REPORT. Cooperating in War - Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan. By Emma Knudsen and Stine Klingenberg MSc. Political Science FORSVARSAKADEMIETS FORLAG

Transcription

1 REPORT Cooperating in War - Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan By Emma Knudsen and Stine Klingenberg MSc. Political Science FORSVARSAKADEMIETS FORLAG

2 REPORT Cooperating in War - Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan By Emma Knudsen and Stine Klingenberg MSc. Political Science ABSTRACT The Western armed forces are about to leave Afghanistan after more than a decade of war, and what appears to be only limited success. What have we learned? Why has coalition warfare been so diffi cult in Afghanistan and wherein are the challenges? The report seeks to answer these questions by investigating of coalition-specifi c challenges in Afghanistan. The report examines key challenges which NATO and the ISAF coalition have faced during the war in Afghanistan, by looking at the character of the three core challenges: unity of effort, unity of command and civil-military cooperation. NATO/ISAF have faced signifi cant challenges in relation to unity of effort and unity of command - both of which are diffi cult to fully eliminate when wars are fought in a coalition. Civil-military coordination has been another important challenge during the war in Afghanistan and one which will probably become increasingly relevant in future wars and demand increased attention from both policy planners and decision makers. The report is based on a number of interviews with civilian and military experts from think tanks in Washington DC, from NATO, Brussels, and from Denmark. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thanks to Jens Ringsmose and Christian Bayer Tygesen for reviews, and Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch for comments and advise in the drafting process. Also, thanks to all the experts, who have contributed to the report through interviews. The authors have the sole responsibility for the content of this report. THE AUTHORS Emma Knudsen (f.1986) has a Master s degree in Political Science from the University of Copenhagen and Dartmouth College (US). She has held internships at Denmark s Permanent Representation to NATO, the Royal Danish Defence College, the American Congress, and Barack Obama s fi rst presidential campaign in Emma is currently head of section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Stine Klingenberg (f.1987) has a Master s degree in Political Science from Aarhus University. She has held internships at Denmark s Permanent Representation to NATO, and for the Danish politician (MF) Mette Frederiksen (S) in the Danish Parliament, Christiansborg. Stine is currently head of section at the Ministry of Transportation.

3 The Royal Danish Defence College is the Danish armed forces powerhouse for education, training and research-generated consultancy. Our research is conducted within a broad range of military-related topics. Our research priorities, such as topics and resource allocation are determined by the Commandant of the Royal Danish Defence College, who is aided by a research council. Research at the Royal Danish Defence College should enlighten and challenge the reader, whether they are in the armed forces or in the surrounding environment. This is only achievable if the employees have the freedom to administer their own research projects and draw their own conclusions. This is a principle, which is honoured at the Royal Danish Defence College. We hope you enjoy reading the Royal Danish Defence College s publications! Royal Danish Defence College All rights reserved. Mechanical, photographic or other reproduction or photocopying from this book or parts thereof is only allowed according to agreements between The Danish Defence and CopyDan. Any other use without written consent from the Royal Danish Defence College is illegal according to Danish law on intellectual property right. Excepted are short extracts for reviews in newspapers or the like. Copenhagen April 2013 Royal Danish Defence College Ryvangs Allé 1 DK-2100 Copenhagen Denmark Phone: Fax: Editor: Director of the Institute for Strategy Ole Kværnø Graphic Design by Bysted Layout by Bent-Ole Kure ISBN: Number printed: 300 Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House

4 Royal Danish Defence College Contents ABBREVIATIONS...5 INTRODUCTION...6 Key challenges in coalition warfare...7 Interoperability...7 Unity of effort (UoE)...7 Unity of command (UoC)...8 Civil-military coordination...8 Analytical framework...9 The three core challenges in coalition warfare...9 Approach Afghanistan and Helmand as units of analysis Afghanistan s basic structures and lack of resources Use of data literature and interviews ANALYSIS Unity of effort in Afghanistan Developing coordinated political and strategic objectives Nations varying wishes for the war plans The extension and expansion of the mission Developing political and strategic objectives in Helmand...17 Inadequate understanding of the situation on the ground Interim conclusion Political and strategic development ISAF s presence in Afghanistan ( ) Parallel missions ISAF and OEF The war in Iraq as a distraction Developments after 2009: Greater UoE with the US as lead nation in ISAF? Challenges with UoE in Helmand ( ) Increased UoE in Helmand? Interim conclusion Burden sharing and caveats Burden-sharing as a cause of considerable tension in ISAF Caveats restrictions among ISAF member states Caveats in Helmand Interim conclusion Unity of command in Afghanistan The degree of UoC in Afghanistan : From a lead-nation model in Kabul to a joint command in the entire country : Challenges of a joint command structure

5 A) Challenges in relation to coalition members as lead nations for PRTs B) Challenges for the NATO leadership of ISAF C) Challenges related to ISAF and OEF The US as a de facto ISAF lead nation since The degree of UoC in Helmand Interim conclusion...41 Civil-military coordination in Afghanistan Differences in the civilian and military paradigms Organization and culture Notions of the confl ict Perceptions across the civil-military divide Coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors ) The national level the UK planning phase ) The intermediate level The Helmand PRT and the Americans in Helmand ) The global level...51 Information sharing and cooperation with the UN...51 Cooperation with the EU Cooperation with NGOs The implementation of a coordinated effort in the theatre The importance of security for the coordinated effort Helmand and the coordinated effort COIN and the coordinated effort in Helmand Interaction in Helmand despite challenges CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY...64 APPENDIX

6 Royal Danish Defence College ABBREVIATIONS CENTCOM CIMIC COIN COMISAF DFID FCO FKO IED IJC IO ISAF ISAF HQ MIC MFA MOD NATO NESA NGO NTM-A OEF PCRU PRT QIP RC RC-S RC-SW ROE SCR UNAMA UoC UoE USAID WoG United States Central Command Civil-military cooperation Counterinsurgency Commander of ISAF Department for International Development (UK) Foreign & Commonwealth Offi ce (UK) Forsvarskommandoen (Defence Command Denmark) Improvised explosive device (aka roadside bomb) ISAF Joint Command International organization International Security Assistance Force ISAF headquarters (Kabul, Afghanistan) Multinational Interoperability Council Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UK) Ministry of Defence (UK) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies Non-governmental organization NATO Training Mission Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom Post-Confl ict Reconstruction Unit (UK) Provincial Reconstruction Team Quick Impact Project Regional Command (ISAF) Regional Command South (ISAF) Regional Command Southwest (ISAF) Rules of engagement Senior Civilian Representative (NATO) United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Unity of command Unity of effort United States Agency for International Development Whole of government 5

7 INTRODUCTION We ll close the hole in the ozone layer after we ve won the war. (Advisor to the Ministry of Development in a NATO member country (anonymous) 1 ). The Western armed forces are about to leave Afghanistan after more than a decade of war and what appears to be only limited success. What lessons have we learned? Coalition warfare is complicated, but what exactly are the challenges? This report seeks to provide a thorough analysis of the coalition challenges experienced by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the war in Afghanistan based on a wide range of empirical material. The war in Afghanistan has lasted for more than a decade and is now entering its fi nal phase. As the above quote suggests, the challenges during the war have been signifi cant, and there is no indication that the insurgency will end by 2014 when the combat troops of the international coalition leave the country. The war has been led by a coalition of around fi fty states and has involved a wide range of external civilian actors. But why has the war been so lengthy and complex despite the massive efforts? Many analyses dealing with the war in Afghanistan focus on the internal factors that affect the outcome of the war effort. Afghanistan is often described as a failed state or a graveyard of empires, with a reference to how the Soviet Union, the UK and Alexander the Great have all been defeated in Afghanistan (Isby, 2010). Following this tendency, one of the greatest war coalitions in world history, ISAF, is now facing signifi cant challenges in the country. In contrast, this report focuses on the external, international factors that affect the outcome of war. Instead of pointing to Afghanistan s history and internal dynamics, this report seeks to examine the challenges associated with the dynamics of waging war in a coalition and to create a more holistic picture. This is achieved by examining several years of the war and by using three different perspectives. The aim is to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how waging war in a coalition may be part of the reason for the vast challenges experienced by ISAF in Afghanistan. The three core challenges in modern coalition warfare, which are given the main focus in this report, are: securing a common understanding and direction, establishing a common command structure, and fi nally an increased focus on civil-military coordination. We examine the combination of these coalition challenges in Afghanistan to give a wider picture of the coalition-specifi c challenges, rather than focus on an in-depth analysis of a single challenge. In addition to the examination of the coalition challenges in Afghanistan as a whole, we also look specifi cally at the coalition challenges within the Helmand Province. We investigate the coalition challenges from the beginning of the war in 2001 until today, but with a special focus on the period when ISAF began operating in all of Afghanistan, i.e. from 2006 to (1) Quote from: Thruelsen, 2010:124 6

8 Royal Danish Defence College Key challenges in coalition warfare This report distinguishes between supply-generated challenges, which are related to the dynamics of the war coalition, and demand-generated challenges, which are associated with the characteristics of and the security situation in Afghanistan. The supply-generated challenges are the main focus of this report. However, the supply side is partially defi ned by the demand side in Afghanistan because the scope of the demand is so broad that the supply is bound to involve civil-military coordination. This means that the environment, i.e. the demand-generated challenges, has a major infl uence on how the supply side evolves. A large part of the, mainly empirical, literature on coalition warfare relates to the many challenges and diffi culties involved. In many cases it is discussed how to optimize coordination between the different parties, how to set up an effective command structure which satisfi es all parties, as well as how much each nation ought to, can and will contribute. Based on this, we have identifi ed four key challenges that are especially important in coalition warfare: interoperability, unity of effort (UoE), unity of command (UoC) and civil-military coordination. Interoperability Interoperability refers to a number of practical challenges when coordinating forces from the different member states of a coalition. Typical diffi culties involve differences with regard to rules of engagement (ROE), doctrines, asymmetric relationships, development in information technology, culture and language. Whereas the challenges related to UoE, UoC and civil-military coordination can all be identifi ed and will be examined at the strategic level; the challenges related to interoperability are primarily present at the operational and tactical levels. Since the latter challenges are of a more practical nature, interoperability will not be discussed further in this report. Unity of effort (UoE) One of the most important elements in creating unity in coalition warfare is to make sure that the members of the coalition agree on the overall objectives and the political objectives for the war, i.e. that they share a common understanding of the objectives and the required effort. Unity in messages and efforts is crucial. With the term UoE, this report refers to both unity of effort and unity in purpose, as this is the term most commonly used to describe the unity in ends and means in the literature on coalition warfare. When states engage in war coalitions, they will, besides a desire to reach the common objective of victory, have different national interests and reasons for joining the coalition. Thus, it may be diffi cult to formulate common political-strategic objectives and strategic guidelines which are relatively simple to operationalize. In order to examine the degree of UoE within ISAF, it is relevant to examine the creation of common political-strategic objectives and the political-strategic development throughout the war. In addition, asymmetric burden sharing and restrictions on national forces, also known as caveats, pose considerable challenges for UoE in a war coalition. 7

9 Unity of command (UoC) In addition to the need for unity in terms of political-strategic planning, a common command structure and unity of command (UoC) are also crucial in coalition warfare. This means that, besides the necessity to formulate common policy objectives, it also has to be clarifi ed how the objectives can be operationalized with a minimum of friction and a maximum of internal coordination. One way to ensure UoC is to make all forces operate under one and the same leader, and e.g. make one leader responsible for each of the defi ned strategic objectives. The highestranking leader has to be responsible for reaching the overall common objective (Rice 1997: 163 f; Thornhill 2010: 21). However, there are a number of inherent challenges and tensions which may hinder fully coordinated warfare. UoC depends on the existence of coherent political-strategic objectives, and if these are not present at all levels, or if no common enemy exists, there will be a risk of signifi cant challenges with regard to coordination and cooperation in a coalition (Bechtol 1995: 6). UoC is one of the most important principles at the strategic and operational levels of coalition warfare, although it is unusual to have full realization of UoC, since national leaders are often reluctant to outsource the leadership of their national forces because of political objectives and national pride (Fenzel 1993: 3). In order to investigate the degree of UoC, it is necessary to examine the given command structures in a coalition: Is it a joint leadership model, a lead-nation model or one with parallel command structures? Command structures may evolve during the course of a war, and the individual models can lead to different types of challenges in relation to UoC in a coalition. Civil-military coordination 2 The dynamics of international war coalitions have changed over time, for example when it comes to the perception of when a war can be defi ned as completed. With soft security objectives of peace and stability, international actors seek to create special conditions to maintain the peace after a mission is completed. These efforts include objectives that lie beyond conventional military objectives of defeating the enemy. As the objectives of international coalition operations have changed, the need for greater coordination and cooperation between civilian and military efforts has increased. In the context of international crisis management, this has led to the development of the concept whole of government or coordinated effort. This wish and requirement for cooperation creates a number of challenges for the actors involved in modern coalition warfare. In this report, the challenges of civil-military coordination are examined on three different levels: 1) the global level, 2) the intermediate level, and 3) the national level (Rintakoski & Autti 2008: 25). Interaction between civilian and military actors is relevant both on a national level, investigating the coordination between different government departments and agencies, and on the intermediate level, examining the coordination inside the international organizations (IOs), such as the UN, the EU and NATO. In addition, this interaction is relevant between nations in a coalition, as well as on the global level, in the system of national and international actors engaged in coalition war or crisis management. At (2) Civil-military coordination is a broad term for the relations and the cooperation between civilian and military actors, and the term is used interchangeably with the term coordinated effort in this report. 8

10 Royal Danish Defence College the national level, it is relevant to examine national approaches to create harmonization between ministries of defence, foreign affairs and development. At the intermediate level, harmonization is sought between the member countries and internally in the IOs. At the global level, the conditions and structures between all the international and local actors are relevant (Hull 2011:8 f). Potential challenges regarding coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors exist both at the national, intermediate and global levels. Studies of the Kosovo war suggest that major differences and prejudices exist between the civilian and military actors. Furthermore, coordination between civil and military actors is a challenge on the ground, especially in the transition period and with regard to distribution of tasks between the actors. Analytical framework UoE and UoC are absolute concepts that require complete unity, but since this is not achievable in war coalitions, especially not in large coalitions, the concepts are assessed as a matter of degree of unity. Civil-military coordination is especially related to modern coalition wars, where the objective of the war often includes a wish to help develop a stable and functioning state, and consequently involves coordination between civilian and military efforts. The purpose of this report is to examine how and to what extent the three core challenges have been apparent in the war in Afghanistan. The report does not focus on causal relationships, but primarily on the nature of the challenges that ISAF has experienced in Afghanistan. This choice was made as the object of analysis is very complex, and it is diffi cult to collect enough data. Thus, we will examine whether and, if so, how the three core challenges of coalition warfare have been apparent and have infl uenced the coalition war in Afghanistan. The three core challenges in coalition warfare In order to examine the nature of UoE, UoC and civil-military coordination in Afghanistan, an operationalization of the concepts for each of the three core challenges is necessary: Unity of Effort (UoE). The creation of the political-strategic objectives will be examined, as well as the operationalization of the political strategy, asymmetric burden sharing and caveats. Unity of Command (UoC). The command structures will be examined. This entails an analysis of several relevant factors, including command and control, the development of command structures and possible lead nation(s). Civil-military coordination. The differences in and the compatibility between the civilian and military paradigms will be examined, including coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors at national, intermediate and global levels as well as coordination and cooperation in the theatre. 9

11 Table 1: The framework for analysis 3 Unity of Effort (UoE) Operationalization Focus Creation of coordinated political-strategic objectives Political-strategic development in the war Burden-sharing and caveats Unity of Command (UoC) Command structure Civil-military coordination Coordination and cooperation between the civil and military actors Differences in the civilian and military paradigms Implementation of civil-military coordination in the theatre Has a common end state and common objectives for the war been developed and has a common understanding been present among the members of the coalition? How have the strategies of the coalition members been implemented in the theatre and how have politicalstrategic discussions developed in the cause of the war? Has a political-strategic understanding been present for the contributions to the war by the different nations and have caveats been an issue in politicalstrategic discussions? Operationalization What types of command structures have been apparent in the coalition and in what degree has UoC been present to support UoE? Operationalization Is information being shared and does any coordination/cooperation exist between civilian and military actors? What differences exist between civilian and military actors and do they make it relevant to distinguish between two different paradigms that are not compatible? How are the stabilization and development tasks organized and what kind of coordination/cooperation takes place? Examination of the creation and discussions of initial common politicalstrategic objectives by looking at the early phases of the war on a politicalstrategic level. Examination of the development and political-strategic discussions among the coalition members throughout the war, with a focus on the periods from 2006 to 2009 and from 2009 to Examination of the issue of burdensharing, as well as the extent to which this and caveats have infl uenced the cooperation in ISAF. Focus Examination of which command structures have been implemented, and how the structures have developed over time. Focus Examination of this on national, intermediate and global levels with a focus on the national UK process, the Helmand PRT and the external cooperation with IOs and NGOs. 3 Examination of different institutions and cultural norms, as well as differences in the perception of the confl ict and each other. This is relevant for both civilian and military actors within the coalition and externally. Examination of civil-military relations in the theatre in Helmand. (3) The internal processes of the IOs at the intermediate level will not be analyzed, as the aim of the report is to examine only coalition-specifi c challenges. Nor will the SCR be part of the analysis. 10

12 Royal Danish Defence College Approach Afghanistan and Helmand as units of analysis This report focuses on the challenges of coalition warfare based on an analysis of the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan as a whole and in the Helmand Province. The focus on this one case allows for an in-depth analysis that would not be possible if the report was based on examination of several coalition wars. A similar framework of analysis could be used to examine other coalition wars, but in order to draw parallels between this one and other coalition wars, it would be necessary to consider the special characteristics of the coalition war in Afghanistan. What makes the war in Afghanistan particularly interesting is that it has lasted for more than a decade, which makes it possible to analyse more than ten years of coalition warfare. However, Afghanistan presents a special case of coalition warfare, which means that reservations have to be expressed in relation to a generalization of the fi ndings. Afghanistan s basic structures and lack of resources Afghanistan has been the subject of several large and long-lasting wars, including three British wars ( , and 1919) and an occupation by the Soviet Union ( ). These confl icts have shaped the country s development, and large parts of the population have never experienced a confl ict-free life in Afghanistan. Tribal culture is a fundamental feature of the social structures, and Afghanistan cannot be characterized as a state in the Westphalian sense (Mason 2009: 173). There is more ethnolinguistic diversity in Afghanistan than in any other country comparable in size and population, and this diversity has brought considerable internal tensions (CIA 2012; Isby 2010: 29, 191). In addition, patron-client networks are widespread, and they can be described as the key to power in Afghanistan. Membership of patronage networks is often hereditary and the way to gain security, jobs and welfare, and therefore such networks compete with the state s legitimate claim to governance (Isby 2010: 46-50). Afghanistan can, in accordance with the defi nition made by the Crisis States Research Networks, be characterized as a failed state, as it can no longer perform basic security and development functions and has no effective control over its territory and borders (CSRN 2006). The country s overall development level is in the low end in terms of the degree of health, education, inequality poverty, etc. (UNDP 2011). Afghanistan s economy is recovering from decades of confl ict, but the country is still extremely poor and dependent on international aid. Based on GDP per capita in 2011, Afghanistan is the 13 th poorest country in the world (CIA 2012), and it is estimated that two-thirds of the population can neither read nor write (Isby 2010: 24). Corruption is also a major problem in Afghanistan, which undermines Kabul s possibility of legitimate power in the country and weakens the government s already weak claim to power (ibid: 199, 205). Afghanistan has been a dangerous place to live in for decades, and Afghans pointed to lack of security as their biggest problem in both 2006 and 2012 (Danish MFA 2012). There are considerable differences in the security environment in Afghanistan s different provinces with insurgents 11

13 operating mainly in the southern and eastern parts of the country where internal confl icts between clans are frequent (FE 2011: 19f). The basic structures, the lack of resources and the security environment are central to the challenges of the ISAF coalition. These challenges are demand-generated, but they pose a key limitation on the ability of the coalition parties to achieve their objective of stabilization and reconstruction, and to engage the country and the people they seek to help. Compared to other provinces, Helmand is a special case in the study of the war in Afghanistan, due to the very unstable security environment, which is related to opium production and a high number of insurgency groups. Many of the security problems that generally exist in the country are reinforced in this province, and this has a major impact on the ISAF campaign. The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the challenges of coalition war in Helmand thus have to be moderated in comparison to the rest of the country and cannot be immediately generalized to other provinces. Helmand is still highly relevant as a case because the province is central to the rest of the country, not least because of circumstances related to the enormous opium production. The coalition is thus forced to bring stability to this province to ensure overall security in the country (Dressler 2009:43). In addition, Helmand provides an advantage in relation to data collection, because Danish sources have been more accessible. Overall, Afghanistan is a particularly diffi cult case because of its special characteristics, and consequently the fi ndings of the report should be considered a worst-case test of the challenges of coalition warfare because of the many demand-generated challenges. The latter is also true for the Helmand example when compared to the challenges in Afghanistan at large. As a result, we expect the coalition challenges found in Afghanistan to be in line with the challenges in other coalition wars, but also that the extent of the challenges is intensifi ed in Afghanistan and Helmand. This means that it is not possible to directly generalize the fi ndings of the report to other cases, but the basic challenges will probably be similar in future coalition wars, albeit to a different degree. Use of data literature and interviews The fi ndings of the report are based on written analyses and accounts of as well as interviews on coalition warfare. The studied literature is written by practitioners and academics with insight into the war in Afghanistan or coalition warfare in general. This ensures a high degree of expertise on coalition wars from a military perspective, which is supplemented by academic examinations of the subject to ensure a thorough approach in our categorization of the challenges. On the other hand, the interviews and reports on the efforts of the ISAF coalition allow for fi rst-hand reports on specifi c conditions and stories about the campaign in Afghanistan. However, the personal experiences will be balanced against the scientifi c articles and reports to help ensure that the interviewees claims fi t into a supported context. 12

14 Royal Danish Defence College 15 interviews have been conducted for the report with a total of 20 people. The interviewees were selected on the basis of a series of criteria to achieve diversity in terms of professional background, nationality and knowledge of the war in Afghanistan. The interviewees can be divided into the following three categories: 1) Interviews with offi cials at the NATO headquarters in Brussels in order to gain insight into the perspective from experts within the NATO organization, which has been the head of ISAF since These experts have been able to provide a background perspective on the development, and several of them have followed the discussions and negotiations between the nations since the initial stages of the war. Several of them also have a practitioner s insight and know NATO from within. In addition to their own national perspective, they have acquired a good knowledge of various other nations perspectives on the war through their work in NATO. 2) Interviews with academics and practitioners at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) and the RAND Corporation in Washington DC. NESA is one of fi ve regional centres of the US Department of Defense, whereas the RAND Corporation is a politically independent think tank, which, among other things, focuses on security policy and post-war capacity building and has published reports on the war in Afghanistan. 3) Interviews with a number of Danes who were or are deployed in the Regional Command Southwest (RC-SW), the Helmand PRT, the Stability Division and the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) offi ce in the ISAF headquarters (ISAF HQ). We have spoken to people who have been deployed with both a civilian and a military background. We have also conducted interviews at the Danish Embassy in Washington DC with two Danish diplomats, and at NESA with Ali Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan ( ). However, the information from these interviews will, due to imposed classifi cation, not be included directly in this report. Considerations from these interviews will only be included in the report if it can be supported by other reports or interviews and without other references to the interview. We have included an appendix with an overview and presentation of our interviewees (see Appendix 1). ANALYSIS Unity of effort in Afghanistan One can question the incremental approach by which we have expanded ISAF. (Interview with Jespersen 2012). One of the key aspects of a functional war coalition is that the participating states have the same political-strategic objectives for the coalition, i.e. they have a shared understanding of the objectives of the operation and the required effort. Here unity of purpose and effort (UoE) is important. When states are part of a war coalition, there will always be different national interests and motives underlying the desire to achieve victory. Consequently, it may be diffi cult to decide on 13

15 common political-strategic objectives and to ensure strategic guidelines that can be realized. In order to examine the degree of UoE, it is relevant to examine both the creation of political-strategic objectives in the initial stages of the war, and the political-strategic development throughout the war. In addition, asymmetric burden sharing and national caveats pose considerable challenges for UoE in a war coalition. In order to assess the degree of UoE in the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan, it is relevant to examine how ISAF coordinated and planned the engagement in Afghanistan prior to the actual war. This includes examining the extent to which there was a correspondence between the coalition members objectives for the war, and examining which factors can explain the direction of the war. Here it is particularly interesting to note how the reasoning behind the war evolved, and how the mandates for the war were gradually extended throughout the fi rst years. Developing coordinated political and strategic objectives Before our arrival no one knew what was here it was largely a blank map. (Dressler 2009: 15). The ISAF coalition was established in December 2001 following the Bonn Conference where it was decided to send an international force of limited size to Kabul. ISAF was given a relatively restrictive mandate to support and provide security for the Afghan transitional government, which was formed at the Bonn Conference, for six months (UN 2001; UNSC 2001). However, it was never defi ned when the mission could be regarded as being fulfi lled. In October 2001, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition had removed the Taliban from power after only a month, and in December the ISAF mission was established (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 16 f). The decisions regarding the ISAF commitment in Afghanistan were taken with a short-term focus and in a quick process which did not leave much time for a thorough and timely analysis of the needs or the social structures in Afghanistan. Both the Bonn Agreement and the ISAF mandate refl ected a strong confi dence in the ISAF coalition and in the ability of the transitional government to stabilize the situation relatively quickly. The mission was limited to a relatively small UN force with the aim of helping to stabilize Afghanistan, and it was emphasized how ISAF backed Afghan sovereignty and the authority of the transitional government (UN 2001; UNSC 2001; Dale 2011: 5). The planning process is essential to ensure UoE in a coalition, but in this case this process was both short and hastened. This can partially be explained by the initial, limited scope of the ISAF mission, as the mandate was restrictive and did not allow the mission to operate outside Kabul. The initial objective and limited mandate of the ISAF mission were supported by the many member states though the mission was enlarged over time and was expanded to cover the entire country. Nations varying wishes for the war plans There are necessarily varying degrees of interest in a war among the member states of a war coalition. Whereas the US was interested in removing the Taliban, several of the other contributing countries joined the mission primarily to support the US mission and ensure good relations with 14

16 Royal Danish Defence College Washington. They view this special relationship as key to their own security and political room for manoeuvring internationally, and this is why they have been willing to contribute signifi cantly to the ISAF mission, both with regard to the number of troops and risk sharing (Ringsmose 2010: 331). Among these countries are Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, and to some degree Norway. Thus some countries conceive of their contributions as symbolic and the relations to Washington as the most important factor, rather than having the importance of winning the war in Afghanistan as their primary motivational factor (ibid). This has also been the case in ISAF, and furthermore the countries have had different views on how the mission ought to develop. Several European countries supported the initiation of the ISAF mission as they looked for a supplement to the OEF mission, because they found the counter-terrorism agenda inadequate. They were in favour of a stabilization and reconstruction effort in a coordinated civilian and military effort (interviews with Henriksen and Harting 2012). France and Germany thus wanted a broad UNled campaign with a reconstruction focus (ibid). The US, on the other hand, preferred a limited campaign: the OEF mission, which was to strike against the Taliban who harboured Al-Qaeda, and a limited and merely military ISAF mission. President Bush had no intention of starting a war that would be a long-term investment or would develop into actual and substantial nationbuilding (Bush 2001; interviews with Wood and Kværnø 2012). Already during his presidential campaign, President Bush had distanced himself from a nation-building effort, and in October 2001, the press secretary of the White House explicitly declared that it was not the intention to engage in nation-building: It s not the job of the United States to engage in nation-building of that manner. (White House 2001). These disagreements between member states in the early stages of the war on how the West should engage, and how the ISAF mission should evolve (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 3; Hoehn & Harting 2010: 13, 26), were also accompanied by political disagreements domestically in the different member states. James Dobbins, who was special envoy to Afghanistan for the US in 2001, describes a considerable disagreement within the US administration regarding what type of commitment to engage in (interview with Dobbins 2012). Dobbins advocated for greater involvement than just a light footprint and has repeatedly stated that he found the approach of the Bush administration too narrow and that it mistakenly lacked a focus on nation-building (Chin 2010: 221). The different views among the coalition members on how the ISAF mission ought to evolve, indicates that whereas decisions in the very early stages were characterized by a certain degree of UoE, this did not continue as the mission was prolonged and expanded. The extension and expansion of the mission Six months after NATO took over command of ISAF, it was decided to extend the mission on the basis of a fi ve-point plan consisting of the following phases: 1) Assessment and preparation, 2) Geographic expansion, 3) Stabilization, 4) Transition and 5) Redeployment. The plan for expansion of the mission to cover the whole of Afghanistan was now mentioned for the fi rst time but only in very general terms (Soria 2011: 45). Moreover, it only gradually became clear to the member states how much the security environment would vary in different parts of Afghanistan (Morelli 15

17 & Belkin 2010: 11 f). ISAF was thus not aware how large a security challenge they would face in the southern parts of Afghanistan prior to deployment, something which would complicate the war considerably in the subsequent years (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 29). This points to signifi cant challenges in the initial planning phases which are crucial in ensuring the unity of a coalition. Furthermore, NATO chose a leadership role in ISAF seemingly without considering in depth what kind of involvement this would entail, including the length of the mission. Hoehn & Harting thus describe how NATO stumbled into the mission (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 2). Budd also notes a signifi cant lack of strategic analysis in NATO prior to the takeover and continuation of the mission: There was no strategic analysis done by anybody in the [NATO] HQ or in Mons to say: What is the problem called Afghanistan, what is the solution, who needs to be part of that solution, and what is our role in it going to be. (Interview with Budd 2012). As indicated above, the decision to expand the mission to the whole of Afghanistan was not characterized by careful consideration, instead, it was based on other considerations, and according to several experts, the mission was slowly expanded without a thorough, clear strategy or a clear end state (interviews with Budd, Kværnø and Jespersen 2012). The mandate and the scope of the ISAF mission were both expanded over time. In addition, there was a belief among the nations that counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan would require that the mission was extended to cover all of Afghanistan: If Afghanistan was part of the international terrorist problem, it would have to be transformed in some way. The original ISAF plan would fail in this respect, unless it was extended to the whole country. (Clarke 2011: 11). This indicates that the ISAF member states felt obliged to fulfi l the original promise of the Bonn Agreement to support the transitional government in its efforts to obtain control of the country, although this strategy was based on limited analysis. Another factor infl uencing NATO s takeover of the leadership role of ISAF was the idea, among some nations, that it was necessary for NATO to mark its importance after having lost some relevance since the end of the cold war (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 27; Morelli & Belkin 2010: 2). Wood describes NATO as grasping for relevance at the time (interview with Wood 2012). In addition, several nations considered the takeover of the mission and the expansion as an opportunity to show NATO as a tight and well-functioning alliance, which was particularly important following the great disagreements that had arisen and split the NATO member states with the war in Iraq (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 27). The engagement of NATO in Afghanistan was perceived to be a manageable task for the alliance, although there was no comprehensive and thorough assessment behind this assumption. Additionally, the planning process seemed further complicated by a delay. When ISAF was created, it followed the creation of the OEF mission. Although several nations were involved in 16

18 Royal Danish Defence College the OEF coalition, it was a US-led mission, and the US defi ned the direction. This was refl ected in a statement by the former Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld, when he declared that the mission would determine the size of the coalition: In this war, the mission will defi ne the coalition not the other way around. (Rumsfeld 2001; Hoehn & Harting 2010: 13). With the objective of UoE in mind, it would make sense to jointly plan and coordinate the two missions prior to the ISAF involvement. Instead, the OEF mission remained intact, and ISAF was created as a parallel mission, which has since led to considerable challenges for the coalition members in terms of both UoE and UoC. Overall, there were considerable challenges in the planning process and a low degree of UoE, as ISAF was created and later expanded. The intentions and ideas of the mission differed among the member nations, and there was no in-depth analysis conducted that could shed light on the challenges ahead. Such an in-depth analysis might have increased the likeliness of and formed the basis of better coordination and unity in the coalition. An analysis that shed light on the situation and conditions in Afghanistan would have made it easier to ensure that coalition states had similar ideas of what could be done by ISAF, and what the coalition engagement would entail. Moreover the delay in the planning process, where ISAF was created after and as a distinct mission from OEF, reduced the unity in the coalition. The limited degree of UoE must be measured against the realities of coalition wars, where some disagreement within the coalition is to be expected with so many states involved, as has been the case with ISAF. Thus, the very general and lofty wording and objectives are not surprising, as it is an objective in itself to get all countries on board. In many of the member states it has been diffi cult to achieve political consensus domestically, and, not surprisingly, it has often been even harder to agree internationally with more actors involved (interview with Harting 2012). In an effort to achieve UoE, there must be a balance between the need for unity and the need for fl exibility, which can ensure broad support and can leave room for possible changes along the way. In ISAF, the general wording had to cover and bridge fundamental disagreements about the objectives of the war. This has created a number of challenges for the coalition, despite of the increased fl exibility. Thus UoE is an ideal, but even though the initial, offi cial statements and agreements express an idea of the common ground among the nations, it cannot be the sole indicator of UoE in a mission. It is also necessary to examine how the perceptions and UoE evolve throughout the mission. The lack of thorough planning and the differing views among the nations about how to proceed in Afghanistan marked the initial phases of the war. This is also apparent, when examining the UK preparations for deployment in Helmand, as the ISAF extended its presence across the country. Developing political and strategic objectives in Helmand It is also relevant to examine the process of coordinating political and strategic objectives at the provincial level. Just as unity within the coalition must be developed for the ISAF engagement in Afghanistan overall, it is crucial that the engagement in each province is initiated on the basis of 17

19 timely, thorough and coordinated planning between the nations involved. However, there were also key challenges in the initial stages of the ISAF mission in Helmand. Inadequate understanding of the situation on the ground As the ISAF mission expanded, the UK was given responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand in This decision was apparently a coincidence more than an active choice, as Canada wanted to be in charge in the Kandahar province (Clarke 2011: 14 f). Getting approvals and facilitating the coordination between the coalition parties among political parties domestically was a lengthy and complicated process. At one point, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff was so worried about the outcome of negotiations that the planning process was temporarily put on hold, until there was a fi rm pressure from NATO to continue negotiations (ibid: 16). Like the rest of ISAF, the UK was not prepared for the signifi cant level of insurgency they met in southern Afghanistan. The idea was to launch a signifi cant reconstruction effort, and because of the lessons learned from Iraq, it was furthermore the intention to improve cooperation between various sectors in the UK administration in order to create security and development simultaneously. Thus, the UK expected to engage in few, if any, combat operations, and instead planned to focus heavily on support for political development and development policies (Soria2011: 30; Chandra 2008: 946). The belief that such engagement would be suffi cient, was based on two main weaknesses in the planning process of the UK strategy, The Helmand Joint Plan. First of all, a large part of the UK resources were already allocated to Iraq, which removed considerable focus from the war in Afghanistan during the planning process in 2005 (Soria 2011: 36). Secondly, there was an information gap in the UK intelligence on the situation in Helmand, which also complicated the planning process (ibid). There were very few intelligence assessments available when the UK needed to assess how hostile the security environment would be. The only actors operating in Helmand at the time were 100 US Marines who were assigned to a PRT for the OEF mission at Lashkar Gar, and since they had no contact to the local population, they could not provide the necessary insight into the situation in Helmand in 2005 (Chin 2010: 230; Clarke 2011: 16; Soria 2011: 36). Among other coalition members who were to deploy soldiers in the province, access to information about the local situation was also very limited; this was the case for the Danish forces who had not expected to meet such heavy fi ghting in Helmand (Thruelsen & Jakobsen 2011: 78). The UK government sent out a small reconnaissance group to the province with representatives from various ministries. However, the group was unable to gather suffi cient information to obtain an understanding of the security situation on the ground (Soria 2011: 36; Dressler 2009; Williams 2011: 74). As the group fi nished its research after three months, from March to May 2006, they concluded that they did not have enough information to develop long-term plans and objectives for the UK engagement in Helmand (Soria 2011: 36; Clarke 2011: 16 f). As a UK military leader described it, the knowledge of Helmand was extremely limited prior to the deployment of the forces: Before our arrival no one knew what was here it was largely a blank map. (Dressler 18

20 Royal Danish Defence College 2009: 15). As stated in a report to the British Parliament in 2007, the UK government did not consider the Taliban to be a strategic threat to the security in Afghanistan in mid-2007 (House of Commons Defence Committee 2007). Instead, the UK government believed that the security threat would be manageable. When the above-mentioned reconnaissance group announced that its knowledge of Helmand was too limited for developing long-term strategies, the UK government decided to complete and implement the initial strategy of a coordinated effort. The government wanted to deploy for the sole purpose of reconstruction, and as declared by Reid, the former UK Minister of Defence, he hoped they could avoid fi ring a single shot (interview with Budd 2012; Chandra 2008: 946). According to Williams, there was a signifi cant problem with naivety in regard to the situation in Helmand: Both the military and civilian actors involved ( ) at the operational level were exceedingly critical of those at the political level for viewing the situation far too naively. Time and time again in interviews, the lack of strategic planning at the political level in Whitehall was raised. What were the big issues facing Helmand and Afghanistan? What could the UK realistically achieve? (Williams 2011: 74). The UK strategy development has subsequently been criticized by the Defence Committee in the House of Commons who in 2011 published a report in which they used strong language to criticize the decision-making process in the early phase of the UK involvement in Afghanistan (Clarke 2011: 6). It was concluded and criticized that the three-year deployment in Afghanistan was characterized by failed military and political policy coordination, and that the early decisions were far from thought through. Another important aspect of the development of the UK strategy for Helmand was that it only considered the UK engagement, instead of planning for a multinational, coalition-based approach, despite the fact that the UK was to represent the ISAF coalition in Helmand (Soria 2011: 44 f). The UK had several forces under its command, but Denmark was not included in the UK strategy planning, and when the fi rst Danish deployment team was operationally deployed in Helmand in July 2006, the UK forces were already spread across the province (Thruelsen & Jakobsen 2011: 82). Greater coordination between the member states in ISAF had probably been benefi cial to UoE, as well as a common understanding of how to reach an end state. Interim conclusion Overall, the UK takeover of and subsequent plan for Helmand were not characterized by timely and thorough planning. Firstly, the decision of the UK takeover in the province was not driven by factual arguments or analysis; secondly, there had been no thorough analysis of the security environment in Helmand; and thirdly, the strategic plans for the campaign in Helmand were developed nationally and had considerable inherent weaknesses, which resulted in a strategic uncertainty. 19

21 Weaknesses in the development of the UK political-strategic plan for Helmand were signifi cant, but the uncertainty in the initial phase can to some extent be seen as a consequence of the fact that the overall NATO plans for expansion were described only in very general terms. As the development of a strategy for ISAF in general seems to be characterized by hasty, unclear and ad hoc based decisions about what the mission would achieve in Afghanistan going forward, so it was the case for the Helmand plan. The fact that the UK acted independently had a detrimental effect on UoE, as the nations deployed in Helmand never reached an agreement on a common way forward or coordinated the plans in the initial phases of the war. Political and strategic development How can you go in without any plan? You can t. (Interview with Budd 2012). It is not only relevant to be careful regarding the design and content of the initial phases and strategies that drive a given war, war planning also has to be adapted to the reality on the ground. This means that when examining whether unity has existed in the coalition, it is also relevant to examine how the war has changed over time, how the overall objectives have been implemented, and how the various nations have interpreted the overall objectives. It is vital to the success of a war coalition that nations have common perceptions of the strategy and objectives. The ISAF mission covering all of Afghanistan can be divided into two periods, one from 2006 to 2009 and one from 2009 to From 2006, ISAF was engaged in all of Afghanistan, and the coalition members had soldiers deployed in different parts of the country. By 2009, the nature of ISAFs engagement changed with the introduction of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. ISAF s presence in Afghanistan ( ) The ISAF mission faced a number of challenges when expanding the area of operations to cover all of Afghanistan. In the late phases of the process, the coalition met considerable and unforeseen insurgency challenges in the south and east by insurgents who had not previously been affected by the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan, as the coalition had only been located around Kabul (interviews with Henriksen and Budd 2012; Morelli & Belkin, 2010: 5). Recognizing that the overall plan had several weaknesses, the allies agreed on a communiqué in December 2005 on PRT training of Afghan police and defence forces and of state-building efforts, which should ensure that Kabul had capable security forces. This was a major liability; as such forces barely existed from the outset (Bush 2010: 207; Morelli & Belkin 2010: 12). The purpose of the mission was thus expanded signifi cantly, and NATO took over command of ISAF in April ISAF was not the only coalition in Afghanistan, however, and the existence of the OEF mission as a parallel mission, which was not part of, nor coordinated with, the ISAF engagement, led to challenges in securing an overall and coherent strategy for the international involvement in Afghanistan. State-building efforts were now extended signifi cantly. As ISAF expanded towards the south and east of Afghanistan, the US deployed another 10,000-12,000 troops to ISAF. According to Henriksen, European states added more troops to ISAF to follow the example of the US (interview with Henriksen 2012). Several of the coalition members, including the US, did not seem to have 20

22 Royal Danish Defence College their full attention on the war in Afghanistan in this period, however. Instead, the involvement in Iraq at times seemed to be prioritized over the war in Afghanistan. Despite this overall increase in troops, ISAF continued to meet considerable challenges between 2006 and 2008, and the coalition still did not have a detailed strategy in which objectives and an end state were defi ned. One of the challenges in relation to ensuring UoE was the carrying out of several parallel missions in Afghanistan. Parallel missions ISAF and OEF From the outset, the creation of ISAF as a supplement to the already existing OEF mission seemed to refl ect the differences that existed between the coalition members perceptions of the purpose of the war in Afghanistan. The two parallel missions refl ected how key parts of the US administration considered counter-terrorism as the most important component of the Western engagement in Afghanistan, whereas many European states emphasized the need for prioritizing reconstruction with only a limited focus on kinetic warfare. A common management could probably have ensured greater unity and a common direction for the mission, and in 2006 the US argued to merge ISAF and OEF. However, several European states were opposed to this idea, as they did not want to engage their troops in counter-terrorism operations, but wanted to emphasize the reconstruction aspect instead (interview with Henriksen 2012; Morelli & Belkin 2010: 16). The UK, Germany and France were sceptical regarding a merge for various reasons: The UK and Germany wanted to contribute to stabilization efforts and limit their involvement in kinetic warfare (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 12, 16; Soria 2010; Noetzel & Rid 2009). Germany s offi cial reason to oppose the idea was that German forces were not trained to engage in the US COIN operations, whereas the UK wanted its focus on counter-narcotics to remain purely in a political sphere (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 16). In addition, France feared that the US would seek to implement its own and broader agendas in Afghanistan, if the missions were merged, and also that the US might use this as an excuse to move some of its forces from Afghanistan to Iraq (ibid). In fact, several European states were reluctant to merge the missions, and many European nations were not prepared to engage in counterinsurgency efforts, even though the US would not admit at the time that this was exactly what they had in mind (interview with Dobbins 2012). Thus ISAF and OEF remained two separate missions. The existence of the two parallel command structures has challenged consistency in the leadership of ISAF, because of differences in the overall objectives of the missions, the different purposes of the missions as well as the overlapping command structures, which have had a signifi cant impact on the ground (ibid). The US General McKiernan became head of both ISAF and all US forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) in 2008, and the merger was intended to provide greater fl exibility for the US. McKiernan reported both to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and to NATO headquarters. In 2010 there was an attempt to create synergy between the OEF and the ISAF missions so they could assist each other in times of emergency (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 17). However, the two missions were never offi cially merged, and today they are still two separate missions with different overall objectives. 21

23 The existence of OEF as a parallel mission has been a challenge for UoE in ISAF. Several coalition members in ISAF are also part of OEF, but the two missions have been characterized by diverse and not always coordinated interests and strategies. The war in Iraq as a distraction The simultaneous involvement in Iraq of most Western ISAF coalition states posed another challenge for ISAF in Afghanistan, as several states had their primary focus elsewhere for years. The war in Iraq was a distraction in the initial UK strategic planning in Afghanistan, and several experts also point to the US focus on the war in Iraq as a reason for a lack of attention to Afghanistan at the highest political level for several years (Clarke 2011: 13; interviews with Jensen and Wood 2012). The lack of a daily focus on Afghanistan at the political level was a major obstacle in terms of securing a strategic coherence of the mission, and Wood describes how there was no real political debate within the US administration about a possible end state in Afghanistan (interview with Wood 2012). Afghanistan was called the other war (Dale 2010: 60), and according to Wood the US was willing to entrust responsibility for ISAF to NATO in 2003, due to a US desire to focus on the war in Iraq: Quite frankly, one of the reasons that the US government was willing to see NATO take on a much larger role in Afghanistan was so the US could turn much more attention to Iraq and hand over (...) what was thought to be a quite stabile peacekeeping mission or at least sold that way to the Europeans. (Interview with Wood 2012). While the people engaged in operational planning in the US kept their focus, the daily focus on the mission disappeared at the highest political level in the US, and so did the daily focus of the CENTCOM: By the time the full stage 4 transition of RC East was completed, the organization at the US CENTCOM, which was daily focused on Afghanistan, almost overnight shut down. The mission had now been handed over to somebody else. (Interview with Wood 2012). Thus from 2006 to 2009 the war in Afghanistan lacked full attention from its biggest contributor, since the US was not paying full attention to the development of possible future scenarios and strategic guidelines (interview with Jensen and Wood 2012). Whereas this tendency gradually began to change in 2008, during the last year of the Bush administration, when the administration started taking some initiatives and began to increase its focus on Afghanistan, the real change did not appear until As the US, the largest and most important player in Afghanistan, focused more on the war in Iraq than the one in Afghanistan, there was no real progress in the ISAF mission. The war in Iraq attracted the primary policy focus of many Western states between 2006 and However, this changed in 2009 when the US unoffi cially took upon itself the role as lead nation. 22

24 Royal Danish Defence College Developments after 2009: Greater UoE with the US as lead nation in ISAF? After years of underlying internal disagreements between nations on how to engage in Afghanistan, as well as uncertainty about an end state, the US took a more prominent role in the ISAF coalition after President Obama took offi ce in The question is whether this has led to an actual increase of UoE in the coalition. The developments in ISAF after 2009 have been described as an Americanization of the war. With the deployment of 30,000 additional US forces and a clear strategy for the development of ISAF towards the withdrawal of combat troops, the US took a leading and defi ning role after a previously more passive role in the coalition (Hoehn & Harting 2010: xi, 46). As a leading player with great dominance in the coalition, the US chose the approach do as we do, or we will take lead, which led to greater UoE based on US ideas (Thruelsen 2010: 101). Despite of a greater UoE, NATO as the offi cial head of ISAF faced a new challenge in terms of ensuring its relevance and infl uence in Afghanistan. In addition, NATO had to ensure, fi rstly, that the US would not forget the nation-building aspects of the war with the US focus on implementation of a COIN strategy, and secondly, that the US would not speed up the pace of developments to an extent where the other actors were unable to follow (ibid). As previously mentioned, this was the fear of France and one of the reasons why France would not combine ISAF and OEF in The US revised its primary focus from counter-terrorism to a focus on people-centred COIN and thus from a primarily kinetic warfare focus to one including aspects of development, which was a central priority among the European states. The COMISAF, General McChrystal, became the symbol of this population-oriented COIN strategy which sought to build a more effective and legitimate Afghan state, which could win the hearts and minds of the Afghan public. Both General McKiernan and General Richards had tried to implement a similar approach, but lacked the necessary resources that McChrystal eventually secured (Rynning 2012). From 2009 there was a more obvious leadership in the coalition as the US stepped up, but also because the US Afghanistan strategy moved in a more development-oriented direction, creating greater consistency between the US and the European approach to the challenges in Afghanistan. According to Dobbins, the revised US approach ensured a greater UoE in ISAF: (..) Unity of purpose along the way: The closest we got was McChrystal s analysis and recommendations in 2009 which changed what the US was doing from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency (...). I think the comprehension of the mission was largely unifi ed with McChrystal s description of the mission and his message to get all of the European governments, as well as the US government, to set out a vision of the mission, which as far as I know none of them challenged and all accepted. (Interview with Dobbins 2012). Following this change, at the Lisbon summit in 2010, NATO created a positive and limited end state of the ISAF coalition efforts in Afghanistan, which until then had only been formulated in lofty terms (interviews with Kværnø and Harting 2012). 23

25 A common end state is a highly important component in ensuring the UoE of a coalition, and after several years of not having placed full attention on the war in Afghanistan from the highest political offi ce, the US took on a leading role in the ISAF coalition after 2009, thus creating a clear direction and a higher degree of unity in the coalition at least at the political and strategic levels of the coalition. There has also been a clear development over time in terms of the presence and strategy of the coalition in Helmand, and here it also makes sense to distinguish between the ISAF engagement in and the development from 2009 onwards. Challenges with UoE in Helmand ( ) The ISAF faced signifi cant challenges in Helmand in the fi rst years following the expansion of the area of operations. Again, the role of the UK is central in understanding the engagement of ISAF and the UoE in Helmand, as UK was the largest and dominating coalition partner in the province. The UK was responsible for the ISAF mission in the province, and its actions are thus important in understanding the role of ISAF. As shown above, these challenges in the region can, in the early years of the war, be explained by an inadequate UK strategy, but also by a gradually deteriorating security environment and an increasing opposition from insurgents in the area. The UK had to adapt the strategy both because of an underestimation of the security situation and because of a lack of coordination across the coalition members deployed in the province. The UK assumption that a stabilization force would be suffi cient in Helmand did not correspond with the reality the UK forces met when beginning the deployment. According to Soria, the UK changed its strategic analysis the moment the troops were deployed, since it was immediately clear that it was impossible to employ the top-down and mainly political state-building strategy that was originally planned (Soria 2011:45; Farrell & Gordon 2009: 21). The UK deployed a force of 600 soldiers who were scattered over an area of 600 km 2, but the troops were unable to operate effectively in the area (Williams 2011: 74; Farrell & Gordon 2009: 21; Chin 2010: 234). As part of the original strategy, the UK forces began to move north, where they met considerable resistance. This happened before they had established themselves properly in the original and central areas around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion (Clarke 2011: 23). After heavy fi ghting against insurgents with an insuffi cient number of troops, the troops had to surrender many of the areas they had fought for. The initial attempts to maintain areas were subsequently described as mowing the lawn, because the troops never achieved real control over an area before insurgents returned and challenged them (Chin 2010: 234; Farrell & Gordon 2009: 22). As a result, the population fl ed the areas and the civil non-governmental organizations (NGOs) considered the areas unsafe to operate in, so the original UK Helmand Joint Plan had to be discarded (Williams 2011: 74). The development and adaptation of the renewed UK strategy in Helmand took place in two stages. In the fi rst period from 2006 to the end of 2007, focus was on adapting the original peacekeeping strategy to reality on the ground. The operations were then consolidated in the Helmand Road Map in 2007 (Farrell & Gordon 2009: 20). More troops were deployed, and a new strategy was developed which contained initiatives in a number of areas, i.e. security, counter-narcotics, development and governance. This strategy offi cially refl ected the stated purpose of the UK, 24

26 Royal Danish Defence College NATO and the Afghan government (ibid). The focus and content of the strategy was changed to a COIN approach with a continued use of hard military power, but with a greater focus on soft effects and security for the population. This development was gradually adapted on the ground, and according to Riebnitzsky, these changes were recognizable when she was redeployed in mid to early 2009 compared to her initial deployment from 2007 until early 2008 (interview with Riebnitzsky 2012). Like the rest of ISAF, the coalition forces in Helmand faced substantial challenges after In addition to the challenges caused by the inadequate UK strategy with its main focus on state-building and missing realization of the need for kinetic warfare, ISAF faced a deteriorating security-political situation that made the UK reformulate its strategy. The problematic start reveals several challenges in relation to UoE, and the lack of inclusion of coalition partners in the planning process did not help matters further. Increased UoE in Helmand? Over time, the coalition in Helmand has achieved a greater degree of UoE. At the same time as the strategy was adapted to the situation on the ground, coordination between the coalition members operating in Helmand was also improved. Following the initial challenges of the ISAF mission in Helmand with its lack of coherence between the strategy and the reality on the ground, signifi cant progress has been made: Most have agreed that tactical innovation by the armed forces on the ground learning and adapting, applying new lessons, fi nding ways to prevail has been impressive. But good tactics cannot rescue bad strategy; at most they might disguise some of its failings. (Clarke 2011: 7). The deployment of US forces in Helmand has resulted in a greater focus on Afghan capacity building, as it was made possible for the UK and Danish forces to look beyond their clear-holdbuild strategy and put an increased focus on development, with attention to hold and build and not just the clear element (Thruelsen & Jakobsen 2011: 89). Moreover, the challenges caused by the overstretching of UK forces, a problem that has been present since 2006, have been greatly reduced, which has improved the collaboration between the Danish and UK forces considerably. Compared to the initial stages of the ISAF engagement in Helmand, there has been an increased focus on coordination between the strategies of coalition members since 2009, and in addition to the development of joint ISAF plans for Helmand, the member states have also coordinated internally with regard to the national strategies. As an example, Krüger-Klausen explains how the planning of the Danish Helmand Plan up to 2014 was coordinated with the UK: FKO [Defence Command Denmark] and UK Permanent Joint HQ coordinate closely. We know their plans, they know ours, and we meet when necessary. We started with the coordination and development of plan-complexes and gradually went to refi ne and be refi ned, a process dealing with the details. (Interview with Krüger-Klausen 2012). 25

27 Meanwhile, the UK coordinates its plans with the US. The same close coordination and development of plans have occurred in Helmand between the Americans, the British and the Danes, according to Nødskov (interview with Nødskov 2012). Political processes may to some extent disturb the results of the close international defence cooperation, and the conditions and cooperation can be limited along the way and on the ground in Afghanistan due to domestic considerations. According to Krüger-Klausen, the forthcoming Danish Helmand Plan is likely to be changed signifi cantly along the way when the plans are reviewed politically, which might result in several changes in strategies despite efforts to create a coordinated effort. Over time, signifi cant improvements have been reached in Helmand when it comes to the understanding of the situation on the ground, strategy alignment and internal coordination. Whereas the early years were characterized by many major changes in strategy and implementation concerning the presence of the coalition forces in Helmand, we have seen a better long-term planning of coalition forces in recent years. The improvements can be partly explained by the presence of US troops, which has resulted in an increase in the total number of troops and thus the release of more resources for development-oriented tasks. Interim conclusion The ISAF mission met great and unexpected resistance from insurgents when the mission was expanded to the southern and eastern part of Afghanistan. The different ways in which the coalition members dealt with the challenges, seem to illustrate how the different nations had different perceptions of the war and divergent objectives for the war. From 2006 to 2009, the presence of two different missions, OEF and ISAF, and the distraction caused by the war in Iraq turned out to be important components in explaining the different national interpretations of the objectives for the war and why the coalition did not experience any real progress or was able to discuss an end state. These conditions gave rise to signifi cant challenges for the mission and the degree of UoE. However, it appears that the situation changed in 2009, when a clearer US focus led to stronger cohesion and increased UoE in the coalition. This trend has also been visible in Helmand. Burden sharing and caveats Many countries were sending troops so heavily restricted that our generals complained they just took up space (...). NATO had turned into a two-tiered alliance, with some countries willing to fi ght and many not. (Bush 2010: 212). Uneven burden-sharing and a lack of strategic compensation among coalition partners can yield major challenges for the cohesion of a war coalition. This has been the case for ISAF throughout its mission where these issues have caused many disagreements and tensions among the member states. Burden-sharing as a cause of considerable tension in ISAF Questions regarding the number of forces and capabilities, which the various states should supply, have caused a lot of tension among the ISAF member states, especially following the 26

28 Royal Danish Defence College expansion of the area of operations in As mentioned earlier, the US only turned its full attention to the war in Afghanistan when its engagement and the number of troops in Iraq began to decrease. According to Wood, it was the insuffi cient contribution of the European states which, among other things, made the US launch the surge and assume a greater leadership of ISAF from 2009 (interview with Wood 2012). When debating the unequal burden-sharing, it should be noted, however, that the notions of the transatlantic gap have at times been exaggerated. The burden-sharing gap gives a different impression when examining contributions to the reconstruction efforts; here the European NATO countries contributed with a larger aid share than the US (Sperling & Webber 2009: 506-7). In 2003, when the US focus on the OEF rather than the ISAF mission was most remarkable, the US provided almost 68% of the forces to OEF, while on the other hand, the European allies contributed almost 60% of the armed forces to ISAF. The US contribution to ISAF was less than 2% (Sperling & Webber 2009: 503). When ISAF and OEF are considered jointly, however, the contributions of the European NATO allies to ISAF amounts to about 38%, which is signifi cantly less than their fair share (Sperling & Webber 2009: 506, 510). The US frustration with the European allies grew after the expansion of the mission, and the US tried to pressurize the Europeans to contribute more troops and more material through NATO prior to their surge. This was partly done by making a list of the types and amounts of equipment that was needed in Afghanistan, and targeting NATO member states collectively at NATO summits to ask them to contribute with the needed resources (interview with Wood 2012). This procedure was repeated between 2006 and 2008 without tangible results. According to Wood, the US began to keep track of how much stock each nation possessed, and how much was sent to Afghanistan in 2007: We had started pulling together our defense analysis guys and say (...) go through every country that is part of the coalition and tell us how many helicopters they have, where are they deployed, how many of them do they have at home, how many are broken ( ) and to how many should we be able to go and say: Look, you re holding out on us you ve got fi ve helicopters sitting in such and such base that you are doing nothing with. We did that. It was basically a call your bluff -kind of move. (Interview with Wood 2012). At one point, the US frustration with the European allies was so intense that it led some US political voices to question whether the US had to assume overall responsibility for the mission, particularly in the eastern and southern part of Afghanistan, where the European states took little responsibility (Hoehn & Harting 2010: 46). However, in 2008 the debate changed as consensus was reached within NATO that there was a need for more troops and more personnel. Especially in the US the need for more resources was realized, and during the US general election in 2008, both candidates promised to increase the number of troops considerably. However, there were signifi cant differences between the promises of the candidates and what the military leaders in the theatre felt was needed (ibid). With the end of the war in Iraq the Western nations, including the US, again turned their attention to Afghanistan and added more resources. 27

29 Caveats restrictions among ISAF member states Caveats have led to significant challenges among ISAF nations during the mission. When examining caveats and burden-sharing in the mission, it is also relevant to consider the willingness of taking risks. Risks can here be separated into three dimensions: 1) the number of combat deaths, 2) the stationing of troops in safe as opposed to dangerous areas within Afghanistan, and 3) the numerous national caveats which keep national forces well out of harm s way (Sperling & Webber 2009: 507). The UK, Canadian and US armed forces accounted for around 84% of the 1,078 combat-related deaths in Afghanistan between October 2001 and February 2009 (Sperling & Webber 2009: 508). The European states accounted for just above 28% (ibid). As Budd describes it, nations put restrictions on their forces in Afghanistan as soon as they grasped the stakes of the war and the challenging security environments (interview with Budd 2012). Generally, nations that had forces in the south and east suffered most losses (including the US, UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark), while the area of operation was more peaceful in the northern and western provinces (Germany, France, Spain and Italy) (Hoehn & Harting 2010:49). Germany was the fi rst country to follow the US in establishing a PRT in Afghanistan in The German PRT was established in the northern and relatively peaceful Kunduz Province, because the Germans wanted to focus on reconstruction efforts and avoid heavy fi ghting (interviews with Budd and Henriksen 2012). Caveats were considered necessary in a domestic political context, but they have also limited the ability of the forces to meet multinational needs, and consequently national restrictions have played a signifi cant role in ISAF and have affected UoE in the coalition. Caveats have had strategic impact on the coalition and have caused mutual mistrust and tension between the US and the European allies, which have had implications far beyond the direct effects (interview with Budd 2012). One of the consequences of caveats was that the coalition needed far more troops than were actually necessary to perform the desired tasks, because caveats placed restrictions on the freedom of movement of the national forces (interview with Budd 2012). The problem with caveats was raised as early as 2006 at NATO s Riga Summit, but discussions did not lead to actual solutions, neither in Riga nor in subsequent discussions (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 6; Flockhart 2008: 3). At the Riga Summit nations agreed on a declaration in which northern positioned forces in particular were asked to support other forces in emergencies, but it was never defi ned what would constitute an emergency (ibid). In addition to the limitations on mobility and opportunities for cooperation on operational and tactical levels, caveats also have had an impact on the strategic and political levels, where it has created considerable tension within the coalition. The case of the German caveats illustrates the possible negative consequences for cooperation in a coalition very well, as this country put considerable restrictions on its forces. In fact, Germany has been criticized heavily by other coalition members for imposing such extensive and restrictive caveats on its ISAF forces (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 7; Hoehn & Harting 2010: 49 f). The German soldiers have been subject to a series of comprehensive legal restrictions, ROEs, and German soldiers always had to carry a so-called pocket card, a small instructional handout which spelled out the ROE in simple terms for every 28

30 Royal Danish Defence College German soldier. The overall objective was to limit the use of force and fi re power, but it limited the soldiers considerably in all tactical situations and fi ghts with the enemy (Noetzel & Rid 2009: 75). In addition, German soldiers were only allowed to shoot in self-defence or in an attack until April One of the German rules that has had the most far-reaching consequences, is a rule which stipulates that every time a German soldier is involved in a situation with civilian casualties (regardless of nationality), a trial has to take place in Germany in which the situation is to be examined (ibid: 76). The German combination of limited capabilities deployed and legal restrictions has had a signifi cant impact on the ground (Noetzel & Rid 2009: 76). For example, the German forces are only allowed to operate before sunset, which means that in November the soldiers have to be back in their camp by mid-afternoon, which has been a severe handicap for the operational and tactical cooperation. France has also had strict ROEs, but unlike German forces, the French troops were not merely trained for stabilization efforts, but also for real kinetic fi ghting (Morelli & Belkin 2010: 7, 21 f). Whereas the Netherlands was initially opposed to sending their troops into combat situations, they have ended up contributing to ISAF with a signifi cant number of troops, although they continue to put more emphasis on stabilization than fi ghting. The Dutch have put geographical restrictions on their forces, which means that they can only operate in areas surrounding Urozgan (interview with Kværnø 2012); and Lithuanian forces have only been allowed to patrol within an hour s distance from their main camp to meet the requirement of being within the golden hour if a soldier gets wounded (interview with Jespersen 2012). The many caveats became an increasing problem as NATO s role and responsibilities were expanded. Especially geographical restrictions have been an issue, since many troops have not been able to assist or rescue allies outside their own area of operation. On top of the offi cial written caveats there has been a number of unoffi cial caveats especially in southern Afghanistan. During the ISAF mission there were signifi cant challenges caused by caveats and unequal burden sharing within the coalition. The tension has been infl uenced by the differing views on what kind of war the nations were engaging in. Some nations have automatically, and with certain restrictions, been able to avoid taking heavy losses, as opposed to others operating in more unstable regions. In addition, it has been the impression in the US that European countries have not been willing to contribute with their share of the burden in terms of troops and equipment. These factors have to a large extent diminished the degree of unity in ISAF and thus the degree of UoE, especially between 2006 and Caveats in Helmand The debate regarding caveats has not been equally pronounced in Helmand (interviews with Krüger-Klausen and Kværnø 2012). Here the cooperation challenges among nations have surfaced due to frequent political interference on troop behaviour rather than overall national constraints imposed on the troops. Denmark is one of the few ISAF nations that which had no restrictions on its troops (interview with Krüger-Klausen 2012). Denmark did not expect the heavy fi ghting in Helmand, but undertook an active and dangerous role to prove its commitment to the US and 29

31 NATO (Thruelsen & Jakobsen 2011: 98). Furthermore, the Danish forces were not tightly controlled from the national government; instead they have been able to act relatively independently in accordance with Danish and UK strategies, and Danish forces were governed by a UK operational framework (interview with Kværnø 2012). Krüger-Klausen points to his own deployment to RC-SW as an example; he had been instructed by the then Chief of Defence, Bartels, not to take Danish interests into account, but unreservedly follow interests of the coalition, as part of the ISAF command. This has not been the case for all ISAF soldiers. Thus, signifi cant tension has existed between UK and US forces in Helmand, partly due to a generally close, daily political management from London and partly due to a specifi c incident (interview with Krüger-Klausen 2012). Krüger-Klausen explains how a specifi c episode gave rise to considerable tension between the US and the UK over some time. During 2011, the US asked the UK to reinstate forces in northern Helmand, in order for the US to move further ahead and implement their planned operations. This was an area where the US, the UK and Denmark had all suffered considerable losses, and the UK objected politically to enter the area again, because they wanted to consolidate their presence in the Central Helmand River Valley, and thus could not extend the security bubble they were responsible for. This led to considerable tension and damaged the relationships on the ground for a period of time, as it caused great frustration among the Americans in RC-SW (interview with Krüger-Klausen 2012). The tension in RC-SW resulted in the decision by the US Chief of Operations Planning that there could be no UK staff offi cers in joint planning, since you could not be sure that they would plan loyally to ISAF or had the freedom to do this and that s signifi cant. (ibid). This type of incident and tension can have a relatively large impact on cooperation in a coalition and may affect cooperation both at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Even though there have been some incidents leading to tension in Helmand, this has been modest compared to the tension among nations deployed elsewhere in the country, where caveats have caused signifi cant challenges to the UoE. Interim conclusion The ISAF mission has experienced considerable challenges in relation to UoE. While there is a need for fl exibility to include many nations, there is also a need for a general consistency in how coalition members conceive the overall purpose and the objectives of the war to ensure a sustained commitment and cohesion. ISAF has been particularly challenged by a continuous uncertainty and confl ict between different national perceptions of the purpose of the campaign. This has characterized the mission, and particularly in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan where nations have met signifi cant insurgency fi ghting, the different perceptions among the nations have been apparent. At the same time, the UoE has been challenged by tension between nations caused by the differing willingness to take risks and to share the burdens. Starting in 2009 with the increased US dominance of ISAF, we see a higher degree of unity and the beginning of a transition towards a greater support for fi xed end states. 30

32 Royal Danish Defence College Unity of command in Afghanistan [It has] 6 or 7 layers of complexity to it like everything else dealing with Afghanistan. (Interview with Wood 2012). Unity of command (UoC) is an important aspect of warfare, especially in the wars led by coalitions where there is a need for clear, transparent structures, ideally with one overall leader who can ensure that everyone in the coalition is moving in the same direction. From 2001 to 2003, the command structures of the ISAF mission were relatively simple with changing lead nations and a limited area of operations. When NATO took over leadership of the mission in 2003, this structure was replaced by one single NATO command structure. However, several factors disrupted the single command structure, including: 1) member states of the coalition having the lead of civil efforts in the ISAF PRTs, 2) NATO being an organization based on consensus, which makes absolute unity diffi cult, and 3) parallel missions with different mandates. The degree of UoC in Afghanistan : From a lead-nation model in Kabul to a joint command in the entire country From 2001 to 2003, when ISAF operated under a limited mandate, both the mission and the command structures were relatively simple. According to Wood, this period is probably the closest ISAF has been to achieving UoC in the campaign; there was one overall US military leader with an international deputy and an international team which consisted of relatively few states: (...) Probably, the early days are the closest you are going to get [in having UoC]. Maybe the early days with Combined Forces Command Afghanistan with a US commander who had an international deputy commander and a somewhat international staff, predominately from the UK, the US and Canada. (Interview with Wood 2012). Whereas the ISAF mission was originally based on a lead-nation command structure, with different UN member states assuming leadership of the mission for a six-month period, the establishment of a joint command structure under NATO leadership in 2003 replaced this structure. The explanation for this initial structure lies in the fact that neither the US, NATO nor the UN were willing to assume leadership of the mission (interview with Dobbins 2012). Accordingly, there was not one organization or one actor who could undertake the establishment of an overall and comprehensive plan for the ISAF engagement in Afghanistan. As Germany was to take over ISAF leadership with the Netherlands in 2002, they put forth a request to borrow NATO material and equipment for the mission. This happened after a discussion within NATO about whether the organization should assume the leadership of ISAF. As mentioned earlier, most nations perceived it to be a limited and manageable task, although a few nations opposed the idea. When NATO took over responsibility for the mission in April 2003 the command structure was made comprehensive and singular. 31

33 Figures 1 and 2: ISAF nations in Afghanistan Figure 1: ISAF nations in Afghanistan in The fi gure indicates which ISAF member states acted as lead nations for the various regional commands and PRTs in January 2007 (ISAF 2007). Figure 2: ISAF nations in Afghanistan in The fi gure indicates which ISAF member states acted as lead nations for the various regional commands and PRTs in January 2010 (ISAF 2010). 32