INFOSERIES. Afghanistan: Canada and the intra-nato dialogue. The Manley Report IN OCTOBER 2001, CANADIAN NAVY WARSHIPS

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1 Afghanistan: Canada and the intra-nato dialogue IN OCTOBER 2001, CANADIAN NAVY WARSHIPS were deployed to the Arabian Sea to support the efforts of a US led international coalition to invade Afghanistan and topple the Taliban regime. In early 2002, Canada deployed 850 troops to Kandahar as part of the coalition ground forces, which by that time had driven the Taliban from power. In 2003, Canada sent a second contingent of about 1,750 troops to join the UN mandated, NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide security in Kabul and the surrounding region. In August 2005, the Canadian contingent was redeployed to Kandahar to take over a Provincial Reconstruction Team. A full infantry battlegroup was added in the spring of 2006 to provide security throughout Kandahar Province. This brought Canada s Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF AFG) to about 2,500 personnel. Meanwhile, the Canadian Embassy was reopened in Kabul in 2003; it now has a staff of over 30 diplomats and five development officers. The military mission has met with continued tactical success, but not without cost. Concentrations of insurgent forces have been defeated wherever they have been found, but 82 soldiers and one diplomat have been killed in Afghanistan since Despite these losses, intervention in Afghanistan has remained Canada s top international priority. However, in view of the planned expiry of the mission at the end of January 2009, the government decided to seek advice on the way forward. The Manley Report The Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan 1 was created in October 2007 to advise government on options for the mission after February Chaired by former Deputy Prime Minister John Manley, the panel carried out wideranging consultations in Canada and abroad, and travelled to Afghanistan to assess the situation on the ground. Its report, released on 22 January 2008, characterizes the context of the Afghan mission; sketches the origins, experience and achievements of Canada s engagement; and provides recommendations on Canada s future role in Afghanistan. 2 The Panel s key conclusion was that it could find no operational logic that would justify ending the Canadian military mission at the end of February In fact, it said that a premature military withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether full or partial, would imperil Canadian interests and values. Moreover, the Panel stated that Canadian objectives in Afghanistan are honourable and achievable. 4 The Panel suggested that the mission be extended indefinitely, subject to certain conditions, and called for the adoption of a more comprehensive strategy. Specifically, it thought Canada should work diplomatically to bring more coherence and coordination to the overall international effort in Afghanistan. It also recommended that the Prime Minister personally lead this effort, supported by a special Cabinet committee formed specifically for this purpose and by a single full time task force to coordinate interdepartmental activity. To address the obvious shortage of NATO troops in southern Afghanistan, the Panel proposed that any extension of Canada s military commitment should be contingent on the deployment to Kandahar province of another battle group (approximately 1,000 troops) by one or more ISAF countries. It also proposed that the extension of the mission be conditional on the Canadian government s provision, by February 2009, of medium lift helicopters and high performance uninhabited aerial vehicles for the JTF AFG. Should these conditions be met, the JTF AFG would be able to accelerate the mentoring and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with a view to possibly transferring security responsibility for Kandahar Province to the ANSF by 2011, the date when the Afghan Compact expires. PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE PUBLICATION PRB 08-02E, 22 APRIL 2008

2 AFGHANISTAN INFOSERIES Prime Minister Stephen Harper said that the government broadly accepted the Panel s recommendations and that it specifically agreed with the recommendation to extend Canada s mission in Afghanistan if the conditions mentioned in the report were met. Speaking in Ottawa to the Conference of Defence Associations on 21 February 2008, the Prime Minister previewed a new motion, recently put before Parliament, that called for an extension of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan subject to the military conditions laid out in the Manley Report. The Manley Report recognizes that Canada is one of 39 (now 40) nations contributing forces to the NATO led ISAF and one of 51 countries committed to the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. 5 It discusses the more inadequate aspects of the international community s efforts in security, governance and development. It is frank in its criticism of NATO and the Afghan government for the apparent lack of a comprehensive strategy and related measurable benchmarks. It expresses dissatisfaction with some NATO governments who have placed operational limitations on their forces, and also clearly points out the lack of cohesiveness in the coordination of military and civilian activity. US criticism The issue of burden sharing within NATO, although not new, received a burst of attention when, in testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 February 2008, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the unwillingness of some member states to risk combat casualties was threatening NATO s future and undermining the prosecution of the Afghan war. I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people s security, and others who are not, Gates said. It puts a cloud over the future of the alliance if this is to endure and perhaps get even worse. 6 Within NATO, some consider that the future of NATO depends on success in Afghanistan, but there are also those who view that future as resting on much more than the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. The intra-nato dialogue As helpful as the Manley Report has been in initiating more informed debate of Canada s mission in Afghanistan, there are lingering complaints that too many people are still looking at Afghanistan through a straw, focusing only on Canadian activity and ignoring the fact that these efforts do not constitute an independent campaign but are only one element albeit a significant one of the broader NATO led campaign. Recognizing that the Canadian mission is required to work with and among our NATO allies, along with many non NATO partners, it may be of some value to consider how other NATO countries view Canada s circumstances in Kandahar and Canada s conditions for staying there. The Brussels conference. Over 100 parliamentarians from NATO member countries met in Brussels on February 2008 to examine a variety of issues, chief among which was the situation in Afghanistan. At a joint meeting of the Defence and Security, Economic and Security and Political Committees of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, delegates discussed Afghanistan among themselves; held a joint meeting with members of the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters; and received briefings from the Commander Joint Force Brunssum, General Egon Ramms, who oversees the operations of ISAF. Throughout these meetings, Canadian delegates repeatedly raised the central items of the Manley Report; their European colleagues politely acknowledged the report but declined to discuss its content in any formal way. However, Canada s call for more troops and other support consistently acted as a catalyst for vigorous discussion of the broader notion of burden sharing within the Alliance, and led to an airing of concerns about whether the spirit of Article 5 was being heeded and about the apparent lack of a determined, comprehensive military strategy. 7 The United States, United Kingdom and Canada persistently called for more effort. So did France, Germany and Spain, but the detail of their arguments was not entirely the same as that of the former group. Other countries called for a more energetic and 2 (PRB 08-02E) PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE

3 AFGHANISTAN united effort, declaring that the war in Afghanistan was certainly winnable. However, throughout all this, it was apparent that as much as they seemed to want to help in Afghanistan, Canada s European allies were also preoccupied with matters closer to home. One development that quietly caught the attention of Canadian delegates was an indication that President Sarkozy of France might be interested in bringing his country back into NATO that is, into full membership within the NATO military command structure. France has always provided military liaison teams at all NATO military headquarters, and a French officer commands KFOR in Kosovo, but France remains officially outside the NATO military chain. The French Permanent Representative said that one vehicle for such a development might be the deployment of additional French troops to Afghanistan; indeed, only days earlier the Canadian government had dispatched a high level delegation to Paris to explore just such a possibility for the Canadian area of Kandahar. Various issues in addition to Afghanistan remain prominent on the NATO agenda, many of which present a potential, and perhaps imminent, threat to European security. A resurgent Russia is challenging NATO airspace and maritime approaches. NATO dialogue with Georgia and Ukraine, which might lead to eventual NATO membership, is actively opposed by Russia. The involvement of Poland and the Czech Republic in the US ballistic missile defence program has elicited Russian threats to aim their strategic nuclear missiles at the two NATO allies, should they choose to proceed with the program. Finally, but certainly not least, are circumstances surrounding the recent declaration of independence by Kosovo. NATO members do not share a unanimous wish to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, and many feel that Balkan instability may once again declare itself. NATO therefore intends to keep its Kosovo Force (KFOR) in place. Other issues that occupied the agenda during the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings in Brussels, ranged from the enhancement of NATO partnerships beyond the Euro Atlantic area, through improvement of the NATO Russia relationship, to the continuing transformation of NATO to be able to address new security issues in the 21 st century. Despite the scope of these concerns, both NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Canadian General Ray Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, stressed at the Brussels conference that Afghanistan was NATO s operational priority. This fits nicely with Canada s view, but what about the priorities of other NATO allies? A quick review of the burden that is being carried by others might be instructive. 8 France fields over 1500 military personnel in Afghanistan, but also has 2,000 in Kosovo, 1,500 in Lebanon and 1,100 in Chad. Germany fields over 3,200 personnel in Afghanistan, and leads four Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the northern region; with less than 10% of the overall ISAF force strength, it secures more than 30% of Afghan territory In addition, over 2,400 German troops serve in Kosovo, as well as another 260 in the Horn of Africa. Nearly 2,900 Italian personnel support ISAF headquarters and the Regional Command Headquarters in the capital of Kabul. Italy also leads two Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the west. However, Italy also fields more than 2,200 troops in Kosovo and another 2,500 in Lebanon. Poland contributes about 1,100 personnel in Afghanistan, but has 900 in Iraq, 500 in Lebanon and 500 in the Balkans. Spain has 700 troops in Afghanistan, 1,100 in Lebanon, 1,000 in the Balkans and is coping with a simmering, violent Basque insurrection at home. The NATO parliamentary delegates to the Brussels conference were in general agreement that, while military action alone was insufficient and NATO s involvement in reconstruction activity was appropriate, the broader program of development was beyond NATO s role and resources. Effective development is thought to require more energetic leadership by the United Nations (UN), improved cooperation between NATO and the European Union (EU), and a better understanding of the inherent complexity of taking a comprehensive approach to the mission. 9 Delegates noted that NATO has changed from being a simple defence organization to a complex security organization. However, NATO remains a military organization and, as such, continues to impose certain burden sharing obligations on all members. PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE (PRB 08-02E) 3

4 AFGHANISTAN INFOSERIES From an operational perspective, General Ramms agreed with Canada s call for additional troops and capabilities in the southern region of Afghanistan, but not with the idea that national troops should be rotated in or out of their established areas of responsibility. He argued that the tactical value of leaving troops in place to establish long term relations with local Afghans is considerable and provides significant benefit to security, reconstruction and development efforts, and emphasized how difficult it has been to fill approved ISAF troop levels. NATO nations have consistently failed to provide adequate numbers of troops and capabilities in Afghanistan. NATO troop levels in Afghanistan are currently about 15% below the politically agreed minimum. Subsequent discussion. After the Brussels conference, various media reports continued to refer to the possibility of more French troops being deployed to Afghanistan, but now it was thought that they might go into the eastern provinces, along the border with Pakistan. This would supposedly release a good number of US troops, who might be redeployed to reinforce Canadian troops in Kandahar. 10 In fact, a 26 February 2008 article from the American Forces Press Service stated, Nearly a third of the 3,200 Marines scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan next month will be stationed in NATO s southern and western regional commands to train Afghan security forces to face upcoming threats. The bulk of the 1,000 outbound Marine trainers will be stationed at Regional Command South. 11 As welcome as this news may have been to Canadians, the rest of NATO felt there was more to the discussion. Overall, attention remained focused on the need for a clear, comprehensive NATO strategy in Afghanistan. 12 The addition of a few hundred troops here or there is not the most important item on the NATO s Afghanistan agenda. Most European delegates say the question is not how far, but simply how? 13 In the end, the difficult circumstances faced by Canada s military mission in Afghanistan were understood by NATO allies and, in some corners, generated a degree of sympathy, but this response was not strong enough to immediately produce the extra troops called for in the Manley Report. Although Canada s situation has been the subject of energetic discussion among NATO allies about the nature and extent of operational burden sharing in Afghanistan, most NATO allies view the conditions set out in the Manley Report as reflecting largely an internal Canadian debate. Privately, many allies thought the remedies sought by Canada would be forthcoming, but only through private diplomacy, not public debate. As it happened, the vigorous debate on burden sharing that took place at the Bucharest Summit provided Canada with a more favourable response. The Bucharest Summit. NATO heads of state met at a summit meeting in Bucharest, Romania, 2 4 April 2008, where a number of member states pledged additional troops and capabilities for ISAF. Most notably, a 700 man French infantry battalion would be deployed into Afghanistan s eastern provinces, thereby allowing the United States to redeploy approximately 1,000 troops to the Canadian zone in Kandahar province. Additional helicopter support and Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) support are also expected. Accordingly, Prime Minister Harper has been able to declare that Canada s conditions for remaining in Kandahar until 2011 have largely been met. 14 With political consensus at home and allied support abroad, the government can now look toward playing an effective role in an enhanced strategic effort in Afghanistan. The Bucharest Summit Declaration is clear in its intent for the Afghanistan mission. 15 It recognizes the requirement for a broader, more comprehensive strategic effort that includes all major partners and calls for the international community to work more closely together in taking a comprehensive approach in addressing the security challenges of today and tomorrow. The Declaration notes it is essential for all major international actors to act in a coordinated way, and to apply a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments in a concerted effort that takes into account their respective strengths and mandates. NATO has endorsed an Action Plan composed of a set of pragmatic proposals that aim to improve the coherent application of NATO s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilization and reconstruction. 4 (PRB 08-02E) PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE

5 AFGHANISTAN Consultations have begun among diplomatic and military officials from NATO and the United Nations, European Union, World Bank and important non NATO allies such as Australia to develop a more cohesive strategic effort in Afghanistan in which all partners can play their part more effectively and together achieve a synergy that has so far been lacking. As things have developed to this point, Canada remains committed to playing an important and effective role in Afghanistan. Jim Cox Political and Social Affairs Division 22 April Terms of reference, information on members, submissions, and other materials are available on the Panel s website at panel independant.ca. 2. Independent Panel on Canada s Future Role in Afghanistan, Report [Manley Report], Ottawa, January 2008, panel independant.ca/reporteng.html. 3. Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ann Scott Tyson and Josh White, Gates Hits NATO Allies Role in Afghanistan, Washington Post, 7 February 2008, p. A01, (accessed 18 April 2008). 7. Article 5 of the NATO Charter reads, The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. NATO website at (accessed February 2008). 8. See ISAF information webpage at (accessed February 2008). 9. The comprehensive approach is simply an international version of Canada s whole of government approach, in which it is recognized that many government departments and other international organizations have an important role to play in the overall development of Afghanistan. 10. CTV.ca, Bush to Harper: I ll provide troops for Afghanistan, 26/france_afghanistan_080225/ ?hub=World. 11. John J. Kruzel, General Discusses Marine Deployment to Afghanistan, American Forces Press Service, 26 February 2008, Mitch Potter, Europeans ponder the how of dealing with Afghanistan; Draft documents circulating among NATO allies ahead of April summit call for revamped strategy, Toronto Star, 27 February Ibid. 14. Mike Blanchfield, France fulfils Canada s wish for more troops Sarkozy commits another battalion to NATO s Afghanistan mission, Ottawa Citizen, 3 April 2008, 4dec 45ea 84ed c36903d6e The text of the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration is available at 049e.html. PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION AND RESEARCH SERVICE (PRB 08-02E) 5