The Taiwan Tangle. Alan D. Romberg

Transcription

1 The Taiwan Tangle Alan D. Romberg On 27 February 2006, Taiwan s president, Chen Shui-bian, announced that the National Unification Council created by Lee Teng-hui s Kuomintang (KMT) administration in 1991 would cease to function and that the National Unification Guidelines that the Council created would cease to apply. This was the culmination of a series of steps taken in the wake of the humiliating defeat Chen s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered in the 3 December 2005 local elections, steps he hoped would raise Taiwanese consciousness, thus reenergizing the party faithful and appealing to the broader Taiwan electorate. Along with the bottom-up, outside-in approach to constitutional revision that he had been pushing with renewed vigor since autumn, this step once again heightened Washington s sense of mistrust of Chen, negating efforts since the March 2004 presidential election to rebuild mutual confidence. This mistrust led to a confrontation over Chen s proposed transit of the United States in May on his way to and from Latin America, which, in turn, created uncertainty regarding both Taiwan s cross-strait policy over the next two years as well as the future course of U.S.-Taiwan relations. At the end of May, in response to the political crisis arising from insider trading allegations against his son-in-law and rumors swirling about corruption on the part of his wife and close political associates, Chen transferred power to Premier Su Tseng-chang and said he would refrain from any party activities. The main effect seemed to be that Su would carry out the day-to-day business of government without direct intervention by the president, but Chen would continue to manage those issues he said were specifically given to him by the constitution. These include foreign and national security policy and cross-strait relations. Chen also after months of hesitation reaffirmed his commitment to previous positions foreswearing any steps that touched on sovereignty or could otherwise upset the cross-strait status quo. Although Beijing has avoided comment on the latest turn of events, it lost no opportunity to highlight Chen s lack of trustworthiness and to assign Washington the responsibility for reining him in lest he move to formal independence and force the PRC itself to act a formula for disaster. At the same time, the PRC continued to exhibit great confidence about the constraints on Chen s ambitions for independence in the short term as well as its own ability to create a more favorable environment for eventual peaceful unification. 1

2 Finally, during PRC president Hu Jintao s late-april visit to Washington, the United States reaffirmed its one China policy, reassuring Beijing about the basics of the American approach to Taiwan though not going as far as the PRC would have preferred. Still, clearly targeting Taipei, President Bush did underscore subtly during Hu s visit, and not so subtly on the occasion of the Chen transit that Washington would not tolerate either side unilaterally seeking to change the status quo or otherwise hindering peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues. This essay relates the events occurring in this triangle since October 2005, when they were last addressed in CLM. Chen Shui-bian s Movement to the Edge Throughout the almost eight months from October 2005 through May 2006, Chen Shuibian continued to hammer on themes that further distanced Taiwan from the concept of one China and that were seen in Washington and Beijing as challenges to the cross- Strait status quo. In an interview in early October, in the face of Beijing s insistence that dialogue could only be resumed on the basis of Taiwan s accepting one China, Chen shot back that he wanted to strive for delays while not fearing talks, a play on Beijing s earlier call to strive for talks while not fearing delay. 1 A few days later, in his 10 October National Day address, Chen avoided direct reference to cross-strait relations, but he called for a new political order, insisting that long-term political stability and democratic sustainability in Taiwan required comprehensive reviews and revisions of the constitution. He announced that, henceforth, revising the constitution would be a bottom-up, outside-in process, that is, relevant proposals will be first initiated by the social groups before political parties are involved. 2 In adopting this posture, Chen was setting the scene for what could well become a free-for-all in which radical, independence-oriented draft amendments or even full texts would likely be put forward from the grass roots or even in the legislature. Such measures could, if adopted, cross PRC red lines against juridical independence, potentially drawing the United States into conflict with China. In the fall, these issues did not draw particular attention from Washington because Chen s earlier pledges to avoid destabilizing steps were thought to be intact. But once those pledges were cast into doubt, Chen s approach to constitutional revision, along with his handling of the National Unification Council (NUC) and National Unification Guidelines (NUG), came back to haunt him and U.S.-Taiwan relations. 2

3 Bush to China, Reaffirms One China Policy, Praises Taiwan Democracy Before President Bush visited China in late November, he met with the Asian press. On Taiwan issues he previewed the standard, neutral position he would present in Beijing: I ll confirm my one China, three communiqué policy, that not only says that we do not support independence, but as well, we will adhere to the Taiwan Relations Act. I think that s important for the Chinese leadership and the people of China to hear. 3 The president voiced concern that one party or the other might do something unilaterally to change the status quo, but he expressed optimism about ultimate peaceful resolution, taking favorable note of ongoing dialogue (presumably meaning with the opposition KMT) and urging continued discussion to that end. En route to Beijing, Mr. Bush gave a major speech in Kyoto, Japan, focusing on democracy and touting Taiwan s achievements. Although official briefers claimed he was not holding up the island as a model for the PRC, the president seemed to speak in parallels. Having effusively praised Taiwan for embracing freedom at all levels and observing that it had moved from repression to democracy as it liberalized its economy, he then went on to say that, [a]s the people of China grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well. 4 Taipei immediately seized on the speech as quite significant and voiced common cause with American calls for peace, democracy and dialogue. 5 Taipei s representative in Washington, adding a cautioning modifier that proved prescient, said the speech represented the restoration of mutual trust and confidence to some extent between our leaders and also... better communication between our two governments. 6 Responding to the speech with language reminiscent of an earlier era, Beijing retorted that Taiwan is a part of China, an inseparable part of China, and China does not brook any [outside] interference in its internal affairs. 7 In her briefing to the press following the president s meetings on 20 November with Chinese leaders in Beijing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not volunteer that Taiwan was one of the issues discussed, but in answer to questions she acknowledged it had been and described the president as simply presenting the basics of the one China policy, including urging cross-strait exchanges and dialogue. 8 In his own meeting with the press that day, President Hu Jintao reiterated China s stance against Taiwan independence and went on to note that President Bush had stated on many occasions that the United States would stick to the one China policy, abide by the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués, and oppose Taiwan independence, a position, Hu said, that he highly appreciated. 9 As usual, Taipei was anxious about what might come out of the Beijing summit and, as usual, it breathed a sigh of relief when nothing new emerged affecting Taiwan s 3

4 interests. 10 However, the results of island-wide local elections two weeks later, on 3 December, touched off a train of events that has roiled the waters ever since. Local Taiwan Elections Change the Dynamic There were three different levels of local elections in December, and the KMT won handily in all. For example, of the 23 county magistrates and city mayors up for election, the KMT won 14 and its pan-blue allies another three, a gain of five for the party and three for the pan-blue alliance, while the DPP won only six, a drop of three. DPP party stalwarts later tried to argue that the overall 42 percent of the vote garnered in these elections was a mere 3 percent lower than obtained in the last local elections four years earlier, but this rang hollow in light of the fact that the KMT alone won 51 percent in these elections (up from 42 percent four years earlier) and the pan-blue alliance obtained a total of 57 percent. In the county and city council and township chief elections, in which the independents got roughly 30 percent of the vote, Chen s DPP fared even more poorly in comparison with the KMT, getting 22 to 24 percent as against the KMT s 40 to 45 percent. 11 These results were generally ascribed both to poor performance of the DPP government and to a number of scandals that have plagued the administration, some of which involved close associates and even family members of the president. Although he was not implicated in any of the scandals, party chairman Su Tseng-chang resigned to take responsibility for the election debacle. He was then, however, appointed premier by Chen, replacing Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, a moderate who had been appointed a year earlier, in December 2004, at a time when the DPP sought to recover from the Legislative Yuan defeat. As of the moment, Su is undoubtedly the leading contender for the DPP presidential nomination for 2008, but Hsieh, who has agreed to stand as the DPP candidate for mayor of Taipei in December 2006, also remains in the running. Still, this disaster for the DPP was not universally seen as an automatic boon for the KMT. As the normally pro-blue China Post editorialized on 5 December: As the people are ready to confront their post-election hardship, a dark tide of helplessness is descending on the nation. They know their government is heading in the wrong direction. They are pessimistic about their own individual futures, fully aware that the government will not do anything to help them. The government party is sinking fast, but the opposition does not rise to the occasion, despite the almost quixotic but highly creditable effort on the part of its leader Ma Ying-jeou. The best he did was to retain the allegiance of hardcore Kuomintang supporters. Problems on the one side do not lead to a resurgence of the other. Ma, mayor of Taipei and the odds-on favorite for the KMT s presidential nomination (he was elected KMT chairman in July 2005), tried to seize the moment to press forward a proactive cross-strait agenda. He characterized the realization of the three links meaning primarily, by now, direct cross-strait transportation links as not 4

5 only urgent but necessary. And in a discerning casting of the issue that implicitly predicted the direction in which Chen would eventually move, business leaders on the island reportedly said trade should be normalized as quickly as possible, not tightened up. 12 The PRC seemed generally satisfied that the election results would contain what they saw as Chen s persistent independence tendencies. They publicly characterized the elections as reflecting the hope of Taiwan citizens to maintain social stability, economic development and peaceful and stable relations with the Mainland. But the State Council s Taiwan Affairs Office also warned that Chen Shui-bian s proposed second phase of constitutional reform was the biggest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region. 13 Chen Reemerges, Presses For Political Change The election result was universally seen as a resounding defeat for President Chen, whose approval rating just after the election dropped to between 12.6 and 21 percent while disapproval rose to percent. 14 After a post-election period in which he maintained a very low, almost invisible, profile (he is said to have gone into seclusion for nine days), Chen reemerged in late December to say that he had been reflecting hard since the election, and that the result of his musings would be manifest in his 1 January address to the nation a speech he described as more significant than either of his inaugural addresses. 15 Chen used that speech to deliver a hard-hitting message focused on Taiwanese consciousness and democratization, arguing that issues concerning national identity are an inescapable reality that must be confronted and addressed. 16 He bemoaned as a heartbreaking and humiliating predicament the fact that circumstances forbid us from saying out loud consistently the name of our country... our country, Taiwan. Chen s approach seemed to manifest his determination to win back the support of the DPP base that had deserted him over the accusations of poor governance and corruption, and it was not to be his last effort in this regard. Foreshadowing the controversial step he would take within a month with respect to the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines, Chen expressed tolerance for the statement by a party chairman (i.e., Ma) that unification was his party s ultimate goal. But, he went on, [w]hat cannot be tolerated is any attempt to deprive the people of their freedom to choose, as such deprivation violates the principle of popular sovereignty. Linking Ma with Beijing, he said no leeway would be given for either the KMT or the Chinese Communist Party to establish an undemocratic premise or impose a set of choices that precludes democratic freedom or that contravenes the principles of sovereignty, democracy, peace, and parity. Further laying the groundwork for his later move on the NUC/NUG front, Chen cited several steps Beijing had taken to strengthen its military threat to Taiwan, including 5

6 adoption of a three-stage plan encompassing preparation for war against Taiwan in order to ensure victory in a decisive battle by As became evident later on, Chen viewed these changes as representing an intention to use force against Taiwan, thereby invalidating the premise of his five noes inaugural pledge. 17 Chen struck two other themes in the New Year s address that would continue to resonate. First, he cited the growing risks of cross-strait trade and investment liberalization for Taiwan s sustained economic development. He announced a revision of the previous proactive liberalization and effective management approach, standing it on its head so that it was now proactive management and effective liberalization. The purpose was not to cut off cross-strait economic flows entirely, an unachievable, selfdefeating goal. However, fulfilling the fears of the business community, he clearly aimed to put a governor on them. In addition, while identifying six priority areas for reform over the remaining two years of his presidency, 18 Chen reaffirmed the special importance he placed on constitutional reform or reengineering, as he had come to call it. The result, which he dubbed Taiwan s New Constitution, was to be timely, relevant, and viable. Although committing himself yet again to follow the very high-bar constitutional amendment procedures which require a three-fourths affirmative vote in the legislature and approval by half of all eligible voters in a national referendum Chen also reiterated his call for a grassroots approach. As he put it in a later interview: Taiwan is a democratic and plural society. The freedom of speech is guaranteed. We must also respect dissenting opinions. 19 So far, so good. The problem came with the implications of his additional statement: The government has an open mind. Chen had explicitly proposed in his second inaugural that sensitive issues related to sovereignty, territory, and unification/independence be excluded from the constitutional reengineering project. 20 Now, however, he took the position that no topic could be excluded from discussion in a democratic process that holds the constitution to be the collective mandate of the people. He also argued accurately, in this observer s view that radical amendments have no prospect of passing, given the stringent ratification requirements, and he later reaffirmed that he would absolutely abide by the promises and pledges I have made to the U.S. Government and the U.S. president. 21 But by setting up a process where such issues are likely to arise indeed, where he seems to be inviting and even inciting them he began to raise serious doubts about whether he would live up to that commitment. In Taiwan, reactions to the New Year s speech broke along predictable lines. On one side, opposition spokesmen called it tremendously unintelligent and the wrong treatment for improving Taiwan s woeful political situation. 22 On the other, a pro-green newspaper editorialized that, through the speech, the administration had finally attained a degree of strategic clarity about the role and goals of the DPP government and how to get the needed popular support to achieve at least some of its goals. 23 Unsurprisingly, political analysts predicted an uneasy political year ahead. 6

7 In his own New Year s address, Hu Jintao talked of Taiwan policy at some length in standard terms. 24 And when the PRC reacted to Chen s speech several days later, it also did so in firm but still customary language, expressing a desire for peace, stability and more exchanges, while firmly rejecting any movement toward Taiwan independence. 25 This time, Chen s speech caught U.S. attention. In response, a State Department statement stressed the American expectation that Chen would keep his promises and take no steps in the constitutional amendment process that could be interpreted as crossing Beijing s red lines on independence, leading to confrontation. 26 Ironically (in light of later events), no particular attention was focused on the fifth no : not to abolish the National Unification Council and Guidelines. Senior Taiwan spokesmen spent time trying to assert that, while the State Department statement showed the United States was concerned about Chen s New Year s speech, Washington had not protested and its attitude remained moderate and neutral. 27 They pointed the finger of responsibility for the confrontation at Beijing, citing the Anti-Secession Law of March 2005 and a series of other developments since that had shown the PRC was antagonistic and had no interest in dealing with the Chen administration. As Chiou I-jen, secretary-general of the National Security Council, put it: We know that Beijing would like to continue ignoring the popularly elected government. Beijing may think that the strategy is quite successful, but their lack of respect promoted [sic] President Chen to urge the Taiwanese people to ditch their fantasies about China. 28 In mid-january, partially in response to a Newsweek interview in which KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou had affirmed the KMT s policy of seeking ultimate unification with the Mainland, 29 Chen Shui-bian said such a position totally contravenes the democratic principle of honoring the people s right to sovereignty. 30 And he argued that the PRC had not only the intention and capability but an operational plan to defeat Taiwan militarily. 31 As time wore on, he sought to imply that the United States shared his assessment as reflected in repeated U.S. statements of concern that Beijing was working to tilt the military balance in the Mainland s direction. 32 Building on this view, when he met with supporters on the Lunar New Year at the end of the month, Chen argued that the National Unification Council and Guidelines were not only moribund as they failed to reflect the view of the vast majority of Taiwan s people but that their very existence was problematic, since they were aimed specifically at achieving a predetermined goal of unification and even accepted the intolerable one China principle. The president cited the demand of various people for their abrogation and said this should be considered in earnest and handled properly in a suitable period. 33 This declaration clearly came as a shock to Washington, renewing concern and even anger that Chen was pulling surprises on potentially dangerous cross-strait issues without considering U.S. equities, and that he was breaking pledges to the United States 7

8 in the process. The State Department issued a formulaic statement the next day, 34 but the message to both sides of the Strait was as much in its speed, formality, and coldness as in its exact wording. Moreover, as time went on, the United States intensified its efforts and broadened the focus of its criticism. There were credible but unconfirmed reports that a senior NSC staff member and State Department official 35 went to Taipei in mid-february to try to persuade Chen not to abolish the Council and Guidelines. When it was evident this had failed, and as the eve of the decision approached with preparations for PRC president Hu Jintao s visit to Washington ramping up a State Department spokesman identified the substantive nub of U.S. concern, which, he said, the United States was strenuously conveying to Taipei: We do not support Taiwan independence and we oppose steps by either side that raise tensions or alter the status quo as we define it. 36 Taipei scrambled to make the case that Chen s announcement did not represent a change in the status quo, but was, as Foreign Minister James Huang Chih-fang put it, a natural reaction to the PRC s relentless suppression of Taiwan. 37 Later on, officials in Taipei argued that, regarding the specific proposal to abolish the National Unification Council and Guidelines, the president was not only reflecting the will of the people on Taiwan not to be formally committed to unification, he was also complying with a resolution of the legislature calling for abolition of various non-standard presidential commissions that were operating without proper legislative mandate. 38 One of the purposes of Chen s move seems to have been to put the putative 2008 KMT presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, on the defensive, perhaps even forcing him to defend the KMT-imposed Council and Guidelines, which would not have stood him in good stead politically. But, in a rehearsal of a debate that is likely to last through the entire election campaign, while Ma continued to stand behind the KMT s position in favor of ultimate unification, he made clear that the final choice would be up to the people of Taiwan and that, in any case, no resolution of cross-strait relations unification or other would be feasible until many years down the road, when the PRC had democratized and become prosperous. Thus, Ma argued, Chen should stop taking steps that only antagonized the United States and alarmed Beijing, and should focus instead on the pressing economic and social needs of the people of Taiwan. 39 The PRC continued to castigate Chen for raising tensions and seeking to bring about de jure independence through constitutional revision by the time he leaves office in 2008, but, by and large, Beijing remained calm. As Yu Keli, director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, confidently put it: Chen s attempt to seek Taiwan independence would never win support from the people on the island, nor would he succeed. 40 This modulated response contrasted sharply with the excited reaction to Chen s various proposals for constitutional change, referenda, and other separatist steps in the course of the 2004 presidential and legislative elections. This difference was due to far greater PRC confidence not only in its own gathering attraction (and clout) for people in 8

9 Taiwan but also, crucially, in the willingness and capability of the United States to keep Taipei on the straight and narrow. As a showdown approached, President Chen came out publicly on 22 February for abolishing the Council, labeling it an absurd product of an absurd era. 41 The proposed step generated turmoil all along the political spectrum in Taiwan. Some in Chen s own party had already questioned the wisdom of stirring things up this way, 42 and in the wake of his statement the opposition threatened to bring a motion of censure in the legislature, 43 a ploy that was, however, quickly abandoned. Chen Acts On the National Unification and Guidelines On 27 February 2006, Chen formally announced that the National Unification Council would cease to function and the Guidelines would cease to apply. 44 This fig-leaf phraseology was the product of intense negotiations with the United States, and seemed to satisfy Washington or at least part of Washington because it avoided the term abolish. Although the Chinese term used for cease to function and cease to apply carried the substantive meaning of terminate, the United States appeared to believe that, since the agreement was negotiated in English, the English terminology took precedence. Reflecting the negotiated arrangement, U.S. spokesmen voiced support for the outcome, but they ducked on the question of whether this step changed the status quo, and expressed a degree of wariness about next steps: [I]t s our understanding that President Chen did not abolish it [the NUC] and he reaffirmed Taiwan s commitment to the status quo. We attach great importance to that commitment and we ll be following his follow-through carefully. 45 An astute reporter asked whether Chen would pay a price for his insistence on playing with the wording rather than backing away altogether from taking action on the Council and Guidelines. The spokesman responded: I don t know what that [paying a price] means. Later developments suggested what it meant. China s rhetorical reaction was harsh, but, citing the March 2005 Anti-Secession Law, Beijing tellingly reserved its most serious warnings for what it described as the rising risk and danger of pushing independence through constitutional reform. 46 PRC officials also made a point of cautioning the United States to fully realize the gravity and danger of Chen s aims and to take concrete actions to oppose them, making concerted efforts with China to maintain sound Sino-American relations and peace and stability in the Strait. 47 Lest anyone in the broader international community mistake the seriousness of the issue, the PRC sent a letter to UN secretary-general Kofi Annan accusing Taiwan of advancing its independence agenda and challenging cross-strait peace by its action on the Council and Guidelines. 48 9

10 At the same time, Beijing reiterated the central importance of Hu Jintao s four points as laid out on 5 March: one China, peaceful reunification, pinning hopes on the Taiwan people, and opposing Taiwan independence. 49 PRC premier Wen Jiabao also cited Beijing s consistent adherence to peaceful reunification, one country, two systems and former president Jiang Zemin s eight-point proposal for developing cross- Strait relations and promoting peaceful reunification. 50 Still, the most important reaction was that in Taiwan itself. As already noted, among the many assessments of why Chen took this step, one of the more credible was that, in addition to seeking to provoke a PRC reaction he could play against, he sought to box in KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou, forcing Ma to endorse the KMT-created Council and Guidelines, thus risking his popularity with the Taiwan electorate. In fact, Ma dodged that bullet. Although his first reaction was reportedly to consider supporting a motion of recall, 51 he soon dropped that, arguing, as he had before, that any resolution of cross- Strait relations was a long way off, that the KMT favored ultimate unification only after China was democratic and prosperous, and that, in any case, the choice would be up to the people. At this point, he said once again, Chen should stop playing political games and attend to the urgent economic, health, education, and welfare issues facing Taiwan s people. 52 Ma stressed these same themes throughout his nine-day visit to the United States in late March in an effort to win American support and understanding (as well as to disarm criticism of the KMT position on arms sales, discussed toward the end of this essay). Pro-independence media predictably hailed Chen s action as having historical significance for the people of Taiwan and said the cessation of the NUC and NUG marked the final termination of the most important remaining illegitimate relics of the era of authoritarian rule by the former ruling Kuomintang. 53 A former deputy directorgeneral of Chen s National Security Council, however, suggested that, while Taiwan s internal abstract space might seem bigger, external substantive space will only shrink. The loss, he judged, will outweigh the gain. 54 The spotlight quickly focused back on the U.S.-Taiwan dynamic, as it was reported that senior Taipei officials had said there was no difference between abolishing the National Unification Council and having it cease to function. Although Taiwan later denied any such statements had been made, 55 the State Department, no doubt partially with an eye to Beijing s reaction, called for Taipei publicly to correct the record and unambiguously affirm that the February 27 announcement did not abolish the National Unification Council and did not change the status quo, and that the assurances remain in effect. Having tried to avoid the question of whether abolishing the NUC and NUG would change the status quo, Washington finally came down on the issue: Abrogating an assurance would be changing the status quo. 56 After several instances of U.S. officials repeating the call for Taipei to unambiguously clarify its position, the issue eventually slipped from the front pages. However, Taipei never entirely cleared the air on this issue and Washington s anger and suspicion over Taiwan s word games did not fully dissipate. Senator John Warner (R- 10

11 VA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, went so far as to warn that, if conflict were precipitated by just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I m not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem, 57 a statement that contrasted sharply with President Bush s declaration five years earlier that the United States was ready to do whatever it takes to defend Taiwan. President Chen pledged again that there would be no accidents or surprises: There will be no change in the commitments that I ve made to the U.S. government, to President (George) Bush, he told the newly arrived U.S. representative, AIT Director Stephen M. Young. 58 He persisted in defending his action regarding the National Unification Council and Guidelines as aimed merely at bolstering Taiwan s freedom to choose our own destiny and consolidating and deepening Taiwan s democracy, rather than at moving toward de jure independence. 59 But he also continued to plug for a bottom-up, outside-in constitutional revision process and said we should adopt an open attitude regarding these sensitive issues of whether to change the national moniker, national territory, or national flag. 60 As noted earlier, this was in direct contradiction of his May 2004 inaugural pledge and it again raised red flags in Washington about Chen s dedication to upholding previous commitments on sensitive issues affecting cross-strait relations. A State Department spokesman responded: The leadership of Taiwan has made public commitments with regard to its cross-straits policy. Those commitments are well known. We appreciate them and we take them seriously and we expect that they ll be sustained... They ve made those commitments we hold them to them. 61 While it sought to contain Chen Shui-bian s provocative actions, the Bush administration also continued to focus on the other side of the equation, raising questions about the size of the PRC s military buildup. In an echo of controversial remarks by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Singapore in June 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice termed China s intentions concerning and said that the United States and others needed to make sure that we re looking at a Chinese military buildup that is not outsized for China s regional ambitions and interests. 62 President Chen found some support in this for his argument that it was the PRC (not Taiwan) that was changing the status quo. He was also heartened by the remarks of a senior Pentagon official that U.S. policy opposes unilateral changes in the Taiwan Strait status quo by either party. The PLA military build-up changes that status quo, and cited them in a press interview. 63 Taiwan s Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations These developments clearly energized the debate over Taiwan s cross-strait policy. It was also in this period that Ma Ying-jeou emerged as the KMT s spokesman on national policies. In speeches during his trips to Europe and the United States in February and March, Ma began to give more substance to his long-standing position that cross-strait relations must be grounded in the 1992 Consensus, which he claimed he had created and which he said should be understood as one China, respective interpretations. 64 He even endorsed Chen s five noes (which Chen, of course, had by now cast into 11

12 considerable doubt) but also went beyond them to put forth a positive agenda for cross- Strait relations, including negotiation of a long-term interim peace accord and reaching a modus vivendi over Taiwan s international space. 65 All of this generated strong responses back and forth between Ma and Chen, including at their televised meeting on 3 April This set of issues will be the focus of later CLM analyses. Meanwhile, the reasonably high-profile treatment accorded Ma by the U.S. government when he visited Washington in March was obviously meant to signal Chen that American patience was running out and, if he did not pay closer attention to U.S. interests, Washington had visible ways of indicating its displeasure. 66 As one perceptive PRC analyst put it, this treatment indicated American attitudes toward Chen rather than any wholehearted embrace of Ma or the KMT. 67 And although statements on China policy by Rice and Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick over the next several weeks did not dwell on Taiwan, per se, the dramatic turn of events surrounding President Chen s proposed transit of the United States in early May showed that it had not disappeared from the American official consciousness. An intervening event that helped keep it there was the visit by PRC president Hu Jintao to Washington on April 20. President Hu Comes to Washington In his welcoming statement on the South Lawn, 68 President Bush recited pretty much the entire mantra of the U.S. one China policy. Beyond opposing unilateral steps by either side to change the status quo, he underscored that we urge all parties to avoid confrontational or provocative acts. 69 President Hu responded, also in largely standard terms, noting that President Bush had stated on various occasions that you... oppose Taiwan independence. 70 In their comments to the press in the Oval Office after their meeting, President Bush took the initiative to note, We spent time talking about Taiwan, and I assured the President my position has not changed. I do not support independence for Taiwan. 71 In response, President Hu again went through the PRC mantra on Taiwan, but then went on to reveal a bit more of what Bush had said: President Bush gave us his understanding of the Chinese concerns. He reiterated the American positions and said that he does not hope that moves taken by the Taiwan authorities to change the status quo will upset the China-U.S. relationship. 72 Having exhibited considerable nervousness about what might transpire during the Hu visit that could affect Taiwan s interests, and having apparently worked hard to ensure that references to Taiwan independence were linked to do not support rather than oppose, Taipei breathed a collective sigh of relief. President Chen even thanked President Bush for not allow[ing] China to score on the Taiwan issue and for having made no comments that would take Taiwan by surprise. 73 Even KMT spokesmen thought the controversy over the National Unification Council and Guidelines was over

13 But, although it is clear that Beijing was disappointed not to obtain a clearer public statement from Bush regarding his opposition to Taiwan independence, and perhaps even an endorsement of peaceful reunification, Taipei s exultation seems to have reflected a bit of a wishful thinking. By emphasizing in the welcoming ceremony his opposition to provocations, and by volunteering his attitude toward Taiwan independence in the Oval Office, Bush was expressing in very clear ways that he did not share Chen Shui-bian s benign characterization of what the Taiwan president had been up to. This impression was deepened during the readout of the meetings by NSC officials, who stressed that the president had made a very strong statement about where he is on Taiwan, reiterating a clear and consistent position, which, they said, the Chinese president appreciated. 75 By way of contrast, it was evident that Bush said nothing about the PRC military buildup opposite Taiwan beyond the vague allusions to restraint by both sides in his South Lawn statement. The point was not that the United States didn t care about the buildup, but that it was currently not nearly as problematic in the president s view as what he saw coming out of Taiwan. Because of various gaffes during the Hu visit, reports have emerged of smoldering Chinese anger in response to what Beijing is said to believe were calculated insults. 76 This characterization seems exaggerated. While the Hu party surely was upset, and the PRC embassy almost apoplectic, most especially over the presence of a disruptive Falun Gong protestor at the South Lawn ceremony, PRC briefings given in the wake of the trip, and private conversations with Hu and his senior aides, stand in stark contrast to that reporting. Whatever the level of anger, China was determined to cast the results in very positive terms. In his speech at Yale, Hu said that he and Bush had agreed to promote a constructive relationship of cooperation between our two countries in the 21st century. 77 Hu s foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, described the visit as of milestone importance to bilateral relations. As to their discussion of Taiwan, one has to assume some exaggeration in the Xinhua report of Li s claim that China and the United States agreed to take joint steps to safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. 78 Collaboration on Taiwan questions has been a long-term PRC goal, but one that the United States has steadfastly rejected. Nonetheless, the two governments do share the goal of avoiding any move by Taipei in the direction of formal independence. In the meantime, in a 25 April Wall Street Journal interview (and again two days later with Sankei Shimbun 79 ), President Chen reasserted Taiwan s independent, sovereign status, a position that had led to sharp criticism from the Bush administration in past years. He went on to say: [F]or the past 50 years, it has been abundantly clear to the world that there is only one China. Indeed, there is only one China, a totalitarian China. But at the same time, there is also a democratic Taiwan. For the past half-century, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait has been that there is one democratic Taiwan and one 13

14 totalitarian China, and neither of these two has had effective jurisdiction over the other. Each has its own national moniker, national flag, constitution, government, armed forces, and judicial system. Indeed, they are two separate countries. 80 Chen s Proposed Transits of the United States As these various strands were playing out, plans were being developed for Chen Shuibian s trip to Paraguay and Costa Rica in May. He applied for transits of the United States each way, reportedly asking for overnight stops in San Francisco and New York. Instead, he was offered brief refueling stops in Honolulu and Anchorage. While intense negotiations between Washington and Taipei ran on till the last minute (in fact, so late that they led to a delay in Chen s departure), Beijing made clear its predictable opposition. Its foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, proclaimed: We will... not allow Taiwan leaders to make use of so-called transit diplomacy to sabotage ties between China and other countries. 81 Beijing apparently gave some muscle to this approach when, after Chen decided not to stop in the United States on his outward-bound leg, it blocked the Taiwan leader s preferred alternate stop in Beirut, forcing him to land in Abu Dhabi, instead, and then to take a lengthy detour via Amsterdam. Despite accusations in Taipei that the ultimate U.S. decision to restrict Chen so severely was due to PRC pressure, this was not the case. It is true that U.S. relations with the PRC always provide important background music to dealings with Taiwan. After all, if it weren t for the requirement to have a one China policy in order to maintain constructive relations with Beijing, U.S. policy toward Taiwan would be quite different. But that is hardly a new factor, and within the context of unofficial American relations with Taiwan since 1979, and despite the broadening U.S. agenda with Beijing, Washington has been rather consistent in backing Taiwan in terms of security assistance and in other ways. It is also possible that the sour notes struck during the Hu visit in the form of the multiple gaffes conditioned the White House s approach to not roiling U.S.-PRC waters further. But the most salient factor was that Chen s policies were seen as potentially rocking the boat, endangering American interests. That perception came against the history of the previous six years, when at several points Taipei was seen to act on its own domestic political imperatives without sufficient attention to the vital interests of the United States. U.S. signals regarding its discomfort with Chen s steps since January and a desire for some reassurance about Taiwan s policy directions between now and 2008 seemed not to penetrate Taipei policy circles. Even the high-profile reception given to Ma Ying-jeou was explained away in Taipei. 82 So there was a perceived need to send a stronger, more direct signal of U.S. concern, not just in response to the actions taken so far, but because of what they portended for the future

15 As Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick put it in his testimony before the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) on 10 May 2006, [What] one... has to be careful about is that, when some political figures who ve got their own competitive politics, just like we have in this country, decide they want to either change their word, or go back from something, or push the edge of an envelope that could lead to conflict, well, then, yes, our government will respond. 84 Washington had anticipated that President Chen might refuse to transit the United States when the full range of restrictions was revealed, but it was something of a surprise when, having announced he would transit Anchorage, he abruptly changed plans and ended up in a 37-hour detour via the United Arab Emirates and the Netherlands. He recouped some of his lost sense of dignity when he was able to stop in Libya and Indonesia on the way home, but his handling of the transit issue became a topic of heated debate in Taiwan along with questions about how to manage relations with the United States over the next two years. Some people have already speculated that Chen will try to play these events as the victimization of Taiwan at the hands of both the United States and the PRC which he has blamed for the U.S. decision and hence adopt even more problematic positions. It is clear he will adopt such a stance with regard to the PRC, having already referred to Beijing s brutally and savagely blocking Taiwan officials from both transits and overseas visits, and vowing, We will not be defeated but will become bolder. 85 Taking on the United States, as well, would have obvious appeal for some socalled dark Green supporters, 86 but it is far from certain that confronting the United States over these events would appeal to even the light Green supporters, much less to anyone in the pan-blue camp. 87 In any event, so far Chen has stuck to his position that this series of events will have no harmful effect on U.S.-Taiwan relations, including on plans for arms purchases. And he recently reassured a former Bush administration official that he would continue to steadfastly cooperate with the United States for the common interests of the two countries. 88 Political Turmoil in Taiwan, Reembracing the United States In late May, Taipei once again descended into political turmoil. The detention of Chen Shui-bian s son-in-law on charges of insider trading, and accusations aired against Chen s wife for accepting large sums of money, led the president to announce he was turning day-to-day management of government fully over to premier Su Tseng-chang and stepping back from any DPP party activities. Chen made clear, however, that he was holding on to those powers specifically granted to the president by the constitution, including with respect to foreign and national security policy and management of cross- Strait relations, and he later described the moves as some changes to the technical issues relating to the coordination of administrative and ruling party operations

16 These steps did not quell calls by the opposition pan-blue forces for Chen to resign, nor did they bring comfort to many pan-green partisans who now saw Chen as an albatross around their necks as they faced important elections between now and The pan-blues tabled a motion of recall against the president in mid-june. While most people saw this as unlikely to succeed it needed support of two-thirds of the legislature, where the opposition had only a one-vote majority, and in a referendum it would need backing from over half of Taiwan s eligible voters many felt it would further undermine Chen s political power and enhance opposition prospects in forthcoming elections. In the meantime, plans were also mulled for a possible resolution of no confidence in the Su Tseng-chang government, which would need only a simple majority of the legislature to pass. This calculation was complicated, however, by uncertainty over how Chen would respond. He would have a choice of either appointing a new premier or dissolving the legislature and calling for new elections. New elections would seem appealing to the opposition in the abstract, since the pan-greens are suffering badly in public opinion, but such elections would be conducted under new provisions adopted in 2005, under which half of the seats in the legislature are being abolished. Thus, not only pan-green members would lose their offices, so would a substantial number of pan-blue members. KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou at first resisted supporting the recall motion, and relied instead on pressing Chen to step down voluntarily, a step backed by almost half of Taiwan s people, according to polls. 91 Eventually, however, in an apparent effort to keep control of the party, Ma backed the motion despite its dim prospects of success. As of this writing in mid-june, the legislature was in the midst of the recall procedure with a vote scheduled for the end of the month, and next steps were yet to be determined. The one thing that did seem certain was that, if credible evidence developed to prove the as yet unsubstantiated allegations against the First Lady, pressure on Chen to resign would come from his own party as well as from the opposition. On 8 June, Chen met with visiting AIT chairman Raymond F. Burghardt. Chen s office issued an English-language statement after that meeting saying that his promises to President Bush and the United States, including the four noes, have never been changed since his first inauguration in 2000, and will not be altered either in the next two years. It also said Chen told Burghardt that Taiwan s constitutional reform would touch upon neither the sovereignty issue nor the alteration of national territory and title. 92 The Chinese-language version of the report, however, which was much more complete, 93 made clear that the reiteration of the four noes also included a reiteration of the precondition that they applied only as long as the PRC had no intention to attack Taiwan. Since Chen has already declared that precondition null and void, in fact this represented no real advance on what he had said many times in the preceding months. Chen s statement to Burghardt on exclusions from constitutional reform also differed from his inaugural statement, but it was close enough to take as a reiteration of the earlier position

17 In any event, the United States chose to seize on these statements as a reaffirmation of the four noes, ignoring the issue of the precondition. The State Department issued a statement specifying the pledges Chen had declared or reaffirmed to Burghardt and seeking to nail them to the door: The United States attaches profound importance to these pledges, which are a cornerstone of cross-strait peace and stability. 95 The statement called on Beijing to match this important contribution to stability by taking parallel steps to fulfill its obligations for regional peace and stability, including by reaching out to Taiwan s duly elected leaders. The PRC has responded to all of this with a few news reports about developments on the recall motion, but little more. In fact, there were reports that the Central Propaganda Department in Beijing on 9 June issued an order that PRC media not publish any commentary on Taiwan s political situation. 96 Presumably this reflected the judgment not only that any outcome had costs as well as benefits for the Mainland, but also that any comment could be used by Chen and the DPP to rally opinion in their favor. At the same time, the two sides announced progress on various chartered passenger and cargo flights, which was hailed as a major step toward the opening of regular cross-strait flights. 97 Moreover, there were broad hints that agreement on opening up Taiwan to Mainland tourists was in the offing, and Taiwan s vice premier, Tsai Ingwen, suggested that further liberalization of overall cross-strait trade policy was likely. A conference on policy options and initiatives for Taiwan s sustainable economic growth, to be held July, has been cited by many people as an occasion when further liberalization steps will be proposed, 98 and Premier Su Tseng-chang has promised to implement with full vigor and urgency any consensus coming out of that meeting. 99 All of this reinforces the notion that, although President Chen announced his new proactive management, effective opening policy early in the year, most signs so far have pointed to business as usual or even a certain level of liberalization of the rules for cross-strait investment. 100 Even before Chen turned over certain powers to Su, some observers saw the cabinet seizing the initiative from the president, and believed that a more moderate approach would prevail. On the other hand, the details of the program for effective opening are yet to be announced, and they reportedly will include greater government scrutiny of large investments in the Mainland and of those that involve sensitive technology. While tourism from the Mainland as a whole may open up, limits on PRC visitors from certain areas could also be tightened. And there are reports that negotiations over zero tariffs for Taiwan agricultural exports to the Mainland have broken down over Taipei s insistence on including particular officials in the Taiwan delegation. 101 Meanwhile, on the other side of the coin, Taipei reportedly plans to offer loans and other preferential treatment to attract investment back to Taiwan from the Mainland