Political Leadership in West Bengal

Transcription

1 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 Political Leadership in West Bengal The Implications of Its Changing Patterns for Economic Planning Myron Weiner It is popularly believed in Calcutta, especially by the intellectuals of that city, that as Calcutta goes so goes all of West Bengal. Since Calcutta turned against the Congress Party in the 1957 elections, many Calcutta intellectuals believe that rural Bengal will follow suit in the 1962 elections. The data provided here concerning the rise of a rural elite into political positions suggests that the influence of Calcutta and of her politicians upon rural areas is decreasing. Built upon this outdated image of the political process is another view that India's parliamentary system is simply the "plaything" of urban intellectuals. But the legislature is already under rural control, rural representation m Parliament is increasing and it is likely that rural influence will continue to increase, What effect will this increase in rural leadership have upon the freedom with which economic planning may be pursued? So long it has been possible for India's planners to plan on a highly rational and relatively non-political basis. To the extent that rural areas increasingly articulate their interests, it will become more and more difficult for planners not to take these demands into account. If political demands increasingly enter into economic planning, what effects might this have upon the democratic structure? Planners will be faced with some hard choice. They may have to modify what they conceive to be highly rational plans based solely upon economic considerations, or alternatively, adopt authoritarian measures to minimize the influence of these political pressures. The urban industrial emphasis of planning may indeed undergo great changes. THE process by which a new leadership is emerging throughout Asia provides us with one key to understanding the dynamics of social and political change. With the achievement of independence new leaders emerge with new interests and demands. How well these fragile democracies will be able to withstand the pressures exercised by new leaders and new groups is one of the fundamental questions of our times. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the changing pattern of leadership in a single state in India during the past forty years and to suggest the kinds of demands likely to enter Indian political life as a result of these changes. Finally, we shall ask what effect these demands are likely to have on the freedom with which economic planning may be pursued by the Indian government in the years ahead. Our study is based upon the following reflections: 1. Under western colonial rule the countries of Asia have experienced a quiet but profound change In the character of their political leadership One could view the nationalist struggle in India, as elsewhere, not only as a struggle by Indians to replace their British rulers, but as a struggle by one group of Indians a western-educated class of journalists, doctors, lawyers and administrators to replace an older leadership of maharajas, landlords, and hereditary administrators. To understand modern India, one must understand this new leadership, the social background from which it derives, the groups with which it is associated and whose interests it articulates, the values and ideologies it propagates, and the influence which it wields. 2. This new leadership has itself been undergoing many changes. The late 19th and early 20th century leadership which participated in the Indian National Congress. India's paramount nationalist organization, was largely drawn from middle income groups in the coastal cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and their environs. In the 1920s major changes occurred within the nationalist movement. Not only did the advent of Gandhi mean a change in style by the nationalist movement, from the two strands of modern liberalism and violent extremism to non-violent civil disobedience built upon mass participation, but a change occurred in the character of the leadership. The leadership which arose in the 1920s did not come so exclusively from Bengal Madras and Bombay, but from Gujerat, United Provinces, Bihar, Andhra and the Central Provinces. The new leadership came from the hinterlands away from the main centers of western Intrusion, Such changes in the geographic backgrounds of leaders, along with 925 changes in social origin, are often critical factors in the kinds of political conflicts and public policies which emerge. 3. Finally, it is assumed here that public policy in India Is not simply made by a handful of men who attempt to enforce their decisions upon a static population. Between the top decision makers and the masses are an array of intermediate leaders, some of whom communicate governmental decisions to the masses, others of whom attempt to influence policy, administration and the selection of personnel on the basis of the interests of the groups to which they belong and identify. Much of the thinking about political leadership) in India and elsewhere in Asia and Africa focuses on the elite-mass dichotomy. This dichotomy finds a central place in the thinking of Tareto, Mosca and Lasswell. but while it now plays a secondary role in the analysis of American and European political systems, it occupies a central place in popular and even scholarly thinking about non-european political systems. This image of the political process fails to take Into account the great changes which have occurred in India since the 1920s and fails to explore the linkage between the top leadership in India the Prime Minister, cabinet members, and State chief ministers and the masses.

2

3 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 Middle Strata of Leadership This study, therefore, is an attempt to explore the social and geographic orgins of this intermediate leadership, and the ways In which this leadership has been and Is changing, By intermediate leadership we refer to those leaders who serve as a link between the social system and the governmental structure. What characterizes thin leadership is that it has a "constituency," not simply an electoral constituency, but some group affiliation a trade union; a peasant, refugee, caste or tribal organization; a business chamber; or a civic association. Our inquiry into this middle strata of leadership in India has led us to focus our attention on a single state, West Bengal. West Bengal is by no means a "typical" state, but for that matter one can find unique as well as "typical" features to every Indian state. But the most salient fact about the uniqueness of West Bengal for our study; however, is the extent and duration of the Western impact. The East India Company established Itself in Bengal in the latter part of the 18th century. British policy during the 18th and early 10th centuries resulted in the elimination of Moghul rule, the establishment of a new landlord class, the introduction of English in a newly created system of Anglo-Indian schools and a major university in Calcutta, and the rise of new westernized occupations associated with activities of the British-administration, medicine, law, and journalism. Bengal was perhaps the most active of the earliest nationalist centers. Bengalis were among the leading moderates who led the Indian National Congress in the latter part of the 19th century, and they were also among the leading terrorists who threw bombs at the British in the first decade of the 20th century. Not until the early 1920s, when Gandhi and a new national leadership arose, did the position of Bengal in the national movement recede. Bengal was further weakened by the partition of 1947 when some 40 millions of people in East Bengal became part of Pakistan while some 27 millions of people in West Bengal remained part of India. But even with partition, West Bengal continues to remain one of the most politically active states in India. It is possible that Bengal's early access to western ideas, her higher degree of political organization, and her relatively high level of industrialization may foreshadow developments elsewhere. But this is speculation. It is enough at this stage to indicate the pattern of development in one state and leave to other researchers the task of developing comparative data. Analysis of 408 Bengali Leaders Our inquiry is based upon an analysis of 408 Bengali leaders in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and Council (1957-), the Indian Parliament ( ), the West Bengal State Congress Committee (1958), the Executive Committee of the Praja Socialist Party (1958), the Executive Committee of the Communist-sponsored peasant organization, the All India Kisan Sabha (1958), and the Executive Committee of the Marxist left peasant organization, the United Kisan Sabha (1958). Our sample thus includes members of the four major political groups in West Bengal: the Congress Party (198), which controls the state government, the Communists (85), the Socialists (36), and the various splinter Marxist left parties (42), plus independents and members of smaller parties (47). How involved these leaders are with various interest groups in West Bengal is indicated by the following statistics. Ninety-nine are involved in civic activities at the local level 33 are in religious and caste bodies, 83 are in peasant associations, 38 are in trade unions, 14 are in credit societies and cooperatives, 35 are in cultural and professional bodies, 11 are in business chambers. One hundred and nineteen members of the sample are also active in institutions of local government. Of the 408 individuals in our sample. 315 hold public office in Parliament, the West Bengal Legislative Assembly or the West Bengal Legislative Council. The data employed In this study* was derived from published * I am indebted to the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics for the financial support which made this field work possible. The data presented here is part of a larger study of political leadership in West Bengal, which in turn is part of a larger study of the r ole and function of Interest groups in Indian politics. 927 Who's whos and interviews conduct ed in Calcutta in 1957 and 1958, We shall focus on the one fundamental Issue before us: how has this leadership been changing, and what effects do these changes have upon political demands and public policy? We are faced at the outset with a serious methodological problem. While data on the present leadership is available, direct data is not available for those who were active in politics in the 1920s, or 1930s, or even the 1940s, Our study would have to be terminated even before we began were it not for the fact that Indians, like most other Asians and Africans, are recruited into politics in their early 20s or younger. Those who are today in the 60s entered politics in the 1920s, those who are 50 entered in the 1930s and so on. By exploring the differences between age groups it thus becomes possible for us to see the ways in which political recruitment has been changing over a forty year period. In our sample we have the ages of 340 individuals. Of these 84 were born before 1900, 98 were born between 1900 and were born between 1910 and 1919 and 57 were born after Ruralization of Elites As might be expected in a largely agricultural country, most political leaders were born in villages However, through the forty years the number born in Calcutta and other urban centers has declined, while the number born in villages has increased. Fifty per cent of the sample born before 1900 came from villages, while 74 per cent of those born after 1920 were of village origin. ("See Table I). The trend is thus toward more ruralization of the elite rather than less, (The question might be raised as to whether the rise in rural born leadership might, not merely indicate that urban areas have more village

4 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY born leaders than earlier. That this is not true is proven by the fact that only 11 of the 36 members of the Legislative Assembly representing urban areas were born in villages. Other criteria of "ruralization," such as occupation, parental occupation, and source of income, all tend to substantiate our conclusion. Of the 214 assembly members for whom occupation data was available, 12 per cent of the oldest group reports agricultural occupations compared with 37 per cent of the youngest.) This trend nans counter to the increasing urbanization of West Bengal, and likewise runs counter to the increasing urbanization of political leadership in industrialized countries of the west. In India, rural powers- princes and landlords were so protected by the colonial power that they did not participate in nationalist politics. Nationalist leadership arose in urban centers where western ideas of democracy and representation were introduced, and where the new universities created a class of lawyers, doctors, clerks and other middle class occupations. Not until the 1920s when the nationalist movement tried to win support for independence from the rural population did more rural leaders enter politics. But the trend toward the emergence of a new rural leadership had begun even earlier with the gradual emergence of a new rural middle class only partially involved in land ownership. The smaller landlords or their sons who became rural lawyers, teachers and shopkeepers soon became as intensely patriotic as their urban brothers. Most of the rural seats in the legislative assembly are now represented by rural-born members. Only 33 out of 168 rural seats in the Legislative Assembly have urban-born members. By contrast, 14 out of 29 rural MP seats are still held by urban members. The trend in both the Assembly and in Parliament, however, is for more and more or the younger members to be rural born. While only 56 per cent of the MLAs born before 1900 came from rural areas, 79 per cent of those born after 1920 are rural. Since 77 per cent of the Assembly seats are from rural constituencies, it is possible to conclude that the rural areas are now producing enough of their own leaders to till their seats in the Legislative Assembly. This is yet to be reflected in the selection of members of Parliament where 78 per cent of the seats are rural, but only 41 per cent of the seats are held by rural born members. On the basis of what has already happened in the West Bengal Assembly (where 68 per cent are rural born), one could predict that rural-born representation in the Parliament m New Delhi from West Bengal is likely to increase. Rural-Urban Separation What does this growing self-sufficiency in rural leadership indicate? It suggests that urban discontent may not so easily overflow into rural areas. With rural areas increasingly providing their own leaders, both rural leaders and rural voters are more likely to be conditioned by what is going on in rural areas than by discontent in the cities. Bad urban conditions may, of course, affect rural conditions as well. The absence of industrial growth may lessen job opportunities, increase rural overcrowding, and lower rural living standards. But the mere fact of urban discontent by itself may not affect rural leadership or voting behaviour. It was possible, for example, for Calcutta to elect a majority of its Assembly representatives from the Communist Party in 1957, but. for the rural areas to elect Congressmen. And it is possible too that this rural-urban political split in West Bengal may persist for some time, precisely because of the selfsustaining nature of both rural and urban political leadership. To the extent that rural and urban areas of West Bengal separate politically, each with their own leadership, their own interests, and their own voting patterns, then West Bengal will simply be following a pattern already established in other growing industrial areas of the world. Democratic Chicago versus Republican "downstate," and Democratic New York versus Republican "upstate" simply Indicate that rural and urban areas often have conflicting interests, outlooks, and' leadship. The later development of rural interests in India, which runs counter to the timing of such developments in the west, is the consequence of a complex series of factors related to western domination; but equalization of rural-urban interests in West Bengal does seem to be occurring and may portend a pat- 928 tern likely to develop in other parts of India. It is popularly believed in Calcutta, especially by the intellectuals of that city, that as Calcutta goes so goes all of West Bengal. Since Calcutta turned against the Congress Party in the 1957 elections, many Calcutta intellectuals believe that rural Bengal will follow suit in the 1962 elections. The data provided here concerning the rise of a rural elite into political positions suggests that the influence of Calcutta and of her politicians upon rural areas is decreasing. Many Bengalis are living with an image of the political process of an earlier era when intellectual ferment in Calcutta overflowed into the rural areas as urban nationalists journeyed to the rural areas to organize the peasantry on behalf of the national movement. Calcutta's influence on rural areas is still great. Her newspapers are read by many of the literate leaders of the rural areas. Rural elites have often studied in and have friendship ties with Calcutta. But today, Calcutta provides influence, not leadership, for rural West Bengal. Built upon this outdated image of the political process is another view that India's parliamentary system is simply the "plaything" of urban intellectuals. It is true that half of the West Bengal Cabinet?s urban-born, that 17 out of 22 members of the Executive Committee of the Praja Socialist Party in West Bengal are urban and only one out of four Bengali Ministers in New Delhi is rural, but the legislature is already under rural control, rural representation in Parliament is increasing and it is likely that rural influence will continue to increase. Characteristics of Rural Leaders Who are those rural politicians and what interests do they represent? By all measurements, Congress is the most rural party in West Bengal. (See Table II, p 929.) In our total sample of 192 Congressmen for whom place of birth was available, 119 were born in villages, 39 in towns and 34 in Calcutta. The village bias is heaviest in the Legislative Assembly (95 out of 133) and least in Parliament (only 15 out of 39). These ruralborn Congressmen invariably represent rural constituencies. One hundred and sixteen of the Congress MLA constituencies (86 per cent) are

5 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1950 rural and almost all the 116 Congressmen from rural constituencies give rural addresses as their permanent address. In short, the vast majority of Congressmen in the Assembly were born in villages, represent the constituency in which they were born, and continue to reside within their constituency and, in some instances, even in the village of their birth. Place of birth of Communists was only available for the 43 Communist MLAs and MPs. Of these, one half were village born, one-fourth from towns and another fourth from Calcutta. Of the 38 Communists in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly, only 19 are from rural constituencies. Among the seven Communist MPs, only two are village born. Data on the exact birthplaces of Communist workers in the Ail India Kisan Sabha was not available, but it is interesting to note that as many as 12 of the 44 for whom district of birth was known were born outside of West Bengal (mostly in East Bengal). A rather large number of Communist workers among peasants apparently come from outside of the areas in which they work, in contrast to the Congressmen who are invariably part of the local rural gentry. The Socialists and Marxist leftists in the Assembly occupy proportionately more rural seats than the Communists, less rural seats than Congress. Of the 30 MLA seats held by Socialists and Marxists, 20 are rural. (See Table II.) Interest Group Affiliations What are the interest group affiliations of rural politicians? The interest group affiliations of MLAs indicate the extent to which rural representatives tend to be well established in their communities. Eighty-five of the 168 rural MLAs have been active in local government, and 62 in local civic associations. In contrast only 12 of the 38 urban MLAs have been active in local government and only nine in local civic associations. Many of the rural representatives are also active in caste, tribal and religious associations (20) and credit and banking associations (10). Then? are few rural MLAs who have not had a record of activity in local government, local civic associations, caste, tribal and religious bodies, credit, and banking associations or cooperatives. In contrast, many of the 38 urban MLAs (19 of whom are members of the Communist or Marxist left parties) have no group affiliations other than the party to which they belong and the trade unions, peace fronts and other associations dominated by their party. One striking difference between Communists and Marxist leftists on the One hand and Congressmen on the other is the extent to which one is deeply involved in various kinds of occupational interests, such as unions and peasant associations, while the other is more involved in local government, local civic activities, various caste, religious and tribal bodies. Congressmen are active in school boards, village panchayats, charitable organizations, tribal and scheduled caste societies, Muslim associations, temple boards and a host of other bodies in the local community. These bodies, public and private, are the structures of power and influence in rural India and it is in these that the Congress Party demonstrates so clearly the sources of its voting power in West Bengal. Few Assembly members have built their electoral careers on trade union and peasant organisation work, and the fact that so few non-congressmen are elected from outside of Calcutta is a demonstration of this fact. Even opposition legislators in rural areas must build themselves through local government and civic activities. If Congress wins votes in West Bengal, in large measure it must be attributed to the fact that Congress is better entrenched in such local activities than are other parties. Economic Conflicts In Rural Areas All this suggests that class conflicts within rural areas are not so great as to disrupt the unity of local civic bodies. Were economic conflicts within rural areas clearly articulated, then peasant organizations, bodies of agricultural labourers, tenant associations and the like would be growing sources of power and would provide the base by which politicians could obtain power. This has not happened in West Bengal and the Congress Party, with its commitment to harmonizing divergent interests, protits from rural unity. For some time but with little success the Communists and the Marxist left parties have endeavoured to cultivate class struggle. But in recent years, there have been indications that these parties intend to imitate the Congress by working within local bodies, credit societies, cooperatives, and village panchayats a recognition by the Communists of the essential character of rural society in West Bengal. The rural leadership in the Legislative Assembly is made up of small landholders (52 out of 168), and middle class professionals (73) who hold positions as doctors, merchants, lawyers, teachers, journalists and clerks. (See Table III.) It is this well-established group, relatively high in income, occupational status, education, and in some instances caste from which political leadership is derived. Leadership and Planning Process What effect will this increase in rural leadership have upon the freedom with which economic planning 929

6 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

7 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 may be pursued? At present it is possible for India's planners to plan on a highly rational and relatively non-political basis. Planners assess resources, needs and targets, and then proceed to allocate those resources to best achieve those targets. The demands of various political groups for special attention have thus far been of minor importance. Planners work within a relatively free atmosphere as far as political pressures are concerned. What pressures exist are slight compared with those present in American, British,or Japanese politics, and slight compared to what they are likely to be a few decades hence as interests in India become more articulate. We have noted that rural leadership is derived from community associations which often unite the community, not class associations which divide. Intermediary landholders, large peasants and nonagricultural middle classes are sources of local leadership. Poorer tenants and sharecroppers might oppose this leadership, but have yet to show any disposition to do so and attempts by Communist and Marxist left peasant associations to win their support have been without success. Rural demands are likely to be directed at winning government assistance, rather than expressions of political conflict within the rural community. This pattern may change, in which event the predictions which follow will have no validity. But at this time there is no evidence that conflicts within the rural community are of any r magnitude. Demands upon government have focussed on two issues: government taxation, and allocations of government revenue. Attempts by government to increase rural taxes (such as irrigation taxes) are likely to meet with Increased opposition. Demands from rural areas for more government expenditures for agricultural development, irrigation schemes, roads, rural industries, medicaj and public health programmes, credit facilities and the like are already present and are sure to increase. Already, criticisms within the Indian Parliament have been made that the Second Five Year Plan has had an industrial urban bias and that increased attention, i e, expenditure, must be given to rural areas in subsequent plans. To the extent that rural areas increasingly articulate their interests, it will become more and more difficult for planners not to take these demands into account. During the past few years planners have had and perhaps for a few years longer may continue to have opportunities for rational planning which may rapidly diminish. Demands within Congress Party 931 Were rural demands rising outside the Congress Party fold, it might be possible for the government to resist pressures as it has so successfully resisted pressures from many urban groups. But demands within the Congress Party are moredifficult to resist. In some states, such as in Rajasthan, rural-urban conflicts have taken the form of Congress Party-government conflicts. In other states, such as in West Bengal, growing rural and urban demands have forced the state government to exert pressure on New Delhi for more financial support. The growth of rural political power has the effect of straining center-state relations. For West Bengal, like other states, has the constitutional authority to tax agriculture, but agriculture is poor and politically powerful. On the other hand, West Bengal's industrial sector is relatively wealthy, but only the center has the authority to tax industry and income. The State government thus increasingly turns to the Center for financial help. The result is that growing rural demands on the state are deflected into statecenter conflicts. Congress governments have thus far resisted urban demands for lower food prices, higher wages, more consumer goods and more employment, a factor not unrelated to the growing weakness of Congress in India's major urban centers. To resist rural demands is more difficult, for Congress depends so heavily upon the rural areas for votes. The rural leadership and particularly the rural gentry have thus far effectively delayed or through influence on local administration effectively negated legislation creating ceilings on land holdings. In both land reform and tax policy the rural leadership has demonstrated its capacity to prevent or invalidate government action. The possibility now exists that the rising number of rural Congress leaders combined with the decreasing number of urban Congress leaders may result in a situation in which this rural leadership could do more than negate policies, but may make more demands on government. Already there are re* ports of increasing pressures from rural ML As on the departments of Public Works, Fisheries, Agriculture, and Community Development. Social service expenditures for health programmes, schools, fisheries, agriculture, etc. per capita are even now higher in West Bengal than any other state (Rs 6.12 in West Ben-

8 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1959 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY gal, Rs 5.94 In Bombay, Rs 4.19 in Madras and Rs 2.37 In UP). Hard Choice We are admittedly now entering speculative realms, but is it far fetched to assume that the growing numbers of rural MLAs, MPs and political workers will affect the relative freedom with which policy makers now operate? If political demands increasingly enter into economic planning, what effects might this have upon the democratic structure? Government planners will be faced with some hard choices. They are likely to be under pressure from growing rural interests to modify their plans. At this point they must either modify what they conceive to be highly rational plans based solely upon economic considerations, or alternatively they must adopt authoritarian measures to minimize the influence of these political pressures. In short, there is likely to be a price for democracy which planners have not yet had to pay, Indian government officials rightly pride themselves on their eagerness to plan for economic growth within a democratic framework, but thus far these two values have hardly come into conflict with one another. So long as many government officials look upon democracy as a way in which the population is exhorted to freely participate in activities leading toward the goals of national unity, economic development and rural reconstruction, then democracy appears to harmonize with a highly economic and rational view of the planning process. But as organized demands increase and politicians begin to view democracy as a threat to this highly rational and what in their minds is a "responsible" view of planning and the country's long term needs, many a politician in the higher echelons of government may consider sacrificing democratic institutions, But the dilemma may very well never take this form. At the moment control of the central and state governments is largely in the hands of those who come from urban areas and have an urban outlook and an urban committal to giving priority to industrial development. The rise of rural leadership in the Assembly and in political parties has yet to be reflected in actual control of the governmental machinery on the state and national level. The demands of rural areas for greater allocations of government expenditures, and the demands of rural leaders for greater access to power will be difficult to reject, not only because of the growing importance of rural leaders in a system in which universal suffrage flourishes, but also because of the rural populist ideology of many urban leaders who, steeped in Gandhian lore, look upon villages as the "real" India, and as the repository of India's national heritage. Few urban politicians would be willing to argue the case for increasing rural taxes, in spite of the low taxes now paid. Nor can the urban politician modify the system to diminish the role of rural representative, since the electoral system is built into the constitution. The urban politicians' control over national and Mate governments, and the urban industrial emphasis of planning may indeed undergo great changes,