Korea s Transfer of Political Power and Foreign Policy Hosup Kim (Professor, Chung-Ang Univ.)

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1 Korea s Transfer of Political Power and Foreign Policy Hosup Kim (Professor, Chung-Ang Univ.) 1. Introduction The Lee Myung-bak government was inaugurated on February 25, 2008, marking a restart for the nation s conservative camp. Through the presidential election in December 2007, the Korean people expressed their disappointment at the liberal presidents that had been in power over the last decade by choosing the conservative party. The parliamentary elections on April 9, 2008 also testified to the liberals' fall from grace and the conservatives' ascent to power. The Grand National Party (GNP) won 153 seats in the 299-seat National Assembly and two conservative minority parties picked up 32 seats with another 20 seats of conservative independents. In all, therefore, the conservative groups won about 200 seats, giving the Lee Myung-bak government greater stability in the management of state affairs. The Lee government s most important policy goal is to elevate Korea to advanced nation status. Toward this end, President Lee has pledged to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy. The content and method of his pragmatism on global affairs will become more apparent as a variety of diplomatic issues are addressed one by one. At this point in time, two months after his inauguration, we know for certain that Lee s diplomatic priorities are different from those of the liberal governments over the past decade. The Lee Myung-bak government places top priority on reinforcement of the U.S.- ROK alliance. Its second and third priorities are, in order, strengthening ties with Asian countries and improving inter-korea relations. These priorities are in line with the nation s traditional foreign policy pursued by supporters of the conservative ideology that catapulted Korea, an once backward state, into a near-advanced nation over the past half century by means of economic growth, security enhancement, and anti-communism. This essay intends to examine the liberals self-reliance diplomacy and the conservatives alliance diplomacy, which have been at loggerheads over the last decade in Korea, by comparing their contents and premises. The two views are in stark contrast with each other in terms of perceptions and global outlook, leaving little room for compromise. In addition, it is difficult to identify the third way in foreign policy that can reconcile the two sides. This essay maintains that the U.S.-ROK alliance is an historical outcome and a Korea s national asset that has been successfully maintained for more than 50 years. Therefore, it argues that the question about the U.S.-ROK alliance should not be about whether to form or not, but about how to manage and maintain it to embrace for new realities in the years to come. 1

2 2. Comparison between Alliance Diplomacy and Self-reliance diplomacy The following are points of disparity between alliance diplomacy and self-reliance diplomacy: (1)priorities for national policies; (2)South Korea s relative national power and geopolitical standing; (3)military threat from North Korea; (4)the possibility of replacing the U.S. ROK alliance; (5)Korean unification in light of international politics; (6)mental factors like consciousness, ideology and the state of mind among resources of national power; (7)the impact of the U.S. ROK alliance on neighboring states of South Korea; (8)implications of the U.S. ROK alliance on South Korea s autonomy; (9)relationship between economy and security; and (10)rationale for the deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea (1) Priorities for National Policies The alliance and the self-reliance policies differ on priorities for national agendas. In particular, they differ on the weight that should be given to the improvement of inter- Korean ties and Korean unification. Proponents of self-reliance diplomacy, or the autonomists, a term coined by the author, put reconciliation between the two Koreas before everything else, perceiving inter-korean cooperation as being most crucial. (Baik 2004) Autonomists argue that national unification and inter-korean reconciliation and cooperation are the most pressing tasks for the Korean people and thus have priority over the U.S. ROK alliance.(hamm a) They further insist that the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea must be reconsidered if it raises the possibility of hampering reunification of the Korean peninsula or reconciliation and cooperation between the North and the South.(Hamm b) Even relatively moderate autonomists see that U.S. ROK relations and inter-korean relations are equally important, refusing to forgo one for the other.(im Hyug Baeg) Autonomists assert that the U.S. ROK alliance has a negative impact on building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.(lee Samsung) They contend that since such peace treaty regime is not compatible with the current alliance between Washington and Seoul, re-organization of the alliance is desirable and indeed indispensable if South Korea is determined to construct a peace regime with North Korea. Autonomists, who assert that any potential outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula must be prevented, voice fears over the possibility of U.S. attacks against the North, arguing that in order to stop the U.S. from mounting preemptive strikes on North Korea the South should not serve as a U.S. launch site. To them, it is not likely that 2

3 the United States would plan to launch a war on the Korean peninsula without resorting to forward deployed U.S. forces in South Korea, wartime operational control (OPCON) of hundreds of thousands of the South Korean military and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).(Lee Samsung) Thus, it is clear to them that the highly unilateral subordination of South Korea to the U.S. under the alliance made it possible for Washington to almost go to war against Pyongyang in 1994 without consulting Seoul. Advocates for alliance diplomacy, or the pro-alliancers, regard maintenance of liberal democracy as the nation s top priority.(han Yong-Seop; Kim Woosang; Lee Choon Kun) They believe that reunification of the Korean peninsula should be preceded by the defense of liberal democracy. The U.S. ROK alliance should be retained and reinforced for some time as it is instrumental in protecting the system. In other words, the South must place greater emphasis on maintaining the alliance with the U.S. rather than inter-korean reconciliation on the premise that North renounces liberal democracy, while the U.S. promotes the system. Pro-alliancers argue that the U.S. ROK alliance is a tool essential to sharing national interests with the common ideologies of liberalism and democracy and to fighting against powers that defy liberal democracy.(lee Choon Kun) They question whether reconciliation with North Korea, although one of the nation s important foreign policy goals, is worth risking damage to diplomatic relations with major foreign countries including the U.S. It is the Kim Dae-jung government that pushed for the improvement of North- South relations as the nation s most urgent foreign policy issue. The then President Kim placed top priority on improving inter-korean ties and successfully engaging the North. He saw that relations with traditional allies such as America and Japan may be subject to modification in order to achieve success with the sunshine policy, laying greater emphasis on the success of sunshine policy and inter-korean reconciliation than the U.S.-ROK alliance. In this regard, the author believes that it was the Kim Daejung government that first came up with self-reliance diplomacy. This essay argues that the reconciliation between two Koreas should be dealt with as top priority if other nations did not matter. It is questionable, however, whether the normalization of inter-korean ties should be the highest priority when it is in the country s best interests to maintain economic and political relationships with multilateral parties in the international community. Furthermore, the author believes that the South Korean government must pay attention to the opinions of the international community like IAEA and UN Security Council if the Kim Jong-il regime remains intransigent toward Seoul s reconciliation efforts and the international 3

4 community does not want to cooperate with the North on grounds of the regime s liability. (2) South Korea s Relative Power Standing The second issue is that autonomists and pro-alliancers make different assessments of South Korea s relative national power and its geopolitical standing. Autonomists argue that South Korea is no longer a peripheral nation but a power at the center of Northeast Asia. To quote one of the autonomists: Korea is at the core [of Northeast Asia] Northeast Asia is no longer a far-flung region. The area plays a central role in a new international order. Likewise, Korea is no longer a peripheral part of the international arena. 1 Achieving national self-defense is a key agenda in self-reliance diplomacy. Autonomists say that Korea has grown to having self-reliant defense capabilities. Now that Korea has become the world s 12 th economic power, it is faced with the responsibility of achieving self-reliant national defense. 2 Autonomists are confident that South Korea has sufficient national power to counter North Korea's armed aggression.(lee Samsung) They argue that the South is equipped with adequate military capabilities to defend communist reunification by the armed forces of the North. According to them, since the ROK is able to prevent the aggression of the DPRK independent of U.S. involvement, there is no need for U.S. troops to be stationed in the country.(lee Samsung) Even if a war did break out on the Korean peninsula, it is hard to believe the war would lead to North Korean-led reunification. To them, the North cannot overpower and defeat the South because it does not have the qualitative and quantitative military edge over the South or the economic resources to build up combat capabilities. Pro-alliancers perceive that the Korean peninsula, surrounded by regional powers and a superpower and thus under their influence, can hardly obtain self-reliant defense capabilities due to its geopolitical position. And the U.S. ROK alliance can make up for this geopolitical vulnerability.(kim Woosang) The alliance is characterized by the fact that the weak ROK chose the superpower U.S. as an alliance partner to keep other powers in check. Therefore, the alliance is inherently an asymmetric alliance between a superpower and a minor partner based on a tradeoff between autonomy and security.(kim Woosang) Pro-alliancers who recognize this asymmetric characteristic see that the U.S. ROK alliance is being challenged by a shift in the relative national powers of the two 1 President Roh Moo Hyun s address on the Independence Day, August 15, in the same address. 4

5 allies. Kim Woosang points out that as for the typical asymmetric and autonomysecurity trade-off alliance, when the national capability of the weaker ally increases at a rapid pace compared to a strong ally, the former is highly likely to modify the asymmetric alliance. Korea s national strength has increased rapidly thanks to its impressive economic growth in the 1970s and the 1980s. Its role in the alliance has grown since the 1980s and is expected to further increase. As the asymmetric U.S. ROK alliance has gradually become more symmetric, the Korean people have expressed their discontent with the lack of autonomy. Kim argues that in order to calm the resentment among the Korean people, both governments have to address the U.S.FKrelated issues being disputed such as the transfer of war-time operational control, sharing defense expenses, and revising SOFA to adjust the existing alliance to a more equal relationship. As we have seen, pro-alliancers also maintain that the alliance between the two nations can only be maintained properly through readjustment that reflects the shift in their relative national powers.(welt) (3) Military Threat from North Korea The third issue is that the two groups of theorists assess the characteristics of military threat posed by the DPRK differently. Autonomists do not see much chance of aggression by the DPRK.(Hamm 2003a) They insist on making a new assessment of the military balance between the two Koreas to find a way out of the U.S. ROK alliance and proceed with self-reliant defense. They conclude that the DPRK is no military rival for the ROK, which has built up arms based on its absolute superiority in economic power. They cite the following reasons for the low possibility of North Korea s armed aggression: 1)the regime is suffering from economic collapse; 3 2)when Korean leaders met Kim Jong Il, the supreme leader of the North, he has said that he has no plans to invade the South; 4 and 3)the end of the Cold War terminated the support of excommunist allies, diminishing the threat of the regime. Autonomists note that North Korea s military capabilities are far exaggerated in South Korea.(Hamm 2003a) Economic meltdown in the 1990s cut back military expenses and the collapse of the Communist bloc led to a drop in military aid from the communist allies. The amount of its military expenditure and armaments has been overestimated by the South Korean conservatives. The DPRK s failure to modernize 3 Hamm 2003a. 4 President Kim Dae-Jung s arrival address to South Korea after the summit meeting with Kim Jong-Il on June 15,

6 its military and advance military information technology has left it with a stockpile of obsolete weapons harking back to the Soviet s last days. Furthermore, severe shortages of fuels and foreign exchange have greatly reduced its capability to operate and maintain even the decrepit stockpile. To sum up, Pyongyang s conventional military power has sharply dwindled. Pro-alliancers see that the possibility of North Korean aggression remains and thus the regime still poses a military threat to the South.(Ryoo; Han) There is no evidence that the North has made any changes in the past half century so the existing military threat cements the necessity of the U.S. ROK alliance. Pro-alliancers believe that the U.S.FK plays a crucial role in deterring Pyongyang s armed provocation against Seoul and that the U.S.FK has successfully overseen the ceasefire footing on the Korean peninsula since The following are the major views shared by pro-alliancers who believe that the North poses a military threat: 1) North Korea s conventional weaponry is definitely superior in numbers; 5 2) It has yet to abandon the strategy of a surprise attack, while its forward deployment of excess forces is no different from offensive deployment; 3) it has also beefed up long-range missiles and forward deployed multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled guns in recent years, signaling the bolstering of offense strategies; 6 4) North Korea has not concealed its intentions to develop nuclear weapons, violating the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework; 5) the North Korea s nuclear test in October 2006 has shown its ambition of military blackmail and; 6) skirmishes in the Yellow Sea in 1999 and 2002 showed that the North had not recognized the North-South boundary line established since 1953 and therefore intended to achieve its political aims through the use of armed force. That is why pro-alliancers hold an unfavorable opinion of the sunshine policy. North Korea remains uncooperative toward South Korea by repeatedly expressing its nuclear ambitions and mounting military provocations. Under these circumstances, engaging the North with the constant provision of economic assistance will send the wrong messages to the North Korean leadership. If no sanction is imposed upon its wrongdoing, the North will not be motivated to change its ways. Pro-alliancers point out that the U.S. ROK alliance is one of the greatest security assets of the ROK, which acts as a crucial deterrent against military threats posed by the DPRK. The alliance is more important as a deterrence against possible aggression than as a defense mechanism against real threat. Deterrence means ruling 5 Han Yong-Seop. 6 Han Yong-Seop. 6

7 out the possibility of war by letting the DPRK know that any aggression will bear severe consequences. The North should be made to believe that its invasion of the South would inevitably invite retaliatory attacks by the U.S. The alliance and U.S. military presence on the peninsula are prerequisites to making the North Korean people perceive the consequences. (4)Alternatives to the ROK-U.S. Alliance Both sides have different views about the alternatives to the U.S. Some autonomists suggest China as a new ally partner of South Korea.(Lee Su-Hoon) Others argue that the Northeast Asian multilateral security regime is likely to take the place of the bilateral alliance.(lee Samsung) They cite the following as the case for forging a new alliance: i)the national capability of the U.S. is diminishing; 7 ii)u.s. policy toward the Korean Peninsula is in flux; 8 iii)the U.S. is increasingly displaying imperialist ambitions; 9 iv)the ROK is a subordinate to the U.S.; 10 and v)china better serves the economic interests of the ROK. 11 The autonomists who recognize an Asia Pacific multilateral security framework as a potential alternative to the U.S. ROK alliance view that the end of the Cold War has brought about the end of bilateral alliance, while the multilateral security system works better in the post-cold War era. They assert that the U.S.-led Asia Pacific multilateral regime, however, rings an alarm bell. If the U.S. forms a NATO-like hegemonic security organization by compiling a number of its bilateral military alliances with other Asia Pacific countries such as Japan, the Philippines and Australia, the ROK should be kept on full alert because such a framework would lead to perpetuation of East Asia s division. Autonomists suggest that the peace process on the Korean Peninsula or the institutionalization of peace in a unified Korea should be premised on a common security agreement by the four powers surrounding the Korean peninsula.(lee Samsung) Pro-alliancers believe that no other country is qualified to take the place of the U.S. They say that the U.S. ROK alliance remains essential even after the fall of Communism, a multilateral security regime cannot supplant the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and China is unlikely to acquire power to match the U.S. in the foreseeable future. They doubt whether Korea will be able to enter into an alliance analogous to 7 Lee Su-Hoon. 8 President Roh Moo Hyun s address on the Independence Day, August 15, Lee Su-Hoon. 10 Lee Samsung. 11 Lee Su-Hoon. 7

8 the current one with the U.S. and even if another alliance is established, it is unlikely to serve the national interests positively. If the ROK is attacked by the DPRK or other foreign enemies, the odds are low that China as well as Japan or Russia will go to war with the aggressor.(kim Woosang) Pro-alliancers view that the alliance with the U.S. should remain intact even after unification to promote national interests. Kim Woo-sang suggests three prerequisites for the alliance of a unified Korea: 1)the ally should be geographically as far as possible from Korea and forming an alliance with neighboring states raises the possibility of territorial disputes in the near future; 2)the ally, which is geographically distant from Korea, should have considerable national interests on the peninsula that will made it willingly deliver on alliance pledges when a unified Korea plunges into an emergency; and 3)the ally should have powerful military capability enabling it to promptly mobilize a large number of troops in a contingency. Kim Woosang argues that the U.S., without a doubt, best meets all the requirements. (5)Korean Unification in Light of International Politics Autonomists and pro-alliancers have different stances on the implications of Korean reunification upon international politics of Northeast Asia. Autonomists maintain that unification of the Korean Peninsula is the concern of the Korean people and should be handled by them. They predict that unification will naturally create one nation on the peninsula. They turn a blind eye to the issue that although the main players of unification must be the two Koreas, the event will eventually affect the existing international order and the balance of power in the Northeast Asian region, which means Korea s unification is also the concern of its neighbors. Pro-alliancers see that the reunification of the North and the South is not only a matter of the Korean people, but also a part of the Northeast Asian issue. They assert that maintaining the alliance with the U.S. will help the South extend its sovereignty to the North. (Kim and Cho) Pro-alliancers believe that Korean unification can be achieved only when the U.S. plays a positive role in the process or U.S. strategic interests can be fulfilled by the event. Policy effects can only be maximized when South Korea's policy toward North Korea is aligned with the interests of its neighbors. In particular, the ROK will attain policy autonomy within the structure when its North Korean policy successfully adjusts to the U.S. interests in Northeast Asia.(Chun) They believe that at a time when the U.S. exercises worldwide leadership and every single country including North Korea wants to take advantage of its power, if South Korea rejects use of the advantages out of emotional aversion to the U.S.-leaning policy of the 8

9 past, it is merely a show of unrealistic anti-american sentiment. They further claim that a divide between the U.S. policy agenda and South Korea s policy of reconciliation and cooperation may lead nowhere. Pro-alliancers acknowledge the limitations of the ROK, thereby accepting the reality that without the cooperation of the U.S. and Japan it cannot open the door of and reach rapprochement with the DPRK. Besides, they recognize that without cooperation, economic and political, from the U.S. and Japan, South Korea will not be able to mobilize either its own or the world s economic resources to rebuild the North Korean economy, even if it successfully opens up the communist regime. It seems to me that South Korea needs the cooperation of the international community to deal with other types of threats on all fronts, not just military menace from the North. The North regime represents a variety of issues such as nuclear programs, nuclear missiles, the opening and reconstruction of the economy, weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian aid, and refugees. Over the long term, South Korea needs to consult with the U.S.-led international community, including Japan, to reach an agreement on the viability of the Kim Jong Il regime, find practical means to drive change in the North s system, and identify possible scenarios following the change of regime and the solutions. To this end, pro-alliancers note that enhancing the U.S. ROK alliance is critical to solving the problems posed by North Korea and smoothing the path toward unification. The prohibition of the sales or shipment of key strategic goods to the Kaesong Industrial Park is a good example showing how South Korea s reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea is subject to the norms of the international community. Since the supply of strategic goods to the industrial region is restricted by the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, the only companies that do not need to deal with such strategic goods were allowed to locate in the industrial park. Pro-alliancers believe that even if the Kim Jong Il regime peacefully collapses, the region will not naturally come into the control of South Korea and therefore the U.S. ROK alliance should be maintained to prepare for potential intervention by bordering states.(kim and Cho) If the international community intervenes in the Korean affairs following the fall of the regime, it is quite possible that the U.S. and China, considering their own national interests, will not be able to agree on the system of the North. The backbone of U.S. foreign policy is the spread of democracy and market economy, and therefore the U.S. will prefer the democracy and market economy 9

10 model as the future system for North Korea, which is also in the interests of South Korea. By contrast, pro-alliancers maintain that since China sees the North as the buffer zone and wants it to remain a separate state even after the regime change rather than be absorbed into the South to form a unified Korea, the U.S. is most likely to support the South in the process. The possibility gives greater importance to the U.S. ROK alliance.(shim and Kim) (6)Mental Factors Among Resources of National Power Supporters for the self-reliance diplomacy emphasize ideology, consciousness, mentality and state of mind, arguing that self-reliance diplomacy requires a mindset for autonomy. On the other hand, pro-alliancers are more concerned with national power in the real world. Autonomists cite mental subordination to the U.S. as the reason for failing to push for self-reliance diplomacy. They note that the necessity of the U.S. ROK alliance arises from South Korean s mental dependency on the U.S., saying that the Korean people can accomplish anything once they are united and set their minds to it. 12 They believe that because of dependence mentality Koreans still hold on to the U.S. as a safety blanket, seeing the U.S. ROK alliance as the foundation of national security. 13 They also argue that the demand for an overhaul of the alliance does not result from the rising tide of anti-americanism or a lax sense of security. It rather means that a sense of security has matured in Korean society. Koreans, who had depended solely on the U.S. ROK alliance, now seek to upgrade the quality of security by demanding military autonomy and equal partnership. Autonomists attack the subordination of Korea's ruling conservatives to the U.S., pointing out that such subordination is rooted in a problematic mindset rather than in the difference in national power. They further maintain, The U.S. ROK military alliance implies the voluntary subordination of successive ruling powers to the U.S. Subordination originates not from physical and institutional inequalities in the alliance, but from the mindset of the Korean government, media, and intellectual society that idolize and put the alliance with the U.S. before anything else. They insist, inequality of the alliance does not lie in the characteristics of the institution or the pact. 14 According to them, if the U.S. ROK alliance continues to be based on the dependent mindset that regards the U.S.FK as inevitable for Korea s national security, the ROK will have no opportunity to coordinate policies to promote peace on the 12 President Roh Moo Hyun s address on the Independence Day, August 15, Hamm 2003a. 14 Hamm 2003a. 10

11 peninsula.(lee Samsung) Some autonomists call into question South Korea s security dependence on the U.S., noting that it undermines self-reliant national security. They argue, Military buildup does not mean self-reliant security. Nearly 30 years have passed since South Korea proclaimed self-reliant defense, but dependence on the U.S. remains unchanged. Because of the situation, the ROK is still inexperienced at dealing with issues such as wartime operational control or a future alliance after U.S.FK withdrawal and its military structure and weapons system leave much to be desired. The reason is not so much Korean military incompetence but rather the voluntary acceptance of U.S. hegemony, which reinforces Korea s security dependence through military and strategic considerations by US possessing wartime operational control, giving up autonomous opportunities for training, exercise, planning, and carrying out joint operations. Further, Ham Taik-young says the security vacuum expected after the withdrawal of the U.S.FK will be a vacuum in the mind rather than in real life. He argues, self-reliant national security stems from the autonomic mindset to defend national security, considering the solidarity and capability of the people and the system, some South Korean conservatives are excessively concerned with security. 15 Pro-alliancers cite the practical limitation of being unable to pursue national goals beyond the limit in national power. They say that the ROK is allied with the U.S. because the U.S. was the sole superpower that could confront military threat from the DPRK in the 1950s when it was a weak and vulnerable nation. Most pro-alliancers adopt a pragmatic view of international politics that national goals should be defined within the limit of national power, and national goals or objectives that cannot be sustained beyond the country s own capabilities will inevitably lose the significance. According to advocates of this view, insufficient national power should be supplemented by an alliance and America is the most suitable partner. (7) Impact of the U.S. ROK alliance on Neighboring States of South Korea The seventh issue is about influences of the U.S. ROK alliance upon the relationship between the ROK and its neighbors. In this regard, autonomists and proalliancers assess the influence differently. Pro-alliancers argue that the U.S. ROK alliance and the U.S. Japan alliance virtually forge a trilateral alliance between Japan, Korea, and the U.S.(Cha) The US-ROK alliance admitted the ROK into the Americanled democratic bloc, which in turn laid the groundwork for its economic development. They suggest that comparison with the case of the DPRK, which allied with the former 15 Hamm 2003a. 11

12 Soviet Union and China, shows how positively the alliance with the U.S. has affected the development of the nation. Pro-alliancers maintain that the U.S. ROK alliance has no negative impact on relations between the ROK and its neighbors. Their argument is based on the fact that the ROK established diplomatic ties with communist nations such as the Soviet Union and China in the 1990s when the alliance with the U.S. was solid. According to the alliance advocates, the U.S. ROK alliance has positively affected Korea s diplomatic capability by achieving economic growth to the extent of being able to establish formal ties with communist nations in the 1990s. Autonomists suggest that maintaining the alliance with the U.S. will have a negative impact on the relationship between the ROK and China. Retaining U.S. military presence in the nation will spark China s doubts, heightening new tensions on the peninsula.(lee Su Hoon) If armed clashes erupt between America and China, the ROK will have to provide military support to America in accordance with the U.S. ROK alliance and adopt a hostile posture against China. Since autonomists are concerned about risks of entrapment, they see that the bilateral alliance has restrained the ROK from forging ties with communists. Autonomists see it highly probable that the relationship between America and China, the potential challenger to the US hegemony, will be strained in Northeast Asia in the future. As China has risen to economic power on the back of fast growth, economic relations with China are becoming more crucial to South Korea than those with the U.S. Changes in the characteristics of the U.S.FK due to the Bush administration s unilateralist foreign policy may sour the Sino-Korean relationship. Therefore, the ROK should call on the U.S. to abandon missile defense and amend its unilateral strategy toward Northeast Asia in return for reorganization of U.S.FK into regional forces. They argue it should embrace such reorganization of the U.S.FK only when America accepts these preconditions. The autonomists also suggest that since a stronger alliance between the U.S. and the ROK may potentially increase hostility from China or Russia, the ROK will be more vulnerable to hostilities by these powers in case of contingencies.(lee Samsung) For example, if the ROK works with the U.S. in building the U.S. missile defense program, it might be able to stay under its protection, but enemies close to the ROK will perceive the nation as the target of attack. (8)Autonomy of South Korea 12

13 The eighth point of difference is about the autonomy of the ROK. Autonomists argue that the alliance with America undermines South Korea s sovereignty. According to them, the alliance limits the country in exercising autonomy in Korean diplomacy.(lee Su-Hoon) If self-reliance diplomacy is defined as the exercise of sovereignty over the national territory, the U.S. ROK alliance flies in the face of self-reliance.(hong Hyun-ik) Autonomists often associate a series of negative incidents caused by the U.S.FK presence with the matter of sovereignty: environmental pollution, crimes committed by U.S. soldiers against Korean civilians, and issues related to the relocation of the U.S. camp.(hong Sung-tae) Advocates of self-reliance diplomacy consider the U.S. ROK alliance an important instrument for perpetuating South Korea s subordination to America. Ham Taik-young maintains that the alliance represents the inequality and asymmetry of the U.S. Korean relationship that arises from structural issues such as wartime OPCON of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). He indicates that the alliance has the nature of a guardian ward relationship. To him, from the military perspective the ROK, even described as a protectorate of the U.S., has a subordinate relationship with the U.S., thus its political and military dependence on the U.S. deserves to be called as voluntary subordination. Moreover, issues borne out of the CFC system have resulted in restricted military sovereignty and limited national autonomy. The fact that wartime OPCON is to be exercised by the U.S. is a matter to the fate of South Korea s national sovereignty and self-reliance. Therefore, the current situation in which South Korean politics, economy, and military security largely depend on shifts in U.S. policies or strategies should be changed. Autonomists argue that Korea has lost sovereignty to the alliance, but most Koreans have turned their eyes from the gravity of problems that lie in the irony of lost independence caused by the constant dependence on the alliance and U.S. military capability.(hamm 2003b) In their view, the loss of independence does not end with the abandonment of autonomy, but it will eventually alienate and exclude the Korean people from the decision process concerning war and peace on the Korean peninsula. However, Koreans have no consciousness of the possible consequences. Pro-alliancers take relatively little interest in the infringement of domestic autonomy by the U.S. military presence. Because they so highly value the national interests generated by the U.S. Korean alliance, they often play down crimes by U.S. soldiers as part of the overall positive outcomes. The type of autonomy cherished by the pro-alliancers is the protection of South Korea s national security. Since the nation has established foreign relations not only with the U.S. but also with all its neighbors, it 13

14 should protect its autonomy from all other countries. They argue, Korea is located at a point where the strategic interests of powers permanently intersect. All its neighbors (United States, Russia, Japan, and China) are global military powers. Among them, China, Japan, and Russia historically had territorial interests in Korea. For a relatively weak nation like Korea, forging an alliance with a power with no territorial ambition is the best policy for maintaining independence. They conclude that retaining the alliance with the U.S. will help the nation protect national security and ensure territorial independence. (9)Economy and Security The ninth point of difference is about the connection between economy and security. Autonomists tend to be ambiguous about the correlation between economy and security, making a brief mention about the Korean economy. They say, Our nation s security and military policy should aim to promote stability and peace in Northeast Asia through disarmament and economic cooperation. Korea s true security depends on its booming economy and the Korean economy is based on close relations not only with the U.S., Japan, but with China. 16 They argue that the cost of military buildup needed for self-reliant defense is exaggerated. Pro-alliancers believe that economy and security are closely linked to each other as follows: 1)the economic costs of reinforcing defense capability, a prerequisite for self-reliant defense should be counted upon; 17 2)economic growth should be given higher priority than self-reliant defense and as the economy matures, the closer the nation comes to self-reliant defense; and 3)the US ROK alliance can lay the overall groundwork for friendly relations with the U.S. More specifically, it forms the basis of smooth economic relations between the two countries. Lee Choon-Kun argues that the economic and political systems of the United States, presenting a role model for South Korea, are an advantageous element of the alliance. He notes that since the American economic system in particular has proved to be the most efficient in the world, enhancement of the alliance and the continual presence of the U.S.FK will contribute to promoting Korea s economic growth. The Korean business circle also highlights the economic value of the alliance in terms of the international confidence in the Korean economy. The maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula is a precondition for retaining international confidence in Korean economy, which can only be guaranteed by a solid alliance between the U.S. 16 Hamm 2003b. 17 Ryoo. 14

15 and the ROK. The alliance with the nation at the center of globalization works greatly to the advantage of the Korean economy because the U.S. is the source of cutting-edge industrial technologies including information technology as well as the largest market for Korean-made electronic goods and automobiles. In addition, since most of foreign direct investment and stock investment comes from U.S.-based companies and financial institutions, a breakdown of the alliance would definitely sink international confidence. 18 (10)Rationale for the US Presence in South Korea The tenth and final difference is about the rationale for the U.S. military presence in the ROK. Autonomists see it as America s attempt to protect its own national interests; therefore, even if Koreans demand withdrawal of US forces America will not comply as long as it holds national interests there. They further argue that the US forces proceed regardless of Korea s intentions. Historically, the U.S.FK have never been mobilized in line with our intentions and this is especially the case under the Bush administration, they say.(lee Samsung) Autonomists note that the national interests the U.S. seeks to protect by stationing troops in Korea is the maintenance of U.S. hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. They assert, The U.S.FK, as the vanguard of the U.S. strategy toward Asia, has played a role in maintaining hegemonic stability in the region. 19 Therefore, the U.S. will continue to maintain a strong alliance with the ROK even after any threat from the DPRK disappears as long as it seeks to preserve its hegemony in the Asian Pacific region. Autonomists expect that the U.S. will solidify the U.S. ROK military alliance and continue to station troops in Korea, although it may reduce troop levels and redeploy them. In addition, autonomists suggest that other reason for maintaining the alliance with U.S. is to keep China in check and retain naval military hegemony in the Asia Pacific region.(hamm 2003b; Lee Samsung) Their argument is that in order to restrain China in East Asia and retain naval military hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and Northeast Asia, the U.S. has expressed the intention of securing an alliance system that supports its military activities in the region. The U.S. ROK alliance is therefore significant to support the hegemonic role of the U.S. in the East Asian region. Lee Samsung criticizes the US-ROK alliance for being integrated into the U.S. Japan 18 Suh. 19 The Institute for Far Eastern Studies. Kyungnam University. May

16 alliance, arguing that South Korea is subordinately integrated into the U.S. Japan alliance under the U.S. naval hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. Pro-alliancers suggest historical reasons for stationing of the U.S. military. According to them, the US ROK alliance was forged in 1953 upon a strong request from the South, which had been devastated during the Korean War. They acknowledge that South Korea s security, which had historically been threatened by neighboring states, has been protected since U.S. troops were deployed under the alliance system. Security benefits obtained by the U.S. military presence are incomparable.(kim and Cho) Regarding the possibility of U.S. forces withdrawal, pro-alliancers take seriously the remarks made by the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who mentioned the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawal. He said, America is not an imperialist and therefore it will withdraw its troops if its counterpart does not want the American military presence. Moreover, they cite the all-out withdrawal from the Philippines. Further, the fact that the U.S. promised to cut troops in Korea by one third by the end of 2005 (delayed to the end of 2008 following final negotiations) and redeployed some of the Second Division to Iraq in 2004 points to the real possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the South. Pro-alliancers see the reduction of U.S. troops as the weakening of America s security commitment to South Korea. The troop reduction is highly likely to be a response to the anti-american sentiment in Korea, they say. Since the Korean people do not believe that the U.S. troops are never stationed in a country that does not welcome their presence, they believe that the U.S. may carry out its arms reduction plan (even as the six party nuclear talks are underway) to teach the Koreans a lesson. 3. Summary and Conclusion: For a Stronger U.S. ROK Alliance During the last decade in Korea, self-reliance diplomacy supported by the liberals and alliance diplomacy advocated by the conservatives in South Korea have been at odds over which side better aligns with the nation s interests. The disparities between the two views are not simple differences that result from different policy responses to the rapidly changing post-cold War situation. They represent the divide in national policy priorities, assessment of the military threat from North Korea, interpretation of the nature of the U.S. ROK relationship, and the national interests of the U.S. and the ROK, which also includes the gap between spiritualism and materialism. It is the responsibility of the Korean people to choose between the two different diplomacies through their political leader, and in December 2007 the Koreans chose the 16

17 conservative political power. However, self-reliance diplomacy proposed by the liberal camp has driven the conservatives to review some issues which used to be natural to them. Over the past half century, the conservative camp has been quite certain that the US ROK alliance and the friendly relationship with the U.S. well match the national interests of the ROK, but such a view should be further examined from the very core because of the autonomists challenge. Conservatives believed that although self-reliance diplomacy was a noble ideal, the concept of self-reliance as a diplomatic option was a thing of the past and not likely to be practical in the international politics of the 21 st century when interdependence between countries, advancement of IT, and globalization have changed the world out of recognition. However, self-reliance diplomacy has made conservatives think twice about the self reliance or autonomy. It also required a fundamental re-examination of whether the US would serve the national interests of the ROK or rather undermine them. The Korean people accepted the conservative answers last December by giving the liberal camp their greatest defeat ever. The author would like to bring attention to part of a dialog between President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice when she attended his inauguration ceremony in February, President Lee said, A strong US-ROK relationship is also good for inter-korean relations. His comments are tantamount to a reshuffling of the foreign policy priorities carried out by liberal presidents over the last decade. He showed that the US ROK relationship had the top priority by saying that enhancing the alliance should come before improving inter-korean relations. In other words, he has in effect declared that, as the leader of the administration, he will make every possible effort to promote relations with the US. President Lee underscored the importance of the US ROK relationship in his inaugural address as the diplomatic keynote of his administration. He mentioned Korea s friendly relationship with the U.S., the importance of the bilateral alliance, and foreign policy toward Asia followed by the reunification of the Korean Peninsula and the improvement of inter-korean relations in that order. This order reflects the Lee government s priorities on diplomacy and foreign policy. He also declared, The unification of the two Koreas is the long-cherished desire of the 70 million Korean people. Our attitude toward the North will be pragmatic, not ideological. What bothered the conservative camp during the past decade was the fact that the autonomic diplomacy perceived the enhancement of the US ROK relationship and the reconciliation of the two Koreas as a zero-sum game. The liberal governments carried out diplomacy as if improvement on one side meant worsening on the other. Since improving relations between the two Koreas was given the highest priority under 17

18 this perception, the liberals took for granted the deterioration of the relationship with the US. In pointing out the problems and reviewing the nature of the alliance, we should approach the problems from the perspective of properly managing an alliance that has successfully served its purpose over the past 50 years rather than forming a new one. The national interests involved in establishing a new alliance are quite different to those involved in maintaining the existing one. Maintaining the U.S. ROK alliance is in the interest of the ROK, but in order to see it evolve both countries should adopt a peaceful resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue. Other short-term goals include smooth ratification of the Free Trade Agreement signed by the administrations of both countries. The North Korean nuclear issue, critical to the security of the Korean Peninsula, will only be resolved fundamentally after unification. Based on this view, the U.S., Japan, and Korea will be able to identify common interests in unification. The trilateral cooperation regime, essential to prepare for possible disintegration of North Korea, should be re-established. It is true that understanding of the significance of the U.S. Korean security cooperation and the Korean Japan cooperation system has substantially dwindled since 2002 because of changes in Korean domestic politics. Discord in their perception of the Northeast Asian (and Korean) security situation has increased among the U.S., Japan, and Korea. In order to resolve North Korean issues peacefully, the Lee Myung-bak government must resume discussions with the U.S. and Japan, which have liberal democracy and the market economy system in common, to share their perceptions and seek resolutions, Although inter-korean issues constitute domestic affairs on the Korean peninsula, the division of the peninsula is part of the Northeast Asian international order led by the U.S. The main actors in improving inter-korean relations are the two Koreas. However, such developments can eventually change the political situation surrounding Korea. Moreover, the reality of international politics around Korea is that the surrounding countries are very sensitive to change of status quo caused by the unification. Against this backdrop, reinforcement of the US ROK alliance can dispel the concerns of the neighbors. Maintaining and enhancing the alliance with the US means that the ROK will accept the U.S.-led global order. The Lee Government gives the highest priority to patching up and enhancing the alliance as it is a useful response to the concerns other countries have regarding reunification of the Korean Peninsula. References 18

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