversaries, and they are benefited from the perception that they are experienced (Flanigan and Zingale, 2006: 201, 217). However, one thing is this advantage that we consider natural, and a different one, advantageism. If it happened that in our region the results for the president candidates are much higher than those obtained by the government parties in situations of non-immediate reelection, then we should watch even closer and tune the controls because there would be the possibility, and not necessarily the certainty, that we are facing advantageism situations, and not only of the natural advantage that the exercise in office provides. Let us see in the first place what do electoral results tell us. A. Rotation and Immediate Presidential Election In a compared analysis between the elections in industrialized countries and democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean until 1995, we find that in industrialized countries governments won 70% of the elections. In contrast, in the Latin American and Caribbean countries, democratic governments won only 32% of the elections until 1995, starting to count from the last reinstauration of democracy. That is, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the governments tended to lose elections much more frequently than in industrialized countries, and they were defeated in a quite high proportion, higher than two third parts of the time (Molina, 2001). Let us see what happened in the last presidential elections in Latin America from November, 2005 to December, Haiti is excluded because it was a democracy re-foundation election about which it is not possible to talk about victory or defeat of the previous government. Therefore, there were eleven presidential elections. Of these eleven elections, the government won five (45%) and lost six (55%) of them. When we distinguish between the elections in which 20

22 Experiences and Lessons Learned immediate reelection was not at stake, from those in which it was, we find a very interesting situation for our analysis. Of eight elections in which the current president was not seeking reelection, the elect president s party on the previous elections won two of them (25%), 3 and lost six of them (75%). 4 This result keeps the tendency that was present until 1995: frequent rotation. The situation radically changes when we look at the results of the elections in which the immediate reelection option was present. Of the three elections, the government won all of them (100%). 5 Given the reduced number of cases, before reaching any conclusion, it is useful to see what were the results of the elections with immediate presidential reelection in Latin America from 1990 to December, 2006, that is, during the current age of the resurgence of political personalism. Twelve elections were carried out in which the exercising president was a candidate. The government won ten of them (83%), 6 and lost only on two instances (17%). 7 As we can see, the tendency towards rotation, taking the region as whole, radically changes when the immediate presidential reelection option is present. In this circumstance, the governments are almost invincible, and they win the elections with a much higher frequency than in elections where there is no possibility of immediate presidential reelection. As we mentioned above, this does not necessarily indicate that in all cases there has been advantageism, but it suggests that we should carefully observe, as this may be the case. It is worth mentioning that we are not suggesting that when the party, or the government coalition, wins the presidential election 3 Chile and Mexico. 4 Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. 5 Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. 6 Alberto Fujimori in Peru (twice: 1995 and 2000), Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (twice: 2000 and 2006), Joaquín Balaguer in Dominican Republic (twice: 1990 and 1994), Álvaro Uribe in Colombia (2006), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1995), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1998) and Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2006). 7 Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (1990) and Hipólito Mejía in Dominican Republic (2004). 21

23 Tight Electoral Results repeatedly, it is necessarily produced by advantageism. There are other variables that could explain a result like that; for instance, that the alternative of the opposition is electorally blocked because it is perceived as extremist by the electorate (the typical case of post-war Italy, and probably contemporary El Salvador), or because opposition is identified with the previous dictatorial regime (possibly the Chilean case on the first post-pinochet elections); a prolonged economic bonanza, etc. What we want to highlight is that we should carefully look at this almost-unbeaten record of immediate presidential reelection, as one of its causes could be advantageism. B. Immediate Presidential Reelection Brings about Implicit Advantages and Dangers of Advantageism As we saw on the previous section, the results on the presidential elections are very different, in regard to the government and the opposition s possibilities, between situations of no immediate reelection and those in which this possibility is present. According to the considerations that we made at the beginning of this section, the fact that the governments are practically invincible in situations of immediate reelection, and that the contrary happens when this is not the case, invites us to find the causes for this. The exercise of office generates certain implicit advantages that are not necessarily anti-democratic, such as the population s familiarity with the candidate, but this alone does not seem enough to explain the radical change of the tendency, and much less that the possibilities that the government wins the elections are higher, even in countries with consolidated democracies. A possible, and worrisome, explanation is that institutions in some of our democracies are not strong or autonomous enough to prevent the advantageism that affects the equality of opportunities. If the institutions do not enforce the necessary controls, it is highly probable that the advantage of the president candidate includes, among its components, the management of public resources, directly or indirectly, to put them in favor of his/her presidential campaign, 22

24 Experiences and Lessons Learned and in the worst-case scenario, that judicial or police institutions are used to harass the opponents. As we previously said, there could be other factors that explain the almost-unbeaten record of presidential candidates in Latin America; however, in view of this true fact according to statistical data, it seems reasonable to suggest that controls and vigilance mechanisms should be intensified to ensure that any reason for this advantage, it does not derive from advantageism that is produced by the weakness of control institutions, and in particular of the electoral body. III. Celerity in the Scrutiny and the Electronic Vote During the 2005 and 2006 presidential elections, one of the aspects that generated controversy in several countries is the one related to the time required for the scrutiny. In this sense, there were complaints by certain political actors in Honduras (CAPEL, 2007:43), Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru (Zovatto, 2007:7); there were also complaints in Venezuela due to the scrutiny of the referendum on the constitutional reform on December 2, It should be noted that among these countries, there are precisely those in which the results were tight. A tight scrutiny and slowness could be an inevitable combination, but it is also an accurate recipe to nourish mistrust. In the region there has been experimentation with different alternatives to guarantee the swiftness of the scrutiny, and some have been very successful. I would like to stop in one of the most striking: the electronic vote. This was used in the presidential elections in Brazil and Venezuela on the period under study, and also during the Venezuelan referendum on the constitutional reform on December 2, 2007, on which we can make some comments. What can the electronic vote achieve? It seems to have two advantages. The first one is celerity, and the second is the increase of trust in the electoral process. In regard to swiftness, the way I see it, there is no doubt that the electronic vote ensures great swiftness, with the exception that we will discuss later. The only reservation is cost. The countries should 23

25 Tight Electoral Results assess whether the cost of using the electronic vote is justified by the advantage of scrutiny swiftness, taking into account the difference with the alternatives available. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned before, this scrutiny swiftness in the cases of automated vote could be compromised in the case of tight results. For instance, in the voting for the constitutional reform of December 2, 2007 in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, in spite of the automated ballots and scrutiny, the National Electoral Council took several hours after the last polling stations were closed to present their first bulletin which comprehended only 88% of the scrutiny minutes. This bulletin indicated an advantage for the winning option of 1.40%, which the National Electoral Council considered irreversible, even when 12% of the minutes were still to be scrutinized. Probably this conclusion was reached because there was telephone or fax communication of the minutes that were not electronically processed. The second National Electoral Council bulletin was produced one week later, still with only 94% of the scrutinized minutes, thus ratifying the results of the first bulletin. The delay of several hours in publishing the first bulletin in a highly polarized environment raised the political climate to the verge of violence. The delay and the tension generated seem unjustifiable given the use of a costly electronic voting and scrutiny system. However, this delay, including the fact that one week later all the minutes had not yet been scrutinized has a simple explanation: the system is not totally automated. One part of the polling stations, in the most remote places and abroad, use manual ballots; moreover, one part of the automated polling station is not on line via telephone or satellite to the national scrutiny center, in such a way that the totalizing minutes should be physically taken to the National Electoral Council for their formal inclusion in the scrutiny. As a consequence, in case of a tight result, the system depends on its weakest and slowest links. That is, when electronic vote is used in combination with manual vote, even when it is for a small section of the electorate, if the result is tight, it will be the manual polling stations, or automated vote without electronic 24

26 Experiences and Lessons Learned transmission, the one that will set the pace in regard to swiftness and reliability of the final result. In the Venezuelan case, the government s recognition of its defeat, although still 12% of the minutes had to be scrutinized, which included a number of votes that was quite superior to the difference that separated the winning option from the losing option, prevented a political overflowing. In any case, in the situation of very tight results, even when most voting centers are automated, if a part of them is manual or is not on line, the natural advantage of automatization, which is its capacity to produce swift results, is lost. In regards to the reliability of the results, I believe that the experiences of countries like Venezuela and the United States tend to demonstrate that electronic vote does not necessarily surpass manual vote and scrutiny in this sense. The key is in the electoral bodies, the polling station officers and party witnesses. If the polling stations are not managed by impartial personnel, or at least controlled by witnesses from the political forces, it will always be possible, for instance, to enter votes of those who have not appeared to vote. The machine s minute cannot be altered after it has been electronically produced and transmitted, but before this, measures could be taken that affect the impartiality of the processes. In other words, machines are not invulnerable to fraud, even in the case that all software and machine usual testing has been performed. In high polarization conditions, only the integration of electoral bodies, at all levels, in such a way that it guarantees impartiality, can generate the necessary trust. In brief, electronic vote could effectively solve slowness problems during the scrutiny, except in the case posed above, but it will not solve the problem is results reliability by itself. IV. Conclusions The quality of electoral processes and democracy has progressed in Latin America since the beginning of the so-called third wave of democratization by the end of the nineteen seventies (Huntington, 1991); however, it is also evident that today there are clear differences 25

27 Tight Electoral Results between the countries in the region, as can be proved, for instance, by observing the evaluation of the validity of the political rights that the organization Freedom House ( HYPERLINK fredomhouse.org presents yearly. These differences indicate us that although certain countries present a high level of quality of democracy, others have medium or relatively low levels. The analysis of the quality of democracy carried out by Levine and Molina (2007) confirms these affirmations and reveals that even in countries with better levels in the region, there is still an important margin to keep progressing. One of the dimensions of the quality of democracy in which there is still a margin to progress is precisely the one related to the quality of the electoral decision and the concomitant processes. The analysis that we have carried out of the presidential electoral processes in Latin America has allowed us to highlight certain aspects of tension, in which it seems possible to learn both from success and problems to advance in the refinement of our democracies. Among the recommendations that seem to arise from our analysis, there are: to avoid the hiring of speed counts or exit polls by electoral bodies; to issue official partial results, making it clear that these are not necessarily representative of the country s electoral behavior; to have as a rule the realization of total recounts in case of tight results if it is requested by the losing candidate; to ensure that the electoral bodies are non-partisan, or, at least, that most of their members are trusted by the main political organizations; to intensify controls in cases of immediate presidential reelection to prevent the use of government resources and institutions to give an advantage to the president candidate; and, finally, to keep in mind that there are different paths to obtain the degree required on the scrutiny, one of which is the electronic vote, whose advantages should be evaluated by also taking into consideration the costs that it implies. 26

28 Experiences and Lessons Learned Bibliography CAPEL Elecciones, Democracia y Derechos Humanos en las Américas: Balance Analítico. San José, Costa Rica: CAPEL- IIDH. Flanigan, William and Nacy Zingale Political Behavior of the American Electorate. Eleventh Edition. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Hernández, Janeth Organización Electoral y Credibilidad. Cuestiones Políticas 37 (July-December): Huntington, Samuel The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norma, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. Levine, Daniel and José Molina La Calidad de la Democracia en América Latina: Una Visión Comparada. América Latina Hoy 45 (April): P.23. Molina, José The Electoral Effect of Underdevelopment: government turnover and its causes in Latin American, Caribbean and Industrialized Countries. Electoral Studies 20 (September 2001): Molina, José and Janeth Hernández La credibilidad de las elecciones latinoamericanas y sus factores. Cuadernos del Cendes 41, May-August, 1999: Zovatto, Daniel Balance Electoral Latinoamericano Noviembre 2005 Diciembre Revista Elecciones 7, Peru:

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30 Tight Electoral Results: A Challenge for Latin American Electoral Democracies. Lessons Learned from an Electoral Organization Perspective: the Chilean Case Carmen Gloria Valladares Moyano I. Introduction In Chile there have historically been two constitutional mechanisms to solve the electoral conflict that is produced in view of the impossibility to proclaim the President of the Republic in only one voting, since the required votes percentage has not been reached, that is, the absolute majority of the valid votes cast. The first of these mechanisms, applied under the validity of the 1925 Political Constitution, consisted in that the National Congress elected the President of the Republic between the two candidates that obtained the two first relative majorities. In practice, the Legislative Branch always respected popular will. After the debate on this instance, they are only limited to ratify the candidate who had obtained the majority of the votes. This situation took place in the 1946 election, in which Gabriel González Videla was elected; in the 1958 election, in which Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez was elected; and in 1970, in which Salvador Allende Gossens was elected. Since 1999, under the validity of the 1980 Fundamental Charter, the issue was started to be solved through the ballotage or second round, 29

31 30 Tight Electoral Results mechanism, which is carried out thirty days after the first voting. This election is circumscribed to the two candidates who have obtained the two highest relative majorities. 8 The second electoral round was applied on the 1999 and 2005 elections, in which Ricardo Lagos Escobar and Michelle Bachelet Jeria were elected, respectively. In these cases, the candidate who obtained the simple majority on the first round was elected later as President of the Republic. For the electoral system, the fact that there are tight elections, that there is a scarce different of votes between one and the other candidate, is a huge challenge, in which not only the functioning of the electoral bodies is put to test, from the point of view of electoral administration, but also it jeopardizes the trust that the electorate deposits on the institutions that publish the official results of the will expressed by the citizenship. The tightness of the results of an election could give place to the fact that its participants require the intervention of the validating body through the interposition of electoral complaints, to obtain either the rectification of the scrutiny or the nullity of a closed electoral act. In this context, it is of vital importance that electoral conflicts are object of a swift, timely and effective resolution by the bodies in charge, so as to prevent that the delay that eventually generates the decision of these conflicts, and the consequent delay in the process to submit the final results, cause uncertainty on the population and that the performance of the administrative or jurisdictional electoral bodies is doubted. The experience of our country, from the time in which the democratic election of authorities was retaken, whose first presidential elections were held on December, 1989, has been calm and without great complications, which could be attributed to different factors. In the first place, the counting of votes is designed in several successive stages in charge of different social levels. The most basic one is in charge of the members of the polling station, public counting 8 See article 26 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile.

32 Experiences and Lessons Learned which may be attended by the representatives of the interested political parties and any citizen. It is not strange that the voters of a determined polling station attend the scrutiny at the end of the day, as its validity is widely recognized by the community and political actors. The second counting is in charge of the Scrutinizing College, integrated by the presidents of the polling stations who were selected by a raffle to be a part of these. These meet the day following the election and their duty is to register the voting of a maximum of two-hundred polling stations. Finally, the general scrutiny of the election or plebiscite is performed on the Election Qualifier Tribunal, which is the body in charge of acknowledging this work and proclaiming the elected candidates. Another factor that could be considered is that in the presidential elections, nevertheless if solved the last two onesthrough the ballotage mechanism, the differences of votes between the candidates, both on the first and second rounds, has not been so great that they could determine the change the elections result. Later we will analyze the result of the last presidential election results on December, Finally, the country s political actors and the citizenship itself have given a permanent and wide recognition to the electoral institutions, in a way that these enjoy great credibility by society. II. Results of the Presidential Elections, December 11, 2005 We will now analyze the presidential elections held on December, The last Chilean presidential elections were verified through two instances: a first round, held on December 11, 2005, in which the candidates Sebastián Piñera Echenique, from the National Renovation Party; Michelle Bachelet Jeria, from the Socialist Party, in representation of the Concentration of Parties for Democracy; Tomás Hirsch Goldschmidt, from the Humanist Party and Joaquín Lavín Infante, from the Independent Democrat Union Party, were postulated. Later there was a second round, held on January 15, 2006, 31

33 Tight Electoral Results between the most voted for candidates on the first round: Sebastián Piñera Echenique and Michelle Bachelet Jeria. The December 11 results showed a loose difference between the two most voted for candidates. Indeed, the candidate with most votes, Michelle Bachelet, reached 45.96% of the votes, while Sebastián Piñera obtained 25.41% of the votes. As it can be seen, the difference between both candidates was more than 20%. Nevertheless, the results were tight between the candidates who obtained the second and third majorities, thus putting a quota of uncertainty on who would be the candidate who would contend against Michelle Bachelet on a second electoral round. Indeed, the candidate Joaquín Lavín, who obtained the third place, achieved 23.22% of the votes, with a difference of only 2.19% in respect to Piñera, which represented a difference of approximately 150,000 votes. On the second round, Piñera obtained 46.50% of the valid votes and Bachelet, who was definitively elected, 53.50%, thus shortening the difference between both candidates to only 480,000 votes. As complementary data to the analysis, it is necessary to take into account that the national population at the time was 16,432,674 inhabitants. Citizenship voting is represented on the following table: Registered Voters Valid votes FIRST ROUND 8,220,893 7,207,278 6,942,041 SECOND ROUND 8,220,893 7,162,345 6,959,413 *There were 32,957 polling stations. III. Comments Related to the Tight Results We will mainly analyze the tight result given between Sebastián Piñera, from the National Renovation Party and Joaquín Lavín, from the Independent Democrat Union Party. As it was previously 32

34 Experiences and Lessons Learned mentioned, between them there was a difference of only 150,000 votes, thus occupying the second and third place, respectively. Chile has a multi-partisan political system, and there are a total of nine legally constituted political parties, 9 which are grouped in different coalitions. The main coalitions in the country are the one denominated Agreement of Parties for Democracy, center-left alliance conformed by the Christian Democrat Party (DC), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Socialist Party (PS) and the Social-Democrat Radical Party (PRSD); and the Alliance for Chile, formed by the rightist parties National Renovation (RN) and Independent Democrat Union (UDI). The fact that Chilean legislation indicates that the President of the Republic that is elected is the candidate who obtains the absolute majority of the validly cast votes on the first round, or the one who obtains the most votes from between the most voted for in a second round, has produced that the political parties customarily present one sole candidate per block or coalition, in order to increase the possibilities of electoral success. Such is the case of the 1999 presidential elections, in which on the second round fought Ricardo Lagos Escobar, sole candidate for the Agreement of Parties for Democracy, and Joaquín Lavín, sole candidate for the Alliance for Chile. A similar situation happened during the 1989 and 1993 presidential elections, when both coalitions competed with one sole candidate. Moreover, in Chile there is a binominal system of parliamentary election, 10 which also takes the different political parties to group in 9 According to the Electoral Service Political Party Registry, the legally constituted political parties in Chile are: National Renovation, Party for the Democracy, Independent Democrat Union, Christian Democrat Party, Socialist Party of Chile, Communist Party of Chile, Social-Democrat Radical Party, Humanist Party and Regionalist Party of the Independent. 10 Article 109 bis of the Constitutional Organic Law on Popular Vote and Scrutiny, Law No. 18,700, which consecrates the binominal system in Chile, indicates that:... the Tribunal will proclaim elected Senators or Deputies those two candidates from one same list, when this list reaches the most number of votes and has a total of votes that exceeds the double of those reached by the list that suggests in a number of votes. If no list obtained the two seats, each one of the lists that have the two highest majorities of the total votes of the list will elect one seat, and the Tribunal should 33

35 34 Tight Electoral Results order to obtain the most representativeness possible in Parliament. This has generated electoral pacts that have become stable political alliances. This demerger of the center-rightist coalition clearly affected the intention of vote and explains why the results were so tight between the second and third places. Indeed, the votes of the traditional supporters to this public sector was divided and had to choose between two very strong and competitive candidates. One of them was Sebastián Piñera, who previously was Senator for the Metropolitan Region and had already been President of his party. The other one, Joaquín Lavín, had been candidate on the previous presidential election, and by obtaining a great voting, disputing the Presidency of the Republic, on second round, against Ricardo Lagos. The votes obtained on the first round by the two Alliance for Chile candidates was higher to the one obtained on that same instance by the Agreement of Parties for Democracy candidate, which had not happened in the previous elections. This means that the contest between the candidates of the same political sector was such that it promoted voting even from other sectors, probably of the most centrist sectors of the Agreement of Parties for Democracy and humanist sectors. However, for the second round, the coalition could not join its forces, which caused that the great amount of votes for Lavín was not totally transferred to the Piñera candidate, thus this sector lost the race to presidency, and the definite candidate elected was Bachelet, by a difference of 480,000 votes approximately. This election was a novelty for the Chilean electoral processes, as it was the first time in which the first round had to be reviewed, not only from a point of view of the determination of whether a candidate reached or not more than half of validly cast votes, and in consequence a second round had to be called, but also that it was important to verify which of the candidates was left in the second place. It is worth mentioning that on the 1999 presidential election, the difference between the second and third candidates was of approximately fortyfive percentage points. proclaim elected Senators or Deputies those candidates that, within each list, have obtained the highest majorities...

36 Experiences and Lessons Learned However, although the voting was considered tight, this closeness between the presidential candidates was not determinant, in such a way that the qualification of the election was efficiently undertaken by the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, with an absolute absence of electoral complaints, and repeating the same situation in the qualification performed for the second electoral round. IV. Performance of Public Institutionality, Political and Social Actors The body in charge of the qualification and proclamation of the President of the Republic of the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, which is composed by five Ministers, of which four are current Ministers in office on the Supreme Court of Justice, and the fifth comes from the parliamentary side. It is a constitutive level body, autonomous and independent, of permanent operations. 11 Given that the qualifying term is the same to summon a second voting than to proclaim the President elect, in practice, for the Tribunal it is not or more serious to verify any of these circumstances, from an administrative point of view. In order to comply with the constitutional mandate on the term established (fifteen days), the Tribunal had to implement a series of jurisdictional and administrative procedures that we will briefly detail: The jurisdictional procedures are related to the interposition of electoral complaints, so the Tribunal monitors, via fax or telephone across the country, the existence and number of electoral complaints presented, and it adopts the measures necessary for them to be sent to the Tribunal as soon as possible. Once the complaint has been submitted, it is assigned to a rapporteur, who will be in charge of reporting to the Plenary, in the same audience in which the qualification of the polling stations in question takes place. 11 See article 27 of the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile and Law No. 18,460, Constitutional Organic Law on the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, of November 15,

37 Tight Electoral Results The administrative procedures are related to the total revision of the votes issued in the country, starting with the classification of the Minutes of Votes Polling Station. 12 On each polling station, two minutes with the voting results should be filled in, one of which should be submitted to the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, and the other one should be submitted to the President of such polling station, to later present it at the corresponding Scrutinizing College. Later, the qualifying notebooks are prepared; these include the information on the results of each polling station, precisely indicating if there was any type of anomaly, which is analyzed by the Tribunal to determine the corrections that should be made and to determine the official results of the election. In regard to the performance of the political parties in Chile, these play a determinant role on the electoral processes, especially on the election day, through the so-called polling station representatives, whose duty is to observe the procedure, formulate objections, demand to leave a note on the minutes, object the identity of electors, and no vocal can deny their right to speak. There are many social actors in Chile who comply with different tasks on the electoral processes, and they are respected and valued by the citizenship in the duties assigned to them. Among them we can highlight the mass media, civil defense, the company that transports the polling station minutes, the polling station vocals who have always worked for free, except on the last presidential election. V. Lessons Learned and Conclusions The electoral processes that have evolved in Chile since the return of democracy have been normal, calm, transparent and widely recognized by the community. There have not been, at the presidential election level, elections in which there have been tight results, as this scarce difference of votes could mean the proclamation of one or the other candidate. 12 See Law No. 18,700, Constitutional Organic Law on Popular Vote and Scrutiny, May 6,

38 Experiences and Lessons Learned However, and in spite that there have not been tight electoral disputes of which we have been talking about, the social actors have acknowledged the suitability of institutions in charge of validating electoral minutes, so that this circumstance has restricted the interposition of scrutiny nullity or rectification complaints, which is a clear manifestation of the trust deposited on the Chilean electoral bodies. Moreover, another fact that contributes to the community authentication is the fact that the national electoral processes qualification system in Chile is designed in such a way that all the participants on the electoral process, electors, candidates, political parties, etc., can intervene on the count and analysis of the votes issued, to which may be added up the fact that on the top of this scrutiny pyramid, there is the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, which has demonstrated efficiency, suitability and opportunity in its mission to qualify electoral processes, which has been acknowledged by the most different social actors. However, the greatest conclusion and lesson learned which can be reached on the Chilean process, which is related to the absolute absence of electoral complaints before the Elections Qualifier Tribunal, is the huge conviction that the Chileans have that democracy is the government system that we seek, and that is reason why in Chile we say that it is the people who count the votes at the polling station, in front of the candidates, electors, representatives, mass media and the general public. The merely informational result submitted by the Ministry of the Interior the same day of the election, is quite close to the definitive results, as there is a body that will exhaustively, independently and autonomously revise each one of the votes issued on the polling stations that operated in the country, and also, in a duly manner, even if they come from geographically remote territories, such as the Pascua Island, Juan Fernández Archipelago, Chilean Antartida, Valle de la Luna or Panguipulli Lake. 37

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40 Tight Electoral Results: the Case of Costa Rica, Presidential Elections, February 5, 2006 Zetty Bou Introductory Notes On February, 2006, for the Costa Rican presidential elections, we faced a difficult situation produced by a very tight result, but of great historical value: the system was put to a test, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones TSE) was strengthened, and the final result was respected. Social peace was kept. A determinant factor for the electoral process to be successful in this situation was the Costa Rican institutional scheme, which in its legal instruments has always sought to watch over electoral guarantees. In this sense, I would like to highlight several relevant aspects to understand the strength of the electoral body in view of the crisis that it had to face on February, The 1949 Constitution that governs us, in safeguard of the electoral guarantees, established a series of structural and functional restraints and counterbalances, relevant for its effective protection. On the one hand, the President, Vice-Presidents, Deputies and municipal authorities are nominated through universal, direct and secret vote by the citizens on elections summoned by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. The Legislative Assembly elects, by qualified majority, the Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice (twenty-two in total) and the deputy Magistrates of each Court, who are reelected except in the 39

41 Tight Electoral Results case when a qualified majority of deputies decides the contrary. At the same time, the Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice designate the Electoral Magistrates. Additionally, the Supreme Electoral Court was granted authorities that guarantee its independence from the other branches and constitutional bodies. 13 It is important to mention that the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has the constitutional status of Branch of the Republic, and it is integrated by three permanent magistrates and six deputy magistrates, all designated, as was previously mentioned, by the Supreme Court of Justice by qualified majority, based on a background contest. The designations are made for six years, but the magistrates could be reelected by qualified majority, when reporting has been previously made. Every two years, the Court should elect a permanent member and two deputies. For the presidential elections, for a period of eighteen months, from one year to up to six months after the elections, two of the Deputy Magistrates (designated for this by the Supreme Court of Justice) become permanent members, to integrate a tribunal of five members. It should be mentioned that the electoral magistrates have the same responsibilities, prerogatives and immunities that the members of the Supreme Branches have. (Articles 100 and 101 of the Political Constitution). The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is in charge of issuing the official declaration of the election of the President and Vice-Presidents, which constitutes one of the main guarantees introduced by the Constituent 13 Executive Branch: Article 177 of the Political Constitution assigns the preparation of the Public Sector to a specialized department. However, it indicates that...the expenditures budgeted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for suffrage purposes cannot be objected by the Department to which this article refers... Legislative Branch: The Supreme Electoral Tribunal distributes 57 deputy seats that integrate the Legislative Assembly, among seven provinces, according to the last population census. (Article 106 of the Political Constitution). The approval of any project of law on electoral matters requires of mandatory consultation to the TSE by the Legislative Assembly. To separate from the criterion expressed by TSE, qualified majority is required. (Articles 97 and 121 of the Political Constitution). Six months before and four months after an election, the Legislative Assembly cannot turn into laws those projects about which the TSE expressed its disagreement. (Article 97). Judicial Branch: The designation of the Magistrates (permanent and deputy) of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is performed by the Supreme Court of Justice through the vote of two thirds of the totality of its members. (Article 100 of the Political Constitution). 40

42 Experiences and Lessons Learned to prevent the involvement of the Executive and Legislative Branches in this transcendental aspect. 14 All the employees on the electoral body bear political-partisan prohibition, except to go to the polls. This obligation to neutrality also applies on consultative processes such as the referendum. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the Costa Rican Supreme Electoral Tribunal, apart from being the governing constitutional body of the electoral process (organization, direction and vigilance of the minutes related to the polls) and exclusive interpreter of the Political Constitution and valid standards in electoral matters, is also in charge of the Civil Registry, and it exercises jurisdictional duties that include the knowledge on the electoral appeal of protection, acting as constitutional judge and the processes for electoral disputes. Its resolutions may not be object of any appeal, except action for prevaricate. (Articles 99 and 103 of the Political Constitution), which constitutes another of its strengths. Likewise, the Political Constitution included, since its promulgation, standards and principles that guarantee the enforcement of voting and the respect for the popular decision expressed at the polls. The 1952 Electoral Code developed these principles and introduced important regulations to reinforce the system. 15 Through a reform, which was a precisely a consequence of an election with tight results (1966 presidential elections, to which we will refer later), in 1969 it was decided that the ballots for the election of president and vicepresidents, deputies and municipal authorities be produced in different colors and deposited on independent boxes duly identified, as this was precisely one of the most debated aspects at that moment. 16 In our country, the Civil Registry, as it has already been mentioned, is assigned to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and we have a unique 14 Article 102, clause 8 of the Political Constitution. 15 Among others, it establishes the exercise of the right to vote in electoral districts, specifications and duty of the register, impediments, nullity regime, scrutiny and terms for the corresponding declaratory judgment (articles 4, 14, 29, 32, 121, 132, of the Electoral Code). 16 Law No. 4341, June 3, 1969, reform to articles 27 and 33 of the Electoral Code. 41

43 Tight Electoral Results identity document for all civil and electoral effects. The electoral registry is publicized, updated and depurated, according to that established, in strict compliance with the electoral chronogram, 17 excluding those who die, those who are declared in state of interdiction, and those who are sentenced to a suspension of political rights, and including the individuals who are becoming of age and those who have acquired citizenship and are suitable to vote. 18 In the case of those who die after the closing of the registry, but before the submission of the electoral material to the polling stations, the corresponding communications are included on the same box. If the decease happens later, the corresponding telegram is sent to each station so that its members have this input during the voting day. In a tight results scenario, all these factors were important to legitimately attend the complaints presented, and they were the basis for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to successfully conclude the process. I. Summary of the Facts What happened on February 5, 2006? In Costa Rica we apply a double-scrutiny system, with a two-way data transmission: telematics and physical. Immediately after closing the voting, the Polling Station Boards classify, assess and count the ballots, in the presence of the partisan fiscals, as well as of any observer that is present. They fill in the corresponding closing act for the registration, they prepare the electoral material for its submission, and they should comply with three legal obligations: 1) Sending the official communication of the results by the fastest media available and that the Tribunal has for this 17 Articles 22 to 25 of the Electoral Code. 18 According to Article 1 of the Electoral Code: Electors are all Costa Ricans, of one or other sex, older than eighteen years-old and registered with the Civil Registry Electoral Department, with the following exceptions: a) Those who are judicially declared in a state of interdiction; and b) Those who suffer sentenced that impose the penalty of suspension of exercise of their political rights. The Costa Rican citizens due to naturalization are not able to vote until after twelve months of having received the respective letter. 42

44 Experiences and Lessons Learned effect (Article 122 of the Electoral Code) in order to initiate the communication of the provisional data, 2) Sending the totality of the material duly classified in a sealed bag to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal so that it serves as input for the definitive scrutiny (Article 121, clause n of the Electoral Code); and 3) Raising the certification of results, which is sent to the Tribunal, with a copy for each partisan representative (Article 121, clause k of the same code). In Costa Rica telematics transmission provides for the need to give preliminary results, but it is not the one used to reach the final or official result, as this is done based on the other physical media used to consign the relevant data (ballots, register, certification, signatures of the members of the polling station on the envelopes that contain the ballots, telegrams). On previous electoral processes (except on the 1966 presidential elections, when the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN) was defeated by a difference of one vote per polling station, approximately. 19 The wide margin between the top two parties allowed the projection of a winner on the same election night, for which the manual scrutiny stage in charge of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal did not generate a major interest for the public. On February 5, 2006, we Costa Ricans did not go to sleep without knowing who would be our next president. That day we closed with 5,451 polling stations processed (88.45%) and a difference of 3,250 votes (0.22%, that is, less than ¼ percentage point) between the two candidates of the major parties. If 100% of the communications from the polling stations had entered, a total provisional result could have been given on the same election day, as the telematics system worked as expected. In fact, it can be affirmed that it work adequately, as precisely the security filters were activated as programmed. 19 On the 1966 presidential elections, with 3,015 polling stations, an electoral register of 554,627 voters and 18.6% of abstentionism, Professor José Joaquín Trejos Fernández, from the National Unification Party (coalition of the Republican and National Union parties) was elected by 4,220 votes. 43

45 44 Tight Electoral Results There were 712 polling stations out of the 6,163 open polling stations that were not possible to process on election night, for which the preliminary result of 100% the polling stations could not be determined. Of those 712 polling stations, 276 submitted the official telematics communication, but due to inconsistencies (any incorrect data, in relation to the stored information), the transmission system security mechanism rejected it, thus channeling it by other tribunal data register via, for its later examination. Of the other 436 polling stations, the result was not received at all for its telematics transmission, which was considered by the authorities as normal, as, in spite of the training provided and the instruction manuals included within the electoral material, the polling station members, due to tiredness, carelessness or creativity, place the instrument (filled in or blank) inside the sealed bag that goes to the tribunal, instead of submitting it by the fastest media, as regulated, to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. These two words, inconsistencies and normality, with a clear meaning at the electoral argot level, manipulated by the second electoral force and other groups with the help of certain mass media, generated unnecessary questioning and doubts within the process. 20 The Tribunal, to clarify the uncertainty, started the manual counting with those 712 polling stations, which came from all the country, but, as was warned to the political parties and the citizenship, it was not officially possible to add these definitive results to the provisional results that were processed on the election night. 21 While on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal 712 polling stations were scrutinized, the National Liberation Party (Partido Liberación Nacional, PLN) requested that the definitive scrutiny of the rest (in which there were provisional results available) was performed, not by 20 The utilization of the word inconsistencies by electoral representatives to explain the impossibility of processing the pending telematics results, which was interpreted by several receptors as irregularities in the worst sense of the expression, and the quote by Mr. Oscar Fonseca Montoya, President of the TSE, that it was normal that there was some missing material in this, as well as in other processes, and perceived as a form to take off importance or minimize the happenings, generated negative reactions in certain sectors. An analysis of such reactions may be seen on the webpage 21 According to Ordinary Session , article 2, February 7, 2006.

46 Experiences and Lessons Learned province number San José (1), Alajuela (2), Cartago (3), Heredia (4), Guanacaste (5), Puntarenas (6), Limón (7)-, but rather by alphabetical order Alajuela, Cartago, Guanacaste, Heredia, Limón, Puntarenas, San José-. The purpose of this was clear: to submit the definitive result of the counting of the province of San José at the end, as this is not only the province with most electors, but also the one that most favored the Citizenship Action Party (Partido Acción Ciudadana, PAC). The Supreme Electoral Tribunal denied the petition in order not to vary the traditionally followed order during the scrutiny process. 22 This generated that during the manual scrutiny, in certain moments the PAC occupied the first place, thus creating false expectations on some sectors. In spite of the above, this Tribunal s decision was the most accurate in a scenario of tight results, and it contributed to maintain the trust on electoral institutionality. A change in the order of the scrutiny would have accelerated knowing the result, but it would have also generated suspicions and put to doubt the neutrality of the head of the electoral body, which, in the long run, would have been more dangerous for the country s stability. The PLN won the provinces of Cartago, Guanacaste, Puntarenas and Limón, of which Guanacaste, Puntarenas and Limón area rural and coastal provinces. The PAC, on the other hand, won San José, Alajuela and Heredia, all predominantly urban, and therefore, more populated. So that the reader can have a better idea of the situation being referenced, the following is a table excerpted from the TSE webpage, which details the total number of polling stations per province. Thus, during the first days of the scrutiny, the results favored the PAC for having won on the provinces of San José, Alajuela and Heredia. The advantage of this party reached 33,800 votes at the closing of the scrutiny for the province of Heredia. Nevertheless, when the counting of the province of Guanacaste was performed, the distance between the two parties was reduced to 14,300 votes, and 22 Article second, Ordinary Session , February 9, 2006:...It is established: The Tribunal had predefined that, once the non-computed polling stations during the transmission of provisional results had been scrutinized, the traditional scrutiny order would be followed, such as it happened today, and it does not find any legal reason to modify its decision. It trusts in that the interested groups accept the result of the definitive scrutiny with the same maturity and tranquility shown by the citizenship. FINAL AGREEMENT. 45

47 Tight Electoral Results NUMBER OF POLLING STATIONS PROCESSED BY PROVINCE when the scrutiny of the votes for Puntarenas started, the PLN began to sustainably surpass the PAC, so the counting of this province closed with an advantage of 7,200 votes in favor of the PLN. This PLN s advantage, plus the one it obtained in the province of Limón, gave at the end an accumulated total difference of 18,169 votes in its favor, which corresponds to a percentage difference of 1.12%. 23 Valid Votes per Political Party February 05, 2006 Elections for President and Vice Presidents. Costa Rica By Province and numbers in thousands PROVINCES 23 Information excerpted from the TSE databases. 46