PROGRAMME MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION OPERATIONS: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND OPTIONS

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1 PROGRAMME MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION OPERATIONS: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND OPTIONS Thursday 13 Sunday 16 March th WILTON PARK CONFERENCE In cooperation with Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) NATO Foreign and Commonwealth Office Synopsis What future role will counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations have in the security policies of allied governments? What are all the implications of these operations for military doctrine and capability requirements? How can countries generate adequate civilian expeditionary capability for them? How can national and multinational civil-military strategic planning and co-ordination for these operations be made more effective? In what ways do the trans-national and trans-dimensional characteristics of modern insurgencies, as seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, affect classic counter-insurgency goals such as winning hearts and minds? What might a long-term, strategic counter-insurgency plan for Afghanistan look like? THURSDAY 13 MARCH DEVELOPING A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION OPERATIONS WELCOME TO THE CONFERENCE Robert GRANT Programme Director, Wilton Park NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND IRREGULAR OPERATIONS What does strategic risk assessment forecast regarding the nature of future conflict? Will complex, persistent conflict stemming from state weakness or failure remain the predominant security challenge in coming decades, or could there be a major reemergence of state on state, conventional warfare? When and why should NATO countries and other allies engage in counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations? Under what conditions can these operations be successful, at acceptable cost? To what extent can early indirect intervention, for example through training and mentoring missions, help avoid the need for deployment of large intervention forces? Thomas MAHNKEN Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Washington DC Major General Robert RANQUET Deputy Director, Strategic Affairs (Policy), Ministry of Defence, Paris Tea and conference photograph

2 DEALING WITH COMPLEX CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS In what ways do the trans-national and trans-dimensional characteristics of modern insurgencies affect classic counter-insurgency goals such as winning hearts and minds? Are there alternative concepts for characterising and analysing these increasingly complex conflict environments? How can counter-insurgents control violence and provide security in environments where large-scale narcotics trafficking helps fuel insurgency? In what ways does a more classic counter-insurgency environment such as Colombia s differ from that of Iraq? How should responses differ? How solid are recent achievements, and what lies ahead? 1930 Drinks reception 2000 Dinner COLOMBIA AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY: STRATEGY, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND WAY FORWARD Juan Carlos PINZÓN Vice Minister of Defence for Strategy and Planning, Bogotá IRAQ OPERATIONS IN 2007: MUCH MORE THAN COIN? Emma SKY Special Advisor to Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Vice Chief of Staff (nominated), US Army and former Commanding General, Multi-National Corps - Iraq FRIDAY 14 MARCH BUILDING CAPACITY FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION OPERATIONS HOW SHOULD DOCTRINE EVOLVE? How can military doctrine better integrate with civilian-led tasks, and what can be done with host country governments to build "integrated missions"? Is it feasible for doctrine to address the multi-national, inter-agency dimensions of irregular operations? How much overlap and synergy is there between doctrine and practice for the different types of irregular operations? Coffee and tea STATE-BUILDING AS THE MISSING LINK IN COIN DOCTRINE Clare LOCKHART Chief Executive Officer, Institute for State Effectiveness, Washington DC THE FRENCH APPROACH TO IRREGULAR OPERATIONS Lieutenant General Christian DELANGHE Vice President, Maréchal Leclerc Foundation, Caissargues THE IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND STABILISATION OPERATIONS FOR MILITARY CAPABILITY What are the implications for militaries of developing improved capability for counterinsurgency/stabilisation operations in terms of force structure, organisation, manpower levels, specialisations, personnel systems, education, training and exercises? What are the differences in military capability requirements between counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations? Is it possible to field armed forces that are highly capable for both conventional, state on state warfare and irregular operations? What relative weight in defence resource allocation should be given to conventional warfare capability versus counter-insurgency/stabilisation operations? How can governments afford to do both effectively? Lieutenant General Sir John KISZELY Director, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham Lieutenant Colonel John NAGL Commander, 1st Battalion of the 34th Armoured Regiment, Training Transition Teams, Fort Riley Rob de WIJK Director, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

3 Lunch CREATING CIVILIAN EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY What changes are needed in the missions, organisational culture, and incentive structure of civilian agencies, the education and training of their personnel, and the resources allocated to them, in order to create adequate, responsive civilian expeditionary capability for counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations? How can political and bureaucratic support for these changes be developed? What has the experience been to date with efforts to create various forms of civilian reserve capability for deployment overseas? How could these efforts be strengthened? Are there any lessons to be drawn from British and French imperial experience, or from the US CORDS programme in Vietnam? How far can the "contracting out" model work for hot stabilisation and COIN operations? Tea and coffee Elisabeth KVITASHVILI Deputy Assistant Administrator and Director, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development, Washington DC Paul LAROSE-EDWARDS Executive Director, CANADEM, Ottawa Andrew RATHMELL Director, Libra Advisory Group, London ISSUES IN COIN AND STABILISATION IMPLEMENTATION Interval for changing Reception drinks BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY: HOW CAN WESTERN COUNTRIES MOST EFFECTIVELY ASSIST HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES? Jeffrey (Jeb) NADANER Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy, Washington DC LESSONS LEARNED FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: ARE THEY RELEVANT TO OTHER THEATRES? Richard TEUTEN Head, Stabilisation Unit, London MULTINATIONAL IRREGULAR OPERATIONS: DEALING WITH NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH Professor of Military Operational Science, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda INTRODUCTION OF BREAK-OUT GROUPS IN PLENARY SESSION followed by breakout group deliberations 2000 Conference Dinner with After Dinner Speaker KEYNOTE ADDRESS General Dick BERLIJN Chief of Defence, The Netherlands

4 SATURDAY 15 MARCH CIVIL-MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION CHAIR: Diego RUIZ PALMER Head, Planning Section, Operations Division, NATO HQ, Brussels CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURES FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION What conceptual and organisational innovations have countries undertaken in order to provide more effective coordination of civil and military activities? What has the impact been of these initiatives? What are the prospects for further reforms? How do civilian departments as well as militaries view concepts such as a comprehensive approach Tea and coffee CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION: A VIEW FROM WHITEHALL Alison BLAKE Head, Conflict Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London CANADA S EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL-MILITARY PLANNING AND CO-ORDINATION Robert DEROUIN Director General, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force Secretariat, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa DEVELOPING A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN What might the broad contours of a long-term, strategic counter-insurgency plan for Afghanistan look like, encompassing the Taliban, reconstruction/development, narcotics, Pakistan, and Iran? By what process could key international players and the Afghan government come to agreement on such a plan? What conditions would need to apply in order to start such a process? Lunch General Sir David RICHARDS Commander in Chief, UK Land Command, Salisbury Ashraf GHANI Former Finance Minister of Afghanistan and Chair of Institute for State Effectiveness, Washington DC SUSTAINING POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM CAMPAIGNS: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN Do governments give enough emphasis to winning the battle at home. What are the interplay of factors that influence public and political attitudes towards military intervention? How do major contributing countries in Afghanistan perceive their national interests at stake there? Are those perceived interests sufficiently strong to sustain the commitment required to implement a long-term strategic plan? Do governments need to articulate more effectively to their legislatures and electorates the nature of the effort involved? To what extent do divergent national views on policy and operations in Afghanistan undercut the political will to engage resources there? Could multi-national agreement on a long-term strategic plan help create greater willingness to devote the necessary resources? Tea and coffee Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH Professor of Military Operational Science, Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda Arend Jan BOEKESTIJN Member of Parliament, Dutch Liberal Party, The Hague REPORT BACK FROM BREAK-OUT GROUPS

5 UN, EU, AND NATO RELATIONS: HOW STRATEGICALLY COHERENT CAN MULTINATIONAL COALITIONS BECOME? In what ways might the UN, EU and NATO strengthen existing institutional links in order to help improve multi-national strategic coherence for irregular operations? What political developments could enable implementation of potential measures to strengthen these institutional links? Through what processes and structures might key organisations more effectively develop common campaign objectives in theatres where they are all planning to engage? Is some new structure needed that can join up the full spectrum of transatlantic military and civilian capacity for strategic planning and co-ordination purposes? 1930 Dinner Daniel KORSKI Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, London SUNDAY 16 MARCH Breakfast and payment of bills 0915 Participants depart