Rethinking North Korean Diplomacy on the Nuclear Issue. Ambassador (ret.) Joseph DeThomas Rethinking Seminar April 10, 2018

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1 Rethinking North Korean Diplomacy on the Nuclear Issue Ambassador (ret.) Joseph DeThomas Rethinking Seminar April 10, 2018

2 What s the Problem?

3 Basic Facts Tested missiles with range and payload capacity to strike all of continental U.S. [But not RV]. 30 year old nuclear weapons design & production program. Has tested probable thermonuclear device of about 200 kt yield. Has somewhere between 25 and 60 fission weapons. Has over a thousand shorter range nuclear capable missiles (capable of hitting Japan and ROK).

4 What is the Problem with DPRK Nukes? Problem 1: Decoupling Problem 2: Nuclear decoupling Problem 3: The hostage dilemma Problem 4: Nukes as trade goods.

5 A Strategic Bottom Line The DPRK has upset the 65 year old mutual deterrence that permitted a nasty but stable peace to persist on the Peninsula ICBM program calls U.S. alliances with ROK and Japan into question and exposes those countries to coercion. Even a Hillary Clinton Administration would have responded to this. U.S. has accepted a nuclear DPRK for a dozen years, but apparently Trump Administration cannot accept one that can target the U.S. I state this not because I think it is wise but because it appears to be the thinking of POTUS.

6 Confusion about Purpose Ignorance Ideological speculation Are they crazy and violent? Are they rational and defensive? Are they rational and militarily aggressive? Are they rational and politically aggressive? Or, are they just extortionate?

7 Different Purpose/Different Threat Irrational: Unprovoked attack on homeland. Defensive: Global non-proliferation regime & transfer. Militarily aggressive: conventional aggression. Politically aggressive: alliance decoupling Extractive (i.e., it is willing to sell it to us for a price.)

8 A Dynastic Rational Actor

9 A Hostile Environment

10 Lessons of History

11 Cross Purposes Trump Administration (at least the White House) believes that once the DPRK can target U.S. cities all is lost. Result is a race by DPRK to the one outcome that might push the U.S. to initiate preventive war.

12 Vince Lombardi Diplomacy North Korea s diplomatic playbook is very thin, but they execute the few plays they run quite well from a tactical perspective. Based on two basic assumptions: DPRK surrounded by richer, stronger basically hostile powers Its military is strong enough to inflict a high enough price to make full scale war too expensive to be worth the prize of regime change.

13 Diplomacy Prime DPRK objectives are to: 1) prevent a coalition of all the powers against it and 2) extract resources from one or more of those powers. High point of policy was during Sino-Soviet split. DPRK got bribes from both Communist powers and lined them both up to keep the U.S. at bay. But it has worked acceptably since 1994 with China, ROK, Japan and U.S. alternating as the hostile and resource providing powers. Uses violent incidents short of war accompanied by a snarling diplomacy to keep bigger powers off balance and to retain initiative.

14 Dancing at the Edge of the Cliff Given its diplomatic approach, DPRK can take things to the edge of war as a tactic then create a high profile mechanism to open a peace offensive. Benefits from sense of relief.

15 North Korean Error Diverted from the playbook under Kim Jong Un Conducted provocations vs ROK Accelerated its nuclear and missile testing (perhaps due to Presidential transitions in ROK and U.S.) Disrespect or worse for Chinese

16 Maximum Pressure This opened the door in to the U.S. Maximum Pressure sanctions campaign. China, ROK, Japan and U.S. all tighten sanctions in part via a series of UNSCRs. For first time DPRK s general economy targeted. From 4 th Quarter 2017 on foreign exchange badly impacted.

17 The Peace Offensive

18 Back to the Playbook This is the way to see Kim Jong Un s peace offensive since January 1. He has identified the weak point in each member of the coalition against him and he is dealing separately with each of them. Seeking to break off one or more of them from maximum pressure and to delay/abort any effort by U.S. to shift towards preventive war and regime change.

19 The ROK The weakest link. The Pyeong Chang Olympics. Fear of war. Moon Administration has Sunshine Policy in its DNA.

20 U.S. Kim probably surprised Trump said yes so quickly. Trump may believe DPRK needs deal fast. Focused on denuclearization (And on keeping ROK on side). U.S. leadership changes lack of preparation something to ponder.

21 China Willing to go along on maximum pressure to prevent war and catastrophe but only when everyone else was. Fears loss of leadership role.

22 Japan Abe left holding the bag on the hard line All he cared about was to be in lock step with Trump and to use hard line on DPRK for domestic/constitutional purposes. Now scrambling to catch up to others with summit of his own.

23 Four Summits one Center Kim has managed to divide his opponents meeting each of them at summit level separately. He has 1) undercut chances of military action; 2) put himself at the center of the agenda; and 3) created openings for loosening sanctions.

24 Prospects DPRK has been tactically slick, but it is not clear where it goes from here (or even how they see their situation). There is likely a complete mismatch in what we mean by denuclearization (think Libya) and what Kim means (think U.S.-Soviet arms control). This is not likely to survive a Trump-Kim summit.

25 Prospects Key question will be how serious ROK is about denuclearization in the face of prospects for DPRK concessions on North-South issues and the risk of U.S.-initiated war. Second possible weak point China. Now that Kim has shown proper respect will it weaken sanctions enforcement? (Perhaps as a weapon in trade war?)

26 Trump-Kim Many ways this could go very wrong, but there is one very thin road to it going right. The Reykjavik Model.

27 And Then What? Success is a problem of its own. CVID is a dream not a goal. Would be so unstable as to generate crisis. Need a real phased solution on nuclear and missiles. Failure especially if on the personal level could cause major rupture.

28 Backup Slides

29 Los Angeles 15 kt

30 LA 250 kt

31 Pentagon Ground Burst 15 kt

32 Pentagon Ground Burst 250 kt