Edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble

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1 Edited by Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble Country Studies The Korean Peninsula in U.S. Strategy: Policy Issues for the Next President Jonathan D. Pollack restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact To purchase the print volume Strategic Asia : Challenges and Choices in which this chapter appears please visit < or contact 1215 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1600 Seattle, Washington USA

2 executive summary This chapter assesses U.S. strategy on Korea and proposes a policy agenda for the next administration. main argument: Three main issues will define future U.S. strategy on the Korean Peninsula: (1) changes in South Korean views of North Korea and their implications for U.S.-ROK relations; (2) North Korea s nuclear weapons development, systemic decline, and the consequences for nonproliferation strategy and regional diplomacy; and (3) South Korea s increasing economic and military capabilities, their effects on regional geopolitics, and U.S. perceptions of long-term U.S.-ROK defense relations. policy implications: The calls of South Korea s new government for closer relations with the U.S. enhance the prospects for effective policy management and redefinition of alliance goals. The U.S. cannot, however, assume automatic policy congruence with South Korea. Competing strains of Korean nationalism could also prove a limiting factor in bilateral relations. The risks posed by North Korea s nuclear weapons development and internal vulnerabilities remain palpable. The U.S. (in consultation with regional actors) would benefit from mitigating these risks, increasing access into North Korea, and managing the potential for disruptive change. U.S. policy toward North Korea will be most effective if it simultaneously addresses regional stability and nonproliferation; policy outcomes skewed to a single objective will be incomplete and quite possibly unworkable. It is important that the U.S. impart unequivocally to Pyongyang that full relations with the outside world will not be possible if North Korea seeks to retain its nuclear capabilities. The U.S. will want to give increased attention to a multilateral peace and security mechanism but only if non-adversarial relations among all states prove possible.

3 Korea The Korean Peninsula in U.S. Strategy: Policy Issues for the Next President Jonathan D. Pollack This chapter addresses U.S. strategy on the Korean Peninsula and identifies a policy agenda for the next administration. The commitment of South Korea s new president, Lee Myung-bak, to closer relations with Washington enables the United States to weigh future policy options in more comprehensive terms. What are the risks and opportunities for U.S. interests? What would be the goals of a reconfigured alliance? Where might Korea North as well as South fit in U.S. conceptions of Northeast Asia in the longer run? The existence of separate Korean states each with starkly divergent histories, national identities, and development paths has long defined U.S. policy. Past history, however, should not inhibit consideration of future strategic possibilities. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a major ally of the United States and an increasingly consequential international actor, but there are major disagreements within South Korea on its longer-term political and strategic identity. The Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to pose major risks to U.S., South Korean, and regional security interests. Although the DPRK asserts that it seeks a transformed relationship with the United States, it is both a nuclear-armed state and a system experiencing profound economic and societal decline. Addressing the DPRK s nuclear weapons capabilities will almost certainly be bequeathed to the next U.S. administration, as will the possibilities of the continued Jonathan D. Pollack is Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College. He can be reached at <jonathan.d.pollack@gmail.com>. The judgments in this paper are the author s own and should not be attributed to the Naval War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

4 136 Strategic Asia erosion of the North Korean system and its consequences for regional stability. At the same time, the United States must weigh the peninsula s larger significance to U.S. strategic interests and policy objectives. To assess U.S. policy options, this chapter will focus on four principal issues. First, the chapter will address how the two Koreas define and deliberate their respective strategic identities. The next section will assess the major policy developments of the past decade concentrating on internal political change in South Korea and the effects of such change on the U.S.- ROK alliance, the second North Korean nuclear crisis, and major shifts in the U.S.-ROK defense relationship. Third, the chapter will analyze how South Korea and North Korea view the United States in their underlying strategic calculations. Fourth, the chapter will weigh policy options for the next U.S. administration, focusing on the nuclear weapons issue, the redefinition of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the management of potential instability in North Korea, and the role of the Korean Peninsula in long-term U.S. strategy. The Grand Strategies of the Two Koreas The two Koreas inhabit separate political and economic universes and confront widely divergent future prospects. Profound disparities in identity and power define their respective strategic horizons. The ROK is now a major factor in international politics and economics. Its citizens, though still exhibiting intense local and regional loyalties, are increasingly educated, prosperous, and articulate. South Korea is the world s thirteenth largest economy with some estimates placing this rank higher, depending on exchange rates and President Lee (at least for aspirational purposes) has stated that the ROK should strive to become the world s seventh largest economy within the next decade. 1 Seoul occupies a pivotal strategic position between continental and maritime Asia; South Korea s identification with globalization, though resisted by various domestic constituencies, is also beyond dispute. By every measure of national power save aggregate military capabilities, South Korea has outstripped North Korea by ever wider margins. 2 In stark contrast, North Korea remains mired in militarization, exclusivity, and backwardness. Pyongyang is linked to the outside world 1 Julia Cunico, The Bulldozer Moves In: Lee Myung-bak Is Inaugurated as the Republic of Korea s President, Korea Insight 10, no. 3 (March 2008): 1; see also South Korea s Election: What to Expect from President Lee, International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing no. 73, December 21, 2007, 4. 2 For a detailed overview, see Jonathan D. Pollack, The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas, in Strategic Asia : Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005),

5 Pollack Korea 137 primarily through limited trade and investment ties with China and South Korea and through international aid and humanitarian assistance. Beyond hortatory calls to become a powerful and prosperous nation by the centenary of Kim Il-sung s birth in 2012, and barring extraordinary international breakthroughs, the DPRK s options for addressing the state s profound internal problems are decidedly bleak. The succession to Kim Jong-il represents another looming uncertainty, with the possibilities only dimly understood by the outside world. North Korea s isolation has been reinforced by the heightened economic sanctions imposed following the October 2006 nuclear test, especially by Japan. Indeed, notwithstanding the enunciation of various market-oriented policies in 2002, recent policy statements, replete with renewed calls for economic autarky and reiteration of the primacy of songun (military-first) principles, have reverted to earlier state-centered concepts. 3 Amid acute deprivation, North Korea grimly persists, without definitive indications of where the country is headed or how Pyongyang proposes to get there. South Korea s Strategic Alternatives South Korea has three primary strategic alternatives. The ROK can pursue (1) a U.S.-centered strategy, (2) an autonomous strategy, or (3) a diversified or hedged strategy. None of these approaches is fully explicated, and all three entail potential tensions and contradictions. A U.S.-centered strategy represents the preferred choice of Lee Myungbak. The April 2008 National Assembly elections resulted in a slim majority for the ruling Grand National Party, though the party s narrow electoral advantage and intra-party factional rivalries as well as intense domestic opposition ensure that Lee s policy priorities will be contested throughout his term in office. 4 Although the ROK president retains significant discretionary authority over foreign policy, national security affairs, and inter-korean relations, internal political challenges will nonetheless constrain the new government s pursuit of its preferred strategy. 5 President Lee seeks to build upon the alliance ties of the past five and a half decades, with Seoul assuming increased responsibility for South Korea s own defense. The threat from 3 Rudiger Frank, Socialist Neo-conservatism in North Korea? A Return to Old Principles in the 2008 New Year Joint Editorial, Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online, April 22, 2008, The country s stark regional polarization remains a source of potential instability and inhibits policy consensus on critical domestic and international issues, including issues that will require constitutional revision. Peter M. Beck, South Korea: Voting for Change, Korea Herald, April 16, See, in particular, South Korea s Elections: A Shift to the Right, International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing no. 77, June 30, 2008.