Great Game in Muslim Central Asia

Transcription

1 e A I IR F A F 47 he New New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia Muslim Central Asia M. E. Ahrari

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4 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA M. E. AHRARI with JAMES BEAL McNair Paper 47 January 1996 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Washington, DC

5 NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY President: Lieuten,'mt Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF Vice President: Ambassador William G. Walker INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATE(;iC STRATE(;IC STUDIES Director & Publisher: Dr. H;uis H~u~s A. Binnendijk Bimaendijk NDU Press Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC (X)0 Phone: (202) Facsimile: (202) Director & Managing Editor: Dr. Frederick T. Kiley Vice Director & General Editor: Major Thomas Tlionias W. Krise, USAF Chief, Editorial & Publications Branch: Mr. George C. Maerz Senior Editor: Ms. Mary A. Solrunerville Sominerville Editor: Mr. Jonath:m Jonath;ui W. Pierce Editor for this issue: issue" Ms. Mary A. Sommerville Editorial Assistant: Ms. Cherie R. Preville Distribution Manager: Mrs. Myrna Myers Secretary: Mrs. Laura Hall From time to time. INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and hfform inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in tlie the post-cold War era. Tliese These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military civil-milit<'iry relations, milit;iry military technology, grad rmd joint, combined, ~md ;uid coalition operations. ()pinions, Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of the authors. authors, l'hey They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this publication m;iy may be quoted or reprinted without further fllrther permission, witli with credit to tlie the Listitute hastitute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews ~md mid tearsheets would be appreciated. For sale by the U.S. II.S. Oovemmcnt Government Printing Office Supenntendent Superintendent of Documents, Docuinenl.s, Mail Stop: SSf)P, SSOl', WashingTon, Washington, DC ISSN

6 CONTENTS 1. The Framework Geopolitics and the Dynamics of Domestic Problems... 9 Ethnic Problems... 9 The Economy Resources Ecology and Health Political Pluralism Islam and the Future of Political Stability Security Control of Nuclear Weapons Modalities godalities of the New Great Game Central Asia as an Extension of the Middle East Russia, America, and the Great Game New Players: Turkey and Iran Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Conclusion Appendix 1: : Structure of Muslim Central Asian Economies, Appendix 2: Contemporary Sources of Russia's Dominance in the Near Abroad About the Author... 91

7 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA 1. THE FRAMEWORK The dismantlement of tlie the Soviet Union also brought about the liberation of six Central Asian Muslim republics Azerbaijan, republics--azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kazaklistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstaii, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (figure 1). Atliough Athough Azerbaijan is part of the Caucasus region, it is included in tliis this study because: The independence of that country, cotmtry, like tliat that of the Central Asian states, was brought about as a result of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, like its Central Asian counterparts, is a Muslim state, and faces similar politico-economic problems. Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia Annenia involving Nagomo-Karabkli Nagorno-Karabkh reminds one of a number of conflicts in the Central Asian region. Tliese These include a seetliing seething etlinic ethnic conflict in Kazakhstan (involving tlie the Khazaks Kliazaks and die the Slavs), the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan "along ethnic, national, and religious lines (since the tlie Russian forces are "also involved in this Uiis civil war), and the etlmic etlinic conflict in the tlie Fargana valley that cuts across the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Like the economies of its Central Asian neighbors, the Azeri economy was largely dependent on the economy of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, like its other otlier neighbors, neighbors. Azerbaijan is also busy establishing economic self-sufficiency, along with strengthening its religious political, pohtical, linguistic, and ethnic identities. All these states are etlmicaily etluiically heterogenous, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan having the largest percentage of Russian population; except for Azerbaijaal, Azerbaijan, the Sunni Muslim faith predominates; and the mother tongue of these countries, save Tajikistan, is of Turkic

8 2 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA origin. Althougli Although these states appear to have more in common witli with file tlie Middle East tlian than with other members of tile the Commonwealth of h~dependent hidepcndent States (CIS), quite wisely, tliese these states decided to join that organization. Through this action, they appear to have postponed the political instability that their sudden independence was likely to have caused. These states are eillier either primarily or substantially Muslim. They have no tradition or institutional memory of a democratic government. The level of education of their population is among mnong the lowest in the region. As these states deal with this unique period of independence, they will also try to find their proper places in the tlie world community. During this tliis time, they tliey will be ilffluenced influenced by various regional and extraregional actors aclors who have their own agendas vis-a-vis these states. The old version of the die "great game" might have entered history; the new version began soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is this "great gmne--post-cold game post-cold War style" that is tlie the topic of tliis this study. The Tlie originator of the phrase "great game" was J. W. Kay, who used it in his book. book, History of the War in Afghanistan} Afghanistan, ~ but Rudyard Kipling popularized it in his novel, Kim, to describe tlie the 18th- and 19th-century rivalry between Britain mad and Russia over the Indian subcontinent. Peter Hopkirk, in The Great Game, Game. establishes tliat that the territory of this struggle---characterized struggle chaiacterized by intrigues mad and conspiracies--was conspiracies was the land between Russia and India.^ 2 The Central Asian territory was then ruled by a variety of local khans. Even though they did not have much knowledge of the world beyond their immediate vicinity, they were indeed quite cogni/.anl cogni,,.ant of Russian motives and of the British conquest of India. To prolong their own rule, they were able to play these two great powers against each other with considerable skill. The new great game may not be aimed at the physical subjugation of Muslim Central Asia, but Russia the Russia--the only regional actor witli wifl~ the capability to conquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia may Asia--may indeed resuscitate its own historical will to reconquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia, especially if the democratic experience in that country becomes a miserable

9 THE FRAMEWORK 3 I,LI t" (.'3

10 4 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA failure and if extremists gain control of the tlie Russian government. It is possible, however, that tliat any of these tlicse countries would intervene ill in the affairs ",fffairs of its neighbors in the event of an impending civil war, in the name of stabilizing the troubled area. In that case, Russian troops would be likely to play an important role in pacifying tliat that area; this is exactly what is happening in Tajikistan, where Uzbekistan is reported to have intervened on behalf of the pro- Communist regime of Ralmian Ralmlan Nabiyev. The Tlie Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan are also reported to be intervening on behalf of the ex-communist forces. Pu~ An important aspect of this new great game is that tlie tile Muslim Central Asian republics are playing a crucial role in determining lheir Iheir own future. Such an independent role also entails choosing friends, alliances, government models (an Islamic or a secular one) and economic arrangements (e.g., emulation of the South Korean, Chinese, or Westen European models). A number of great and regional powers are also likely to play an equally crucial role in the new great game. gmne. These include Russia, the die United States, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. This aspect of the great game is quite crucial, for it involves political, nfilitary military economic, and, most important, the religious agendas likely to determine the strategic future of Muslim Central Asia. The involvement of these great and regional powers also means that tjiat they would bring into the die regional arena their respective strategic priorities, which arc are not of great significance significm~ce to the Central Asian countries but wlfich which might influence tlie the future dynamics of the great game itself. For instance, die the Iranian-Turkish Iranim~-Turkish rivalry or the tlie Saudi-Iranian rivalry is not of much concern to one or more of these republics, but whichever of Uiese these regional powers gains a diplomatic upper hand may have some bearing on the decision of one or more of the tile Central Asian Asim~ republics to opt for an all Islamic or secular model. One has to be careful about not overplaying or underplaying the tlie significance of the Iraniml Iranian or Turkish models. In the final analysis, die the decision to remain secular or to turn toward Islam will largely be determined, in the nccir near future, by the ruling elite groups. The popular preferences regarding these models are not likely to be apparent anytime soon, mainly because the decisionmaking in most of file Uie Central Asian Muslim republics does not reflect popular preferences. Moreover, the political

11 THE FRAMEWORK 5 sophistication of tlie the population is not sufticientiy sufficiently high in many of these republics to influence these tliese issues in the short run. The Tlie Central Asian states supplied raw material for the industrial part of the die former Soviet Union. Since its breakup, bre~up, these actors are earnestly seeking to adopt plans that would give them economic self-sufficiency. They want to exploit their own natural resources, not export them Uiem to Russia; they want to integrate dieir their economies with those of their southern neighbors and Europe, not just with widi Russia. We might be witnessing the emergence of two dimensions of this new great game in Central Asia Uie Asia--the geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions.' 3 An emphasis on geoeconomic objectives motivates a nation- state to seek arrangements aimed at bringing about abcmt economic integration and links with other actors; such ties would inevitably lead to escalated political influence. An enhancement of political influence would, in turn, be a crucial aspect of geostrategic dimension. (It could be argued diat fllat all economic activides activities among nation-states may lead to the improvement of political influence, but when a nation-state is interested in systematically converting political poliucal influence to incorporate ouier other nations into some sort of a political bloc--even bloc even an informal grouping of nations---or nations or an alliance--a alliance a formalized tbrmalized and differentiated system-- system it is indulging itself in geostrategic activities.) The Tlie geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects aspecks of the great game are aimed at keeping tlie the inter-state conflicts in that part of the world at a manageable level. Various actors might attach different degrees of significance to its various aspects. For instance, an actor might be emphasizing its economic significance through aid and trade arrangements and through creating economic blocs. Iran, Turkey, and (to a lesser extent) Saudi Arabia might be underscoring this diis aspect of the great game, but ml an emphasis of their Uieir involvement inevitably leads to an esc',dation escaladon of their dieir geopolitical significance in Central Asia. Tlie The Central Asian countries might value the integration of Uieir their economies with that of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or lrm~ Iran because, trader under these Uiese arrangements, they are arc likely to be treated as equals. Russia, on the otlier other hand, might prefer the continuation of economic arrangements diat that prevailed under the former tormer Soviet Union. AlUiough Although die the continuation of these arrangements would result in die the sustained subordination of the die economies of the Central

12 6 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Asian countries to that of Russia, its side payoff might be the willingness of Russia to give flmse Oiese states stability and security. The Central Asian states, however, might view this continued subordination as too high a price to pay for security and stability. The United States and Europe may attach utmost uunost value to security' and stability for the continued survival of the CIS, with or without witliout paying much heed to how tliese these variables are envisioned by the Central Asian.states. If any of the preceding preferences are correct, we might be witnessing tlie the making m~ing of a highly complicated version of the new great game gaine in Central Asia. This study therefore will focus on the dynamics of geoeconomics and geopolitics from the tlie perspectives of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and the tlie United Stales States and Russia. The first section of this study offers an overview of the domestic problems, problelns, such as acute economic underdevelopmcnt, underdevelopment, absence of economic and industrial communication and trm~sportadon transportation infrastructures, iuid and ecological problems that need urgent remedies. The argument here is that not only is the resolution of these problems at tlie the core of the Central Asian states' diplomatic activities, but that the potential re.solution resolution of these problems will 'also determine tlie tim future of peace and stability in that region. Tlie The prospects for political pluralism and democracy and the role of Islam are issues requiring a closer examination exanfination of these republics. A potential incorporation of democracy by most, if not "all, of tliese flmse states might enable them to shun political extremism of all shades. In this context, they also must try to involve Islamic parties in the ever-escalating pace of political activities in their domestic arena, and not curb the activities of tliese these parties, or even try to ban diem Ihem by using the excuse of "Islamic fundamentalism." fundmnentalism." The issue of nuclear weapons involving Ukraine and Kazakhstan is also analyzed. Tile The second section covers the modalities of the new great game, focusing on the activities of Irma, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and tile the United States and analyzing three important observations: Although the diplomatic and political mmmuverings maiieuvcrings of these states are aimed at promoting their respective strategic agendas in Muslim Central Asia, it is the political preferences and priorities of the tlic newly independent republics that tjiat are going to play a crucial role in assigning priorities to any au~y of these actors.

13 THE FRAMEWORK 7 While the competitive interactions of the tliree dlree regional actorsiiran, actors Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia serve Arabia--serve as a_s an important wrinkle ol of the new great game, one should be careful about assigning undue importance to these interactions. In Ill the final analysis, the future significance of these interactions is most likely to be detennined detelanined by the Central Asian republics themselves. tlicmselvcs. The resurgence of overly assertive, if not aggressive, tendencies of Russia's foreign policy is a development likely to intensify the level of turbulence in an already troubled region. As the sole remaining superpower, (he the United States cannot long afford to concede a free hand to Moscow Mo,scow ill in tile the name of bringing about stability in Central Asia.

14 2. 11 GEOPOLITICS AND THE DYNAMICS OF DOMESTIC PROBLEMS The Tlie Muslim states of Central Asia have been isolated from their regional neighbors since their conquest by Russia in the late 19th 19tli century, an isolation that extends even further into the tlic past, with the closing of the tlie old overland silk route to China. As newly independent members of the CIS, these diesc states are filled with widi self- discovery and busy establishing extensive contacts and ties lies with the world in the immediate vicinity as well as beyond. The problems faced by tliem them are both acute and enormous. The proliferation of violent border disputes throughout tliroughout the die region of the former Soviet Union reflects the imperial and arbitrary nature of republican borders, as conceived by die the former Soviet authorities. The region traditionally existed as a "shatterbelt" between competing regional powers: Russia and Persia, Russia and China, or Russia and Great Britain. ETHNIC PROBLEMS One of tlie the most significant domestic problems faced by these tliese states is that they "were never intended to be truly ethnic states." The names given to diem them under the Stalin regime were derived from froln their tribal designations Uzbeks, designations--uzbeks, Kazakhs, K~akhs, etc. and etc.--and diey they "were created primarily as a mechanism of divide and rule." The rationale was "to destroy any idea of a united 'Turkestan,' which, with its combined powers, could have Uireatened threatened Moscow's hold over the region."^ ''4 Commenting on this issue, Marthat Olcotl Olcott notes: Stalin drew the map of Soviet Central Asia not with aii m~ eye to consolidating natttral natural regions, but rather for the tlie ptn'pose purpose of reducing tlie Oae prospects for regional unity. tmity. Five separate republics 9

15 10 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA THE MIDDLE EAST & THE NEW MUSLIM I m z m / O m > -i o > m z c!p2~> i o m z H > > > AHMN LUnwIG 19n3 AB WAR CttLEGC c~ FIGURE 2 I.I.l I.I.

16 THE FRAMEWORK 11 were formed, creating national units for etjinic ethnic commtmities commimities that had yet to tliiiik flahlk of tliemselves fl~emselves as distinct nationahties. nationalilies. Moreover, boundaries were set to insure tlie flae presence of hirge large irredentist populations in each republic.^ republic) A related problem is tile the ethnic diversity of Muslim Central Asia, which promises to be tlic the root cause of a multiplicity of ettmic ethnic conflicts. conflicts, In hi a region where economic underdevelopmcnt underdevelopment is acute, deep resentment related to the advantageous status of one ethnic group is likely to cause a considerable number of violent outbreaks and indeed even chaos, especially from those groups who regard themselves tliemselves as victims of exploitation. Another AnotJier root cause of etlmic conflicts goes back to Stalin's mass relocation campaign. The intent was to dilute the etlmic ettmic strength of one dominant group by creating in its midst pockets of ethnic nfinorities; minorities; conscquently, consequently, when one examines the tlie etlmic breakdown of these tliese republics, one is struck by the tlie prevalence of etlinic ethnic diversity. The major example of ethnic diversity is the republic of Kazakhstan, wliich which contains two major nationalities, Kazakhs and Russians, where Kazaklis Kazakhs are in the minority and where tlie the Ka/.akli Kazakh language is not spoken or understood by a majority of population. As Kazakhstan sets out to develop its national persoivality, personality, it has to fight political battles with Russians (and to a lesser extent, with other ethific etlinic groups) to keep the country intact. The northern nortliern and eastern parts parl~ of tliat that country colmtry are arc inhabited predominantly by Slavs, and there tliere is always a danger that tliat if they do not like tuture future political developments, they may attempt to secede or ask Russia to take over those regions of Kaz',dd~stan. Kazaklistan. Even the political parties in Kazakhstan Kazaklistan reflect the binational character of x)f tliat that country, witli with the Endinstvo (Unity) movement and tlic the Azat (Freedom) party representing and reflecting the fears, aspirations, and political preferences of Slavs and Kazakhs, respectively. Another Anotlier problem related to etlinic ethnic makeup m',ff, is that a majority of the productive sectors of Kazakhstan arc are in the hands of non- Kazakhs. As the counuy counuy aims its industrial and agricultural policies aimed at privatization, the non-kazakh part of the population is likely to resent deeply the redistributive rcdistributive policies of the die government that tliat are destined to lower its privileged status. Kyrgyzstan is another state where Russians have a large presence presence 21.5 percent of the tlie population. Even though tliough President

17 12 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Asker Akaev has been adamant adamaiu about maintaining ethnic and cultural pluralism in his country, the Slavic population is destined to feel discriminated against as more and more nationalistic policies are adopted. It should be noted, however, that ethnic problems in Kyrgyzstan do not appear as ominous as they do in Kaz~hstan. Kazakhstan. Etlmic Etlinic problems are slightly different in Uzbekistan, the most populous republic of Muslim Central Asia (19.9 million). The presence of Russians, though problematic given their traditionally privileged status, might be diminishing in its deleterious potential because they are leaving Uzbekistan. LIzbekistan. A potentially destabilizing problem of Uzbekistan is the presence of the Tajik minority, and in fact, two famous Tajik-speaking Islamic centers of Central Asia--SaJnarkhand Asia Samarkhand and Bukhara--are Bukliara are part of Uzbekistan. When one adds tliis Otis confused intermingling of etlinic ethnic groups with the fact that Uzbeks, because of their number, nmnber, cause much fear among aniong minority groups that are likely to be assimilated in the larger culture, one is looking at a potential etlinic ethnic explosion. Anticipating this mislunash mislimash of various ethnic groups that are either suspicious of each otlier other or even do not uot like each other, ouier, and recognizing that tliat artificially drawn borders anlong among republics might cause an outbreak of hostilities, these republics have carefully guaranteed the pennanence permanence of borders in all bilateral agreements. One of the key provisions of the new commonwealth also mlderscores underscores the inviolability of the present borders.*" 6 For Kazakhstan, Kazaklistan, tliis this is a major fear, stemming from a potential change of heart in Moscow, especially if Boris Yeltsin is replaced by a hardline Slavic chauvinist leader. Other republics also manifest the salne same concern.' concefn. 7 THE ECONOMY The Tlie greatest need for the tile Muslim Central Asian states is to acquire economic self-sufficiency, which has several characteristics. First, the Central Asian states are interested in breaking away from the old Soviet economic ties in which "all were assigned a specific economic role witli with tlie the chief aim of serving the Soviet economy. eccmomy. At the same time, they are busy reformulating this association in the form of a Centr~ Central A~sian Asian Conunonwealth. Comiiionwcaltli. Second, tlic file Central Asian states are looking for avenues of economic integration with ouier other Muslim

18 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 13 states of tile the Middle East and Soutliwest Southwest Asia, in which they would not play the role of suppliers of raw materials only. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) has become an important vehicle in this regard. The third characteristic of their quest for self- sufficiency motivates these countries to seek arrangements for industrialization and joint ventures with Western countries. Appendix! 1 and the tlie following briefs provide economic profiles of these six republics. Azerbaijan This country rates high on the tile scale of industrialization, with its industry accounting for more than 40 percent and its agriculture for 30 percent of the net material product (NMP) of the former Soviet Union.* 8 Azerbaijan led the fomier former Soviet Union in economic growfll growtli from 1971 to It has large oil reserves, estimated to be around 1 billion metric tons. Its annual production declined in recent years, from 13 to 11 million metric tons, about 80 percent of which is produced offshore. Azerbaijan is one of the few Musliin Muslim Central Asian republics that not only exports more than it imports, but whose exports and imports are largely finished goods and industrial raw materials, respectively. Its exports were 46 percent and imports 37 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from X7 to Over 90 percent of its exports are refined oil products, machinery, textiles and wines that are shipped mainly to Russia and Ukraine. Of its imports, 70 to 80 percent come from other republics of the fonner former USSR. These include industrial raw materials, crude oil for reexport as a refined product, and processed foods. These figures are destined the decline because of the Azeri-Annenian conllict confiict involving Nagorno-Karabakh, Nagomo-Karabakli, and also because of Azerbaijan's status as a newly independent republic. Kazakhstan This nation rates as the most industrialized republic in tlie the region. Kazakhstan's unique feature is that its industrial and agricultural sectors are highly developed, with agricultural products forming 37 percent of its NMP in Its industrial sector is "geared mainly toward metallurgy, heavy machinery and maci]ine machine tools, petrol- chemicals, agro-processing and textiles.'"' ''~

19 14 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Kazakhstan Kazaklistan is well endowed in mineral resources. "As of 1990, the country's proven mineral reserves represented over 90 percent of total USSR reserves of chrome and close to 50 percent of the USSR reserves of lead, wolfram (tungsten), copper, mid and zinc; it accounted for 19 percent of USSR coal production and 7 percent of oil production." The chromite deposits of northwest Kazakhstan, for example, supplied virtually "all of Soviet production, with output in the tlie mid-1980s reaching 4 million metric tons ammally. annually.'^' 1 Otlier Other important mineral resources for Kazakhstan include its gold reserves, which accounted for one-sixth of total Soviet Scjviet production. Besides raw materials extraction, Kazakhstan ",also enjoyed a developed chemical and steel industry. Of tlie the total annual Soviet output of phosphate (600,000 metric tons), Kazakhstan produced four-fifths, four-fiftlis." u Kazakhstan's Kazaklistan's steel industry, however, was developed under ideological guidelines, ratlier rather tlian than available resources. While possessing sufficient energy and coking coal, the steel mills Inills at Karaganda depend on both imported iron ore and water.'^ ~2 Given the development strategy of Moscow, Kazakhstan's industry was heavily tied to that of the otlier other republics. In some fields Kazakh plants produced the lion's share of a given product. In the chemical chemic',d and smelting industry, Kazakhstan was wa.s often the most vital of all Soviet sources. But even this country is also a victim of specialization that was idiosyncratic to the economy of the former Soviet Union. About one-third of the finished goods consumed in the country are imported. By the same token, three- tliree- fourths of its total exports, including interrepublican trade, are intermediate goods and raw materials." ~3 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's economy is primarily agricultural, but its unique characteristic is the presence of a sizable private sector.'" TM In some major crops, the tlie share of the die private sector is between one-third and one-half. Agriculture accounted for 40 percent of the NMP in , 1, while the industrial sector accounted for about one-third of the tlie NMP. Another feature of the tile Kyrgyz economy is its excessive dependence on imports, especially from republics of the tile former Soviet Union. For 1990, ml an estimated 98 percent of its total exports were sold witliin within these republics.

20 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 15 Tajikistan This is the poorest of all the tlie Muslim Mushm republics. Its economy is highly dependent on agriculture, which accounted accotmted for 38 percent of its NMP in It is also a major producer of cotton, and accounted for 11 I 1 percent of die the total cotton production of the former USSR. Tajikistan's industrial sector is substantially state owned. The Tlie state's share of fixed industrial assets was around 98 percent in For the same year, Tajikistan's share of interrepublic trade was between 80 SO percent and 90 percent of its exports and imports, respectively) respectively.'^ 5 Turkmenistan Turl<menistan This republic lies "at the lower end of the scale in terms of social development indicators, with the highest infant mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy at birth. birtli.""' ''I*~ Its economy is primarily agricultural. Cotton is the major crop grown, accounting for more than 50 percent of its arable land Imld and mid 60 percent of its total agricultural production. Production and processing of energy are also important for its economy. Turklnenistan's Turkmenistan's gas reserves are estimated to bc be 8.1 trillion cubic meters; its energy reserves are estimated to be around 700 million tons. The significance of cotton and miner',d mineral resources is reflected in its industrial development. In 1991, 61 textile enterprises generated about one-third of its total industrial production. Tliirty-eight Thirty-eight large state-owned chemical, gas, oil processing, and electricity-generating industries accounted for another lliird third of its industrial production. Uzbekistan This Tliis is a state where agriculture, oil, and mineral deposits dominate economic activities.'^ 17 Agriculture represents about 40 percent of its NMP mid and 30 percent of employment, while its industrial production is around 30 percent of its NMP and 18 percent of employment. Its heavy trade dependence on the states of the former Soviet Union is underscored by the fact that its exports to these states form 34 percent of its GDP, while "foreign" exports are only about 4 percent of its GDP. Similarly, its imports from its fonner former Soviet partners and from "foreign" sources are reported to be 3(1 30 percent and 6 percent, respectively, of its GDP. Uzbekistan is the fourth fourda largest producer of cotton, which accounts for 40 percent of its entire agricultural production. It also has large reserves of petroleum. petroleum,

21 16 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA natural gas. gas, aiid and coal. Uzbekistan was a major natural gas producer of the former Soviet Union. RESOURCES Perhaps tlic the most critical resource for future development is energy. cnergy. The six Central Asian states stales account for 9 percent of CIS oil production, but are known to have 12 percent of total in the CIS proven reserves. rcserves. Of these, tliese, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan "have oil resources comparable to those of the minor OPEC production."'' ''~8 For these states, oil reserves not only guarantee a measure of economic independence, but also represent a potential source of hard-currency income, such as Kazakhstan's recent deal with Chevron to exploit the Tenghiz oil field. Turkdnenistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan contain large mnounts amounts of natural gas, and Kazakhstan is moving to attract foreign investment and development of oil and gas fields at Karachaganak, where oil and natural gas reserves were estimated to be around 1 trillion cubic meters and 80 million tons, respectively. Kazakhstan's Kaz~hstan's energy reserves also include major coal deposits. The coal fields at Karaganda uid and Ekibastuz were tlie the dfird tliird largest in tlie die fonner former Soviet Union; annually, some 130 million tons of coal were extracted from these tliese fields for slfipment sliipment to the tlie Ur',d Ural steel nfills mills or for use in regional electrical generating plants] plants.'" In the former Soviet Union, however. however, Central Asia was also a primary source of natural gas. Because of Central Asia's large reserves and <md its relalive relative proximity, it met 40 percent of the European half of the Soviet Union's natural gas demand.^" 2 Though there arc are some reserves in odier other republics, tl~e the most mos! important source tor for natural gas was Turkmenistan. During die the eleventh Five- Year Plan, before the die economic disruption of reform, Turkmenistan produced 84.7 billion cubic meters of gas annually and held 70 percent of "all Central Centr',d Asian reserves.'' 2~ Given their large proven and estimated reserves of energy, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan can enjoy a greater degree of autonomy as a result of dmir dieir domestic energy self-sufficiency. The other states in the region have fewer sources of energy, which include some hydroelectric stations. The hydroelectric stations of Tajikistan, however, depend on skilled technical workers, many of whom are Slavs. Thus the loss of Slav

22 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 17 technicians could result in a temporary decrease ill in output. Uzbekistan also has lias energy resources of its own. In 1990 its estimated natural gas output was about abou! 41 billion cubic meters, and its petroleum production was about 2.8 million tons. The recent discoveries of oil in file tlie Namangan and Ferghana regions promise to make Uzbekistan self-sufficient in energy.^" 22 Energy reserves are only a fraction of the natural resources located in Central Asia, albeit tlie the most important. Given tlie file new post-cold War global order, the location of uranium mining facilities in the region may prove to be a tempting delicacy for a third power, regional or not. Though most of the former Soviet Union's uraniiun uranimn was mined in tliis this area, most processing took place in Russia. Besides yellow gold. gold, Central Asia was known more for its white gold: cotton. Development of the cotton industry dates back to the tjie 1860s, 186()s, when the tlie American Civil War deprived Russia of American cotton. Though Central Asia as a region is important for cotton production, cotton growing is concentrated mainly in Uzbekistan, which contributes some 61 percent of total production.^^ 23 Tile Tlie extent and importance of cotton production were increased under the Soviet authorities, autliorities, especially during the past 30 years. Tile Tlie expansion of production in diis this arid region has come as a result of a massive increase in irrigation, largely from the Ainu Amu Darya and Syr Darya. From 1961 to 1986, land under irrigation in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan increased 62 percent.^'* 24 The expansion of the cotton fields has had several negative impacts on the tlie states of Central Asia, however. Examining file tlie socioeconomic conditions of the region, one can see the impact of the cotton monoculture. Unfortunately for the local population, cotton proved to be extremely profitable for tot both Moscow and the republican Communist leadership, who benelltted benefitted the most from the cotton profits. In an economy suffering from shortages and poor delivery systems, cotton proved to be the ideal crop. Whereas Soviet agriculture tended to lose 20 percent of a given crop between farm ajld and inarket market because of rough handling or spoilage, cotton has the distinct advantage of being imperishable. Fruit or vegetable production requires expensive refrigeration, but cotton can be simply piled on the ground. Given the Central Asians' reluctance to leave their traditional, rural life, cotton seemed to offer an effective means of exploiting

23 18 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA tile tlie situation. Cotton production in Central Asia is labor intensive: over one-half of the harvested cotton is collected by hand. The Tile combination of a high birth rate (Central Asia's average for 1986 was 35 births per 1,000 population), a propensity to remain rural, and a lack of investment in production-related industry translated into growing unemployment. Before tile the collapse of die tile Soviet Union, unemployment in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan was esthnated estimated to be 16 to 20 percent of tile the potential labor force." 25 The concentration of cotton production in Uzbekistan led to an especially acute situation. Unemployment in the late 1980s was estimated to be around two million people, ahnost almost 10 percent of the total population. James Critchlow, in his exajnination examination of the tlie Uzbek economy, writes that unemployment was repeatedly cited as a factor in tlie tile 1989 Faarghana valley riots in that country. These riots, he maintains, resulted in making more than two-fifths of the Uzbek population "dependent on otliers, others, whether relatives or the state. slate."^'' ''2~ Expausion Expansion of tlie file cotton monoculture monocuiture was achieved at great cost in ouier other areas as a,s well. For instance, even though cotton was grown in tile die Central Centr',d Asian states, its processing was done in Russia. The underlying intent was to deprive tliese tilese states of industrialization and keep them dependent on tlie the Soviet Union for the processing of their vital commodity. Second, tax rates heavily favored the Soviet Union. Ahmad Rashid cites telling figures on this issue: "There was an average tax of roubles on one ton of raw cotton, while on finished products the tax was in region of 1,200-1,700 roubles."" ''27 To increase production, most arable land was given over to cotton production, and as cotton production increased, an almost equal and dramatic loss in food production also materialized. Now Central Asia, which used to grow enough food to sustain itself, is dependent on food imported fnim from other ouier republics. This trend has been especially evident in the loss of the tlie inany many fruit orchards. orchards, In hi Uzbekistan, trees used to grow on an estimated 15 percent of the arable land, but by 1987 that percentage had decreased to only 1 percent. As the Soviet Union collapsed, food shortages becaane became quite common in the region. The new states have made efforts to increase the amount anlount of land devoted to food production, but the damage cannot be immediately reversed. As Russia itself tries to retbnn refonn its agriculture, CenU'al Central Asia must begin to look for otlier other sources of grain and other foodstuft~. foodstuffs. Some Muslim states have

24 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 19 moved to fill this need; already Saudi Arabia has donated 800,000 tons ot of grain to Uzbekistan/* Uzbekistan. 28 Certain ooier other economic characteristics likely to affect the political dynamics and future stability of the Central Asian Muslim republics are wortli worth noting. For instance, the economy of northern Kazaldlstan, Ka2.aklistan, because this tliis region is predominantly inhabited by the Russian population, is heavily industrial and is more closely linked to Siberia and the Russian republic than tlian it is to its own agricultural south. soutli. In Kazakhstan Kazaklistan one finds the tlie Baykonur space complex and its related technology, yet the region is also marked by extreme poverty and backwardness. In hi the past, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan mainly exported raw materiais materials to other otlier republics for final processing. For example, Uzbekistan produced 5 million tons of cotton annually, but 90 percent of tliis this cotton was exported raw. During , however, that tliat country set out to establish its own cotton processing industry by importing it fi-om from the West. Of these republics, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appear determined to make steady progress toward becoming liberal and market-oriented economics, economies, while Turkmenistan and IJzbekistan--because Uzbekistan because they are highly authoritarian states--are states are manifesting greater central control over tlieir their economies. It will be some time before Tajikistan, which is experiencing a civil war, will determine its own course of economic development. Much of its economic direction will depend on tlie the type of govenunent govermnent tliat that emerges at the tlie conclusion of the tlie civil war. Azerbaijan is also likely to forge ahead aliead with market-oriented reforms in the future. However, like the Tajik civil war, another ongoing political conflict.--this conflict tliis one involving Nagonio-Karabakh will Nagomo-Karab',dda--will have a major impact on ils ils political politic',d leadership, as well as on economic priorities. ECOLOGY AND HEALTH Environmental neglect and destruction are not restricted by ideology, and the extent of the ecological damage in the former Soviet Union approaches the realm of science fiction. fction. The following most aptly describes the foniier former Soviet Union's crimes against nature in Central Asia: Nowhere has the link between tlie file misuse of tlie the land rind and tlltliy filthy water been manifested m,'mifested more clearly tluin than in Central Asia. Tliere, There.

25 20 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA a combhlatioll combination of tmfiltered luifiltered drinking water, untreated sewage, mid large IfirgcqiKuitilies qum~tities of pesticides, herbicides, detolimlts, defoii;uus, ~md ;uid fertilizers has lias done massive damage to tlie the population's healtli, health, not to mention causillg causing severe economic losses. For decades, pure water from tim tlie region's rivers has lias been diverted to irrigation projects (especially for cotton), and,'rod d~e tlie water remaining in rivers mid m~d streams is almost ~dways.dways badly polluted. Noting that more tlimi thm~ three billion cubic meters of agricultural, indt, industrial,,'rod mid htm~ml hunimi w~lste w.'lste flowed hlto into the Ainu Amu Dgtrya Darya each year, the minister of health healtli of Soviet Turkmenia [present day Turkmenistma] Turkmenistmil descrihed described that waterway sever,'-d several years ago as "little more th,'m tlian a sewage ditch.""' '''-9 This systematic neglect and even gross abuse of the environment that the Muslim Central Asian states experienced has its roots in some of the tlie idiosyncrasies of the centrally planned economy of the fonner USSR. A substantial portion of resources in tlie the former Soviet economy (approximately 85 percent) were allocated to "production group A." These Tliese resources include heavy industries, mining, energy, transportation sectors, and the manufacture of the means of production. On the contrary, only 15 percent of resources were invested in the consumer-oriented sector. "The result was production lbr for its own sake, which increased stresses on the environlnent. enviroiimem."^" ''3 AnoUier Another reason environmental environlnental abuse went unattended, especially in Muslim Central Asia, was "the depth of corruption" in that region.^' region, a~ The lesult result was a systematic distortion of statistics, by underreporting the death rates rales and by falsifying reasons of deaths on a national scale. In oflmr otlier words, when the Conununist Communist system was not even willing to face the gross abuse of the tlie enviromnent and its attendant consequences, there was no hope that it would do anything about it. It was only in the early 1970s that Soviet autlioritics authorities decided to lake take "positive action to ctmibal combat first air and then water pollution."'" 'm" The llie pollution problems of Kazakhstan are more traditional: air pollution from the tlie old, centrally controlled industries and factories, and some radiation problems around the Semipalatinsk Semipalalinsk weapons test site. In the agricultural (especially cotton) regions of Central Asia, however, the tlie drive to expand cotton production at all costs has presented its bill: water shortages in countries like Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kazaklistan, and Kyrgyzstan, and poisoning of the land and people of the region; the massive diversion of the Amu Darya and Syr

26 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 21 Darya, leading to a dramatic change in and even perhaps the slow death deatli of the Aral Sea, which is fed by these rivers. The development of a massive system of irrigation canals caused only one-eighth as much water to reach the Aral Sea from the two main river systems in 1989 as in I960." 33 In fact, in tlie the 1980s it was reported that tliat the Syr Darya no longer reaches this sea. Unless corrective measures are taken soon, the Aral Sea will disappear in our lifetime: its capacity has shrmak shrunk by 80 kilometers, its depth has decreased by 123 meters, and it has lost 69 percent of its original volume of water.^ 3a While Wliile solutions remain difficult to identify, the cause is more obvious. Adding insult to injury, the massively developed irrigation network is extremely inefl]cienl. inefficient. Irrigation canals require not only initial investment for construction, but also continued capital inputs for upkeep. As was often the case in the former Soviet economy, such additional funding is not available. The results are staggering. An estimated 50 to 90 percent of the water diverted for irrigation never reaches the fields, becoming absorbed into die the earth in the many unlined and poorly maintained canals.'' 3~ The water that tliat does docs reach the tlie fields often achieves undesired undcsired results. The constant use of field flooding as a means of irrigation irrigauon has over time led to the salinization sajinization of the soil."' 3~ In addition, some of the irrigated lands have become useless through tlirough rising water tables. In the die cotton area, an estimated 8.6 million acres have become waterlogged and have had to be removed from production." 37 The Tlie picture of environmental disaster gets worse. As land was lost, and as cotton yields decreased, tlie the leadership moved to reverse the trend by increasing the use of chemicals. Thus after flowing through the tlic fields, the tlic water that remained was heavily polluted. To combat resistant insects, tlie the local authorities applied 49 pounds of chemical per acre.'* 38 That Tliat remaining water, polluted and saline, constituted the Uie drinking water for the region's population. A further furtlier problem is that tliat infrastructural investments Ilave have not been made in water purification plants planls and mid this heavily,'olluted?olluted drizddng drinking water has taken its toll on tlie the people. In the autoi auto) omous republic of Karakalpak (in Uzbekistan), mothers who nu, nu. se their dieir infants run the risk of poisoning tliem.'' them. 3~ In the entire re; re: ion the drinking water crisis has become parucularly particularly acute. Gi\en Given die the chemical cocktail contained in its drinking water and the tlie low state of healtli health care, care. Central Asia has the Uie highest infant mortality rates of

27 22 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA dae die former Soviet republics. In Turkmenistan, for example, tlirce- threefil~hs fiftjis of Oie the maternity clinics, wards, aiid and pediatric hospitals cannot supply hot water, and an additional 127 hospitals have no piped water, resulting in an infant mortality rate of 111 per thousand.'*" 4" Drinking water is also a problem for Uie the region's mostly rur~ rural population, which lives mostly in the cotton belt, is actively involved in ill cotton production, and is engaged in actually cutting the tlie chemically dusted cotton by hand and hand--and thus faces even further furtller water and health problems. problems, In hi the republics of Azerbaijan (also a cotton producer), Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, between 44 and 48 percent of the townships have no sewer systems; their waste simply flows into the already stagnant runoff.'" 4~ In some areas, the die population is left with no choice but to quench its thirst by drinking directly from Ihese these stagnant ponds, since their tlieir collective fanns do not have any piped water. As Murray Feshbach notes, "only 23 percent of the collective tarms fanns in Uzbekistan, 20 percent in Kirghizia, 14 percent in Tajikistan and just 2 percent in Turkmenistan has piped water for farmers' residences.""" ''42 As the Central Asian states embark on the pada patla of democratization, die tlie lingering problems iltherited inlierited from "Czar Cotton" will leave their mark. The possibilities contained in the potential oil and gas wealth are seemingly outweighed by the ecologic',d ecological disaster in the region. Restoring the health of the people is inherently fled ued to the health healtli of tlie the land. As the Aral Sea slowly disappears, the region's climate will also change, chmage, with unknown unlo~own consequences for regional agriculture. In Februaiy February 1992, members of the CIS (with the tl~c exception of Ukraine) signed an interrepublican agreement, "On Cooperation in the Area of Ecology mid and Environmental Protection," Prcnection," in which the parties agreed: To promote environlnental environmental protection through the drafting m~d and enforcement of environmental legislation and regulations, monitoring and assessing environmental quality, pursuing sustainable economic development, preserving wilderness areas and biodiversity, and supporting environmental education To hannonize harmonize mefllodologies, metjiodologies, procedures, and standards of environmental assessment and regulation and to make them compatible with international practice

28 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 23 To pursue joint environmental research and protection programs, including the dismantling of chemical and nuclear weapons To create an all "interstate ecological information infomiation system" and common list of endangered species To fonn an "interstate ecological council" composed of die the environment ministers of the participating states To finance an "interstate ecological lined" fimd" aimed primarily at rendering disaster assistance/' assistance. ~3 Turkmenistan refused to be a party to financing the activities of the interstate ecological council. Given the grossly poor record of environmental management, the signing of this document is definitely a leap forward. lorward. Now, it remains to be seen how seriously the signatories will adhere to the letter and the spirit of the die document. POLITICAL PLURALISM Tile The issue of political pluralism is very complicated in Muslim Central Asia. Yet, the future dynmnics dynamics of this topic will not only determine the die political personality of all diesc these states, but it will also determine how stable these countries are likely to be in the coming years. Like human beings, states are affected by their social and political milieu. This milieu includes historical, cultural, and political traditions not only of the Central Asian socicfies societies but also of their immediate inmlediate neighborhood. Culturally and historically, these countries are tribal and nomadic societies that were not allowed free existence. The czarist regime incorporated them in its empire, and when the imperial rule canoe came to a bloody end, the Communist "czars" proved equally determined, and no less ruthless, in maintaining the system of colonial rule and subjugation of these states. stales. Under both systems, the Muslim states were forced to exist under an assumed and alien entity, first as part of llie the Russian empire, then as ~ citizens of the Soviet empire. Altliough Although their ethnic identity was maintained as an administrative necessity, dieir their real existence as Muslims was suppressed and denied. According to one study, Stalin's policies were clearly aimed at shattering the die "hopes of pan-lslanfic piui-islamic or pan-turkic movements "in Central Asia; he divided the Central Asian people in separate ethnic edinic groupings, groupings.

29 24 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA killed Uieir their hopes for having "a common homeland, a common language, and a common destiny" and clearly wanted to "pit one republic and one ethnic group against another.'"*" ''44 This was not enough. Tlie The Communists invested their best efforts in eradicating the tlie presence of Islam through massive anti-lslmuic anti-islamic propaganda, by banning the use of Arabic mid and replacing it with a Latin script first and then tlien Cyrillic, and by closing mosques. This anti-islamic campaign was effective: there tliere were 26,000 active mosques in 1971, bul but by 1985 tliere there were only 400. These systematic anti-islamic policies were explained away by file tlie Communist rulers by saying that they Uiey were, in reality, attempting "to create a new Soviet man.""'' ''45 One of the reasons no independent political movement took root in Russia was because the native elites were extremely small in number, remained deeply divided, and failed to broaden tlieir their support base among the masses. Consequently, when the Communists won the civil war after the 1917 revolution, tliey they co- opted tlie the Muslim elites into the Communist system and thus made the political transition from czarism to nationalism, and then to soci',dism socialism within a single generation. Muslim leaders who refused to go through this transformation were killed. This treatment of Central Asian Muslim leadership "was only a continuation c(nitinuation of the early refusal of the Bolsheviks to acknowledge any of the local political trends or popular aspirations.""^ ''46 The Soviet system tlius thus established a veneer of indigenous educated elites, who identified themselves as both Soviet and Communist, and mid a majority population in Muslim Central Asia that identified itself as neitlier. neither. Moreover, a substantial part of tliis this population remained uneducated and inward looking, and, most important, continued to identify itself witli with Islam. In the 20th century, the political traditions with which the Central Asian states are familiar are eitlier either communism, which prevailed in the former Soviet Union, or authoritarianism, which prevailed in the Middle East. There is also the Turkish model of democratic secularism; however, Uie the chances of its incorporation on a permanent (or even for the long-term) basis arc are questionable, at best. When Wlien the Soviet Union collapsed from within, Muslim Central Asian leaders were reluctant to accept the sovereign status of tlieir their republics. In every state, these leaders were handpicked by the authorities in Moscow, because of their impeccable credentials as

30 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 25 loyal Communist Comnmnist apparatchiks. When the Communist Party was disbaalded disbanded hi in Moscow, these leaders scrambled to find a new and a "democratic" identity, because democracy came crone into vogue in almost all corners comers of the tlie former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe-- Europe but these leaders had no experience with democracy. More important, they were presiding over societies that were similarly lacking any experience in democracy and iuid were economically underdeveloped. Some of the tlie most significant questions faced by tile the Central Asijui Asian leadership were how to preside over such societies; how to bring about economic development without being autocratic; and whether to allow political pluralism (or how nmch much pluralism to allow) as they endeavored to move toward market economies (otherwise known kmown as economic pluralism). Another crucial question was whether political pluralism and economic pluralism would be simultaneously introduced. The Gorbachev experience his experienceihis decision to introduce glasnost and perestroika eventually brought about the collapse of the tlie Soviet empire--was empire was an uneasy reminder Uiat that tlie the simultaneous introduction of both economic and political pluralism may lead to cataclysmic changes. No Central Asian leader was willing to accept such a potenti',d potential outcome. They were, however, aware that pluralism had also been introduced in a number of Eastern European Europem] countries, so the path they had to take was not clearly marked. There were serious risks hanging over their tlieir respective political horizons. The actual performance of the Muslim Central Asian leaders regarding political pluralism requires closer exmnination. examination. The politics of Azerbaijan since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been turbulent. Because it was a part of the Soviet empire Ior for so long, and because it had no political experience with witli democracy, its post-independence approach to democracy has been shaky. Even its membership in the CIS was consummated on an undemocratic basis, when the former President Ayaz Mutalibov signed an agreement to join in December 1991, despite opposition from many Azeri nationalists. Today, the tlie future of democracy and political pluralism in that tliat country rests with the tlie future dynamics of two major issues: the resolution of the Nagomo- Nagorno- Karabakh Karabakli conflict and the pace of economic development. At times, the country appears to be so consumed by the Karabakh Karab~h conflict that the tlie political fortunes of major politicians are made and destroyed by episodic development involving this conflict. For

31 26 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA instance, when the Annenian Armenian forces lbrces killed several hundred Azeri civilians in tlic the Karabakh town of Khodzhaly, President Mutalibov was forced to resign on March 6. The election of President Abulfaz Elchibey, Elchibey. who was the tlie chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (AZPF), in June 1992 was carried out in the aftemiatli aftermath of another skirmish over Karabakh--which Karabakli which resulted in the fall of Susha to the Armenian forces (figure 3)."^ 47 FIGURE 3. The Armenia.Azerbaijan Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute GEORGIA Caspian Sea TURKEY Gyandzha ^ingechaiir AZERBAIJAN.NAGORNO- KARABAKH Stepanakert Caspian Sea THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN DISPUTE AflUM LUOWIC B3 An WAR COILECS II5SR2X27 In hi the tile absence of any resolution of the Karabakh conflict, one can cml only hope tliat that the emergence of political pluralism in Azerbaijml Azerbaijan rests largely with the ability of some politicians "whose program promised economic wealth to rival Kuwait's.'""* ''48 Tlie The number of politicians with radical solutions to this conflict appears to be growing as tlie file Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), (CSCE). or the neighbors of Azerbaijan, continue to fail in their attempts to negotiate a political solution. A continued impasse on this Uiis conflict appears to be a time bomb close to the heart of political pluralism in that country; in fact, in June 1993, that time bomb exploded when rebel commander Colonel Surat Husseinov seized power from President Elchibey. This power struggle was directly

32 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 27 related to the way the Karabakh conflict was handled by the Elchibey government. Tlie The Azeri parliament voted to strip Elchibey of all his power, and Heydar Aliev, who was appointed as speaker of the tlie parliament by Elchibey in an attempt to avert the impending civil war in tliat that country, took over. Aliev's rising political fortunes also cast a dark shadow on the political landscape of that country because of his checkered career under tjie the former USSR, as a former KGB general, a Communist Party boss of Azerbaijan in tlie the 1970s, and a politburo member in die tile 1980s.'''' 4~ The Tlie future of political pluralism appears better in ill Kazakiistaii, Kazakhstan, simply because President Sultan Nazerbaev--a Nazerbaev a former Communist--has Communist has adopted a steady course for his country. Even though Nazerbaev N~erbaev cannot pass for tor a genuine democrat, given llie tile special character of his country he has been quite successful in bringing about a political transition for Kazakhstan from a Cormnunist Communist society to one that is independent and relatively open. The source of concern related is that his personal leadership has become too important importmlt an entity for the future of KazakJistan. Kazakhstan. hi In other words, the notion of political legitimacy that is so crucially linked with political institutions as a precondition for the evolution of democracy is sorely lacking in Kazaldmtml. KazakJistan. Instead, political legitimacy is revolving around the personality of Nazerbaev. Consequently, whether Kazakhstan would be able to make a successthl successful transition from personal legitimacy to institutional legitimacy remains a question. While one considers the issue of legitimacy, one should not forget that tliat in 1993 Kazakhstan became one of the Uic hopeful symbols of the capability of a Muslim Central Asian state to develop political pluralism. This Tliis is a country next door to Russia, whose northern nortliem half is predominantly Russiml Russian and which keeps a wary eye on political developments in Russia. Kazakhstan is also a nuclear state. It is a society where the indigenous population as well as its Slavic section remain overly sensitive about their respective future political status and fortunes. Kazakhstan is a polity where even political parties Uirive thrive along ethnic lines. Where possible, Nazerbaev has sought to limit the contentious nature of governing a multiethnic, multireligious slate. state. His opposition to Lslamic Islamic political parties is matched by his opposition to all religious parties. Though an m~ adieist, atheist, he states his opposition to religious

33 28 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA organizations not on dogmatic grounds, but rather on political realities.'" 5 Despite the political sophistication with which Nazerbaev has been managing political events, it should be noted that he ha.s hax expressed his ambivalence toward the evolution of political pluralism and democracy in his country on more than one occasion. He is reported to be "nervous about relinquishing his personal power too rapidly" and has expressed profound agreement with witli the view flint tliat "the path from totalitarianism to democracy lies through ~,'~1 enlightened authorltarmnlsm. aullioritarianism."''' " He might have been thinking of tim tlie Gorbachev experience when he observed that lliat "one would have to possess a heart of ice and a mind of concrete to linfit limit freedom to small doses for people who have been deprived of it for nearly seven-and-a half decades."" ''s2 Kyrgyzstan is a shining example of a Muslim Central Asian state's experience with political pluralism. This country is led by the physician-cure-politician physician-cum-politician Askar Akayev, who takes pride in the fact that he was responsible for the die establishment of the first multiparty democracy in the Uie area and who apparently does not share the apprehension of Nazerbaev about rushing headlong into democracy. Akayev "also believes in the simultaneous evolution of political as well as economic pluralism, and his example is likely to be watched with interest by the political leaders of Russia, K~akhstan, Kazakiistan, and Azerbaijan. Unlike Azerbaijan, however, Akayev's country is not saddled with a conflict c(mflict of the size of Nagorno- Karabakh. Furtliennore, Furthermore, unlike Kazakhstan, Kazakiistan, Kyrgyzstan does not have to worry about the presence of a very large number of Russians whose political alienation could result in a division of his country. counuy. The evolving political and economic pluralism does face one disadvantage Kyrgyzstan disadvantage--kyrgyzstan relies heavily on the technical talents of Slavs. The other ouier two Central Asian republics--turkmenistan republics Turkmenistan and Uzbckistan--ratc Uzbekistan rate highly on tlie the scale of auuioritarianism. authoritarimfism. In botli both states, slates, former Communist bosses are arc serving a,s as Presidents--Islam Presidents Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and Sepermurad Niyazov in Turkmenistan. Karimov has "a reputation as the most authoritarian leader in Central Asia"'' Asia. ''s3 His political preference is precisely summarized in the phrase, "stability at any price."'" ''Sa Tliis This preference was also expressed when President Karimov stated that China continues to serve as a role model for economic reform in Uzbekistan." ss

34 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 29 Although Altliough he later denied ever making this statement, it is clear that as a former Communist who is presiding over a former Communist state, he was intrigued by one "central principle" of the Chinese strategy: "encouraging economic but not political initiative."'* ''56 As a result of his extensive trip to Soutlieast Soufl~east Asia, Karimov is reported to have been fascinated with witli the "Indonesian model" of economic development. There are a number of factors in common between Uzbekistan and Indonesia--Islanl, Indonesia Islam, large population, history of colonial domination, etc. but etc.--but it appears tliat that Indonesian economic development under authoritarian autlioritarian political rule is tlie the reason for this interest. Turkmenistan's President Saparmurad Niyazov, like his Uzbek counterpart Karimov, insists that political stability is the most important variable for fulfilling the vision of a democratic and secular state that he wants for his country,''' 57 but that explanation becomes his excuse for presiding over anotlier another highly authoritarian state of Central Asia. Political power in this country remains firmly finnly in tlie the hands of the old Communist Party nomenklatura, and "the overall direction of policy is under Niyazov's personal control."'* ''ss Niyazov's own views of de,nocratic democratic freedoms are reflected in the treatment of this issue in the Turkmcnistani Turkmenistani constitution. "In sections of the tlie constitution dealing with basic rights and freedoms, one-third of the articles leave the final say to bureaucratic agencies."'' ''s~ In an interview on the subject of personal freedoms, Niyazov noted, "Tlicse "These fieedoms freedoms a~e aie all observed at present [in our country], although during tlie the transitional stage the state must regulate the functioning of these tliese concepts in the interest of society as a whole."*"" ''6 One cannot ca~mot help noticing tlie the striking resemblance of this statement slatement to tlie the old Marxist rhetoric related to establishment of the dictatorship of tlie the proletariat as a state of transition toward the creation of a classless society. This condition is supposed to bring about the "disappearance "'disappearance of tlic the state." The supreme ruling body of Turkmenistan is known as the tlie People's Council, a vehicle devised by Niyazov. This council "'masks "masks the authoritarian nature of Niyazov's rule with a structure intended to hark back to the tribal assemblies of Turkmenistan's past."'"' ''~ Moreover, tlicrc there are no officially recognized political parties in Turkinenistan. Turkmenistan. No definite statement can be made at this time about political pluralism in Tajikistan, where a civil war has been in progress since

35 30 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA May 1992, tlie the purpose of which is to dislodge the rule of fonner former Commtmist Communist President Ralimau Ralunan Nabiyev, who was heading another authoritarian regime in that country. This civil war has been variously described as a battle between ex-communist ex-commtmist and anti- Communist forces, or a struggle between ex-communist and nationalist-islamic forces. Shalirbanou Shallrbanou Tadjbakhsh, a specialist in file tlie Tajik affairs, describes it: The Tlie battle in Tajikistan is not propelled by ideology: the driving forces,are not Communist, Islamic, nationalist or democratic v'alues. values. These Tlicse ideologies ;ire are only labels used in the legitimization of different regiontil region~d clashes. Strong regional rivalries ("mah~dg:troi," ("mali;ilg;iroi," mmslated irmislated as "regionalism" or "localism"), which have been encouraged by the Moscow policy of divide-and-role divide-and-mle since 1924, determine today's political loyalties." "" The Tlie real reason for this civil war is a combination of the tile second and third positions: it is a struggle between ex-communist and nationalist-islamic forces, in which "regionalism" or "localism" is "also playing a catalytic role (figure 4). These different groups, led by different "warlords," seem "to be organized around two major regions (Leninabad in tlie file nortli north and the soutlieni southern Karategin faction) which enjoy clientele relationships widi wifl~ other towns and md cities."''^ ''~3 Because the conflict is brewing in a Muslim country, it is only inevitable that Islmn Islam will play a rolc role in it, especially when "the speedy politicization of Islam [was] carried out by ambitious groups of interested people."*^ ''~ The troubling aspect of the role of Islam in this conflict is related to two developments. First is the position taken by the united opposition a opposition--a grouping of the tlie Democratic Party, file tlie Rastokhez National Front, and juid the Islamic Revivalist Parly Party (IRP)--during (IRP) during the antigovcmment antigovernment demonstrations held during April-May This group made "vague promises of a future Islamic state but [had] a more pertinent goal of re-islamization [read renativization] renativizalion] of society to replace the "Sovietization" of

36 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 31 m O o -D C/) o O o m (/) H O "D o m CD ( FIGURE 4 ILl r'r' (.'3 I.I.

37 32 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA institutions."''' ''~s As a response, llie the progoverninent progovermnent groups and the Russian army portrayed the opposition as "Islamic Fundamentalists." The Tile speaker of the parliament, Emomali Rakhmonov, blamed Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, the Qazi (religious judge) of Kalan, Kalau, for conducting the civil war. But ill in reality, "only a small minority of the fighters actually belonged to the lslanlic Islamic Revivalist Party; most fighters figiiters were politically secular."''*' ''~<' Although Althougli the tlie ex-commuafist ex-communist forces (still Communist in all but name) gained all an upper hajld hand and the nationalist Islamic coalition forces suffered a setback, the civil war is far from over. If tlie dm ex- Commtmist Communist forces gain a cle<ir clear victory, aullioritarian authoritarian rule will be reinstated in Tajikistan. Tajikistml. Even tlien, diem in all likelihood, Tajikistan will remain an unstable polity. What is most disconcerting about this civil war is tile the participation of Uzbek and Russian troops on behalf of ex- Communist forces; neither neiuier state has "behaved as if it considered Tajikistan as a genuinely sovereign and independent country."'''' countw. ''~'7 In 1995, Tajikistan as a sovereign state exists only on paper. The Rahmonov government is too dependent for its existence on the tlie presence of the Russian and Uzbek forces. The government's govermnent's supporters in the soutjieni southern part of that country are not interested in a political compromise tliat that will lessen their political power. The opposition parties are divided between those who.seek a political solution and power sharing, and those who waalt want an all-out victory over the Ralimonov Rahmonov government. The Russian, Uzbek, and Tajik axis, to its credit, has expressed its interest in seeking a political dialogue with witli the opposition forces under the intense scrutiny and criticism of such entities as international amnesty groups and some European countries over their tlicir treaunent of the tlie opposition forces and gross violations of human rights. The prospects for the reemergencc reemergence of Tajikistan as a truly sovereign nation are not exactly dim, however. Imagine the ominous implications of the precedent of a potential disappearance of a nation-state due to tlie the ethnic-based etlinic-based warfare in the tlie entire region. At the Uie same time, one has to recognize the immensely complicated nature of tlie the protracted civil war in that unhappy country, which is also tied to an equally equ',dly complicated and zmd protiacted prouacted civil wai' wax tliat that has been continuing in Afghanistan.''* 6~ To summarize, tlie the prospects for political pluralism are, at best, mixed in Muslim Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is the best example of

38 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 33 political pluralism, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have a mixed record. At least Kazakhstan is stable and benignly autlioritarian. authoritarian. Azerbaijani politics have some way to go before a stable pattern of political pluralism is to emerge. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are under autlioritarian authoritarian regimes tliat that are likely to plunge into civil war, if their present acute economic underdevelopment tmderdevelopment continues. The Tajikistani Tajikistan! example is keeping the attention of both Niyazov and Karimov. But in all likelihood, they both are likely to increase the level of authoritarian autlioritarian control over their Uieir populations since they tjiey value political stability so much. ISLAM AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY A discussion of political stability in any Muslim polity must also take into consideration the role of Islam. The absence of the Western notion of separation of church and stale state in Muslim countries makes it only inevitable that Islamic parties of all shades--the shades the moderate as well as the radicals--will radicals will enter the political arena. Given this reality, the important question is, what will be the relationship between Islmn Islam and the state in the tlie Central Asian countries in coming years'? years? The Tajik civil war does not bode well for the peaceful and constructive evolution of this relationship, and the prospects for a peaceful and stable future in any of these Uiesc Central Asian countries do not look very bright. To begin with, almost "all states, save Kyrgyzstan, arc under authoritarian rule, which means that the present regimes are not likely to allow for political compromises among a number of groups especially groups---especially Islamic groups on groups--on various crucial political, social, and economic issues faced by these countries. It is wortli worth noting lliat that political compromise has its roots in the character of a democratic political culture. It is nurtured tluough duough a process of socializadon socialization at all levels. Political PoliticM leaders are old hands at forging compromises before they reach the uppermost echelons of decisionmaking. The Tlie political polidcal culture of Central Asia, on the contrary, has been heavily influenced by tribalism, centralized control, political and religious repression, and democratic centralism. AH All these characteristics, characterisucs, save tribalism, are typical of Communist societies. When the Soviet Union collapsed, those who were at the hehn helm of

39 34 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA affairs in Central Asian countries were trained Communists. As such, they not only ignored the "forewarning of the impending collapse" of the USSR, but "supported the failing union to tlie the end, makin_o making no contingency ~ plans tor for its possible demise."'".,,60 After they reluctantly became independent, they changed the names of Communist parties in their respective countries to some sort of "democratic" parties, but those parties in reality remained Communist. These leaders had no experience with democracy. They were also presiding over polities that were teetering at the brink of political chaos if direly needed economic development and progress did not materialize. In order to focus on economic development, a number of them (save Akaev of Kyrgyzstan) were convinced tliat that they must continue willi with authoritariiin authoritarian control. Such a political posture allows no room for compromise, unless pressure becomes acute. Even then, tlien. a natural reaction of ua~ an autlaoritarian authoritarian regime is to retaliate against those who are perceived as "enemies" of die the regime. Regarding tlie dae Islamic parties, a "standard" response of a number of Central Asian states is to either outlaw them tliem or repress them so much O~ey tliey go underground. As in all Muslim polities, however, the relationship between Islam and govermncnt govermnent must be worked out over a period of time. In this regard, the Central Asian states share an aji important characteristic with other otlicr Muslim polities, where the relationship between government and Islzunic Islamic parties is far from settled. In most Muslim societies, Ibis lliis relationship has ha.s been a rocky one: Egypt and Algeria are recent examples. In others, Islam and govenunent government arc are so fused that the latter has ha~s tried to sound like the extension of the former. Pakistan is an example of this, lliis, as is Saudi Arabia, where the tlie ruling fmnily family ha.s been acting not only as the guardian of Islamic shrines, but, bul, arguably, also as a "guardian" of Sunni Islam.''" 7 (Indeed, the Saudi religious elite has remained, since the founding of this dynasty, a symbol of legitimacy for the Saudi rule, and as such, the religious elite serves the political objectives of the Saudi rulers.) The prevailing relationship between the government and Islam in these countries, however, cannot in any way serve as prototypes for any Central Asian country. Central Asian countries must develop tlieir their own relationships with lslmn, Islam, relationships that reflect the political and economic realities that prevail within each Central Asian country, or within the region. Islam is destined to figure prominently in the tlie politics of these states, and the present

40 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 35 rulers of Muslim Central Asia are well aware of this likelihood. That might be one reason why they tliey are striving so hard to postpone the inevitable. An Islamic revival is underway throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, from the tlie Caucasus to the Pamirs. Pamirs, Indeed, hidced, one can identify a trend among republican leaders to co-opt Islam as a means of securing legitimacy, in the same manner maamer others pursue national identity. As tlie the strength of the Communist Party began to dissipate, many leaders began to associate tlicmselves themselves publicly with Islam, such as Islam Islmn Karimov in Uzbekistan." 71 Despite their profession of Islamic Islanfic faitli, faith, many of Central Asia's leaders have been anything but hospitable toward the different Islamic-oriented political movements in the region. Given the region's proximity to Iran, raising tlie the excuse of "fundamentalism" "fundanlentalism" has given them a convenient means to secure their political polilical end end-- to maintain power. As the Moscow-based Mo.scow-based Islmnic Islamic Renaissance Party began to spre~l sprcid throughout Central Asia, it encountered many obstacles. In Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party was not allowed to register as a political piirty party until after the aborted August coup of the Soviet Union in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Religious-based parties are. still not allowed to register.'^ 72 Efforts to porlxay portray Muslim politicians as ruthless rutliless "fundamentalists" are present in almost every state; for example, in Uzbekistan, Muslim followers of the Muahid sect were blamed for starting starling the Ferghana riots of X9. The highly authoritarian ruling style of President Karimov and his deep fear of a potential repetition of the Tajik-syle civil war in his country might be two variables that arc driving his continued suppression of Islanfic Islamic parties in Uzbekistan." 73 Similarly, in Kazakhstaal, Kazakhstan, the Islamic movement Alash has been harassed and mid labelled a "fascist" organization, and the former fonner leader of Tajikistan, Nabiyev, categorized members of the Islamic Renaissance Party as fundamentalist extremists who want to create ~1. a HeW new Iran on Tajik soil.'" 7a The real threat from the Islamic Islanfic Renaissance Party, however, lies not with any religious fundamentalism, but rather witli with its strength as a political movement. As in many other republics of the lormer former Soviet Union, there tliere is a growing desire among many people to purge the government of the old Communist nomenklatura. While the Islmnic Islamic Renaissance Party does profess a desire for all Muslims to live in accordmace accordance with the Quran, they also slate state the

41 36 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA desire to achieve such a goal through constitutional means.'' 75 Even in conflict-ravaged Tajikistan, tlie the local Islamic Renaissance Party has continued to express its desire to achieve an Islamic order slowly through legitimate, peaceful means. In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Chairman of the Tajik Islamic Islaanic Renaissance Party Mukhamad-Sharif Khimmatzoda Kliimmatzoda stated: This Tliis is what we want. w;mt. We realize tliat flaat 100,00 or 200,000 people attending a rally do not have the tlie right rigiit to foist flleir tlieir will on file tlie entire republic. People,are not ready yet. We believe ilie file time will come when fl~e die children :rod ;md grandchildren of those tliose who today oppose Islam Ishim at the tlie nationwide referendum, will say,,yes. ' yes.'"^,,7. The Islamic question is a multidimensional one. Attempts to portray the Islanfic Islamic parties as "fundaanentalist" "fundamentalist" or "extremists" are just as erroneous as claims of a pan-turkic dircat threat to the region. Besides the split between Sunni and Shia Muslims, the Muslim community around tlie the world does not act as a monolithic or unified bloc; why should Central Asia prove to be the exception? Many regional problems in Central Asia aggravate trends toward a splintering rather Uian than a fusing of Islamic IslaJnic forces. The rural-urban divide and the existence of regional loyalties arc important factors in this regard. Many of tlie the main parties or factions are centered in urban areas and almost exclusively comprise intellectuals. Wlien When 50 to 60 percent of the population is rural, largely uneducated, and living in squalid conditions, it cannot be taken as a given that the urban Muslims speak for the rural believers. The divide between the two also represents the deepest split among aanong Central Asian Muslims: the Muslim intellectual elites with their jadidist (reformist) heritage and the rural masses, who view Islam as a populist movement.'' 77 In the near future. future, Islamic parties arc likely to emerge mnong among the major opposition parties in almost all MusHm Muslim Central Asian states. Whether these parties will play a role in stabilizing or destabilizing these polities depends on two factors: The extent of success of economic development in these states. If these states were to make effective and steady economic progress, then the purported "necessity" for sustaining authoritarian rule (as presidents of various republics

42 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 37 claim) would disappear. Under such circumstances, Islamic parties are also likely to participate, along with other political groups, in the political process. How Islamic parties are likely to be treated by the ruling elites, regardless of the pace of future economic progress in those countries. If these parties are suppressed or outlawed, then they will have no choice but to acquire the tbrm form of insurgencies. Under such circumstances, their political posture and rhetoric might also be dominated by radical elements. If, on tlie tile other hand, the Islamic parties are allowed to remain as part of conventional opposition in these states, then their own style and rhetoric is likely to remain moderate. SECURITY The Tlie most pressing security issue for tlie tile new states of the tile CIS is tliat that of ethnic relations within witliin their republics. Tile The war in Georgia and the ongoing war in the Caucasus between Azeris and Armenians offer stark evidence of the dangers that exist in the tlie post-soviet world. The republics in Central Asia have so far been spared any major outbreaks of ethnic violence or widespread interrepublican violence, altliough although in the past few years there have been isolated attacks, such as in ill Osh or tlie tile Ferghana Valley riots. So why should ethnic tensions be a source of concern for Central Asia? Asia'? In only a few Central Asian republics does the titular nationality have a majority. Even these republics have a sizable group of minorities living within their border, and many of these minority groups are geographically concentrated. In Kazakhstan, for example, most of the Russian minority lives in the northern areas, where Kazakhstan's industrial base lies. For the three republics sharing the fertile Ferghana Valley, the Soviet-drawn borders have encompassed sizable groups of minorities from the surrounding republics. Central Asia tlius thus represents a quilt of nationalities. The danger of ethnic conflict is not based on long-standing hostilities, such as in the fonner former Yugoslavia. Before die the Soviets entered Central Asia, many of these people did not even identify with witli a national group; radier, rather, they differentiated among themselves Olrough Uirough their lifestyle settled lifestyle--settled or nomadic. In die the context of social upheaval, however, file tlie prospect of using the "new nationalism" as

43 38 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA a source of legitimacy brings with it many risks. Currently there exists a movement to establish an identity separate from the Soviet period, removing traces of Russian domination. The Tajik party Rastokhez, Raslokhez, for example, bases its program on a "renaissance of national language, culture and the better traditions and customs." The attempts to legislate issues of national identity, however, are fraught with conflict, especially in the multietlmic multietlinic realities of the Central Asian states. For example, attempts to create a "Slavic University" in Bishkek were met with widespread protest by many Kyrgyz nationalists.^^ 78 Attempts to solidify solidity, national identity on religious or linguistic lines have also led to a dramatic emigration of many Russians or other otjier groups. Unfortunately I Jnfortunately for the new states, these groups often possess Uic the vital technical skills needed to run the factories and energy plants, thus their exodus could lead to a short-term worsening of the tlic economic situation. The Tlic Tajik conflict has already spurred a massive emigration of Russian-speaking inhabitants. Of the 400,000 Russian speakers living in Tajikistan before the civil war, not more than 70,000 remain there tliere today] today.'" Perhaps in efforts to stave off such an m~ exodus and calm fears an~ong among minority groups, the states of Kazakhstm~ Kazakhstan and ;ind Kyrgyzstan originally declined membership in the Islamic Conference Organization and mid moved to restrict Islantic Islamic movements from flae tlic political scene in their states.'"' 8c~ Such moves, naturally, nm ntn the risk of alienating "national" support for such leaders, leaders. hi In tlie the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan, Tajikistau, we can sec scc the potential for conflict, eiflmr eitlicr interregional or interethnic. When Wlien the tlie new government was formed after Nabiyev's removal from power, many of the residents of the Lcninabad Leninabad oblast tlleatened tluealened to secede to Uzbekistan, Uzbekistm~, a valid threat because the oblast isheavily populated by Uzbeks living in Tajikistan. In the fighting in Dushanbe, many nlany of the attacking soldiers claimed they were Uzbeks, and many of the vehicles used in tlic the assault on die the capital had Uzbek license plates." 8~ By the summer of 1993, the continuing civil war was changing the political landscape of Tajikistan. There was a sizable pre,sence presence of Russian Russim~ forces, who were responsible for both botli internal intemal and mid external security. Russia was regularly using the excuse of protecting the interests of Russian minorities in Tajikistan, not only to continue its intervention in the internal affairs of that country, but also to push the rubber-stamp Tajik legislature to pass a dual citizenship law. The passage of such a law

44 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 39 was to be used to legitimize future intervention, at a time when wlien the tlie Russian troops would no longer be stationed in Tajikistan. The Tlie Uzbek troops and air force were reportedly also present in Tajikistan, making sure that diat the Russian presence had the semblance of a CIS-wide approval. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, fearing a domino effect of this civil war on their own polities, also gave their approval to the presence of Russian and ljzbek Uzbek forces in Tajikistan. However, boui both tliese fl~ese governments remained war), wary of the future implications of the growing activism of Russia and itnd Uzbekistan for their own sovereignties. Aaaother Another aspect of the die fighting in Tajikistan is Uic file creation of large groups of homeless refugees now moving around the region. Refugees have been fleeing the conflict and violence into the surrounding.states, including Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. The number of refugees crossing into Afghanistan has been particularly high because of its proximity to the soutliern soufl~ern regions of Tajikistan, regions involved wiui with tlie the opposition forces. During the height of the Communist reconquest of Dushanbe, an estimated 100,000 refugees crossed into Afghanistan.*^ s2 Perhaps concerned for Kyrgyz people living in Tajikistan, Vice-President of Kyrgyzstan Felix Kulov cmled called for the die introduction of peacekeeping troops from his republic into the fracas in Tajikistan." s3 The collapse of the Soviet Union has also raised Uie fl~e specter of regional border conflicts, not only between the new states but also over disputed territory wiui wifll China. The Chinese claim territory currently currenuy held by the states of Kazakhstan Kaz~hstan and Kyrgyzstan, having in fact over 12 different disputes with the latter state.*'" ~ Given fl~e tlie presence of nuclear weapons both in Russia and, for now. now, in Kazakhstan, it is unlikely that China will act on tliesc these claims. Of greater interest might be the destabilizing factor within China resulting from the independence of die the Central Asia states. Many of tiiese these peoples--kazakhs, peoples Kazaklis, Uighurs, Kyrgyz--have Kyrgyz have relatives across fl~e tlic border in China. How fl~ese diese Turkic groups will react to changes in die the region is a question that will be answered only over the next decade or so. Kazakhstan K~akhstan has auoiorizcd aufllorized citizenship to any Kazakli Kazakh in the world wishing to return to the homeland. Moscow and Beijing long tried to instigate rebellion in each other's Turkic hinterlands, and now that Soviet Central Asia has gained its independence, Beijing finds itself in an uncomfortable position.

45 40 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA The final element, which could lead to conflict in the region, is the densely populated Ferghana Valley. Not only is the valley a mixture of ethnic groups and languages, it is also the agricultural heart of the region, widi with the greatest concentration of population. As clean water becomes scarce and competition for agricultural resources increases, this tension could rapidly spread in an area already marred by etlinic ethnic violence. Another Anodier important element has also entered tlie the picture: the Uzbek discovery of oil near Namangan, Nmnangan, which happens to lie in the Ferghana Valley. As the new states seek to rebuild, modernize, and diversify tlieir their economies, foreign capital will prove to be extremely important. CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS The issueof nuclear weapons in the tile CIS is a source of considerable concern in the West because, aside from Russia, the other republics where nuclear weapons are stationed are Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The first two have shown their reluctance to give up these weapons. Ukraine was consistently consistendy opposed oppo.sed to this transfer without obtaining certain guarantees and payoffs from the tlie West; Kazakhstan later adopted a similar policy. It was apparent that tlie the variable that was to play an important importm~t role in determining wheuier whether they would give up their nuclear weapons was the dynamics of domestic politics in these countries, especially true in die the case of Ukraine.*''' ~5 In the West, however, this was largely viewed as a proliferation issue. The Western countries regarded possession of nuclear weapons by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus as inherently destabilizing, and because these states were viewed as "both unstable and not sufficiently 'mature' to deal wiui with the command and control of nuclear weapons on their Uieir territory," Western thinking was (and continues to be) that they might, wittingly or unwittingly, become sources of leaking of these weapons to other states. stales.*^ 86 In the case of Kazakhstan, there was that perennial Western fear of tlie the emergence of an "Islamic "Islanfic bomb." That country had based at Derzhavinsk and Zhangiz-Tobe I04SS intercontinental ballistic missiles, the largest missiles in the inventory of the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan also contains the die Baikonur-Tyuratam space launch facility, the die mainstay of the Uie Soviet space program, and Sary- Shagan, a site for an anti-ballistic missile air defense system.*^ 87 Kazakhstan's own nuclear policy was greatly shaped by the attitude of Ukraine on this issue, even though the former sought

46 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 41 closer economic and security ties with Russia because of its binational character about character--about 40 percent of its population are native Kazakhs and the other 40 percent are Russian, Russian. hi In tlie the case of Ukraine, its reluctance to give up nuclear weapons is largely related to its fear of the Russian imperialism that enslaved that tliat country for centuries; as Lepingwell notes: The Ukrainians argue that they are being asked to disarm even though the tlie Russian parliament continues to raise questions concerning the tlie Crimea's status as part of Ukraine. To eliminate nuclear weapons on Ukrainian Ukr,'mfian territory under such circumstances will require a combination of strong incentives and reassurances about Ukraine's territorial integrity.** ~ A number of other aspects of Ukraine's position on nuclear weapons influenced Kazakhstan.*' Kaz~hstan. *Q Ukraine stated that its own willingness to ratify START I was contingent upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. First, Kiev sought guarantees from the leading Western nuclear states that Russian nuclear weapons, and especially those transferred from Ukraine, would not be directed against it. Second, Ukraine linked the ratification of SALT I to the "need for economic assistance [from the West] to dismantle and destroy its nuclear weapons." Third, Ukraine wanted "compensation for fbr the nuclear material contained in the dismantled warheads." Another variable that tliat was not well publicized but played a critical role for both Ukraine and Kazaklistan, Kaz',dd~stan, was that the ownership of these tliese weapons was a source of national prestige. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, it seems that the West has paid attention to countries like Ukraine or Kazakhstan largely (if not solely) on the issue of nuclear weapons. Tliese These two countries understood this reality and were keen on exploiting it to tlieir their advantage. Originally, Kaz',~dlstan Kazaklistan refused to make a firm commitment to acquire a nonnuclear status by transferring its nuclear weapons to Russia. In January 1992, President Nazerbaev agreed to sign tlie the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear state. This was his gesture to Washington and other odier Western states that his country would not be the source of the transfer of nuclear weapons to a Muslim country coimtry of tlie the Middle East. Kazakhstan was to transfer

47 42 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA its weapons to Russia in early By April of that year, however, Nazerbaev had another change of heart, when his country announced that tliat it would retain nuclear weapons on its territory. In so doing, Kazakhstan noted its security concerns emanating from the tlie presence of nuclear weapons in two of its important neighbors, Russia and the People's Republic of China. Alma Ahna Ala Ata also attributed its change of policy to the growing signs of imperial tendencies in Russia. At the tlie same time, lime, in order to soothe Western concerns, Kazakhstan aruiounced am~ounced its willingness to sign the NPT as a nuclear state. This Tliis apparent change on the part of Kazakhstan Kaz~hstan was not a real change if one closely examines the tlie controversy. Alma Ata not only ratified tlie the "Lisbon protocol" to tlie the START I treaty but the tlie treaty itself, in which the Uic former USSR agreed to eliminate half of tlie the SS- 9s and SS-18s that were much feared by the United States. The Tlie START II treaty provided for the destruction of SS-l8s SS-18s and eliminated tlie the loophole (contained in START I) whereby the former tbrmer USSR could transfer these missiles to any m~y other state. From Kazakhstan's perspective, this provision was not acceptable since it would foreclose any opportunity for it to acquire Russian nuclear missiles in the future.''" Nazerbacv's Nazerbaev's tlip-ilop flip-tlop on the issue of nuclear weapons was, as previously noted, closely tied to the domestic politics of his country. After he signed the Lisbon protocol, "one of the Khazak Kliaz.ak opposition parties warned that it would call for t?w the resignation of die file government if the parliament ratified the nonproliferation treaty."'" '' ~ In November 1994, the Ukrainian Parliament agreed to join die the NPT. This "strategic deal" struck in January 1994 between President Clinton, Russian President Yeltsin, Yehsin, and LIkraine's Ukraine's then- President Krevchuck was regarded a~s as directly responsible for the Ukranian decision of November 16. This Tliis deal linked the U.S.- Russian nonproliferation objectives to the security and economic concerns of Ukraine. The most important aspect of Ukraine's decision for this tliis study was that it set an excellent precedent for the Kazakh leadership, especially the part of the strategic deal that linked Ukrainian willingness to transfer nuclear weapons to Russia to die the security assurance furnished by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Equally important were provisions of this agreemen agreement in which the United States Statcs agreed to thmish furnish economic a~ssistance assistance to Kiev. Undoubtedly emulating the die Ukrainain example,

48 GEOPOLITICS AND DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 43 Kazakhstan, as a precondition for transfering its nuclear weapons to Moscow, was expected to insist on Russia's "respect" for "the independence and sovereignty and tile the existing borders" of Kazakhstan; Kazaklistan; tlie tile application of tlie the "CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinale subordinate to their own interest [i.e., tlie the interests of Russia and tile the United States] Stales] the tile exercise by" Kazakhstan "of the rights inherent inlierent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantage of any kind;" the promise of U.N. Security Council action to furnish assistance to Kazakhstan as a nonnuclear nonnuclcar weapon state, if it were to face an act of aggression or a tlireat ti~reat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; m~d and economic assistance from Washington and the Western European cotmtries, countries.''^ qz As it turned out, Kazakhstan got a similar deal from Washington for agreeing to transfer the 104 long-range SS-18 missiles with 10 atomic warheads to Moscow. The United States appropriated $91 million for that country in 1993; that amount was expected to go up to $311 million for Some of the money was to be used for dismantling the warheads. What Kazklistan Kazkhstan did not get from Washington or Moscow was explicit guarantees guarm~tees respecting its borders and provisions of security that were given to Ukraine. After the discovery of 25 million tons of oil and gas reserves in Kazaklistan, Kaz',dd~stmL Washington was beginning begilming to perceive that country as "a valuable strategic ally." However, tlie the implications of such an American perception for Alma Alta remained unclear, given its proximity to Russia, and the presence of a sizable number of Russians within its borders. A major breakthrough on the nuclear issue involving Kazakhstan came when that country agreed to transfer translbr more than half a ton of bomb-grade uranium to the United States. This action might turn out to be the beginning of a symbiotic relationship between Washington and Alma Ahna Alta. The United Slates States was extremely concerned about the possible acquisition of weapon- grade uranium by Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. Kaz',dd~stan, Kazaklistan, t~ing taking advantage of the American concern, worked out an agreement for the transfer and gained that country tens of millions of dollars. More to tlie ti~e point, by agreeing to transfer that uranium, Kazakhstan expected a variety of economic and trade agreements from tlie the United States and the West."' 93 In summary, the signing of the NPT by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Kazaklistan, tlie ti~e strategic deal among the tlie United States, Russia, the

49 44 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA United Kingdom, and Ukraine, and tlie file transfer of weapon-grade uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States, along with witli the tlie related economic packages offered by Washington to Alma Aita Alta and Kiev, have greatly lessened the tlie specter of nuclear proliferation in that region. However, the continued economic problems, the attendant political uncertainties, and the availability of a large pool of unemployed and underemployed nuclear scientists in the former Soviet states warrant continued vigilance on the part of all those who do not wish to see the emergence of new nuclear states in or around Central Asia.

50 3. i MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME NEW GREAT GAME CENTRAL ASIA AS AN EXTENSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST Since the dismantlement of tlic dm Soviet Union, a number of Middle Eastern actors have escalated their activities ill in Central Asia. This activism may be viewed from two perspectives. On a more nlundml mundane and nonstrategic level it may be seen as an endeavor on the part of a number of Middle Eastern actors--such actors such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan--to Pakistan to establish diplomatic ties and look for trade opportunities. Seen as such, the activities of these countries appear to be quite benign. But from a strategic perspective, an entirely different picture of tlieir their activism emerges. Since Iran's Islamic revolution of , Saudi Arabia and Irml Iraii have initiated a strategic competition for enhanced influence in, or even domination of, the Persian Gulf and the contiguous areas. As tlie the military might of Iran was used up by the fury of the Islamic lslmnic revolution, Saudi Arabia saw an opening that it could not help but exploit for its own advantage. It responded to Iranian threats tlireats to regiolral regional stability by creating the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an organization tliat that turned out to be a vehicle for establishing Saudi military dominance of tlie the Arabian Peninsula. While Iran lran was busy fighting a protracted war with Iraq between (I and mid 1988, Saudi Arabia was building its own military infrastructure. The Tlie Nixon administration's adnfinistration's policy of the 197()s 1970s of relying on a regional actor to promote or s',ffeguard safeguard U.S. interests has never been abandoned by Washington. The focus was wa~s on Iran until the Islamic Islmnic revolution. Since 1980, this focus h)cus has shifted to Saudi Arabia. Washington's carte blanche--that blanche that the Nixon administration had offered to the Shall ShM~ of Iran to purchase American weaponry after "alter was 1970 was now extended to the Saudi monarchy. The presence of 45

51 46 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA large oil reserves made Saudi Arabia vital to tlie the West, and by the tile 1970s, tliaiiks thanks to OPEC's maneuvering of oil prices, tjie the Gulf states acquired enormous financial capabilities and considerable political clout. The regional politics of the Persian Gulf also worked in favor of the tlie Saudis after The Islamic revolution of Iran and tlireats threats of its potential exportability to the neighboring states necessitated strengthening of the Saudi security apparatus. The Iran-Iraq war was perceived by the United States and the peninsular Arab countries (except Yemen) as a,s a serious enough reason to concentrate on strengthening the military capability of the Gulf sheikhdoms. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 both proved and disproved these concerns. It pnwed proved tlic fl~e concern of the Arab states in the die sense fl~at tliat this war occurred within less tlian than 3 years of the cessation of tlie the Iran-Iraq war. It disproved the capabilities of the GCC. GCC, because when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, that organization ceased to exist. But for Riyadh and Washington, this development did not serve as an obstacle in the way of continued development of Saudi military power. For Iran, lhe tlie growing Saudi military capabilities are a source of friction m~d and concern. Given the small population of Saudi Arabia, and considering the fact that it will be a long time before Saudi forces will be able to develop an effective use of American weaponry, Iran does not perceive that kingdom as a real military challenge to its own ambitions to dominate the Gulf and its contiguous areas. These perceptions notwithstanding, Iran cannot afford to sit on its laurels. After all, it fought a bloody war with Iraq in which it was attacked by chemical weapons, weapf^ns, and its cities absorbed barrages of missiles from Iraq. Iran is not about to take a chance and not rebuild its own military power, so the tlie arms race between Tehran and Riyadh is on--but on but this is only a side show. The real game is about which country will emerge as a donfinant dominant actor. (For now, Iraq is out of the picture as a military threat.) The emergence of Central Asian Muslim states only widens the geographic area of strategic competition between these two Persian Gulf nations. The Iranian and Saudi presence in Central Asia is, inter alia, alia. also aimed at enhancing their political influence. The Islamic variable remains as one more instrument to exercise lliis this influence. These Tliese two states have different stakes in the region, rcaion, and both have

52 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 47 certain advantages they can overplay, but each encounters certain disadvantages the otlier ~ther party may be able to exploit. Iran and Central Asia Contiguous to two Central Asian republics--azerbaijan republics Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan--and Turkmenistan and closer to the otlier other republics than Saudi Arabia, han Iran has high stakes in the region. It can look actively for a variety of trade agreements agreemenls witli with these republics and has made quite a bit of progress in this regard. It also has a powerful cultural affinity with witli Azerbaijan, because a substantial portion of tlie the population in that country is of the Shiite faith. faitli. Similarly, the ethnic and linguistic commonality between Iran and Tajikistan can also become a powerful basis for cooperation, a.s as the Tajiks are culturally Iranian rather ratlier than tlian Turkic and spe~ speak an eastern dialect of Farsi (Persian).'"' ~4 To the tlie extent that tliat Iran can continue to escalate the pace of its diplomatic and tfade trade activities, its closeness to Muslim Central Asia is advantageous. However, given the nature of irredentist tendencies on the part of Azerbaijan, this propinquity could become disadvantageous. Similarly, a potential escalation of political instability in Turkmenistan may also turn out to be a source of grave concern for Iran, as the continuation of the Nagorno- Nagomo- Karabald~ Karabakli conflict already has. Aside from tjie the geographic proximity, the sec, second advantage that Iran enjoys in Central Asia is its experiment with an Islamic government. It is true that a number of heads of Central Asian states have expressed their antipathy to the Iranian model, but one should not regard this tliis reality to be permanent. Most heads of these countries are tbnner fonner Communists and as such they might feel more comfortable with secularism. What Wliat is significant is the popular response to the tlic notion of Islamic government in the future. In the aftermath of the tlie breakup of the former Soviet Union, the Muslim Central Asian peoples are in the tlie process of discovering two realities flint tliat had eluded them for a long time: their tlicir independence, mad and their ability to practice Islam without any fear of repression from the state. This notion of independence also means that a number of political parties, especially the Islamist parties, are also likely to gain bases of operation in those politics. This emerging political pluralism will enable them tliem to look at Islam, along with other systems, as a political arrangement. At flaat tliat time, the utility of the Iranian model is also likely to be examined. Tliis This is where the

53 48 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Shiite nature of tile the Iranian model might turn out to be to its disadvantage, but such a disadvantage may not affect the ver>' very principle of incorporation of Islamic government. goverlmaent. At that point, the utility of file tlie Saudi or file tlie Pakistani model may also be examined.'^ 95 The Tlie disadvantages faced by Iran in Central Asia are economic and religious. As a country whose economy has experienced devastations stemming from the revolutionary lunnoil turmoil since 1978, and from the war against Iraq between 1980 and 1988, Iran's economic capabilities are quite limited. Even though a substantial portion of its revenues (90 percent or so) come from oil, Iran has been operating in ill an all environment of depressed oil prices since the early 1980s. While its oil income is down, its expenditures have skyrocketed. It is spending enonnous amounts of money rebuilding its economy. In addition, Iran lran has also adopted an ambitious program of military buildup. Given these major outlets for huge capital expenditures, Teltran Teliran can offer few monetary enticements for the Central Asian states, whose economies are badly in need of capital investments. What Iran can do and d(r--and it has been active along these lines is lines--is to supply in-kind assistance, assistm~ce, such as establishing air and railway linkages, signing joint exploration and production ventures, etc."' 9~' It cannot, however, offer these countries generous cash subsidies to start a number of economic projects. The religious variable may "also turn out to be a disadvantage for Iran in Central Asia. As a Shiite Muslim state, it cannot become an effective force in thal that area, where, save for Azerbaijan, the predominant portion of Oae tlae Muslim population belongs to the Sunni sect. Lest one overstate lliis this point, it is importjint important to note tliat fl~at Iran has the potential to overcome this disadvantage by remaining a proponent of an Islamic government. The fact that Iran has implemented such a system in the aftermath aftennath of a revolutionary change may be viewed as a source of illustration and inspiration for the tlie Centr',d Central Asian states, whose independence became a reality only as a result of another revolutionary change, the dismantlement of die tlie Soviet Union. Despite reports of Iranian inw)lvement involvement in the growing violent activism of the Islamist lslamist forces in North Africa, Tehran has maintained die file scope of its activities in die the Central Asian countries along the conventional lines of seeking economic and trade vcnturcs. ventures. In this diis regard, die flae government of President Prcsidcnt Ali Hashemi Ilashcmi Ralsanjani Rafsanjaiii scored a major victor>' victor), when Azerbaijan gave Iran a $7.4

54 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 49 billion share (or 2(1 20 percent of the tot',d) total) of its international oil consortium. Iran also signed an agreement with Turkmenistan to lay pipelines to carry Turkmeni gas to Europe through Iran. Kazakhstan and Iran signed an agreement for the transfer of 2 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan Kazaklistan tlirough through the Caspian Sea to Iran. Tehran worked out a variety of agreements witli with a number of Central Asian countries, including weekly flights to Iran, a number of border crossings, and building bridges and repairing roads.qj7 roads." As an Islamic republic, Iran continues to emphasize the pan- Islamic aspects of its foreign policy through Central Cenu-al Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. It is worth emphasizing that the Iranian focus on pan-islamism is a development on which a number of Arab governments---e.g., governments e.g., Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco---are Morocco are keeping a wary eye. But at the popular level, this pan-islmnism pan-islamism has the potential to attract a considerable amount of sympathy, indeed even euphoria, in almost all Muslim countries. Similarly, at the popular level, level. pan-islamism in Central Asia is bound to gather gatlicr ample sympathy and momentum as the dust from the breakup of the former Soviet Union settles within the next few years. Saudi Arabia and Central Asia Saudi Arabia has a considerable advantage over Iran in Central Asia, especially in economics and religion. As tlie the largest producer of oil, it can afford to make loans and grants to a number immber of these countries, and the tlie Saudis have already invested $4 billion in that area. Riyadh has been interested, along with Iran and Turkey, in investing in the oil industry in Turkmenistan, which has also received $10 billion in credit from Saudi Arabia.''* ~s There Tliere is no doubt that Saudi Arabia has been concerned about the tjie escalated pace of Iranian activism in Central Asia. For instance, the die diplomatic trip of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sand Saud Al-Faisal A1-Saud Al-Saud during February 1992 to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and mid Azerbaijan was clearly aimed at not only underscoring a high degree of Saudi interest in the region but also at expressing its anxiety over the formulation of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Obviously, the Saudis did not want to be left out. Riyadli Riyadh has also been channeling large sums of

55 50 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA money through joint ventures in a number of Central Asian countries. The AI-Baraka-Kaz~hstan Al-Baraka-Kazakhstan Bank is one such example. As the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia holds a special place in the hearts of the Muslims of Central Asia; since a majority of Central Asian Muslims are of the Sunni faitli, faith, Saudi Arabia has a tremendous advantage in offering Islamic education to the tlie Central Asian Muslims. The Saudi monarchy has been quite active in furnishing free Hadj to pilgrims from different Central Asian countries, in supplying millions of copies of the Quran, and in funding thousands tliousands of new religious schools and mosques. On these matters, Tehran has no choice but to take a second place."' ~ Tlie The Saudi Govemment Government invited Central Asian states to attend the tlie Jeddah- Jeddalibased bascd Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) which led to full membership in the organization for Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan has attended as an observer. Members are entitled to obtain funds from the Islmnic Islamic Development Bank. Besides its distance from Central Asia, Riyadh's other major drawback is that Saudi Islmn Islam is conservative. It is very much oriented toward stability and status quo, while Iranian Islam is highly politicized, proactive, and anti-status quo. More important, Iranian Islam, or at least its public rhetoric, is aimed at creating a new balance of power in the region, from the Persian Gulf to Centr',d Central Asia. It has unsuccessfully tried to create a new balance of power in the Persian Gulf, where the predilections of oil sheikhdoms have been overwhelmingly overwhehningly conservative, pro-westem, pro-western, and for maintenance of tlie the status quo. The politics of Central Asia, because political instability has been the tlie sine qua non of their history, may be receptive to suggestions for the creation of new power centers (or a new balance of power), especially in the name of Islam. In this sense, Iran may have a considerable advantage over Saudi Arabia. Tliis This aspect of the new great game gajne might nfight be only in its initial phase. RUSSIA, AMERICA, AND THE GREAT GAME In the post-soviet era, as leaders and the torcign foreign policy elites in Moscow examine the realities of power in the tlie international arena, the significance of the "near abroad" region becomes abundualtly abundantly clear to them.

56 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 51 The Tlie ff~rmer former Eastern European satellite states are scrambling to become a part of Western economic and security systems. Western Europe and the tlie United States have maintained llieir their strong strategic ties emanating from their membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and NATO. In fact, the tlie latter has become so important that it has had to find a new mechanism--"partnership mechanism "partnership for peace" (PFP)--to (PFT*) to accommodate the growing desire of the former Warsaw Pact nations to join. Even Russia came to the conclusion that tliat it cannot afford to be left behind and decided to become one of the signatories of the tlie PFP.' " 1 For their security concerns, these tliese countries continue to assign a great deal of importance to Washington. Even the Middle East has become a region where American prestige stemming prestige--stemming from the 1991 Gulf War--remains War remains high. The snail-paced progress in the Palestinian-lsraeli Palestinian-Israeli peace has taken the steam out of one of the most contentious issues of the Middle East. Consequently, the conventional hardline states Syria, states--syria, Iraq, and Libya hxst Libya--lost their erstwhile significance as tlie the "spoilers" of a potential peace process. The demise of the Soviet Union has also eliminated the major source of military support and weapons supply for them; Iraq has been eliminated as a major military actor as a result of its crushing defeat in Uie the Gulf War of About Uic the only region that is left in which Russia can build its strategic significance as a great power is its immediate neighborhood, the near abroad. The foreign policy elites in Moscow know full well tliat: that: The security of their country is inextricably linked li1~ked with political developments in tlie the near abroad In order to emerge as a great power, Russia must concentrate on building close ties with these states Moscow must focus on sustaining the extant economic ties with the former members of the USSR and creating new ones (of course, it is no secret tliat that an important objective underlying these economic relationships is to sustain the dependency of these countries on Russia) Russia must insist that the former Soviet states should not only retain but strengthen security arrangements witli with Moscow. It is also well-known that the main purpose of these arrangements is to make m~e sure that these states do not develop security relations with Muslim states of the Middle East, or

57 52 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA with other ouier states of the far abroad."" 1 I Appendix 2 shows an overview of the thinking of the Russian foreign policy elites regarding the tlic dynamics of their tlieir country's strategic ties with its neighbors. Since the emergence of Russia as heir to the Soviet Union, its owal own perspectives regarding the near abroad have gone tlirough through two pha.~es. phases. During the first year of fide tlie creation of the tide CIS, Russia was too busy with its domestic turbulence emanating from tlie the disappear~mce disappearjincc of the Soviet l_lnion Union and too preoccupied with obtaining massive economic assistance from the West to focus on Muslim Central Asia. Besides, it was quite natural to think that any stable patlcnis patterns of foreign policy were going to take some time betore before tliey they gelled. It was expected before too long tliat that Russia was bound to act as a great power, power.'"" l z Since early 1993, there has been a dramatic turnabout in Russia's relations with its neighboring states. Elaborating on this shift in Russia's foreign policy. policy, Porter and Saiveiz Saivetz. write that Russia "has employed a wide range of political, military, and economic pressures and inducements to reassert rcas.scrt its influence throughout lliroughout the Near Abroad." They note further that Russia's activities in this area are "rapidly becoming fulcrums of political leverage throughout the former Union."'"' ''~ 3 There is a clear nostalgia in Russia about tlie the former tormer Soviet empire and about the status of that country as a superpower. Not even an Atlanticist is expected to be totally free from moments of relnorsc remorse about tlie die loss of international status for Russia in the post- Soviet days. Even if the llie Atlanticists were to raise themselves and truly pursue the tlie pro-western, democratic, zmd and free market maiket orientations, they would remain vulnerable to criticisms from Eurasimfist Eurasianist and ouier other groups tliat that arc are advocating a neo-imperialistic policy for Russia."^ TM Even if Russia's economic status improves, the tlie ultranationalist groups are not likely to wither away or become irrelevant in the foreseeable luture future and are likely to remain relnain politically active and potent for a number of reasons: The strategic environment enviromnent of llie the Muslim Central Asian countries counu^ies is likely to remain vulnerable to the manipulation of Russia. The events of the recent past in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan have already resulted in Russia's intervention. It should be noted that Azerbaijan and Georgia were "avant- garde states" in their endeavors "to exit Moscow's sphere of

58 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 53 influence," thus they became "'the "the prime targets of a Russima Russian 'object lesson' designed to teach odaer otlier states how to stay in line.""^"^ ''1 ~ The price extracted from these countries was quite steep, and they tliey were given little choice but to accept Russia's demand to join the CIS. In the case of Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnazde was also forced to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, accept stationing of Russian troops in Georgia, and grant the use of tliree three bases in his country. In return, Russia saved Shevardnazde's government from being defeated by the forces of the former dictator of Georgia, Zviad Gainsakhurdia. Gmnsakhurdia. In the coming years, the growing nationalism in Muslim Central Asian countries (with a varying percentage of Russian population, whose total number for that region is around 25 million) is likely to result in an increased migration of Russians to motlier mother Russia. Tliis This reality, along with continued concern in Moscow about the plight of Russians still residing in the die Central Asian countries, is going to serve as a catalyst for jingoistic and mad ultranationalistic rhetoric of dae die Eurasianist and neo-imperialist neo-imperialist groups for assertive and imperialistic overtures of Russia toward its neighbors. Tliis This issue is likely to affect K~aldastan KazakJistan in a most significant way, as Russians are reported to be between 38 mad and 40 percent of its population. The growing influence of Islam is a variable that tliat has always created acute paranoia among the Russian political elites. On this issue there tliere appears to be a congruity of interests between Moscow and die the present prcsent rulers of all Muslim countries of Central Asia. The authoritarian type of governments in all of these countries, except for Kyrgyzstan, does not allow for political dissent, especially when it comes from the Islamic groups. groups, In hi its dealings with Islamic lslaanic groups, even the record of President Akaev's govermnent government is not much different. Any challenge from these groups will be dubbed a challeoge challenge from "Islamic fundamentalism," fmldanlentalis n," a phrase well unders.~od undcrs. wd by Moscow. In fact, die the Russian intervention in Tajikistml Tajikistan which was endorsed by all the Muslim countries of Cent, al Asia except Turkmenistan, was done under the pretext of Ul u] rooting the die "fundamentalist" forces. Russia will be concerned about the Uie growing foreign policy activism from Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. In the case of Iran

59 54 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA and aiid Pakistan, the concern is also also related to the tile previously mentioned paranoia about Islam. Islmn. In the case of Turkey, the Russiml Russian concern will be about the potential growth of pan- Turkism, which is also one of the historical Russian worries. Resurgent Russian nationalism has vividly manifested itself in the die oil, gas, and pipeline issues involving revolving Azerbaijan, Kazaklistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistm~. As table 1 shows, tliese these tliree three countries have substantial gas and m~d petroleum reserves. Oil industry analysts believe diat. tliat. together with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan could form fornl the world's third largest oil producing region, after Siberia mad and the Gulf. Rudyard Kipling is reported to have observed once that the fate of tlie die great game gmne in Central Asia would be won by tlie die country that succeeded in building the largest network of railroads. In the contemporary version of this great game, oil and gas pipelines appear to have replaced the railway network in strategic significance. The issue of pipelines involving the tlie states of the tbrmer former Soviet Union, Turkey, and Iran has been marred by controversies over its routing, which, in turn, promises to determine dctemiine tlie die future modalities of the New Great Game. Gmne. The first controversy, commonly referred to as tlie die Caspian Sea development issue, involves the pipeline routes to carry oil from Azerbaijan to die tlic West. The second one concerns pipelines to carry oil from the Tengiz fields of Kazakhstan to the West. The pipeline routes to carry gas from Turkanenistan Turkmenistan to the West constitute the third issue of controversy (figure 5). Russia, the tlie United States, Turkey, and Iran are promoting their respective agendas related to the ilie pipeline routes. For Russia, the issues of energy and pipelines are inextricably linked to its determination detenninauon to keep the economies of the Central Asian nations mad and Azerbaijan dependent on its own. In tliis this sense, Moscow views the endeavors of these countries to establish joint ventures with Western entrepreneurs as a clear challenge, if not an outright threat, to its dominant position in that region. Consequently, Russia has used subtle threats and blatant policy positions to dissuade Azerbaijan, Kazaklistan, KazakhstmL and mid Turkmenistan from going too far in tlie the pursuit of economic independence.

60 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 55 o > m m z m O J3 m > H O > i: m en on KAZAKHSTAN Aktyubinsk ~I,', "~l" ~ ".l Z <.< Mediterranean ^^^7^,:,. Sea ^V^ IRAN Tehran.,< prepartd by Gail Smith AFSC10-9S oil-producing region ~ L..=. by pipeline port by ship I I E o FIGURE 5. Projected Russian, Turkish, and Iranian routes for transporting oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan "0 0 e e- 0~ ~._~ 0 ~ "-E =1.-- o e- e,- "10 e- e- v, (o ('o N,=I -I nr o u o o O. U.I rr 11 (I~

61 56 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA TABLE 1 -.Oil : and gas reserves and production in the ClS CIS (1991 data) data) Prove0 Proved Reserves* Probable Reserve Additions* Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan 0.3 TOTALS Russia * Billions of barrels NATURAL GAS STATUS Est. Est, Proved Reserves* Probable Reserve A0ditions* Additions* Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan 1 2 Tajikistan 1 2 TOTALS Russia 1,437 1,269 * Trillion cubic feet Source: Extracted from Joseph P. Riva, Jr., Petroleum in the Muslim Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States: More Oil for OPEC? (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 1, 1992),, CRS 6. Tile The Caspian Sea Pipeline is an issue on which the new great gmne game remains in its most compmcated complicated form. Countries bordering the Caspian Sea--Russia, Sea Russia, Iran, Iraii, Kaz',ffdlstan, Kazaklistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan--could Turkmenistan could not independently decide on the exploitation of oluieir their part of the shelf because of several reasons. First, the sea's boundaries and navigational rights had not been defined. Second, the sea constituted one ecosystem and required one international

62 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 57 organization to decide on its exploitation.'"^" 1 6 Needless to say, this issue "alone was highly controversial. Third, the assets used by the tormer former Soviet states were built mainly by Russia during the tlie days of the tlie USSR. This Tliis reality was used by Moscow to claim a veto power over any oil and pipeline deals that eitlier either excluded Russia or were not acceptable to it. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), an I 11-member l-member consortium (British Petroleum Peu^oleum and Ramco of the tlie United Kingdom; Amoco, Aanoco, Unocal, McDennott, McDermott. and Pennzoil of United States; Statoil of Norway; Turkish Petroleum; Russia's largest oil company, Lukoil; Delta, Delta. a private Saudi company; and the Azeri company, Socar, which has a 20 percent interest), is involved in developing tliree three Azeri oil fields in phases. In the lhe cjirly early phase, lasting Uirough through 1997, tlie the production was to reach 80,000 barrels per day. The Tlie peak output of these fields was expected to reach about 700,000 bbls/day, bbls/day.'"' w7 The Tlie competilion competition to win contracts to transport oil exports from the Caspian Sea developed into a contest tliat that pitted Moscow against Washington. Russia was pressing for what may be termed temied the nortliern northern pipeline option, a route that was to take tlie the Azeri oil through tlirough neighboring Chechnya to the main Russian Black Sea port of Novorissiysk. The Azeri crude would then be transferred to tankers, which would pass through the Bosphorus cn on route to the Mediterranean refineries. As an ml incentive to the AIOC, Moscow offered tariffs at least 20 percent lower than the ones offered by Georgia, and this discount offer was to be raised if the oil consortium were to use the Russian pipelines to export at least part of its crude during the later phase of production. Turkey, on the other otlier hand, promoted a proposal to pipe oil extracted during tlie the early phase of production to the Georgian port of Supsa. From Qiere, Ihere, it would be taken to northern Turkish ports and sent by rail to markets in Central Anatolia. Washington supported tliis this routing as a way of reducing tlie the region's dependence on Russia and also to exclude potential Iranian participation in the Azeri consortium. In fact, U.S.-Turkish pressure led to the rescinding of all an Azeri offer to give Iran 5 percent out of tlie the Azeris' own 20 percent share of the consortiumj consortium.'"** ~ The contest between Russia and Turkey over their respective pipeline options w&s was so intense that at one point the Turkish Prime Minister, Mrs. Tansik Ciller, threatened that "not a drop of oil will pass through the

63 58 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Bosphorus if Turkey loses the contest to attract the early oil production from the tlie Azeri oil project."""' ''~t'~ The AIOC finally came up with a compromise whereby 5 million tons per year of early oil would be split between a Russian pipeline and the Turkish-sponsored route Uiat tllat runs tlirough tttrough Georgia. As a result of this compromise, Turkey was willing to allow a 2.5 million tons of oil destined for Russia to pass tlirough through the Bosphorus. Tliis This compromise was characterized a~s as "a major victory for the Turkish-U.S. diplomacy.""" ''t' Russian high-handedness on the energy issue was apparent when Moscow coerced Azerbaijan into granting its Lukeoil Q)inpany Qimpany a 10 percent stake in the Azcri Azeri consortium.'" ~ ~' The most significant aspect of this announcement was that not only was it linked to the Oie Russian mediation on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but Moscow was explicit in arguing that tlie the development of the Caspian Sea oil resources must be based on the tlie participation of all Caspian countries. Regarding the Russian attempts to link the oil issue with witli tjie the Karabakh conflict, conllict, Azerbaijan sent an unnfistakable unmistakable signal by seeking mad and winning the tlie support of Washington, Paris, I.xmdon, London, and Ankara for the presence of peacekeeping forces from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe over the tlie Russian peacekeeping forces within its borders. Russia Rus,sia also put pressure on Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to agree to swap their debts for lbr equity in tliose those republics' oil and gas finns. Kazakhstan's vast Tcngiz Tengiz oil field could be producing 700,000 million barrels per day at its peak in Moscow blocked the tlie exports of Kazakh oil starting in May 1994, thus depriving that tliat country of hard currency and Western contacts. By August of lliat that yeai', year, Kazakhstan Ka7,aklistan relented by granting the tlie Russian oil compaaly company Rosneft 1 million tons of oil as transit fees. At tlie the same time, time. Alma Ahna Alta "also kept intact its Western option by signing an agreement with Chevron to develop the Tengiz oil field, while another contract was signed with Bechtel of Uic the United States to build a pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiiysk, linking with the existing facility from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny, Russia. Turkmelfistan Turkmenistan was handled in a similar high-handed fashion by Moscow. Russia invited itself to the tlie oil and gas consortium of Turkmenistan and participated in negotiations with wiui Iran and Turkey for a pipeline deal to transport oil and gas to Europe. In addition, Russia purchased gas from Turkmenistan at a low price and resold

64 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 59 it to Turkey with a markup of 300 percent. In an attempt to maintain other energy trade options, Turkmenistan signed a cooperation agreement witli with Iran to lay a pipehne pipeline to carry Turkman gas to Europe through Iran. Yet another anotlier agreement was signed between Iran and Kazakhstan for the transfer of 2 million tcmis tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan through the Caspian Sea to Iran. The two countries were also discussing a potential oil pipeline deal. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan have encountered a tremendous disadvantage emanating from daeir tlieir economic backwardness and dependency on Moscow. More important, tliey they also suffered because Wa,shington Wa,qhington was pressing its own agenda, especially on Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, of excluding Iran from the tlie gas and oil deals. What Wliat are America's interests in cotmtries countries that tliat were once a part of the former Soviet Union? Aside from helping Moscow make m',tke steady progress toward democracy and toward creating a free market economy, the foremost American concern is to create political conditions for the transfer of nuclear weapcjns wealxms from Ukraine, Belarus, Bclarus, and mid Kliazakshtan Khazakshtan to Russia. Of these, tliese, the tlie transfer of nuclear weapons from Belarus is complete. As previously noted, with witli tlic the sigiaing sidfing of the NPT by botli both Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Kazakhstaal, witli with the strategic deal involving the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom. Kingdom, and Ukraine, and with witji the ilie tr~msfer transfer of the weapon-grade uranium from Kazaklistan Kazakhstan to tlie the United States, tliis this issue has largely been defused, at least for tlie the lime time being. The Tlie third American interest in the tlie areas surrounding Russia and its neighbors is regional stability. On the tlie surface, this is a reasonable concern, but what is problematic is that America's preoccupation with witli regional stability enables it to regard Russia as the primary (if nol not the sole) legitimate actor to detemiine determine the modality of tliis this stability. Moreover, Washington does not want to question the tactics Moscow uses to bring it about. What Wliat is even more disconcerting is tliat that Washington appears oblivious to the fact that, in its zeal to bring about regional stability in some of the former states of the Soviet Union, Moscow appears to be creating conditions that tliat would end their status as independent countries. Describing Russia's perspective on tlie the freedom of maneuverability that it has with the connivance of the West, Allen Lynch writes, "Russia ca~mot cannot expect serious western opposition to the exercise of

65 60 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Russian political-military influence as long as it remains confined to the tlie CIS and, possibly, the Baltic States as well.""" ''1~2 In his 1994 State of the Union message, message. President Clinton observed, observed. "We will seek to cooperate with Russia to solve regional problems, while insisting thai that if Russian troops operate in neighboring states, they do so only when those states agree to their presence, and in strict accordance with international standards." Three Tliree problems exist with this position: There is clearly no Western or United Nations scrutiny scniliny of how such ml an agreement will be brought about. Ill In the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia, Russia was reportedly involved in creating impossible security conditions in their respective conflicts. Then, Moscow made its help a condition for these states to join the CIS and required the stationing of Russian forces within witliin tlieir their borders. In the case of Tajikistan, the neighboring states' purported concerns about the tlie civil war were clearly aimed aitncd at propping up the neo-communist forces in tliat that country. This Russian behavior was clearly not what Clinton meant when he "alluded to "'strict "strict accord with international relations." This Tliis position is likely to accept Russia's interpretations of threats direats to regional security and to forestall any genuine attempt,s attempts witliin wiflfin Muslim Central Asian countries to bring about political changes. Finally, allowing Russia a wide latitude in determining regional security would also enable Moscow to create conditions tliat flint would prolong tile the acute econolnic economic dependence of these countries on Russia, a reality that all of tliem them are earnestly tr>'ing trying to end. An example of the wide ladtudc latitude in Moscow's acdons actions in tlic the near abroad were the Russian attempts to link its troop withdrawals from the Baltic slates states to the resolution resoludon of what it described as a "violauon "violation of human rights" of the Russian-speaking population of those states. Clinton initially accepted tliis this Russian Russim~ position without scrutiny. The Tlic carte cane blanche that lliat Wa, Washington dfington has given to Moscow in tlie the rea.hn realm of regional stability becomes a crucial source of legitimacy, at least in the view of Moscow, in its dealings with the Uie Muslim states of Central Asia. There are no vital U.S. interests involving those Uiose countries; perhaps there are arc only secondary interests, as long as a.s Kazakhstan remains a nonnuclear country'. country.

66 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 61 There is also a congruity of" interests between Moscow and Washington regarding Islanl. Islam. "Islamic I,' tundanmntahsm, i'undamentalism," though pejorative and imprecise m in its mezming, meaning, is viewed as the next "enemy" by both sides. All the present rulers of the tlie Central Asian countries concur with Moscow and Washington m in flmir tlieir perception of Islmn. Islaji). This congruity of interests underscores the fact that the regional hegmnon hcgemon (Russia) should be allowed to use whatever means it feels arc are warranted to cope with the Islamic Islmnic challenge. Moscow has "already exploited this opportunity and has established bilateral military agreements with all the states of Central Asia.'"' ~3 The Tlie collective security agreement signed in ill May 1992 in Tashkent by all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistml Turkmenistan adds another layer of legitimacy tier for Moscow's intervention inlervenlion in any political polilical turbulence witliin wifllin tlie tim borders of its signatories. As long as Moscow- czm can crush the Islamic tk~rces, forces, the United States does not need to be involved in this exercise and thus does not face any potential deleterious spillover effects of brutalizing these forces in a region very ver)' important to the security concerns of Washington the Washington--the Muslim Middle East. Moscow's.is intervention in the tlie Tajik civil war was brought about as a result of die the Tashkent Taslikent collective security agreement and at the "invitation" of Uic the Muslim Musliln states of Central Asia (save Turkmcnistm0, Turkmenistan), thus tlius making it a "perfectly legitimate" action in die the eyes of Washington. No one cares to recall that Uiat a few years ago the ago 1979 the world was told that the Soviet Union was also "invited" into Al)htmistan Afghanistan by tim tlie government of flint Uiat country. Now a nfm-colllnlunist non-communist Russia is lighting a potential enemy enenly of Moscow, tim the existing governments of Central Asian countries, and Washington--"Islatnic Washington "Islamic fundamentalists." fundmnentalists." Moscow will continue to intervene to safeguard the current gm, govcnimcnls, emments, while the auflloritarian autlioritarian rulers will also continue to crush all political dissent. Islam Karimov, that inveterate autocrat of Uzbekistan, has been quite instrumental in using the Russian card to prolong his own rule. This is a tradition that promises only to make tim die politics of Muslim Central Asia quite turbulent in the coming years. How far will this emergence of a "cooperative condominium" between the tile United States mad and Russia go before they part company regarding Muslim Central Asia?""* Asia'? ~ In jui ml imaginary (or unspoken) strategic hierarchy of states of that lliat area, Washington would be more sensitive to tlie the security issues of the Baltic stales states and Ukraine first,

67 62 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA or perhaps even Georgia. The Muslim states would be at the very bottom of America's Ainerica's strategic concerns, unless there is a major conflict that would open up the weak seam that is keeping the Russian population a part of Kazakhstan. Alternatively, Washington might be jolted out of its Pollyarma Pollyanna attitude toward Moscow if the democratic forces were ousted and Russia adopted a pronounced authoritarian/imperial posture. posture. In summary, summar}', tile the modalities of tile the sphere sphere of intluence are increasingly detemiincd determined by Moscow on the basis of a growing consensus within Russia tliat, that, as a great pcjwer, power, it must strengtlien strengthen its hegemonic presence in tile tjie near abroad. Even if Russia were to Emerge emerge as a democratic nation, tlic the hegemonic aspects aspects of its foreign policy would likely be pursued much more vigorously in Muslim Central Asia than toward Ukraine or in the Baltic states, for these states enjoy cultural proximity and religious commonality with the West. At the same time, time, the Clinton administration's lackadaisical attitude toward Central Asia gives Moscow ahnost almost a free hand in that til area. A continuation of hegemonic ti~rcign foreign policy also means lncans diat that Russia would do everything to ensure that the current rulers of the tile Central Asian countries stay in power. At the same time, as the polities politics of these tliese societies become more mature, mature, and politically and religiously more conscious, they Uicy are arc likely to experience an ;ui increased amount of cultural and religious aclivism activism and political pluralism, which are only going be suppressed by the Uic authoritarian aullioritarian rulers. Such a scenario does not bode well R~r for the political future of the states of Muslim Central Asia, especially if their economic lols lots are also left leti to the whims and fancies of the politicians in Moscow. NEW PLAYERS: TURKEY AND IRAN After the tile end of the tile Cold W;ir, War, Turkey lost its significance as a country conliguous contiguous to tjie file fonner former Soviet Union. Even its attempt to become a member of the European Economic Community or Common Mjirket Market (EEC) has ha.s been delayed because of pressure from Greece and because some Western Westeru European countries have serious misgivings about tlic the Turkish human rights record mad and its treatment of the Kurdish minority. The ThE dissolution of the Soviet SoviEt Union, however, did give the Turks a new strategic relevance, and a new area--muslim area Muslim Central CEntral Asia where Asia--where they could exercise their

68 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 63 influence. And because tile the United States, Slates, as tile the only remaining superpower, is concerned about tlic die stability of the CIS, Ankara and Washington have tound found a new basis ti)r for strategic cooperation. One should also keep in mind that within the Llie Turkish political arena, there appears to be a recxamination reexamination of some of the most "revered Ataturkist traditions so traditions--so valuable juid and critical to the nation',d national survival in an earlier era of Turkish histor>'." history." Some of the variables are "isolationism" and "avoidance of Islamic mad and Pan- Turkic ideological interests.""'^ ''i~s In Central Asia, Turkey has definitely replaced its isolationist tradition with a high pace of activism and involvement aimed at establishing cultural and trade ties. There Tlicrc is no hesitation on fl~e die part of political leaders in Ankara in admitting that Turkey must seek economic integration in the Central Asian and the Black Sea regions. On the issue of "avoidance of Islmnic Islamic and pan-turkic ideological interests," however, Turkey remains indecisive. In the 1990s, 199()s, when it is so fashionable to look for ti)r the threat tlireat of "Islamic fundmnentalism" fundamentalism" in ever), every comer of tlie the Middle East Ea.st and Central Asia, Turkey remains excessively cautious. Even pan-turkism remains an issue of suspicion and mid concern in that part of the world, but the Turkish secular model is a variable that is viewed favorably faw~rably by the United States. From tlic fllc perspective of the die Bush mad and Clinton administrations, Turkey needs to play its ethnic card in that region. The Turkish "sccular "secular model" which model"---which empha~sizcs emphasizes separation of church and state--should state should be extended as a source of emulation and, most iml)ortzmt, important, as a competing alternative to the Iranian Islamic model. Washington Wa.shington hopes that tlie die acceptance of the Turkish model by the Central Asian states would also enable them lliem to avoid political instability. Although it appears tliat flint not much clear thinking has been done on this tjiis issue, one cm~ am extract certain underlying assumptions. First. First, because a nolewortjiy noteworthy characteristic of the "Iranian model" is anti- Aanericanism, Americanism, it is assumed that an adoption of lslalnic-oriented Islamic-oriented government on the tlie part of any Centr',d Central Asian Muslim countr), countr}' would automatically lead to anti-americanism. m~ti-americanism. A related notion is diat that Islamic resurgence would inevitably lead to extremism and anti- Westernism. Granted that the Iranian revolution has done cverything cverytliing to prove this fallacious notion, notiori, not much thought has been given to the fact that tlicrc flmre are otlier olher countries at least as

69 64 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA Islamic as Iran--Saudi Iraii Saudi Arabia and Pakistan--that Pakistan that are arc nonetheless nonetiieless allies of the United States. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are practitioners of U^aditional traditional Islam, but their overall dealings with the international community c;mnot cmmot be labelled examples of Islamic extremism. Western thinking now realizes that Islamic societies are not likely to become examples of liberal democracy. There are certain cultural and religious idiosyncrasies idio.syncrasies of those societies that would not allow them to assume the liberalism of the United States or Western Europe. However, this tliis does not mean that Muslim polities would not adopt some form of democracy. Islamic orthodoxy and democracy can be made compatible, as long as the governments praclice practice some form tiwm of secularism without withou! necessarily flaunting it. Any domestic debate along Uie the line of "Islam "I:daln versus secularism" secularisln" in any IsUunic Islmnic country is ix bound to create unmanageable tensions, indeed even potential instability. in.slability. A not-so-subtle assumption underlying such a debate would be dmt, tiiat,.somehow,.secularism ix is "superior" to Islam, and such a proposition would not be accepted by a majority inajority oflhe the people in any Islamic.society. Even Turkey can be called c',dled an exaunple example of a secukir secuhu" government merely presiding over a Muslim society. The second assumption related to the Iranian model is that Irm~'s Iran's involvement in Central Asia is inherently destabilizing. As previously noted, Iran is seeking conventional types of relations with Central Asian stales states in the form f~wm of joint economic cconomic ventures, vcnturcs, trade ties. ties, etc. Moreover, Teliran's Tehran's increasing reliance on Russia for weapons and, lately, lamly, for ff,r nuclear teclinology. teclmology, would ensure from it a foreign ft,reign policy behavior in Central Asia that would not jeopardize Russian strategic interests. As a major state of the region, Iran is likely to remain highly active in Central Asia in the coming years. Not inuch much attention is paid to Uie the fact that Iran remains nen, nervous about a possible unification of the republic of Azerbaijan Azcrbaijan jind and its own eastern and jind western Azerbaijani sections. In tact, fact, the Iranian inw~lvement involvement in mediating tlie d~c Nagorno-Karabcikh Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a good exmnple example ofhc)w how complicated and delicate that region is for liar Iran. Irml. It would suit Iran that this conflict, even if were not resolved, should remain manageable. Any intensitlcation intensification of war between Armenia Arlnenia and Azerbaijan is destined to spill over into the Iranian Irmfian Azcri Azeri section. Iranian maneuvering inaneuvering regarding this conflict contlict has "also resulted in frequent criticisms from the republic of Azerbaijan tlial fllat

70 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 65 Tehran does not really want to resolve it. In order to establish its credibility with witli Armenia, h-an kan becan~e became tlie the first Muslim state outside the CIS to establish diplomatic ties with it."* 116 This move lowered suspicion in Yerevan about possible Iranian complicity in this conflict, but the Karabakh Karab~h issue remained far from being resolved. It should "also be remembered tliat that even tliough though a majority of tlie the Azerbaijani population is Shiite, Shiile, they are of Turkish origin. As such, tliey they also have a strong ethnic affinity mid and preference for Turkey. In fact, Azerbaijan, as previously noted, is on record for its preference for Turkism and Islam. Whetlier Whether such an intermingling would mean an emulation of the Turkish "secular model" or a variation more suitable to Azeri politics remains to be seen. Azerbaijan has also replaced its Cyrillic alphabet alphabe with the Turkish Latin alphabet. The Taiik Tajik civil war demonstrates that the tug-of-war between ex-communist and nationalist-islamic forces has only begun. It was the tlie authoritarian autlioritarian character of the fonner former President Raliman R~lman Nabiev that did not allow for tile tlie emergence of a political compromise between these groups. This bloody civil war, and the Uzbek-Russian intervention on behalf of tlie the ex-communist forces, has not only established a dangerous precedent but also sent unambiguous signals to similar forces elsewhere that the current regimes in other Muslim Central Asian states arc are likely to manifest a similar attitude toward political dissent. Such a reality does not bode well for tbr future peace and stability in these states. The Tlie Tajik civil war has established the fact that Iran lran has stayed away from playing any role, so when or if the tile nationalist-islamic coalition forces gain an upper hand in this civil war, it is not likely that tliey they would adopt an Iranian model of Islamic Islmnic govenunent. An important variable underlying Uie file promotion of the Turkish secular model was also related to the overplaying of the Turkic ethnic factor in Cenu'al Central Asia. It should be noted that any underscoring of Pan-Turkism may also trigger feelings of pan- Slavism and pan-iranianism (on the part of the Tajiks and the Iranians). The Tlie United States is not paying attention to the fact tliat that such an emphasis 'also underscores tlie file notion of Pan-Turkism in the region, which is feared by Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and Iran."' 1~7 Greeks and Arabs have already accused Turkey of reviving Turan, or Greater Turkistan--from Turkistan from China, across Asiatic Russia, to the Adriatic sea."" H" Moscow charged that tliat the real intention underlying

71 66 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA the increased Turkish activities is to obtain nuclear weapons that were in the possession of Kazaklistan, Kazakhstan, "and of applying 'racial criteria" criteria' in its effork~ efforts to establish a belt of Turkic-speaking republics south of Russia.'" Russia.""" 'Q Althou~ Altliougli Turkey made numerous official statements to assuage the fears of its neighbors that it has no pan-turkic ambitions, the euphoria about the Turkic variable in the Central Asian Muslim states that was felt in the immediate aftermath aftermatli of the tlie collapse of the Soviet Union and die the heightened Turkish activism made Russia, lran, Iran, Armenia, Greece, and Tajikistan nervous.'^" '2 GEOPOLITICS AND GEOECONOMICS There appears to be a worldwide surge among mnong nation-states, especially after the conclusion of the Cold War, to seek geoeconomic objectives actively. This is done through concerted efforts to bring about economic integration and to seek economic links with major economic actors inside and outside their regions. Needless to say, such successful endeavors have tlieir their payoffs in terms of an enhancement entlancement of geostrategic influence. As major regional actors, lran Iran and Turkey have manifested strong predilections toward systematically converting their political influence into formulating politico-economic blocs, thereby enhancing their geostrategic influence. It is possible that tlie the high international visibility given to d~e tlie potential emergence of the EEC as a powerful entity in the 1990s might have stimulated Iran and Turkey to promote similar arrangements in Central Asia. Then, there is an equally important variable of growing strategic cooperation, discussed in the preceding sections. Boda Botli Iran Irma mad and Turkey operate in an area where tlie the rhetoric, not the reality, of Arab nationalism and pan-arabism has prevailed at lea,st least since World War II. Iran lran can become a part of tlie the Arab world only by emphasizing pan-islamism, pan-lslanfism, and in fact, Iran has been underscoring this phenomenon since the early 1980s. Howevcr, However, pan-islamism is not a slogan that could promote solidarity between Arab countries and Iran, especially when it comes from Tehran. The Tlie Shiite Islam of Iran, die the long-standing rivalry between the Arab zmd and Persian civilizations, and Iran's own hegemonic tendencies in the Persim~ Persian Gulf region emerge as some of the chief obstacles in the

72 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 67 way of Iranian-Arab solidarity based on Islam. Iran has won some friends among Arab countries, such as Sudan, Libya, and Syria, but no persuasive ca~e case can be made that Islam is tlie file predominant basis of cooperation in any of these exmnples. examples. Sudan is the only country where the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity is used by both sides. However, Sudan is also an economic basket case, and Iran [ran is reported to have injected large sums of money into that country. Libyan and Syrian cooperation with Iran is largely, if not primarily, based on the mutuality of political and strategic objectives, not Islam. In Ill general, none of these actors serves as promising source of economic ties. In Muslim Central Asia, Iraal Iran is not competing against even tile tlie rhetoric of pan-arabism. There are, to be sure, rumblings of pan- Turkism; however, it has not yet become a fully developed exclusionary phenomenon like pan-arabism. In this part of the world, Iran Irm~ can emphasize pan-islamism a bit more successfully than tlian in the Middle East, and the Muslims of the Central Asian states can be religiously mobilized by using this slogan. Nevertheless, the Shiite Sliiite Muslims of Iran continue to serve as a significant constraint even in Central Asia. The Central Asian Muslim countries offer Iran a wide range of potential economic activities, and Tehran has been pursuing it. For instance, Iran [ran has activated the moribund Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) established in July In the February 1992 meeting in Tehran, the original membership of tliis this entity, which included [ran, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, was expanded to include Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and mid Uzbekistan (figure 6). Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzsian, and Tajikistan also attended as observers, and in the Uie course of this meeting Tajikistan and m~d Kyrgyzstan became lull full members. Afghanistan also renewed its request for membership.'"'.12, The Iranian Irmfian perception of the role of the tlie ECO was manifested by its depiction of this organization by President Rafsanjani as a "bridge between north and south." As if to assure each other, as well as the West, both Iran and Turkey emphasized the exclusive economic nature of this organization. This meeting also witnessed the tlie growing rivalry between these two major members. While the late President Ozal insisted that tliat all member states must accept the free market system. system, President Rafsanjani reacted by accusing Turkey of "trying to impose a Western system to the tlie detriment of tradition Islamic culturc."'^^ culture. '''22 At its May 1992 meeting, members of

73 68 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA 05 en m z m Q H ILl :C) r,.9 I,I. ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 0 sop H > m c o m XI > > > FIGURE 6

74 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 69 ECO agreed to grant each other most-favored-nation (MFN) status. This Tliis agreement "also provided for a plan to expedite development of the tlie Tejen-Sargt-Mashhad Tejen-Sargt-Mashliad trans-asiatic railroad line by 1995 and to construct a gas pipeline to carry fuel from Turkmenistan to Iran, Turkey, and Europe.'" 123 On a different economic front, lran Iran also proposed the formation of an Organization of the Caspian Sea states, whose membership is to include Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Turkey characterized this proposal as "superfluous,"'" ''lz~ while Russia expressed some apprehensions. Moscow was concerned tliat that "after the April 1992 division of the Caspian Sea military fleet among Russia, Azerbaijarl, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, Iran would increase its own strategic presence in that tliat area; Russia's concerns were not baseless. Since the division of the Caspian sea fleet, Iran considers the tlie 1828 treaty--which treaty which granted only Russia the right to maintain a navy in that sea--invalid] sea invalid.'" zs [ran Iran has also established military and trade ties witii with Ukraine. In 1992, it exported 4 to 5 million tons of oil to that country. Tehran and Kiev signed an agreement on a joint venture to build three tliree gas pipelines to carry Iranian gas to Ukraine and on to Europe. Azerbaijan is also a party to that agreement.''* agreement, az6 Turkey is a state tliat, that, like Iran, is not a part of die the Arab world. Under the legacy of Kemal Ataturk, it has remained loyal to the dual traditions of secularism and pro-wcstcmism. pro-wcsternism. Because of its secular character, it has notliing nothing to do with Pan-Islamism,at least officially.'^' 127 In Central Asia, however, Turkey has found tlie the commonality of Turkic the variable, although altliough it cannot go too far in playing up dfis diis variable witliout without triggering charges of racism on the tlie part of Russia, Greece, and the Arab countries. An interesting aspect of the Turkic variable is that it appears significant when examined exanfined from outside tliat that area. However, when viewed from witliin within tlie the region, even tlie the Turkic languages in all the Muslim Central Asian countries (save Tajikistan) do not allow for free communication among tliese these states. So, while Turkey and the rest of the Central Asian countries (save Tajikistan again) may feel euphoric about being Turkic, there is no guarantee that that tliat fact alone could become a basis for cooperation. The highly divisive legacy of pan-arabism serves as a constant reminder that nation- states are more likely to cooperate based on mutual tangible interests than on a highly emotive and charged concept, such as Arab nationalism. nalionalism. It may not be too long before tlie the Central Asian

75 70 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA countries will also experience this tliis uneasy reality. Tile The United States has emphased emphascd tlie the Turkic variable largely because it hoped that all Muslim Central Asian states would gravitate toward Turkey instead of Iran. Turkey has also intensified its economic activities in Central Asia. In Ill the ECO, Turkey must share the limelight with Iran. Ankara felt tliat that it needed a separate economic forum, and so it established the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in Its signatories included Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Georgia. Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Annenia Armenia plus the Balkan states of Romania, Albania, and Greece. From the tlie perspective of economics, the Black Sea Organization does not have tremendous potential. Aside from Greece, Turkey is the tlie only member which is at all advanced and has a self-sufficient economy. The remainder of its membership has to undergo a major transformation from a state-controlled to a market- oriented economy. Its biggest problem in the initial phase of its creation is finding direly needed capital investments. invesmients. It is from the perspective of politics that this pact achieves major significance. The Black Sea Organization is likely to serve.several foreign policy objectives of Turkey: Ankara can use it to enter the trans-caucasian, trans-caucasian. Central Asian, and Russian markets. In all tliese these areas, Iran is likely to pose a source of competition, because it has also escalated the pace of its economic activities. If Turkey remains ouk,~idc oulsidc llie the EEC, the Black Sea Organization could serve as a useful vehicle to do business with wiili Europe. Russian membership in this fledgling entity could become an important source of attracting European capital in the near future, as Western Europe remains keenly interested in the stability of the CIS. Ankara could potentially exploit its enhanced significance--stemming significance stemming from this organization and from its heightened activism in the CIS region--to region to gain membership in the EEC in the not-too-distant future. Tlie The membership of Greece in Uie the Black Sea Organization is also likely to improve the relationship between Ankara and Athens. Such a mended relationship might stop Greece from objecting to Turkey's entry into the EEC. Before Atliens Athens end its opposition, however, the issue of the continued division of Cyprus must mu.st also akso be resolved.

76 MODALITIES OF THE NEW GREAT GAME 71 The incorporation incoq^oration of Armenia in the tile Black Sea Organization might lum turn out to be a major step toward defusing file the historical conflict between Ankara mid and Yerevan. Moreover, through tlirough tlieir their membership in this organization, both Azerbaijan and Armenia might be able to find a negotiated solution of the Karabakh KarabaWi conflict. Ankara has the potential to emerge as a credible mediator at some point. Keeping the growing international trend of establishing regional economic arrangements arrangenlents in mind, Turkey also proposed a Turkic Cormnon Common Market. Its aim is to establish a common currency. This proposal is al.so also aimed at making Turkey the tlie center of a variety of economic activities involving tlie file Turkic.states of Central Asia. It will be a long time before a proposal of this nature gathers momentum, however.

77 4. m CONCLUSION Tile Tlie pati1 patli on which Uie the slates states of Central Asia have embarked is long and treacherous. World history, indeed current reading of a newspaper, is littered with examples of countries that attempted to reform and failed. The states of Cenu^al Central Asia, ironically enough, owe their very existence to a state that failed to reform and transform transforai ikself itself successfully. The challenge now remains to overcome tlie tile serious obstacles for these new countries, rebuilding the economy, feeding their people, and ensuring a relatively better quality of life, which includes providing clean ecological conditions, clean water, and better health care. As witnessed by events now underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tile tlie lbrmer former Czechoslovakia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nagomo-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Checlmya, the roles of etho-nationalism and religion are indeed becoming urmmnageably unmanageably powerful. In Muslim Central Asia, tlie the conflict thus far has been limited to Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh; tlie the question is, however, how long this will last belbre before it surfaces in otiler otlier neighboring countries. The future dynamics of tlie the new great game in Muslim Central Asia will be determined by a number of developments, botli both within mid and in the tlie immediate vicinity. The first and foremost variable is the scope of political and economic developments in these tliese countries in the tlie coming years. The intensely assertive Ibreign foreign policy of Russia, and indeed the future of democracy in that country, will also influence the dynamics of this new great game. gmne. In the new great game, the Central Asian states are playing an important importm~t role in determining the modalities of political and economic exchanges. Their Tlieir fate is no longer determined by outside actors and events out of Uieir their control. Since these political and economic exchanges are so important, the prospects for the die survival of the tlie CIS become equally important. If file die Commonweallh Commonwealth survives, the process of politico-economic change within the polities of its member states 73

78 74 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA is likely to be more manageable and less unpredictable. The Tile future of Russia is also important, because it is inextricably linked to the developments in domestic politics of Muslim Central Asian slates. states. For instance, if the tlie autlioritarian authoritarian rule is challenged in one or more of these countries, as was done in Tajikistan, then the response of the government is most likely to be increased repression of tlie the forces of change. If such a response were to lead to an outbreak of violence, then Oien the response of Russia to such a development would become very significant. As previously noted, if Russian participation in defeating tlie the nationalist-islamic forces in Tajikistan became a pattern, then the tlie prospects for political stability of Muslim Central Asia are likely to become grim. A related issue is the relationship between political and economic pluralisms. The Chinese and South Korean models underscore the possibility (not the inevitability) that economic development and pluralism must precede the measures enhancing political pluralism. At the same time, tlie the Gorbachev experience points to the tlie dangers of "allowing political and economic pluralisms simultaneously. When Wlien introduced simultaneously, in all likelihood political pluralism would get out of hand and even create acute pressures on tjic the politicjil political system, resulting in a cataclysmic change, with witli unanticipated or even deleterious consequences. At tlie the same stone time, no one really knows how long any government can disallow political pluralism but promote economic pluralism, before betore the absence of the die former would create so much pressure on the government that it would not only undermine undernfine the pace of economic pluralism but also create political instability. Another issue is the role of Islam in the Central Asian states. The political leaders of these countries remain extremely wary of the potential power of Islam in their societies. As former Communists, they dicy not only least understand lslanl Islam but, in ahnost almost all instances, tend to parrot the purported threats of "Islmnic "Islamic tundamentalism" fundamentalism" to their tlicir rule. It behooves them to first define what exactly they mean by this pejorative phrase. If they define it as "Islamic radicalism or extremism," then they should also understand tliat that extremisms of all sorts thrive only under conditions of economic miser), misery and political repression. Almost all Islamic parties in Central Asia are currently not part of any extremist movements. If these parties parlies underscore the role of Islam in the social and political lives of their societies, lliis this should not be

79 CONCLUSION 75 automatically depicted as extremism. As a pragmatic political strategy, the Muslim Central Asian countries must allow free participation of Islamic parties in the political process, because, if allowed to participate in the process of government, they tliey would have little chance of indulging in extremism. Only by letting them become players in the political arena would these leaders expose them to the realities and complexities of governance, in which simple-minded extremism plays no role. Regarding tlie die significance of the role of the three major actors of their neighborhood, the pendulum of advantage is likely to swing between Iran and Turkey, with Saudi Arabia playing an important role in heightening the IslaJnic Islamic consciousness of Muslim Central Asia. There is little or no relationship between this enhanced Islamic consciousness of these republics and mid their acceptance of religious extremism or anti-americanism. The future of all extremisms is likely to be determined by the future capabilities of these tliese countries to grow and prosper economically. Among die tlie three Middle Eastern actors, Saudi Arabia's role is very important because it is aimed at giving religious orientation to die tlie Central Asian Muslims. Iran faces some disadvantages, because of its Shiite nature, but its advantage becomes apparent in the political aspect of Islani. Islanl. Islamic IslaJnic government has been established in that country recently mid and as a result of revolution. The Central Asian Muslims witnessed the making of tliis this phenomenon up close, seeing its ups and aqd downs, its aspirations, mid and its furies. They cam~ot cannot remain indifferent to the possibilities of adopting an aj~ Islamic govermnent. government. Afghanistan, AfghaJfistaJa, one of their neighboring states, is well on its way along this path, although tlie the route has been bloody and turbulent. No Muslim Central Asian country necessarily has to undergo the Afghani example to adopt an Islamic government, unless the existing government becomes detennined deteniiined to foreclose any compromise with indigenous Islamic forces. The Saudi and mad Pakistani examples are also present in their region and mid are more relevant to tlie the Sunni Sumfi masses of Central Asia, especially in the tlie sense that Uiat tlie the establislmaent establisliment of Islamic government in tliose those countries has not been as in Afghanistan. The Turkish secular model is also useful, although altliough whether whetlier the Central Asian states would accept the Kemalist legacy in its totality is questionable. What Kemalism did was to find a scapegoat in Islam, and it adopted Wcsternism Westernism and ils its attendant secularism as a panacea for its social, political, and

80 76 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA economic decline. The Tlie Central Asian states have not experienced the peaks and nadirs of the Ottomans, and are not looking for Ibr scapegoak~. scapegoats. In fact, they appear eager to acknowledge their Islamic heritage by increasing their systematic orientation to it. Once this orientation is complete, they have to decide how much of Islam Islmn tliey they would like to incorporate in tlieir their polities. The Tlie future incorporation of the Turkish secular model or the Iranian Islamic model is not likely to be determined in these states in the near future, and Uiere there is not likely to be one model for all ail these countries. The Muslim population in Central Asia has to come to grips fully witli with its Islamic identity first; only tlien then will it be in a position to judge the path that each nation must take. t~e. The present flirtations with the Turkish secular model by a number of Central Asian countries are only manifestations of the elite's preferences. Whether Whetlier such preferences <'ire are going to emerge as more or less a stable and across-the-board phenomenon will be determined in the next 5 to 10 years. Even dien, then, one cannot state with witli certainty tliat that such a trend would last for a long time. The dust on this issue is far from settled yet. The Tlie mid-1990s is a time when pan-turkism or pan-slavism is lurking on the horizon. There is also a suggestion of tlie the potential rejuvenation of Eurasianism (Yevrazist). This phenomenon envisages a potential union between the Slavs and the Turkic steppes, which is based "on mutual respects and not [on] assimilation or absorption."'^* ''~28 These Tliese tendencies, especially their tiicir darker sides, will gain an upper hand only if economic hardships are prolonged in the CIS, but especially if they become worse. After gaining independence, Muslim Central Asia is not likely to remain either eitlier politically or economically subservient to Moscow, growing Russian assertiveness in that area notwithstanding. To ensure their independence, tliese these slates states are scrambling to integrate themselves into international and regional economic arrangements. In this regard, tlie the United States and Western Europe have the potential to play a crucial role. What these actors must do--especially do especially the United States--is Slates is to help these countries stabilize themselves economically. In its endeavors to help the CIS, the West must focus locus on a "balanced" invesunent investment of its economic assistance. A balanced approach to investment means that no one state should be allowed to take a lion's share by depriving especially the nonindustrial states

81 CONCLUSION 77 oflhe the CIS. If the Central Centr',d Asian Muslim states were to make steady economic progress, the chances are that tliat they would avoid all types of extremism, political as well as religious.

82 NOTES Author's note: iioie: I wish to thank thaiik die the following individu~ds individuals for tor their dieir assistance: From the Air Wiir War College, Dr. Amiin Arrnin Ludwig, who prep;ired prepared maps for this tliis study; Colonel Brent Smith and ;uid Howard Dale, who provided expert computer assistance; assist,'mce; ;uid and Dr. William Riley, editor. From tlie the Armed Forces Staff College, Marie Mfirie Harrison and Mary Mjiry Louise O'Brien, ()'Brien, librari,'ms, libr;irians, and Gall Gail Smith, graphic,artist, who provided their valuable professional assistance when tliis this study was being revised. 1. As cited in Miron Rezun, Rezm~, Intrigue and War in Southwest Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game. 3. Michael T. Clare discusses geoeconomic ;uid and geostfategic geostrategic objectives in "Policing the Gulf----And Gulf And the tlie World," Nation, October 16, 1990, Edw;ird Edward N. Luttw;ik Luttw~d also discusses these diese concepts in his "From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics,"National A'wf/o/ia/ Interest (Summer 1990), Gr~dmm Gr;ilKim Fuller, Central Asia: The New (;eopolitics Geopolitics (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1992), 1992) Martha Olcott, "Central Asides Asia's Post-Empire Politics," Orhis (Spring 1992), Fuller, Ibid., 14 and ;u)d 21, passim. 8. The Tlie entire discussion of tjie the Azeri economy is based on Economic Review: Azerbaijan (Washington, DC: Inteniatioiial h~temational Monet;iry Monetary Fund, May 1992). 9. The entire discussion of Kaz<'ikhstan's Kazakhstan's economy is based on Economic Review: Kazakhstan (Washington, DC: hiteniationid Intemation:d Monetary Ftmd, Fmid, May 1992). 10. James H. Bater, The Soviet Scene: A Geographical Perspective (London: Hdw;ird Edward Aniold, Arl~old, 1989), 212. Kaz;ikhstan Kazzd<hstan also contained the principal source of Soviet copper ore at Dzhekazg:m. Dzhekazgrni. 11. Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., L The Tlie entire discussion of die the economy of Kyrgyzstan is based on Economic Review: Kyrgyzstan (Washington, DC: International hltemational Monetary Monet'try Ftmd, Fluid, May 1992). 15. Tlie The entire discussion of the Tajik economy is based on Economic Review: Tajikistan (Washington, DC: Liteniational hltemational Monet.'irv Monetary, Fund. Fund, May 1992). ^g 79

83 80 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA 16. The discussion on the tlie economy of Turkmenistan is based on Economic Review: Turkmenistan (Washijigton, (W,'kshh~gton, DC: International Monetary Ftmd, Fimd, May 1992). 17. This discussion is based on Economic Review: Uzbekistan (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fimd, Fund, May 1992). 18. Joseph P. Riva, Jr., Petroleum in the Muslim Republics of the Commomvealth Commonwealth of Independent States: More Oil for OPEC? (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Rese;irch Service), September 1, 1992, Rust,'un Rustam Achmedow ;uid mid Jiiri Jttri Sljuss;u"ew, Sljussarew, Energiewirtschaft (Moscow: APN Verlag, 1989), Ibid., Ibid. 22. Ibid., "Soviet Economic Performzume Performmice in 1989: Prelude to a Major Recession Tliis This Year," PlanEcon 6, nos. 7-8, James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Rel)ublic's Republic's Road to Sovereignty (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), Bater, Critchlow, Almaad Alimad Rashid, Rfishid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 6( "Pulse of the tlie Day," Pravda, Moscow in Russkm, Russimi, 22 J~muary Jaiu.'iry 1, in FBIS-SOV , 24 January Jmiuary 1992, David E. Powell, "Crimes Against Agailzst Nature," Natural History-, History, August 1992, Georgii S. Golitsyii, Golitsyn, "Ecological Problems in the CIS During die the Tr,'msitional Transitional Period," RFE/RL Rese.'irch Research Report 2, no. 2 (8 Jmuiary. January, 1993). 1993), Patricia M. Carley, C,'u'ley, "Tlie "The Price of the Plmi: Plmn Perceptions of Cotton mid ;md Healtli He',dill in hi Uzbekistan Uzbekistim ~md ruid Tttrkmenistml," Turkmenist;m," Central Asian Survey Sur\>ey 8, no. 4(1989): Golitsyn, Feshbach Fe.shbach ajid mad Friendly, Fricndly, 74. Tliesc These authors also detail the demise demisc of the Arab Sea: its water level has dropped by 47 feet, its volume has decreased by two-tliirds two-flfirds ~md :uid its area by 44 percent. See also D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), Ibid. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., Tlie The salinization has been further worsened through the tlie evaporation of tlie flae Aral Sea. Massive storms often blow salt and,'rod sand onto the tiie loc;il loc{d fields (1/2 ton per acre). Such storms often reach Belarus, Bek'irus, which is 1,200 miles away, depositing salt mid and sand staid tliere there as well. See also

84 NOTES 81 David R. Smith, "Salinizatioii "'Salinization in Uzbekistmi," Uzbekist m," Soviet Geography. Geography, Feshbach, Fcshbach, Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan, ( Another Anotlier expert found that pesticide use in the Amu Darya basin was 10 times the tlie U.S.- recommended recoitimended level. See D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands, Feshbach, 73. See also Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistam Bater, 262. See also, Feshbach, Ecocide. Ecocide, 75 and Feshbach, Feslibach, Ecoeide, Ecocide, Ibid., D.J. Peterson, "The "Tlie Environment in the Post-Soviet Era," RFE/RL Research Report, 8 January, Jmluary, , no. 2., Ahmad, Ibid. 46. Ibid., Elizabedl ElizabetJi Fuller, "Azerbaij;ui "Azerbaij~m After liie the Presidential Elections," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 26 (26 Jime June 1992): Ibid., For instance, see"azerbaij~m "Azerbaij;ui Rebel Claims Power and,'rod Support," The New York Times, June 24, 1993; and "'Azerbaijan "Azerbaijan Parlimnent Parli~unent Votes to Strip President of Power," The New York Times, Jtme Jiuie 25, Boris Giller, Giller. interview of President Nazerbaev, "IA "la by Khotel dovesti do kontsa Kurs, Kiirs. Kotoryi my vybrali," Karavan (Ahna (Alma Ata), no. 14, 9 April 1993, James Critchlow, "Democratization in Kazakhstan," RFE/RL Research Report 1, l,no. 30 (24 July, 1992): Ibid., Gr~dlzu'n Gr;ili;uTi Fuller, Central Asia." Asia: The New Geopolitics. Geopolitics, Bess Brown, "Tajik Civil War Wjir Prompts Crackdown in Uzbekist,'nl,'" Uzbekistan," RFL/RE Research Report Repori2.no. 11 (March 1993): 1993); "Help from Uzbekistan ;uid ~md Kyrgyzstan," Kyrgyzst,'mj' Ekspress Khronika, Klironika, 21 October, Cass~ldra Cassandra Cavanaugh, "'Uzbekist~ "Uzbekistan Looks South ~md ;md East E;tst for Role Models," ftf/tz/jl RFE/RL Research Report 1. 1, no. 40 (October 1992): Bess Brown, "Turkmenist~m "Turkmcnistmi Asserts Itself," RFE/RL Research Report 1, no. 43 (30 October 1992): Ibid., Christopher J. P~mico, Pfuiico, "Turkmenistan "'Turkmenist,'m Unaffected by Winds of Democratic Change," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 4 (22 Jjuuiary J~muary 1993): Ibid.. 7, emphasis added. 61. Ibid., Ibid Shal~btulou Shalirb;mou Tadjbakhsh, Tadjbiikhsh, "Causes zmd mid Consequences of the Civil War," Wnr," Central Asia Monitor 1 (1993):

85 82 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA 63. Ibid.. Ibid., Ibid. 65. Ibid., Ibid. 67. Michael Collins Dunn, Duiiii, "Uzbek Role in Tajik Civil War Is Ominous Portent for Centr~ Central Asia," The Washington Report Middle East Affairs 11, no. R 8 (March 1993): For a recent and excellent treatment of tliis this immensely complicated subject see Shalirbaiiou Sh,'dlrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Tajikistmi: "Tajikistlm: From Freedom to Wiu," Wm," Current History, April Martha Brill Olcott, "Islam, Fund;imentalism. Fundamentalism, and Public Policy ill in Central Asia," (Washington, DC: Tlic The Nation<'il Natiomd Coimcil Cotmcil for Soviet and East European Research, 1993). 70. The Tlie Mu:daid Mujihid (or "unitarian") u-adition tradition of Saudi Arabia goes back to the days of Muhjimmad Muharnmad Ibn-al-Wahab, who, in ill the tile 18th century, w;uited wanted to cle:mse cie.'inse Islam from a number of traditions introduced by the Sufi movement, movement. hi Li a more popular sense, diis this tradition is also described as tlie the "Wahhabi" tradition. I have avoided using liiis this pejorative phrase in diis this study. 71. Critchlow, Critclflow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan, 167 and Boris Giller. Giller, interview with Nazerbaev, For inst.'ince, instance, see Roger D. Kangas, "Uzbekist;m: "Uzbekistan: Evolving Authoritarianism," CMrre«f//(.f/ory, Current ttistory, April 1994, 17g Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan, 178: 178; J,'unes James Critchlow, "Democratization "Democrauzation in Kazakhstan," RFE/RL RFEIRL Research Report 30 (24 July, 1992); Bess Brown, "Tajikistan: "Tajikist;in: The Fall of Nabiyev," RFE-RL Research Report, 10 September. 75. Bess Brown, "Islamic Renaissance Party P;irty in Central Asia," Report on the USSR 3, no. 19 (May 10, 1991). 76. U. Babakhjinov Babakhanov and A. Ganelin, Gmielin, "Will Tliere There be a Squ;ire Square of the Victorious Opposition in Dushlu~be?" Dushmibe?" Kornsomolskayu Kornsonu)lskaya Pravda, Moscow, 22 May 1992, 1, in FBIS-SOV , FBIS-S6>V , Critchlow, g. 78. "Asaba' Protests Against Dedication of tlie the Slavic University," Ekspress Khronika, 2g 28 October Such a generous move stands in stark st.'irk contrast to tile the legislation passed p;issed by the Kyrgyz P;irli;iment Parliament stating that all land will be he in the possession of the "Kyrgyz "Kyrgy/ people," disregarding the large hirgc presence of non-kyrgyz peoples in ill llie the stales. states. See G. F. Morozova, "Sovremennie migratsiomiie migratsiomlie iavleniia: Bezhentsy Bezhcntsy i emigrmity," emigranty," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, Nr. 3, Text tra.nslated translated into German, Germmi, Osteuropa, March 1993, A116-A ()leg Oleg Ptinfilov, P~mfilov, "Tovarishchi 'Tovarishchi po onlzhiiu," onizliiiu," Moskovskie Novosti, 23 May 1993, p. 12A. To place these diese niunbers ntunbers in die the context of a pattern of

86 NOTES 83 Russian Russkin emigration, during the 1980s some 37,000 Russians left Tajikistan (9.4 percent of tlie the Russian Russi,'m population). See RoK'ind Roland Scharff, "Migration trod luid etlinische etlmische Mobilisienuig," Mobilisienmg," Osteuropa, March All Martha Brill Olcon, Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1992). 81. "Colmntmist "Communist Attempt Coup in m Tajikistan," Ekspress Khronika, 28 October Edward A. Gargan, "Refugees "'Refugees Fleeing Tajikistan Strife," New York Times, 14 January J;inuary See also Molly Moore, "Tajiks Trade One Nightmare for Another," Washington Washingion Post, 19 J~umary Jmuiary "Help from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan," Kyrgyzstmi," Ekspress Khronika, 21 October The Tlie issue of sending U.N. "blue helmets" to CIS hotspots was wiis "also discussed during a recent trip to Washington by Foreign Minister Kozwev. Kozyrev. 84. Alexander Alexm~der Knyazev, Moscow Radio Rossii Network, in Russian 1900 GMT, GMT. 30 May 1992, in FBIS-SOV , I 1 Jtme Jiuie 1992, For instance, see John W. R. Lepingwell, "Introduction: "Intrtxluction: The Tlie Problems of Former Soviet Nucleiir Nuclear Weapons," RFEIRL RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 8(19 February 1993): Ibid., John W. R. Lepingwell, "Kazakhstan "Kaz;ikhst;ui and ;uid Nucle&r Nuclear Weapons," RFE/RL RFEIRL Research Report 2, no. 8 (19 Febniary. February, 1993). 88. Lepingwell,"Introduction," This discussion is bitsed based on Siiz^'uine Suz:ume Crow, "START II: Prospects for Liiplementation," hnplementation," RFEIRL RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 8(198 February, 1993): Lepingwell, "Kaz',,ddlstan "Kazaklist;in and Nuclear Weapons," Crow, Extracted from "U.S., Russial3 Russiaji and British Security Assurances to Ukraine," Arms Control Today, Jmnuvy/February Janu~u'y~ebruary 1995, "U.S. in a Secret Deal, Removes Bomb Fuel in Ex-Soviet Republic," The New York Thnes, Times, November 23, 1994; and "Months of Delicate Talks in Kazakhstzm Kjizaklistmi Atom De'd," Deal," The New York Times, November 24, For a brief overview of Ir~mian Irrmijin hlterests Interests ha in Central Asia see "Iran's Relations with the Southern Members of tlie the Commonwealth Commonwe',,dth of Independent St:ltes," State,s,"firtr)feg/-rtu/iriflr(^(Foreign Background Brief(Ft~reign & Conamonwealth Commonwealth Office, London, London. March 1992), A similar point on the u^ansitory transitory nature of Uzbekistan's personality is made by Donald S. C<'irlisle. Carlisle. He writes, " personal self- identification as Uzbek and mid the tlie phenomenon of Uzbek nationalism are lu^e incomplete mad and still in the process of formation." Making a more general point about 'all Central Asia along the tlie stone same line, he notes: "At best. best, the tlie

87 84 THE NEW GREAT GAME IN MUSLIM CENTRAL ASIA region should be viewed as in trlmsition irmisition politically, caught somewhere between tradition,'rod and modernity." "Uzbekist:m "Uzbekistm: ~md <'uid die tlie Uzbeks," Problems of Communism, September-October 1991, For inst;uicc, mstlmce, lnmim~ Ininiaii economic activities, according to one report, included a proposal to build a it railway from Ashkliabad Ashkhabad to northern Irrui Ir:m and ;md then to the Persi,'m Persian Gtdf: Gulf; a gas pipeline from Tajikistm~ Tajikistmi to Pjikistan; Pakistan; a joint L-anian-A/ijrb;ujjuii Ir,'ufian-Azerb~djani venture for oil exploration in the Caspi;m Caspiml Sea; ;uid ~md die tlic replacement of the tlie Russi~m Russim: specialists with lrmli,'ms Irtuiians m in Azerbaijan's oil and gas industry. Commonweahh Commonwealth cf of Independent States and the Middle East (CIS & ME), A Mondlly Monilily Summary Summ;iry mid <'uid News Analysis of the tlie CIS and East European Press XVII, XVII. no. 4 (1992): 1. Hereafter will be referred to its as CIS & ME. 97. For det~dls detiiils see, "Irwin "Irrin Gains in Scramble for Central Asia," Financial Times, December 13, CIS& & ME XVII, no. 5 (1992): Cherif J. Cordiilii, Cord~dfi, "Central.^sia Asia Emerges into hlto tlie file Muslim World," Middle East International (MEI), 3 April, 1992, "Russia, NAT() NATO Sign Historical Agreement," The Norfolk Virginian Pilot, Jiuie Jtme 23, Also see Allen Lynch, "After tlie the Empire: Russia ;uid zmd Its Western Neighbors," Nc'ighhom:' RFE/RL REE/RL Research Report, 25 March 1994, M.E. Allrari, Alirari, "Moscow <'uid mad the Middle East: Tlie The Future Futttre of Strategic Relationships," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies XVII, XVn, 11o. no. 4 (Summer 1994): Bruce D. Porter mid m~d Cm'ol Cm^ol R. Smvetz, Saivetz, "Tlie "The Once ()nce and m~d Future Empire: Russia mad and die tlie 'Ncir 'Near Abroad,'" Abroad,"' The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1994) Graham Fuller ;ilso zdso presents mi zu~ interesting discussion of Oae tlie Atlanticist, AUmiticist, Eurasi~mist, Eurasifinist, m~d mid imperialist ttmtking tliinking of Russian foreign policy in his "Russia mid iuld Central Asia: Federation or Fault Line?" Line'.'" in Mendelbaum, Thomas Goltz, "Letter from Eurasia: Etu'asia: The Tlie Hidden Russian Russimi Hand," Hmid," Foreign Policy "Moscow Claims Caspian Caspimi Energy Deals Veto," The Financial Times, November 9, "Azerbaijmi "Azerbaijml Oil Deal Signed in Face of Russimi Russiml Protests," The Financial Times. September 21, OH. "Azerbaijmi "'Azerbaijan Wmils W:mts to Keep Up Irmi Ir,'m Ties," The Financial Times, May «, ~, "Turkey Refuses to Lose Oil Battle witli with Russimis," Russizms," The Financial Times, Scplcmhtr September 13, Ibid "A Russiml Russimi Oil Gimit Gimlt Grows Powerful, "The "'The New York Times,