Grand Strategy for Assertiveness: International Security and U.S.-Brazil Relations

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1 Grand Strategy for Assertiveness: International Security and U.S.-Brazil Relations by Thomaz Guedes da Costa 1 Professor National Security Affairs Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies National Defense University Washington, D.C. This paper expands upon remarks delivered at the first session of the Challenges to Security in the Hemisphere Task Force March 24, 2010 Brazil on the Radar of Strategic Calculations Brazil seems to have been taken into account in the strategic calculations of many countries and international business enterprises these days. For once, the country s prominence is not the result of its tropical or cultural features, or a soccer game, or even for the reason President Lula 1 These notes summarize an earlier presentation made for the Challenges to Security in the Hemisphere Task Force, Center for Hemispheric Policy, University of Miami, in October The ideas here presented do not reflect necessarily those of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or of the United States Government.

2 da Silva has given that the country now has the respect of the world, because Rio will host the 2016 Olympic Games. It is political. Brazil s economic scale and growth are attracting more economic partners and adding to its influence in trade negotiations. Foreign direct investment is flowing steadily into Brazilian markets. 2 Brazilian multinational companies continue to expand abroad and the country has weathered the 2007 financial crisis well. Its agricultural production and continued potential for growth promise to assist in feeding the world, both now and in the future. The diversity of its renewable energy sources promotes economic creativity and sustainability. News of greater oil reserves has generated expectations that Brazil may become a significant supplier to the world market. In addition, as the largest steward of the Amazon tropical forest and of other complex biomass, Brazil s interests and positions matter a great deal in global environmental negotiations. Brazil s location in South America, with the region s traditional isolation from global political confrontation, has finally turned into a valuable asset: Far from other powers and powder kegs, Brazil does not challenge any other contender in global disputes. Its increasingly independentminded elite and independent behavior in international politics generate new possibilities in a multi-polar world, while jolting some in Washington. Brazil now causes other actors to ponder the relative merits of engaging, ignoring or confronting Brasilia s economic, technological or political initiatives. Brazilian behavior is not based solely on responding to initiatives from faraway countries such as Iran, China, Russia or India, or those from traditional partners such as the United States, Britain, Germany, France or Japan. Brazil s leadership is proactively seeking wider and all-inclusive relations. As the decade draws to a close, President Lula s administration is clearly signaling that Brasilia has fashioned a new grand strategy over the past 20 years, with proactive initiatives to engage its neighborhood and to be a country that matters. Brazil has sought to shift from being a rule-taker to a rule-maker in international politics. To play the latter role effectively, Brazil has to increase the support to review international regimes and to assist in the strengthening of these global institutional set-ups. Brazil s goals and behavior on the international scene, as judged by the new grand strategy it has implemented over the past two decades, might be summed up as follows: 3 The current dominant leadership crafting Brazil s grand strategy seeks assertiveness in international politics in order to increase the country s influence in international politics. It reflects a different set of beliefs and attitudes on how to project Brazil into the global scene. Leveraging the interests of other 2 About the country s recent developments, see the special Brazil Takes Off. The Economist, Nov. 12, 2009, available at 3 A practical reference on applying the concept of grand strategy for the understanding of a country s behavior in international politics is found in Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, My preference regarding the concept assumes that grand strategy is the crafting of how an actor advances a set of core and enduring objectives in the international environment where the use of force in various formats permeates calculations. I believe that grand strategy is a useful analytical concept, not necessarily a normative one. 2

3 countries interested in engaging with Brazil is the principal means by which it advances selfreliance and resulting equidistance from major powers. I present the following ideas as propositions for further consideration by academic researchers and policy-makers. Researchers need to validate the extent to which each proposition is associated in fact with the formation of Brazil s current strategic behavior. Policy-makers should take them into account in their future interactions with Brazil in order to improve their policy calculations. The Class of 1979 and the Ideological Divide The first proposition is related to the change in the ideological composition of the group leading Brazil s foreign policy under President Lula s administration. One of the major driving forces in the shaping of a new Brazilian grand strategy refers to the worldview (or mind-set) of the dominant leadership and opinion-makers commanding the government of Brazil in the past decade. This group is comprised of the diplomats, military, bureaucrats and elected officials at the federal level who were politically socialized about international politics and security starting in the turmoil of the transition from the military regime to the new republic in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This group was exposed to, and participated in, a period of numerous international constraints on Brazil s foreign policy, from the oil crisis to debt negotiations, and the negative impact of technological relations with the United States under international control regimes. This influential group of officials, led by a career cadre in the foreign ministry (called Itamaraty, after the palace that housed the ministry), displays an ideological preference in foreign policy that is coherent with that of President Lula s in balancing capitalism and market forces with a social-democratic agenda that favors government regulation and controls on the economy. Brazilian diplomats base their views, including those regarding the country s relations with the United States, on the concept of a core-periphery model of international dominance. 4 In that model, Brazil was, until the end of the Cold War, under the influence of global polarization (without choice) and in a strategic confrontation, where pragmatism was necessary to overcome discrimination, power politics and a sense of irrelevance of the country in an international system imposed by core industrialized countries of the North. 5 In addition to this dependency framework, embraced particularly by social democrats and labor leaders, nationalism and the principle of preserving sovereignty were prominent themes in foreign affairs, advanced by nationalists led by former military officials and others civilians partially educated in the National War College (Escola Superior de Guerra ESG). Besides experiencing the political difficulties of regime transition in the late 1970s and the 1990s, all these leading groups that today envision a strong Brazil on the world stage experienced the downfall of the military regime s aspiration to make Brazil an influential middle-power by the 4 For a popular description, see Fernando H. Cardoso Dependency and Development in Latin America. New Left Review, 74 (1972), pp José Augusto Guillon Albuquerque, A Percepção da Política Externa dos EUA e do Brasil por Diplomatas Brasileiros. In Henrique Altemani e José Augusto Guillon Albuquerque, orgs. A Política Externa Brasileira na Visão de sus Protagonistas. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Lumen Juris, 2005, pp

4 1980s. Furthermore, one of the most powerfully-held aspirations by this nationalist group was, and has been, the establishment of an advanced, endogenous weapons industry, based on national technical competence and on the absorption of foreign-supplied sensitive technologies. Today, many of the leading strategists in Lula s administration consider that international-control regimes and political constraints of other countries overpowered Brazil s own abilities to build national capacities and remain in the international arms markets. They consider this a misstep that they do not wish to repeat. As the Ministry of Defense declared in a statement in 2009, Capable of defending itself, Brazil will be in a position to say no when it has to say no. It will be able to build its own development model. 6 This expected self-reliance is a cornerstone of the Lula strategy and is at the core of Brazil s grand strategy. The vision of many of these class of 1979 strategists is symbolized by Brazil s 1979 nuclear agreement with Germany. These officials were either junior military officers, diplomats or government bureaucrats, or were activists opposing the military regime at the time. This group began thinking about Brazil s foreign policy during a period when Brazil was struggling with the project of making itself into a rising global power. Brazil entered into its nuclear deal with Germany in order to receive industrial technology and technical assistance that would allow the country to eventually fully control the nuclear fuelenrichment cycle. Brazil approached West Germany concerning the agreement since such an arrangement could not be negotiated with the United States, the partner it preferred for nuclear technology transfer. Although there have been industrial and technological advances in energy production, Brazil s nuclear program has not reached a level high enough to translate into increased international bargaining power such as perhaps that achieved by India. Indeed, since the late 1980s, most national programs for advancing endogenous conventional arms, satellites, missiles, nuclear-propulsion and nuclear-weapons capabilities essentially came to a halt or have been delayed. Foreign considerations were not the only ones shaping weapons ambitions in Brazil. Expanding democratic oversight imposed by the new Constitution of 1988, and greater civilian control over military institutions because of economic constraints and budgetary limitations also weakened the development of natural defense technologies. In addition, for government officials, both civilian and military that were in power over the past decade, a very strong and lasting image although flawed was the negative impact that foreign powers and control regimes had on Brazil s ambitions to be an influential actor in the global system, especially during the 1980s. 7 Today, a familiar description of Brazil s trajectory in international politics is the one originally presented in 2003 by Ambassador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretary-General of Brazil s 6 National Strategy of Defense. Brasília, Ministry of Defense, 2009, p In the 1990s, Brazil joined treaties and conventions for control of weapons of mass destruction, including the Non- Proliferation Treaty and agreements under the watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Today, Brazil is part of the Nuclear Supplier Group (for control of nuclear technology and fuel) and Missile Technology Control Regime. But it has not fully joined the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons precursor control), the Zangger Committee nuclear materials and technology export, and the Wassenaar Agreement for conventional weapons and dual-use goods trade. 4

5 Foreign Ministry ( ) and Secretary for Strategic Affairs in the last year of Lula s administration. The extraordinary international instability emanates essentially from the marginalization of peripheral states, that is, from the increasing gap of economic, technologic, military, and scientific power among states, and of the effort to preserve this situation. The powerful states are even more powerful and distant from the others. There is no indication that the per capita income gap is closing; on the contrary, the periphery, with few exceptions, continues in tumultuous impoverishment. 8 Pinheiro Guimarães goes on to argue that the powerful states use intimidation, as well as a process of setting international norms through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example, or through international agreements on technology controls and weapons nonproliferation and these tools serve to allow the core states to disarm the periphery further. He adds that this construct is under the guise of an ideological narrative that all of this is for the good of humankind. 9 A group that shares Pinheiro Guimarães s arguments and translates them into policy therefore focuses its efforts on defying what it sees as the current principles of the international system, and on developing new processes and rules to conduct political and economic relations. This view also implies that Brazil s approach to economic management can be an example for change, by providing an alternative to botched neo-liberal economic models by substituting the failed Free Trade Area of the Americas with an ever expanding MERCOSUL, and by expanding relations overseas in a globalized and multipolar world. 10 As Brazil advances the goal of becoming a global actor that aims to engage in shaping rulemaking in international regimes and structures, some ideological differences will have to be adjusted, 11 by pragmatically accommodating what is desired with what is possible. One realworld issue that may arise in the near term is how will Brazil promote democracy while confronting the increasingly authoritarian rule of populist neighbors such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Evo Morales in Bolivia? How will Brazil, a stable and growing country within MERCOSUL, attract foreign direct investment while it continues to share regional integration with a fragile and somewhat unreliable financial partner such as Argentina? How will Brazil manage the ideological sympathy of its current leadership toward populist and leftist political forces in Cuba and Venezuela, as well as with the FARC, while projecting itself as a global champion of democratic rights? 8 Pinheiro Guimarães, Samuel. Perspectiva das Relações do Brasil com os Estados Unidos. Seminário de Política Externa do Brasil para o Seculo XXI (Proceedings). Brasilia: Camara dos Deputados, 2003, p Ibid. pp Ibid, pp On this effort, see Paulo Roberto de Almeida O Brasil na construção da ordem econômica internacional contemporânea. Contexto Internacional, 26:1, Jan/jun 2004, p

6 Implementing the Strategy Brazil s officials apparently have reconnected with the 1970s vision of making the country an important actor in international politics and an emerging world power. 12 There are several paths Brazilian officials are likely to follow to advance their interests and pursue their foreign policy goals. Brazil clearly seeks a greater international presence because this could bolster Brazil s own goals and self-reliance, while enhancing its abilities to deflect the unwanted influence of other major powers on it. Evidence of this goal is President Lula s extensive and intensive travel to conferences, his state visits, and the vocal promotion of Brazil and of his administration. Brazil s declared objective to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is a good example. This is the largest bet Brazil has made so far that could impact on its relations with neighboring countries, other seat-seekers (e.g., Argentina, Germany, Japan, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico) and the current five permanent members of the Security Council. The argument for having Brazil on the Security Council has varied. Initially, under the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil boldly proposed that it deserved the seat because of its size, international reach and abilities as a global actor. Not surprisingly, this approach caused negative reactions, or silent non-concurrence, especially among neighboring countries. More recently, the government s argument shifted to one that emphasized Brazil s role as a representative of Latin America. As the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) slowly reviews its charter, the value of a permanent seat as a basis for playing power politics is uncertain. The five countries with veto power may logroll changes, or even decide to oppose any significant changes, in the power dynamics of the Security Council, not least by warning against potential unintended consequences of accepting new permanent members. If that were to happen, Brazil s efforts would fail. If, on the other hand, the power of the Council is diluted by the General Assembly, and the number of permanent members is increased with new (or lesser) responsibilities and/or veto power, Brazil could gain a seat, but the achievement will have been diminished. Either way, what matters is the energizing effect on Brazil s image as it promotes this goal in this international forum, since the process reinforces other bilateral and multilateral dialogues in a variety of opportunities and levels. Brazil s strategy also involves redesigning and expanding relations with the Latin American and the Caribbean region. Important here may be the perception that the United States, either by design or as a result of the course of events, is retrenching as the dominant actor in the region. This is illustrated by the fact that Hugo Chávez is able to expand his influence and forge an anti- U.S. movement with sympathetic partners, influencing internal politics in many countries with aid and electoral contributions, promoting constitutional changes and bullying Colombia. Such U.S. retrenchment could also partially explain China s expanding trade and investment presence in the hemisphere, the diplomatic overtures of Iran and Russia to explore relations and gain a 12 See Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Engaging a Rising Brazil in Patrick M. Cronin, editor. Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America s Security Role in a Changing World. Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2009, pp Online available at: 6

7 foothold on the continent, and their efforts to gather votes from countries in the region on issues to be decided in international organizations. In this environment, Brazil is pursuing two regional campaigns. In Central America, it expanded its diplomatic presence by opening new representative offices and with Lula making regular visits to Central America and the Caribbean. Brazil has also gradually strengthened its relations with Cuba, including investments and defense dialogues. In coordination with the United States, Brazil has introduced new ideas and processes to assist small, tropical countries to expand their use of bio-fuels to increase available energy sources and diversify their economies. Most importantly, Brazil has been a faithful supporter, since 2004, of UN operations in Haiti. And with the tragic consequences of the January 2010 earthquake, Brazil s leadership promises that it will be a leader in continuing the UN s MINUSTAH mission and in coordinating relief and reconstruction efforts. With the largest troop contingent and credibility in coordinating with local political forces and contributing countries, Brazil s willingness to retain forces in Haiti can be considered a leading indicator of its commitment. Of course, the collateral gains Brazil may achieve with its diplomacy and global presence will depend on how well it will compare with the overwhelming commitment of the United States in helping Haiti. In South America, Brazil has designed a diplomatic campaign around the Union of the South American Nations (UNASUL) and the South American Defense Council (CDS). In practical terms, both institutions function basically for diplomatic talk and discreet consultation on disputes among its members - that is, they are fora where ideas are conveyed, tested and promoted, and where disputes and controversies can be aired publicly. Internal controversies over sovereignty issues (Peru-Chile, Bolivia-Chile and Ecuador-Colombia) and ideological differences (led by Chávez) have undermined the progress of both institutions. As a result, Brazil s pursuit of its interests and projects continues to take place largely at the bilateral level. Thus, Brazil has woven a pattern of radial bilateral relations, characterized by dialogue and projects of bilateral interest, with all its neighbors. 13 Since 1999, a dominant goal of the CDS has been to promote military and defense collaboration among member states in South America, without foreign interference. So far, however, it is not clear what form the CDS will eventually take. At this point, it has not projected itself as a political-military alliance, in the style of NATO, nor is it a substitute for diplomatic mobilization as countries face the diminished importance and effectiveness of the Organization of American States (OAS). Despite the declared support of Council members, little progress has been made. Colombia has preferred to have the United States as its ally rather than rely on the CDS for its security. Bilateral disputes, such as those between Chile and Peru, are negotiated through other channels. Projects for joint defense industries or joint strategic studies face a lack of practical proposals and shared funding. Finally, the 2009 agreement between Colombia and the United States, involving the United States use of Colombian bases for anti-drug efforts, while generating concern in Brazil and other countries, bolstered the resolve and the regional autonomy of the Colombian government and showed the limits of South American efforts to work together. 13 For a better understanding between bilateral and multilateral preferences in Brazil s international relations, see Alcides Costa Vaz. Integração e Processos Negociadores; a Construção do Mercosul. Brasília, Instituto Brasileiro de Relacões Internacionais,

8 Quite possibly, it also signaled to Brazil the limits of its own ability to mobilize and lead local multilateral collaboration or to solve security disputes that may arise in the near future. A third strategic path that Brazil has pursued involves acquiring endogenous capability for nuclear fuel enrichment technology and for industrial production of conventional weapon systems. Brazil has sought development of its own technologies for energy production and submarine propulsion. The view that there are structural limits to this goal, imposed by the international system as described by Pinheiro Guimarães, is shared by some military leaders and opinion-makers. But behind the scene, some political actors continue to push this nuclear agenda for Brazil. Occasionally, a public statement reminds audiences of this view. 14 This desire is not official policy and officials quickly deny any such intentions. Furthermore, there are constitutional prohibitions to manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, and under the Non- Proliferation Treaty and agreements with other international non-proliferation control instruments, this prohibition is strengthened. Though different in motivation from the nationalist proposals to hedge against aggression in an uncertain future by developing a nuclear deterrent, the non-weapon nuclear program conducted by Brazil is also under threat, primarily because of the strictures of an international nonproliferation system operating to contain the country s economic use of nuclear power, which supports the critique voiced by Pinheiro Guimarães. Thus, it is possible that Brazil s relations with Iran serve to bolster internationally the goal of maintaining its own sovereign right to enrich its own nuclear fuel and advance its nuclear-powered submarine program. The engagement with Iran may involve more than the promotion of commercial ties. It may be a backdoor for communication with the leadership in Teheran, or for facilitating peace in the Middle East. It could be that Brazil s attitude is also a signal that Brazil is ready to defend the independence of its nuclear program as the 2010 date for the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) approaches. At this point, Brazil is unwilling to accept the Additional Protocol of the treaty that will require, among other things, more intrusive inspections of nuclear facilities, which is a condition for international cooperation in fuel enrichment. For the Brazilian strategists, this proposal preserves a discriminatory principle of the NPT regime: Disarm the weak while the nuclear-weapons powers retain their privileges and constrain non-nuclear powers from developing technology even for peaceful use. 15 Currently, no other subject is more revealing about the fundamentals of Brazil s grand strategy than its wave of arms procurement. 16 On this strategic track lies the reviving of the aspirations partially abandoned in the 1970s. Whether in purchasing modern systems to replace aging ones, 14 The most explicit argument for the know-how of nuclear weapons was made by Army General Jose Benedito Barros Moreira, then the Undersecretary for Strategic Affairs and International Relations at the Ministry of Defense, when he publicly argued that we have in Brazil the future possibility of, if the State so wishes, developing a nuclear artifact. We cannot disregard the world s reality. See General defende que Brasil desenvolva bomba atômica. O Estado de São Paulo, 15 de Novembro de Available at 15 On the power play, strategy and the perceptions of subordination see José Luis Niemeyer dos Santos Filho, As Torres de Papel de Ontem e a Defesa Nacional do Brasil Hoje: Querer e Poder. In A Política Externa Brasileira na Visão dos seus Protagonistas, op. Cit., pp For more details on the national security logic for this effort, see the newly issued National Strategy of Defense, op. cit., pp

9 or inaugurating new capabilities to protect its dominion, Brazil is demanding from suppliers the technological transfer and adoption of systems to support and expand local production for its own needs, as well as to supply potential buyers in the international markets. The internal processes and negotiations for a new generation of fighters, helicopters, submarines and air defense systems indicate that Brazil is seeking to diversify suppliers rather than to have exclusive strategic alliances with a single supplier. In fact, since the early 1970s, Brazil has developed multiple partners in the weapons trade. Britain and Germany provided naval systems, including frigates and submarines. Spain, Russia and Israel have come to trade with Brazil over the past decades. More recently, France is the preferred strategic partner for the Lula administration, according to criteria that remain unclear. China may be the next preferred partner. Brazil s Approach to Defense Relations with the United States: the Role of Mistrust Mistrust plays an important role in shaping Brazil s approach to its defense relations with the United States. It is difficult to put into practice the concept of trust. However, it needs to be addressed, especially by policy-makers involved in establishing long-term associations with partners. At first glance, relations with the United States have been present in Brazil s grand strategy since the end of the 19 th century. Brazil was very successful in leveraging balance-ofpower policies and international arbitration when defining its borders. The United States played an important, if mainly symbolic, role in this achievement. Nevertheless, the unmet aspirations involved in continuing Brazil s World War alliance with the United States, the differences between the two countries during the latter part of the military regime in Brazil and the technological constraints of the 1970s caused considerable mistrust. 17 The United States is central to Brazil s current strategic design, although not necessarily as a desired close partner, but as the main country from which the dominant strategic group wishes to achieve a certain autonomy and distance. Thus, as Brazil seeks other partners and becomes successful at playing in multiple international arenas, it may achieve what Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue has called equidistance from the major global powers, including the United States. Obviously, the Brazil-U.S. relationship requires extended discussion, but suffice it to say that relations between the two countries, both in terms of public and private interests, are complicated and intense. There are two key factors at the core of the Brazil-U.S. interaction. One is the perpetuation of the differences in power between the two countries, which generates mistrust when the leadership in Brazil looks toward the future. Specifically, with different views of the rule-making processes and structures in the international system and of United States, Brazil has renewed its effort to be able to say no when it wishes to do so in dialogues with major powers. If the United States does not recognize Brazil as a reliable recipient for technological transfer, it could increase the distrust of the Brazilian strategic elite. Unfortunately, both sides have been shaping a less than 17 For a revealing analysis of Brazil s long-lasting frustration with the United States in the post-second World War security relations, see Vagner Camilo Alvez, Illusão desfeita: a aliança especial Brasil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 48:1, 2005, p

10 mutually-trusting relationship. Peripheral issues such as bilateral discord have also been feeding Brazil s support for populist governments in Latin America. Internal political processes produce additional complications. Most Brazilian diplomats understand quite well the power of U.S. congressmen to mix parochial domestic politics with foreign policy. This has been evident in bilateral issues involving trade protectionism, immunity for U.S. military personnel and, more recently, the power play behind the U.S. senate s delay in approving the designated ambassador to Brazil, which partially was a reaction to Brazil s role in the Honduras coup of This blending of domestic and foreign-policy concerns, while accepted in principle as legitimate in the United States, makes the dialogue between the two countries more difficult. Brazilian officials do not want to be held hostage by members of the U.S. congress in their negotiations with American diplomats. Another factor that complicates the calculation of interests is that Brazil s interests (and those of many South American countries) do not only involve relations with Washington. Brazilian officials do not expect or want to pay homage to Washington. A Brazilian congressman once asked me why it is legitimate for the United States to pursue its interests everywhere as they define them but it is not legitimate for other democracies to do the same. As Brazil increases its relations with new international partners and seeks to defend its interests, the risk of diverging views between Brazil and the United States will grow. Brazil s trade in conventional weapons illustrates the diversity of its possibilities. Germany, Britain, Italy, France and Japan have been close and reliable partners of Brazil for a long time. South Africa, India, Spain, Ukraine and Russia are later arrivals with increasing economic and diplomatic ties with Brazil. China has become Brazil s leading trade partner, and future new trade expansion may include defense relations. Brazil has diplomatic relations, at the ambassadorial level, with Cuba, Iran, Syria and North Korea, countries on the watch list of the United States. Brazilian officials make the point that Brazil wants to promote engagement and peaceful relations. Relations involving finance, trade and technology, as well as social relations, expand the possibilities and are a part of advancing respectful relations among Brazil and other countries. For many opinion-makers in the United States, Brazil s current independent attitude is unsettling and frustrating. One can argue that Brasilia s efforts to be a legitimate global leader loses credibility when Brazil downplays its own observance of human rights at home, especially regarding police brutality and the treatment of its native population, or when it does not strongly defend the rule of law. On the other hand, some Brazilians argue that U.S officials are hypocrites because when it is in the U.S. interest, Washington supports dictatorships, authoritarian regimes or condones torture. A mutually-acceptable approach that could improve Brazil-U.S. collaboration in helping other countries and improving international relations in the Americas has so far been elusive. While Washington focused on the struggle in the Middle East, on the global terrorist challenge and on its own financial crisis, most of the rest of the Americas, including Brazil, received little attention from the United States on the political agenda. Washington s attention to security developments in Colombia and Mexico continues; however, many Brazilians feel that the 10

11 political presence, interest and influence of the United States in the region reached its lowest point at the close of the Bush administration. Developments under President Barack Obama have either been on issues where Brazil is a player (Honduras and bio-fuel exports to the United States) or have been reactions to external events, such as the earthquake in Haiti. Complicating Brazil s willingness to collaborate with the United States is the deep resentment many civilian and military leaders feel toward the United States regarding natural resources and its future defense needs. This sentiment is driven by the almost irrational fears of some Brazilians that the United States covets the riches of, or favors the internationalization of, the Amazon. Others believe that many influential groups in the United States do not want to see a Brazil that can defy Washington. Brazil s purchase of new jet fighter planes for its air force reflects some of the not-so-hidden concerns. When both President Lula and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim point out that the final decision on the supplier of the jet planes is not political, why doesn t Brazil purchase the U.S. fighters offered by Boeing, since their product is technically superior? It seems that the technical or commercial factors of this decision do not matter. The decision is political and the political criteria are not explained unless Brazilians are deeply concerned about the potential limitations of end-users that the United States can impose, as it did when Brazil was not allowed to sell Tucano ground attack aircraft to Venezuela due to the presence of U.S. components in that aircraft. Both the social democrats, who opposed the military regime, and the nationalistic forces that now permeate many military institutions have strong misgivings regarding what has happened in the security relationship between Brazil and the United States since the World War II, and especially since the events of the late 70s and early 80s. 18 Specifically, the perceived restrictions on the transfer of critical technologies wanted by Brazilian strategists, and the export of weapons derived from them, are fundamental problems. There are also the events surrounding Brazil s move to cancel its military agreement with the United States in the early 80s on the grounds of its being useless, and then ignoring Washington s suspicions by making an agreement with Germany for access to nuclear technology. Given this history, it is not surprising that the nuclear issue and mutual mistrust are always in the background of the Brazil-U.S. relationship. As for the frustration of some in Washington with Brazil s current strategic behavior, one might describe the core problem as asymmetrical priorities. Some American officials may describe relations with Brazil as reflecting shared values and as having equal importance. And some Brazilian officials might agree that U.S. actions are congruent with U.S. intentions and rhetoric. However, Brazilians argue that the U.S. government only pays attention to Brazil when Brasilia is acting in ways that displease the United States. In every international economic event, such as the Summit of the Americas or the G-20, where President Lula meets President Barack Obama, the press reports a cordial exchange between the two. Brazil s diplomatic narrative does not suggest that there are outstanding Brazilian demands 18 On the frustration about Brazil-United States relations in the seventies, see also José Augusto Guillon Albuquerque, As Relações Brasil-EUA na Percepção dos Militares. A Política Externa Brasileira na Visão dos seus Protagonistas, op. cit., pp

12 on the United States. It seeks only to promote closer relations. 19 Brazilian officials do not ignore the United States. They just report the bilateral relations as cordial and save their energy to advance their grand strategy elsewhere. If U.S. officials wish to leverage Brazil s potential value in international politics, even if only to promote U.S. interests, Washington will have to take the initiative and be creative in relating to Brazil s current objectives and grand strategy. Conclusion As relations and developments become more complex and difficult to manage, Brazil will face dilemmas and contradictions, such as those now found in promoting values such as human rights, democracy and free markets, on the one hand, and seeking engagement or projects with countries that do not fully observe them, such as China and Iran, on the other. If Brazil wants to be a rulemaker, it needs to strictly observe the widely-accepted, legitimate rules and values of the international system. Bending these rules and values for short-term gains undermines the general goal of being a rule-maker. On some occasions, Brazil may over-extend its reach, or find itself without the will to pay for the financial and political costs that leadership demands. On other occasions, there will be unintended consequences from Brazil s actions. As for the United States, it will likely be a key interlocutor in the implementation of Brazil s grand strategy. Care and attention are therefore needed by both sides if they are to prevent any unintentional outcomes from their stands on global matters or harm to their shared core objectives and values. While academic researchers ought to do more to further the understanding of how Brazil-U.S. relations have evolved, policymakers in both countries should strive to promote clear communication and shape opportunities for collaboration around mutual interests. Mistrust seems to be at the core of the bilateral relationship, and U.S. policy-makers need to ask what can be done to overcome it. Brazilian policy-makers, at least those that are in power right now, have made up their minds about strategic relations between the United States and Brazil: the U.S. is not the partner of choice. The new Brazilian grand strategy is designed to go beyond relations with a single country, especially the United States. It is therefore time for the United States to decide if Brazil matters in its future, and if so, how to be pro-active in improving the bilateral relationship. Thomaz Guedes da Costa is professor of national security affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. He worked as analyst with Brazil s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), as international market analyst at EMBRAER, and served as a researcher and advisor in the Center for Strategic Studies, Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, in the Office of the President of Brazil. Dr. Costa was an adjunct professor for strategic and defense studies in the international relations department at the University of Brasilia. Recently, he contributed to the published Global Strategic Assessment, 2009, America s Security Role in a Changing World (Washington, D.C., NDU/INSS, 2009), and wrote The Teaching of Strategy; Lykke s Balance, Schelling s Exploitation, and a Community of Practice in Strategic Thinking (Forthcoming, Carlyle, Strategic Studies Institute). All statements of fact or expression of opinion contained in this publication are the responsibility of the author. 19 For an official statement reinforcing this view, see the interview with the new Brazilian ambassador to Washington in Garantia dos EUA sobre bases e Satisfatória. Folha de São Paulo, 25 de Novembro de