1 Prepared remarks by a North Korean representative at a recent (2010) conference in Hong Kong.

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1 Northeast Asian Regional Security after the Cheonan Incident A North Korean Perspective* Kevin Shepard, Ph.D. James A. Kelly Korean Studies Fellow, Pacific Forum CSIS The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) on March 27 rattled inter-regional relations, triggered military posturing, and raised questions of DPRK motives, ROK policies, US commitment, and Chinese benignity. From a North Korean perspective, regional security has been shaken in the short-term, but the incident has provided some strategic opportunities, and will have few long-term implications. According to Pyongyang, recent incidents directly affect the security of the Korean Peninsula such as DPRK-US and DPRK-Japan hostile relations, US-Japan and US-south Korea military alliances, the attempt to build US-Japan-south Korea tripartite military alliance, long-term stationing of nuclear armed US troops in south Korea and Japan and the US military strategy aimed at containing China and Russia. 1 However, nothing in this statement was nonexistent prior to the sinking of the Cheonan; while tensions are currently heightened, there has been no paradigm shift. Long-time North Korea analyst Tong Kim best summed up the unfortunately slight impact of the sinking: The Cheonan incident is not a new turning point towards the deterioration of relations with Pyongyang, in the sense that the relations had already been on the down slope. 2 While there had been some positive signs in recent inter- Korean relations, this observation of the Lee Myung-bak administration-era is unfortunately accurate. The incident does not represent a new strategy by North Korea although it may be an indication of a period in which North Korean actions may be short-sighted or tunnel-visioned. New US sanctions against the North do not indicate a paradigm shift in policy, either. The additional targets of sanctions only indicate the lack of earlier enforcement. What is more vital to understanding the impact of the sinking of the Cheonan on regional stability is understanding how actors within North Korea view the incident and the subsequent reactions of regional actors. While the official rhetoric is easily dismissible as propaganda, Kim Jong Il does not make decisions in a vacuum; the perspectives and proposals of military and political advisors in the North shape the lens through which the leader views the region, and these advisors are not 1 Prepared remarks by a North Korean representative at a recent (2010) conference in Hong Kong. 2 Tong Kim, Dichotomy of Obama s North Korea Policy: Deterrence and Sanctions Will Not Solve the North Korean Question without Chinese Cooperation, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, August 5, security /dichotomy-of-obama2019s-north-korea-policy-deterrence-and-sanctions-will-not-solve-the-north-koreanquestion-without-chinese-cooperation. *Paper presented at The Asan Institute for Policy Studies Symposium on Post-Cheonan Regional Security, Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, August 13, 2010, Seoul, Korea.

2 privy to full disclosure. Representatives dispatched to various venues outside the DPRK also provide feedback to policy-makers, and identifying what they are (and are not) aware of is also an important part of understanding what goes into North Korean policy decision-making. Pre-Cheonan Perspective In order to best understand the impact on North Korean strategy, we should first recognize the environment in which the incident occurred, understand the likely trigger, and then examine Pyongyang s response. In order to understand the security implications, it is also necessary to glean how, and to what extent, the international reaction to the incident has been publicized in North Korea. Policy advisors in the North have been shown to be, for the most part, rational actors. 3 That does not make them safe, or right. It does, however, make them somewhat predictable. Predictions are only possible, however, if we understand the lens through which Pyongyang views this incident. DPRK Economics In the first half of 2010, North Korea was reeling from failed currency reform. Food and goods were in short supply, many residents lost their savings, there was push-back in some markets, and in the end, most people s holdings were devalued yet inflation was not brought under control. Despite the setbacks, the North continues pushing hard to acquire foreign currency; there were rumors of massive Chinese investment, Kaesong Industrial Complex continues to stumble along, deals with China and Russia are providing infrastructure repairs in resource and transportation sectors, and other projects are indicative that that not only was the North actively pursuing foreign investment, but that is was relatively successful in obtaining it. Optimism regarding the ability to bring in outside investment would allow for more hard-line policies toward South Korea in order to exact more concessions, but the Cheonan incident was upsetting on a level not beneficial to either economic or inter-korean policy handlers. Inter-Korean Relations Despite tensions over ROK President Lee Myung-bak s perceived hard-line policies toward North Korea, significant inter-korean exchanges had taken place over the last year. The North sent a delegation headed by Kim Ki-nam (secretary of the Workers Party of Korea) and Kim Yong Gun (WPK director) to the South for former ROK President Kim Dae-jung s funeral and to meet with President Lee. Pyongyang was also successfully pursuing a modicum of cross-border 3 Kevin Shepard, North Korea s Foreign Policy and Bounded Rationality: Post-Cold War Policy Regarding the United States (Ph.D. dissertation, Kyungnam University Graduate School of North Korean Studies, 2009). 2

3 dialog and easing of tensions over the closing of the Mount Keumgang tourist area and inflated wage and rent demands in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In a show of optimism, North Korea had also recently made several small political concessions to Seoul and Washington, returning (last August) the crew of the Yeonan 800, acknowledging error and apologizing for six dead in the South after opening floodgates on October 14 of last year, releasing two US reporters held for crossing illegally into the North (while gaining a propaganda coup afforded by the visit of former President Clinton), and entertaining the possibility of a summit meeting with President Lee since the topic was brought up last November in Singapore. Considering the vitriolic criticisms aimed at Lee in the past, humoring such an idea was an olive branch of sorts. Domestic Politics Significant personnel shuffling has been underway in In just the first half of the year, more than a dozen high-ranking positions within the leadership have been reshuffled. 4 Some of these moves remind us of the advanced age of the regime, with at least eight of the seats opening up due to death (although some deaths were attributed to car accidents and executions rather than old age). They also offered Kim Jong Il an opportunity to further lay the groundwork for succession, most notably with the appointment of brother-in-law Jang Song-thaek to the National Defense Council. The expansion of the NDC and a constitutional revision in the spring, two Supreme People s Assembly sessions only months apart, and a scheduled September meeting of the Workers Party of Korea representatives, the first in 44 years, all indicate significant shifts in regime leadership structure are underway. What Caused The Incident, & What Does It Mean? 4 KWP Central Military Committee Member Pak Ki So (died); Chief Secretary for the Kangwon Party Provincial Committee (died); Director of the KWP Central Committee Financial Planning Department Pak Nam Gi (died); Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department Ri Yong Chol (died); KWP Secretary of Workers Organizations Kim Jung Rin (died); Commanding Officer of the Korean People s Army Ri Jong Bu (died); Senior Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department Ri Je Gang (died); KWP Central Committee Director of Propaganda and Agitation Choe Ik Gyu (replaced, possibly died); Director of Office #39 Kim Tong Un (replaced); Ambassador to the UN Mission in Geneva and to Switzerland Ri Chol (retired); National Defense Commission Member and Vice Minister of the Ministry of People s Armed Forces Kim Il Chol (retired); Premier Kim Yong Il (recalled); Vice-premier Kwak Pom Gi (recalled); Vice-premier O Su Yong (recalled); Vice-premier Pak Myong Son (recalled); Minister of Light Industry Ri Ju O (recalled); Minister of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industry Jong Yon Gwa (recalled); Chairman of the Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission Pak Hak Son (recalled). 3

4 In the midst of leadership transformation, economic recovery efforts, improving relations with Washington and Seoul, and ongoing nuclear issues, the South Korean warship ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772) issued a distress call on March 27, only to be found split in half at the bottom of the West Sea. Assuming the findings of the international investigation headed by South Korea are accurate, a North Korean torpedo was the culprit. Evidence gathered from the recovered wreck and surrounding seabed helped investigators pinpoint the how, but there is no solid evidence as to the why. There are several plausible theories; some more so than others. It is unlikely that a central order came from Kim Jong Il or his immediate circle of cadres. Chains of command and lines of communication in North Korea are too constricted and the bureaucracy too slow to allow for a green light to be given to an opportunistic strike. On the other hand, command and control over assets, and especially military assets, is too valued to believe that there has been a standing fire when ready command in retaliation for last November s West Sea firefight. 5 It is more likely that the unfortunate incident played out much as previous surface-to-surface squirmishes have: The simplest explanation is that an adventuresome North Korean vessel gets boxed in by chance, likely aware of the normal patrol routes for South Korean ships and caught off-guard by the Cheonan s alternative path. Feeling threatened or fearing capture, the boat fires and flees. Only this time, not being a surface ship, the exchange of small-caliber guns is not an option. Another, slightly more concerning, possibility is that the DPRK boat commander saw an opportunity to strike, and did so offensively and without highest approval. This is not to say that there was no prior plans to strike a South Korean ship or that the State Security Department, which is grooming Kim Jong Eun, was not involved, but it is not likely that a specific attack on the Cheonan had been ordered by Kim Jong Il. This is more concerning because it would indicate some degree of a lack of central control. Theories of rogue sailors in defiance of authority or power struggles within the North s military are unlikely; however, the ongoing reshuffling of decision-makers, along with the reorganization of and competition between strategic and security bureaus, may have encouraged ambitious officers to compete for attention through shows of 5 For more on the lines of communication within the North Korean regime, see Sung-il Hyun, Bukhanui Gukka Jeollyakgwya Pawo Elliteu [North Korea s National Strategy and Power Elite] (Seoul: Sunin, 2007); Dong-su Kim, Bukhanui Oegyojeongchaek Gyeoljunggwa Daegukjegigu Oegyojeongchaek Byeonhwa [Foreign Policymaking Process in North Korea and Change in Diplomacy Toward International Organizations], Bukhanjosayeongu [Research and Studies of North Korea] (Vol. 9.1, 2005). 4

5 loyalty. 6 This is not indicative of regime instability or a threatening lack of control; these are not challenges to authority, but rather, attempts to improve standing with higher authorities. This will likely only grow as the future roles for Kim Jong Eun and Jang Song-thaek become clearer. Either of these possibilities is even more plausible given that there was an upcoming election in South Korea. The South Korean left becomes very visible and very vocal whenever inter-korean tensions heighten, pressuring the Lee administration to appease North Korea. North Korean intelligence agents have actively encouraged this through support for and involvement in leftist South Korean organizations; the increasing role Kim Jong Eun is taking in the State Security Department, the upcoming ROK election, the consideration in Seoul for improving dialog and exchanges, and the North s strategy of pressuring Lee Myung Bak lends credence to the possibility of a general order to bump up inter-korean tensions in order to encourage Lee to pursue a more lenient policy toward Pyongyang. Post-Cheonan Perspective While sinking the Cheonan was not likely part of the North s central strategy, and has brought upon Pyongyang unwanted pressure and attention, North Korea has gained some status from the incident. DPRK-PRC relations Although censured, Pyongyang is not concerned by the statements made at recent G8 and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); only if the United Nations had issued a resolution would North Korea have taken notice. That did not happen, however, because China has reaffirmed support for the Kim Jong Il regime by refusing to accept the ROK-led investigation results, blocking United Nations Security Council attempts to censure Pyongyang and ensuring that the presidential statement acknowledges North Korea s denial of responsibility. 6 1) Jang Song-thaek and O Kyuk-ryol, both vice-chairmen of the NDC, are competing for stature through the foreign investment organizations they control: the Korean International Trading Company and the Taepung International Investment Group, respectively. 2) Offices 38 and 39, in charge of Kim Jong Il s personal finances and many of the North s overseas illegal activities, were thought to have been merged following Office 39 Director Kim Tong Un s removal after being slapped with an EU travel ban, but are now Office 38 is said to have been reestablished; There are also rumors of transfer of control of some of the accounts held by these offices to Kim Jong Eun s control. 3) The Ministry of People s Security, recently subordinated to the NDC, and the State Security Department have stepped up operations in a bid to gain favor with Jang Song-thaek and Kim Jong Eun. 5

6 At the same time Pyongyang was being reassured that China would defend it in the international arena, bilateral diplomatic ties were also being reaffirmed; Hu Jintao hosted a summit with Kim Jong Il in May despite a request from President Lee Myung-bak that the meeting be cancelled. (Following the summit, Beijing released a 5-point statement that many say was more harsh than usual, reflecting tension in the relationship, but the statement is not known to most in Pyongyang; 7 rather, it is publicized that Hu affirmed that the visit put the Sino-DPRK relations and cooperation on a new higher stage. 8 Hu reconfirmed close ties with Pyongyang in his remarks when accepting credentials from the new North Korean ambassador on July 30. In addition, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue visited Pyongyang in late July, 9 and an agreement on furthering economic and technical cooperation was signed on July Even more recently, China has leased rights to yet another North Korean port, in Chongjin, indicating plans to further invest in North Korean infrastructure. The message received in Pyongyang is that the Cheonan incident has not hurt economic or diplomatic ties with China, that expanding economic cooperation will ease the burden of sanctions by others, and that China will use its leverage over UNSC decisions to protect the North. Peninsular Environment As North Korea continues to pursue economic recovery, it is unhelpful that President Lee has scaled back inter-korean trade, but has done so only by one-third, and is (as of August) providing additional hard currency to the regime by giving a raise of all North Korean workers in the complex. 11 However, the expanded campaigns for foreign investment this year were not aimed at South Korean financiers; South Korean involvement provides dangerous levels of exposure to ROK success. As relations appeared to improve in the months prior to the Cheonan incident, North 7 Author s assessment based on conversations with North Korean representatives at several venues in the region in June, KCNA, Chinese President on Sino-DPRK Relations, August 1, China confirms senior diplomat s visit to DPRK, July 28, KCNA, DPRK, China Sign Economic Cooperation Agreement, July 29, Despite announcing the termination of inter-korean trade, South Korea continues to operate facilities in the Kaesong Industrial Complex that made up more than half of all inter-korean economic cooperation before the Cheonan incident, providing a 5% raise in early August. Data from the Korea Customs Service indicates that inter-korean trade has falled by 32% since April. The ROK government also still allows some aid to cross the border. North Korea Newsletter No. 118, Yonhap News Agency, August 5, 2010; Inter-Korean trade falls since Cheonan probe, JoongAng Daily, August 7, Accessed at on August 9, 2010; 6

7 Korea was carefully sniffing for the possibility additional aid, but not full-scale investment. In addition, the eventual sanctions by President Lee were not surprising- Inundated with anti-lee Myung-bak propaganda, most simply saw it as the other foot finally falling. The North Korean regime must be very pleased with South Korea s refusal to release the report of the Cheonan incident investigation, giving credence to DPRK denial and allowing for myriad alternative theories questioning the integrity and accuracy of the South s findings. Even despite the contradictory nature of the various claims, they are widely circulated in North (and South) Korea, evidencing rejection of the official findings. The KCNA has been careful to quote from US, Japanese, Chinese, Russian and even South Korean sources to add credence to the criticisms. Of the many challenges to the official findings, the two gaining the most traction in the press are the findings by J.J. Suh and Seung-Hun Lee, which conclude that the only conclusion one can draw on the basis of the evidence is that there was no outside explosion, 12 and a document Hankyoreh News claims to be from the Russian investigative team dispatched to Seoul that corroborates Seoul s finding of an outside explosion, but suggests the Cheonan hit a mine. 13 It was also likely encouraging to the North Korean strategists to witness the limitations on the ROK navy s ASW, recovery, and deep-sea diving equipment. However, with the delay in OPCON transfer, the additional US-ROK naval exercises and the wake-up call this has sent to ROK military strategists, North Korea is aware that these capabilities will be heavily invested in over the next several years, further weakening its relative naval capacity. Regional Security Tensions around the peninsula were immediately raised, with ROK and US forces on alert for additional provocations, and the North preparing for retaliatory strikes by heightening readiness and even repositioning some SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles in the coastal region near where the Cheonan went down. This was followed by joint exercises in the East Sea, ROKN exercises in the West Sea, and North Korean threats of physical response and bolstered nuclear deterrent. The North has watched these exercises carefully, threatening to strike any vessel that crosses into DPRK territory and firing 130 artillery rounds in the direction of two South Korean islands (with ten rounds falling South of the NLL, and South Korea failing to make good on its promise to 12 Press Conference on Cheonan Report (part 2), 6:10. Video accessed online at on July 31, Complex combination of factors responsible for Cheonan sinking, Russian investigation concludes, Hankyoreh, July 27, Accessed at html on August 1,

8 return such fire three-fold). This is largely posturing for the sake of domestic military support, but the threats could have easily painted the North into a corner were US or ROK ship or plane to stray (something that I have personally witnessed with alarming frequency). Thankfully, the exercises have, so far, gone off without a hitch. Warnings issued by the North are often played up in South Korean press as antagonistic or threatening, but Pyongyang s warnings for fishing craft to avoid the waters near the Northern Limit Line was a prudent move likely designed at preventing accidental escalation due to misidentification or miscommunication. That said, a South Korean fishing boat has already been seized by the North, days after Pyongyang issued its warnings. The interest of the Chinese government due to the three Chinese fishermen onboard will hopefully speed up resolution of this issue, but it should serve as a warning to both North and South of the potential for inadvertent escalation. Pyongyang is not looking for a fight; in fact, the US and ROK have been quite persuasive in convincing the North that there will not be any (planned) military retaliation for adventurism. 14 Lee Myung-bak even stated, [South Koreans] have always tolerated North Korea s brutality, time and time again, acknowledging the lack of response to both the 1983 assassination attempt on then-president Chun Du-hwan in Myanmar and the bombing of KAL 858 in 1987 (while not mentioning the lack of retaliation for the seizing of the USS Pueblo, the shooting down of a US EC-121, the murder of American and South Korean soldiers in the DMZ, special forces raids on the home of the South Korean president, and numerous other acts of provocation). 15 While he threatened that North Korea will pay a price this time, Seoul s sanctions were hollow. Inter- Korean trade was cut by less than half. The Kaesong Industrial Complex, representative of inter- Korean cooperation, continues to grow. Psychological warfare operations were halted before they began. Economic losses are expected to be absorbed through increased cooperation with China, and while joint US-ROK military exercises are unwelcome, they are likely seen as an inevitable result of Lee s hard-line policies. As long as Pyongyang avoids inadvertent escalation, South Korean concerns of escalation will prevent them from retaliating harshly, the US will respect the wishes of Seoul (and Beijing), and this incident will fade away as just another inter-korean clash [South Koreans] have always tolerated North Korea s brutality, time and time again. Accessed at on August 9, Special Address to the Nation by the President Lee Myung-bak, Office of the President, May 24, Accessed at &board_no=e03&search_key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=1. 16 This is not what the author wishes, but rather, what he expects. The Cheonan incident should bring into sharp perspective how both North Korea and China view the region. The manner in which this incident has been 8

9 What To Expect That this was likely not part of an organized campaign makes its reoccurrence more likely, not less. There is very small number of North Koreans fully aware of facts surrounding the Cheonan incident. Most, including those working within the regime and local military leaders, believe the following 1) North Korea may have been complicit, but no one has been punished; South Korea s claims of North Korean responsibility have been undermined; Chinese support has not waned. If succession politics continue to stoke competitions over loyalty, we could see more provocations in the near future. The North Korean leadership would prefer the Cheonan incident had never occurred; they will exploit it for all they can, but would rather put it behind them as quickly as possible. Lack of support for the ROK position has helped legitimize a more hard-line militarist posture by North Korea, something beneficial to domestic politics as the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) is likely to be re-empowered in the upcoming September WPK representatives meeting. The inner circle is aware of the dangers of additional provocations, but will not order military commanders to avoid conflict. Rather, Pyongyang is hoping that South Korea wants to avoid similar incidents, and will heed the warnings from the North- they are begging the South to help prevent accidental escalation. While incidents such as this may be related to succession issues, as actors vie for power, the Cheonan incident was not a signal that the North wishes to suspend international relations while it deals with domestic issues. Decision-makers rely quite heavily on lessons learned and historical experiences. There has been but one power transition from which to glean advice; and in that example, Kim Il Sung s death had minimal impact on the 1994 nuclear negotiations. Rather, Pyongyang is vigorously pursuing economic growth (as opposed to reform) and the establishment of a Great and Prosperous Nation by What we are most likely to see is a mix of signals that will lead some to reel about North Korean irrationality, but will be more indicative of concurrent yet uncoordinated strategies. The central government is focused on economic growth and stable transition of power. Attempts to engage South Korea are for propaganda value; the North hopes Seoul will be the detractor. There is the threat of unintended escalation. Pyongyang recognizes this, but is hampered in its ability to pass down relevant orders while maintaining loyal facades. In order to maintain the current level of handled (i.e. as an isolated incident rather than a reflection of DPRK views of the South and the region) only emboldens Pyongyang. 9

10 peninsular and regional security, the Lee Myung-bak administration will need to continue to be reserved and pragmatic, but the price for this will be that the North will continue to know that provocations will go largely unanswered. 10