The Relationship between the CCYL and the CCP, : From Organizational Rival to Leadership Incubator. Yunzhe CHEN

Transcription

1 The Relationship between the CCYL and the CCP, : From Organizational Rival to Leadership Incubator Yunzhe CHEN A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW Canberra August 2015

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract Acknowledgements List of Figures Abbreviations V VI VII IX Chapter 1. Introduction Significance of the CCYL Literature Review Main Argument of This Thesis Research Methodology Structure of the Thesis 33 SECTION I: Early Period of CCYL Development, 1920s-1935: Origin and Rivalry Chapter 2. The CCYL in the Period of Establishment (1920s) st National Congress of the CSYL in Origin of the Chinese Socialist Youth League The Establishment of the CSYL Local Committees Summary 73 Chapter 3. The CCYL in the Pre-Mao Zedong Period ( ) CCYL in the 1st United Front Period: Organizational Subordinate to 75 the Party 3.2 Revolutionary Cadre Development Projects and Factional Struggle in 90 Moscow 3.3 Development of the CCYL in the Jiangxi Soviet Period Summary 111 SECTION II:The Mao Zedong Period of CCYL Development, : CCYL as a Corporatist Mass Organization Chapter 4. The CCYL and the Rise of Mao Zedong ( ) The Reconstruction of the CCYL in the Sino-Japanese War ( ) 4.2 The Party-led Mass Organization Role of the Reconstructed Youth 124 League 4.3 The Causes of the Reconstruction of the CCYL The Incentives for Rebuilding the Youth League ( ) 139

3 4.5 The Bottom-Up Rebuilding Process of the Youth League Summary 149 Chapter 5. The CCYL in the Period of Mao Zedong after the Establishment of the PRC ( ) The Organizational Development of the Youth League ( ) The Functions of the CCYL ( ) The CCYL in the Cultural Revolution The Reasons Contributing to the Attacks on the CCYL Summary 181 SECTION III: The Post-Mao Period of CCYL Development, : Principal Role in the Development of New Leaders Chapter 6. The CCYL in the Period of Deng Xiaoping ( ) The Recovery of the CCYL after the Cultural Revolution ( ) The Preparation for the CCYL Reform Reform of the CCYL and the Role Change ( ) Summary 216 Chapter 7. The CCYL in the Period of Jiang Zemin ( ) Tiananmen Event and the Emphasis of the CCYL on Political 218 Socialization 7.2 Cross-Century Projects and the Youth Department Role of the CCYL The Reform of the Personnel System of China and the Leadership 239 Development Arrangement Role of the CCYL 7.4 CCYL and the New Type of Economic Organization Summary 255 Chapter 8. The CCYL in the Period of Hu Jintao ( ) The Characteristics of the China s Politics in the Hu Jintao Era Cadre Recruitment CCYL Training Position Transformation ( 转岗 ) The Other Functions of the CCYL Summary 298 Chapter 9. Conclusion Findings 299

4 9.2 Implications of the Findings for Understanding the Chinese Political 303 System 9.3 Areas for Future Research 304 Bibliography 306 Appendixes 372 Glossary of Individuals, Organizations and Movements 405

5 V ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes the relationship between the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from their emergence in 1920 to the latest leadership change of the CCP in In contrast to existing studies that regard the CCYL either as a corporatist institution undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youths or as the foundation of a CCYL faction that plays a significant role within China s leadership politics, this thesis highlights the multifaceted and evolving relationship between the CCYL and the CCP in the development of the Chinese Communist movement. This thesis argues that despite its continued complexity the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP across nearly a century can nevertheless be characterized in broad terms as a change from organizational rival to leadership incubator. In the early period of the Communist movement, the CCYL functioned as a de facto second communist party which at times threatened to overtake the CCP as the major Communist organization in China. After the reconstruction under Mao Zedong in 1936, it was subordinated to the CCP s needs and started to serve as a Party-led mass organization to politically socialize Chinese youths. And in the Deng Xiaoping and Post-Deng periods, it has played an important role as one of the institutional arrangements for developing leadership candidates for the CCP. By tracing the organizational development of the CCYL to uncover its evolving and complicated relationship with the CCP, this project provides a more complete picture of the pathway through which the contemporary relationship has emerged. On a broader level, therefore, it offers the CCYL as an example to reveal the limitations of the Factionalist and Corporatist approaches to understand China s contemporary leadership politics. In addition, it provides new understandings and materials for the future study of the CCP s leadership development.

6 VI ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to the many institutions and people who have assisted me to complete this PhD thesis over the past four years. This experience has been one of my best periods of my life, and one I will treasure forever. First of all, I would like to express my gratefulness to China Scholarship Council of the People s Republic of China and the University of the New South Wales. Without my country s financial support and the university s tuition fee scholarship, an ordinary student, like me, could never afford this opportunity to study. As one of the examples of Sino-Australia educational cooperation, I hope both my study and my experience will contribute to the mutual good of both nations. Secondly, I give my most sincere thanks and best wishes to my supervisors, Prof. David Lovell and Dr. Jian Zhang, for their brilliant guidance and enthusiastic work attitude. The influence of my supervisors on me is not only confined to scholarship, but extends also to my attitude to life. They are respectful scholars who have taught me how to understand the thinking of scholars. In my future career, I will use them as role models to spur my actions. Thirdly, I express my gratitude to Prof. Wu Qing, Director of the Research Institution of the CCYL, and Prof. Tong Jing in Central School of the CCYL who provided me a valuable fieldwork opportunity in the Central Committee of the CCYL. Interviewees in Beijing, Guangzhou and Canberra also provided me with valuable information required to test my arguments. Fourthly, I give my thanks to the Counsellor and my colleagues in the Education Office of the Chinese Embassy in Australia. With your support and teachings, I got a valuable opportunity to contribute to the educational cooperation between China and Australia. This working experience will be one of my most significant memories. Finally I dedicate this thesis to my beloved family and friends. This PhD journey was never one man fighting alone. It would not have been completed without your love, encouragement, and understanding. I will love you all for the rest of my life.

7 VII LIST OF FIGURES 1-1 The Expression Concerning the Nature of the Organization in the 372 Constitution of the Youth League (From 1st -16th National Representative Congress) 2-1 Major Student Organizations Led by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in New 380 Culture Movement 2-2 Process for Establishing Local Branches of the CCYL ( ) Mao Zedong s Three Levels of Advanced Youth The Membership of the CCP and the CCYL from The Political Structure of the Youth League (1953) CCYL Central Authority and Its Evolution ( ) Major Nationwide Mass Movement from 1949 to The Political Movement of the CCP and the Actions of the Youth League 162 ( ) 5-5 The CCYL Cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP (from ) 6-1 The Number of CCYL Members (1964, ) Basic Design of the Inner Youth League Reform The Structure of the CCYL in Universities CCYL Cadres Position in Universities The Position and Administrative Ranks in the Chinese Public Servant 391 System 7-4 The Promotion Period from Section Member( 科员 ) to Subministry 243 Department Chief( 正厅 ) 7-5 The Expected Promotion Age, the Normal Cadre Ceiling Age, and the 246 CCYL Cadre Ceiling Age 8-1 Seats of CCYL Faction and CCYL Cadres in 14th -18th Central 260 Committee of the CCP 8-2 The Age of Members of the 13th -17th Political Bureau of the CCP The Data of the Original Unit of the Employed Cadre of the Working Organs in the Central Committee of the CCYL through State Civil Service Examination( ) 392

8 VIII 8-4 The Relationship between the Dominance of Recruitment and the 271 Position Rank in the Public Transferring Approach (Central Committee of the CCYL) 8-5 The Pre-CCYL Position and Post-CCYL Position of the Secretaries of 393 the Central Committee of the CCYL ( ) 8-6 Position Transformation Data of All Secretaries of the Village Level 396 Youth League Committee in Baoying County of Yangzhou City in Jiangsu Province in The Position Change Information of CCYL Cadre The Position Transformation Data of the Director/Deputy Director in the Central Committee of the CCYL 402

9 IX ABBREVIATIONS ACFT ACWF AYC BUCESG BUMRA BWSMAG CBYLSA CYWC CCP CCYL CPPCC CSYL CTUS CYVA CYI CYID EWSG KMT NDYL All-China Federation of Trade Union All-China Women's Federation Association of Young China Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group Beijing University Marxism Research Association Beijing Work-Study Mutual Aid Group Central Bureau of the Youth League in the Soviet Area Central Youth Work Committee Chinese Communist Party Chinese Communist Youth League Chinese People s Political Consultative Conference Chinese Socialist Youth League Chinese Trade Union Secretariat Chinese Young Volunteers Association Communist Youth International Communist Youth International Division Europe Work-Study Group Kuomintang New Democratic Youth League

10 X NYSA PLA PRC ROC SOE SSA YLBE Northwest Youth Salvation Association People s Liberation Army People s Republic of China Republic of China State Owned Enterprise Student Salvation Association Youth League Branch in Europe

11 1 CHAPTER ONE Introduction This thesis aims to analyze the evolving and complicated relationship between the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL, 中国共青团 ) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP, 中国共产党 ) from their emergence in 1920 to the latest CCP leadership change in 2012 through tracing the organizational development of the CCYL. 1 The CCYL is a long-existing but under-studied organization in Chinese Communist politics. Firstly emerged in 1920, it developed from a small group with 15 local branches and around 5,000 members to one with approximately million members, 191,000 full-time cadres 2 and million youth league branches at the grassroots level in late While defined as a Mass Organization ( 群众组织 ), it possesses as complete an organizational structure as the CCP and plays a significant role in the Chinese Communist movement. 1.1 Significance of the CCYL The CCYL is a unique institution officially identified as the CCP s assistant and 1. Although the CCP was established in July 1921 and the CSYL (the early name of the CCYL) was established in May 1922, yet the first youth league branch (Shanghai Socialist Youth League) and Communist Party branch (Shanghai Communist group) were both established in August This thesis aims to analyze the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL. For better understanding the early interaction between the Party and the youth league, this thesis sets the starting point of its studies as Concerning the details of the establishment of Shanghai Communist Party and Shanghai Socialist Youth League, please see: 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp.28-31]. 2. In this thesis, the concept of cadre ( 干部 ) is used according to the definition of Chien-wen Kou and Wen-Hsuan Tsai. It encompasses aspects of both civil servants and political appointees. And the CCYL cadres( 共青团干部 ) refer to people who work as full-time staff in CCYL organizations, details please see: Chien-wen Kou, Wen-Hsuan Tsai, Sprinting with Small Steps Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System, The China Journal, no.71, 2014, p In addition, another two large groups of people are the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and All-China Women s Federation. Concerning the data of the CCYL, details please see: 刘维涛, 全国共青团员 万名, 人民日报 2014 年 5 月 4 日 04 版 [Liu Weitao, The Number of the Youth League Members is up to million, People s Daily, 4th May 2014, p.4]; 共青团中央, 团史展览馆 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, History Exhibition Hall of the Communist Youth League Network ], website of the CCYL, accessed at:

12 2 political successor. As Chapter 10 of the Constitution of the CCP clearly states, the CCYL is the Party's Assistant and Reserve Force ( 党的助手与后备军 ). 4 These two roles refer specifically to the significance of the CCYL in two key areas, namely, social management and leadership development Significance of the CCYL as a Mass Organization From the aspect of social management in the People s Republic of China (PRC, 中华人民共和国 ), mass organizations have always played significant roles in assisting the CCP to manage society, particularly in the period of Mao Zedong s chairmanship of the Party. The CCYL, All-China Women's Federation (ACWF, 中华全国妇女联合会 ) and All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU, 中华全国总工会 ) are three of the major, state-recognized mass organizations in China. Different from the other two mass organizations, the CCYL focuses on social groups of youths with the aim of providing a two-way conduit between the CCP and young Chinese. On the one hand, as the representative of youth, it contributes to articulating the interests and rights of Chinese young people and, on the other, serves as the youth department of the government to manage youth affairs and an ideological department of the party to implement the political socialization of Chinese youth. In modern Chinese history, the youth and CCYL have occupied crucial positions in China s political development. For example, in the May Fourth Movement ( 五四运动, 4th May 1919), the founding of the CCP (July 1921), the Sino-Japanese War ( 中日战争, July 1937-August 1945), and post-deng politics, the CCYL and its predecessor were among the main players and vanguard of these movements. It is reasonable to argue that whether the CCYL can appropriately fulfil its functions without directly affecting the stability of Chinese society. What is more important is that while the role and significance of other mass organizations declined in the reform period, the role of the CCYL in Post-Mao politics, especially in the Post-Deng decade has become even more important. Its 4.CCP, The Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Amended and adopted at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 21, 2007), website of China, accessed at:

13 3 leadership development function was highly emphasized in the CCP s reform of the personnel system and its appearance in the period of Hu Jintao has been argued to be one of the most significant features of China s politics. 5 Although Hu left the CCP s power core at the 18th National Congress of the CCP (8th-14th November 2012) and the supreme power of the CCP passed to the fifth generation, the CCYL faction 6 still possesses a substantial number of seats in the Politburo Standing Committee, Politburo Committee and Central Committee of the CCP Importance of the CCYL in Leadership Development From the aspect of leadership development, the significance of the CCYL, as the leadership incubator of the Party, is that considerable numbers of CCYL cadres have appeared in the leadership of the CCP throughout its history. In this thesis, the leadership of the CCP refers mainly to the members and alternate members of its Central Committee who comprise the group of leaders who "wield the real power of China by controlling specific bureaucracies." 7 Therefore, the occupants of seats on this committee can be regarded as an important indicator of the power distribution of the CCP s leadership Kou Chien-Wen, "The Rise of Youth League Affiliates and Their Paths to the Top," in Kou Chien-Wen and Zang Xiaowei (ed.), Choosing China's Leaders ( Routledge: Taylor & Francis, 2013) pp ; Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming- of Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, Summer 2005, pp. 1-16; Li Cheng, The New Deal: Politics and Policies of the Hu Administration, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 38, no. 4-5, October 2003, pp ; Li Cheng, Hu s Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League, China Leadership Monitor, no.3, 2002, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: documents/clm3_lc.pdf; Bo Zhiyue, The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Formal Institutions and Factional Groups, Journal of Contemporary China, vol.13, no. 39, 2004, pp ; Wang Zhengxu, Hu Jintao's Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China's Elite Politics, Issues & Studies, no. 4, December 2006, pp CCYL faction is a concept of Factionalism, it refers to a group of senior cadres of the Central Committee of the CCP who served as CCYL officials at the provincial level or above, and if their tenures as high CCYL bureaucrats occurred at least partly in , when Hu Jintao was in the youth league secretariat. The idea of faction and CCYL faction will be discussed in the following sections. Details please see: Li Cheng and Lynn White, The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?, Asian Survey, vol.43, July/August 2003, pp Victor Shih, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu, The Central Committee, Past and Present: A Method of Quantifying Elite Biographies in Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Melanie Manion (ed.) Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p Victor Shih, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu, The Central Committee, Past and Present: A Method of Quantifying Elite Biographies, in Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Melanie Manion (ed.) Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.53.

14 4 CCYL cadres refer to people who work as full-time staff in CCYL organizations, each of which normally consists of a secretary/vice secretary, department chief/deputy chief and staff, and at all levels in the subordinate public institutions of the CCYL committees but not part-time workers, such as the secretary of a CCYL branch at the university level ( 班支书 ). In terms of the officially declared leadership core of the CCP, from Mao Zedong ( 毛泽东 ) to Hu Jintao ( 胡锦涛 ), there have been four generational leadership changes. 9 Of these leaders, Mao Zedong (Changsha CCYL Committee, 长沙共青团 ), Deng Xiaoping ( 邓小平 ) (CCYL Committee in Europe, 旅欧共青团 ) and Hu Jintao (Central Committee of the CCYL, 共青团中央 ), had been in full-time service on CCYL national or local committees while Deng Xiaoping's originally planned political successors, Hu Yaobang ( 胡耀邦 ) and the cross-generational Hu Jintao, were each First Secretary of the CCYL before they became the General Secretary of the CCP, the party s top leadership position. In addition, several senior CCYL cadres successively entered the leading power group of the CCP To list just a few: Zhang Tailei ( 张太雷 ), Cai Hesen ( 蔡和森 ) and Li Lisan ( 李立三 ) in the pre-mao era, Ren Bishi ( 任弼时 ), Zhou Enlai ( 周恩来 ), Deng Xiaoping ( 邓小平 ) and Dong Biwu ( 董必武 ) in the Mao Zedong period, Hu Yaobang( 胡耀邦 ) and Hu Qili( 胡启立 )in the Deng Xiaoping era, and Li Ruihuan ( 李瑞环 ) in the Jiang Zemin period. It is significant to note that, on average, the CCYL cadres have occupied more than one-third of the seats on the Central Committee of the CCP across its history. From the CCP s 1st Congress (July 1921) to its 18th (November 2012), there were 1,962 cadres who sat on the Central Committee, more than 679 of whom were once CCYL cadres. To be precise, from 1921 to 2012, 34.59% seats of the Central Committee have been occupied by CCYL cadres These four generations of leadership are based on the claim of the CCP and are the leadership groups led by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively. 10. The data is from the Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres Vision) created by the author It contains the entire curriculum Vitaes of the members of the Central Committee from 1921 to 2012.

15 5 However, to date, only a small amount of scholarly research has been carried out on the CCYL, with no major work written in English providing a comprehensive understanding of its position in Chinese Communist politics. Most extant studies of mass organizations in China have emphasized the workers and trade unions, 11 peasants and rural associations, 12 and small business and the Association of Private Enterprise 13 rather than the CCYL which has been largely overlooked. While exploring Chinese political development, much focus has been on the CCP and Chinese Government, with the role of the CCYL almost ignored. The gap in investigating a vital component of China s political system hinders a complete understanding of how this system actually works. Also, as Healy points out that an understanding of how the diverse parts of the system correlate can only be obtained through research on its individual components. 14 The remainder of this chapter consists of four major sections. Section 1.2 presents a literature review. However, as little specific English research has been conducted on the CCYL, the conventional wisdom rests mainly on the two related theories of Factionalism and Corporatism. Therefore, details of these two schools of thought, their arguments concerning the CCYL and their shortcomings in terms of understanding the role of the CCYL are provided. Section 1.3 presents the central proposition of this thesis. Section 1.4 introduces the research methodology and sources of research information used, and section 1.5 outlines the thesis structure. 1.2 Literature Review During the early period, there was no specific scholarly research conducted on the CCYL and it was only mentioned in analyses of two specific historical 11. Regarding work on Corporatism in Trade Unions, please see: Anita Chan, Revolution or Corporatism? Worker and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29, January 1993, pp ; Anita Chan, China s Tran Unions in Corporatist Transition in Jonathan Unger (ed.), Associations and Chinese State: Contested Spaces (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 2008) pp Robert Ash, The Peasant and the State in Brian Hook (ed.), The Individual and the State in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp Regarding work on Corporatism in Association of Private Enterprise, please see: Keming Yang, Keep Business for Business: Associations of Private Enterprise in China in Jennifer Hsu and Reza Hasmath (ed.), The Chinese Corporatist State: Adaption, Survival and Resistance (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2012) pp Paul Michael Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League (Queensland: Griffith University, 1982) p. 1.

16 6 movements, the May Fourth Movement ( 五四运动, 1919) and Cultural Revolution ( 文化大革命, ). Some studies reveal the establishment history of the CCYL in relation to the May Fourth Movement. For example, Vera Schwarcz s The Chinese enlightenment: intellectuals and the legacy of the May Fourth movement of 1919 (University of California Press, 1990) and Chow Tse-tsung s The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Harvard University Press, 1964) provide detailed analyses of this movement and its influence. Comparing Europe s Enlightenment with the May Fourth Movement, Vera Schwarcz believes that, although the latter is an incomplete enlightenment, it has unshakable importance as it created a new Chinese generation which was the ideological foundation of the CCP and CCYL. 15 In Chow Tse-tsung s opinion, the May Fourth Movement was the most significant event in enabling Chinese intellectuals to realize the powerful force of students and the working class and introducing Communism. Soon after this event, Communism received unprecedented attention from Chinese elites, with the CCP (1921) and CCYL (1922) nationally established in quick succession. 16 During the Cultural Revolution, the CCP and CCYL were completely reorganized. However, Chou W. L. argues that the CCYL s reconstruction process (January 1968 July 1973) was much slower than the CCP s (January 1968 August 1971) which may indicate the importance of this mass organization and the complexity of youth issues. 17 Sofia Graziani determined that, as a political mass organization in the Cultural Revolution, the CCYL and its leadership organs, especially its Central Committee and Beijing Municipal Committee, suffered serious impacts. 18 What caused the fall of the CCYL at this time? Paul Michael Healy and Wang Hsueh-wen argue that the reason lay in the CCYL s resistance to Mao Zedong s complete control and implementation of the class struggle line Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (California: University of California Press, 1990) pp Chow Tse-Tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Harvard University Press, 1964). 17. Chou W. L., A Survey of the Chinese Communist Youth League, Issues and Studies, vol 12, September 1973, pp Sofia Graziani, The Communist Youth League in the Struggle to Revolutionize Chinese Youth: (Lund: Centre for East and Southeast Asian Studies in Lund University, 2006) p For details, please read: Paul Michael Healy, The Chinese Communist Youth League

17 7 Shelah Gilbert Leader, James Townsend and Victor Funnell also discovered that, apart from deviating from Mao s political line, the CCYL was weak in terms of members and elite recruitment. 20 Comparing the new CCYL, which experienced Maoist rehabilitation and the previous one, in relation to the Red Guards, the fall of the CCYL may partly reflect the young proletariat s dissatisfaction with it and China s social and political realities. 21 In addition, according to John Israel s research, most of the Red Guards were actually youths leaving the CCYL. 22 If we ascribe the barbarity of the Red Guards to the inspiration of Mao Zedong and their being misled by the Gang of Four, why not blame it on the CCYL s failure to successfully socialize Chinese youth? Recently, an increasing amount of work has concentrated on the CCYL, of which the two major approaches, Factionalism and Corporatism, can partially reveal the complicated relationship between the CCYL and CCP. From the viewpoint of the Factionalism model, the CCYL is regarded as the foundation of the CCYL faction ( 团派 ) in the CCP s leadership politics, from the perspective of the Corporatism model, it is considered mainly a mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth. Although both models fail to completely describe the dynamic and developmental relationship between the youth league and party, they provide a solid foundation for this research. For example, Factionalism research can contribute to our understanding of the leadership development function of the CCYL. Corporatism can deepen our knowledge of the political socialization function of the CCYL. I will examine them, in turn, in the following sub-sections. (Nathan: School of Modern Asian Studies in Griffith University, 1982); Wang Hsueh-wen, Maoist Rectification of the Young Communist League, Issue and Studies, November 1970, p Detail please see: Shelah Gilbert Leader, The Communist Youth League and the Cultural Revolution, Asian Survey, vol.14, no.8, August 1974, pp ; James Townsend, The Revolutionization of Chinese Youth : A Study of Chung--Kuo Ch ing-nien (Berkeley: Centre for Chinese Studies in University of California, 1967) ; Victor Funnell, The Chinese Communist Youth Movement, , The China Quarterly, vol 42, June 1970, pp Shelah Gilbert Leader, The Communist Youth League and the Cultural Revolution, Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 8, August 1974, pp John Israel, The Red Guards in Historical Perspective: Continuity and Change in the Chinese Youth Movement, the China Quarterly, vol. 30, 1967, pp.1-32.

18 The Factionalism (Informal Politics) Model The Factionalism (informal politics) model argues that factional struggles are an essential feature of Chinese leadership politics. 23 In this theory, the CCYL is viewed as the foundation of one of the major factions in China s politics the CCYL faction ( 团派, or Tuanpai: the Pinyin spelling of CCYL faction). The coming to power of Hu Jintao in 2002 stimulated research on the CCYL and its faction. To be specific, at the 16th National Congress of the CCP (8th-14th November 2002, Beijing), when Hu Jintao peacefully took over the position of General Secretary of the CCP from Jiang Zemin and, two years later, was appointed as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the term CCYL faction became one of the most popular concepts for analyzing the factional struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and explaining the latter s consolidation of power. 24 To better understand the power foundation of Hu Jintao, some scholars have identified senior leaders in the Central Committee, Politburo and Standing Committee of the CCP who had worked in National or Provincial Youth League Committees and had close connections with Hu Jintao as the CCYL faction. 25 The Framework of Factionalism The Factionalism model is a systematic theory of modeling factional politics, arguing that the basic nature of the CCP's leadership politics is factional struggles. For example, in Jing Huang s study of Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, Huang argues that factional struggle between the incumbents (Mao Zedong) and successors (Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao) were the major reason contributing to the falls of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. 26 After the Tiananmen Event (4th June 1989), the decision to select Jiang Zemin as the General Secretary of the CCP was also interpreted as the outcome of a factional 23. Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.53, January 1973, pp Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming-of-Age, China Leadership Monitor, July 2005, no.15, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: Li Cheng, Lynn White, The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?, Asian Survey, vol.43, July/August 2003, pp Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp.1-20.

19 9 struggle between Deng Xiaoping's reformist and Chen Yun's conservative factions. 27 At the 14th National Congress of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping appointed Hu Jintao to enter the Politburo Standing Committee as the successor to Jiang Zemin. Since then, the factional struggles among the Shanghai Gang faction ( 上海帮 ), Princelings ( 太子党 ) and CCYL faction have dominated analyses of the CCP's leadership politics. 28 The traditional understanding of China is of a Communist regime dominated by informal rules and this character is reflected in the negative attitudes towards law and formal regulation which can be considered as one of the major obstructions to its institutionalization. 29 Due to the structure of the Nomenklatura System 30 in structure and democratic centralism in decision making, the traditional Leninist-type communist regime endows Chinese political leaders with highly centralized power and the use of that power lacks adequate supervision and restraint. 31 In Factionalism studies, there are different mainstream opinions of the concept of faction, cause of factional politics and rule of factional struggle and so on, as explained in the following sections. Concept of Faction Although there is considerable controversy among scholars over the precise meaning of faction, all admit a significant role for Guanxi (informal relationships) in connecting the members of a faction. The lack of institutionalization leads to informal relationships playing extremely important roles in the CCP's leadership politics which are sometimes interpreted as being the real source of power for political leaders of the CCP. For example, when Dittmer Lowell analyzes the fall of the Gang 27. Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996) pp.3-29; 28. Li Cheng, One Party, Two Coalitions in China's Politics, August 16, 2009, website of East Asia Forum, accessed at: Lenin s Communist blueprint has little space for law and he clearly opposed the idea of the rule-of-law. Details please read: Polan A.J., Lenin and the End of Politics(London: Methuen, 1984) pp ; Graeme Gill, Institutionalization and Revolution: Rules and the Soviet Political System, Soviet Studies, vol.37, no.2, April 1985, pp ; Eugene Kamenka, The Soviet View of Law, Problems of Communism, vol.14, no.2, March-April 1965, pp Bohdan Harasymiw, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party s Leadership Recruitment System, Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol.2, no.4, December 1969, pp ; Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp ; Rigby T.H., Political Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990) pp Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (MA: Harvard University Press, 1953) p.291.

20 10 of Four and Deng Xiaoping's rise, he argues that informal relationships were the power base of Deng s leadership. 32 The replacements of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang by the retired Eight Elders adds further weight to the idea that the foundation of political power of CCP leaders is not their institutional positions but their informal relationship networks. Andrew Nathan has proposed a Factionalism model to explain the patterns of conflict and coalition among Chinese political leaders. In his definition, a faction is a group of political leaders vertically organized by a "Clientelist Tie" defined as an "exchange relationship of a limited and specific kind" which includes "patron-client", "godfather-parent" and "trader-customer relationships. A Clientelist Tie is the foundation of a political faction and, indeed, of the social network radiating from the leaders at its core in which members have vertical relationships between its upper and lower rungs. 33 At this point, Tang Tsou disagrees with Nathan. He proposes "Informal Groups" or Political Action Groups as substitutes for Nathan s concept of faction. He argues that Nathan s definition does not fully consider the role of formal organizations in informal political struggles and cannot demonstrate from where a political faction comes (formal or informal organizations). Tsou argues that, in the CCP, the relationship network for forming a faction is not only limited to the Clientelist Tie, but should include parallel relationships between colleagues with the same ranking. 34 In Tsou s conceptualization, this is a way of highlighting that formal and informal political relationships coexist in the CCP's leadership politics, with the formal position a precondition for the development of informal relationships and factions. Lucian Pye proposed a sectarian model to demonstrate his factional view of Chinese politics with the help of Chinese political culture. He pointed out that, on the one hand, Chinese culture stresses that leaders should be harmonious and, on the other, emphasizes the need for subordinates to give absolute loyalty to their superiors. 32. Lowell Dittmer, Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the Gang of Four, World Politics, vol.1, October 1978, pp Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.53, January 1973, pp Tsou Tang and Andrew Nathan, Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.65, March 1976, p ; Tsou Tang, Chinese Politics at the top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of power or a Game of Win All?, The China Journal, no.34, July 1995, p

21 11 Therefore, in essence, he argues that harmony on the surface as well as factional struggle beneath the surface is China s main political dynamic. 35 In addition, many scholars further enlarge the content of the relationships for forming factions, which contain colleagues, schoolfellows, Mishus and families. 36 Different from the above interest exchange relationship, Xuezhi Guo further argues that Guanxi is a complex combination which, in reality, is a relationship built on etiquette, emotion and moral principle, and should also be taken into consideration. 37 After combining concepts of scholars (mainly the theories of Andrew Nathan, Tang Tsou and Lucian Pye), Lowell Dittmer further expands Factional Politics to Informal Politics. He points out that, in China s politics, the relationship is the core of informal politics and, in the analysis of China s political phenomena, not only factional interactions but also factors of informal and formal politics should be considered. 38 The Causes of Factional politics In conventional wisdom, the origins of factional politics can be divided into the three major views of Power-seizing, Policy Disputes and Bureaucratic Interest. 39 The group supporting power-seizing claims that the core of politics is power allocation and thus the struggle for power is the fundamental cause of China s informal political struggle, with policy issues only the means and power-fighting the 35. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981); 36. Li Wei and Lucian Pye, The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishus in Chinese Politics, China Quarterly, no.132, December 1992, pp ; James Mulvenon and Michael Chase, The role of Mishus in the Chinese Political System: Change and Continuity, in David Frinkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (ed.), China's Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) pp ; Bo Zhiyue, Princeling Generals in China: Breaking the Two Career Barriers, Issue & Studies, vol. 42, no. 1. March 2006, pp ; Li Cheng, University Networks and the Rise of Qinghua Graduates in China's Leadership, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no.32, July 1994, pp.1-30; Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming-of-Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, July 2005, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/ Guo Xuezhi, Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics, The China Journal, no.46, July 2001, pp Lowell Dittmer, Chinese Informal Politics, The China Journal, no.34, July 1995, pp.1-34; 39. Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp.29-34; Kou Chien-wen, The Transfer of Chinese Elite politics---system and Power Transfer, (Taipei: Chinese Continental Research Centre of National Chenchi University, 2010).

22 12 end of leadership conflicts. 40 For example, Roderick MacFarquhar, in his famous work The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Contradictions among the People, reveals that different conflicts activated by policy disputes finally turned into power struggles. 41 Therefore, a power struggle is always hidden behind policy differences. The power-seizing idea is well used to explain the leadership conflicts in the era of the revolutionary leaders (Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping). 42 Lucian Pye argues that CCP leaders' factional political behavior is deeply rooted in Chinese "cultural and psychological security drives". His famous work The Dynamics of Chinese Politics not only points out that the tensions between consensus and conflict coexist on the Chinese political stage but also reveals the lack of a sense of security in Chinese culture and psychology. This provides the cultural and psychological foundation for cadres to offer their loyalty in exchange for protection from the leader who has power which drives the factional politics established by various relationships in China s political ecology. 43 Insomuch as power-seizing is the sole reason for leaders to look for protection and there are negative attitudes towards formal rules and law in Communist regimes, leaders will prefer to build informal networks to secure or enlarge their power. 44 Based on this idea, MacFarquhar and Hong Yung Lee generate the "power-struggle model" to explain the leadership conflicts among Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution. 45 Andrew Nathan and Lowell Dittmer argue that, since power-fighting is the core issue of the CCP s struggles, leaders policy preferences will be less important after they acquire power. 40. Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). 42. Roderick Mac Farquhar, The Succession to Mao and the end of Maoism in The Politics of China : The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)pp ; Richard Baum, The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s, in Roderick Mac Farquhar(ed.), The Politics of China : The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (MA: Oelgeschlager Gunn & Hain, 1982) pp Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Factional Politics (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1992) pp Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol.1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) pp.2-3; Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California, 1978).

23 13 When the leader gains power, he will change his original policy claim. 46 The group supporting policy disputes believes that as, throughout China s history, all inner party struggles have been around political lines, such disputes are the main reason contributing to factional politics. Doak Barnett's Uncertain Passage, for example, argues that power-fighting, which is initiated by policy disputes, serves the purpose of achieving policy. 47 Insomuch as ideology plays a significant role in CCP politics and has a concentrated power structure, the CCP requires united ideological guidance to maintain its unity. As the embodiment of ideology, a policy dispute reflects a struggle among different political lines, an idea often used to explain the leadership conflicts initiated by different policy preferences. 48 Although Tang Tsou believes that the origin of a faction is power-seizing, he still admits the significant role of policy differences in forming factions. 49 Jurgen Domes concludes that the reasons for leadership conflicts lie in both policy differences and power struggles. 50 Harry Harding believes that policy preferences create CCP leaders' conflicts. 51 According to Carol Hamrin s analysis, the policy outcomes in the post- Mao era were the result of struggles between the Conservative (Leftist) and Reformist (Rightist) factions. 52 The group supporting the bureaucratic interest approach considers that, based on 46. Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.53, January 1973, pp.33-66; Lowell Dittmer, Bases of Power in China: A Theory and Analysis of the Fall of the Gang of Four, World Politics, vol. 31, no.1, October 1978, pp Doak Barnett, Uncertain Passage (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1974). 48. Kenneth Lieberthal, The Great Leap Forwards and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership: in Roderick Mac Farquhar (ed.), The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp ; Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 49. Tsou Tang and Andrew Nathan, Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.65, March 1976, pp ; Tsou Tang, Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?, The China Journal, no.34, 1995, pp ; Doroth Solinger, The Fifth National People s Congress and the Process of Policy Making: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition, Asia Survey, vol. 22, no.12, December 1982, pp ; Carol Lee Hamrin, Competing Policy Packages in Post-Mao China, Asia Survey, vol.24, no.5, May 1984, pp Doroth Solinger, The Fifth National People s Congress and the Process of Policy Making: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition, Asia Survey, vol. 22, no.12, December 1982, pp ; Carol Lee Hamrin, Competing Policy Packages in Post-Mao China, Asia Survey, vol.24, no.5, May 1984, pp Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981) p Harry Harding, China's second revolutions: reform after Mao (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987) pp.2-3; Carol Lee Hamrin, China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990) pp.4-7.

24 14 a structural analysis of the CCP, a leadership conflict is a "manifestation of bureaucratic conflict". 53 That is, although factional conflicts are associated with power and policy, the most profound reason lies in the interests of the bureaucratic system. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg argue that, although the "(CCP) leaders might propound views of the bureaucracy over which they preside, and that elite contention over policy and/or power might be a manifestation of bureaucratic conflict", leadership conflicts are caused by clashes among bureaucratic interests. Because leaders have to consider these interests, they are de facto representatives of bureaucratic institutions. 54 When the leadership style was changed from that of the revolutionary leaders (Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping) to that of bureaucratic leaders (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping), institutional positions increasingly became the source of power for CCP leaders, with support from selected groups extremely significant for them to maintain their leadership. Therefore, Susan Shirk argues that, in the CCP's political succession process, a leader will use a Clientelist Tie to set up his faction and claim certain policies to satisfy bureaucratic interests in order to win the acceptance of institutional leaders. Therefore, bureaucratic interest plays a significant role in any CCP factional struggle. 55 Rule of Factional Struggle Although there is still no agreement on the rule of factional struggle, there are five influential ideas that enjoy wide acceptance, the Code of Civility, Zero-sum Game, Bandwagon, Balance of Power and Recurrence of Power Balance. In the code of civility proposed in his influential article "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", Andrew Nathan argues that the CCP factions enjoy relative power equality and, although there is an outcome from factional fighting, the winner does not, and will not, have sufficient ability to eliminate the loser. He points to the 53. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988) pp.17-18; Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1933) pp Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Process (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988) pp Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933) pp.90.

25 15 existence of this code as the factional struggle rule in the CCP's leadership politics. 56 The zero-sum game proposed by Tang Tsou and supported by Joseph Fewsmith refers to the idea that those who win in a struggle will reap all the rewards (e.g., policy making, and personnel appointments and removals). 57 Based on an analysis of the politics of Communist China, Tsou believes that the nature of the CCP's factional struggle is the zero-sum game or "Winner takes All" and, in his debate with Andrew Nathan, criticizes Nathan's Factionalism model for neglecting the role of formal institutions. Specifically, when one faction wins the leadership position in a formal institution, it can receive more resources and advantages than the other factions on the basis of monopolizing that institution. 58 Analyzing the dilemma of reform, Joseph argues that total victory is the final goal of a faction's factional struggle. 59 Jing Huang uses the Yan'an Round Table 60 to explain the leader relationships and policy making in the Mao Zedong era. The Gao-Rao affair, and the falls of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping can all be explained as factional zero-sum struggles and Mao Zedong as the winner who took all. Bandwagon refers to the phenomenon that occurs when a specific faction wins a power struggle, and the losing factions devote their loyalty to it by undergoing self-criticism to avoid political purges. In terms of the CCP's factional struggles, balance of power means that factions will unite to avoid a certain faction becoming too strong and damaging their interests. 61 In Avery Goldstein's view, since the establishment of the PRC, the CCP's factional struggles have changed from bandwagon to balance of power, that is, in the era of Mao s rule, due to the surplus of revolutionary achievements and personal charm and no factional or individual competition, the Chinese political elites moved 56. Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.53, January 1973, p Tsou Tang, Chinese Politics at the Top: Factionalism or Informal Politics? Balance-of-Power Politics or a Game to Win All?, The China Journal, no.34, 1995, p Tsou Tang and Andrew Nathan, Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal Groups in CCP Politics, The China Quarterly, no.65, March 1976, pp Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1994) pp Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2000) p Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991) pp

26 16 close to him but, after his death, were in a balance of power situation. 62 Avery s idea receives Lucian Pye's support from the perspective of the latter s emphasis on the Guanxi explanation. Pye believes that during the periods of the postrevolutionary leaders (Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping), on the one hand, not all the power candidates could enjoy political authority as Mao and Deng changed the developmental trajectory of the CCP and, on the other, the lack of a sense of security rooted in Chinese political culture followed the rule of balance of power. 63 To Lowell Dittmer, the Recurrence of the Power Balance principle means that, on the basis of Nathan s code of civility, once a leader leaves his official position, the relationship network of his faction can easily collapse. Therefore, with the appointment of a new leader, other new factions enter the competition arena. 64 The CCYL from the Perspective of Factionalism In the Factionalism model, the significance of the CCYL is that it cultivated the CCYL faction which is regarded as the key support for Hu Jintao. 65 There is no doubt that Hu Jintao s coming to power stimulated research on the CCYL and its faction. As I explained earlier, at the 16th National Congress of the CCP (8th-14th November 2002, Beijing), when Hu Jintao peacefully took over the position of General Secretary of the CCP from Jiang Zemin and, two years later, adopted the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the term CCYL faction became one of the most popular concepts for analyzing the factional struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and explaining Hu Jintao's consolidation of power. 66 The Definition of Study Objects of CCYL Using the framework of the Factionalism model, scholars began to identify 62. Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991) p Lucian Pye, Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Administrative and Political Behaviour in Jonathan Unger (ed.), The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002) pp Lowell Dittmer, Chinese Informal Politics, The China Journal, no.34, July 1995, pp Wang Zhengxu, Hu Jintao s Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China s Elite Politics, Issues and Studies, no.4, December 2006, p Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming-of-Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, July 2005, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: publications/ china-leadership-monitor/article/7962.

27 17 membership of the CCYL faction among senior CCP leaders. Regarding a definition of the study objects of this faction, Li Cheng believes that its members should be those who advanced their careers through the Chinese CCYL. 67 In related literature, the scope of CCYL faction members is limited to those who had specific periods of CCYL work experience and been members of the party s Central Committee or above, in particular leaders in the Central Political Bureau. As Li Cheng and Lyn White point out that Tuanpai leaders are identified as such if they are members of the CC (Central Committee of the CCP) who served as CCYL officials at the provincial level or above, and if their tenures as high CCYL bureaucrats occurred at least partly in , when Hu Jintao was in the youth league secretariat and, as such, belong to the CCYL faction. 68 In Kou Chien-wen s opinion, members of the CCYL faction should be the Secretariats in the Central Committee of CCYL, ministers and deputy ministers in the Central Committee of the CCYL, provincial party committee secretaries and deputy secretaries in the CCYL. 69 He then modifies his view and, after 1973, adds deputy department (bureau) and above as the study objects. 70 Major Arguments regarding CCYL faction Analyses of the CCYL faction in the research literature on the CCYL can be summarized as follows. Firstly, as Li Cheng and Kou Chien-wen find, by comparing cadres in different factions, the average age of those in the CCYL is the lowest and the education level is the highest (most have a graduate degree). Of the disciplines studied, the main ones 67. Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming-of-Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, July 2005, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: publications/ china-leadership-monitor/article/ Li Cheng and Lynn White, The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?, Asian Survey, vol.43, July/August 2003, pp Kou Chien-wen, The Development of The Communist Youth League Cadres After The Cultural Revolution Era in The Development of Party System, in Chen Choumei (ed.), China In The New Century (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 2002) p Kou Chien-Wen, CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of Channeling Cadres, Prospect Quarterly, vol.8, no.4, October 2007, pp

28 18 involve economics, law, politics and other areas of the humanities and social sciences. Therefore, in general, there is tremendous potential for the political development of CCYL cadres. 71 Secondly, as Li Cheng and Lynn White discover, CCYL faction members are numerous in party committees and governments although their work is mainly limited to organization, propaganda, united front, discipline, education, etc., while only a few work in fields such as foreign trade, foreign affairs, the economic and finance sectors, science and technology, etc. 72 Therefore, Wang Zhengxu and Li Cheng infer that, given certain limitations regarding its career development, the CCYL faction cannot dominate Chinese politics and must share power with other political factions which further ensures a certain diversity within China s one-party political system. 73 Thirdly, from a demographic point of view, Li Cheng discovers that, as most CCYL faction members are from civilian families without prominent family backgrounds, revolutionary achievements, economic expertise, foreign expertise and armed forces support, they are highly representative of the population in general. When participating in the policy-making process, they tend to focus on social fairness and justice to obtain the support of ordinary people. 74 Fourthly and perhaps most significantly, Kou Chien-wen argues that the influence of the CCYL faction will not disappear along with the replacement of CCP leaders. Different from other factions (such as the Shanghai Bang and Princelings), the rise of the CCYL faction has been a combined effect of factional and institutional factors. The CCYL is a formal institution with an organizational mission to develop political leaders for the CCP, an institutional advantage that exists only in the CCYL faction. Therefore, regardless of whether future supreme leaders of the CCP are from 71. Li Cheng, Hu's Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League", China Leadership Monitor, no.3, July 30, 2002, p.6; Kou Chien-Wen, CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of Channeling Cadres, Prospect Quarterly, vol.8, no.4, October 2007, p Li Cheng and Lynn White, The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?, Asian Survey, vol.43, July/August 2003, p Wang Zhengxu, Hu Jintao s Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China s Elite Politics, Issues and Studies, no.4, December 2006, p.103; Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming- of Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, summer 2005, p Li Cheng, One Party, Two Coalitions in China's Politics, August 16, 2009, website of East Asia Forum, accessed at: Li Cheng, The New Deal : Politics and Policies of the Hu Administration, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 38, no.4-5, December 2003, pp

29 19 the CCYL, in terms of consolidating their power, they nevertheless have to acknowledge the CCYL. 75 Shortcomings of the Factionalism Model Generally speaking, the Factionalism model focuses on the leadership development function of the youth league which, no doubt, is significant. However, as the relationship between the youth league and party also consists of other aspects, such as a political socialization function, this model alone is insufficient to analyze this complicated relationship. As the CCYL faction is not equivalent to the CCYL organization, an overemphasis on relationship may lead to a misunderstanding of the CCYL. Existing scholarly studies of the CCYL faction and CCYL also have some weaknesses. The following pages address their shortcomings in the areas of theory applicability, object selection and research methods. Theory Applicability Over-emphasizing the influence of informal relationships leads the Factionalism model to neglect the increasing institutionalization of China s politics. In the past 30 years of reform and openness, the Chinese political system has achieved a certain level of institutional development. Some scholars who are aware of this change have begun to study China s politics from an institutional perspective in addition to considering factions. 76 As development of the CCYL has contributed to this institutionalization, the institutional factor must also be considered in CCYL studies. Unlike other factions, the CCYL faction is based on a formal institution that has the organizational mission of developing political leaders for the CCP. It possesses a unique organizational advantage and a large number of talented reserves. By limiting the objects of research to the small number of leaders who served as officials of the CCYL, analyses of the CCYL faction may lead to serious errors. 75. Kou Chien-Wen, CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of Channeling Cadres, Prospect Quarterly, vol.8, no.4, October 2007, p As to the documents of institutional development of China s politics, please refer to David Bachman, The Paradox of Analyzing Elite Politics under Jiang, The China Journal, no. 45, January 2001, pp ; David Bachman, The Limits on Leadership in China, Asia Survey, vol.32, no.11, November 1992, pp ; Lowell Dittmer, The Changing Shape of Elite Power Politics, The China Journal, no.45, January 2001, pp

30 20 In addition, while regarded as members of the CCYL faction, some cadres also belong to other factions, such as Liu Yandong ( 刘延东 ), who is also one of the Princelings with a close relationship with Jiang Zemin. Her father, Liu Ruilong ( 刘瑞龙 ), was one of the founding members of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Vice-minister of Agriculture, and was recommended by the adoptive father of Jiang Zemin to be a member of the CCYL. 77 Therefore, it is insufficient to study the CCYL using only informal political theory. Study Objects The exclusiveness of the study objects will also inevitably lead to a poor understanding of the CCYL. At this stage, the Factionalism literature focuses mainly on cadres above the bureau administrative level ( 厅级以上 ) while, in many American scholars opinion, such a study is limited only to leaders in the Central Committee of the CCYL and its Provincial Committee Secretaries. In terms of participating in political activities, cadres above deputy division administrative level ( 副处以上 ) can be transferred among units, institutions and state-owned enterprises. While this phenomenon is relatively common, there are a large number of government cadres of division level or below in the CCYL that have been promoted to the provincial official list. 78 If the CCYL is regarded as only the CCYL faction, then the function of the CCYL is inappropriately assessed. Also, evaluating cadres in the CCYL from the perspective of factions lacks objectivity. As a national youth organization, the CCYL, under the leadership of the CCP, has established its local branches in party and government organs, public institutions and enterprises, colleges and universities, mass organizations and other parts of the public sector, and has a large number of cadres teams. If CCYL cadres 77. 多维新闻, 刘延东成为中共第四位女副总理 (Duowei News, Liu Yandong Became the Fouth Female Vice-Premier of the CCP ), 17th March 2013, website of Duowei, accessed at: On this point, after reorganizing and summarizing the resumes of Standing Committees of the Party Committee in provinces issued by Chinese Communist Party News Network, the author found that, until October 2007 (exclusive of the army), approximately 19 senior cadres have worked in the CCYL Central Committee, and around 57 in provincial, 20 in city, 9 in county, 2 in town (street), 8 in government departmental, 15 in university, 9 in enterprise (factory) and 9 in other grassroots organization youth league committees. Source from the Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres Vision).

31 21 above division level are considered, their education is not only limited to the humanities and social science disciplines while their excellence in fields such as foreign trade, economics, finance, technology and other aspects is unknown. Study Method In existing studies of Factionalism and the CCYL, there have been horizontal comparative analyses (such as between the CCYL and other factions) rather than any longitudinal comparative ones. The primary research span has been from 1978 to date which cannot fully represent either how CCYL cadres are trained or their development process. In the existing literature, studies of the CCYL tend to begin from when General Secretary Hu Jintao served as Secretary of the CCYL Central Committee, with cadres before that period, especially before the PRC s foundation, not being considered significant in China s history. Therefore, the comparative analysis from the perspective of historical development is rare and the developmental history of the CCYL cannot be fully presented, thus the relevant institutional development course cannot be seen. In summary, factional studies of the CCYL are useful for beginning to discover and understand the CCYL s role in the CCP s leadership politics. However, as this role is somewhat broader than this analysis allows, it cannot provide us with a full understanding of the CCYL s institutional development. Existing studies rarely regard the CCYL as a complete and mature institution for selecting, training and delivering political leaders or explore its functions for updating and renovating China s political leaders The Corporatism Model As a theoretical model in political and social science, Corporatism describes a society constituted by major units or social groups based on common interests. As Howard Wiarda points out (The Corporatist)...system of social organization...has at its base the grouping of men according to the community of their natural interests and social function, and as true and proper organza of the state they direct and coordinate labor and

32 22 capital in matters of common interest. 79 Philippe Schmitter similarly defines it as follows: Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. 80 The Corporatism model reveals a type of social management, with the role of the CCYL one of a corporatist organization for operating the political socialization of Chinese youth for the CCP. This role refers mainly to ideological propaganda and education about the CCP, in essence, educating Chinese youth about the CCP's political doctrine, assimilating their political viewpoints and persuading them to join the Communist movement. This school of thought makes three key arguments: firstly, the relationship between the CCP and Chinese society follows the classic logic of Corporatism theory; secondly, the CCP places significant emphasis on forging close ties with the broad masses of people, organizing and mobilizing them, and raising their political consciousness, with mass organizations the main agents of this strategy; and, thirdly, the CCYL is the official mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth. Outline of Corporatism in China Bruce Dicken indicates that Corporatist arrangements can exist in different political systems. In modern society, one such arrangement in an Authoritarian regime dominated by the State is known as "State Corporatism", 81 the category in which, 79. Howard Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Great Ism (New York: Routledge, 1996) p Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?", The Review of Politics, vol.36, no.1, pp Bruce Dickson, Cooperation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Political Science Quarterly, vol.115, no.4, winter , p.532.

33 23 given the character of the Chinese regime, the CCYL belongs. On the basis of the Russian Communist experience, the CCP has built corporatist structures into the framework of the Chinese regime. There are many similarities between Corporatism and Socialism in terms of their understanding of a society without class conflict. 82 Margaret Pearson realized the emerging corporatist elements in Chinese society and formed the concept of "Socialist Corporatism" to explain the Chinese political system. 83 Other scholars also used the concept to understand "mass organizations" and the interactions and relationships between Chinese authority and society. 84 Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan pointed out that, at the national level, the state recognizes one and only one organization (say, a national labor union, a business association, a farmers' association) as the sole representative of the sectoral interests of the individuals, enterprises or institutions that comprise that organization's assigned constituency. The state determines which organizations will be recognized as legitimate and forms an unequal partnership of sorts with such organizations. The associations sometimes even get channeled into the policy-making processes and often help implement state policy on the government's behalf. 85 Corporatist organizations have been created and placed under the control of the ruling party. 86 In a Joint Meeting of Communist Delegates to the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Communist Members of the All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and Communist Members of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions (30 December 1920), Lenin proposed this corporatist arrangement to regulate the relationship between the Bolshevik Party, Proletariat and all working people, calling it the 82. Douhlas Chalmers, Corporatism and Comparative Politics in Howard Wiarda (ed.), New Directions in Comparative Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) pp Margaret Pearson, The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 31, January 1994, pp For details concerning the usage of Corporatism in terms of China studies, please see: Jennifer Hsu and Reza Hasmath (ed.), The Chinese Corporatist State: Adaptation, Survival and Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2013); Jennifer Hsu and Reza Hasmath, The Local Corporatist State and NGO Relations in China, Journal of Contemporary China, vol.23, no.87, 2014, pp Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33, 1995, p Daniel Chirot, The Corporatist Model and Socialism, Theory and Society, no.9, 1980, pp

34 24 transmission belt system. 87 In Mao Zedong s works, Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership ( 关于领导方法的若干问题, 1st June 1943) and On Coalition Government ( 论联合政府 24th April 1945), he further defined this as mass organization ( 群众组织 ) and mass line ( 群众路线 ). 88 Corporatism is not a grand theory for analyzing everything that occurs in China but a useful framework for determining the "Linkage Organizations" in the middle between the "Core Apparatus" (party centre) and "Legal, Semi-legal and Illegal Organizations and Associations" (an inclusive group of organizations or institutions without party or government backgrounds). 89 This Corporatist structure should provide a two-way conduit between the ruling party and assigned constituencies. From the top down, it enables the party to transmit, mobilize and raise the political consciousness of specific sectoral members and, from the bottom up, should represent and protect the rights and interests of its members. Corporatist organizations can usefully contribute to the dominance of the ruling party by serving as an alternative to coercion control mechanisms. 90 As Unger and Chan point out, "the more the economy decentralizes, the more corporatist associations get established as substitute control mechanisms". However, a Corporatist structure can also undermine or weaken the power of a central government by enlarging the autonomy of its associations. 91 Corporatist research on the CCYL As one of the time-honoured mass organizations in the Chinese Communist movement, the CCYL has been analyzed from the perspective of Corporatism and 87. Lenin, Vladimir, The Trade Unions, The Present Situation and Trotsky s Mistakes in Lenin s Collected Works vol 32 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965) pp Mao Zedong, Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership and On Coalition Government in The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (vol. III) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977) pp , Michel Oksenberg, China's Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, The China Journal, no. 45, January 2001, p Jonathan Unger and Chan Anita, Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in an East Asian Context in Barrett McCormick and Jonathan Unger (ed.), China after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1966) p Bruce Dickson, Cooperation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 115, no. 4, winter, , p.533.

35 25 identified as the mechanism for promulgating the party s mission to Chinese youth. 92 On the one hand, it is regarded as the sole sectoral organization of Chinese youth and, on the other, as the state-recognized institution for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth. Like other major mass organizations (especially the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) and All-China Federation of Trade Unions(ACFTU)), the CCYL is officially authorized by the CCP. Theoretically, according to the definition of State Corporatism, the CCYL should provide a two-way conduit between the CCP and Chinese youth for achieving consensus and common goals. 93 And, indeed, from top to bottom, it serves to transmit, mobilize and assimilate youths under the command of the CCP and, from bottom to top, represents the rights and interests of the youth constituency. However, in China, maintaining the rule of the CCP is the priority of the CCYL, while representing the interests and rights of youth is only secondary and essentially aimed at undertaking their political socialization. In addition, in the period of Mao Zedong, as there was no room for any degree of autonomy implied by State Corporatism, 94 previous corporatism research on the CCYL has focused mainly on the its political socialization function. Of the many Corporatism studies, the only two scholarly ones that focus on the political socialization function of the CCYL are The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth (Michigan University, 1977) by Ronald Nicholas Montaperto and The Function of the Chinese Youth Leagues ( ) by Klaus H. Pringsheim. Montaperto systematically argues that the CCYL is the CCP s tool for undertaking the task of educating Chinese youths about Communism. 95 Pringsheim believes that, to the ruling party, the youth organization in China is more significant than those in non-authoritarian countries. He also explores the history of the CCYL 92. Concerning the history of the CCYL, please see: Klaus Pringsheim, Chinese Communist Youth League ( ), The China Quarterly, no.12, October to December 1962, pp Jonathan Unger and Chan Anita, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33, January 1995, p Jonathan Unger and Chan Anita, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 33, January 1995, pp Ronald Nicholas Montaperto, The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth (MI: Michigan University, 1977).

36 26 ( ), its Vanguard Mistake ( 先锋主义 ) (anti-chen Duxiu Movement) and Liquidationism ( 取消主义, plenary session of the CC of the CYLC was held in November 1927) which reveal "how the CCP transformed the CCYL to be the party s loyal servant". 96 Shortcomings of Corporatist Research on the CCYL Although the scholarly works in this category certainly provide us with an understanding of the CCYL s role in undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth, several weaknesses prevent them from providing a comprehensive understanding of the CCYL s relationship with the party. Firstly, the Corporatist model is based on an arguable assumption that the Chinese political system is a Corporatist system and the CCYL one of its State Corporatist organizations. However, as Bruce Dickson counters, there is no full-blown Corporatist system in China, only some emerging Corporatist elements. 97 Therefore, when analyzing a component within this political system, choosing an inappropriate theory may lead to a misleading result. Nonetheless, the CCYL is one of the mass organizations created by the party which belong to the State Corporatist organization in China despite previous CCYL studies by the Corporatist school concentrating mainly on revealing its political socialization function without adequately considering its role as the sectoral agency of Chinese youth for protecting their rights and interests. Particularly in the post-mao Zedong period, the CCP started to ease direct controls over Chinese society. The CCYL, as one of the Corporatist bodies, was at that time able to gain a certain degree of autonomy to protect youths interests and rights, an area analyzed in this thesis. The second shortcoming of the Corporatist school is that while it is useful for analyzing the interaction between the party and society, the CCYL is more than a Corporatist institution. On the one hand, it gave birth to the CCYL faction, one of the major elements in the CCP s leadership politics and, on the other, it has an organizational mission to develop political cadres for the CCP, an institutional 96. Klaus Pringsheim, The Function of the Chinese Youth Leagues ( ), the China Quarterly, no.12, October to December 1962, pp Bruce Dickson, Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation, Political Science Quarterly, vol.115, no.4, winter , p.534.

37 27 arrangement for assisting leadership renewal of the CCP. This noteworthy role of the CCYL is not properly accounted for by the corporatist model and Corporatism is insufficient for revealing the sophisticated relationship between the CCYL and CCP. The most recent research on this theory of the CCYL is a PhD thesis from Michigan University The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth by Ronald Montaperto which was written before The period of Reform and Openness (since 1978) has contributed to significant changes in China s political development and, most significantly, the decreasing importance of ideology has led directly to the decline of the political socialization function of the CCYL. By contrast, the institutionalization of the CCP s leadership politics has allowed the leadership development function of the CCYL to become increasingly important. Therefore, to continue to identify the CCYL as simply a mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth is misleading in terms of its expected future course Brief Summary Existing scholarship indisputably provides useful insights and detailed materials for understanding the functions and history of the CCYL, with both Factionalism and Corporatism confirming in different ways its significance in Chinese Communist politics. However, the arguments of both schools merely explain partial aspects of the relationship between the modern CCYL and CCP, either that of leadership development or political socialization. Neither can reveal the dynamic nature of the CCYL and provide a comprehensive understanding of its changing relationship with the CCP across different historical periods. Until now, there has been no work dedicated to emphasizing the development of the relationship between the youth league and party. To most scholars, even researchers in mainland China, the CCYL is a familiar word but a relatively unknown organization. 98. Ronald Nicholas Montaperto, The Chinese Communist Youth League and the Political Socialization of Chinese Youth (MI: Michigan University, 1977).

38 Main Argument of This Thesis This thesis traces the organizational development of the CCYL its emergence in 1920 to the latest leadership change of the CCP in 2012 to discern the evolving and complicated relationship between the CCYL and CCP. It argues that this relationship has been dynamically changing, with the CCYL having different major functions during different historical periods. Since its establishment, it has always served a multi-functional role, including being the mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth, the youth department for providing public services and the institutional arrangement for developing young leadership candidates for the CCP. Each of these aspects has been emphasized at different stages in the CCYL s history, as documented in this thesis. Regarding the causes contributing to changes in the relationship between the CCYL and CCP, there are three factors of note: CCP leadership changes, the external political environment and internal CCYL factors. From being a rival organization to the CCP during its establishment to being a rival faction within the party in the Jiangxi period to being a party-led mass organization in the Mao Zedong era and then experiencing the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the CCYL finally became the inner-party institutional arrangement for developing political cadres for the party. To be specific, in the early Communist movement of the 1920s, the CCYL was described as the CCP s organizational rival and was established as the Second Communist Party. After re-formations in the 1st United Front Period ( ) and Jiangxi Soviet Period ( ), although the CCYL nominally became a subordinate organization of the CCP, it continued to act as a rival faction to Mao Zedong faction within the party. In the Sino-Japanese war ( ), on the basis of the goal of Anti-Japanese, the Central Committee of the CCYL was transformed into the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP ( 中央青年工作委员会 ) and its local branches reconstructed into different kinds of Anti-Japanese Youth Salvations, a disbanding which completely eliminated its rivalry within the party.

39 29 During the period of the Second CCP-Kuomintang War ( ), the youth league was re-built on the basis of its former organizations and, when the CCP became the ruling party in 1949, served as a State-recognized mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth. However, like other former institutions in the CCP s system, it was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution ( ). The CCYL recovered after the end of the Cultural Revolution. The new youth league followed the previous model to re-build in the Reform and Openness period (1978 to date) but, along with the CCP strategies of Cadre Four Modernization and The Third Echelon, its function of developing leadership candidates for the CCP became increasingly significant. Also, because of the Reform, for the CCYL, the significance of ideology declined as did that of being a mass organization while becoming an institutional arrangement to develop leadership candidates for the Party grew. Although its process of institutionalization was hindered by the Tiananmen Event (4th June 1989), having experienced sustained development during the periods of Jiang Zemin ( ) and Hu Jintao ( ), the CCYL arrangement is now one of the key inner-party institutional settings through which CCP leadership changes occur. Concerning the definition of the role of the CCYL, the Second Communist Party refers to one of the Communist political organizations which are under the guiding ideology of Marxism and leadership of the Comintern and having the same functions as the CCP in the Chinese Communist movement. It had two developmental stages. In the first, it was a rival organization seeking to wrest leadership of the Chinese Communist movement from the CCP which was described by the CCP as Vanguardism ( 先锋主义 ). In the second, it became an exclusive organization within the CCP. It strictly recruited members on the basis of social origin (the workers and poor peasants) and refused the membership of other people from different social backgrounds which the CCP regarded as Closed Doorism ( 关门主义 ). The CCYL role of the Mass Organization is one that the party or state (after 1949) has recognized in the CCP system. It is the sole representative of youth groups and youth departments of the party and is designed, in both its organizational and

40 30 ideological aspects, to win or preserve the supremacy of the CCP while undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth as its central task. The CCYL role of the Youth Department refers to a state-recognized organization which acts as the administrative department of the government for providing public services and human resource development to young Chinese. The CCYL role of the Institutional Arrangement points to one of leadership development in the CCP s system which implements the CCP strategy of recruiting young talent to become candidates for leadership of the CCP. It consists of three stages: recruitment, equipment and transformation. Throughout its history, the CCYL has experienced two major variations in its features contributed to by CCP leadership changes, the external political environment and internal CCYL factors. In the first change from organizational rival to party-led mass organization, Mao Zedong s coming to power was the significant leadership factor contributing to the focus on mass organizations. The external political environment was the Sino- Japanese war which required an anti-japanese strategy. In addition, at that time, the CCYL had an exclusive policy of recruiting members from only the classes of workers and poor peasants which led to a sharp decline in its influence among Chinese youth. During the war period, the CCP, which closely controlled the army, would not tolerate the CCYL continuing as its rival organization, so becoming a party-led mass organization was a matter of survival for the CCYL. In the CCYL s second change of emphasis from a party-led mass organization to inner-party institutional arrangement for leadership development, the top-level design of Deng Xiaoping was no doubt the major factor while the Reform and Openness of the CCP and internal CCYL reform of Song Defu were the external and internal contributing factors respectively. Economic reform led directly to the declining importance of ideology in the Communist regime and the growing civil society appeared to challenge the influence of the Communist ideas among its youth. However, the Third Echelon of the CCP and Cadre Four Modernization Policy strongly shaped the CCYL into an institutional arrangement for leadership development. The reform of Song Defu assisted the CCYL to participate in the

41 31 Personnel System Reform and further provided multiple advantages for CCYL cadres to become competitive as candidates for leadership of the CCP. 1.4 Research Methodology This thesis takes a pragmatic approach (mixed methods), a research methodology that comprehensively applies quantitative and qualitative methods, for exploring the role of the CCYL in the development of Chinese Communist politics. 99 This approach accords with the tradition of conducting pragmatic research in the Social Sciences and provides greater space than a single approach in terms of reflecting and theorizing practice for knowledge generation. 100 Since it can be an appropriate research method for analyzing a new object our former wisdom cannot explain and contribute to new knowledge generation, 101 it is the proper methodology for researching the role of the CCYL. The research materials for this thesis consist of three parts: Chinese primary documents; in-depth interviews with senior CCYL cadres and scholars; and a leadership dataset created by the author. The Chinese primary materials include official documents of the CCP and CCYL (e.g., Congress Reports, annuals and white papers), CCP leaders remarks and letters (such as from Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong), and memoirs of specific historical figures (for example, that of Zhang Guotao). They provide this thesis with new information unavailable in the English-language literature. Interviews were conducted during the author s field research trip to the Central Committee and Central School of the CCYL in Beijing between January and June Two groups of CCYL cadres, official scholars of the CCYL and senior political 99 George H. Sabine, The Pragmatic Approach to Politics, The American Political Science Review, vol. 24, no. 4, Nov., 1930, pp ; Lucy Yardley, Felicity Bishop, Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: A Pragmatic Approach in Carla Willig and Wendy Stainton-Rogers(ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015) pp ; David L. Morgan, Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods, Journal of Mixed Methods Research January, 2007, vol. 1, no. 1, pp ; 100. Ivaylo Iaydjiev, A Pragmatic Approach to Social Science, 1st March 2013, website of International Relations Student, accessed at: Jorg Friedrich and Friedrich Kratochwil, On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology, International Organization, vol. 63, Fall 2009, pp

42 32 leaders in the Central Committee of the CCYL were contacted and interviewed. In terms of the scholars, some are senior examiners in leadership selections for the CCYL and some have direct access to the internal party and youth league documents stored in the Central Archives of the CCP and CCYL. The former are specialized examiners who investigate the recruitment of CCYL cadres and recommend suitable candidates to the party as well as help formulate CCYL standards for leadership selection. In terms of the CCYL cadres interviewed during the fieldwork, they have long been engaged in organizational affairs or recruited into the leadership program (such as position transformation 转岗 ). They provided insightful personal observations as well as first-hand information about the inner operations of the CCYL, particularly on leadership issues. Given the political sensitivity of these cadres political positions, their interviews are reported in this thesis without attribution to any particular individual, a practice with which the interviewees agreed. In addition, this study also established a "Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres Vision) which contains all the Curriculum Vitaes of the members of the Central Committee from 1921 to Concerning source of the Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision), details please see: First-hand materials: Central Organization Department of the CCP and Party History Research Centre of the CCP, The Dictionary of the Past and Present Central Committee Members (Beijing: Party History Research Centre Press,2004); Central Committee Members Curriculum Vitaes in Xinhua Website and Database of Chinese leader Biographies (This database is established by the CCP in 4th November, It includes 1600 resumes of the leaders from the party and government, website of CCP, accessed at: Law Press, Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Law Press, 2005); Law and Regulation Research Centre, Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China and Its Relevant Regulation (Beijing: Law Press, 2012). Fieldwork materials (February-June, 2012):It contains inner-policies and leaders' reply letters, which stored in the Archives of the Central Committee of the CCYL and library of the Central School of the CCYL, and interviews of official scholar: Academician Lu Shizhen, Prof. Zheng Guang, Li Yuqi, Wu Qing, Huang Zhijian, Tong Jing, Dr. Hu Xianzhong; Referencing materials: Wolfgang Bartke, Who Was Who in the People's Republic of China: With More Than 3100 Portraits ( Munich: K G Saur Verlag Gmbh & Co, 1998); Malcolm Lamb, Directory of Officials and Organizations in China(M E Sharpe Inc., 2003); Other scholar's Dataset: Victor Shih, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu, Biographical Data of Central Committee Members (Version 1.0) ( Evanston : Northwestern University), January 2008, accessed at: Kou Chien-Wen, Chinese Political Elite Dataset (Taipei: National Chengzhi University), 30th November 2005, accessed at:

43 Structure of the Thesis This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter One introduces the framework of this study, including its research objectives, literature review, main argument, research methodology and outlines of the other chapters. The remaining chapters are organized in chronological order as: the establishment period (1910s-1920s), pre-mao Zedong period ( ), First Stage of Mao Zedong period ( ), Second Stage of Mao Zedong period ( ), Deng Xiaoping era ( ), Jiang Zemin period ( ) and Hu Jintao period ( ). In addition, these seven periods are organized in three major sections based on the major changes in the primary role of the CCYL in each. To be specific, Section I, which consists of Chapters Two and Three, focuses on the establishment and secondparty role of the CCYL in the early period (1910s-1935). Section II contains analyses of the whole period of Mao Zedong s rule in Chapters Four and Five during which the major role of the CCYL changed to that of a mass organization undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth. Section III, Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, focuses on the development of the CCYL in the Post-Mao eras. Along with the institutionalization of the CCP s politics in this last period, the CCYL became an institutional arrangement with the role of assisting in CCP leadership development. Chapter Two explores the formative period of the CCYL (1910s-1920s) and argues that, like the CCP, it was established as a combined outcome of the May Fourth Movement and the export of Communist revolution from the Soviet Union and, during this time, it shared a close but independent relationship with the CCP. As another Communist Party, the main work of the CCYL included disseminating Marxism-Leninism, absorbing youths into the Communist camp, recruiting young talent to the Comintern to receive political education and motivating worker strikes and student demonstrations. This led directly to a problem of organizational overlap between the CCYL and CCP which caused a relationship adjustment in the next period. Chapter Three examines the development of the CCYL in the pre-mao Zedong period ( ) and contends that, although it was organizationally adjusted as a subordinate organization of the CCP, its second-party role did not change. In this

44 34 period, the CCYL contributed to three leadership training projects which cultivated different kinds of leaders for the CCP and lay down the foundations of the factional struggle between the returned students from Moscow and the worker and peasant cadres in the following period. Chapter Four discusses the development of the CCYL in the first stage of the Mao Zedong period ( ) and argues that it was reorganized into a mass organization by the CCP which completely eliminated its second-party role and changed it to a party-led mass organization. This reorganization consisted of two stages. In the first, the former CCYL was transformed into the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP and Anti-Japanese Youth organizations and, in the second, it was gradually re-built during the civil war period. When the CCP finally won the civil war, the CCYL formally accomplished its rebuilding and could now become a national mass organization in the Chinese Communist political system. Chapter Five looks at the development of the CCYL in the second stage of the Mao Zedong period ( ) when the CCP became the ruling party of China. Before the Cultural Revolution ( 文化大革命, ), the CCYL was a mass organization contributing to mass movements, political education and leadership development for the CCP. Although its main function was to undertake the political socialization of Chinese youth for the party, like other institutions, it suffered serious attacks by the Red Guards from 1966 onwards. Chapter Six studies the recovery of the CCYL in the period of Deng Xiaoping ( ) and argues that it began to be entrusted with a new role of being the institutional arrangement for developing political cadres for the CCP which gradually changed it from a mass to a leadership renewal organization. This chapter demonstrates that the motivations contributing to this main change in feature were the Cadre Four Modernization reform and self-reform of the CCYL by Song Defu. Above all, the age regulation in Song Defu s reform, which stipulated the ceiling ages of CCYL leaders of all ranks, equipped CCYL cadres with an unapproachable age advantage over those from other leadership avenues. Chapter Seven evaluates the development of the CCYL in the days when Jiang Zemin held the General Secretary position in the CCP. Based on the practices of the

45 35 CCYL in universities, state-owned enterprises and new types of economic behavior, this chapter shows that following the promotion of reform and openness, the political socialization function of the CCYL was severely challenged and its significance declined but its role as the institutional arrangement for developing leadership candidates for the CCP steadily advanced. Chapter Eight investigates the development of the CCYL in the period of Hu Jintao. The prosperity of the CCYL faction and increasing regularization were two of its major characteristics at this time. This chapter demonstrates that there was an institutional cause contributing to the prosperity of CCYL cadres in China s politics. Based particularly on interview materials and official documents, it provides specific details of the internal operations of the CCYL arrangement (recruitment, training, and position transformation) for developing leadership candidates for the party. Chapter Nine summarizes and synthesizes the major findings obtained from the empirical analyses in this study in terms of the relationship between the CCYL and CCP. Based on them, it also offers some predictions for understanding the Chinese political system and, in addition, proposes some suggestions for future studies of the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP in the development of Chinese Communism.

46 36 SECTION I: Early Period of CCYL Development, 1920s-1935: Origin and Rivalry

47 37 CHAPTER TWO The CCYL in the Period of Establishment (1920s) This chapter provides a discussion of the origin and early establishment of the CCYL in the Chinese New Culture Movement(1910s-1920s) in which it is argued that, during this period, the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP was organizational rival. When the CCYL was formed, it developed significant features which underline its significance in Chinese Communist politics. Of them, the following three are the most significant and greatly influenced its relationship with the CCP for the next several decades. Firstly, the CCYL and CCP shared the same origins as they were both outcomes of the revolutionary ideas of the Comintern and Marxist camp of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the New Culture Movement. Therefore, the CCYL enjoyed a close but mutually independent relationship with the CCP but subordinate ones with the Young Communist International (YCI) and Comintern due to which it was a de facto rival party to the CCP in Chinese Communist politics. Secondly, during this period, the youth league was multi-functional and involved five activities: disseminating Marxism-Leninism, motivating mass movements, improving the living standards of young workers and peasants, absorbing youths into the Communist camp and recruiting young talent to receive political education from the Comintern. Its objectives were not limited to students in universities but included workers in factories and peasants in rural areas. Therefore, the work of the CCP and CCYL seriously overlapped which increased their rivalry. Thirdly, the CCYL was called the Chinese Socialist Youth League (CSYL, 中国社会主义青年团 ) at its 1st National Congress. The word Socialist was a way of attracting more radical youths and obtaining a legal position from the republication government. This contributed directly to the more powerful influence of the CCYL than CCP at that time and consolidated its independence as the youth Communist Party.

48 38 This chapter consists of four sections. Section 2.1 presents an analysis of the 1st National Congress of the CSYL in 1922 and its main activities in this formative period; section 2.2 aims to determine its origins in the New Culture Revolution, particularly the ideological and organizational preparation for its establishment; section 2.3 details its bottom-up development which reveals the relationship between it and the Marxist camp of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao and Comintern, and also uses its branch in Europe as an example of the sophisticated relationship required to establish local CSYL branches; and a short conclusion is presented in section st National Congress of the CSYL in 1922 The 1st National Congress of the CSYL highlighted what is generally regarded by both historians and the CCYL itself as the formal establishment of the CCYL in the calendar of the Chinese Communist movement. 1 To be specific, on 5th May 1922, the 104th anniversary of Karl Marx s birth, the 1st National Congress of the CSYL was held in Guangzhou East Garden. 25 representatives from 15 local CSYL branches, two from the Communist Youth International (CYI, 青年共产国际 ) and all senior leaders from the Central Bureau of the CCP attended. 2 The Guiding Principle of the CSYL specifies that its Central Executive Committee, which consists of a Secretary and representatives of three working departments (Secretary, Economic and Propaganda), is the supreme authority when congress is not in session. 3 The congress selected Gao Junyu ( 高君宇 ), Shi Cuntong ( 施存统 ), Zhang Tailei ( 张太雷 ), Cai Hesen ( 蔡和森 ) and Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ) as members of the Central Executive Committee, with Feng Jupo ( 冯菊坡 ), Lin Yunan( 林育南 ) and Zhang 1. 郑洸, 罗成全, 中国社会主义青年团的创建, 收录于团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 团内文件, 1984) 页 [Zheng Guang and Luo Chengquan, The Establishment of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, collected in Youth Movement Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection on the Establishment of the CSYL (Internal document, 1984) pp.12-25]. 2. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国大会号, 先驱 ( 团中央机关报刊 ), 1922 年 5 月 15 日头版 [CSYL, The 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper(Official Newspaper of headquarter of CCYL at that time), 15th May 1922, p.1]. 3. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团章程, 先驱 第八号第二版,1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, The Constitution of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.2 ].

49 39 Qiuren( 张秋人 ) alternate members. Shi Cuntong was elected Secretary at the 1st meeting of this Executive Committee at which establishment of the CSYL was formally proclaimed Socialist is the Cover of the CCYL Although the 1st National Congress of the CSYL used the word Socialist rather than Communist to identify itself, the CSYL was actually the CCYL and served the role of the a Communist Party which contributed to the proletarian movement. Using this word did not mean that the guiding principle and organizational nature of the CSYL grew out of the Socialist movement but was merely a temporary expedient that served the two strategies of recruiting more radical youths and obtaining legality. After the failure of the First Anglo-Chinese War ( 第一次鸦片战争, June August 1842), modern China gradually fell into conditions of a semi-colonial society and numerous western doctrines streamed in. At that time, Socialism ( 社会主义 ) was a popular and inclusive name for different political thoughts. It was not limited to Marxist Scientific Socialism but included Mutualism, the Work-Study Doctrine, Corporatism, the New Village of Socialism and even Anarchism. As, especially after the May Fourth Movement, it was a synonym for reform society 5, it appeared less radical and more well-known than Communism. At that time, because of its revolutionary intentions, Communism was forbidden by the Beiyang Government ( 北洋政府, ) 6, and the Communist organization was illegal. 7 So the youth league adopted the name of Socialist to win the support of the youths and to obtain a legal position for the development of the 4. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国大会号, 先驱 ( 团中央机关报刊 ), 1922 年 5 月 15 日头版 [CSYL, The 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper, 15th May 1922, p.1]. 5. 李玉琦, 中国共青团名称的由来, 收录于 共青团历史上的 100 个由来 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 10 [Li Yuqi, The Origin of the Name of Chinese Communist Youth League in 100 Origins in the History of CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) p.10]. 6. Beiyang Government ( 北洋政府 ) refers to the official government of the Republic of China in warlords period from 1912 to It was named because of the capital city Beijing. Details please see: Christopher Lew and Edwin Leung, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013). 7. 高军编 中国现代政治思想资料选辑 ( 上 )( 成都 : 四川人民出版社, 1983) 页 85 [Gao Jun, The Selection of Chinese Modern Political Thoughts(vol.1) (Cheng Du: Sichuan People Press, 1983) p.85].

50 40 organization. In 1921, the 2nd International Congress of the Communist Youth International was held in Moscow. In the Report of the Chinese Socialist Youth League in the 2nd International Congress of the Communist Youth International in this Congress, the delegation of the CSYL clearly explained the considerations around choosing the name of Socialist rather than Communist at the founding of the youth league. They believed that the name Socialist received more social acceptance than the name Communist in Chinese society, and obtained a legal position for the development of the organization. 8 In the 1 st National Congress of the CSYL (5th May 1922), the youth league proclaimed its nature as a proletarian youth organization serving the purpose of complete liberation of the proletariat. That is to say, in the establishment of the CSYL, the youth league clearly expressed the fact that the CSYL was a Communist organization. As the Principle of the Chinese Socialist Youth League 中国社会主义青年团纲领 clearly pointed out: Its organizational nature belonged to the proletariat whose complete liberation was its purpose; and its fighting goal was to establish a Communist society in which all means of production belonged to the public and reaping without sowing was forbidden. 9 In addition, two years later, under the promotion of Sun Zhongshan and the Comintern, the CCP and the Kuomintang achieved the first alliance for overthrowing the rule of warlords. It was called the 1 st United Front between the CCP and the Kuomintang (1924 to 1927). In this period, CCP and the political theory of Communism received a legal position in the area ruled by Kuomintang. The youth league soon changed its name to the Communist Youth League. In the Declaration of 8. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团代表在青年共产国际第二次代表大会上的报告, 青运史研究 1984 年第 3 期, 第 2 页 [CSYL, Report of the Chinese Socialist Youth League in the 2nd International Congress of the Communist Youth International in Journal of Research on Youth Movement History, vol.3, 1984, p.2]. 9. Original words are 中国社会主义青年团为中国青年无产阶级的组织, 即为完全解放无产阶级而奋斗的组织, 在中国建立一切生产工具收归公有和禁止不劳而食的初期共产主义社会 details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团纲领, 先驱 第八号第三版, 1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, The Guiding Principle of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3].

51 41 the third National Congress of the CSYL (January, 1925), it confirmed its proletarian nature and declared that using the name Socialist Youth League was no longer appropriate, and the name of the youth league should be henceforth be the Communist Youth League. We decided to no longer use the inappropriate name of Socialist Youth League as we believe that, to promote the Chinese revolutionary movement, (we) must guide the Chinese youth to know and believe in proletarian power. Therefore, we no longer need to hide our claim of representing the interests of the proletariat. As Communism is the most bloodcurdling word for imperialists, warlords and all counter-revolutionaries to hear, we should bravely demonstrate our true Communist face and let them tremble in front of us. 10 As this shows, the Communist nature of the CSYL was confirmed. In addition, because of the popularity of the name Socialist and fewer restrictions on conducting Socialist activities, by the time of the 1st National Congress of the CSYL, the number of members had reached approximately 5, In contrast, the CCP had only about 50 members at its 1st National Congress in In this establishment period, the CSYL was more powerful than the party which was one reason leading to its reorganization in the 1st United Front period, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 10. Original words are: 我们决议不再沿用以前那种不甚合当的 社会主义青年团 的称呼, 我们相信为要促成中国的革命运动, 必须引导中国的青年认识并且信赖无产阶级的力量, 所以我们用不着隐讳我们代表无产阶级利益的主张 共产主义是帝国主义 军阀以及一切反革命派所最恐怖的名辞, 我们正应当狠勇敢的揭示我们共产主义者真面目, 让他们在我们的面前发抖, details please see: 中国共青团中央办公厅, 中国共产主义青年团第三次全国大会宣言, 中国青年运动历史资料 (2)( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版社, 1957) 页 [The Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL, Manifesto of the 3rd National Congress of the CCYL in Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement(2) (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party Historical Material Press, 1957) pp.30-32]. 11. Source from the website of the Chinese Communist Youth League, accessed at: org.cn/695/gqt_tuanshi/. 12. Source from the website of Xinhua (official website of the Chinese Government), accessed at:

52 The Organizational Function of the CSYL in the Period of Establishment The organizational function of the CSYL can well reveal its relationship with the CCP. As a new-born Communist organization, the propaganda of political thought and development of organization (members and cadres) should be the most significant and urgent preparation tasks for the budding Communist revolution. On the basis of the documents, including meeting records, of the 1st National Congress (1922) and early practices of the CSYL, this section demonstrates that, during the establishment period, the CSYL placed its emphasis on disseminating Marxism-Leninism (to improve the living standards of young workers and peasants, and conduct a mass movement) and developing the organization which included absorbing youths (young students, workers and peasants) into the Communist camp and sending young talent to the Comintern to receive Communist education. In practice, in this period, the CSYL was a Second Communist party with the rival relationship with the CCP. The Constitution of the CSYL, which was approved at its 1st National Congress, did not define its functions and its guiding principle only generally mentioned that its purpose was to build a Communist society. 13 However, there were three specific approved documents regulating the CSYL s work in advertising Communism and expanding the organization: the Resolution of raising the Living Conditions of Young Workers and Peasants ( 青年工人农人生活状况改良的议决案 ); Resolution about the Political Propaganda Movement ( 关于政治宣传运动的议决案 ); and Resolution about the Educational Movement ( 关于教育运动的议决案 ). In the the Resolution of Raising the Living Condition of Young Workers and Peasants, the CSYL distinctively claims that it is the political organization of the class of the proletariat. So their most significant work is to improve the living standard of Chinese young workers and peasants. As the Resolution pointed out: 13. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团纲领, 先驱 第八号第三版, 1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, The Guiding Principle of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3].

53 43 Our Socialist Youth League is an organization fighting for the proletariat, particularly the young proletariat, so we should do our utmost to improve the living conditions of young workers and peasants. 14 In addition, in this Resolution, the youth league listed nine specific working goals for achieving this aim, including aspects of hours, age and content of work, education, living and working standards, and entertainment. 15 However, protecting the interest of workers and peasants was not the end but a means for the CSYL as its purpose was to encourage workers and peasants to accept Communist doctrine and join the Communist camp. As Chinese workers and peasants cared far more about their vital interests than political thoughts, the only approach for disseminating Marxism-Leninism among them and recruiting them into the Communist camp was to claim that their interests were being protected which became effective and significant for propagandizing Communism and developing the organization. Zhang Teli ( 张特立, also known as Zhang Guotao 张国焘 ), the representative of the Chinese Trade Union Secretariat (CTUS, 中国劳动组合书记部, the predecessor of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions) who attended the 1st National Congress of the CSYL clearly pointed out that the workers and peasants would only follow a doctrine which could protect their interests and solve their problems. These days, there are some persons talking about Anarchism, Socialism and Communism. But our workers, we don t understand (these thoughts). We now only observe the influence of their work on us, and wait for what interests they can bring us. If these are only some empty words, we will be too foolish to understand. Now the Socialist Youth League appears. We hope it can keep the promise of being with the proletariat and for the proletariat. Now we work more 14. Original words are: 我们社会主义青年团是为无产阶级尤其是为无产阶级的青年奋斗的团体, 所以我们对青年工人农人生活状况改良, 应该尽最多最大的力量, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 青年工人农人生活状况改良的议决案, 先驱 第八号第三版,1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, The Resolution of Raising the Living Condition of Young Worker and Peasant, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3]. 15 Ibid;

54 44 than eight hours per day and are suffering in hunger. We hope all the men in the Youth League can help release us from difficulty. 16 Mass movements, including worker strikes and student demonstrations, were regarded as the major approach for the CSYL to advertise Communism and develop the organization during this period. In the Resolution about the Political Propaganda Movement, it was required to gain leadership of all kinds of political mass movements. In addition, its cadres had to organize public speeches, assemblies, clubs and demonstrations when major political issues arose. Ensuring that the rank and file accepted Communist doctrines was the main goal of all the CSYL s political propaganda, as indicated by the following. We should actively participate in every mass movement, particularly political ones. No matter whether it is a patriotic movement or movement for freedom (fighting for the freedom of assembly, association, speech, press and demonstration), as long as (the movement) can obtain the sympathy of the mass, we should order our members to join it. 17 The specifics regarding mass movements detailed in the Resolution about the Educational Movement had the six aspects of literacy education for workers and peasants, free compulsory education for proletarians children, gender equality for women, rights for students to participate in school management, rights of non- 16. Original words are: 现在有些人讲甚么无政府主义, 甚么社会主义, 甚么共产主义, 但是我们工人对于这些都不懂得 我们现在只好看他们于我们工作实际上发生些甚么影响, 实际上于我们工人求得什么利益 ; 若只是些空空洞洞的名词, 那我们就无从懂得, 因为我们工人的头脑实在太简单 现在又有从事实际运动的社会主义青年团出现了 我们更希望他们能实践他们的宣言, 就是结合无产阶级为无产阶级谋利益 我们现在还要做八个小时以上的工作, 肚子时常要挨饿, 我们希望社会主义青年团诸君, 为我们解除实际的困苦, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团一大及其筹备会议和第一届团中央执委会会议记录 (1922 年 2 月 年 8 月 ), 党的文献, 2012 年 1 期, 页 13 [CSYL, The Meeting Record of the 1st National Congress of the CSYL and Its Preparing Meetings and the Meeting Record of the Execute Committee of the 1st CSYL (February 1922-August 1923), Literature of Chinese Communist Party, no.1, 2012, p.13]. 17. Original words are: 每一种群众运动发生, 尤其是政治性质的群众运动发生, 我们必须努力参加其中, 占得指导的地位, 无论是爱国运动, 或自由运动 ( 争得集会 结社 言论 出版 罢工等自由权利 ), 只要能引起群众的同情的, 我们必须对团员下动员令, 一律参加到里面去活动, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 关于政治宣传运动的议决案, 先驱 第八号第三版, 1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, Resolution about Political Propaganda Movement, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3].

55 45 Christian students in Christian schools and usage of the Mandarin language 18, all of which served the purpose of political propaganda. Apart from promoting the use of Mandarin which aimed to remove the language barrier, all the movements had vivid political overtones. Political indoctrination was operated on the basis of criticizing reality, with the CSYL arguing that only a social revolution could ultimately solve social problems. The resolution pointed out the following. To workers and peasants (Let them) understand that the danger of their economic position oppressed by Capitalism and a collapsing economy --- cannot be solved without the complete achievement of a Communist society. To proletarians children To reveal the truculence and weakness of the society, let all people know that such a minority-privileged society has to operate a revolution.. At least arouse the resentment and awareness of the students towards society. To women The principle of educational equality between man and woman cannot be fulfilled in a private-ownership society hundreds of thousands of education problems of women cannot be solved without social revolution. To students Break such a bureaucratic and imprisoned school system, gather national students from various places to participate in the movement for joining school management. 18. 中国社会主义青年团中央, 关于教育运动的议决案, 先驱 第八号第三版,1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, Resolution about Educational Movement, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3].

56 46 To non-christian students in Christian schools Reveal the intimidation and bribery of Christian schools and exclude their influence from education. 19 Recruiting increasing numbers of youths to join the Communist movement was the organizational function of the youth league designed by Chen Duxiu. According to the memoirs of Zhang Guotao, in the preparation meeting to establish the youth league, Chen Duxiu hoped the league could become an effective organization to recruit as many youths as possible to join the Communist camp. As Chen Duxiu said: (We) should set up a Youth League, as the Preparation School for Communism. At the beginning, the Shanghai Youth League may have approximately 30 members. In the Soviet Union, they call them Комсомол and, in China, we can call them the Socialist Youth League. To better absorb youths, the joining condition should not be too strict. 20 Sending young talent to the Comintern to receive orthodox Communist education and training to become Communist warriors was a significant aspect of the CSYL functions which it fulfilled by building the Foreign Language Learning Society ( 外国语学社 ). This institution was established in September 1920 in the headquarters of the Shanghai Youth League, No. 6 Yuyang Street ( 渔阳里 6 号 ), with the leader of the 19. Original words are: 明了他们现在所处的经济地位 被资本主义压迫 崩坏的经济地位 之危险, 非完全实现共产主义的社会不能解决, 以暴露现社会的野蛮和弱点, 俾人人知道这样少数人专利的社会, 非革命不可 至少也可引起全国贫穷学生对于社会的愤恨和觉悟, 男女教育平等的原则, 为私有财产制的社会所不能实现 以表现几万万女青年的教育问题, 非社会革命不能解决, 打破这种官僚式 或牢狱式的学校制度, 纠合各地方和全国学生作种种要求参加校务的运动, and 务使教会学校威胁利诱的假面具, 尽情毕露而排除其势力于教育范围之外, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团中央, 关于教育运动的议决案, 先驱 第八号第三版,1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, Resolution about Educational Movement, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.3]. 20. Original words are: 组织一个社会主义青年团, 作为 共产主义预备学校, 这个团的上海小组预计最先有三十多人参加, 这在苏俄叫做少年共产党, 在中国则可命名为社会主义青年团, 加入的条件不可太严, 以期能吸引较多的青年, details please see: 张国焘, 我的回忆 ( 第一册 )( 北京 : 东方出版社, 1998) 页 97[Zhang Guotao, My Memory (vol.1) (Beijing: East Press, 1998) p.97].

57 47 Shanghai Youth League, Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ), its secretary and Grigori Naumovich Voitinsky (a Soviet official) a Russian teacher. 21 Although the Society published an Advertisement for Student Recruitment in Republic Daily on 28 September 1920, yet most of the students of the society were members of local Communist party or youth leagues of various places. For example, Mao Zedong led the Changsha Youth League which sent 6 members to the Society and Liu Shaoqi ( 刘少奇 ), Ren Bishi ( 任弼时 ) and Xiao Jingguang ( 肖劲光 ) were in the list. 22 Another notable point is that not every member of the Society, only those selected to be leader candidates, could be sent to the Comintern. From February to August 1921, the Society sent approximately 30 students in three groups to Moscow for education. Most of them later returned to China and held leadership positions in the Party or PLA, such as Liu Shaoqi ( 刘少奇 ), Ren Bishi ( 任弼时 ), Xiao Jingguang ( 肖劲光 ), Luo Yinong ( 罗亦农 ) and Wang Yifei ( 王一飞 ) who became senior leaders of the CCP in the ensuing development of Chinese Communism Relationship between CSYL, CCP and YCI The CSYL was the subordinate organization of the YCI and had a close but mutually independent relationship with the CCP during the establishment period. To be specific, as the CSYL was established with the support and by the command of the Comintern 24, its relationship with the YCI was clearly subordinate. 21. 共青团中央青运历研究室, 中央档案馆, 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) ( 北京 : 团中央办公厅, 1981) 页 99 [Central Research Institution of Chinese Youth Movement and Central Archive of Chinese Communist Party, Historical Materials of the Chinese Youth Movement: (Beijing: Central Office of the CCYL) p.99]. 22. 任继宁, 在上海外国语学社学习的爷爷任弼时, 人民政协报, 2010 年 12 月 23 日 6 版 [Ren Jining (Grandson of Ren Bishi), My Grandpa Ren Bishi Studied in Shanghai Foreign Language Society, in Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Newspaper, 23 rd November, 2010, p.6]. 23. 姚金果, 张玉菡, 建党时期上海的革命干部学校, 光明日报, 2011 年 02 月 23 日, 11 版 [Yao Jinguo and Zhang Yuhan, Shanghai Revolutionary Cadre School in the Period of the Establishment of the CCP, Guangming Daily, 23rd, February, 2011, p.11]. 24. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团的建立与青年共产国际的关系 ( 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国代表大会文件 ), 先驱 8 号, 第一版 1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, The Relationship Between the Establishment of the CSYL and the Young Communist International (Congress Document in 1st National Congress of the CSYL), The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, p.1].

58 48 However, during its period of establishment, the relationship between the CSYL and CCP was cryptic and sophisticated. Generally speaking, they were Communist partners which maintained a close but mutually independent relationship defined in the Announcement Concerning the Relationship between Our League and the CCP Policy, Work, and Organization ( 本团与中国共产党之关系之通告- 政策 工作 组织 ) as: Apart from the political proposition that the Chinese Socialist Youth League should negotiate with the CCP, it possesses completely autonomous rights At each level, each Executive Committee of the CCP and CSYL would/will exchange one representative with voting power. 25 However, the CCYL and CCP had a serious problem of their local committees having an organizational overlap, with the former almost taking over the role of the latter in terms of operating the Communist movement; for example, in Wuchang District, while the party had only approximately one hundred members, the youth league had more than one thousand. Therefore, as the majority of the work was carried out by the Wuchang Youth League rather than the Party 26, in Nanchang District, people knew that there were youth league organizations but were seldom aware of the Communist Party. 27 In terms of the subordinate relationship between the CSYL and the Young Communist International, the CSYL was set up under the command of the Comintern, 25. Original words are: 除了政治上的主张须与中国共产党协定以外, 中国社会主义青年团应有完全自主之权 两团体各级执行委员会会议, 得互派有表决权之代表一名出席, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 本团与中国共产党之关系之通告 - 政策 工作 组织, 先驱 第十八号第四版, 1923 年 5 月 10 日 [CSYL, Announcement Concerning the Relationship between Our League and the CCP Policy, Work, and Organization, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.18, 10th May 1923, p.4]. 26. 共青团武昌地委, 团武昌地委半年来的工作报告一一关于组织 宣教 工农 学生工作情形 (1925 年 8 月 27 日 ), 收录于中央档案馆, 湖北省档案馆 ( 编 ), 湖北革命历史文件汇集 甲 2( 武汉 : 湖北人民出版社, 1983) 页 108 [The Wuchang Communist Youth League Committee, Half Year Report From Wuchang Youth League Committee to Central Committee of the CSYL Concerning the Working Situation of Organization, Propaganda, Teaching, Working Peasant, and Student (27th August 1925), collected in Central Archive and Hubei Province Archive (ed.), Collection of Hubei Revolutionary Historical Document, vol 2 (Wuhan: Hubei People Press, 1983) p.108]. 27. 赵醒农, 赵醒农致中夏信一一申请津贴 ( 1924 年 5 月 17 日 ), 收录于中央档案馆, 江西省档案馆 ( 编 ), 江西革命历史文件汇集 ( ) ( 江西 : 江西人民出版社, 1986 ) 页 78 [Zhao Xingnong, Letter From Zhao Xingnong to Deng Zhongxia(17th May 1924), collected in Central Archive and Jiangxi Province Archive (ed.), Document Collection of Jiangxi Revolutionary History ( ) (Jiangxi: Jiangxi People Press, 1986) p.78].

59 49 and when finishing its nation-wide establishment, the CSYL immediately applied to the CYL to become its Chinese branch. After the 1 st national congress, the executive committee of the CSYL immediately applied to join the Young Communist International. And on 10 May 1923, Moscow approved this application. 28 However, in May 1921 the building process of the local branches of the youth league was paralyzed because of a funding shortage and ideological differences among the members. And at this moment, Zhang Tailei ( 张太雷 ), a main leader of the CCYL, returned from Russia with orders to rebuild the youth league. He gathered old members of the youth league and started the re-building process in November. And in May 1922, the nation-wide establishment of the CSYL was finally accomplished. 29 In respect of the partnership between the CSYL and CCP, there is no specific document directly mentioning this relationship. The Resolution about the Relationship between Chinese Socialist Youth League and Other Chinese Organizations ( 中国社会主义青年团与中国各团体的关系之议决案 ) was the only formal document regulating the early relationship between the CSYL and other institutions adopted at its 1st National Congress. However, it did not specifically mention this relationship as it simply divided all the parties in Chinese society at that time into two groups (reactionary parties ( 反动的 政党 ) and democratic revolutionary parties ( 民主革命的政党 )) and adopted the attitudes towards them of attack and support, respectively. 30 However, given that a revolutionary party espoused the same political ideology, the supportive attitude of the CSYL towards the CCP can be inferred from this resolution. Nevertheless, the unclear relationship between the CSYL and the CCP soon brought chaos into the management of the youth league. In that period, many youth 28. 青年共产国际, 青年共产国际给中国社会主义青年团书, 先驱 第十八号第四版, 1923 年 5 月 10 日 [Communist Youth International, Letter From the Communist Youth International to Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper, no. 18, 10th May 1923, p.4]. 29. 中国社会主义青年团, 本团与中国共产党之关系之通告 - 政策 工作 组织, 先驱 第十八号第四版, 1923 年 5 月 10 日 [CSYL, Announcement Concerning the Relationship between Our League and the CCP Policy, Work, and Organization, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.18, 10th May 1923, p.4]. 30. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团与中国各团体的关系之议决案, 先驱 第八号第三 四版, 1922 年 5 月 15 日 [CSYL, Resolution about the Relationship between Chinese Socialist Youth League and Other Chinese Organization, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.8, 15th May 1922, pp.3-4].

60 50 league leaders were also party members. They were always selected to work in party affairs. And it led to delays in the youth league s work. 31 In June 1923, the CSYL and CCP held a joint conference and released the Announcement concerning the Relationship between Our League and the CCP Policy, Work, and Organization to confirm their early relationship. Its two key points were: 1) the CSYL admits the central role of the CCP in the Chinese Communist movement; and 2) the two parties maintain a coincident and close but mutually independent partnership. As the announcement pointed out: We admit that the CCP is the center of the Chinese Communist movement and our league a part of it. Regardless of words or actions, both parties should maintain a closed and coincident relationship the CCP is the elder brother and our league the little brother. The CSYL should possess complete autonomy (in terms of political propositions) while our league should only negotiate with the CCP rather than maintaining absolute obedience. 32 The larger membership and greater social influence of the CCYL, as compared with the CCP in Chinese communist politics in this period, contributed to a relationship of relative autonomy rather than obedience. Indeed, in the period of the Beiyang Government, the CCP was only a secret organization with limited branches and small numbers of members. By contrast, the youth league was a popular, legal youth organization with thousands of members. On 30th June 1922, in the Report from Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP Chen Duxiu to the Soviet Union ( 中共中央执委会书记陈独秀给共产国际的汇报 ), Chen Duxiu explained that the CCP 31. Interview with Prof. Zheng Guang. 32. Original words are: 我们承认中国共产党是中国共产主义运动的中心, 本团是中国共产主义运动的一部分, 我们的两个团体无论在言论上或行动上, 都须结合一种亲密的一致的关系 中国共产党是大哥哥, 则本团就是小弟弟, 除了政治上的主张须与中国共产党协定以外, 中国社会主义青年团应有完全自主之权.. 本团与中国共产党, 只规定政策应该 协定, 并没有决定应该绝对服从, details please see: 中国社会主义青年团, 本团与中国共产党之关系之通告 - 政策 工作 组织, 先驱 第十八号第四版, 1923 年 5 月 10 日 [CSYL, Announcement Concerning the Relationship between Our League and the CCP Policy, Work, and Organization, The Pioneer Newspaper, no.18, 10th May 1923, p.4].

61 51 at that moment had merely 195 members and the party branches spread over Shanghai, Changsha, Guangdong, Hubei, Beijing, Shandong, Zhengzhou, Sichuan and other foreign countries (such as Russia, Japan, German, France and America). 33 Nevertheless, at the same time, the number of youth league members exceeded 5000 and over 17 cities had already established youth league local branches. 34 In addition, the CCYL and CCP had a serious problem of there being no clear distinction between the party and league ( 党团不分 ) in local areas. 35 As Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ) pointed out in the 2nd Congress of the CYI, many members of the CSYL/CCYL were also members of the CCP and, in some places in China, the former even took the place of the party for setting up workers, peasants or women unions to lead these movements; 36 for example, in Wuhan ( 武汉 ) and Wuzhou ( 梧州 ), all these movements were directly under the leadership of the local CSYL/CCYL, rather than the party 陈独秀, 中共中央执委会书记陈独秀给共产国际的汇报 收录于, 中共中央党史研究室 ( 编 ), 共产国际 联共 ( 布 ) 与中国革命文献资料选辑 ( ) ( 北京 : 北京图书馆出版社, 1997) 页 [Chen Duxiu, Report from Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP Chen Duxiu to the Soviet Union, collected in, Party History Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCP (ed.), The Documents Selection of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and Chinese Revolution( ) (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1997) pp ]; 中国共产党, 1921 年 7 月至 1927 年 5 月中共党员数量统计表, 中共中央组织部 ( 编 ), 中国共产党组织史资料 ( 第 1 卷 )( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2000) 页 39 [CCP, Statistical Table of members of the CCP from July 1921 to May 1927, in the Organization Department of the CCP (ed.), The Historical Material of Party s Organization (vol1) (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2000) p.39]. 34. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国代表大会筹备报告 (1922 年 5 月 5 日 ) [CSYL, The Preparation Report of the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (5th May 1922)] website of the CCYL, accessed at: 赵文, 共产党与共青团早期关系研究述略, 上海青年管理干部学院学报, 2012 年 1 期, 页 5-8 [Zhao Wen, The Research of the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL in early period, in Journal of Shanghai College for Youth Administrators, vol.1, 2012, pp.5-8]. 36. 李玉贞 ( 译 ), 中国社会主义青年团在青年共产国际第二次代表大会上的报告, 远东人民, 1921 年第 4 期, 页 [Li Yuzhen(translated), The Report of the CSYL in the Second Congress of Young Communist International, Far East People, vol.4, 1921, pp ]. 37. Case of Wuhan please see: 共青团武汉地委, 团武汉地委关于各特支概况向团中央的报告 (1926 年 3 月 29), 收录于, 中央档案馆, 湖北省档案馆 ( 编 ), 湖北革命历史文件汇集 ( 甲 2)( 湖北 : 湖北人民出版社出版, 1987 ) 页 294 [Wuhan Communist Youth League Committee, Report From Wuhan Youth League Committee to the Central Committee of the CCYL (29th March 1926), collected in Central Archives and Hu Bei Province Archives(ed.), Historical Document Collection of Hu Bei Revolution(vol.2) (Hubei: Hubei People Press, 1987) p.294]. Case of Wuzhou, please see: 共青团梧州地委, 团梧州地方大会议决案 - 地委成立后工作概况 (1926 年 9 月 19 日 ), 收录于, 中央档案馆, 广东省档案馆 ( 编 ), 广东革命历史文件汇集 ( 甲 5)( 广东 : 广东人民出版社, 1982) 页 316 [Wuzhou Communist Youth League, Resolution of Wuzhou Youth League Congress The Work Overview after the Establishment of Wuzhou Youth League Committee (19th September 1926), collected in Central Archives and Guangdong Province Archives(ed.), Historical Document Collection of Guangdong Revolution (vol.1, no.5) (Guangdong:

62 Origin of the Chinese Socialist Youth League Though seeking the origin of the CSYL, this chapter has observed that the CSYL and the CCP shared the same origin at the establishment. So just like the CCP, the CSYL also played a Communist Party role in its establishment period. The origin of the CSYL, however, has two aspects worth examining in this chapter. One is the theoretical foundation of Communism and the other is the organizational basis which was related by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and their associated student organizations and followers. The CSYL was formed in the New Culture Movement ( 新文化运动, 1910s- 1920s) which was a social enlightening movement initiated by Chinese intellectuals (such as Chen Duxiu, Cai Yuanpei, Li Dazhao, Lu Xun, and Hu Shi). This movement began to lead a revolt against Confucianism which aimed to create a new Chinese culture based on global and western standards, especially democracy and science. But after the May Fourth movement ( 五四运动, 1919), the focus of this movement changed to propagandizing the Marxist Theory. This movement was activated by the strong feeling of Nationalism generated from China s suffering of the hands of colonial powers. And as the leading figures of this movement, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao had made both ideological and organizational preparation for establishing the CCP and the CCYL. This section presents these two key aspects of the CSYL The Theoretical Foundations of the CSYL Theoretical preparation for the CSYL was cultivated through two significant debates between the Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao camp, and other intellectuals in the New Culture Movement. From anti-feudalism to anti-reformism, the awareness of social revolution and Marxist ideology were deeply indoctrinated into some early Communists to prepare for the establishment of the CSYL and CCP, with Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao regarded by radical youths as leading figures in this process. From September 1915, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao had successively taken up the New Youth Monthly ( 新青年 ) and Morning Bell Newspaper (Supplement) ( 晨钟报副刊 ), and set up a Weekly Comment Newspaper ( 每周评论 ) which they used as Guangdong People Press, 1982) p.316].

63 53 their major opinion bases. Beginning with anti-feudalism by advocating the slogan of "Democracy and Science" to raising the blueprint of the Marxist Workers Regime through serious debates with other intellectuals with different political views, Chen and Li finally adopted the ideology of Communism. Meanwhile, they gathered a reasonable number of loyal radical young followers, such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Shi Cuntong, who were central figures in the establishment of the CCP and CCYL. First-stage Debate: Feudalism of Royalists vs Democracy of Chen Duxiu The main contribution of the first debate in the New Culture Movement was in respect of anti-feudalism. Chen Duxiu s radical articles made masses of Chinese youths realize the disadvantages of feudalism and cultivated a strong climate for change which contributed to the yearning for Marxism and a Russian Revolution in China. To fight against Yuan Shikai s ( 袁世凯 ) restoration of the monarchy in the 1910s, on 15th September 1915, Chen Duxiu established the New Youth as an opinion base, with its founding statement and article entitled To the Youth ( 敬告青年 ) 38. In it, Chen strongly recommended that youth raise the spirit of democracy and science to fight against feudalism. However, in this period, there was a wave aimed at restoring feudalism in Chinese society with, at its heart, the attitude towards Confucianism. On 20th September 1916, Kang Youwei ( 康有为 ) published the article Letter to the President and the Prime Minister ( 致总统总理书 ) which suggested that Confucianism should become the state religion. In reply, between October 1916 and June 1917, Chen Duxiu published a series of articles in New Youth, which pointed out the role of Confucianism in safeguarding the exploitation of feudalism as well as the relationship between Confucianism and restoration, entitled Refute Kang Youwei s Letter to the President and the Prime Minister ( 驳康有为致总统总理书 ) 39, Constitution and Confucianism ( 宪 38. 陈独秀, 敬告青年, 青年杂志, 1 卷 1 号, 1915 年 9 月 4 日 [Chen Duxiu, To the Youth, Youth Journal, vol 1, no.1, 4th September 1915]. 39. 陈独秀, 驳康有为致总统总理书, 新青年, 2 卷 2 号, 1916 年 10 月 [Chen Duxiu, Refute Kang Youwei s Letter to the President and the Prime Minister, New Youth, vol 2, no.2,

64 54 法与孔教 ) 40, Confucian Way and Modern Life ( 孔子之道与现代生活 ) 41, Resurgence of Yuanshi Kai ( 袁世凯复活 ) 42, Old Thought and the Issue of State System ( 旧思想与国体问题 ) 43 and Respect Confucianism and Restoration ( 尊孔与复辟 ) 44. As the opinions of Chen Duxiu and the journal New Youth received numerous criticism from royalists, in reply, on 5th January 1919, Chen published The Defense of New Youth ( < 新青年 > 罪案之答辩书 ) 45 in which he systematically outlined his thinking about modern civilization. While fiercely attacking feudalism and Confucianism, he highly praised the spirit of democracy and science, kindly naming them "Mr. Science" ( 赛先生 ) and "Mr. Democracy" ( 德先生 ) which became the most popular slogan in the May Fourth Movement. Chen Duxiu received the highest respect from youths, and was regarded as the leader of the New Culture Movement and general commander of the May Fourth Movement. Second-stage Debate: Reformism of Hu Shi vs Communism of Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu Starting in the cultural arena and moving to political and social ones, the New Culture Movement demonstrated a surge of anti-feudalism and created a strong desire for New Thought among Chinese students. In the second debate, the Communist doctrine was introduced into China. Although Hu Shi was a partner of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the Literary Revolution and Anti-feudalism movement, when the latter two started to lead this movement into the political arena and recommended Russian Marxism as the October 1916]. 40. 陈独秀, 宪法与孔教, 新青年, 2 卷 3 号, 1916 年 11 月 [Chen Duxiu, Constitution and Confucianism, New Youth, vol.2, no.3, November 1916]. 41. 陈独秀, 孔子之道与现代生活, 新青年, 2 卷 4 号, 1916 年 12 月 [Chen Duxiu, Confucian Way and Modern Life, New Youth, vol 2, no.4, December 1916]. 42. 陈独秀, 袁世凯复活 新青年, 2 卷 4 号, 1916 年 12 月 [Chen Duxiu, Resurgence of Yuanshi Kai, New Youth, vol 2, no.4, December 1916]. 43. 陈独秀, 旧思想与国体问题, 新青年, 3 卷 3 号, 1917 年 5 月 [Chen Duxiu, Old Thought and the Issue of State System, New Youth, vol 3, no.3, May 1917]. 44. 陈独秀, 尊孔与复辟, 新青年, 3 卷 6 号, 1917 年 8 月 [Chen Duxiu, Respect Confucianism and Restoration, New Youth, vol 3, no.6, August 1917]. 45. 陈独秀, < 新青年 > 罪案之答辩书, 新青年, 6 卷 1 号, 1919 年 1 月 [Chen Duxiu, the Defense of New Youth, New Youth, vol 6, no.1, January 1919].

65 55 blueprint for China, he became their major opponent. Hu Shi insisted that the movement should be limited to being vernacular rather than referring to politics and believed that China should use pragmatism rather than Marxism to replace Confucianism. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao did not agree which finally caused suspension of the publication of New Youth, the most significant base of the New Culture Movement. 46 In September 1920, Chen Duxiu decided to terminate the relationship between New Youth and Qunyi Press, changing New Youth to become the party journal of the Shanghai Communist group. In this new New Youth, Chen published the first article- Talk Politics 谈政治 to single out Hu Shi s idea of never refer to politics for criticism. 47 After the success of Russia s October Revolution, Li Dazhao, the first Chinese man to advocate Marxism, started to systematically introduce it to Chinese youth. In June 1918, he published "Comparison of French and Russian Revolutions"( 法俄革命之比较观 ) 48 to predict the fall of capitalism. In November and December, he successively published Plebeian Victory ( 庶民的胜利 ) 49 and The Victory of Bolshevism ( Bolshevism 主义的胜利 ) 50 to highly compliment Russia s October Revolution. He indicated that, in the 20th century, the victory of the Communist regime would spread all over the world. Li Dazhao s propaganda of Communist doctrines caused Hu Shi to criticize Li s Marxist proposal and change of New Youth from a free journal advocating Chinese 46. 杨建辉, 从胡适对新文化运动的主张看 < 新青年 > 团体的分裂, 湖南科技大学学报 ( 社会科学版 ), 2006 年第 9 卷, 第 1 期, 页 [Yang Jianhui, From the Angle of Hu Shi s Attitude Towards New Culture Movement to See the Conflict in New Youth, Academic Journal of Hunan Technology University (JCR Social Science Edition), vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, pp.92-95]. 47. 周为筠, 新青年 : 时间开始的地方, 收录于 杂志民国 : 刊物里的时代风云 ( 北京 : 金城出版社, 2009) 页 1-40(Zhou Weijun, New Youth Where The Time Begin in Magazine China: Era Chang in Magazine (Beijing: Jincheng Press, 2009)pp.1-40); 甄嫣, 胡适不满是 新青年 停刊主因 [Zhen Yan, The Main Reason of the closure of New Youth is dissatisfaction of Hu Shi ], website of Duowei, accessed at: 李大钊, 法俄革命之比较观, 言治 ( 第三册 ), 1918 年 7 月 1 日 [Li Dazhao, Comparison of French and Russian Revolution, Journal of Governing, vol. 3, 1st July 1918, website of Marxists Internet Archive Steering Committee, accessed at: 李大钊, 庶民的胜利, 新青年, 第 5 卷第 5 號, 1918 年 10 月 15 日 [Li Dazhao, Plebeian Victory, New Youth, vol.5, no.5, 15th October 1918]. 50. 李大钊, Bolshevism 主义的胜利, 新青年, 第 5 卷 5 号, 1918 年 11 月 15 日 [Li Dazhao, the Victory of Bolshevik, New Youth, vol 5, no.5, 15th November 1918].

66 56 renaissance and literary revolution to a Communist journal and, in July 1918, he published his famous thesis Do More Research on Problems, Talk Less of Doctrine ( 多研究些问题, 少谈些 主义 ) 51 in the journal Weekly Comment. This article initiated the famous Argument between Problem and Doctrine in the leadership camp of the New Culture Movement. In reply, in the following month, Li Dazhao published his article Discuss Problems and Doctrine" ( 再论问题与主义 ) 52 to point out that "when we talk about social movements, researching practical problems is as important as propagandizing ideal doctrines. But everything should have a fundamental solution. And only when we can understand this solution, other practical problems can receive good solutions." Later, in an oral bibliography, Hu Shi regarded this argument with Li Dazhao as the first round in his battle against Marxism. 53 The criticism from Hu Shi did not stop Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu changing the New Youth into a Communist journal. In January 1919, Li Dazhao edited its Volume 6 No. 5 as the Special Issue of Marxism Research and published his long thesis on My View of Marxism ( 我的马克思主义观 ) 54 which was the first Chinese thesis to systematically analyze the Historical Materialism, Theory of Surplus Value and Class Struggle Theory of Marxism. In addition, he introduced Historical Materialism, Socialism and Social Movements and The Future of Socialism into the curricula of Beijing University and Beijing Women s Normal University. 55 Following Li Dazhao, after the May Fourth Movement, Chen Duxiu successively published The Principle of Population of Malthus and the Population Problem of 51. 胡适, 多研究些问题, 少谈些 主义, 每周评论, 第 31 期, 1918 年 7 月 [Hu Shi, Do More research on Problems, Talk Less in Doctrine, Weekly Comment, vol. 31, July 1918]. 52. 李大钊, 再论问题与主义, 每周评论, 第 35 期, 1918 年 8 月 [Li Dazhao, Discuss Problem and Doctrine, Weekly Comment, vol. 35, August 1918]. 53. 唐德刚, 胡适口述自传 ( 北京 : 北京大学出版社, 1998) 页 [Tang Degang, Oral Biography of Hushi (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1998) pp ]. 54. 李大钊, 我的马克思主义观, 新青年, 第 6 卷 5 号, 1919 年 5 月 [Li Dazhao, My View of Marxism, New Youth, vol. 6, no.5, May 1919]. 55. 杨建辉, 从胡适对新文化运动的主张看 < 新青年 > 团体的分裂, 湖南科技大学学报 ( 社会科学版 ), 2006 年第 9 卷, 第 1 期, 页 94 [Yang Jianhui, From the Angle of Hu Shi s Attitude Towards New Culture Movement to See the Conflict in New Youth, Academic Journal of Hunan Technology University (JCR Social Science Edition), vol. 9, no. 1, 2006, p.94].

67 57 China ( 马尔萨斯人口论与中国人口问题 ) 56, The Awareness of Workers ( 劳动者的觉悟 57, etc. In these articles, he systematically elaborated the idea that workers create the world and theories of the surplus value and dictatorship of the proletariat. He gradually became an active propagandist of Marxism and led the New Youth to become a Communist journal. The radical articles of the New Culture Movement cultivated a strong climate of anti-feudalism and desire for New Thought among Chinese students. However, different intellectuals advocated different western political thought and, along with the shift of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao from democracy to Marxism, their followers started to yearn for Marxism and the Russian Revolution. A reasonable number of sympathetic students set up associations, workers night schools and publications to practice Chen and Li s advocacy The Organizational Origin of the CSYL The organizational origin of the CSYL was based on the student organizations related to Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao which were set up during the New Culture Movement (especially after the May Fourth Movement), with their main followers becoming the first group of CSYL members and cadres. This section details the interactions among youth organizations and Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao to demonstrate how they were influenced into joining the Communist camp. These organizations included the Fraternity Association ( 互助社 ), Xinmin Society ( 新民学会 ), Student Salvation Association (SSA, 学生救国会 ), Citizen Society ( 国民社 ), Renaissance Society ( 新潮社 ), Tianjin Student Association (TSA, 天津市学联 ), Hunan Student Association (HAS, 湖南省学联 ), Consciousness Society( 觉悟社 ), Association of Young China (AYC, 少年中国会 ), Beijing University Marxism Research Association (BUMRA, 北京大学马克思主义研究会 ) and Hunan Russia Research Institution (HRRI, 湖南俄罗斯研究会 ). Their student- 56. 陈独秀, 马尔萨斯人口论与中国人口问题, 新青年, 第 7 卷 4 号, 1920 年 3 月 [Chen Duxiu, the Principle of Population of Malthus and the Population Problem of China, New Youth, vol.7, no.4, March 1920]. 57. 陈独秀, 劳动者的觉悟, 新青年, 第 7 卷 6 号, 1920 年 5 月 1 日 [Chen Duxiu, The Awareness of Workers, New Youth, vol.7, no.6, 1st May 1920].

68 58 related projects were the Beijing Work-Study Mutual Aid Group (BWSMAG, 北京工读互助团 ), Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group (BUCESG, 北京大学平民教育讲演团 ) and Europe Work-Study Group (EWSG, 旅欧勤工俭学 ). (Details of these organizations are in the Appendix: Figure 2-1: Major Student Organizations Led by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in New Culture Movement. 58 ) From 1917 to 1920, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao played a key role in recruiting patriotic student associations into the Communist movement and building Communist student organizations (such as: Association of Young China, Citizen Society, Beijing University Marxism Research Association, etc.). 58. Figure 2-1: Major Student Organizations Led by Chen Duxiu-and-Li Dazhao in New Culture Movement is set up by the author, with its sources including: Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (California: University of California Press, 1990) pp.55-93; 中国共产党, 恽代英同志生平 [CCP, The biography of Yun Daiying ], website of the CCP, accessed at: html; 中国革命博物馆, 湖南省博物馆 ( 编 ), 新民学会资料 ( 内部发行 )( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1980) 页 1-41, , [Museum of Chinese Revolution and Museum of Hunan Province (ed.), Historical Material of Xinmin Society(Inner Party Documents) (Beijing: People s Press, 1980) pp.1-41, , ]; 许德珩, 回忆五四运动 : 学生救国会的形成, 民国春秋 2011 年 5 月 3 日 [Xu Dehang, Recall the May Fourth Movement: The Formation of Student Salvation Association, History of the Republic of China, 3rd May 2011]; 邓书杰, 李梅, 吴晓莉, 苏继, 新潮涌动 ( ) ( 中国历史大事详解 )( 吉林 : 吉林大学出版社出版社, 2005) [Deng Shujie, Li Mei, Wu Xiaoli and Su Ji, New Trend Surging (Jilin: Jinlin University Press, 2005)]; 中国少年会, 工读互助团简章, 中国少年 ( 中国少年学会会刊 ), 1920 年 11 月, 第 1 卷 7 期, 页 [Association of Young China, The General Regulation of Work-Study Mutual Aid Group, Journal of Association of Young China, vol.1, no.7, November 1920,pp ]; 少年中国学会, 少年中国学会, 中国少年 ( 中国少年学会会刊 ), 1919 年 7 月, 第 1 卷 1 期, 页 52 [Association of Young China, The Young China Association, Journal of Association of Young China, vol.1, no.1, July 1919,p. 52]; 马克思主义学说研究会, 发起马克思主义学说研究会启事, 北京大学日刊, 1921 年 11 月 17 日 [Marxism Research Association, The Announcement of Establishing Marxism Research Association, Beijing University Daily, 17th November 1921]; 共青团中央青运史档案馆, 毛泽东与五四运动 ( 五 )-- 发起俄罗斯研究会 [The Archives of Chinese Youth Movement in Central Committee of the CCYL, Mao Zedong and May Fourth Movement (V) --Establish Russia Research Institution ], website of CCYL, access at: =1& Column=448&ID=17619; 共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 留法勤工俭学运动与旅欧共青团的创建专题论文集 ( 团内文件, 1986) [Research Office of Chinese Youth Movement in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), Article Collection of 'The Work-Study Movement in France and the Establishment of the CCYL Branch in Europe (Internal document, 1986)]; 何长工, 留法勤工俭学的斗争和旅欧总支部的建立, 收录于全国政协 ( 编 ), 文史资料选辑 (56 辑 )( 北京 : 中国文史出版社, 2011) 页 [He Changgong, The Struggle of Europe Work-Study Group and the Establishment of Communist Party Branch in Europe, collected in Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference(ed.), Collection of Historical Material (vol. 56) (Beijing: Chinese Literature and History Press, 2011) pp ]; 湖南省地方志编纂委员会 ( 编 ), 湖南省志 : 党派群团志 ( 第 3 卷 ),( 北京 : 五洲传播出版社, 2005) [Local Chronicles Compilation Committee of Hunan (ed.), Chronicles of Hunan Province: Party and Youth League (vol.3) (Beijing: Five Continents Press, 2005)].

69 59 According to records of these organizations, Chen and Li successfully absorbed masses of young talent into the Communist camp to implement their political aims (for example, operating the Work-Study Mutual Aid Group and Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group to arouse the revolutionary consciousness of the rank and file, especially workers) who became the first batch of CCP and CSYL members and leading cadres. From Dependent Student Organization to Communist Organization After the main leaders of the student organizations started to form a personal relationship with Li Dazhao or Chen Duxiu or to join the organizations led by them, their student organizations were assimilated 59 or were guided 60 by Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. That is to say, on the basis of nationalism, some independent student organizations were first integrated into the Li Dazhao led student organization, and then they were transformed into Communist organizations for propagandizing the Marxism and leading demonstrations of students and strikes of workers. These Communist organizations were the predecessors of the CCYL and the CCP. The most active members among those youths include Yun Daiying ( 恽代英 ), Mao Zedong ( 毛泽东 ), Zhou Enlai( 周恩来 ), and Association of Young China for example. Yun Daiying, the founding member of Fraternity Association was a faithful reader of New Youth and had published numerous articles in Chen Duxiu s journal. During the May Fourth Movement, the Fraternity Association was the main force organizing student demonstrations in the Wuhan area. 61 In October 1919, he joined the Association of Young China of which Li Dazhao was the de facto leader. 62 And after building a connection with Li Dazhao, Yun soon established the Liqun Publishing House ( 利群书社 ) which focused on publishing works by Chen Duxiu and 59. Be Assimilated means the organization was originally established by the own view of the students. But after their main leaders started to build the contact of Li Dazhao or Chen Duxiu, they were assimilated by them and were willing to fulfil political proposal of Chen and Li; 60. Be guided points to the student organizations was established by the support from Chen or Li, and regarded them as their mentor of the organization; 61. 中国共产党, 恽代英 [CCP, The Introduction of Yun Daiying ], website of People, accessed at: 中国社会科学院近代史研究所, 五四运动回忆录 ( 下册 )( 北京 : 中国社会科学出版社, 1979)1014 页 [Modern History Research Institution in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, The Memoirs of May Fourth Movement (vol.2)(beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1979) p.1014 ].

70 60 Li Dazhao, such as: the New Youth and Weekly Comment. Besides that, he also transformed the Fraternity Association to become an early Communist group and lead the establishment of CCYL in Wuhan District. Similarly, Mao Zedong was the major originator of the Xinmin Society. On 19th August 1918, he traveled to Beijing with some members of that society to collect funding for study in Europe. Based on the recommendation of his teacher, Yang Changji ( 杨昌济 ), he received the position of library assistant in Beijing University where Li Dazhao was the chief librarian. 63 During his time at Beijing University, Mao Zedong had direct contact with Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and subsequently assisted the latter to establish the Association of Young China, built the Hunan Student Association to lead Hunan students strikes in the May Fourth Movement and transformed the Xinmin Society into the Hunan Russia Research Institution. 64 This latter institution was under the leadership of Chen Duxiu and fulfilled the purpose of choosing enthusiastic Hunan youths to go to Shanghai to prepare for studying in the Soviet Union and Europe. (Later Party leader and general of the Red Army, Ren Bishi ( 任弼时 ) and Xiao Jinguang ( 萧劲光 ) were selected by it). 65 In the following period, when Mao received letters from Chen Duxiu informing him of the establishment of the CCP and CCYL committees in Shanghai, he soon integrated the Xinmin Society, Hunan Student Association and Hunan Russia Research Institution to set up CCP and CCYL branches in Hunan. 63. 斯诺和毛泽东, 毛泽东一九三六年同斯诺的谈话 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1979) 页 33 [Edgar Snow and Mao Zedong, The Conversation between Edgar Snow and Mao Zedong in 1936(Beijing: People s Press, 1979)p.33]. 64. 曾珺, 毛泽东和陈独秀的交往历程 [Zeng Jun, The Interaction Between Mao Zedong and Chen Duxiu ] website of CCP, accessed at: 肖劲光, 肖劲光回忆旅俄支部前后的一些情况, 中国社会科学院, 中国革命博物馆 ( 编 ), 一大 前后 - 中国共产党第一次代表大会前后资料选编 ( 三 ) ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1984) 页 112 [Xiao Jinguang, The Reminiscence of Xiao Jinguang Concerning Some Issue Before and After Europe Work and Study in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Museum of Chinese Revolution (ed.), The Historical Materials Concerning Before and After 1st National Congress of the CCP(Beijing: People Press, 1984) p.112].

71 61 Along with Deng Yingchao ( 邓颖超 ) and other radical students in Tianjin, Zhou Enlai first set up the Consciousness Society, 66 later established the Tianjin Student Association for the purpose of joining the Student Salvation Association (also led by Li Dazhao) and led student strikes in Tianjin during the May Fourth Movement. Li Dazhao held the position of mentor of the Consciousness Society on 21 September Following Li Dazhao s efforts, Zhou Enlai and the Consciousness Society built a cooperative relationship with the Association of Young China and three other Beijing Student organizations 67 by joining the Taoranting Meeting ( 陶然亭会 ). Later with the support of Li Dazhao, Zhou Enlai and a few members of the Consciousness Society received support to study in Europe, and contributed to the establishment of a CCYL branch in Europe. From Patriotic Movement and Cultural Enlightenment to Communist Camp During the New Culture Movement, the Japanese invasion of China initiated patriotic student demonstrations and establishment of the Student Salvation Association. However, the core question among the patriotic talent was how to save China from becoming a colony. Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao highlighted the Marxist revolutionary ideology and successful example of the Russian Communist regime in their publications. In addition, they devoted themselves to running student organizations. In this process, famous student leaders of that time (who later became the early CCYL leaders), such as Shi Cuntong ( 施存统 ), Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ), Deng Zhongxia ( 邓中夏 ) and Gao Junyu ( 高君宇 ), were united around Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu; for example, in the Renaissance Society, Citizen Society and Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao guided the combination of patriotic movements and cultural enlightenment to arouse the social awareness of the 66. 许德珩, 李大钊先生与觉悟社 [Xu Dehang, Li Dazhao and Consciousness Society ] website of CCP, accessed at: 杨飞, 陈独秀与周恩来关系解密 [Yang Fei, The Secret Files about the Relationship between Chen Duxiu and Zhou Enlai ] website of CCP, accessed at: These five student organizations are: Dawn Society ( 曙光社 ), Humanity Society ( 人道社 ), and Youth Fraternity Association ( 青年互助团 ). All of them were led by Li Dazhao. Details please see: Five organization meeting, the website of Taoranting Park, accessed at: showdetails.aspx? IID=94&tabid=1214.

72 62 rank and file. They also absorbed young talent into their Communist camp for the establishment of the CCP and CCYL. At that time, the Renaissance Society and Citizen Society were two major student organizations in Beijing University which was the birthplace of the May Fourth Movement and headquarters of the New Culture Movement. The Renaissance Society was established by twenty-two students of Beijing University, some of whom (such as Tan Pingshan 谭平山 ) were the founding fathers of local branches of the CCP and CCYL. Members of the Renaissance Society inherited the spirit of anti-feudalism from the leaders of the New Culture Movement and contributed to cultural enlightenment. They defined their organizational purpose as "to introduce modern Western thought and criticize the problems of Chinese academics and society". According to the memoir of Fu Sinian ( 傅斯年 ) (one of the founding fathers of the Renaissance Society), although the organizational purpose of this society was different from the intention of Chen Duxiu (i.e., it was not established under the leadership of Chen Duxiu or Li Dazhao), Chen Duxiu approved of its development and provided it with financial support. Many members of the society established close relationships with Chen Duxiu. 68 The Citizen Society was an outcome of the anti-japanese movement. In October 1918, Li Dazhao motivated his closest followers, such as Xu Dehang ( 许德珩 ) and Yi Kekui ( 易克嶷 ), to set up the Student Salvation Association. To better organize the student movement, Xu Dehang and Yi Kekui, and later with the CCP and CCYL leaders Zhang Guotao ( 张国焘 ), Deng Zhongxia and Gao Junyu, set up the Citizen Society as a leadership organ. 69 Li Dazhao was the main editor of the journal of the Citizen Society 70, the main 68. 傅斯年, 新潮之回顾与前瞻, 新潮, 第 2 卷第 1 号,1919 年 9 月 [Fu Sinian, Retrospect and Prospect of Renaissance Society, The Renaissance, vol.2, no.1 September 1919]. 69. 郑洸, 罗成全 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动六十年 ( ) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1990) 页 [Zheng Guang and Luo Chengquan (ed.), Sixty Years Chinese Youth Movement ( ) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1990) pp.18-59]. 70. 许德珩, 许德珩回忆录 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2000) 页 34[Xu Dehang, The memory of Xu Dehang (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2000) p.34].

73 63 focus of which was building the national salvation movement. As the memoir of Zhang Guotao points out, all the members of the Citizen Society believed that all student organizations should devote themselves to the national salvation movement. Compared with other issues, saving the nation is the most significant. 71 In the beginning, because of their different organizational purposes and preferences, the Citizen Society and Renaissance Society did not trust each other. However, after guidance from Li Dazhao, they found coherence and cooperated in running the Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group. 72 In particular, two months before the May Fourth Movement, the leaders of the Citizen Society (Deng Zhongxia, Liao Shucang, Zhang Guotao and Xu Dehang) started to realize that the national salvation movement could not succeed without the social awareness of a wide range of the rank and file. Meanwhile, Luo Jialun and Kang Baiqing, leaders of the Renaissance Society, began to enlarge their scope of activity from Hushi s advocated cultural arena to the social arena preferred by Chen and Li. 73 As Vera Schwarcz mentions, from that time, the student movement developed from periodicals and the university to the street. It represented the appearance in China of a new type of intellectual 74 and provided good preparation for the May 71. Zhang Guotao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party ( vol I) (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1971)p 许德珩, 回忆国民杂志社 收录于, 张允候, 殷叙彝 ( 编 ) 五四时期的社团 ( 二 )( 北京 : 三联书店出版社, 1979) 页 [Xu Dehang, Recall the Citizen Society Press in Zhang Yunhou and Yin Xuyi(ed.), The Associations in the Period of May Fourth Movement (Beijing: Sanlian Bookshop Press, 1979) pp ]. 73. Historical materials please see: 朱务善, 北京大学平民教育讲演团缘起及组织大纲, 北京大学日刊 1921 年 9 月 29 日 [Zhu Wushan, The Origin of Establishing Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group and the Memorandum of Association, Beijing University Daily, 29th September 1921]; 平民教育演讲团, 北京大学平民教育讲演团简章, 北京大学日刊, 1919 年 3 月 7 日 [Civilian Educational Speech Group, General Regulations of Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group, Beijing University Daily, 7th March 1919]; 平民教育演讲团, 平民教育讲演团报告, 北京大学日刊, 1920 年 6 月 22 日 [Civilian Educational Speech Group, Report of Civilian Educational Speech Group, Beijing University Daily, 22nd June 1920] 王学珍, 郭建荣 ( 编 ), 北京大学史料 第二卷下册 ( 北京 : 北京大学, 2000) 页 [Wang Xuezhen and Guo Jianrong(ed.), The Historical Material of Beijing University(vol.2) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2000) pp ]. 74. Antonio Gramsci (ed.) and Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (translate), Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London: Lawrence & Wishart 1971) pp

74 64 Fourth Movement The Establishment of the CSYL Local Committees The first local committee of youth league, the Shanghai Socialist Youth League (22nd August 1920), 76 was born in Shanghai. It was established under the leadership of Chen Duxiu and Voitinsky (the agent of the Comintern). Soon after the establishment of the Shanghai Youth League, similar youth league branches were established by the close followers of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in Beijing, Changsha, Wuhan, Tianjin, Guangzhou, etc. (Details please see: Figure 2-2 Process for Establishing Local Branches of the CCYL ( ) in Appendix). On the basis of the establishment of 17 Local Committees 77 of the Socialist Youth League and over 5,000 members across the country, the CSYL was formally established in 1 st National Congress of the Socialist Youth League (5 th -10 th 1922, Guangzhou). 78 However, the establishment of the local committees of the CSYL was not a smooth process. During 1921, apart from the Changsha Youth League led by Mao Zedong, other CCYL Local Committees experienced a short period of stagnation. And this stagnation was noted by the CCP and Communist Youth International. After July 1921, the CCP began a nationwide re-organization of the youth league, leading finally to a nationwide establishment of the CSYL. Three key points in the bottom-up establishment of the CSYL should be noticed. Firstly, the establishment of the CSYL is a combined effort between the Comintern and Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Two facts can well prove this point. One is that the 75. Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (California: University of California Press, 1990) pp.55-93; 76. CCYL, The Introduction of the Chinese Communist Youth League, website of the CCYL, accessed at: Local Committee of Socialist Youth League includes: Shanghai( 上海 ), Beijing( 北京 ), Wuhan( 武汉 ), Changsha( 长沙 ), Guangzhou( 广州 ), Tianjin( 天津 ), Nanjing( 南京 ), Baoding( 保定 ), Tangshan( 唐山 ), Hangzhou( 杭州 ), Tangku( 塘沽 ), Anqing( 安庆 ), Chaozhou( 潮州 ), Foshan( 佛山 ), Xinhui( 新会 ), Zhaoqing( 肇庆 ), Wuzhou ( 梧州 ). Details please see: 共青团中央青运史档案馆, 历史的轨迹 : 中国共产主义青年团 90 年 ( 重庆 : 重庆出版社, 2012) 页 20 [Archives of the Central Committee of the CCYL, The Trajectory of History: The 90 Years' History of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Chongqing: Chongqing People Press, 2012) p.20]. 78. CCYL, The 1st National Congress of the Socialist Youth League, 08th November 2006, website of the CCYL, accessed at: gqt_ghlc/lcdbdh/200612/ t _5628.htm;

75 65 youth league was established on the basis of the relationship network of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. The other is that, under the command of the Comintern, the local committees of the youth league were re-organized and accomplished the nation-wide establishment. Secondly, ideological differences were the main factor leading to the period of stagnation during the establishing process of the CSYL. At that time, a large number of members of local youth league committees were Anarchists, Guild Socialists, or Labour Syndicalists. So it would be hard to obtain the coherent program needed to develop the youth league. 79 Thirdly, local branches of the CSYL and the CCP were overlapping in an organizational sense. That is to say, in the local area, there were no differences between the youth league and the Party. In some places without Party branches, the youth league also took the place of the Party to operate the Communist movement. Relationship network of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the establishment of CSYL The CSYL was founded on the basis of the relationship network of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and their close followers. Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ), Gao Junyu ( 高君宇 ), Mao Zedong ( 毛泽东 ), Zhang Tailei ( 张太雷 ), Dong Biwu ( 董必武 ) and Tan Pingshan ( 谭 平山 ) were the major founding fathers of its local committees in Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha, Tianjin, Wuhan and Guangzhou. 80 All were influenced by the political thoughts of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and had built up close personal relationships with them when they joined the student organizations or student movements they led. For example, Yu Xiusong was the editor of Weekly Comment, which was the basic opinion base of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the New Culture Movement, and also the leader of the Beijing Work-Study Mutual Aid Group. Gao Junyu was the leader of the Citizen Society, Beijing University Civilian Educational Speech Group and Beijing University Marxism Research Association, and was under the direct 79. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国代表大会 (1925 年 5 月 ), 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 (1)( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1957) 页 124 [CSYL, The 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League in General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL (ed.), Historical Materials of Chinese Youth Movement (1) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1957) p.124]. 80. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页.1-36 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp.1-36].

76 66 leadership of Li Dazhao. 81 Mao Zedong was the leader of the Xinmin Society. During the period of being the library assistant at Beijing University, he built up connections with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, assisting the former to build up the Association of Young China and handling the task of propagandizing Marxism in Hunan by creating the Hunan Russia Research Institution. 82 Zhang Tailei, Dong Biwu and Tan Pingshan were student leaders in the May Fourth Movement of which Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were the key drivers Stage 1: Setting up the Local Branch of the CSYL In early 1920, Gregori Voitinsky of the Comintern traveled to China with the mission of helping to establish Communist organizations (the CCP and CSYL). 84 After meeting with Voitinsky, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao decided to follow the examples of the Soviet Communist Party and Komsomol. 85 The Shanghai and Beijing Youth Leagues were set up directly under the leadership of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and their close students. 86 In Hunan Province, after receiving a letter from Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, and the Constitution of the Shanghai Youth League, Mao Zedong immediately involved his close members from the Xinmin Society, Russian Research Institution and Culture Bookshop in forming the Changsha Youth League. 87 In Tianjin, the Tianjin Youth 81. 俞秀松传 编委会 ( 编 ), 俞秀松传 ( 杭州 : 浙江人民出版社, 2012) [Editorial Committee of Biography of Yu Xiusong, The Biography of Yu Xiusong (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People Press, 2012)]. 82. 中共中央文献研究室 ( 编 ), 毛泽东传 ( ) ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2004) 页 [The Research Office of Literature of Central Committee of the CCP(ed.), The Biography of Mao Zedong ( ) (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2004) pp ]. 83. 黄兆康, 五四运动的总司令应是李大钊, 党史研究与教学 1988 年 03 月, 页 [Huang Zhaokang, The Commander-in-Chief of May Fourth Movement Should Be Li Dazhao, Party History Research and Teaching, March 1988, pp.18-27]. 84. 中国社会科学院现代史研究室 ( 编 ), 维经斯基在中国的有关资料 ( 北京 : 中国社会科学出版社, 1982) 页 460 [Modern History Research Office in Chinese Social Science Institution(ed.), Relevant Material Concerning Voitinsky in China (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1982) p.460]. 85. 共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题文集 ( 北京 : 北京出版社, 1984) 页 7 [Youth Movement Research Office of Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), Collection of the Establishment Issue of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (Beijing: Beijing Press, 1984) p.7]. 86. 刘雪芹, 上海社会主义青年团创建初期的革命活动 上海党史与党建 2009 年 12 期, 页 [Liu Xueqin, The Revolutionary Activity of Shanghai Socialist Youth League in Establishing Period, Shanghai Party History and Construction, vol.12, 2009, pp17-19]; 郑洸, 从密探密报看李大钊和北京青年团早期活动, 收录于 郑洸文集 ( 卷一 )( 内部资料 ), 页 [Zheng Guang, From the Secret Report to view the early activity of Beijing Youth League and Li Dazhao, The Collection of Zheng Guang (Internal Materials), pp.20-24]. 87. 谭冬梅, 试论毛泽东同志早期的建团活动和建团思想, 收录于, 共青团中央青运史研究室

77 67 League was established by Zhang Tailei, who was a student of Li Dazhao and member of the Beijing Youth League, and his friends. 88 In Wuhan, Li Junhan (a member of the Shanghai Youth League) wrote a letter to his friends Dong Biwu and Zhang Guoen ( 张国恩 ) proposing a Youth League in Wuhan, and Chen Duxiu sent his party member Liu Bochui ( 刘伯垂 ) to assist them. In September 1920, they (who were also students of Chen Duxiu or Li Dazhao) and Liu s close friends Chen Tanxiu ( 陈潭秋 ), Zheng Kaiqing ( 郑凯卿 ), Bao Huiseng ( 包惠僧 ) and Zhao Zijian ( 赵子健 ) set up the Wuhan Youth League. 89 In the process of establishing the Guangzhou Youth League, Chen Duxiu not only commanded his close followers Tan Pingshan ( 谭平山 ), Tan Zhitang ( 谭植棠 ) and Chen Gongbo ( 陈公博 ) to fulfil the task of setting it up but also led the debate against the anarchists and forced them to leave this league in December Stage 2: Stagnation of the Establishment of the CSYL In 1921, apart from those in Hunan Province, all the local youth league branches experienced short periods of stagnation. By analyzing the different practices of that in Hunan, this section demonstrates that the main reason for this situation was ideological differences. ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 [Tan Dongmei, Mao Zedong Activity and Thought in Establishment of Youth League, collected in Youth Movement Research Office in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Issues of the Establishment of Chinese Socialist Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1984) pp.71-99]. 88. 董振修, 天津早期社会主义青年团组织的建立及活动, 收录于共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 [Dong Zhenxiu, The Establishment of Tianjin Socialist Youth League and Its Early Activities, collected in Youth Movement Research Office in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Issues of the Establishment of Chinese Socialist Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1984) pp ]. 89. 汪成旺, 武昌社会主义青年团的建立及主要活动, 收录于共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 [Wang Chengwang, The Establishment of Wuchang Socialist Youth League and Its Early Activities, collected in Youth Movement Research Office in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Issues of the Establishment of Chinese Socialist Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1984) pp ]. 90. 陈家文, 也谈广州早期社会主义青年团的建立, 收录于共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 (Chen Jiawen, The Establishment of Early Guangzhou Socialist Youth League, collected in Youth Movement Research Office in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Issues of the Establishment of Chinese Socialist Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1984) pp );

78 68 From January 1921, the youth leagues in Tianjin, Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Guangzhou etc., had begun to become paralyzed. Apart from objective reasons (such as a lack of funding and staff), ideological differences was the main reason for this phenomenon. In the report of the 1st National Congress of the Socialist Youth League, it was declared that When meeting an issue or problem, every person will offer a different approach and suggestion, and (we) seldom can achieve a consensus and conflicts spread all over our organization. 91 This situation became worse after May 1921 when most CCYL cadres were sent to Russia for Communist education. The Youth League in Hunan Province experienced steady development while others suffered stagnation, with its success closely related to Mao Zedong s strategy of focusing on ideological purity which was unlike the styles of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Voitinsky. At that time, influenced by Voitinsky s ideas (firstly, establish formal organizations to unite as much revolutionary power as possible and then transform members with different political beliefs into Communists) and Chen Duxiu s preference for membership growth, other youth leagues paid little attention to the ideology of recruiting members. However, Mao Zedong placed a major focus on finding True Comrades ( 真同志 ) 92 by dividing advanced youths into three levels (as shown in Chart 1). Level 1, who had experienced the longest revolutionary struggle, had the highest class consciousness and were familiar with Marxism, were to be recruited directly into the party and become its secret leadership core.. Level 2, who had experienced a certain revolutionary struggle, had a certain class consciousness and preliminarily accepted Marxism, were to be recruited into youth leagues and become part of semi-public and semi-secret organizations led by the party. Level 3, who were patriotic, dissatisfied with their treatment, would stick to the truth and were willing to devote 91. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国代表大会 (1925 年 5 月 ), 团中央办公厅编 中国青年运动历史资料 (1)( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1957) 页 124 [CSYL, The 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (May 1925) in General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL, Historical Materials of Chinese Youth Movement(1) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1957) p.124]. 92. In Mao Zedong s letter to Zhang Wenliang ( 张文亮 ), he repeatedly emphasizes the ideological purity of recruiting new members. Detail please see: Mao Zedong, Letter between Mao Zedong and Zhang Wenliang, is stored in Youth Movement Archive of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League.

79 69 themselves to social movements and revolution, were to be recruited into public Mao Zedong-led student organizations. 93 Figure 2-3 Mao Zedong s Three Levels of Advanced Youth From the viewpoint of Mao Zedong, youth leagues should be defined as mass organizations or transmission belts for the Communist party. They should recruit patriotic youths, train them in Marxism and select those who had experienced the longest revolutionary struggle, had the highest class consciousness and were familiar with Marxism for the party to form the leadership core of the Chinese revolution Stage 3: Re-Organization of the Local Branch of the CSYL The stagnation of the youth league, which was performed in loose management, reduced membership, and deficient activities, received attention from the CCP and the Soviet Union. 94 On the basis of the joint efforts of both parties, the CSYL was reorganized in 谭冬梅, 试论毛泽东同志早期的建团活动和建团思想, 收录于共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中国社会主义青年团创建问题论文集 ( 内部资料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 98 [Tan Dongmei, Mao Zedong s Early Activities and Guiding Principles for Establishing Youth League, Research Office of Chinese Youth Movement in Central Committee of the CCYL (ed.), Articles Collection about the Establishment of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (Internal Materials) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1984) p98]. 94. Conrad Brandt, Stalin s Failure in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958) pp

80 70 In August 1921, Zhang Tailei came back from the Comintern with the document The Instruction from Young communist international about Establishing the Chinese Youth League ( 青年共产国际关于建立中国青年团组织的指示 ). It required establishing nation-wide youth league committees. 95 So in November 1921 Chen Duxiu signed the The Announcement of the Central Bureau of the CCP ( 中国共 产党中央局通告 ) to direct that all local communist party branches should reorganize the youth league, and in July 1922, the membership of the youth league should exceed 2, Since 1921, Zhang Tailei had led the project of re-organizing the youth league in China. Zhang fist revised its constitution. In the new Constitution, two points were clearly identified. One was to emphasize that the Shanghai Youth League must hold central authority before the establishment of the Central Committee of the Youth League. It solved the problem of uncertain central-local relationship. And it unified the re-organizing project. The other was to define the organization s nature. The new constitution named Marxism as the guiding principle of the youth league. This clarity established the guiding ideology of the youth league, and united the recruitment criteria for members. It contributed to the success of re-organizing the youth league Case Study of the Communist Youth League in Europe Regarding the CCYL S early history, the Europe Branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League ( 中国共产主义青年团旅欧总支部 ) needs to be mentioned. It trained numerous senior leaders for the CCP and Red Army, such as Zhao Shiyan ( 赵世炎 ), Zhou Enlai ( 周恩来 ), Deng Xiaoping ( 邓小平 ), Li Lisan ( 李立三 ), Cai Hesen ( 蔡和森 ), Xiang Jingyu ( 向警予 ), Li Fuchun ( 李富春 ), Wang Ruofei ( 王若飞 ), Chen Yi ( 陈毅 ), Nie Rongzhen ( 聂荣臻 ) and He Changgong ( 何长 工 ). 95. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页.36 [Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.36]. 96. 陈独秀, 中国共产党中央局通告, 收录在, 共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文件选编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 3-4 [Chen Duxiu, The Announcement of the Central Bureau of the CCP in Research Office of Youth Movement of Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Selections of Youth Movement of Central Committee of the CCP(Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1988) pp.3-4].

81 71 This demonstrates the sophisticated relationship involved in establishing local branches of the youth league and highlights both the importance of the personal relationship network and organizational overlap between the Communist party and youth league in local areas. Before agreeing to join the Chinese Socialist Youth League, the Europe General Branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League was called the Europe Youth Communist Party (EYCP, 旅欧少年共产党 ) which indicates the confusion that existed between the Party and youth league. In November 1920, one of the founding fathers of the Beijing Communist Party, Zhang Shenfu ( 张申府 ), went to France to establish a Communist Party branch in Europe under the instructions of Chen Duxiu. Soon after he arrived, he introduced two leaders of the Consciousness Society, Zhou Enlai ( 周恩来 ) and Liu Qingyang ( 刘清扬 ), to the party and then contacted Zhao Shiyan ( 赵世炎 ) (a member of the Association of Young China), Chen Gongpei ( 陈公培 ) (a member of the Beijing Work-Study Mutual Aid Group and founding member of the Shanghai Communist Party) to assist in establishing the CCP branch in France in At this time, they understood that they should model the approach of Beijing and Shanghai to set up the Europe Youth Communist Party to recruit Chinese youth there, with that mission resting on the shoulders of Zhao Shiyan and Zhou Enlai. 98 In June 1922, Zhao Shiyan ( 赵世炎 ), Zhou Enlai ( 周恩来 ), Li Weihan ( 李维汉 ), Wang Ruofei ( 王若飞 ), Chen Yannian ( 陈延年 ), Chen Qiaonian ( 陈乔年 ), Liu Bojian ( 刘伯坚 ), Yu Liya ( 余立亚 ), Yuan Qingyun ( 袁庆云 ), Fu Zhong ( 傅钟 ), Wang Linghan ( 王凌汉 ), Li Weinong ( 李维农 ), Xiao Pusheng ( 萧朴生 ), Xiao Zizhang ( 萧子璋 ), Wang Zekai ( 王泽楷 ), Zheng Chaolin ( 郑超麟 ), Yin Kuan ( 尹宽 ) and Ren 97. Marilyn Levine, The Found Generation: Chinese Communists in Europe during the Twenties (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993) pp Vera Schwarcz, Time for Telling Truth is Running Out: Conversations with Zhang Shenfu (New Haven: Yale University Press, March 1992) pp ; 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ].

82 72 Zhuoxuan ( 任卓宜 ) set up the Europe Youth Communist Party in France. 99 Zhao Shiyan was elected secretary, Zhou Enlai handled the job of propaganda and Li Weihan was responsible for organizational work. 100 In October 1922, when the news of the establishment of the CCP and CSYL in China was heard by the Europe Youth Communist Party, all its members unanimously voted to join the Chinese Youth League and sent an application to the headquarters of the CSYL. 101 After receiving a reply (January 1923) from Chen Duxiu approving their joining and changing their name to the Europe Branch of the Chinese Communist Youth League, they formally became a local branch of the CSYL with approximately 500 members. 102 The personal relationships of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong played a significant role in this process. Firstly, the establishment of a Communist organization in France was the mission Chen Duxiu assigned to Zhang Shenfu, of which the Europe Youth Communist Party could be considered the outcome. Secondly, the main actors in the branch had close relationships with Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong; for example, Chen Yannian ( 陈延年 ) and Chen Qiaonian ( 陈乔年 ) were the sons of Chen Duxiu, Li Weihan ( 李维汉 ) and Xiao Zizhang ( 萧子 99. 傅钟, 傅钟谈旅法勤工俭学和社会主义青年团旅欧总支部, 收录于, 中国社会科学院, 中国革命博物馆 ( 编 ), 一大 前后 : 中国共产党第一次代表大会前后资料选编 ( 二 )( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1980) 页 561[Fu Zhong, Fu Zhong Talk about Work -Study in France and European Branch of Chinese Socialist Youth League in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Museum of Chinese Revolution, and Research Office of Party History (ed.), The Historical Materials Concerning Before and After 1st National Congress of the CCP (Beijing: People s Press, 1984) p.561] 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 132 [Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.132]; 王列平, 周恩来旅欧与海外国共合作, 党史纵览, vol.8, 2008 [Wang Lieping, Zhou Enlai in Europe and Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Cooperation Overseas, History of Chinese Communist Party, vol.8, 2008, website of CCP, accessed at: 旅欧中国共产主义青年团, 旅欧中国共产主义青年团 ( 中国社会主义青年团旅欧之部 ) 报告第一号 (1923 年 3 月 13 日 ), 收录于, 魏宏运 ( 编 ), 中国现代史资料选编 (1)( 黑龙江 : 黑龙江人民出版社, 1981) 页 426 [Europe Branch of Chinese Socialist Youth League, Report no. 1 of Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe(Europe Branch of Chinese Socialist Youth League) (13th March 1923), collected in Wei Hongyun(ed.), Historical Selection of Chinese Modern History(1) (Heilongjiang: Heilongjiang People Press, 1981) p.426] Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, ( London: Random House, 1972) pp.54-60; 王永祥, 旅欧共青团的建立过程及其特点, 收录于, 共青团中央青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 留法勤工俭学运动与旅欧共青团的创建专题论文集 ( 内部文件, 1986) pp [Wang Yongxiang, Establishment Process and Character of Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe, is collected in Central Research Institution of Chinese Youth Movement(ed.), To-France Work-Study Movement and the establishment of the European Communist Youth League (Internal Document, 1986) pp ].

83 73 璋 ) the founding fathers of the Xinmin Society, and Zhao Shiyan ( 赵世炎 ) a member of the Association of Young China led by Li Dazhao. Thirdly and most significantly, although the official history of the CCP claims that the Communist Party branch in Europe established the Europe Youth League, in fact, these organizations overlapped. As previously mentioned this problem also occurred in other local areas in China and led to the re-organization of the CCYL in the 1st United Front period. 2.4 Summary In the establishment period examined in this chapter, the youth league fulfilled the mufti-function role of the Second Communist Party in Chinese Communist movement to disseminate Marxism-Leninism, motivate mass movements, improve the living standards of young workers and peasants, recruit youths into the Communist camp, and recruit young talents to the Comintern to receive political education. So, the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP was organizational rival. Sharing the same origins as the CCP, the Youth League was established on the basis of student organizations led or inspired by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, with support from the Comintern. It can be regarded as the combined outcome of the Comintern s export of revolution and the work of the Marxist camp of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. Therefore, it enjoyed a close but mutually independent relationship with the CCP and a subordinate one with the Comintern. This complicated situation not only contributed to the rivalry between the Youth League and CCP but also led to serious problems in terms of the organizational overlap between their local committees. In addition, in this period, the CCYL was called the Chinese Socialist Youth League. The explanation for using the word Socialist rather than Communist was that it would attract more youths to join the Communist camp, and avoid illegal behavior and state repression. This strategy directly contributed to the situation of the Youth League having a more powerful influence than the CCP and further consolidated the Youth League s role as the Second Party in Chinese Communist politics.

84 74 CHAPTER THREE The CCYL in the Pre-Mao Zedong Period 1 ( ) This chapter provides an analysis on the relationship development between the CCYL and the CCP in the pre-mao Zedong era ( ) which includes, four historical stages: the 1st United Front ( , i.e., the first Kuomintang-CCP alliance); guerrilla period ( ), Jiangxi Soviet years ( ) and Long March years ( ). However as, in the latter two periods, the CCP and CCYL were under military siege, as there are few historical materials indicating the role played by the Youth League, this chapter necessarily covers little of them. This chapter argues that the CCYL was organizationally adjusted to become the subordinate organization of the Party. However, this relationship was nominal, rather than practical. The CCYL became, to some extent, a party within the CCP (in Chinese terms, the Second Party 第二党 2 ). Although officially according to the CCYL constitution, it is defined as the Reserves ( 后备军 ) of the CCP, yet in practice, the CCYL in many ways became a rival to the CCP. This chapter is organised in five major parts. Section 3.1 presents the secondparty role of the CCYL by analysing adjustments to its relationship with the CCP and its challenge against Chen Duxiu in the 1st United Front period. Section 3.2 reviews the leadership training projects of the youth league in the 1st United Front period and the factional struggle among CCYL cadres in Moscow. Section 3.3 discusses new developments of the CCYL in the Jiangxi Soviet years. Section3.4 concludes with this chapter s major findings. 1. The Pre-Mao Zedong period refers to the time before Mao Zedong became the leader of the CCP. 2. The Concept of Second Party ( 第二党 ) first appears in The Resolution of Youth Movement ( 对于青年运动之决议案 ) (the Congress document of the 4th National Congress of the CCP, January 1925). It points out that the problem of no clear distinction between the party and league became serious and it led to the second-party tendency of the CCYL which caused not only unhealthy development of the youth movement but also conflict in the Communist movement. For details, please see: 中国共产党中央, 对于青年运动之决议案 (1925 年 1 月 ), 收录于, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( ) ( 第 1 册 ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1981) 页 298 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Resolution of Youth Movement, in Central Archives (ed.), The Selection of Document of the Central Committee of the CCP( )(vol.1) (Beijing: Central Communist School of the CCP Press, 1981) p.298].

85 CCYL in the 1 st United Front Period: Organizational Subordinate to the Party In the period of the 1st United Front, the CCP completed adjustment of its relationship with the CCYL. Until then, the CCYL had been the subordinate organization (in Chinese terms, the Reserve 后备军 ) 3 in the CCP s political system. However, in practice, it was to some extent a rival organization (i.e., the second party) in terms of leadership of the Chinese Communist movement. Indeed, its challenge was the major force contributing to Chen Duxiu being removed from the leadership core of the CCP. Historically, the Comintern helped to negotiate the first Kuomintang-CCP Alliance to end warlordism in China. 4 From 1924 to 1927, for the first time, Communist doctrines and organizations, particularly the CCP and CCYL, were granted legal status in Chinese society by the Kuomintang-led Republic of China. Therefore, the CCP was no longer a secret party devoted to underground activities. Also, the CCYL could openly proclaim its political views and, at its 3rd National Congress (26th-30th January 1925), changed its name from Chinese Socialist Youth League to Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL, 中国共产主义青年团 ). 5 In the 1st United Front period, the practice of adjusting the CCP-CCYL relationship aimed to solve the organizational overlap problem (as discussed in the 3. 中国共产党中央, 宣传问题决议案 (1926 年 7 月 ), 收录于, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) ( 第 3 册 ),( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1981) 页 200 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution of Propaganda Problem (July, 1926), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement ( ) (vol.3) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, April 1981) p.200]; 中国共产党, 中国共产党党章 (1956 年 9 月 26 日 ), 中国革命博物馆 ( 编 ), 中国共产党党章汇编 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1979) 页 [CCP, The Constitution of the CCP (26th September, 1956), collected in, Museum of Chinese Revolution (ed.), The Collection of the Constitution of the CCP (Beijing: People s Press, 1979) pp ]. 4. Bruce Elleman, Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China, Modern China, vol.21, no.4, October 1995, pp ; Conrad Brandt, Stalin s Failure in China (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958) pp.18-70; Stephen Uhalley, A History of the Chinese Communist Party(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988) pp.3-37; Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet(alias Maring) (New York: E.J.Brill, 1991) pp.26-30, 31-69; Hans J. van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 5. 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 57 [The Youth Movement History Archives of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Review of All Previous CCYL National Congress (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) p57].

86 76 previous chapter) and consolidate the leadership position of the CCP in the Chinese Communist movement Clarification of the CCP-CCYL relationship following examples of Comintern and CYI With the support of the Comintern, in respect of the general CCP-CCYL relationship, the CCP first restrained the CCYL s political function in a mutually negotiated agreement and then absorbed it into the party as the subordinate organization, finally defining it as the reserve of the party. In particular, at the 2nd National Congress of the CCP (July 1922), the party passed the Resolution of the Problem of the Youth Movement ( 关于少年运动问题的决议案 ) to clarify the CCP-CCYL relationship. It was the first time the party had attempted to restrain the political function of the CCYL through a negotiated agreement. That is to say, concerning the issue of political movement, the CSYL had to negotiate with the CCP before taking actions. Without approval from the CCP, the youth league could not initiate any political action. As the Resolution pointed out: Concerning the relationship between the Chinese Socialist Youth League and the Chinese Communist Party.In the aspect of Political Movement, the Chinese Socialist Youth League should be restrained in the negotiated agreement between the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Socialist Youth League. 6 The origin of this resolution lay in the Outline Concerning Chinese Youth Movement ( 关于中国少年运动的纲要 ) 7 adopted at the Far East Revolutionary 6. Original words are: 关于中国社会主义青年团对中国共产党的关系, 在青年劳动者一切经济和教育利益奋斗的方面, 中国社会主义青年团应是个独立团体 ; 关于普通政治运动方面, 中国社会主义青年团则应当约束它与中国共产党协定之下, details please see: 共青团中央, 关于少年运动问题的决议案 (1922 年 7 月 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( ) 第一册 ( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1982) 页 55 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Resolution of the Problem of Youth Movement (July, 1922), in Central Archives (ed.), Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP ( ) (vol.1) (Beijing: Central School of the CCP Press, 1982) p.55]. 7. 青年共产国际, 关于中国少年运动的纲要, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 (1) ( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版社, 1957) 页 [Communist Youth International, Outline Concerning Chinese Youth Movement, Central Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement (vol.1) (Beijing: Central School of the CCP Press, 1957) pp ].

87 77 Youth Congress of the Communist Youth International (CYL) held in January As the local branch of the CYI, the Youth League in China had no choice but to follow this Resolution. So, on 6th September 1922, the Central Executive Committee of the youth league published the Announcement Concerning the Relationship between CSYL and the CCP on the Basis of the Second Congress of the Communist Youth International ( 中国社会主义青年团中央执委会据青年共产国际第二次 代表大会关于共产党与青年团关系的决议所发的第十七号通告 ) to confirm Party s proposal. 9 According to the Outline of the Comintern and the Communist Youth Movement ( 共产国际和共产主义青年运动提纲 ), of the Comintern which was approved on 8 th July 1921 at the third Congress of the Comintern, the CCP further forced the Central Committee of the CSYL to hand over political leadership to the Party to resemble the relationship between the Comintern and CYI. This outline clearly pointed out that, in terms of political issues, the youth league must obey the leadership of the party while its task was to concentrate on leading the Communist youth movement. 10 In August 1923, on the basis of this outline, the 2nd National Congress of the CCYL approved the Resolution of the Relationship between Our Youth League and the CCP ( 本团与中国共产党之关系的决议案 ) which announced that the relationship between the Youth League and CCP will follow the relationship between the CYI and Comintern. Under the condition of organizational 8. 刘丽梅, 中共二大 关于少年运动问题的决议案 的由来, 上海青年管理干部学院学报, 2013 年 1 期, 页 [Liu Limei, The Origin of Resolution of the Problem of Youth Movement in Second Congress of the CCP, Journal of Shanghai College for Youth Administrators, vol.1, 2013, pp.26-29]. 9. 社会主义青年团中央, 中国社会主义青年团中央执委会据青年共产国际第二次代表大会关于共产党与青年团关系的决议所发的第十七号通告 (1922 年 9 月 6 日 ), 收录于, 中共中央黨史研究室第一研究部 ( 编 ), 共产国际 联共 ( 布 ) 与中国革命文献资料选辑 ( ) ( 北京 : 北京图书馆出版社, 1997) 页 [Central Committee of the CSYL, Announcement Concerning the Relationship between CSYL and the CCP on the Basis of the Second Congress of the Communist Youth International, is collected in The first Research Department of the Research Office of CCP History(ed.), The Documents Selection of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and Chinese Revolution ( ) (vol.1) (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1997) pp ]. 10. 青年共产国际, 共产国际和共产主义青年运动提纲 ( 节录 ) (1921 年 7 月 8 日 ), 团中央青运室研究室, 中国社科院现代史研究室 ( 编 ), 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [Young Communist International, Outline of the Comintern and the Communist Youth Movement in Research Office of Youth Movement in the CC of the CCYL, Modern History Research Office in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences(ed.), Young Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1985) pp.45-47].

88 78 independence, the youth league will obey the CCP in respect of politics. 11 Subsequently, the youth league was absorbed into the CCP as a politically subordinate organization. Under the pressure of the Comintern, the Central Committee of the CCYL had to nominally surrender the leadership of Chinese Communist movement to the CCP. However, due to its influential organizational structure and numerous members, the CCYL was not at first willing to give up the role of alternative Communist party in Chinese society. And this intention was reflected in the debate in the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the CCYL in July 1926 in Shanghai. Besides the members of the Central Committee of the CCYL, the participants of this meeting also included: the political cadres from the Comintern and the CCP and CCYL cadres from local branches of North China (Henan-Shanxi District, Jiangsu- Zhejiang District, Hunan District, Guangdong District, Wuhan District, and Shandong District, etc.). 12 This meeting was held on the eve of the breakdown of the Kuomintang-CCP Alliance. The CCP and Communist forces had already suffered losses in the Zhongshan Warship Incident (19th March 1926 中山舰事件 ). 13 And in the Second Plenary Meeting of the Second National Congress of the Kuomintang (May 1926, 国民党二届二中全会 ), the congress approved a bill to further limit the number of the CCP members holding leadership positions in the KMT political system. 14 The significance of the 1926 CCYL meeting mainly rested on it being a meeting to discuss the future role of the CCYL on the eve of the failure of 1st United Front 11. 共青团中央, 本团与中国共产党之关系的决议案, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) 第一册,( 北京 : 共青团中央办公厅, 1981) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Resolution of the Relationship between Our Youth League and the CCP, in General Office of the CC of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement ( ) vol1 (Beijing: General Office of the CC of the CCYL Press, 1981) pp ]. 12. 共青团中央, 共青团三届三次扩大会议, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 89 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Third Enlarge Meeting of the Third Congress of the CCYL, collected in The Central Youth Movement History Archive in the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Introduction of All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Official Document Collection) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) p.89]. 13. Zhou Enlai, The Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party in the Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (vol. II) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960) pp , Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, (Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp

89 79 between the CCP and KMT. In the meeting, various roles of the CCYL were proposed, such as: Young Communist Party ( 青年共产党 ), Cultural Organization ( 文化组织 ), Communist School ( 共产主义学校 ), Reserve of the CCP ( 共产党的后备军 ), etc. Two major ideas eventually emerged. One was raising the role of the youth league as the second party to operate Communist movement instead of the CCP. A reasonable number of CCYL cadres aimed to replace the CCP to lead Chinese Communist movement and strongly supported this proposal. The other was to identify the youth league as the Reserve of the Party which refers to a subordinate organization and talent reserve of the Party. 15 With the support of the representatives from the Comintern and the CCP, the idea of the Reserve of the party prevailed; the inclination of the youth league to be a Second Party was temporarily suppressed. The concept of reserve was first written into the CCYL's official document Resolution of Propaganda Problem (July 1926 宣传问题决议案 ) at its Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee Consolidating the Party s Leadership over the CCYL: Membership Age Limitation As well as clarifying the general relationship between the CCP and the CCYL, the Central Politburo of the Party further implemented policies to shape its leadership position over the CCYL by setting a boundary on membership age. The CCP, on the one hand, gradually lowered the maximum age of being a youth league member but did not set any limit age on being a party member. On the other hand, the party not only rapidly recruited party members from groups of students, workers, peasants, and soldiers, but also quickly recruited the over-age members of the CCYL 共青团中央, 共青团三届三次扩大会议, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 89 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Third Enlarge Meeting of the Third Congress of the CCYL, collected in The Central Youth Movement History Archive in the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Introduction of All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Official Document Collection) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) p.89]. 16. 共青团中央, 宣传问题决议案 (1926 年 7 月 ), 收录于, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) ( 第 3 册 )( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1981) 页 200 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Resolution of Propaganda Problem (July, 1926), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement ( ) (vol.3) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1981) p.200]. 17. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li

90 80 Specifically, in December 1923, the Central Committee of the CCP sent a letter Gradually Turn the Socialist Youth League into a Pure Youth Organization ( 使 S.Y. 逐渐成为纯青年的组织 ) to the Central Committee of the CCYL. In this letter, the party pointed out that most members of the youth league were over-age (mainly older than 28), and for the first time brought out the idea of rejuvenating the youth league. 18 The constitution of the youth league passed at the 1st National Congress (1922) specified that the member age of the youth league should be over 15, but below Later, in May 1924, at the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP, the party approved the Resolution about the Relationship between the S.Y. and C.P ( S.Y. 工作与 C.P. 关系议决案 ). It was the guiding document for regulating rejuvenation of the youth league, requiring it to focus on absorbing youths under 20, with a maximum age of 25, and insisting that all over-age members should leave the CCYL and join the party within three months. 20 Combined with the Constitution of the youth league (passed at the 1st National Congress of the CSYL), this meant that the age of youth league members should be over 15 but below 25. On 14th June 1924, the Party and the youth league issued the Announcement from the Central Committee of the CCP and CSYL-Concerning the Problem of Rejuvenation of the Youth League ( 中国共产党中国社会主义青年团中央通告 - 关于团的青年化问题 ). 21 Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]. 18. 中共中央, 中共中央致社会主义青年团中央信 使 S.Y. 逐渐成为纯青年的组织, 收录于团中央青运史研究室, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文件选编 (1921 年 7 月 年 9 月 ) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 26 [Central Committee of the CCP, Letter From the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the CSYL Gradually Turn the S.Y. into Pure Youth Organization, collected in Youth Movement History Research Office in the Central Committee of the CCYL and Central Archive of the CCP(ed.), The Selection of Youth Movement of the Central Committee of the CCP (July 1921-September 1949) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1988) p.26]. 19. Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Constitution of the Chinese Socialist Youth League (1922), the website of the CCYL, accessed at: documents/200612/t _5514.htm. 20. 中共中央, S.Y. 工作与 C.P. 关系议决案 (1924 年 5 月 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( ) ( 第 1 册 ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1981) 页 194 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution about the Relationship between the S.Y. and C.P, in Central Archives (ed.), The Selection of Document of the Central Committee of the CCP ( ) (vol.1)(beijing: Central Communist School of the CCP Press, 1981) p.194]. 21. 中共中央, 社会主义青年团中央, 中国共产党中国社会主义青年团中央通告 - 关于团的青年化问题 (1924 年 6 月 14 日 ), 团中央青运室研究室, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文

91 81 There is no doubt that this policy encountered resistance from the CCYL. On one hand, the over-age youth league leaders did not want to lose their leadership positions in the CCYL. On the other hand, the youth league decided to enlarge its membership by focusing on a younger age group. Therefore, at the 3rd National Congress of the CCYL (January 1925), two resolutions were passed. One was the Resolution on the Organizational Problem (January 1925) ( 组织问题决议案 1925 年 1 月 ) which allowed members aged over 25 who held important jobs or positions to stay in the CCYL. 22 The other was The Second Amendment of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Youth League (January 1925) ( 中国共产主义青年团第二次修正章程 1925 年 1 月 ) which lowered the regular age for recruitment into the CCYL from 15 to However, this did not mean that the league could only recruit members between 14 and 25 as this amendment also allowed the existence of special members; that is, after reporting to the Central Committee of the Youth League, a recruited member younger than 14 or older than 25 could become a special member of the CCYL. Nevertheless, the number of party members for the first time exceeded the number of the youth league members in From 1922 to 1927, the numbers of members in both the CCP and CCYL increased significantly, with that of the former exceeding that of the latter for the first time in 1926 being, in May 1927, 58,000 and more than 37,000, respectively (please see: Figure 3-1 the Membership of the CCP and the CCYL from ). Quantitatively, the CCP had become the largest Communist force in China which provided it with the strength to further control the 件选编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 26 [Central Committee of the CCP and CSYL, Join Announcement From the Central Committee of the CCP and CSYL-Concerning the Problem of Rejuvenation of the Youth League (14th June 1924), in Research Office of Chinese Youth Movement in CC of the CCYL, Central Archives(ed.), The Document Selection of Youth Movement From the Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing : China Youth Press, 1988) p.26]. 22. 共青团中央, 组织问题决议案 (1925 年 1 月 ), 团中央委员会办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 (1925) ( 第二册 )( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1981) 63 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Resolution of Organizational Problem (January, 1925), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement(1925) (vol.2) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1981) p.63]. 23. 中国共青团, 中国共产主义青年团第二次修正章程 (1925 年 1 月 ) [The CCYL, The Second amendment of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Youth League (January, 1925) ], website of the CCYL, accessed at: 11_5511.htm;

92 82 CCYL. In April 1927, the CCP and the CCYL suffered a heavy purge of its members in Shanghai by the National Revolutionary Army commander Jiang Jieshi ( 蒋介石 ). This purge also marked the end of the CCP-Kuomintang Alliance during the Northern Expedition to defeat the warlords and unify China. 24 Figure 3-1 the Membership of the CCP and the CCYL from In order to increase its membership, in its 5th National Congress, the CCP passed the Resolution concerning the Work of the Chinese Communist Youth League ( 对于共产主义青年团工作决议案 ) which commanded the CCYL to directly send some of its members to the party. 26 Following the order of the party, the CCYL actively sent a large number of 24. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p Source from: 中共中央组织部 ( 编 ), 1921 年 7 月至 1927 年 5 月中共党员数量统计表, 中国共产党组织史资料 ( 第 1 卷 )( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2000) 页 39 [The Organization Department of the CCP (ed.), Statistical Table of members of the CCP from July 1921 to May 1927, in The Historical Material of Party s Organization (vol1)(beijing: CCP History Press, 2000) p.39]; CCP, National Congress Report of the CCP (from Congress 2nd to Congress 5th ), website of CCP(Database of All Previous National Congress of the CCP), accessed at: GB/64162/64168/index.html?utm_source=weibolife; CCYL, National Congress Report of the CCYL (From Congress 1st to Congress 4th), website of CCYL (Gallery of the History of the CCYL), accessed at: 中共中央, 对于共产主义青年团工作决议案, 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 (1927) ( 第 3 册 ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社,1983) 页 69 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution Concerning the Work of Chinese Communist Youth League, in Central Archives (ed.), The Selection of Document of the Central Committee of the CCP(1927)](vol.3)(Beijing: Central Communist School of the CCP Press,1983) p.69].

93 83 members into the party. At that time, the feature of the composition of the CCP was illiteracy which included especially workers and peasants. But the composition of the CCYL was university or college students who could read and write. So many CCYL members had an opportunity to hold leadership positions in the party. And the CCYL, to some extent, and as a consequence, became a powerful group within the CCP. In Chen Duxiu s Report to the 5th National Congress of the CCP (27 th April- 9 th May 1927), he concluded that until March 1927, party members from workers and peasants took up the share of 72.5%, and intellectuals formed only 19.1% of the Party. 27 Although Marxists believe that the proletariat is the most revolutionary and the most advanced class, yet most of the workers and peasants in China had very low levels of education. In fact, some worker leaders who held leadership positions in Communist branches in factories could not even write. 28 By contrast, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the CCYL was formed based on university student associations. Therefore, compared with illiterate workers and peasants, its members were more capable of becoming CCP branch leaders. 29 In addition, before the 1927 Massacre by the KMT, given the rapid increase in the number of Party branches and membership, the shortage of the required number of cadres became a serious problem. According to statistics of the Central Committee of the CCP, in 1926, although the party needed approximately 350 cadres to hold leadership positions, only about 120 were qualified. Including the shortage of 27. 陈独秀, 陈独秀在中国共产党第五次全国代表大会上的报告 (1927 年 4 月 29 日 ), 中共中央党史研究室 ( 编 ), 共产国际 联共 ( 布 ) 与中国革命文献资料选辑 ( ) ( 上 ) ( 北京 : 北京图书馆出版社, 1998) 页 360 [Chen Duxiu, Chen Duxiu s Report in the 5th National Congress of the CCP (29th April 1927), in Party History Research Office in Central Committee of the CCP(ed.), The Documents Selection of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and Chinese Revolution( )(vol.1)(Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1998) p.360]. 28. 上海党委, 上海区委召开支部书记会议记录 - 罗亦农报告目前政治与党务现状 (1927 年 1 月 1 日 ), 中央档案馆, 上海市档案馆 ( 编 ), 上海革命历史文件汇集 乙 5( 北京 : 中央档案馆, 1987) 页 239 [Shanghai Communist Party, Meeting Record of the Secretary of Shanghai Branches Luo Yinong Report the current situation of the Party and Politics (1st January 1927), in Central Archives and Shanghai Archives(ed.), Collection of Shanghai Revolutionary Historical Document, vol.2, no.5(beijing: Central Archives Press, 1987) p.239]. 29. 上海党委, 上海区委召开主席团会议记录 关于团的工作 工人运动和党报问题 (1926 年 7 月 13 日 ), 中央档案馆, 上海市档案馆 ( 编 ), 上海革命历史文件汇集 乙 3( 北京 : 中央档案馆, 1986) 页 73 [Shanghai Communist Party, Meeting Record of The Chairman Group Meeting of Shanghai Communist Party Concerning the Work of Youth League, the Worker Movement, and the Party Newspaper (13rd July 1926), in Central Archives and Shanghai Archives(ed.), Collection of Shanghai Revolutionary Historical Document vol.2, no.3(beijing: Central Archives Press, 1986) p.73].

94 84 secretaries of local party branches, the shortage of cadres was more than 1, Therefore, in this situation(before 1927), masses of the party members who had been directly transferred from the youth league were appointed to hold leadership positions in the CCP; for example, in Guangzhou in February 1925, eight cadres were elected to become formal and alternate members of the Executive Committee of the Guangzhou Youth League. However, from March to July 1925, four were transferred to leadership positions as Secretary of the Shantou Communist Party, Special Correspondent of the Guangzhou Communist Party, Secretary of the Guangdong Communist Party and Director of the Propaganda Department in the National Federation of Trade Unions. 31 It was common for large numbers of CCYL cadres to be transferred to leadership positions in the CCP Consolidating the Party s Leadership over the CCYL: Working Scope Limitation The CCP aimed to confirm its leadership position in the Chinese Communist movement by limiting the working scope of the CCYL in the 1 st United Front period. As mentioned in the previous chapter, before the 1st United Front, the CCP and CCYL had serious problems of organizational overlap with, in some local areas, the 30. 上海党委, 上海区委特别扩大会议记录 罗亦农传达中央扩大会议精神和对组织问题决议案的讨论 (1926 年 7 月 26 日 ), 中央档案馆, 上海市档案馆 ( 编 ), 上海革命历史文件汇集 乙 3( 北京 : 中央档案馆, 1986) 页 155 [Shanghai Communist Party, Meeting Record of The Special Enlarged Meeting of Shanghai Communist Party (26thJuly 1926), in Central Archives and Shanghai Archives(ed.), Collection of Shanghai Revolutionary Historical Document vol.2, no.3(beijing: Central Archives Press, 1986) p.155]. 31. Yang Shihui ( 杨石魂 ) was director of Propaganda Department of Guangzhou Youth League; he was transferred to become Secretary of Shantou Communist Party. Shen Houkun ( 沈厚堃 ) was director of Worker& Peasant Department of Guangzhou Youth League; he was transferred to become Special Correspondent of Guangzhou Communist Party. Liu Ersong ( 刘尔崧 ) was the secretary of Guangzhou Youth League; he was transferred to become Secretary of Guangdong Communist Party. Guo Souzhen( 郭瘦真 )was alternative member of Guangzhou Youth League, he succeeded Yang Shuihui to become the director of Propaganda Department of Guangzhou Youth League in March, was promoted to succeeded Liu Ersong as the Secretary of Guangzhou Youth League in April, and then transferred to become Director of Propaganda Department in National Federation of Trade Unions in May. Details please see: 广州青年运动史研究委员会 ( 编 ), 广州青年团沿革 ( ) ( 广州 : 广州青年运动史研究委员会, 1986) 页 [History Research Association of Guangzhou Youth Movement(ed.), The Development of Guangzhou Youth League( ) (Guangzhou: History Research Association of Guangzhou Youth Movement Press, 1986) pp.20-21]. 32. 共青团广东省委, 团粤区委报告 ( 第 1 号 )-- 关于本区工作概况和批评 (1925 年 12 月 4 日 ), 中央档案馆 广东省档案馆 ( 编 ), 广东革命历史文件汇集 ( 甲 3),( 广东 : 广东人民出版社, 1982) 页 277 [Guangdong Communist Youth League Committee, Report of Guangdong Youth League Concerning the work of Guangdong Youth League and its Criticisms (4th December 1925), collected in Central Archives and Guangdong Province Archives(ed.), Historical Document Collection of Guangdong Revolution (vol.1, no.3) (Guangdong: Guangdong People Press, 1982) p.277].

95 85 latter serving as independent Communist Party leading local Communist affairs. The Resolution about the Relationship between the S.Y. and C.P ( S.Y. 工作与 C.P. 关系议决案 ), which was approved in the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in May 1924, was a programmatic document not only regulating the ages of CCYL members but also limiting the league s political function. It divided its political movements into three categories, workers, peasants and students, confirming the leadership of the CCYL in terms of the student movement and emphasizing that of the party in the other two. 33 However, despite this resolution confining the CCYL s working scope to the student movement, it was still actively involved in organizing worker strikes and setting up peasant associations, such as in Wuhan ( 武汉 ) and Wuzhou ( 梧州 ). In such places, all the movements (workers, peasants, students, women and citizens) were directly under the leadership of the local youth league rather than the party. 34 Therefore, at the 4th National Congress of the CCP (January 1925), the Party seriously criticized the CCYL stating that the Youth League did not know its organizational purpose, and did the work of the Party". 35 Two months later, the Central Committees of the CCP and CCYL made a joint announcement further restricting the latter from engaging in worker and peasant movements. 33. 中共中央, S.Y. 工作与 C.P. 关系议决案 (1924 年 5 月 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( ) ( 第 1 册 ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1980), 页 195 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution about the Relationship between the S.Y. and C.P, in Central Archives(ed.), The Selection of Document of the Central Committee of the CCP( ) (vol.1) (Beijing: Central Communist School of the CCP Press, 1980) p.195]. 34. Case of Wuhan please see: 共青团武汉地委, 团武汉地委关于各特支概况向团中央的报告 (1926 年 3 月 29), 中央档案馆, 湖北省档案馆 ( 编 ), 湖北革命历史文件汇集 ( 甲 2)( 湖北 : 湖北人民出版社出版, 1987) 页 294 [Wuhan Communist Youth League Committee, Report From Wuhan Youth League Committee to the Central Committee of the CCYL (29th March 1926), collected in Central Archives and Hu Bei Province Archives(ed.), Historical Document Collection of Hu Bei Revolution (vol.2)(hubei: Hubei People Press, 1987) p.294]; Case of Wuzhou, please see: 共青团梧州地委, 团梧州地方大会议决案 - 地委成立后工作概况 (1926 年 9 月 19 日 ), 中央档案馆, 广东省档案馆 ( 编 ), 广东革命历史文件汇集 ( 甲 5)( 广东 : 广东人民出版社, 1982) 页 316 [Wu Zhou Communist Youth League Congress, Resolution of Wuzhou Youth League Congress The Work Overview after the Establishment of Wuzhou Youth League Committee (19th September 1926), collected in Central Archives and Guangdong Province Archives(ed.), Historical Document Collection of Guangdong Revolution(vol.1, no.5) (Guangdong: Guangdong People Press, 1982) p.316]. 35. 中共中央, 对青年运动之决议案 (1925 年 1 月 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( ) ( 第 1 册 ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1980) 页 298 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution about the Youth Movement (January 1925), in Central Archives (ed.), The Selection of Document of the Central Committee of the CCP( )(VOL.1)(Beijing: Central Communist School of the CCP Press, 1980) p.298].

96 86 In this Announcement, the CCP requested that all these movements should be led by the Party. The youth league could only operate educational or cultural activities among workers and peasants. In places where the party did not have a branch, the youth league could set up worker unions or peasant associations. But the youth league should be under the leadership of the worker and peasant department of the higher Party committee. 36 Since 1925, the leadership of worker and peasant movement clearly belonged to the CCP. The failure of the May Thirtieth Movement ( 五卅运动, 30th May 1925) left significant lessons for the CCP. 37 During that Movement, the youth league played the leadership role in organizing students. The party concluded that the major reason for its failure was that it did not directly lead the student movement. 38 Consequently, on 17th January 1926, the Central Committees of the CCP and CCYL jointly announced that in future, student movements operate under dual leadership (the Party and Youth League). Every student organization should set up a party caucus, the secretary of which should be appointed by the local Party Committee. 39 From then, the CCP nominally led the worker, peasant and student movements Challenge of CCYL against Leadership of CCP regarding Failure of CCP- Kuomintang Alliance The CCYL initiated the challenge against Chen Duxiu and the leadership of the CCP after the Shanghai massacre of 12 April 1927 when the Chinese communist 36. 中共中央文献研究室, 任弼时年谱 ( ) ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2004) 页.36 [Literature Research Office in Central Committee of the CCP, The Chronicle of Ren Bishi( ) (Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 2004) p.36]. 37. Ku Hung-Ting, Urban Mass Movement: The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai, Modern Asian Studies, vol.13, no.2, 1979, pp ; Edna Booker, News is my Job: A Correspondent in War- Torn China (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1940) p 上海共产党委, 上海区委组织部关于泸区形势分析及巩固党组织的报告 (1926 年 9 月 ), 中央档案馆, 上海市档案馆 ( 编 ), 上海革命历史文件汇集 甲 3( 北京 : 中央档案馆, 1986) 页 425 [Shanghai Communist Party, Concerning the situation analysis of Shanghai District and consolidate the Party organization Report From Organizational Department of Shanghai Communist Party(September 1926), in Central Archives and Shanghai Archives(ed.), Collection of Shanghai Revolutionary Historical Document, vol.1, no.3 (Beijing: Central Archives Press, 1986) p425]. 39. 中共中央文献研究室, 任弼时年谱 ( ) ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2004) 页 36 [Literature Research Office in Central Committee of the CCP, The Chronicle of Ren Bishi ( ) (Beijing: The Central Literature Press, 2004) p.36].

97 87 movement received a heavy setback. The target of the Central Committee of the CCYL was the leadership of Chen Duxiu. As a reward from the new Secretary of the CCP Qu Qiubai ( 瞿秋白 ), the Secretary of the CCYL, Ren Bishi ( 任弼时 ) was promoted into the Central Bureau of the CCP. Yet, the fall of Chen Duxiu inspired the thinking of some CCYL cadres to take over the leadership of Chinese Communist movement from the CCP. In early 1927, Ren Bishi ( 任弼时, General Secretary of the CCYL) was one of the pioneering forces to criticize Chen Duxiu. Specifically, in April 1927 when the Kuomintang successively launched purges of Communists in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hubei, Hunan and Jiangxi, Ren Bishi wrote the "Political Suggestion Report from the Central Committee of the CCYL to the Central Committee of the CCP"( 团中央致党中央政治意见书政治意见书 ) which criticized Chen Duxiu's concession policy. Chen s concession policy mainly pointed to the Concession measures as the appropriate reply towards the provocative activities of the Kuomintang and included political, martial, and party affair aspects. In terms of political concessions, Chen Duxiu forbade Zhou Enlai and Chen Yannian to fight against the provocations of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang at the 2nd National Congress of the Kuomintang. In the aspect of military concessions, Chen Duxiu refused Mao Zedong s military fighting plan against Jiang Jieshi as the Party s response to the Zhongshan Warship Incident. In the area of the party affairs concession, Chen Duxiu accepted the Kuomintang s Party Construction Bill ( 整理党务案 ) (approved in the Second Session Meeting of the 2nd National Congress of Kuomintang) to expel CCP members from the leadership group of the Kuomintang. 40 Ren tried to submit this report to Chen Duxiu three times but failed. On the first occasion, he organized a meeting at the headquarters of the CCYL and invited Chen Duxiu to attend. He handed the report to Chen and introduced its contents but Chen 40. 吴岳霞, 第一次国共合作破裂的原因及其教训 (Wu Yuexia, The Reason and the Lesson of the Split of first Kuomintang-CCP Alliance ), website of the CCP, accessed at: com.cn/gb/64107/65708/65722/ html.

98 88 ignored him and tore the report into pieces. 41 On the second occasion, Ren formally handed the report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP for discussion but, when Chen saw it, he was very angry and tore it up again. On the third occasion, in a meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP (3rd July 1927), when Chen wanted to pass the bill for further compromise with the Kuomintang, Ren Bishi read it out to all those present. 42 Along with the worsening situation (the concession policy of Chen Duxiu led to increased suffering of the CCP and the CCYL), Ren Bishi and other anti-chen Duxiu leaders (such as Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白, Mao Zedong 毛泽东, and Zhou Enlai 周恩来, etc.) received increasing support from the CCP. The Central Bureau of the CCP convened an emergency meeting in Hankou ( 汉口 ) on 7th August This is the famous "August 7th Meeting"( 八七会议 ) in the CCP's history. 43 At this meeting, the leaders of the CCP reached several agreements, including: Firstly, they summarized the reasons for the failure of the 1st United Front and decided that the "Armed Struggle"( 武装斗争 ) and "Agrarian Revolution"( 土地革命 ) should be the general principles guiding the Communist movement. Secondly, in reply to the purges by the Kuomintang, the CCP decided to militarily confront the Kuomintang by supporting the Nanchang Upspring ( 南昌起义, 1st August 1927), Autumn Harvest Uprising ( 秋收起义, 7th September 1927) and Guangzhou Upspring ( 广州起义,11th December 1927). Thirdly, they removed Chen Duxiu from the position of General Secretary of the CCP and re-elected the Central Bureau of the CCP. In this meeting, Ren Bishi was promoted to membership of the Central Bureau of the CCP 洪梦, 成晓明, 任弼时 : 谁有真理谁就有发言资格, 北京日报, 2014 年 3 月 31, 页 17 [Hong Meng and Cheng Xiaoming, Ren Bishi: Who has Truth, Who has the Right to Say, Beijing Daily, 31 March 2014, p.17]. 42. Ibid. 43. 李维汉, 关于八七会议的一些回忆, 回忆与研究 ( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版, 1986) 页 [Li Weihan, Some Memory Concerning 7th August Meeting, Memory and Research (Beijing: CCP History Press, 1986) pp ]. 44. 中共中央, 党的组织问题议决案 ( 一九二七年八月七日 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 1927)( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1989) 页 [Central Committee of the

99 89 The struggle between Ren Bishi and Chen Duxiu contributed to the policy and leadership change of the CCP. And in the "Announcement of the August 7th Meeting of the CCP"( 中共 八七 会议告全党党员书 ), the newly elected leaders of the CCP, Qu Qiubai, praised the CCYL as more advanced than the CCP in the recent events (Anti- Chen Duxiu event). 45 It meant that when the CCP blindly followed the concession policy of Chen Duxiu, the youth league cadre were the first to realize its mistakes. The Struggle between Ren Bishi and Chen Duxiu was interpreted as proof that the CCYL was more advanced than the CCP by local CCYL cadres. To some extent, in local areas, particularly when Chen Duxiu was dismissed from the leadership position of the CCP, there was a tendency to replace the CCP to lead the Communist revolution in local branches of the youth league. And it was defined as the Vanguardism Tendency ( 先锋主义 ) of the CCYL by the CCP. This tendency soon received attention from the center of the CCP and CCYL. On 6th December 1927, the Central Committees of the CCP and CCYL jointly issued the Announcement concerning rectifying Vanguardism and Liquidationism ( 糾正取消主義和先鋒主義傾向 ) to systematically analyze and to criticize this trend. 46 On the basis of this Announcement, in the 5th National Congress of the CCYL (July 1928), the terms of the relationship between the CCP and CCYL were first introduced into the CCYL s Constitution of the CCYL; they further confirmed the political obligation of the CCYL to the CCP. CCP, The Resolution of Party Organizational Problem (7 August 1927), collected in Central Archives(ed.),The Selection of the Document of the Central Committee of the CCP(1927) (Beijing: Central School of the CCP Press, 1989) pp ]. 45. 中共中央, 中国共产党中央执行委员会告全党党员书 ( 一九二七年八月七日 ) 收录于中央档案馆编, 中共中央文件选集 ( 1927)( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1989) 页 [Central Committee of the CCP, Letter to Party Member from the Executive Committee of the CCP (7 August 1927), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Selection of the Document of the Central Committee of the CCP(1927) (Beijing : Central School of the CCP Press, 1989) pp ]. 46. 任弼时, 纠正取消主义和先锋主义倾向, 1927 年 12 月 6 日 [Ren Bishi, Announcement Concerning Rectify Vanguardism and Liquidationism, 6th December 1927], website of CCP, accessed at: /69112/82103/82108/ html.

100 Revolutionary Cadre Development Projects and Factional Struggle in Moscow In the 1st United Front period, as part of the Communist party, the CCYL, whether from consideration of its self-development (from an immature student-built organization to a mature revolutionary organization) or its devotion to the revolutionary movement, needed to train a large number of revolutionary cadres. Therefore, the Comintern, Kuomintang, CCP and CCYL contributed to the following three cooperative projects for developing revolutionary cadres for the Chinese revolutionary movement. I. The Republic of China Military Academy ( 中华民国陆军军官学校 ) (hereafter referred to as the Huangpu Military Academy 黄埔军校 ) which was the first military academy in the Republic of China and established in Huangpu Guangzhou in Jiang Jieshi was its first headmaster and, as the product of the 1st United Front between the CCP and Kuomintang, cadres from both the CCP and Kuomintang shouldered the burdens of its teaching and administration. Its purpose was to educate military officers for the revolution and a reasonable number of the most famous generals in modern China were its alumni. 47 II. The Chinese Kuomintang Peasant Movement Institute ( 中国国民党农民运动讲习所 ) (hereafter referred to as the Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institute 广州农民讲习所 ). This was a famous school for training peasant cadres in modern China and although, in total, it existed for only 6 terms (Peng Pai 彭湃 was its Director for its 1st and 5th terms, Mao Zedong for its 6th term or the largest class, and Luo Yiyuan 罗绮园, Yuan Xiaoxian 阮啸仙 and Tan Zhitang 谭植棠 for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th terms, respectively.), it trained more than 800 peasant cadres and developed many leaders of the peasant movement for the CCP. 48 III. The Sun Yat-sen Communist University of the Toilers of China ( 中国劳动者孙逸仙大学 ) (hereafter referred to as the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University 莫斯科 47. Details please see: 广东革命历史博物馆, 黄埔军校史料 ( ) ( 广州 : 广东人民出版社, 1982) [Guangdong Museum of Revolutionary History, The History of Huangpu Military Academy( ) (Guangzhou: Guangdong People Press, 1982)]. 48. Details please see: Gerald Berkley, The Canton Peasant Movement Training Institute, in Modern China, vol.1, April 1975, pp

101 91 中山大学 ). It was built by the Comintern to memorialize Sun Zhongshan but only operated from 1925 to 1930 and was a training camp for pro-comintern Chinese revolutionary leaders from both the Kuomintang and CCP. After the split of the 1st United Front in 1927, the Kuomintang stopped sending youths to this university and it changed its name to the Chinese Communist University ( 中国共产主义大学 ) in the spring of 1928, thereafter mainly training political cadres for the CCP. 49 During training in this university, there was a factional struggle among the CCYL cadres (between its senior leaders and 28 Bolsheviks) which showed that the CCYL was not an independent political faction but a Communist party like the CCP. It provided political cadres for different factions in China s politics or Moscow. During this period, although training projects were fulfilled under the name of the Kuomintang and CCP, on the CCP s side, the CCYL was its de facto operator or acted as its partner to undertake certain projects for the following reasons. Firstly, the relationship between the CCP and CCYL was in an adjustment period and the situation of there being no clear division between the Party and Youth League was still serious. Secondly, the main participants in these projects were Chinese youth, with the CCYL the main institution focusing on youth affairs. Thirdly, and most significantly, the majority of party members were illiterate workers and peasants. (As Chen Duxiu s report at the 5th National Congress of the CCP mentioned, until March 1927, workers and peasants comprised 72.5% of the party s membership and intellectuals only 19.1 %). 50 However, most CCYL members were college students with certain levels 49. Details please see: Sheng Yue, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account (New York: The University of Kansas, 1971); 费迅, 莫斯科中山大学述略, 苏联问题研究资料, 1991 年, 6 期 [Fei Xun, Brief History of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, in Research Material of Soviet Problem, 1991, vol.6]; 张泽宇, 莫斯科中山大学停办原因论析, 徐州师范大学学报 : 哲学社会科学版, 2006 年 3 期, 页 7-11 [Zhang Zeyu, The Close Down Reason of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, in Journal of Xuzhou Normal University: Philosophy and Social Science Version, no.3, 2006, pp.7-11]. 50. 陈独秀, 陈独秀在中国共产党第五次全国代表大会上的报告 (1927 年 4 月 29 日 ), 中共中央党史研究室 ( 编 ), 共产国际 联共 ( 布 ) 与中国革命文献资料选辑 ( ) ( 上 ) ( 北京 : 北京图书馆出版社, 1998) 页 360 [Chen Duxiu, Chen Duxiu s Report in the 5th National Congress of the CCP (29th April 1927), in Party History Research Office in Central Committee of the CCP(ed.), The Documents Selection of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and Chinese Revolution( )(vol.1 ) (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1998) p.360].

102 92 of education Huangpu Military Academy: Military talents In the history of modern China, the Huangpu Military Academy has been a significant institution for breeding military talent. On the one hand, the CCYL was the main organizer in terms of sending youths to receive military training and, on the other, the major means of absorbing students from the Academy into the Communist camp. After the May Thirtieth Movement ( 五卅运动, May 1925), the CCP raised the issue of training military talent to occupy central positions in its political work. In October 1925, its Central Committee convened an enlarged Meeting of its Executive Committee to set up a Military Movement Committee ( 军事运动委员会 ) to arrange military affairs and train its own military talent for Communist careers. 51 On 1st January 1925, the Central Committee further commanded all the local CCP branches and CCYL to select young cadres to apply for the Huangpu Military Academy and emphasized its importance. 52 From then, the CCP placed heavy emphasis on the mission of training and recruiting military talent and building its own armed force. It not only sent youths to this academy to receive education but also recruited or assimilated students within it (some of whom were members of the Kuomintang). According to the incomplete statistical data of Professor Li Yuqi (the official historian of the CCYL), during the period of the 1st United Front, the CCYL organized at least 500 cadres to study at the Huangpu Military Academy. 53 However, compared with sending Communist cadres of the Party or the youth 51. CCP, The Second Enlarged Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP(28th September, nd October1925), the website of the CCP, accessed at: people.com.cn/big5/151935/176588/176590/ html. 52. 中共中央, 中共中央通告第六十二号 选派同志报考黄埔军校 (1925 年 11 月 1 日 ), 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中央文件汇集 (1925 年 ) ( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1989) 页 265 [Central Committee of the CCP, The 62 Announcement of the Central Committee of the CCP Select Comrade to Apply Huangpu Military Academy (1st January, 1925) in Central Archive(ed.), The Collection of Central Document (1925) (Beijing : Central School of the CCP Press, 1989) p.265]. 53. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 65[Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL(Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.65]; Klaus Pringsheim, The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth Leagues( ), The China Quarterly, no.12, 1962, p.78.

103 93 league to the Academy, recruiting the students studying in Academy was more productive for recruiting Military talents into the Communist camp. Zhou Enlai was the political director of Huangpu Military Academy and he was also its major CCP leaders. He copied his experience of operating the Conscious Society in earlier years and developed members of the Party and the youth league on the basis of the student organizations he built. CCYL cadres were the main organizers in fulfilling Zhou s strategy. During the period when Zhou Enlai was Director of the Political Department at the Huangpu Military Academy (August1924 to January 1925), he was also Secretary of the Special Communist Party Branch in the academy. Based on its party and CCYL members, he set up the Spark Society ( 火星社 ) 54, Young Soldier Society ( 青年军人社 ) 55, and The Association of Chinese Young Soldiers ( 中国青年军人联谊会 ) 56 as soldier organizations for propagandizing Communist thought and recruiting members into the Communist camp. Official documents merely mention that these three organizations were set up on 54. Spark Society ( 火星社 ) was built in early 1925 by Zhou Enlai and other members of the CCP in Huangpu Military Academy. They were Li Laogong ( 李劳工 ), Zhou Yiqun ( 周逸群 ), Wang Bocang ( 王伯苍 ), Chen Gongpei ( 陈公培 ), XiaoRenhu ( 萧人鹄 ), Wu Zhenmin ( 吴振民 ), Chen Ruo ( 陈若 ), Xie Xuanqu ( 谢宣渠 ). And the meaning of Spark was copies the meaning of Lenin establishing Iskra. This society is a secret student organization which led by the CCP in Huangpu. And according to it, a reasonable number of students were recruited into the CCP and CCYL. Details please see: 黄雍 ( 火星舍成员 ), 火星舍成立, 广东革命历史博物馆 ( 编 ), 黄埔军校史料 ( 广州 : 广东人民出版社, 1982) 页 114 [Huang Yong (member of Spark Society), The Establishment of Spark Society in Guangdong Revolutionary History Museum (ed.), The Historical Material of Huangpu Military Academy (Guangzhou: Guangdong People Press, 1982) p.114]; 卜穗文, 大革命时期黄埔军校的军人团体, 黄埔, 2009 年第 5 期, 页 [Bo Shuiwen, Huangpu Soldier Association in Revolutionary Era, in Journal of Huangpu, vol.5, 2009, pp.37-39]. 55. Young Soldier Society ( 青年军人社 ) was a preparation organization of The Association of Chinese Young Soldier ( 中国青年军人联谊会 ). It established in January 1925, and the members of it were all members of the CCP and the CCYL. Details please see: 卜穗文, 大革命时期黄埔军校的军人团体, 黄埔, 2009 年第 5 期, 页 [Bo Shuiwen, Huangpu Soldier Association in Revolutionary Era, in Journal of Huangpu, vol.5, 2009, pp.37-39]. 56. The Association of Chinese Young Soldier ( 中国青年军人联谊会 ) was the most significant soldier organization in Huangpu and was established at 1st February The CCP members held the leadership position of the Association, and it had Association Journal-Chinese Soldier. And this journal is the opinion base of propagandizing Communism in Huangpu. It was dismissed in 14 April 1926 by Jiang Jieshi. Details please see: 曾扩情 ( 黄埔 1 期学生 ), 黄埔同学会始末, 全国政协文史资料研究委员会会 ( 编 ), 第一次国共合作时期的黄埔军校 ( 北京 : 文史资料出版社, 1984) 页 262 [Zeng Kuoqing (First batch student of Huangpu Military Academy), The History of Alumni Association of Huangpu Military Academy in Literature and history research committee in Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference(ed.), Huangpu Military Academy in the period of the First United Front (Beijing: Literature and History Press, 1984) p.262].

104 94 the basis of party and youth league members. However, according to the situation at that time and the nature of these organizations, we can safely assume that CCYL cadres were their main organizers. Firstly, although the Huangpu Military Academy was a joint project of the CCP and Kuomintang, anti-ccp thought prevailed in the Kuomintang. 57 CCP cadres held the teaching and management positions and as, if they publicly identified with political student organizations, this would provide an excuse for rightists within the KMT to attack the CCP. So compared with the party cadres, CCYL cadres were more suitable to operate these organizations. Secondly, the Spark Society, the Young Soldier Society, and the Association of Chinese Young Soldiers belonged to youth organizations. As the CCYL was formed on the basis of Communist student organizations and focused on motivating youth movements, in terms of youth affairs, particularly absorbing youths into the Communist camp, it was more capable than the party. According to data of the Huangpu Military Academy, from late 1925 to August 1927, it enrolled approximately 7,300 students and, Jiang Jieshi s confirmed list of members of the CCP and CCYL numbered more than Of the recruited soldiers, most became leaders of the army of the CCP; for example, in 1955, the Chinese Liberation Army began implementing a system of military ranks. There were 5 Huangpu graduates among the Ten Great Marshals, 3 among the Ten Great Generals, 8 among the Fifty-seven Generals, 9 among the One Hundred and Seventy Lieutenant Generals and 8 among the Major Generals. 59 Also, large 57. 刘建美, 以蒋介石为首的国民党新右派是怎样叛变革的的? [Liu Jianmei, How the New Rightest of Kuomintang which was led by Jiang Jieshi betrayed the Revolution ] website of the CCP, accessed at: 黄彪, 中国共产党早期军事活动概述, 军事历史研究, 1998 年 04 期, 页 [Huang Biao, The Introduction of the Early Military Activities of the CCP, Research of Military History, 1998, vol. 4, pp.81-87]; 蒋介石, 总理纪念周训词, 中央军事政治学校政治部 ( 编 ), 蒋校长演讲集 ( 台湾 : 中央陆军学校, 1927) [Jiang Jieshi, Instructions in Week of commemorating Prime Minister, collected in, Political Department in Central Military and Politics School(ed.), The Collection of the Speech of Principal Jiang (Taiwan: Central Military and Politics School, 1927)], website of Huangpu Military Academy, accessed at: Htm. 59. The list of the students of Huangpu who held the military rank above Major General: Ten Great Marshals: Ye Jianying( 叶剑英 ), Chen Yi( 陈毅 ), Lin Biao( 林彪 ), Xu Xiangqian( 徐向前 ), Nie Rongzhen( 聂荣臻 ); Ten Great General: Xu Guangda( 许光达 ), Chen Geng( 陈赓 ), Luo Ruiqing( 罗瑞卿 ); General: Yang Zhicheng( 杨志成 ), Song Shilun( 宋时轮 ), Zhang Zongxun( 张宗逊 ),

105 95 numbers of army leaders who died in the first and second civil wars, anti-japanese war and Korean War were also students of Huangpu recruited during this period Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institution: Peasantry Cadre The Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institute was, in practice, the first CCYL leadership training project in terms of developing rural cadres to encourage the peasantry to join the political movement. It was proposed and led by Peng Pai (Director of the Worker and Peasant Department of the Guangdong Communist Youth League) with funding support from the Kuomintang. 60 The No. 3 Report from the Guangdong Communist Youth League to the Central Committee of the CCYL (21th July, 1924), directly pointed out that Peng Pai was one of the leading members of the Guangdong Youth League who was sent to work in the Peasantry Ministry ( 农民部 ) in the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. And under the name of Peasantry Minister, he suggested that the Kuomintang set up a Peasantry Movement Training institution in Guangzhou. 61 The Report about Guangdong Peasantry Movement of the Guangdong Communist Party to the Central Committee of the CCP also mentioned that to gain financial support the Peasantry Movement Institution was operated under the name of the Kuomintang. 62 This institution was opened on 3rd July 1924, with its official teaching and research procedures confirmed in the Enlarged Meeting of the Guangdong ChenBojun( 陈伯钧 ),Chen Mingren( 陈明仁 ), ChenShihan( 陈奇涵 ), Zhou Shidi( 周士第 ), Guo Tianming( 郭天明 ); Lieutenant General:Wang Zheng( 王诤 ), Ni Zhiliang( 倪志亮 ), Guo Huaruo( 郭化若 ), Tang Tianji( 唐天际 ),Chang Qiankun( 常乾坤 ), Yan Kuiyao( 阎揆要 ), Peng Mingzhi( 彭明治 ), Zeng Zesheng( 曾泽生 ), Tan Xilin( 谭希林 ); Major General:Fang Zhizhong( 方之中 ), Zhou Wenzai( 周文在 ), Hong Shui( 洪水 ), Zhang Kaijing( 张开荆 ),Li Yimin( 李逸民 ), Yuan Yelie( 袁也烈 ), Cao Guanghua( 曹广化 ), Liao Yunzhou( 廖运周 ). Source from: Chen Yunzhe, Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision); Wolfgang Bartke, Who Was Who in the People's Republic of China: With More Than 3100 Portraits (Munich: K G Saur Verlag Gmbh & Co, 1998); Malcolm Lamb, Directory of Officials and Organizations in China (M E Sharpe Inc., 2003). 60. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 65[Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL(Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.65]. 61. 共青团广东区委, 广东区团委代理秘书刘尔崧给团中央的报告三号, 1924 年 7 月 21 日, 收藏于中央团校 [Guangdong Communist Youth League, No. 3 Report from the Guangdong Communist Youth League to Central Committee of the CCYL, 21th July, 1924, stored in the Central School of the CCYL]. 62. 广东区党委, 中国广东区委给党中央的汇报广东农民运动报告, 1926 年 10 月, 收录于中央档案馆 [Guangdong Communist Party, Report from Guangdong Communist Party to Central Committee of the CCP about the Guangdong Peasantry Movement", October 1926, stored in Central Archives].

106 96 Communist Party and Guangdong Communist Youth League. 63 Peng Pai's idea of not only establishing the Peasantry Movement Institution but also sending its graduates as commissioners to all local areas to establish peasantry associations was approved at the 39th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (30th June 1924). 64 Although this CCYL rural leadership training project conducted only 6 terms of training courses (from July 1924 to September 1926), it trained over 797 professional revolutionary cadres for the peasant movement who played leading roles in the Northern Expedition ( 北伐 ) and later in building the "armed independent regime of workers and peasants"( 工农武装割据 ). 65 Of its graduates, 1/3 were appointed as Special Assignees ( 特派员 ) by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang to all local areas in Guangdong and approximately 2/3 returned to their geographical origins to set up local peasant associations to operate peasant movements and establish armed forces of workers and peasants for the CCP and CCYL. 66 Most significantly, it also cultivated a large numbers of cadres who supported the worker and peasant line. In the subsequent period, they became one of the power bases of Mao Zedong. To be specific, there were five Directors of the Guangzhou Peasantry Movement Institution: Peng Pai, Luo Qiyuan, Yuan Shaoxian ( 阮啸仙 ), Tan Zhitang ( 谭植棠 ) and Mao Zedong, of whom the first three were killed in 1929, 1931 and 1935, respectively. After 1927, when Tan Zhitang lost contact with the CCP, only Mao Zedong remained in the Central Committee of the CCP. 63. 共青团广东区委, 广东区团委代理秘书刘尔崧给团中央的报告三号, 1924 年 7 月 21 日, 收藏于中央团校 [Guangdong Communist Youth League, No. 3 Report from the Guangdong Communist Youth League to Central Committee of the CCYL, 21th July, 1924, stored in the Central School of the CCYL]. 64. 罗琦园, 本部一年来工作报告概要, 中国农民 第二期 1926 年 1 月 [Luo Qiyuan, "the outline of the report of the work of Our Minister", Journal of Chinese Peasantry, vol. 2, January, 1926]. 65. There were 33 graduates in 1st term, 142 graduates in 2nd term, 114 graduates in 3rd term, 76 graduates and 25 auditors in 4th term, 114 graduates in 5th term, and 318 graduates in 6th term. So in total, the Guangzhou Peasantry Movement Institution has 797 graduates and 25 auditors. Besides that, many graduates were assigned the missions to return their hometown to establish familiar peasantry movement institution for training peasantry cadres, to organize the peasantry movement, to motivate the peasantry to supply logistics to the Northern Expeditionary Army, to establish armed peasantry army for the CCP. Details please see: 广州农民运动讲习所旧址纪念馆, 广州农民运动讲习所资料选编 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1987)[Old Museum of Guangzhou Peasantry Movement Institution, The Selective Material of the Guangzhou Peasantry Movement Institution (Beijing: People Press, 1987) ]. 66. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 65[Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL(Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.65].

107 97 As the Director of the institution, the relationship between Mao Zedong and the students of the Guangzhou Peasantry Movement Institution was similar to Jiang Jieshi and his Kuomintang students of the Huangpu Military Academy. So, to some degree, the Institution equipped Mao Zedong with an understanding of Peasantry cadres, which greatly assisted him to lead these students. To these students, Mao Zedong was the only director who was still working as the senior CCP leader. Mao was naturally regarded as their political leader Moscow Sun Yat-sen University: the Agent of the Comintern Moscow Sun Yat-sen University was established to implement the Lenin Eastern Strategy of developing political leaders to create a Chinese revolution. 67 In the period of the 1st United Front, it not only trained political leaders for Chinese Communist organizations (the CCP and CCYL) but also educated political leaders for the Kuomintang. Such a decision was announced by the Comintern agent in China, Mikhail Borodin (Russian name: Михаи л Бороди н, Chinese name: 米哈依尔 鲍罗廷 ), in the 66th Central Political Meeting of Kuomintang (7th October, 1925). And facilitated by Borodin, the Kuomintang and CCP soon established a selection Committee to choose talented Chinese Youths to study in that university. 68 During the period of the 1st United Front, there were three places from which students were recruited, Guangzhou, Beijing and Shanghai. The Kuomintang controlled Guangzhou while the CCP was in charge of selection matters in Beijing and Shanghai, with their approaches different. In this leadership training project, the CCYL was an active participant in selecting candidates, with most students trained as agents of the Comintern to control the leadership of the Chinese Communist movement before Mao Zedong came to 67. The speech of Henk Sneevliet in the fifth Meeting in the second congress of the Comintern(28th July, 1920), accessed at: 中共中央党史研究室 ( 编 ), 共产国际 联共 ( 布 ) 与中国革命文献资料选辑 ( ) ( 北京 : 北京图书馆出版社, 1997) 页 [Party History Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCP(ed.), The Documents Selection of the Comintern, the Soviet Union and Chinese Revolution( ) (Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 1997) pp ]. 68. 中华民国 留俄同学会, 六十年来中国留俄学生之风霜踔厉 ( 台北 : 中华文化基金会, 1988) 页 12 [Russian Alumni Association of the Republic of China, The Sixty Years History of Chinese Student Studying in Russia (Taipei: Chinese Culture Foundation, 1988) p.12]; Sheng Yue, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account, (New York: The University of Kansas, 1971) pp.7-19.

108 98 power, particularly the faction of 28 Bolsheviks ( 二十八个布尔什维克 ). On the other hand, it also acted as an effective political organization for absorbing the offspring of Kuomintang leaders. At the Second Congress of Communist Youth International (July, 1921), Zhang Tailei, the representative of the CCYL had already decided to send the youth league cadres to Moscow to receive Communist training. In the future, these cadres could become the political leaders of the Communist movement in China. 69 Sending young political cadres to Moscow Sun Yat-sen University fulfilled this previous arrangement between Zhang Tailei and the Communist Youth International. On 20th May 1925, the Central Committee of the CCP made a special announcement requiring all local committees of the Party and youth league to select talented youth for further study at Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, clearly pointing out that their task was to learn how to create a revolution rather than be a researcher. 70 From the CCP s perspective, as the students who went to Moscow were regarded as orthodox Communists who knew how to do this, they were competitive candidates for leadership in the CCP. Beijing and Shanghai were the two bases for choosing candidates to go to Moscow. Li Dazhao led the selection mission in Beijing and Yang Mingzhai ( 杨明斋, the former translator of Grigori Naumovich Voitinsky) handled communications with the Comintern and selections in Shanghai. These two men directly guided the establishment of the Beijing and Shanghai Communist Youth League branches. In total, they selected 100 Chinese youths (50 from Beijing and 50 from Shanghai), including Wang Ming ( 王明 ) and the other 27 Bolsheviks. One thing should be noticed is that subsequent CCP leaders, Wang Ming ( 王明 ) and the other 28 Bolsheviks, were youths selected in this program. From the case of Wang Ming, we can see the decisive role of the youth league in selecting candidates for Moscow. In June 1925, Wang Ming was merely a cadre of the Wuhan Student Association which was under the leadership of the Hunan Communist Youth League. 69. 李亚平, 张太雷 : 共产国际中国第一任, 党史纵览 2010 年 11 期, 页 [Li Yaping, Zhang Tailei: The First Chinese in the Comintern, Party History Review, vol.11, 2010, pp.32-35]. 70. 徐则浩, 王稼祥传 ( 北京 : 当代中国出版社, 1996) 页 [Xu Zehao, The Bibliography of Wang Jiaxiang (Beijing: Modern China Press, 1996) pp.48-53].

109 99 He was probably familiar with the youth league, rather than the Party. He successfully joined the CCYL in September 1925, and with the recommendation from the youth league, he soon became a member of CCP in October He received an offer from the Moscow Sun Yat-sen University in 25th October Apart from the candidates from China, the Europe Branch of the CCYL selected 21 cadres for Moscow, including Deng Xiaoping ( 邓小平 ), Fu Zhong ( 傅钟 ) and its main leaders. They were first enrolled in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (also known as the Moscow Far East University). However, as some executive members of the Comintern believed that Moscow Sun Yat-sen University was the ground for developing future leaders for the Chinese revolution, it was deemed to be more appropriate for their education and they were transferred there after 12 days in Moscow s Far East University. 72 Moscow Sun Yat-sen University helped to absorb the Kuomintang leadership candidates into the Communist camp; for example, the family of Shao Lizi ( 邵力子 ). Before April 1927, this university was supervised by the Soviets and Kuomintang, with Shao Lizi the Kuomintang s permanent representative there. 73 However, his son, Shao Zhigang ( 邵志刚 ), and wife, Fu Xuewen ( 傅学文 ), were recruited into the youth league. In Moscow, Shao Zhigang became a loyal Communist and even recommended that Jiang Jinguo (the son of Jiang Jieshi) join the CCYL in December 1925 who, after graduation, was appointed as Director of the International Department of the Far-east Bureau of the Comintern and Secretary of the YCI 周国全, 郭德宏, 王明年谱 ( 合肥 : 安徽人民出版社, 1991) 页 12 [Guo Guoquan and Guo Dehong, Chronicle of Wang Ming(Hefei: Anhui People Press, 1991) p.12]. 72. Alexander Pantsov and Daria Spichak, Deng Xiaoping in Moscow ( ): Ideological Development of a Chinese Reformer, Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 4, 2011, pp Official Documents of Kuomintang: 胡汉民, 一九二六年四月胡汉民自莫斯科致广州国民党中央的电报 [Hu Hanmin, Telegram From Hu Hanmin in Moscow to Central Committee of Kuomintang (April 1964)]; 国民党, 国民党中政会第 139 次会议 ( 一九二六年五月五日 ) [Kuomintang, The 139th Political Meeting of Central Committee of Kuomintang(5th May, 1926) ] ; 国民党, 中执会第 27 次全会 ( 一九二六年五月十一日 ) 的决定 [Kuomintang, The Decision of the 27th Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang(11th May, 1926) ]; 国民党, 国民党中央一九二六年五月十五日致拉狄克的电报 [Kuomintang, The Telegram From Central Committee of Kuomintang to Radek (15th May, 1926) ], all stored in 台北国民党党史会 [Taipei Kuomintang Party History Association]. 74. 散目, 邵力子之子罗马遇刺案, 团结报, 2011 年 7 月 14 日 [San Mu, Son of Shao Lizi was killed in Rome, United Newspaper, 14th July 2011].

110 The CCYL and Factional Struggle in Moscow Sun Yat-sen University The students sent by the CCYL actively participated in the factional struggles in Moscow Sun Yat-sen University. Two batches of CCYL students were recruited into different factions. The formation of the faction of 28 Bolsheviks was a good example of how the CCYL was not itself an independent political faction, but a source of political leaders for different kinds of factions. According to the memoir of Sheng Yue ( 岳盛 ), a member of the 28 Bolsheviks, the formation this faction began from a power struggle for the principal position in Moscow Sun Yat-sen University. This faction was formed in a series of struggle against the Second Line Coalition which was the coalition which did not obey the leadership of Mif and Wang Ming in Sun Yan-set University. 75 In 1927, conflicts between the Kuomintang and CCP caused a new power struggle between Stalin and Trotsky. Because he supported Trotsky at that time, Karl Radek resigned from the position of Principal of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University while the Vice-principal Pavel Mif was in China, with this vacuum causing a factional struggle between the factions of Agoor s academic and Sednikov-led party affairs. To increase the power and influence of their factions, both leaders started to recruit influential student leaders into their camps. Agoor successfully recruited Yu Xiusong ( 俞秀松 ), Zhou Dawen ( 周达文 ) and Dong Yixiang ( 董亦湘 ) from the first batch the CCYL sent while Sednikov won the support of Zhang Wentian ( 张闻天 ) and Shen Zemin ( 沈泽民 ). When Mif returned from China, he found that the struggle had created chaos in the university, with many students not supporting either side, and that a third force tired of factional struggle had been formed. Wang Ming persuaded Mif to support this force, unite with Sednikov and beat Agoor s faction. As a result, Mif won the position of Principal of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University and regarded Wang Ming as his ally. It was the first time a political alliance was formed between Wang Ming and Zhang Wentian, Shen Zemin, etc., and was widely regarded as the origin of the Sheng Yue, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account (New York: The University of Kansas, 1971) pp

111 101 Bolsheviks faction. 76 In September 1927, when the first batch of students graduated, Mif strongly recommended that Wang Ming work in the university where he held the positions of translator for the propaganda staff of the Branch Bureau and Secretary of the Party Committee. 77 Following the struggle between the academic and party affairs factions, with the support of Mif, Wang Ming started to form and lead the student faction in Sun Yat-sen University. To consolidate his power, Wang Ming introduced anti-trotsky activities into the university and initiated a series of struggles against his enemy, the factional coalition he called the "Second Line" which included the "Jiangsu-Zhejiang Countrymen's Association" (the remnants of the former academic affairs faction led by Yu Xiusong and Dong Yixiang), "Vanguardists among CCYL Members in the University" (led by the CCYL branch in Moscow Sun Yan-set University) and the "Worker Oppositionists" (led by Li Jianyu and Yu Dusan). With the support of the Bureau of the Party Branch and university, Wang Ming beat the "Second Line", with he and his 27 core members favorably impressed by the leaders of the Comintern, especially Mif. Therefore, when Mif was later appointed as a member of the Executive Council of the Comintern to handle the affairs of the CCP, the 28 Bolsheviks became his favorite agents for controlling the CCP leadership. Reviewing the history of the factional struggle in Moscow Sun Yat-sen University is a good example to reveal the role of the CCYL in factional struggles. It was not an independent faction, but provided members to the political factions. As, in the beginning, the factional struggle was, in practice, a power struggle for the position of Principal of Moscow Sun Yat-sen University among the existing leaders Mif, Agoor and Sednikov, it should not have been of concern for Chinese students. However, during it, as the faction leaders recruited student leaders into their camp to 76. Sheng Yue, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account (New York: The University of Kansas, 1971) pp ; 王中文, 斗争激烈的赤都圣地 - 莫斯科中山大学全程实录 ( 中 ), 党史纵横 2003, 2 期, 页 21 [Wang Zhongwen, Fierce Struggle in Communist Shrine-The Memoir of Sun Yan-set University (II), Journal of Over the Party History, 2003, vol.2, p.21]. 77. 周国全, 郭德宏, 王明年谱 ( 合肥 : 安徽人民出版社, 1991) 页 19 [Guo Guoquan and Guo Dehong, Chronicle of Wang Ming(Hefei: Anhui People Press, 1991) p.19].

112 102 increase their power, the CCYL then became a pool from which faction leaders could be selected. Based on the strategy of the struggle, the factions of Mif and Sednikov were united, with Wang Ming and Zhang Wentian from the second batch of CCYL students playing significant roles. Wang Ming led the 28 Bolsheviks formed in the subsequent factional struggle which he successfully linked to the anti-trotsky movement and relied on support from outside to beat his enemy. As this faction, which was comprised of the second batch of CCYL students, did not have any organizational form but was united only by the need to fight for power or ideological position, it was a loose group rather than a well-organized organization. 3.3 Development of the CCYL in the Jiangxi Soviet Period The split between the CCP and Kuomintang led to great suffering in the CCYL. From March 1927 to mid-1928, approximately 310,000 people, including more than 20,000 CCYL members, were murdered by the Kuomintang 78 and the CCYL became an illegal organization in areas controlled by the Kuomintang. Therefore, along with the CCP, it started exploring building a Soviet regime in a rural area of China. In the Jiangxi Soviet period, the CCYL s role as the Second Party did not change and, like the CCP, its leadership was dominated by the "28 Bolsheviks (i.e. Returned Students). Its main activities were concentrated on building a revolutionary base, and it extended its branches into the army and also operated some cadre training projects for the Chinese Communist revolution The Recovery of the CCYL in Jiangxi Soviet Area In the Jiangxi Soviet period, Mao Zedong played a significant role in the recovery of the CCYL. His preference for recruiting rural youths also assisted the recovery of the membership of the youth league in rural area. But in the process of the power struggle between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming, the practical power of the Soviet Regime was captured by the 28 Bolshevik. During this process, the Central Bureau of the Youth League in the Soviet Area (CBYLSA, 少共苏区中央局 ) was set 78. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 110[Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.110].

113 103 up to take the place of the leading organ of the CCYL, and the leadership of the CCYL also fell into the hands of the 28 Bolshevik. To be specific, the first Soviet Regime was built in Jiangxi Province under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhude ( 朱德 ). Subsequently, following the example of Jiangxi, several guerrilla leaders started establishing revolutionary bases in rural areas, such as Peng Dehuai ( 彭德怀 ) and Teng Daiyuan ( 滕代远 ) on the Hunan- Hubei-Jiangxi border and He Long ( 贺龙 ) and Zhou Yiqun ( 周逸群 ) in Western Hunan. However, of all these bases, the development of the CCYL in that in Jiangxi was the most significant. In 1931, the Central Committees of the CCP and CCYL moved to Ruijin ( 瑞金, the capital of the Jiangxi Soviet Regime) after which this regime was regarded as the center of the Chinese Communist movement. When establishing the Jiangxi Soviet Regime, recovering CCYL branches was considered crucial by Mao Zedong. In December 1927, when he reached the Jinggang Mountain, he immediately selected party members in the army (Mao Zetan, Chen Dongri, Zhao Fazhong, Zhu Yunqing, etc.) for the villages of the Hunan-Jiangxi border (such as: Qiaolin, Changfuqiao, Getian and Dalong) to set up CCP and CCYL branches. In January 1928, when Mao Zedong's army took over Shuichuan County, he immediately assigned party members (Chen Zhengren, Luo Mingfeng, Wang Suiren, and Li Zhengfang, and Xiao Wankui) to recover the committees of the Suichuan Party and Youth League. Until then, all branches of the youth league had operated in secret under the cover of being different kinds of night schools. 79 However, unlike previous practices, nearly all members of the Jiangxi Youth League were peasants and, as the criteria for recruiting members of the CCP and CCYL rested largely on social origins, poor peasants were preferred. 80 By April 1928, the membership of the CCYL in Jiangxi reached The major work of the CCYL at that time was to offer different kinds of training courses for rural youths, with party or army leaders, such as Mao Zedong and Zhu De, 79. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]. 80. Interview with Hu Xianzhong ( 胡献忠 ), the vice-director of the Central Archives of the CCYL; 81. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 118[Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.118].

114 104 often invited to be teachers. During their education, politics was central and many future CCP party leaders were influenced by these courses and later joined the CCP. According to Tan Qilong ( 谭启龙 ), "the Chanmulong ( 杉木陇 ) Youth League training course (one of the CCYL training courses in Jiangxi) was my first school, it gave me political enlightenment. And because of it, I decided to become a Communist." 82 The CCYL s work in Jiangxi achieved several changes. Firstly, the composition of the CCYL changed from mainly students to peasants which greatly assisted the this league to be rooted in the rural area. Secondly, as the CCYL handled the training task for the CCP, it became experienced in training rural cadres for the party. However, when the 28 Bolsheviks returned to China, in the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Central Committee of the CCP (7th January 1931, Shanghai), with the support of Mif (the representative of the Comintern), they gained control of the leadership of both the CCP and CCYL. 83 The 28 Bolshevik started to assign Special Commissioners ( 特派员 ) to take over the leadership of every Soviet Regime. The Jiangxi Soviet Regime was their main focus and became the location of new central authority of the CCP and the CCYL. In December 1932, Gu Zuolin ( 顾作霖 ) was assigned to Jiangxi to lead the CCYL affairs in the Soviet Area. From 15th to 20th January 1932, the 1st Congress of the CCYL in this area proclaimed the establishment of the Central Bureau, the highest leadership institution in the All-Soviet Area, which existed for approximately a year. When the CCYL headquarters moved from Shanghai to Ruijin in January 1933, these institutions combined to form the Central Bureau of the CCYL. In May 1933, after Gu Zuolin was sent to become the Party Secretary of Fujian-Guangxi Province, Kai Feng ( 凯丰 ) (a close follower of Bo Gu,, core leader of the "28 Bolshevik") inherited his position and formally started the period of the "returned students" leading the CCYL in the Soviet Area. 82. 谭启龙, 回忆青少年时期的谈话记录 (1980 年 5 月 16 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( 第 7 册 )( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1989) [Tan Qilong, Record on Tan Qilong's memory of his period of Adolescence (16th May 1980), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement(vol.7) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1989)]. 83. Sheng Yue, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account (New York: The University of Kansas, 1971) p. 239.

115 105 During the period of Gu Zuolin, the numbers of CCYL branches and members increased: for example, in February 1932, the number of members of the CCYL in the Jiangxi Soviet Regime was approximately 10,389 but, after two months, about 10,675 new members were recruited and, by December 1932, there were more than 29,000 members. In all the Soviet Areas and Red Army, the membership of the CCYL numbered over 100, The Development of the CCYL in the Red Army Whereas, in the Huangpu Military Academy, the CCYL trained and recruited military talent, in Jiangxi, it was the first time it was installed in the CCP's army and established its own armed force. From then, it developed into the army system of the CCP. Historically, in the "Resolution on Military Work"( 军事工作决议案 ) (16th July 1928), for the first time, the Central Committee of the CCYL proposed building CCYL branches in the Red Army which had already been implemented in Mao Zedong s Army. 85 In November 1930, the political department of the corp-level army (superior level) ( 军级以上政治部 ) established a youth department and the divisionlevel army (subordinate level) ( 师级以下 ) a CCYL committee or branch. The mission of the CCYL in the Red Army focused on raising the educational level and political awareness of young soldiers. 86 In the Jiangxi period, the CCYL was not only installed in the Red Army but also established its own armed force, the Young Communist International Division (YCID, 少共国际师 ). To be specific, in May 1933, in the name of the political department of the Red Army, the CCYL Army Committee suggested that the Central Committee of 84. 刘晓农, 少共苏区中央局书记顾作霖, 红广角, 2012 年 10 月, 页 29 [Liu Xiaonong, "The Secretary of the Central Bureau of the CCYL in Soviet Area Gu Zuolin", in Journal of Red Corner, October 2012, p.29]. 85. 共青团中央, 军事工作决议案 (1928 年 7 月 16 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 (4) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1957) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, "Resolution on Military Work (16th July, 1928), collected in General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement(4)(Beijing: China Youth Press, 1957) pp ]. 86. 裕成, 建立红军中的青年工作, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( 第 7 册 ) ( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1989) 页 513[Yu Cheng, Set up the Youth Work in Red Army", collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement(vol.7) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1989) p.513].

116 106 the CCP should establish a Young Communist International Division. 87 At that time, Jiang Jieshi was mobilizing more than one million troops to destroy the Jiangxi Soviet Regime. Facing this strong enemy, as the CCP and Red Army needed all kinds of force devoted to this battle, the proposal was approved by the Political Department of the Red Army and Central Bureau of the CCYL in the Soviet Area. 88 On 23th May 1933, this Central Bureau sent a military conscription order to the CCYL Provincial Committees in Jiangxi, Fujian, and Fujian-Guangxi commanding them to select excellent members of the CCYL and Young Pioneers to form three Vanguard Regiments ( 先锋团 ) of 4,000, 2,000 and 2,000 soldiers, respectively. 89 The Division was was established in Ningdu County in Jiangxi on 5th August 1933 and, because of the enthusiasm of its CCYL members, it comprised more than 10,000 youths with an average age of about 18. The Division Commanders, Chen Guang ( 陈光 ), Wu Gaoqun ( 吴高群 ), Peng Shaohui ( 彭绍辉 ) and Cao Lihuai ( 曹里怀 ), and the Division Commissars, Feng Wenbin ( 冯文彬 ) and Xiao Hua ( 肖华 ), were approximately 20 years old. 90 During the fifth anti-encircling and suppression campaign, this division won numerous battles and received the title of "Iron Fist" from Zhu De ( 朱德 ), Zhou Enlai ( 周恩来 ) and Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 ). 91 In the Long March, the CCYL Army was incorporated into the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army ( 红一军团 ). 92 Although, from 萧华, 中国青年的灿烂花朵 回忆 少共国际师, 艰苦岁月 ( 上海 : 上海文艺出版社, 1983) 页 94 [Xiao Hua, The Beautiful Flower of Chinese Youth- memory of the Young Communist international Division in Hard Time (Shanghai: Shanghai Literature and Art Press, 1983) p.94]. 88. 少共中央局, 关于创立 少共国际师 的决定, 青年实话 第 2 卷第 16 期, 1933 年 5 月 21 日 [Central Bureau of CCYL, Concerning the Decision of Establishing Young Communist International Division, Journal of Youth Truth, vol2, no.16, 21 May 1933], the website of the CCYL, accessed at: 少共苏区中央局, 少共苏区中央局关于创立 少共国际师 的决定, 中央文献研究室 ( 编 ), 建国以来重要文件选编 ( ) (10 册 )( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 212 [Central Bureau of the CCYL, The Decision of Central Bureau of the CCYL of Establishing Young Communist international Division, Central Party Literature Research Office(ed.), The Selections of Import Document since the Establishment of the People s Republic of China ( ) (vol.10) (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) p.212]. 90. 秦利娜, 什么是少共国际师, 人民论坛, 1997 第 5 期, 页 62 [Qin Lina, What is Communist Youth International Division, Journal of People's Tribune, vol.5, 1997, p.62]. 91. 彭绍辉, 彭绍辉日记 ( 北京 : 军事科学出版社, 2005) 页 63 [Peng Shaohui, Diary of Peng Shaohui (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2005) p. 63]. 92. 周恩来, 关于各军团缩编的命令, 收录于, 周恩来军事文选 (1 卷 ) ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1997) 页 373 [Zhou Enlai, Concerning the Order of Downsizing All Army, Military Collection of

117 107 to 1934, this division had existed for less than a year, numerous senior generals of the People s Liberation Army (PLA) joined it at an early age. Like other organs of the CCP, Soviet Government and other mass organizations, the Central Bureau of the CCYL was practically dismissed during the period of the Long March, with its cadres enrolled into the Red Army to help lead the expedition. At the beginning of the Long March, all organizations of the Central Committee of the CCP, Central Revolutionary Military Committee and Central Government were divided into two military columns ( 纵队 ) (with codes of Red Start 红星 and Red Seal 红章 ). 93 The CCYL, along with the central mechanisms of the CCP, Soviet Government, Red Army University, Second Bureau of the Central Military Commission and Workers Union, was enrolled into the Second Column which had approximately 9,583 soldiers. 94 In terms of the cadres of the CCYL, most were appointed into the Political Department of the Red Army from where they started their Army careers; for example, of the leading staff in the Central Bureau of the CCYL at that time, Kai Feng (Secretary of the Central Bureau) was appointed the party s representative in the Ninth Army Corps of the Red Army ( 红九军团 ), 95 Liu Ying ( 刘英 ) (Chief of the Organizational Department) held the position of the Director of the Political Department of the Third Column 96 and Hu Yaobang (Chief of the Propaganda Department) was sent to work in the headquarters of the Second Column The Development of the CCYL in Cadre Training During the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Regime, the CCYL operated several cadre-training projects for the Chinese Communist revolution, including the Young Zhou Enlai(vol.1) (Beijing: People Press, 1997) p.373 ]. 93. 罗平汉, 红军长征日记 : 长征初期失策的大搬家, 同舟共济 2010 年, 第八期 [Luo Pinghan, The Diary of Red Army: The Wrong Strategy of Move House in the Early Period of Long March, in Journal of Solidarity, vol.8, 2010], the website of the CCP, accessed at: people.com.cn/big5/85039/ html. 94. 中革军委, 野战军人员武器弹药供给统计表之据 (1934 年 10 月 8 日 ), 藏于中央档案馆 [The Central Revolutionary Military Committee of the CCP, The Statics Form of All (8 th October, 1934), stored in Central Archive]. 95. 张学龙, 凯丰传 ( 南昌 : 百花洲文艺出版社, 2010) 页 [Zhang Xuelong, Bibliography of Kai Feng(Nanchang: Hundred Flower Land Press, 2010) pp ]. 96. Website of Xinhua, The Obituary of Liu Ying, 3rd September 2002, website of China News, accessed at:

118 108 Pioneers in the Soviet Area ( 苏区少年先锋队, also called Young Pioneers) for developing military cadres, the Lenin School of the CCYL ( 列宁团校 ) for training party and government leaders and the Communist Children Corps ( 共产主义儿童团, also called the Children Corps) for cultivating CCYL cadres. In terms of developing military cadres, the Young Pioneers group in this period was different from that after 1949 as it was a semi-military youth organization comprised of two types of youths, one aged between 16 and 23 who were not from the exploiting classes (landlord, capitalist and rich peasant) 97 and the other all the members of the CCYL in the Soviet Area which constituted a very large group. 98 The organizational structure of the Young Pioneers appeared like a pyramid and was closely led by the CCYL. Similar to the youth league, from its central area to villages, it had 6 organizational levels (central, provincial, country, section, town and village). For each level, the youth league at the same level was its leadership organization. 99 In May 1930, the Young Pioneers had more than 300,000 members in the Jiangxi Soviet Area where the population was less than 3 million. 100 The Young Pioneers had three missions (political, economic and military) for training three types of party or army cadres. Politically, they contributed mainly to the agrarian revolution and public security in the Soviet Area and, economically, to implementing the economic policy of the CCP while the military mission was the major part of their work. In the period of war preparation, on the one hand, they handled the job of recruiting youths to join the Red Army and, on the other, helped to 97. 苏维埃区域少年先锋队, 苏维埃区域少年先锋队章程 (1932 年 5 月 5 日苏区少先队第一次会议通过 ), 藏于中国革命博物馆 [Youth Pioneers in Soviet Area, The Constitution of the Youth Pioneers in Soviet Area (5th May 1932, approved in the 1st meeting of Young Pioneers). Stored in the Museum of Chinese Revolution, the website of the CCYL, accessed at: /gqt_tuanshi/gqt_ghlc/his_wx/his_wx_1932_1941/200704/t _23406.htm. 98. 共青团中央局, 共青团中央局决议 (1930 年 11 月 9 日 ), 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( 第 8 册 )( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1990) 页 [Central Bureau of the CCYL, Solution of the Central Bureau of the CCYL(9th November 1930), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement(vol.8) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1990) pp ]. 99. 少先队中央总队部, 苏区少先队各级队部组织条例 (1933 年 3 月 23 日颁布 ), 藏于共青团档案馆 [The Central Young Pioneers, Organizational Regulation of All Level Young Pioneer in Soviet Area(approved in 23 March 1933), stored in the Archived of CCYL] 少先队中央总队部, 少年先锋队工作大纲 (1933 年 6 月 19 日 ), 藏于共青团档案馆 [The Central Young Pioneers, Work Outline of Communist Young Pioneers (19 June, 1930), stored in the Archives of the CCYL].

119 109 train recruited soldiers. In war time, the Young Pioneers was one of the most powerful military forces for guerrilla warfare. In November 1933, Mao Zedong wrote the report "The Investigation in Changgang County"( 长冈乡调查 ) which highly praised the Young Pioneers and further claimed that all youths should be recruited into it or the Red Guards to receive political and military education. 101 In terms of training Soviet cadres for the party and government, the Lenin School was the first specialized CCYL school for training Communist cadres in the history of the CCYL and was the product of the CCYL implementing the resolution for "Solution of the Cadre Problems"(27th August 1931)( 关于干部问题的决议 ). Specifically, in October 1931, after the success of the third anti-encircling and suppression campaign, the Red Army controlled 21 counties and the Jiangxi Soviet Regime needed further consolidation. At that time, the CCP claimed that cadres were the key to successfully building and maintaining the Soviet Regime 102 and the CCYL contributed to the Lenin School to systematically train Soviet ones for the party. The Lenin School of the CCYL was established in Yangxi Village ( 洋溪村 ) on the 24th December The Secretary of Central Bureau of the CCYL, Gu Zuolin was the Principal of the School. The first batch of students numbered 124, with ages between 14 and They were the selected CCYL cadres from Red Army, and Local Committees of the CCYL (Provincial Level, District Level, and County Level) in Soviet Area. 105 The curriculum of the course included Party and youth league History, Politics, Geography, and Guerrilla tactics, etc. Leaders of the Party, Youth League, Government, and Army were invited to be part of the teaching staff. Party leaders Ren Bishi and Mao Zedong taught Party history and Soviet History 101. 毛泽东, 长冈乡调查, 毛泽东文选 ( 第一卷 )( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1993)[Mao Zedong, The Investigation in Changgang County in Collection of Mao Zedong(vol.1) (Beijing: People Press, 1993)] 中共中央, 中央关于干部问题的决议 (1931 年 8 月 27 日 ), 藏于中央档案馆 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Solution of Cadre Problem (27th August 1931), stored in Central Archive], the website of the CCP, accessed at: html Central School of CCYL, The School History of the Central School of the CCYL, the website of Central School of the CCYL, accessed at: 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 124 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.124] CCP, The First Youth Work Conference of the Red Army(1932), the website of Xinhua, accessed at:

120 110 respectively. CCYL leader Gu Zuolin taught the history of the CCYL. Soviet Government leaders Lu Dingyi ( 陆定一 ) and Xu Teli ( 徐特立 ) taught geography and Politics respectively. And Officials from the Red Army taught Guerrilla tactics. 106 Given the teaching staff of the Lenin school, we can infer that the quality of the education was high. By the same token, the students of the Lenin School were able to build up teacher- student relation with the Leaders of the Party, Youth League, Government and Army. It could greatly enhance their opportunity to be selected into a leadership position in the future. And after graduation, they were sent to different leadership positions to operate the fourth Anti-Encircling and Suppression. 107 In terms of cultivating CCYL Cadres for the Soviet Area, the Children s Corps ( 儿童团 ) was to build reserves for the CCYL. That is to say, the same as the CCP, the youth league also focused on developing its own leadership candidates in the Chinese Communist movement. At the 5th National Congress of the CCYL, it was decided to establish Children Corps to cultivate reserves for the CCYL which, during the guerrilla period, were called Labor Children Corps ( 劳动儿童团 ) but only a small number of counties in Jiangxi established them. After December 1930, this name was changed to Communist Children Corps( 共产主义儿童团 ) and, along with development of the revolutionary base, in 1932, the number of Children Corps members of the in Jiangxi was more than 151,059, with almost all the children in Jiangxi joining; for example, in 1932, the Xinguo County of Jiangxi had only 29,163 children (aged between 7 and 14) but more than 28,714 in the Children Corps. Of the missions of the Children Corps, selecting and training excellent children to become CCYL cadres was one of the most significant. In "The Resolution on the Children's Movement" (6th July 1928) ( 儿童运动工作决议案 ), the CCYL decided for the first time to set up a Children Corps as a reserve of the CCYL, with the ages of its members between 7 and 15 years and their social origins workers, 106. 王连弟, 中国共青团第一所团校的创建, 中国青年研究, 1990 年 04 期, 页 [Wang Liandi, The Establishment of the 1st School of the CCYL, Chinese Youth Research, vol.4, 1990, pp.47-48] Interview with the Curator of the Archives of Central School of the CCYL: Prof. Tong Jing.

121 111 peasants or soldiers. In this resolution, the CCYL explicitly directed local CCYL committees to select activists of the Children Corps to join the "Children Cadre Class" ( 儿童干部班 ) to train them to become cadres for running the children's movement. It also directed them to select brave ones to join the Young Pioneers -- another CCYL project for developing military talent. 108 Famous CCYL and CCP leaders, such as Hu Yaobang ( 胡耀邦 ), were selected and trained in the Children Corps Summary This chapter has examined the relationship development between the CCP and the CCYL in the period from 1922 to In this period, after the relationship adjustment, the CCYL became a subordinate organization of the CCP. But it practically served as a rival organization to the leadership of the CCP (i.e. Second Party) within the Chinese Communist movement. In the 1st United Front period, with support from the Comintern, the CCP successfully turned the CCYL into a subordinate organization of the party although, in many ways, it was a rival organization to the party; for example, it challenged Chen Duxiu and the leadership of the CCP. In the period of the Jiangxi Soviet Regime, the CCYL soon recovered after the suffering of the Kuomintang purges. Like the CCP, its leadership was controlled by the 28 Bolsheviks which demonstrated the great influence of the Comintern in the development of Chinese Communism. Together with the CCP, it not only extended its influence in the Red Army system but also established its own military force. As a Communist party, the CCYL actively contributed to training projects for cadres. From the revolutionary ones in the 1st United Front period (Moscow Sun Yat 共青团中央, 儿童运动工作决议案 (1928 年 7 月 16 日通过 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) ( 第 4 册 )( 北京 : 中国共青团中央委员会办公厅, 1982) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, "The Resolution of Children Movement"(6th July 1928), collected in, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement (vol.4) (Beijing: General Office of the CCYL, 1982) pp ] 陈利明, 胡耀邦 : 从红小鬼道总书记 ( 上卷 )( 北京 : 人民日报出版社, 2013) 页 [Chen Liming, Hu Yaobang: From Red Boy to The General Secretary](vol.)(Beijing: People Newspaper, 2013) pp.23-35].

122 112 sen University, Guangzhou Peasant Movement Institute and Huangpu Military Academy) to those in the Jiangxi Soviet period (the Young Pioneers in the Soviet Area, Lenin School of the CCYL and Communist Children Corps), the CCYL always emphasized developing its reserve of talent. In addition, Moscow Sun Yat-sen University proved that the CCYL was not a faction in its own right but contributed to factional struggles in CCP politics.

123 113 SECTION II: The Mao Zedong Period of CCYL Development, : CCYL as a Corporatist Mass Organization

124 114 CHAPTER FOUR The CCYL and the Rise of Mao Zedong ( ) This chapter analyzes the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP in the first stage of the Mao Zedong period ( ). In this stage, Mao Zedong gradually became the core leader of the CCP which had not yet become the ruling party of China. This period arguably started from the "Zunyi Conference"( 遵义会议 January 1935) and ends with the establishment of the People s Republic of China (1 st October 1949). The main historical feature of this stage is that the Chinese society was at war both within itself and with the Japanese invaders. Historically, Mao rose to be de facto decision-making core of the CCP (the standing Committee of the Politburo) and became one of the main leaders of the Red Army after the Zunyi Conference. 1 In the subsequent Sino-Japanese War( ), with the endorsement of the Comintern and his military achievements, Mao successfully overcame his opponents and became the political leader of the CCP at the Sixth Plenum Meeting of the Sixth National Congress of the CCP (29 th September- 6 th November, 1938). And when "Mao Zedong Thought" was upheld in the "Yanan Rectification Movement"( 延安整风 February 1942-May 1945), Mao finally ended the worship of the Comintern, and established himself as the supreme ideological leader of the CCP. 2 This chapter argues that the CCYL s relationship with the CCP was practically changed through a reconstruction and a rebuilding. In this period the CCYL was changed from a Second Communist party to a Party-led mass organization with multiple functions. Specifically, in the reconstruction, the CCYL was broken into the Central Youth Committee ( 中央青委 ) and several Anti-Japanese youth organizations by the CCP in 1. Benjamin Yang, The Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao's Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party, The China Quarterly, no.106, June 1986, pp Thomas Kampen, Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and the Triumph of Mao Zedong-Thought ( ), Modern Asian Studies, vol.23, no.4, 1989, pp

125 115 Sino-Japanese War period. The Second Party role of the youth league was completely dismissed. The Central Youth Committee of the Party and the Northwest Youth Salvation Association together fulfilled the role of the youth league in the Sino- Japanese war period. And they played three functions in Chinese Communist movement: undertaking the political socialization of youths, developing young cadres, and participating in the building of border area governments. But among these, undertaking the political socialization of youths was its main function. In the following period of Civil War between the CCP and Kuomintang ( 国内战争时期, August 1945-June 1949), the CCP initiated a bottom-up rebuilding process of the youth league. In this process, the youth league was rebuilt as a Party-led mass organization to continue fulfilling its previous multiple functions. This chapter has five main sections. Section 4.1 reviews the reconstruction of the CCYL in the Sino-Japanese war. Section 4.2 analyzes the Party-led mass organization role of the reconstructed youth league in war period. Section 4.3 explores the causes of this reconstruction. Section 4.4 focuses on the incentives for rebuilding the youth league at that time. Section 4.5 presents the bottom up rebuilding process of the youth league and its reasons. The final section summarizes the major findings. 4.1The Reconstruction of the CCYL in the Sino-Japanese War ( ) The CCYL was reconstructed by the CCP in Sino-Japanese war. This process can be regarded as a continuation of the relationship adjustments between the CCP and the CCYL explored in the previous section of this thesis. After this reconstruction, the CCYL was no longer a rival to the CCP and became the Party-led mass organization. In this period, Zhang was the general secretary of the CCP. So he represented Mao Zedong faction to play a significant role in this process. Historically, after the Long March (October 1934-Octorber 1936), the Central Red Army reached Wuqi County in Northern Shanxi Province ( 吴起镇, 陕北 ). It not only meant the end of the Long March of the CCP and the Red Army, but also represented the CCP entering a new historical stage of the Chinese Communist movement. 3 Because of the invasion of Japanese forces, the CCP actually got a 3. Concerning the history of Chinese Long March, please see: Harrison, James Pinckney, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party (Westport: Praeger Publishers,

126 116 valuable breathing space from the encirclement and suppression by the Kuomintang. The Sino-Japanese war also provided the opportunity for continuing to clarify its relation with the CCYL. Under the name of the need for anti-japanese unity, the CCP under the leadership of Mao finally had an opportunity to eliminate the CCYL challenge as a second Communist party. However, because of the influence of the CCYL within the CCP system, Mao and his colleges proceeded cautiously. The whole process of reconstruction of the CCYL contained two stages: self-reform and reconstruction. In the first stage, the CCYL was required to lower the recruitment criteria for the recruitment of new members in But because of its resistance, the CCP and on orders from the Comintern, the CCP finally decided to reconstruct the youth league. The Central Committee of the CCYL was converted into the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP ( 中央青年工作委员会 ) and the Executive Committee of the Northwest Youth Salvation Association ( 西北青救会, 18 th May 1937). Other local branches of the CCYL were transformed into different kinds of Anti-Japanese Youth organizations (such as: Youth Salvation 青救会, Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguards 青年抗日先锋队, Anti-Japanese Young Pioneers 抗日少先队, etc.). And Feng Wenbin ( 冯文彬 ), the Secretary of the pre-reconstructed CCYL, held the position of the vice Secretary of the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP and the position of the Head of the Executive Committee of the Northwest Youth Salvation Association simultaneously. From these arrangements we can confirm that all these Anti-Japanese Youth organizations and Central Youth Committee of the CCP were built on the basis of the CCYL, and the CCYL cadres were their main cadre body. That is to say, the CCYL was transformed into these organizations First stage: Self- Reform of the CCYL In the early period of Sino-Japanese war, the CCYL did not turn away patriotic youths with other political beliefs and undertook a self-reform to change itself into an Anti-Japanese Salvation Youth League. The self-reform of the CCYL refers to the fact that the youth league initiated an inner-youth league reform. But the CCP was 1972).

127 117 dissatisfied with the result of the CCYL self-reform and decided to dismiss the youth league. In this process the General Secretary of the CCP, Zhang Wentian, played the key role. In November 1935, the CCP and the Red Army finished the Long March and built the Shanxi-Gansu Revolutionary Base ( 陕甘根据地 ). The Central Committee of the CCYL started to recover and to reform itself in Wayaobao to meet the Anti- Japanese task of the CCP. To build the Anti-Japanese United Front, proposed in the Wayaobao Meeting ( 瓦窑堡会议 December 1935), the CCYL published the Declaration for Anti-Japanese and National Salvation to the Students from All Schools and the Youths From all Sectors ( 为抗日救国告全国各校学生和各界青年同胞宣言 20th December 1935) to express its wish to welcome all anti-japanese youths into its rank. As the Declaration pointed out: We sincerely declare that: the CCYL are not only willing to cooperate with any anti-japanese salvation organizations, but also to fight with all patriotic compatriots! And we are willing to open our organization and welcome all anti- Japanese youth to join us. With your joining, our youth league can be publicly changed into the Anti-Japanese Salvation Youth League. That is to say: the former members of the CCYL must believe in Communism. And now, after our youth league becomes the Anti-Japanese Salvation Youth League, all patriotic youths whether you believe in Communism or not, if you are willing to fight against the Japanese, you can join our Anti-Japanese Salvation Youth League. 4 The Declaration clearly conveyed the point that as long as youths were willing to fight against Japan and to contribute to national salvation, no matter what ideology or 4. Original words are: 我们极恳切的声明 : 中国共产青年团不但愿意与任何抗日救国的组织合作, 与一切爱国同胞实行亲密团结, 共周奋斗! 而且愿意把我们的组织开放起来, 欢迎一切赞成抗日救国的青年加入, 把我们共产主义的青年组织, 公开地变成广大群众的抗日救国青年团 换句话说 : 以前加入我们青年团的人, 一定要相信共产主义的, 现在, 我们共产主义青年团改变为抗日救国青年团以后, 一切爱国青年, 相信共产主义的也好, 不相信共产主义的也好, 只要愿意抗日救国的, 就可以加入我们的抗日救国青年团, details please see: 共青团中央, 为抗日救国告全国各校学生和各界青年同胞宣言 (1935 年 12 月 20 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( )(13) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1995) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Declaration for Anti-Japanese and National Salvation to the Students from All Schools and the Youths From all Sectors (20th December 1935), collected in General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Materials of the Chinese Youth Movement( )(13) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1995) pp ].

128 118 belief he/she had, they were welcome to join the CCYL. Because of the self-reform, the CCYL branches started to grow in the Communist Revolutionary Base and the Red Army. And from October 1935 to November 1936, over 50 county level CCYL branches were built and the number of CCYL members increased from approximately 2,000 to over 20, However, the CCP believed that the problem of a Second Party Tendency was still serious in the CCYL. Zhang Wentian criticized the slow development and the problem of a Second Party Tendency in an Enlarged Meeting of the Standing Committee of the CCP (22 January 1936). 6 And noting the poor performance of the CCYL in supporting the anti-japanese forces, he further adjusted the leadership team of the CCYL by using Feng Wenbin to replace Kai Feng (the close alliance of Wang Ming and Bo Gu faction) as Secretary of the CCYL in May The position change of the Secretary of the CCYL can be interpreted as the Mao Zedong faction trying to eliminate the influence of the Returned Students (Wang Ming faction) in the CCYL. Since the Jiangxi Soviet period, Kai Feng had represented the Returned Students to lead the CCYL. In the Sino-Japanese War, the youth league did not refuse to implement the CCP s claim of building the Anti-Japanese United Front and to open the CCYL for all patriotic youths. And as mentioned earlier, from October 1935 to November 1936, the membership of the CCYL had increased 10 times. So to charge the CCYL with slow development was not the reason but the excuse for Zhang Wentian to reconstruct the youth league. The main reason lay in trying to eliminate the influence of Wang Ming faction. But when Feng Wenbin became the Secretary of the CCYL, he was incapable of controlling the CCYL and started to seek help from the Mao faction. Specifically, Feng Wenbin reported on the seriousness of the problem of second party within the 5. 陕西省地方志编撰委员会, 陕西省志 共青团志 ( 第六十二卷, 二 )( 咸阳 : 陕西人民出版社, 2007) 页 6-7[Local Chorography Editing Committee of Shanxi Province, The Chorography of Shanxi Province: The Chorography of Chinese Communist Youth League] (vol.62, no.2)(xianyang: Shanxi People Press, 2007) pp.6-7]. 6. 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 114 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meetings of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011)pp.114]. 7. 佟静, 张闻天与共青团改造, 中国青年政治学院报 19 卷 3 号 2000, 页 11 [Tong Jing, Zhang Wentian and the Reform of CCYL, Journal of China Youth College for Political Sciences, vol.19, no.2, 2000, p.11].

129 119 CCYL and requested the Party to assist with the expansion of the youth league in a meeting of the Standing Committee of the CCP on 30th July Zhang Wentian became convinced that self-reform was insufficient to deal with the Second party problem of the CCYL and started to consider reconstructing the CCYL. On 5th August and 9th August 1936, Zhang Wentian sent two letters to Liu Shaoqi to share his own thinking about the reform of the CCYL. In the first letter The Command Letter to the North Bureau and Hebei Party Committee ( 给北方局及河北省委的指示信 ), Zhang requested to use the name of the National liberation vanguard( 民族解放先锋队 ) to replace the name of the CCYL. 9 In the second letter- Letter to Liu Shaoqi ( 给刘少奇同志的信 ), Zhang explicitly expressed his idea of reconstructing the CCYL and asked Liu Shaoqi to undertake an experimental project to dismiss the CCYL in the ruling area of the North Bureau of the CCP Second Stage: Reconstructing of the CCYL The second stage reconstruction- was expanded from an experimental unit to the whole nation: from top to bottom. The CCYL was systematically transformed into the Youth Department or Youth Committee in the party and various Salvation Associations. This reconstruction aimed to completely eliminate the influence of the Wang Ming faction in the CCYL. As the Article Why Reconstruct the CCYL? written by Feng Wenbin (the Secretary of the CCYL of that moment) pointed out: Influenced by Wang Ming s doctrinarism and other objective factors, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, the CCYL became a secret small organization the 8. 佟静, 张闻天与共青团改造, 中国青年政治学院报 19 卷 3 号 2000, 页 11 [Tong Jing, Zhang Wentian and the Reform of CCYL, Journal of China Youth College for Political Sciences, vol.19, no.2, 2000, p.11]. 9. 张闻天, 给北方局及河北省委的指示信 (1936 年 8 月 5 日 ), 收录于, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 第 11 册 )( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1991) 页 [Zhang Wentian, The Command Letter to the North Bureau and Hebei Party Committee (5th August 1936), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Selection of the Documents of the Central Committee of the CCP (vol.11) (Beijing: Central School of CCP Press, 1991) pp.60-67]. 10. 张闻天, 给刘少奇同志的信 (1936 年 8 月 9 日 ), 收录于, 中央党史研究室 ( 编 ), 张闻天文集 ( 第二卷 )( 北京 : 中央党史出版社, 1993) 页 [Zhang Wentian, Letter to Comrade Liu Shaoqi (9th August 1936), collected in The Party History Research Office of the CCP(ed.), The Selection of Zhang Wentian(vol.2) (Beijing: Central Party History Press)1993,pp ].

130 120 same as the party, even much smaller than the party. 11 In this article, Wang Ming s doctrinarism was directly listed as the key reason for reconstruction. It also confirmed that the second party role of the CCYL was problematic for the Communist movement. In 1st January 1936, at Baoan County ( 保安 ), the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP convened a specific meeting to discuss the Reconstruction of the CCYL. CCP leaders Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Bo Gu and Kai Feng and CCYL leaders Feng Wenbin, Lu Dingyi ( 陆定一 ) and Liu Ying ( 刘英 ), etc. attended this meeting. After an intense debate, Zhang Wentian made the decision to reconstruct the CCYL. The meeting appointed Feng Wenbin to draft the The Decision Concerning the Youth Work ( 中央关于青年工作的决定 ) under the name of the Central Committee of the CCP. On 20th September 1936, the Liu Shaoqi led North Bureau of Central Committee of the CCP first implemented this Decision to arrange an experimental reconstruction of the CCYL. The strategy was to recruit youth league members into the Party, establishing the youth department of the party to replace the leading organ of the youth league, and using the national liberation vanguard (mass salvation organization) as a substitute for the youth league body. This arrangement undermined the second party role of the youth league. The Decision pointed out that: According to the command of the Comintern and the CCP, the CCYL should be dismissed and be replaced by a Liberation Vanguard. The youth league comrades from all the local branches should be introduced into the Party. (The Party) should establish the Youth Department to enhance the leadership of the Youth Movement. In All the factories and Schools of the Cities and Rural areas, (the party) should use a Public or Semi-Public approach to organize the youth mass organizations Original words are: 受王明 左 倾教条主义的影响, 加上主客观方面的多种因素的作用, 在抗日战争爆发的前夕, 中国共青团变成了一个 完全同党一样的秘密的狭小的组织, 甚至比党还要狭小, details please see: 冯文彬, 关于改造团的几个问题, 党的工作 ( 当时党内工作刊物 )1936 年 12 月 20 期 [Feng Wenbin, A Couple Question of CCYL Reconstruction, Party Work (Inner Party Journal of that time) vol.20, 1936 December]. 12. Original words are: 根据共产国际与中央的指示, 共产主义青年团即行取消, 以解放先锋

131 121 The reconstruction process began in Manchuria ( 满洲, nowadays Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang Provinces) where the Japanese had first invaded. And after the command from the Comintern and the CCP had been received, reconstruction was promoted nationwide. In Manchuria, all youth league members were recruited into the Manchuria Communist Party, and most of the CCYL cadres were directed to hold leadership positions in the newly-established Anti-Japanese Salvation organizations. All Youth League Branches in the Anti-Japanese Armed Force and local areas were transformed into different kinds of Anti-Japanese Organizations, such as: Youth Anti-Japanese Salvation Association ( 东北青年救亡总会 ), Youth Volunteers( 青年义勇军 )Youth Team ( 青年队 ) etc. Along with the Manchuria area, the CCYL branches in Hebei, and Beijing were dismissed successively. 13 On 30th September 1936, the CCP and the CCYL received a telegram from the Youth Communist International to request a fundamental reform of the youth league into an Anti-Fascist mass organization. 14 Taking into consideration the practices of the North Bureau about reconstructing the CCYL, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP convened a special meeting to discuss the work of reconstructing CCYL and Youth Movement on 1st November After the meeting, they published The Decision on the Youth Work ( 关于青年工作的决定 ) to arrange the nationwide work of reconstructing the CCYL. The main contents of the Decision included: Firstly, in areas ruled by the Kuomintang, on one hand the CCYL members 队代之 所有各地各支部的青年团同志, 即行设法全部介绍入党 建立省委市委的青年部加强对青年运动的领导 在各城市各工厂学校和农村应以公开和半公开的方式来组织青年群众的团体, details please: 中央北方局, 关于青年团的决定 (1936 年 9 月 20 日 ), 收录于郑洸 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动六十年 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1990) 页 225[North Bureau of Central Committee of the CCP, The Decision Concerning the Youth League (20th September 1936), collected in Zheng Guang(ed.), Sixty Years Chinese Youth Movement (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1990) p.225]. 13. Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance and Collaboration in Modern China (California: University of California Press, 2000) pp 少共国际, 少共国际的来电 (1936 年 9 月 30 日 ), 收录于收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( ) 第 13 册 ( 北京 : 共青团中央办公厅, 1995) 页 290 [Youth Communist International, Telegram From the Youth Communist International(30th September 1936), in General Office of the CC of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement( )vol.13 (Beijing: General Office of the CC of the CCYL Press, 1995) pp.290].

132 122 should join and lead all the existing, legal, and public Youth mass organizations, on the other hand, the CCYL cadres should establish all kinds of salvation organizations to replace the youth league organization. And in those areas ruled by the CCP, the youth league should be reformed to become a different kind of cultural, educational, sport, military Youth association or club. Secondly, the majority of CCYL members should be recruited into the Party. And the ones who cannot be recruited into the Party should be considered as active applicants for the party. There was no need to establish youth league branches, but the Party branches or Party groups should be established in all the Youth organizations. Thirdly, the CCP at all levels should establish a Youth Department or Youth Committee and should appoint young cadres to work in them. And fourthly, the CCP should completely change the working approach of mobilizing the Youth Movement, should abandon the Closed-Doorism ( 关门主义 ) 15, should adopt a youthful, mass, Democratic and Public working style, and should undertake ideological education on the basis of Anti-Imperialism and National Salvation for cultivating masses of active applicants for the Party. 16 The project of nationwide reconstruction of the CCYL was subsequently promoted from top to bottom. The youth league was replaced by the salvation organizations it created, and the Youth Department and Youth Committee of the CCP. The CCYL created the Youth Salvation Associations and the leaders of the CCYL also held the leadership positions in these associations. For example, the Central Committee of the CCYL first established the Preparatory Committee of the Northwest Youth Salvation Association ( 西北救国联合会 ) in the Northwest Revolution Base. 15. Closed-Doorism ( 关门主义 ) can be understood as an over-concentration on the class origin of members, and exclusion of those who were not from the class of workers and peasants. Details please see: 刘少奇, 关门主义冒险主义, 刘少奇选集 ( 北京 : 人民日报出版社, 1981) 页 [Liu Shaoqi, Closed-Doorism and Adventurism, in Selection of Liu Shaoqi(Beijing: People s Daily Press, 1981) pp.23-33]. 16. 中共中央, 关于青年工作的决定 (1936 年 11 月 1 日 ), 收录于, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 第 11 册 )( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1991) 页 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Decision on the Youth Work ( 1st November 1936), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Selection of the Documents of the Central Committee of the CCP (vol.11) (Beijing: Central School of CCP Press, 1991) pp ].

133 123 Meanwhile, at the Provincial and County levels, the youth league branches also established similar Preparatory Committees of the Youth Salvation Association. After February 1937, all the work of CCYL had almost stopped. And all the CCYL cadres focused on the work of building and developing salvation associations. All the youth league Branches in the Red Army were transformed into Youth Teams. Until April 1937, the Youth Salvation Associations were established and the members of the Associations increased from approximately 20,000 (CCYL members) to over 160, The first Congress of the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association was held in Yanan from 12th -17th April The former CCYL Secretary Feng Wenbin was elected to be the Director of the Executive Committee of the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association. 18 Before the establishment of the National Youth Salvation Association, the Northwest Youth Salvation Association was the top leadership organ of all such associations. The Youth Departments or Youth Committees of all levels were set up in the CCP. And the original youth league leaders held their leadership positions. Take the Central Committee of the CCP for example; on 5th May 1938, it decided to set up the Central Youth Work Committee to manage the nationwide Youth Movement. 19 The head of the Organizational Department of the CCP, Chen Yun, concurrently held the position of Secretary of the Central Youth Work Committee, and Feng Wenbin (the original Secretary of the CCYL and the Director of the Executive Committee of the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association) held the position of 17. 共青团中央青运史研究室, 共青团陕西省委青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 安吴古堡的钟声 : 安吴青训班史料集 ( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版社, 1986) 页 [Youth Movement History Research Office in the Central Committee of the CCYL and Youth Movement History Research Office in the Shanxi Communist Youth League(ed.), The Bell of Anwu Village: The Historical Collection of Anwu Youth Training Course (Beijing: CCP Party Historical Material Press, 1986)pp ]. 18. 共青团, 西北青年第一次救国代表大会 [CCYL, 1st Congress of the Northwest Youth Salvation ], website of the CCYL, accessed at: htm. 19. 中共中央, 中央关于组织青年工作委员会的决定, 收录于团中央青运史研究室, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文件选编 (1921 年 7 月 年 9 月 ) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 453 [The Central Committee of the CCP, The Decision of Central Committee of the CCP Concerning Establish Youth Work Committee, collected in Youth Movement Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL, the Central Archive(ed.), The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Youth Movement(July 1921-September 1949) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1988) p.453].

134 124 Vice-Secretary of the Central Youth Work Committee. 20 And in the period of Second Sino-Japanese War, the Central Youth Work Committee and the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association replaced the role of the youth league to manage Youth Affairs. 4.2 The Party-led Mass Organization Role of the Reconstructed Youth League The reconstructed youth league played a complex role in this period. During the reconstruction, the CCYL was divided into two parts: the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP ( 中央青年工作委员会 ) and the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association ( 西北青年救国会 ). The role of these institutions represented, in effect, the role of the CCYL in this period. From the viewpoint of its organizational nature, the Central Youth Work Committee was a department of the CCP. And the North Northwest Youth Salvation Association was a mass organization of Chinese Youth. Both of them contributed to the Party-led Mass organization nature of the reconstructed youth league. From the angle of its organizational function, the reconstructed youth league fulfilled three functions: operating the political socialization of the youths, developing the cadre for the CCP, and participating in the building of governments in border area The Nature of the Reconstructed Youth League: Party-led Mass Organization The role of the CCYL was replaced by the Youth Department of the CCP and Youth Salvation Association together in the Sino-Japanese War. In particular, according the principle of The Decision on the Youth Work ( 关于青年工作的决 定 ), the youth league cadres and members were practically reorganized into two parts. One was recruited into the Party and became Party members. The senior CCYL cadres were appointed as leaders of the newly established Youth Department or Committee in the Party Committee. For example, Feng Wenbin, 20. 中央青委, 中央青委给少共国际的信 (1939 年 7 月 7 日 ), 收录于团中央青运史研究室, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文件选编 (1921 年 7 月 年 9 月 ) ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 [Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP, The Letter From the Central Youth Work Committee to the Youth Communist International (7th July 1939), collected in Youth Movement Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL, the Central Archive(ed.), The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Youth Movement(July 1921-September 1949) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1988)pp ].

135 125 the Secretary of the CCYL, was appointed as the Vice Secretary of the Central Youth Work Committee. And concerning all local Party Committees, the Decision commands that all the local Party branches should recruit youth league leaders to work in the Youth Department. 21 The ordinary CCYL cadres and members were sent to lead the development of the Youth Salvation Associations. For example, from late 1936 to April 1937, the main work of all the local youth league branches was to establish the Youth Salvation Associations. And all the members of the CCYL at that moment (approximately 20,000 people) were the first batch of members of the Youth Salvation Associations. They achieved significant development and reached the membership number of 160,000 in April Later, after rebuilding, the new youth league was built on the basis of Central Youth Work Committee and the Youth Salvation Associations. In May 1949, the Central Committee of the CCP decided to establish the standing committee of the youth league on the basis of the Central Youth Work Committee of the Central Committee of the CCP". 22 This reconstruction history played a significant position in the role change of the CCYL from Second Communist Party to Mass Organization. When the youth league was dissolved, the CCP became the only major communist leader of the Chinese youth movement. In the reconstruction, most of the members were recruited into the Party. And the CCYL leaders were further recruited into the Youth Department of the CCP and became CCP cadres. To the CCP, the CCYL challenge of being a Second Party was effectively eliminated. And to the ruling faction of the CCP, the institutional base of the former ruling faction of Bo Gu and Kai Feng was abolished. The reconstruction brought a more harmonious relationship between the CCP and the CCYL, and reinforced the 21. 中共中央, 关于青年工作的决定 (1936 年 11 月 1 日 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 第 11 册 )( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1991) 页 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Decision on the Youth Work ( 1st November 1936), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Selection of the Documents of the Central Committee of the CCP (vol.11) (Beijing: Central School of CCP Press, 1991) pp ]. 22. 申晓飞, 中央青委的历史使命, 河北青年报,2011 年 7 月 28 日 [Shen Xiaofei, The Historical Mission of the Central Youth Work Committee in the CCP, Newspaper of Hebei Youth, 28th July 2011].

136 126 authority of the new leadership team of the CCP. The reconstruction contributed to the forming of the Party-led Mass organization nature of the youth league. First, the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP was the leading organ of the reconstructed youth league. And it was a department of the Party. So the youth league directly served the needs of the CCP. Second, the reconstructed youth league was a mass organization with broader social acceptance rather than Communist party. Before the reconstruction, the CCYL suffered from the problem of Closed-Doorism which was introduced by the Wang Ming faction. It strictly required the member with the social origin of worker or poor peasant family. And to the recruited members who were not from the family of worker and poor peasant, the youth league had inner youth league purge. Even though it began to advocate the youth to fight against Japan, because of its history of inneryouth league purges and the political label of Communism, the youth league still had certain difficulties in recruiting Chinese youths. However, after the reconstructing into the youth salvation association, the new organization better aligned with Chinese nationalism. Under the theme of Anti-Japanese struggle and national salvation, the new Associations had more social acceptance than the CCYL which promoted the ideology of Communism in Chinese society. In the CCP ruling area, before the reformation in 1936, the CCYL only had approximately 20,000 members. Even in late 1927, before the split of the first United Front between the CCP and the Kuomintang, the CCYL only had about 75, 000 members. 23 However, till the spring of 1941, and in the CCP ruling area alone, the members of the Youth Salvation Association numbered over 1 million. 24 The influence of the CCP among Chinese Youth was greatly enhanced The CCYL Role in Undertaking Political Socialization of Youths In the war period, motivating the youths to join the armed struggle of the CCP 23. CCYL, The Statist of the Number of the CCYL Members( ), website of the CCYL, accessed at: 共青团中央青运史研究室, 中国青年运动史 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1984) 页 [Youth Movement Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL, History of Chinese Youth Movement (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1984) pp ].

137 127 was the central work of the political socialization of the reconstructed youth league. In this period, the youth league concentrated on two aspects: undertaking the Anti- Japanese Propaganda and organizing armed force for the military struggle. On 7 th June 1938, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCYL issued the Comment Concerning strengthening the Youth Work in the War Zone ( 中央关于加强战区青年工作的指示 ) to request that: (We) should establish the youth armed organizations and semi-armed organizations we should strengthen the education of the youth, motivate them to participate in the battle and gradually recruit them into the regular armed forces. 25 In terms of undertaking Anti-Japanese propaganda, the purpose of the youth league in political education was to motivate the youth to volunteer for the Army. The strategy to achieve this goal was to use the atrocities of the Japanese army to arouse the youths. As the report of Shanxi Youth Salvation Association mentioned: Motivate the youths to join the movement to resist Japanese aggression and save the country through generally propagandizing the brutal and inhuman atrocities of Japanese army on the youths and Children to arouse the enmity against Japanese fascist of masses of youths. 26 In addition, the propagandizing form of the youth league was effective. Besides the formal political education in the schools, training courses, and journals, it included the forms of speech, singing, and drama. Through the efforts of the youth league, the resolve of youths joining the armed struggle was significantly increased. Take Lin County in Shanxi Province for 25. Original words are: 建立青年半武装及武装组织 加强青年教育, 动员他们参战并逐步吸收他们加入正规军, details please see: 中央档案馆, 中共中央文件选集 ( ) ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1986) 页 517 [The Central Archive, The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP( )(Beijing: Central School of the CCP Press, 1986) p.517]. 26. Original words are: 普遍宣传日寇对青年男女及儿童的种种惨无人道的暴行, 以引起广大青年对日本法西斯无限的痛恨和仇恨, 而奋起抗日救国, details please see: 共青团山西省委, 山西省档案馆, 山西青年运动历史资料 ( 晋绥革命根据地分册, 第一辑 ) ( 内部发行, 1986) 页 20 [The Shanxi Communist Youth League Committee and Shanxi Province Archive, The Historical Material of Shanxi Youth Movement(vol 1 of Jin-Sui Revolutionary Base)(Internal document, 1986) p.20].

138 128 example; among its recruited soldiers, the number of volunteer solder increased from 10,000 to 20, In terms of organizing armed forces for the CCP, the youth league played a significant role in establishing the Youth Anti-Japanese Vanguard ( 抗日先锋队 ) and Youth Military to join the Guerrilla Warfare. In April 1939, the Central Military Committee and the Central Youth Committee of the CCP sent the directive to establish a youth armed force. On the basis of age, youths were organized into two kinds of organizations. Those who were under 18, were recruited into the youth anti-japanese vanguard, youth's militia and non-fulltime half armed force. Those who were over 18 were organized into the full-time youth military army. Experiencing a series of professional military training exercises, they would gradually be recruited into the Eighth Route Army( 八路军 ) and the New Fourth Army ( 新四军 ) of the CCP. 28 In 1939 alone, over 20,000 youths in Shan-Gan- Ning Boarder area ( 陕甘宁边区 ) were motivated by the youth league to join the Eighth Route Army. And in , South Hebei Province Youth Salvation Association set up three battalions of regular forces with over 1,500 soldiers. 29 In the North of China, in 1941, over 40,000 ordinary youths were organized and trained to become members in the Youth Anti- Japanese Vanguard which participated in over 2,300 battles in the Sino-Japanese war 共青团山西省委, 山西省档案馆, 山西青年运动历史资料 ( 晋绥革命根据地分册, 第一辑 ) ( 内部发行, 1986) 页 28 [The Shanxi Communist Youth League Committee and Shanxi Province Archive, The Historical Material of Shanxi Youth Movement(vol 1 of Jin-Sui Revolutionary Base)](Internal document, 1986) p.28]. 28. 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 陕甘宁边区抗日民主根据地 ( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版社, 1990) 页 443 [The Central Archive(ed.), Shan-Gan-Ning Boarder Area Anti-Japanese Democratic Base (Beijing: Party History Material of CCP Press, 1990) p.443]; 共青团山西省委, 山西省档案馆, 山西青年运动历史资料 ( 晋绥革命根据地分册, 第二辑 ) ( 内部发行, 1986) 页 154 [The Shanxi Communist Youth League Committee and Shanxi Province Archive, The Historical Material of Shanxi Youth Movement(vol 2 of Jin-Sui Revolutionary Base (Internal document, 1986) p.154). 29. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]. 30. 魏鹏程, 简述西北青救会在抗战时期青年运动中的作用, 收录于团中央 ( 编 ), 抗日战争时期青年运动专题文集 ( 延吉 : 延边大学出版社, 1988) 页 [Wei Pengcheng, Brief Introduction the Role of Northwest Youth Salvation in the Youth Movement in the Sino-Japanese War, collected in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of Youth Movement in Sino-Japanese War (Yanji: Yan Bian University Press, 1988) pp ].

139 129 In addition, the youth league specifically established the Military and Sport Department to undertake the military training for youths and Children in revolutionary bases. It included antiaircraft defence, gas defence, shooting, and martial fighting. 31 It greatly raised the military quality of the ordinary youths and provided support for the armed struggle The CCYL Role in Developing Cadre for the CCP In this period, the Central Youth Work Committee and the Northwest Youth Salvation Association fulfilled the function of developing Revolutionary Cadres for the CCP, Government of Border Areas, and Army. For example, the Anwu Youth Training Course ( 安吴青训班 ) was their major practice. And this Course was created and promoted by Feng Wenbin, the de facto CCYL leader. The Anwu Youth Training Course was a combination of a series of youth training courses run by the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP and the Northwest Salvation Association. Because a majority of the training courses were operated in Anwu village Jingyang County ( 泾阳县 ) of Shanxi Province, so historians have named them Anwu Youth Training Course. 32 This Course was a specific leadership development project aiming to develop young cadres for the Party, Government in Border Areas, and the Army. Its purpose was: To develop the youth cadre who can contribute to the battle, army, rural area, who can operate the youth movement, organize the youths to participate the armed struggle. 33 From 11 th October 1937 to May 1940 (when the CCP was forced to leave Yanan), the Anwu Youth Training Course held 14 courses, established 127 cadre teams and 31. 晋西青联, 抗日青年纵队召开青年武装会总结一年来青年武装工作, 抗战日报, 1941 年 8 月 6 日, 第 3 版 [West Shanxi Youth Association, Anti-Japanese Column Convened the Youth Military Meeting to Conclude One Year Work of Youth Military, Resistance Daily, 6th August 1941, p.3]; 宋美媛, 抗战时期陕甘宁边区的青年救国联合会, 黑龙江史志, 2009 年 24 期, 页 36 [Song Meiyuan, The Youth Salvation in Shan-Gan-Ning boarder Area in Sino-Japanese War, the History of Heilongjiang, vol. 24, 2009, p36]. 32. 李玉琦, 共青团历史上的 100 个由来 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 [Li Yuqi, 100 historical origins of the Chinese Communist Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) pp ]. 33. 中共泾阳县委党史办 ( 编 ), 安吴青训办 ( 内部资料 )1986 年 7 月 1 日, 页 31 [The Party History Office of Jingyang Communist Party(ed.), The Anwu Youth Training Course(Internal document, 1st July 1986) p.31].

140 130 trained approximately 12,000 cadres. 34 The majority of them were sent to various regions to hold leadership positions or significant jobs in the Party, Government, and Army. For example, Hu Qiaomu, the Vice-Director of the Course, was appointed as Mao s Secretary. For praising the significant role of Anwu Youth Training Course in training revolutionary cadres for the CCP, in 5 th October 1939 (the second anniversary of the Course), Mao wrote the following inscription: Without them (the graduates of the Anwu Youth Training Course), the Revolutionary ranks cannot develop, the revolution cannot succeed. 35 The curriculum of the course contained: the Introduction of the Anti-Japanese United Front, Marxist theory, Military Training, and most significantly the learning of Mass Line and Mass Movement. It was the first training course in the CCP system to systematically teach Mao Zedong s Mass Line and Mass Movement. 36 Because of Mao s preference for mass movement, it is reasonable to infer that in the rule of Mao Zedong, the graduates of this Course would be regarded as suitable cadres. From developing youth cadre for the reconstructed youth league to developing political cadre for the CCP, the development of this Course underwent three stages. In the first (October 1937 to January 1938), it was only the small training project for training the members of Vanguards with only 4 teaching staff, and was named Youth Short-Term Training Course in the War Period ( 战时青年短期训练班 ). The training period of the courses was less than one month, and it contributed approximately 1000 members to the Vanguards. In the second stage (April January 1939), this Course received the commendation from Mao and started to explore the role of being the cadre 34. 李文恭, 抗战时期的安吴青训班, 党史研究与教学, 1997 年第 4 期, 页 25 [Li Wengong, The Anwu Youth Training Course in Sino-Japanese War, The Research and Education of Party History, vol.4, 1997, p.25]. 35. Original words are: 没有他们 ( 安吴青训班毕业生 ), 革命队伍就不能发展, 革命就不能胜利 ", details please see: 中共中央文献研究室 ( 编 ), 毛泽东年谱 ( 中卷 )( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1993) 页 141 [The Central Literature Research Office of the CCP(ed.), The Chronicle of Mao Zedong(vol.2) (Beijing: People Press, 1993) p.141]. 36. 郑洸, 冯文彬主持创办安吴青训班和泽东青干校为党培养了一大批优秀青年干部, 收录于, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 青运史资料选编,2012 年第 3 期 [Zheng Guang, Feng Wenbin Establish the Anwu Youth Training Course and Zedong Cadre School to Develop A Large Number of Excellent Youth Cadre, collected in Central Archive of Youth Movement(ed.), The Historical Material Selection of Youth Movement, vol.3, 2012].

141 131 development project of the CCP. It changed its name to the Youth Training Course in War Period ( 战时青年训练班 ). Some Generals of the Eighth Route Army started to become the teaching staff of this course and the number of students was increased to over In the third stage (January April 1940), it formally became the leadership development project for the CCP and changed its name to Chinese Youth Cadre Training Course ( 中国青年干部训练班 ). On one hand, it provided courses in a fixed place for the cadre (from the party, government of border area, and army) and the students who were from areas ruled by the Kuomintang or the Japanese; on the other hand, it selected 500 youth cadre to constitute 6 working teams, and sent these teams to provide training in the army and rural areas. 37 Some main leaders of the Army and Party gave lectures to this Course. For example, Zhu De ( 朱德, Commanders-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army) was the honorary Director of the Course, Feng Wenbin (Head of the Northwest Youth Salvation Association) held the position of Director of the Course, and Hu Qiaomu ( 胡乔木, Cadre in the Central Youth Work Committee) was the Vice-Director of the Course. 38 Because of the invasion of Hu Zongnan troop, the Central Committee of the CCP had to leave Yanan in May The Anwu Youth Training Course was forced to stop. But this course became the origin of the Central School of the CCYL today The CCYL Role in Border Area Government In this period, the reconstructed youth league participated in the building of the government of the border area. It included three aspects: politics, economic, and education. In terms of politics, participating in the local regime building and the 37. 中共泾阳县委党史办 ( 编 ), 安吴青训办 ( 内部资料, 1986 年 7 月 1 日 ) 页 [The Party History Office of Jingyang Communist Party(ed.), The Anwu Youth Training Course (Internal document, 1st July 1986) pp.44-50]. 38. 共青团中央青运史研究室, 共青团陕西省委青运史研究室 ( 编 ), 安吴古堡的钟声 : 安吴青训班史料集 ( 北京 : 中共党史资料出版社, 1987)[Youth Movement History Research Office in the Central Committee of the CCYL and Youth Movement History Research Office in the Shanxi Communist Youth League(ed.), The Bell of Anwu Village: The Historical Collection of Anwu Youth Training Course (Beijing: CCP Party Historical Material Press, 1987)]. 39. Interview with Prof. Tong Jing.

142 132 struggle to force landlords to reduce rent and interest were the major practices of the reconstructed youth league. In the Anti-Japanese Base Area, the youth cadres positively promoted democratic elections in rural villages. A large number of youth league cadres were elected to become village heads and township heads. According to the data in the Jin- Cha-Ji Border Area ( 晋察冀边区 ), the youth league cadres took up 40.8% seats in the District Congress, and 37.8% in the County Congress. Among others, over 40.8% of major positions of the county were held by youth league cadres. And approximately 320 youth league cadres became leaders of government departments at all level in this border area. 40 To unite all forces to fight against the Japanese, the Reduction of the Rent and Interest ( 减租减息 ) was defined as the basic land policy in Sino-Japanese period in the Ten Outlines of Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation (25 th August 1937) ( 抗日救国十大纲领 )by the Central Committee of the CCP. 41 Differing from the past Agrarian Revolution, the CCP chose to use the approach of negotiation and arbitration to persuade the landlords, who did not support Japan, to reduce rent and interest on the land. 42 Under the guidance of the CCP, the reconstructed youth league initiated a series of activities of Who raises whom? to educate the youths and landlord in the theory of exploitation. In addition, to the landlords who refused to reduce rent and interest, the youth cadres would lead a reasonable number of youths to their house to impose grain levies and to supervise their behaviours. 43 Through the Reduction of the Rent 40. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 165 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p.165]. 41. 中国共产党, 抗日救国十大纲领 (1937 年 8 月 25 日 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1991) 页 [Central Committee of the CCP, Ten Outlines of Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation(25th August 1937), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: Central School of CCP Press, 1991) pp ]. 42. 刘少奇, 关于抗日游击战争中的政策 (1938 年 2 月 5 日 ), 收录于中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 第 10 册 ( 北京 : 中共中央党校出版社, 1991) 页 [Liu Shaoqi, Concerning the Policy in Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War(5th February 1938), collected in Central Archive(ed.), The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP vol.10 (Beijing: Central School of CCP Press, 1991) pp ]. 43. 山东档案馆, 山东革命历史档案资料选编 ( 济南 : 山东人民出版社, 1984) 页 [Shandong Archive, Material Selection of Shandong Revolutionary History (Jinan: Shandong People Press, 1984) pp ].

143 133 and Interest activities, the youth league helped rural youths to receive actual benefits. It further increased their confidence in the CCP and their willingness to join the Army. In terms of economic development, actively replying to the request of the CCP, the youth league fulfilled the role of youth department of the government to mobilize a large number of rural youths to contribute to the economic development of the border area. In 1940 the Central Bureau of the Border Area of the CCP issued the Central Bureau of Border Area Concerning the Conclusion of Youth Work in Border Area and The Future Command ( 边区中央局关于半年来边区青年工作总结和今后工作指示 ) to request that the Youth Salvation contribute to the production of the border area. As it said: In order to make the economics of the border area develop to the selfsufficiency stage, thousands of youths should be the powerful labour force, the Youth Salvation should actively mobilize and lead the youths and teenagers to participating the production activities It would be significant guarantee of the economic development of the whole border area. 44 In February 1940, the Youth Salvation Association of the Border Area established the Economic Department to specifically assist the economic development work of the Government Border Area. In February 1941, the youth league successfully opened 44 farms and gained 20,000 kilograms of food. And in that autumn, the youth league organized the youths from 10 counties to open up over 20,000 square kilometers of wasteland in Yanan. In terms of education, the focus of the reconstructed youth league was to provide literacy education to the youths and teenagers in border areas. In Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area of that time, over 90% of adolescents were illiterate. 45 As Lin Boqu (the 44. Original words are: 为使边区经济迅速走向完全自给自足的阶段, 十几万青年是有力的劳动军, 青救会应该积极动员和领导青少年参与生产活动 对整个边区的经济建设是一个有力保障, details please see: 中共边区中央局, 边区中央局关于半年来边区青年工作总结和今后工作指示 ( ), 收录于中央档案馆, 陕西省档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共陕西省党委文件汇集 ( ) ( 内部出版, 1994) 页 217 [Central Bureau of Border Area Communist Party, Central Bureau of Border Area Concerning the Conclusion of Youth Work In Border Area and The Future Command, collected in Central Archive of the CCP and Archive of Shanxi Province(ed.), The Document Collection of Shanxi Communist Party( ) (Internal Document, 1994) p.217]. 45. 曹守亮, 试论延安时期陕甘宁边区的民众教育及其对新中国教育的影响, 中国延安干部学院学报 2008 年 1 期 [Cao Shouliang, The Discussion Concerning the Education in the Period

144 134 Chairman of Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area Government of that time) mentioned: The border area is a cultural and educational dessert; the schools, intellectuals, and people who can read and write are rare. In some counties, such as Yanchi, there are a hundred people, but only two of them can read, and in Huachi County, only one person can read.there are only 120 primary schools in the whole border area, and they only served the children of the Rich. And there is no Middle school. When it comes to Social education, it is hard to find. 46 To provide the youths with literacy education, the youth league widely established literacy clubs and primary schools in border area. Till October 1939, the youth league built over 400 primary schools to provide compulsory education to approximately 65,000 children. In addition, the youth league also established 5,834 literacy clubs to give the night courses to the young people. Over 39, 383 of them had participated in these clubs. In the schools and clubs built by the youth league, they not only provided literacy education, but also political propaganda; it greatly motivated the young peoples enthusiasm to join the Army and the CCP. 4.3 The Causes of the Reconstruction of the CCYL Among the causes of the reconstruction of the CCYL, the factional struggle between the Mao Zedong and Wang Ming factions and the potential second party role of the CCYL were critical factors. The guiding thought of the Wang Ming faction had begun to shape the CCYL into a rival Second Party to the CCP. And its exclusiveness led to its poor performance in the role of anti-japanese mass organization, which was demanded by the Mao faction and by the Comintern. of Yanan and Its Influence, The Journal of Chinese Yanan Cadre College, vol.1, 2008], website of Chinese Yanan Cadre College, accessed at: 5Btt_news%5D=987&cHash=f85b2ae3cdadd0761e3ba1c6c57c44e2; 46. Original words are: 边区是一块文化教育的荒地 学校稀少, 知识分子若凤毛麟角, 识字者亦极稀少 在某些县如盐池一百人中识字者有两人, 再如华池等县两百人中仅有一人 平均起来, 识字的人只占全人口的百分之一 至于小学, 全边区过去也仅有一百二十个, 并且主要是富有者的子弟 整个边区的中学生是屈指可数的 社会教育简直是绝无仅有的事 details please see: 林伯渠, 陕甘宁边区政府对边区第一届参议会的工作报告, 收录于中国科学院历史研究所 ( 编 ), 陕甘宁边区参议会文献汇辑 ( 北京 : 科学出版社, 1958) 页 26 [Lin Boqu, The Work Report of the 1st Congress of Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area Government, collected in The History Research Institution in Chinese Science Academy(ed.), The Literature Collection of Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area Congress (Beijing: Science Press, 1958) p.26].

145 Exclusive Second Party Role of the CCYL The exclusive second party role of the CCYL was the main internal cause for reconstructing the CCYL in this period. It was criticized as a Closed-Doorism ( 关门主义 ) tendency. According to the definition of Liu Shaoqi ( 刘少奇 ), Closed- Doorism can be understood as an over-concentration on the class origin of members, and exclusion of those who were not from the class of workers and peasants. 47 Closed-Doorism limited the recruitment of the CCYL. Unlike the previous second party role of the CCYL, in which the CCYL became a powerful rival organization to the CCP, the CCYL on the eve of the reconstruction had become an exclusive small communist organization. It not only decreased the influence of the CCYL within the party, but also led to the isolation of the youth league from the Party rank and file. 48 This exclusiveness of the youth league was cultivated by the Wang Ming faction. In the Zunyi Conference, only Kai Feng, the Secretary of the CCYL at that moment, and a close ally of Wang Ming and Bo Gu criticized Mao Zedong. 49 Under the claim of maintaining the purity of the youth league which was proposed by Wang Ming faction, the CCYL had been limiting its recruitment scope. 50 In addition, within the youth league, a series of bloody purges had eliminated members from the intellectual and other exploiting classes. According to the Report from Youth League Committee of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi to the CCYL Congress in Soviet Area ( 少共闽粤赣省委向苏区团代会的一年来工作书面报告 ), only in three months, over 刘少奇, 肃清立三路缮的残余一关门主义冒险主义 (1936 年 4 月 10 日 ), 火线报 ( 中共北方局刊物 )[Liu Shaoqi, Eliminate the Remnant of Lisan Line- Closed-Doorism and Adventurism, Fire Line Newspaper (Official Newspaper of Northern Bureau of the CCP),10th April 1936]. 48. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]. 49. 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meeting of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) pp.85-86]. 50. 共青团中央, 团中央五届四中全会的决议, 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 第九册 ( 北京 : 共青团中央办公厅, 1981) 页 55 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of Fifth National Congress of the CCYL, in General Office of the CC of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of Chinese Youth Movement vol.9 (Beijing: General Office of the CC of the CCYL Press, 1981) p.55].

146 136 youth league members were killed. 51 To the Mao Zedong faction, firstly, the CCYL led by Kai Feng was a supportive base for the Wang Ming faction. Using Feng Wenbin to replace Kai Feng in May 1936 was one of the practices of Mao Zedong faction in seeking to control the youth league. However, the report of Feng Wenbin in the meeting of Standing Committee of the CCP (30th July 1936) demonstrated the failure of this tactic. 52 Secondly, the exclusive policy for only recruiting members from the class of workers and poor peasants contradicted the claim of building an Anti-Japanese United Front which was upheld by the Mao faction. On 20th December 1935, the youth league released the Declaration for Anti-Japanese and National Salvation to the Students from All Schools and the Youths From all Sectors ( 为抗日救国搞全国各校学生和各界青年同胞宣言 ) to express its wish to welcome all the anti- Japanese youth to join the youth league. Yet the former exclusive history of the CCYL remained a reason to reconstruct the youth league. Thirdly, the exclusiveness of the CCYL also violated the Comintern's requirement to build an anti-fascist bloc. The ruling legitimacy of the Wang Ming faction was based on their links with the Comintern. However, when the development of the CCYL violated the demands of the Comintern, they could do nothing to defend it. So on 9 th August 1936, Zhang Wentian, the General Secretary of the CCP sent a letter to Liu Shaoqi. It clearly expressed his view to the CCYL: 51. 少共闽粤赣省委, 少共闽粤赣省委向苏区团代会的一年来工作书面报告, 收录于江西省档案馆, 共青团江西省委 ( 编 ), 江西青年运动史料选编 ( 上册 )( 江西 : 江西人民出版社, 1987) 页 265 [Communist Youth League Committee of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Report from Youth League Committee of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi to the CCYL Congress in Soviet Area, collected in, Jiangxi Archives and Jiangxi CCYL(ed.), The Historical Selection of Jiangxi Youth Movement (vol.1) (Jiangxi: Jiangxi People s Press, 1987) pp ]. 52. 少共闽粤赣省委, 少共闽粤赣省委向苏区团代会的一年来工作书面报告, 收录于江西省档案馆, 共青团江西省委 ( 编 ), 江西青年运动史料选编 ( 上册 )( 江西 : 江西人民出版社, 1987) 页 265 [Communist Youth League Committee of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Report from Youth League Committee of Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi to the CCYL Congress in Soviet Area, collected in, Jiangxi Archives and Jiangxi CCYL(ed.), The Historical Selection of Jiangxi Youth Movement (vol.1) (Jiangxi: Jiangxi People s Press, 1987) pp ].

147 137 The CCYL should be dismissed. The organizational form of the CCYL turns out to be a secret, narrow Second Party The Reconstruction Decision from the Comintern and Young Communist International The need to create an Anti-Fascist United Front in China was the main external cause of the reconstruction of the CCYL. In response to the Comintern, the CCP proposed an Anti-Japanese United Front at its Wayaopu Meeting ( 瓦窑堡会议, December 1935). Its core was to unite all the anti-japanese forces in the struggle against Japan. It required the CCYL to recruit Chinese Youths from different social classes to join the struggle against Japan. However, the problem of Close-Doorism hindered the success of this strategy. The original view of the Comintern and the Youth Communist International was to reform the youth league into an Anti-Fascist Youth League, rather than completely reconstruct it. Obtaining their support for completely reconstructing the CCYL was assisted by reports from the Chinese representatives including Song Yiping ( 宋一平 ), Chen Tanqiu ( 陈潭秋 ) and Chen Yun ( 陈云 ). These representatives explained the serious problem of the CCYL in Chinese Communist development. At the 7th Congress of the Comintern (July-August 1935), Song Yiping intensely criticized the CCYL for Sectarianism (also known as Factionalism, 宗派主义 ) in the Kuomintang working area. And Chen Tanqiu and Chen Yun detailed the sufferings of the Communist forces since Bo Gu had become General Secretary of the CCP. 54 Their introduction not only convinced the Comintern to confirm the outcome of the Zunyi Conference (where Mao Zedong took over the leadership), but also provided the CCYL example in criticizing the Sectarianism in that congress. 53. Original words are: C.Y. 是应该取消的, 像现在 C.Y. 这样的组织, 结果会变成秘密的狭隘的第二党式的组织 ",details please see: 张闻天, 给刘少奇同志的信 ( 一九三六年八月九日 ), 收录于, 中央党史研究室, 张闻天文集 ( 第二卷 )( 北京 : 中央党史出版社, 1993) 页 [Zhang Wentian, Letter to Comrade Liu Shaoqi (9th August 1936), collected in The Party History Research Office of the CCP(ed.), The Selection of Zhang Wentian(vol.2)(Beijing: Central Party History Press, 1993) pp ]. 54. 李玉贞 ( 编 ), 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 674 [Li Yuzhen(ed.), Youth Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement (Historical Archives)(Beijing: China Youth Press, 1985) p.674]

148 138 At this Comintern Congress Georgi Dimitrov ( 季米特洛夫, the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern from ) criticized the incompetence and Sectarianism of the youth league. 55 As he pointed out: In terms of winning the support from the youths, the Communist party and the Communist Youth League should have a fundamental change. The youth league should do everything possible to unite all power of non-fascist youth organization. 56 M. Molotov ( 契莫丹诺夫, the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Youth Communist International at that time) supported the view of Mikhailov and further demanded the reform of the youth league. He claimed that the youth leagues of all countries should build up a new form of youth league on the basis of each country's actual circumstances. And this new form of youth league should be widely accepted by the youths. 57 As he said: These youth leagues should follow the Communist party on one hand; on the other hand they should be much wider in terms of organizational nature and members. Their work should satisfy the condition of their own country and be on the basis of satisfying the economic, political and cultural demand of the youths. 58 In the subsequent 6 th Congress of Youth Communist International (September 55. Georgi Dimitrov, The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism in Georgi Dimitrov: Selected Works (vol.2)(sofia: Sofia Press, 1972), website of Marxists Internet Archive Steering Committee, accessed at: archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm#s14; 56. Original words are: 在争取青年方面, 共产党和共青团组织必须在实际行动上有一个根本转变. 共青团应该尽一切可能力求联合非法西斯青年群众组织的力量, details please see: 李玉贞 ( 编 ), 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [Li Yuzhen(ed.), Youth Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement (Historical Archives) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1985) pp ]. 57. 契莫丹诺夫, 契莫丹诺夫在共产国际七大上的发言, 收录于共青团中央, 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [M. Woolf, The Speech of M. Woolf in the 7th Congress of the Comintern, collected in Central Committee of the CCYL, Young Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement (Historical Document) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1985) pp ]. 58. Original words are: " 这些青年团既跟随共产党, 同时在性质和成员方面比党更广泛, 其工作又适合本国的条件并以满足劳动青年本身的经济 政治和文化要求为基础 ", details please see: 李玉贞 ( 编 ), 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [Li Yuzhen(ed.), Youth Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement(Historical Archives) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1985) pp ].

149 ), the congress approved the Resolution Concerning Youth United Front Task ( 关于青年统一战线任务的决议 ). The Resolution directed a change to the nature of youth leagues, and to completely abandon Sectarianism and stop copying the practices of the Communist party. It required shaping the youth league into a new type of youth organization which did not only recruit Communist youth, but also recruited all non-fascist youth with other political beliefs. 59 This new type of organization should use class struggle doctrine and Marxism-Leninism to educate the members and have a close relationship with the Communist party. 60 The core difference between this new type organization and the previous youth league rested on the recruitment scope of the members. But in many other respects, including its close relationship with the CCP, the reconstructed youth league played the same role as the youth league. 4.4 The Incentives for Rebuilding the Youth League ( ) The youth league was re-built in the period of Civil War between the CCP and Kuomintang ( ), and was established at the eve of the establishment of the PRC. The major role of the newly re-built youth league was as a Party-led Mass Organization for politically socializing Chinese Youths and developing young Party leaders for the CCP. This section analyzes the reasons for rebuilding the youth league. The decision to rebuild the youth league on 5 th November 1946 was made through some discussions within the CCP. During this process, a core member of Mao Zedong faction, Ren Bishi played a decisive role. On the basis of Letter From Mao Zedong to the Member of Central Secretariat of the CCP and the Heads of Central Youth Committee Concerning the Issue of Establishment of the Youth League ( 毛泽东就筹备建团事宜致信中共中央书记处成员及中央青委负责人 ) on 27 th 59. 青年共产国际, 关于青年统一战线任务的决议, 收录于共青团中央, 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [Youth Communist International, Resolution on the Task of Youth United Front, collected in Central Committee of the CCYL, Young Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement(Historical Document) (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1985) pp ]. 60. 李玉贞 ( 编 ), 青年共产国际与中国青年运动 ( 档案史料 )( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1985) 页 [Li Yuzhen(ed.), Youth Communist International and Chinese Youth Movement (Historical Archives) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1985) pp ].

150 140 December 1948, Ren Bishi was appointed by Mao to deal with this matter. 61 From the Reply Letter of Chairman Mao after Reading the Report of First National Congress of New Democratic Youth League ( 毛主席关于新民主主义青年团一大报告的批示 )on 9 th April 1949, the views of Ren Bishi on rebuilding the CCYL were endorsed by Mao Zedong. 62 Within the Mao faction, Ren Bishi was the most appropriate party leader to participate in the youth league s affairs. That is because, firstly, he was the former General Secretary of the CCYL and had significant influence within the youth league. Secondly, Ren had been a close ally of Mao since his childhood period and enjoyed a high leadership rank within the CCP. Ren was recommended by Mao to study in Moscow from the Russian Research Institution in In the 1926 anti-chen Duxiu action, Ren strongly supported Mao. 64 And at the 7 th National Congress of the CCP (April 1945), Ren was listed in the Top Five Secretaries of the CCP, behind Mao Zedong. 65 On the basis of the Meeting Notes (concerning a series of meetings to discuss the youth work of that moment) taken by He Qijun 66 ( 何启君, the vice-director of organizational department of the Central Youth Work Committee from 1945 to 1949 and a participant in this meeting), I argue that the main reason for re-building the youth league was that the existing youth organizations could not satisfy the requirements of the CCP. This argument contains two parts. One concerns the 61. 共青团中央青运史委员会, 中国青少年研究中心 ( 编 ), 毛泽东青年工作书信的题词 - 文稿手迹选 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1993) 页 [Youth Movement History Research Committee, China Youth Research Centre(ed.), The Youth Work Letter of Mao Zedong -The Selection of the Original Copy (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1993) pp ]. 62. 中国青年研究中心, 团中央青运史委员会 ( 编 ) 中国共青团七十年 ( 北京 : 红旗出版社, 1992) 页 35 [Youth Movement History Research Committee and China Youth Research Centre(ed.), Chinese Communist Youth League Seventy Year (Beijing: Red Flag Press, 1992) p.35]. 63. 中共汨罗县委员会 ( 编 ), 任弼时 ( 长沙 : 湖南人民出版社, 1979) 页 20 [Poluo County Communist Party Committee(ed.), Ren Bishi (Changsha: Hunan People Press, 1979) p.20]. 64. Ibid, p.58; 65. The other Top Five Secretary of the CCP included: Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De. Details please see: Thomas Kampen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership (Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000) pp In April 1996, He Qijun(the vice-director of organizational department of the Central Youth Work Committee of that moment and the witnesses of rebuilding the CCYL) published all his records concerning the rebuilding of CCYL in his book: The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League ( 青年团重建史料集萃 ). Details please see: 何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996)[He Qijun, The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1996)].

151 141 problems of the youth organizations at that time, and the other concerns the requirements of the CCP. From the latter, we can also understand the role and function planned for the new youth league The Problems of the Existing Youth Organizations In 1946, CCP leaders in charge of youth affairs found many problems in the existing youth organizations. They appeared too loose in structure, undisciplined, and lacking a clear organizational purpose. They were regarded as incompetent to assist the CCP to win the support from the youth. In particular, compared with the former youth league, the young salvation associations were mass organizations in nature. And at the beginning of establishing these associations, to better recruit all the youths to fight against the Japanese, the CCP did not instill Organizational Life ( 组织生活 ) and set strict Organizational Discipline as they did in the CCYL. As He Qijun mentioned at the meeting assessing the Youth Salvation Association, Now, all the (Chinese) youths are the members of youth salvation association. If all of them are members, it will turn out that nobody is a member.. It seems that the youth salvation associations have a large scale of members, but it does not have competitiveness. 67 Furthermore, when the Anti-Japanese war ended on 2 nd September 1945, the organizational purpose of the youth salvation associations had been fulfilled. Although the CCP soon transformed the youth salvation associations into Youth Associations ( 青年联合会 ) after the surrender of Japan on 15th August 1945, yet they continued to lack organizational purpose, which should be educating Chinese Youth. In this meeting, Li Yunjie ( 李云洁, a youth cadre of Shandong Communist Party) first raised an idea which received wide acceptance by the participants: The CCP should have a youth organization to educate Chinese youth with its ideology Original words are: 现在几乎所有的青年都参加了青救会 如果每一位青年都是青救会成员, 那就等于没有青年是青救会成员.. 青救会看上去有很多会员, 但没有战斗力, details please see: 何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996) 页 13[He Qijun, The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1996) p.13]. 68. 何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996) 页 13[He Qijun, The

152 The Requirement for Political Socialization of Chinese Youths To provide the Chinese youth with a Communist political education was the major task of the rebuilt youth league. In the first Zao Yuan Meeting (August 1946, 枣园会议 the discussion meeting for rebuilding the youth league), Ren Bishi specially emphasized that: The key to doing youth work well is to educate the generation of youth. 69 The Chinese term educating the youth generation mainly points to the political socialization of Chinese youth, especially when the CCP talked about mass organization. Political socialization refers to using Communist doctrine to educate the youths, and generate their support for the CCP. For example, in the August 1946 Meeting, all the participants paid significant attention to political education when they were talking about the topic of Educating the Generation of Youth. They criticized the idea that education was only pure education of culture and knowledge and argued for the idea of undertaking political education on the basis of protecting the interest of youths and in their daily lives. 70 To any political party, winning political support from the youth is very important. Especially during the Civil War, the CCP was fighting against the Kuomintang for state power. Because they lacked advanced military force, winning the support from ordinary people, and especially the youth, was a matter of life-and-death for the CCP. From the discussion at this Meeting we can find out that in the mind of the CCP youth leaders, mass organizations, such as the Youth Salvation Association, cannot properly socialize Chinese Youths, so a political Youth Organization was needed. As Du Qian ( 杜前, leading youth cadre in Shandong Province) declared: The task of educating the generation of Youth cannot pass to Government, and any department of the Government cannot undertake the whole task. In these Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1996) p.13]. 69. Original words are: 做好青年工作的关键在于教育, 对青年一代的教育是很重要的, details please see: 何启君, 任弼时重建青年团, 传承 34 期, 2010 年 12 月, 页 21 [He Qijun, Ren Bishi Rebuild the Youth League, Inheritance and Innovation, vol.34, December 2010, p.21]. 70. 何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996) 页 1-35[He Qijun, The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1996) pp.1-35].

153 143 years, the Youth Salvation Association cannot well undertake the work of operating political and ideological education of masses of Youths. In my opinion, political organization of the youth is necessary. 71 So because of the requirement to undertake the political socialization of Chinese Youth, it was thought necessary to re-establish the youth league The Requirement for Developing Party Members and Youth cadres After eight years armed struggle against Japan, the number of party members of the CCP had increased from 4,000 in July 1937 to 1,210,000 in And the CCP had developed into one of largest Opposition Parties in China. 72 For any political party, qualified members and cadres are needed. But to different parties, the criterion for membership is different. To the CCP of that time, political ideology and loyalty were the most significant criteria for membership. In terms of recruiting qualified Party members, large numbers of Chinese youths applied to join the Party. However, not all of them could be directly recruited into the Party, so the CCP needed a mass organization to assimilate these masses of youths, and to select the activists from among them into the Party. In 1945, the CCP established 18 provincial governments of border areas with land of over 950,000 square kilometers and the population of over 95 million. 73 According to the Meeting Record of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP concerning the establishing of the youth league (26 th August 1946), approximately 3 million to 4 million youths from CCP ruling areas had applied to join the CCP at that time. However, only 40,000 to 50,000 of them were qualified to be recruited. 74 So, large numbers of Youths were ineligible for the CCP. To better 71. Original words are: 教育青年一代 的任务, 不能推给政府, 任何一个政府部门也包揽不了这个任务 青救会这些年来, 对广大青年的政治教育 思想教育也放松了 我看, 青年的政治性团体是需要的, details please see: 何启君, 任弼时重建青年团, 传承 34 期, 2010 年 12 月, 页 15 [He Qijun, Ren Bishi Rebuild the Youth League, Inheritance and Innovation, vol.34, December 2010, p.15]. 72. 刘烨, 抗日战争与中国共产党崛起 [Liu Ye, Anti-Japanese War and the Rise of the CCP ], 19th June,2013, website of People, accessed at: CCP, Memorabilia of the CCP in 1945, website of the CCP, accessed at: com.cn/big5/64162/64164/ html. 74. 中央书记处, 任弼时主持党中央书记处讨论建立青年团的会议记录 (1946 年 8 月 26

154 144 organize these Youths, educate them, and assimilate them, increasingly CCP youth cadres believed that the rebuilding the youth league was necessary. 75 In terms of recruiting qualified young Party cadres, according to the discussion of the Meeting Record, most of the youth cadres of the Party were not satisfied with the work of training young cadres in the period of the Anti-Japanese war. Most of them insisted that after the reconstruction of the youth league, the Youth Associations could not properly develop young cadres for the CCP. For example, in the Meeting while discussing the function of Youth Organization, Wang Zhizhou ( 王治周, the Director of the Youth Committee in Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area from 1942 to 1949) said: In our Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area, the number of trained cadres in the period from the reconstruction of the Communist Youth League to 1942 was far less than the ones before three years of reconstructing CCYL, not even 10% of them. 76 When exploring why the Youth Salvation Association could not fulfill this mission of developing young cadres for the CCP, Li Yunjie said: To develop the reserve for the Party, common youth organizations only provide cultural education which is not enough; it needs a more advanced, politically educated youth organization. 77 As the above discussion pointed out, youth cadres of the CCP did not satisfy the youth work in terms of developing young cadres for the Party. And the main reason was the training outcome in the aspect of politics, especially in the area of political 日 ) 收录于何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996) 页 60[Central Secretariat of the CCP, Meeting Record of the Secretariat of the Central Committee Concerning the Establishing of the Youth League (26th August 1946), collected in He Qijun, The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1996) p.60]. 75. Ibid; 76. Original words are: 我们陕甘宁边区, 从共产主义青年团取消以后, 到 1942 年之间所培养出来的干部, 比之取消共青团前三年, 所培养的干部少得多 后者还不到前者的百分之十, details please see: 何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996,) 页 4 [He Qijun, The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League(Beijing: China Youth Press, 1996) p.4]. 77. Original words are: 要为党培养后备军, 仅只是一般的 文化教育的青年团体还不够, 还必须有一个更高级的 政治教育的青年组织, details please see: Ibid, p.14.

155 145 ideology. The Youth Salvation Association, as one of the most significant mass organizations in the period of the Sino-Japanese War, was not equipped with Communist ideology to better unite all the anti-japanese forces which had different ideologies. So when the war was over, in order to better cultivate the reserve of the CCP (cadres and members), a new youth league was required. 4.5 The Bottom-Up Rebuilding Process of the Youth League The reconstructing and re-building of the youth league helped the CCP to enhance the support of Chinese youths. It concentrated on uniting the force of the Youths. And the re-building of the youth league focused on their political socialization Early Practices to Rebuild the Youth League In the period of the Sino-Japanese War, there were two proposals for rebuilding the CCYL raised by youth cadres to the Secretariat of the CCP. But at that time, the salvation organizational form was more appealing than a party organization with a definite political ideology. That is to say, in the period of Sino-Japanese war, nationalist claims (such as: Anti-Japanese, Anti-Fascist) had much broader appeal among Chinese youths than political ideology (Communism or Three Principles of the People ). In 1940, many former youth league cadres had proposed to re-build the youth league. 78 But in 1941, the Central Committee of the CCP adopted the Resolution Concerning the Youth Work ( 中央关于青年工作的决议 ) to reject their proposal. The reason was that At present is the period of Anti-Japanese struggle, if we rebuild the youth league, it would lead to the danger of isolating us from the ordinary people 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]. 79. 中共中央, 中央关于青年工作的决议 (1940 年 6 月 4 日 ), 收录于团中央青运史研究室, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央青年运动文件选编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1988) 页 547 [Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution of Concerning the Youth Work (4th June 1940), collected in Youth Movement Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL and the Central Archive(ed.), The Document Selection of the Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Youth Movement(Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1988)p.547].

156 146 In 1945, Feng Wenbin (the Head of Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP) suggested rebuilding the youth league again. And in reply, on 6 th April 1945, the CCP published The Instruction of CCP Concerning the Preparation of Establishing the Youth Association in the Liberated Area ( 中央关于准备成立解放区青年联合会的指示 ). At that moment, considering the coming peace talks with the Kuomintang, the CCP refused to build up the youth league, but allowed the establishment of nonpolitical youth associations The Re-building Design by the Central Youth Work Committee In the period of the Civil War, the struggle between the CCP and the Kuomintang was not limited to armed force. It also contained the contest of political ideology (CCP s New Democracy vs. KMT s Three Principles of the People ). During this struggle, the CCP was searching for a new form of political youth organization to assist the political socialization of Chinese Youth. And under the effort of Ren Bishi and other Youth Cadres, the youth league was chosen and was re-built from the grassroots to create a national organization, and it was completely established on the eve of the establishment of the PRC. To be specific, after the Kuomintang started to vigorously attack the CCP on 26 th June 1946, the CCP immediately considered the issue of re-building the youth league to win the support of the Youth against the Kuomintang. The first Proposal to re-build the youth league - The Draft Suggestion Concerning Establishing the New Democratic Youth League ( 关于成立新民主主义青年团的建议草案 ) was made by the Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP, and was submitted to the Central Secretariat of the CCP on 27 th June This Draft Suggestion suggested that firstly, the CCP should rebuild the political educational organization -- youth league to be the leading core of Chinese youth. That is to say, the new youth league should focus on the political socialization of Chinese 80. 中共中央, 中央关于准备成立解放区青年联合会的指示, 收录在共青团中央青运史档案馆 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Instruction of CCP Concerning the Preparation of Establishing the Youth Association in Liberated Area, stored in the Archive of Youth Movement in Central Committee of the CCYL], website of Chinese Youth Research Institution of the CCYL, accessed at: 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ].

157 147 youths. Secondly, the Suggestion defined the nature of this organization as neither a party organization like the former CCYL, nor a mass organization such as youth salvation, but a Party reserve youth organization between the Party and masses. It can be regarded as an intermediary organization between the Party and the masses. And thirdly, it also required the youth league to operate under the principles of New Democracy, which was a concept proposed by Mao Zedong in On New Democracy ( 新民主主义论 ) on 9th January (It refers to the historical stage before entering the Communist society, when the proletariat lead the people to overthrow feudalism and achieve independence from colonialism.) 82 When it came to member recruitment, the ideology of Communism or loyalty to the CCP was the major criterion. 83 It further confirmed its political function for assimilating the Chinese youth into the camp of the CCP. Fourthly, the purpose of member recruitment of this youth league was to recruit approximately 25%~30% of Chinese youths The Rebuilding Process After two meetings (a meeting of the central Secretariat of the CCP held on 26th August 1946, and a meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP held on 13th September 1946), the leaders of the CCP achieved consensus on rebuilding the youth league and appointed the Central Youth Work Committee to experimentally rebuild it. The Central Youth Committee soon adopted The Plan of Central Youth Work Committee experimentally establishing youth league in Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area ( 中央青委在陕甘宁试办青年团的计划 ) to undertake the project. The rebuilding project chose two experimental sections: one in Yanan ( 延安 ) and the other in Suide ( 绥德 ) and Mizhi ( 米脂 ).And they paid significant attention to grass roots level organization building. In Yanan, the Committee selected Fengzhuang ( 冯庄 ) village, Fengzu Matches 82. Mao Tse-Tung, Selection Works of Mao Tse-Tung(vol.II) (Beijing:Foreign Languages Press, 1977) pp 中央青委, 关于成立新民主主义青年团的建议草案, 收录于何启君, 青年团重建史料集萃 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1996) 页 [Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP, The Draft Suggestion Concerning Establishing the New Democratic Youth League, collected in He Qijun(ed.), The Historical Collection of Rebuilding the Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1996) pp.36-48]. 84. 何启君, 青年团的初建 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1987) 页 [He Qijun, The establishing of Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1987) pp ].

158 148 Factory, and Xingzhi Middle school to build youth league local branches. In Suide and Mizhi, the Committee selected five rural villages and Suide Normal University to build youth league branches. 85 From these selected points we can discover that the focus groups of the youth league are peasants in rural areas, workers in factories, and students in middle schools and universities. On the basis of these experimental points, increasingly youth league organizations were built up. And after the experimental project achieved significant successes, the Central Committee of the CCP sent the The Proposal of Central Committee of the CCP Concerning the Establishing of the Democratic Youth League ( 中共中央关于建立民主青年团的提议, 5 th November 1946) to guide the re-building of the youth league along the established lines in all areas ruled by the CCP. From the bottom-up, all the CCP local committees started to establish or to integrate the former youth organizations and youth management sections to build the youth league. And the newly established youth league greatly motivated the youth to undertake Agrarian Revolution and Armed Struggle. 86 For example, in Shandong Province, after receiving the Proposal, the Shandong Communist Party immediately arranged the re-building of the youth league. Beginning from Jingouguan Village, till the end of 1947, in 42 Counties Shandong and most of the School, university, factory and hospital, the youth league branches were established and there were over youth league members. 87 In Dongbei, the original Youth Salvation organizations were transformed into Democratic Youth Leagues or Democratic Youth Associations. When the Bureau of Dongbei received the Proposal, they immediately transformed the Democratic Youth League and Democratic Youth Association into youth league s, and over 80% of the members of former youth organizations were recruited as youth league members 何启君, 青年团的初建 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1987) 页 [He Qijun, The establishing of Youth League (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 1987) pp ]. 86. 共青团陕西省委青运史研究室, 团旗在这里重新升起 ( 西安 : 陕西人民出版社, 1991) 页 6-9 [Youth Movement Research Office of Communist Youth League of Shanxi Province(ed.), The Flat of Youth League Re-Rise from Here (Xian: Shanxi People Press, 1991) pp.6-9]. 87. 中共中央青委编, 青年工作通讯 ( 团内刊物 ) 第 2 期,1948 年 [The Central Youth Work Committee of the CCP(ed.), Work Communication(Inner Youth League Journal) vol.2, 1948]. 88 中共中央青委编, 青年工作通讯 ( 团内刊物 ) 第 7 期,1948 年 [The Central Youth Work

159 149 Along with the national military success of the CCP, in April 1949, the National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League was held in Beijing. It declared the complete establishment of the youth league. And since then, along with the development of the CCP, the youth league gradually became the Mass Organization of the CCP which strengthened the Party s reach into all corners of the Youth sector of Society. 4.6 Summary In the first stage of the Mao Zedong period, the CCYL experienced reconstruction and rebuilding. During these two practices, the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL was changed from organization rival to the practical subordination. In the Sino-Japanese war, the CCYL was reconstructed into the Central Youth Committee of the CCP and several Anti-Japanese youth organizations. The Second Party role of the CCYL collapsed. The CCYL could no longer become a rival political organization to challenge the leadership role of the CCP in the Chinese Communist movement. And in this period, the reconstructed youth league became a Party-led mass organization fulfilling multiple functions, including motivating the youths to participate in the fighting against Japan, developing cadres for the CCP, and participating in the building of border governments. In the following period of Civil War between the CCP and Kuomintang, the CCP initiated a bottom-up rebuilding process of the youth league. On the basis of the practices in the Sino-Japanese War, the youth league was cultivated. The rebuilt youth league served as a party led mass organization. And this organization had three functions: undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youth, motivating mass movement, and developing young party cadres. Among others, undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youths was the main feature of the CCYL which is examined in the next chapter. Committee of the CCP(ed.), Work Communication(Inner Youth League Journal) vol.7, 1948].

160 150 CHAPTER FIVE The CCYL in the Period of Mao Zedong after the Establishment of the PRC ( ) This chapter analyses the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL in the second stage of the Mao Zedong period. This period started with the establishment of the People s Republic of China (1st October 1949) and ended with the death of Mao (9th September, 1976). In this period, Mao was the supreme leader of the CCP which was the ruling party in an authoritarian regime with the characters of Official Ideology, Party-State, Planned Economy, Secret Police, and Party Monopoly of Media and Army. 1 And the Prominence of Ideology (ideology played a prominent role, and was regarded as the power source of Mao) 2 and the preference of Mass Movement 3 were two of the most significant characteristics of Mao Zedong s rule. The development of the CCYL in this period can be divided into two historical phases. From 1949 to 1966, the youth league experienced steady progress and formed the familiar organizational structure we see today. But in the Cultural Revolution Period (1966 to 1976), just like other institutions, the CCYL also suffered serious impact because of the Red Guard and was paralysed. This chapter argues that in the second stage of the Mao Zedong period, the CCYL became a State-recognized mass organization under the leadership of the CCP. 1. Concerning Chinese Totalitarianism, please see: Richard Walker, China under Communism: The First Five Years(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1955); Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960); John Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963); Gordon Bennett, Elite and Society in China: A Summary of Research and Interpretation, in Robert Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People s Republic of China (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1972)pp.3-37; William Odom, Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts, World Politics, vol.45, no.1, 1992, pp.66-98; Guo Sujian, The Totalitarian Model Revised, Communist and Post- Communist Studies, vol.31, 1998, pp ; Guo Sujian, Totalitarianism: An Outdated Paradigm for Post-Mao China?, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol.14, no.2, 1995,pp Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) pp Tsou Tang, Reflections on the Formation and Foundations of the Communist Party-State in China in The Cultural Revolution and Past-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (The University of Chicago Press, 1986) p.276.

161 151 And in this period, the CCYL served the mobilization system, ideology indoctrination, and leadership development of the CCP. Among other, ideology indoctrination was the main function of the youth league in this period. This chapter is constituted by four main sections. Section 5.1 presents the organizational development of the CCYL from 1949 to In this period, the CCYL developed to its contemporary form in terms of its national committee and functional division setting. Section 5.2 examines the role of the CCYL in respect of motivating the political movement, operating ideological indoctrination, and serving the leadership and membership renewal for the CCP. Section 5.3 traces the significance of the CCYL in the Chinese political system on the basis of the interaction between the CCYL, Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four in the Cultural Revolution. Section 5.4 explores two major causes of the CCYL s suffering in the Cultural Revolution. The final section summarizes the major findings of this chapter. 5.1 The Organizational Development of the Youth League ( ) Along with the development of the CCP and the transformation of Chinese society from 1949 to 1966, the CCYL completed its organizational development and extended its influence to all the corners of Chinese society. Specifically, after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, besides eliminating the remnants of the enemy forces, the CCP soon implemented the Agrarian Reform ( 土地改革, completed in 1952) and Three Major Transformations ( 三大改造, completed in 1956) to build up the Socialist system in China. In this new political system, the CCP monopolized all the resources of society. 4 And the PRC during that time can be described in the following terms: Organization is total, reaching from the top of society down to its lowest levels. Everyone is recruited into some group organized and controlled by the regime. 5 In this period, the youth league developed into its modern form and became the organization that strengthened the CCP s reach into the Youth. 4. Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957) pp H.F Schurmann, Organization and Response in Communist China, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 321, January 1959, pp

162 152 From 1949 to 1964, the youth league started to recruit large numbers of members from the government, army, factories, rural areas, schools, etc. The membership of the youth league increased from approximately 1.37 million to over million. 6 Meanwhile, by the end of 1965, the membership of the CCP reached approximately 18.95million. 7 And the labour age population (Male: age between 16 and 59; Female: age between 16 and 54) of PRC on 1st July 1964 was approximately million. 8 So the CCYL membership was far larger than the Party, and the members of the youth league represented about 6.91% of the Chinese labour age population The Name of the Youth League Having experienced three name changes (Socialist Youth League in establishing period, New Democratic Youth League, NDYL 新民主主义青年团 in early period of the establishment of the PRC ), the youth league ultimately confirmed its name as the Chinese Communist Youth League ( 中国共产主义青年团 ) at the 9th National Congress of the Youth League (11th -29th June 1964). And since then, the name of CCYL has become the only official name of the youth league. In addition, to demonstrate historical continuity, the youth league also used this name to identify its former incarnations. To be specific, the name of the youth league experienced three modifications. Originally, the youth league was called the Socialist Youth League ( 社会主义青年团 ) in its first period, 9 and then it changed to Communist Youth League 6. CCYL, The Congress Reports of the 1st National Congress of New Democratic Youth League and the 9th National Congress of Chinese Communist Youth League, website of the CCYL, accessed at: 7. 中共中央党史研究室, 突出成就和基本经验 收录在, 中国共产党历史 ( 第二卷, 下册 ) ( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2011)[The Party History Research Office, Outstanding Achievement and Basic Experience, collected in The History of the CCP (vol2 Part2) (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2011)], website of CCP History, accessed at: /222758/222780/ html. 8. State Statistics Bureau of PRC, The Data of Second National Census from State Statistics Bureau of PRC, website of State Statistics Bureau of PRC, accessed at: /tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200204/t _30317.html. 9. 中国社会主义青年团, 中国社会主义青年团第一次全国大会号, 先驱 ( 团中央机关报刊 ), 1922 年 5 月 15 日头版 [Chinese Socialist Youth League, The 1st National Congress of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, The Pioneer Newspaper(Official Newspaper of Central Committee of CCYL), 15th May 1922, p.1].

163 153 ( 共产主义青年团 ) in the period of First United Front. 10 After the reconstruction in the period of Sino-Japanese war, the youth league finished its rebuilding on the eve of the establishment of the PRC and was named the New Democratic Youth League ( 新民主主义青年团, ) by Mao Zedong. 11 In 1964, at the 9th National Congress of the NDYL, the youth league on the one hand changed its name to the Communist Youth League. On the other hand, all previous National Congresses of the youth league was given the officially-unified name of National Congress of the CCYL. That is to say, the 1 st National Congress of the CSYL in 1922 was marked as the 1 st National Congress of the CCYL. The 1 st National Congress of the NDYL in 1949 was regarded as the 6 th National Congress of the CCYL, and so on. And from then till now, the Chinese Communist Youth League was the united official name of the youth league. The reason for the name changes rested on the needs of the CCP at different historical stages. Take the New Democratic Youth League for example; its name represented the fact that it served the tasks of the New Democratic Revolution ( 新民主主义革命 ) which was proposed and upheld by Mao in his 1948 Speech in the Jin-Sui Area Cadre Conference ( 在晋绥干部会议上的讲话 ). As Mao declared: The Chinese New Democratic Revolution refers to the Proletariat led Mass Revolution; it aims to fight against Imperialism, Feudalism, and Bureaucratic Capitalism. 12 The New Democratic Revolution aimed to overthrow Feudalism and Bureaucratic Capitalism, and to achieve the state s independence from Colonialism. To the CCP, the establishment of the PRC and the completion of the Agrarian Reform 10. 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 57 [The Youth Movement History Archives of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Review of All Previous CCYL National Congress (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012)p.57]. 11. 毛泽东, 毛泽东选集 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1991) 页 1352 [Mao Zedong, Selection of Mao Zedong (Beijing: People Press, 1991) p.1352]. 12. Original words are: 无产阶级领导的, 人民大众的, 反对帝国主义 封建主义和官僚资本主义的革命, 这就是中国的新民主主义的革命, details please see: 毛泽东, 毛泽东选集 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1991) 页 1314 [Mao Zedong, Selection of Mao Zedong(Beijing: People Press, 1991) p.1314].

164 154 ( 土地改革 ) 13 and Three Major Transformations (Transformations of Agriculture, Handicraft Industry, and Capitalist Industry and Commerce 三大改造 ) 14 indicated the tasks of the New Democratic Revolution were fulfilled. So at the 3 rd National Congress of the NDYL (May 1957), when the New Democratic Revolution was almost completed, the youth league formally changed its name back to Communist Youth League and decided that next national congress of the youth league would be categorized as the 9 th National Congress of the CCYL The National Network of the CCYL When the CCP became the ruling party of Chinese society, the youth league served as the State-recognized mass organization to build up its branches or committees in all the industries, vocations and all other sectors of Chinese Youths. And all the youth league organizations took a similar hierarchical structure as the CCP which contributed to the regularization of the youth league. Paragraph 14 of the Constitution of the New Democratic Youth League (1949) regulates the rules of building youth league branches and committees in every division of industry, vocation and administrative area of China. That is: According to the division of industry, vocation and administrative area, establish the youth league organization of all levels: 1. In every factory, enterprise, company, school, organs of government or Party, Street, countryside (or village), if there are 5 or more youth league members, we should build a youth league Branch, several Groups constitute the Branch, and each Group is constituted by 3 to 10 members; if there are a hundred or more members, we should set up a General Branch, several Branches constitute the 13. Website of China, Agrarian Reform, 28th September 2002, website of China, accessed at: 师霞, 什么是社会主义改造 [Shi Xia, What is Socialist Reform ], website of CCP, accessed at: 共青团中央, 关于将中国新民主主义青年团改名为中国共产主义青年团的决议 (1957 年 5 月 24 日通过 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 团的文件汇编 ( 团内文件, 1959) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Resolution Concerning Changing the Name of the Chinese New Democratic Youth League to Chinese Communist Youth League, collected in Central Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Document Collection of the Youth League (Internal Document, 1959) pp.57-58].

165 155 General Branches; if there are 500 or more members, we should establish a youth league Committee. 2. In every district, if we have three or more branches, we should establish the youth league committee of this district. In a county or city, if there are three or more youth league committees of the district, we should establish a prefectural youth league committee or municipal youth league committee. 3. In every Area(such as Dongbei Area, Liangbei Area, Huabei Area, Huadong Area, Zhongyuan Area, etc.) every Province, every Special Section, every County (City), and every District, the youth league should establish an Area Committee, Provincial Committee, Local Committee, Prefectural Committee (Municipal Committee), and District Committee respectively. 16 Since 1949, with the support of the CCP, the national network building of the CCYL received significant development. To be specific, by 1953, it had built up a national organization network with about 380,000 local organizations and over 9,000,000 members. 17 The youth league successfully shaped itself as the State Corporatist organization of Chinese Youths and developed its local branches all over the country. The revised Constitution of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League (i.e. 7th National Congress of the CCYL, 1953) explicitly regulated the political structure of the youth league. From Paragraph Nine of the 16. Original words are: 按照生产 职业和行政区域划分, 建立本团的各级组织机构 :( 一 ) 每一工厂 企业 连队 学校 机关 街道 农村 ( 或乡 ), 有团员 5 人以上, 即成立团支部, 支部下划分若干小组, 每组 3 至 10 人, 百人以上即成立总支, 下设分支,500 人以上设该单位的团委员会 ( 二 ) 在一个区内, 有三个以上的支部, 即成立团的区委员会, 在一个县或市, 有三个以上的区委, 即应成立团的县委员会或市委员会 ( 三 ) 在各区域 ( 如东北区 两北区 华北区 华东区 中原区等 ) 各省 各专区 各县 ( 市 ) 各区, 各设区的区域委员会 省委员会 地方委员会 县委员会 ( 市委员会 ) 区委员会 ), details please see: 中国新民主主义青年团, 中国新民主主义青年团团章 (1949 年 4 月 17 日新青团第一次全国代表大会通过 ), 收录于, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 212.[New Democratic Youth League, The Constitution of the New Democratic Youth League(approved by the 1st National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, 17th April 1949), collected in Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL(ed.), All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) p.212]. 17. 胡耀邦, 新民主主义青年团第二次全国代表大会政治报告 : 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进 (1953 年 6 月 24 日 ), 中国青年报 1953 年 7 月 7 日第一版 [Hu Yaobang, The Political Report of the New Democratic Youth League in the Second National Congress: Uniting National Youths to Join the Team of Building Our Great Country (24th June 1953), in China Youth Newspaper, 7th July, 1953, p.1].

166 156 Constitution, as Figure-1 shows, the political structure of the youth league appears as a Five-Level Pyramid. Figure 5-1: The Political Structure of the Youth League (1953) 18 The Central Committee was the central authority of the youth league. From Central Committee to Grass-Roots Level Committee, there were five levels of youth league Committees at that time. From top to bottom, they were: Central Committee, Provincial Committee, Municipal Committee, Prefectural Committee, and Grass- Roots Level Committee. This structure corresponded to the administrative structure of the PRC and contributed to the regularization of the youth league. It further consolidated the State Corporatist character of the youth league. In addition, the youth league completely followed the leadership of the CCP. In the organizational setting, the Central Committee of the Youth League is required to follow the leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP. And the local committee of the youth league follows the dual leadership of the superior youth league Committee and the Communist Party Committee of the same level. That is to say, the 18. The Figure5-1 is drawn by the author. Information is from 9th Term of the Constitution of the New Democratic Youth League(approved by the 2nd National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, 30th June 1953), Detail please see: 新民主主义青年团, 中国新民主主义青年团团章 (1953 年 6 月 30 日新青团第二次全国代表大会通过 ), 中国青年报 1953 年 7 月 7 日第一版 [New Democratic Youth League, The Constitution of the Chinese New Democratic Youth League (approved by the 2nd National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, 30th June 1953), in China Youth Newspaper, 7th July, 1953, p.1].

167 157 Provincial Committee of the Youth League must follow the leadership of the Central Committee of the Youth League and the Provincial Communist Party Committee, and so on. This political structure setting aims to prevent the re-appearance of a Second Party role of the youth league and to guarantee the complete CCP leadership over the CCYL. In a Meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Work of the Youth League (12th July, 1958), Deng Xiaoping clearly pointed out that in the past, the youth league had one principal error of aiming to replace the leadership of the party. The key of the work of the youth league was rather to bolster the leadership of the party. And the structural setting that meant the youth league committee was under the leadership of the same level Party committee was the key to maintaining the leadership of the CCP. As Deng Xiaoping said: In the youth league history, there was lesson on this aspect; the youth league had made a principal error. That was (aiming to replace the party to lead the Chinese communist movement). There is only one key question, the party. The party is the highest organizational form of the Proletariat, only the party will not change forever. The Communist Party is leader. Party leading everything is the basis of all problems This truth should be spoken forever, till the end of the party and the league. The leadership of the party committee of the same level is the most significant part of the leadership of the party. Without the leadership of the party committee (over the youth league) of the same level, there is no party leadership (over the youth league). 19 The dual leadership of the local youth league assures the complete leadership of the CCP over the youth league. As the Mass Organization of Chinese youths, the youth league possesses a certain degree of autonomy, but this organizational structure 19. Original words are: 在青年团的历史上也有过这方面的经验教训, 青年团要犯原则性的错误, 就是这一条 关键问题只有一个, 党 党是无产阶级最高的组织形式, 永远不变的是党, 共产党是领袖, 党领导一切, 是一切问题根本的根本. 这个道理要永远讲, 直到党 团消亡了的时候为止. 党的领导, 最重要的是同级党委的领导 离开了同级党委, 还有什么党的领导 ) details please see: 中共中央书记处, 1958 年 7 月 12 日党中央书记处会议上对团的工作指示 ( 团内文件 )[Central Secretariat of the CCP, Record of the Meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP on the Work of the Youth League (12th July, 1958) (Internal document)].

168 158 guarantees that the autonomy of the youth league is closely supervised by the CCP, and it cannot undermine the control of the CCP The Functional Divisions of the CCYL Committees The institutional differentiation of the CCYL committees had formally started since the 1 st National Congress of NDYL (i.e. The 6 th National Congress of the CCYL) in Before 1949, the central authority of the CCYL was changed from the Central Executive Committee( 中央执行委员会, )or the Central Bureau ( 中央局 ), and the functional division was not fully settled. For example, at the 1 st National Congress of the CSYL, the youth league established three working departments, included Secretary Department( 书记部 ), Economic Department( 经济部 ), and Propaganda Department( 宣传部 ). 20 But at the 2nd Congress, these departments were changed into four specific positions. They were Secretary-General ( 秘书长 ), Secretary( 秘书 ), Accountant( 会计 ), and Editor ( 编辑 ). 21 And till the eve of reconstruction (1936), the Organization Department ( 组织部 ), Propaganda Department( 宣传部 ), Young Pioneers Team ( 少先队 ), and Children s Bureau( 儿童局 ) constituted the working departments of the Central Bureau of the CCYL. 22 However, since 1949, the leadership organ of the youth league has been formally fixed in the Secretariat ( 书记处 ). And subordinate to the Secretariat, there were several functional departments. They are Office( 办公室 ), Organizational Department( 组织部 ), Propaganda Department( 宣传部 ), Young Worker Department( 青工部 ), Young Peasant Department( 青农部 ), School Work 20. 社会主义青年团中央, 中国社会主义青年团章程, 先驱, 1922 年 5 月 15 日, 八号第二版 [Central Committee of the CSYL, The Constitution of the CSYL, The Pioneers, vol.8, 15 th May 1922, p.2]. 21. 社会主义青年团中央, 中国社会主义青年团第一次修正章程, 团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 (1) ( 内部文件, 1957) 页 [Central Committee of the CSYL, The First Revision of the Constitution of the CSYL, General Office of the CCYL(ed.), Historical Materials of the Chinese Youth Movement(vol.1)(Internal Document, 1957) pp ]. 22. 共青团团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 169 [Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL(ed.), All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) p.169].

169 159 Department( 学校工作部 ), United Front Work Department ( 统战部 ), and International Relations Department( 国际联络部 ). In July 1953, the formalization of the youth league received further development. All the functional departments of the youth league were given a corresponding administrative rank. Take the working department of the Central Committee of the CCYL for example, It was awarded with the rank of Bureau / Ting ( 局 / 厅 ), which was equivalent to the administrative rank of the prefecture-level city and the working department of the Provincial Committee of the CCP or Provincial Government. It reflected the fact that the youth league began to merge into the Chinese political administrative system. Comparing the departmental settings of the youth league in 1953 and in 2008, there are not so many changes. Only the Military Sport and Recreation Department ( 军体部 ) in 1953 was replaced by the Youth Rights Protection Department ( 维护青少年权益部 ) in In addition, the majority of functional departments are more or less the same (only some have changed their names). But the administrative rank of the functional departments of youth league has not changed. (Concerning the Evolution of the Central Authority, details please see: Figure 5-2 CCYL Central Authority and Its Evolution in the Appendix). 23 In addition, there are three major nation-wide Youth or Children s organizations in the PRC, which were also established by the CCP. They are the Chinese Young Pioneers ( 中国少年先锋队 ), the All-China Student Association( 中华全国学联 ), and the All-China Youth Association( 全国青年联合会 ). Although they seem to be independent organizations, all of them are under the leadership of the youth league through different approaches. And there are specific departments of the youth league to respond to their management. 23. The figure is made by author. And the information is collected from: 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) [Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL (ed.), All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012)]; 宋德福 ( 原团中央书记 ), 共青团体制改革的思考与实践 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2007)[Song Defu(former Secretary of the CCYL, The Thinking and Practices of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2007)].

170 160 To be specific, the Teenager and Children s Department( 少年儿童部 ) (later changed to Teenager Department in 1964) of the Central Committee of the youth league handles the daily management of the Young Pioneers. The School Work Department ( 学校工作部 ) (later changed to the School Department in 1964) manages the daily development of the All-China Student Association. And the Director of the School Department of the Youth League holds the position of the Secretary-General ( 秘书长 ) of the All-China Student Association. When it comes to the All-China Youth Association, the youth league as a whole was its leading Corporate Member, and at least 2 Secretaries in the Secretariat of the Youth League hold the position of chairman and vice-chairman of the All-China Youth Association. The daily management of All-China Youth Association is handled by United Front Work Department( 统战部 )of the Youth League. 5.2 The Functions of the CCYL ( ) The CCYL played the role of Mass Organization in the second stage of the Mao period. It aimed to fulfil three functions which included mobilizing the youth to join the mass movement, providing the indoctrination of youth ideology, and assisting the leadership development of the CCP. Ideology was the most significant part of Mao s rule. As Kenneth Lieberthal points out, Mao gave enormous emphasis to matters of ideology and to the importance of ideological education of the people. 24 So in the Mao period, the mass movement was not only an approach to implement certain policies, but also an educational method for ideological indoctrination. In addition, the ideological consideration was also the major index in leadership and membership renewal of the CCP. The CCYL was the main body for encouraging young people to join the Mass Movement. But the core of motivating the mass movement was to give Chinese youths political education, especially the education of political ideology. As for the leadership development function of the CCYL, although it was formally proposed by the youth league, yet the significance of institutionalization was neglected by the then CCP leaders, it could not become the institutional arrangement 24. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) p.62.

171 161 for assisting the leadership development of the CCP. It is commonly held that China in the period of Mao Zedong was one of the Communist regimes dominated by informal rules, and this character was reflected in the negative attitudes towards law and formal regulation which could be considered as one of the major obstructions against institutionalization of the CCP The Youth League in the Mass Movement As the major mass organization in terms of youth, the CCYL was one of the most significant institutions in implementing the CCP s mass movement line. 26 All the practices of the youth league in mobilizing the youths to join the mass movement also assisted the youth league earn a good reputation with the CCP. That is the Party makes the claim, the youth league soon makes the action ( 党有号召, 团有行动 ). 27 Mass Movement was one of the creations in the period of Mao and it was a prominent feature. Unlike all other political leaders in Chinese history, Mao developed a set of ideas on "Mass", "Mass Movement" and "Mass Line" to mobilize different kinds of social groups into the political fight, to take their interests into account when making decisions, and to rely on them in the implementation of policies. 28 Mao believed that he could sufficiently mobilize the populace to accomplish all the goals he set for them. 29 From 1949 to 1976 (the death of Mao Zedong), national mass movements covered every year of Mao Zedong s rule (Details please see: Figure 5-3 Major Nationwide Mass Movement from 1949 to in Appendix). And the field was 25. The Soviet leaders attitude towards law please see: Graeme Gill, Institutionalization and Revolution: Rules and the Soviet Political System, Soviet Studies, vol.37, no.2, April 1985, pp ; Karl Marx neglects law s importance. Please see: Eugene Kamenka, The Soviet View of Law, Problems of Communism, vol.14, no.2, March-April 1965, pp8-16; Lenin s communist blueprint has little space for law and he clearly opposed the idea- rule-of-law. Please read: Polan A.J., Lenin and the End of Politics(London: Methuen, 1984) pp Michel Oksenberg, China s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, The China Journal, no.45, January 2001, p Interview with Huang Zhijian. 28. Tsou Tang, Reflections on the Formation and Foundations of the Communist Party-State in China in The Cultural Revolution and Past-Mao Reform: A Historical Perspective (The University of Chicago Press, 1986) p Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003) p Figure 5-3 is made by the author. It refers: 中共中央党史研究室, 中国共产党历史大事记

172 162 not limited to politics. It covered the areas of Economics, Ideology, Society, and the Intellectuals. As Wu An-chia pointed out, under the rule of Mao, all kind of struggles appeared in the form of Mass Movements. 31 The youth league served the role of positively motivating the youths to join mass movements. As Figure 5-3 the Political Movement of the CCP and the Action of the Youth League ( ) indicates, before the Cultural Revolution, from 1950 to 1966, the CCYL actively responded to and joined all the CCP s mass movements. Figure 5-4 the Political Movement of the CCP and the Actions of the Youth League ( ) 32 Time Political Movement of CCP Land Reform Movement( 土地改革运动 ) The Movement to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea( 抗美援朝 ) The Movement of Suppressing Counter- Revolutionary ( 镇 Actions of the Central Committee of the Youth League (Meeting, Document, or Project) Meeting : National Rural Youth Work Meeting(August, 1950, 全国农村青年工作会议 ) Project: The Patriotism Education Movement: Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Safeguard our Country and Family( 抗美援朝, 保卫家园 爱国主义教育运动 ) Document: The Resolution Concerning the Movement of Increase Production and Practice Economy (approved in November, 1951)( 团中央二届二中全会关于增产节约运动的决议 1951 年 11 月 ) Document: The Announcement of Supporting the Regulation of the PRC Concerning the Punishment of counter-revolution ( 拥护 ( 中华人民共和国惩治反革命条例 ) 的声明 (1951 年 3 (1921 年 7 月 2011 年 6 月 ) ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 2011)[The Party History Research Office of the CCP, Chronicle of Events of the History of the Chinese Communist Party(July 1921-June 2011) (Beijing: People Press, 2011)]; 中共中央党史研究室, 中国共产党历史 ( 第二卷 )( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2011)[The Party History Research Office of the CCP, The History of the Chinese Communist Party(vol.2) (Beijing: Party History Press, 2011)]. 31. Wu An-chia, The Theory and Practice of Chinese Communist Rule in the Past Five Decades: The Role of the CCP s Leadership, Mainland China Studies, vol.42, no.9 September 1999, p The figure is made by the author. And the source from: 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 [Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL, All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) pp ]; 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ]; 中共中央党史研究室, 中国共产党历史 ( 第二卷 ) ( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2011)[The Party History Research Office of the CCP(ed.), The History of the CCP (vol2) (Beijing: CCP History Press, 2011)]; Wu An-chia, The Theory and Practice of Chinese Communist Rule in the Past Five Decades: The Role of the CCP s Leadership, Mainland China Studies, vol.42, no.9 September 1999, pp.1-12.

173 压反革命运动 ) 月 )) Three-anti and Meeting: Five-anti The Conference of Activists of the Youth League in the Central Campaigns ( 三反五 Organ (1951 年 12 月 19 日中央直属机关青年团积极分子大 反运动 ) 会 ) Three Great Transformation ( 三大改造运动 ) Rectification Movement( 整风运动 ) The Anti-Rightist Movement ( 反右派斗争运动 ) Great Leap Forward ( 大跃进 ) People's Commune Movement ( 人民公社化运动 ) 1964 Four Clean-ups Movement ( 四清运动 ) Document: The Resolution Concerning Mobilizing and Organizing Masses of Rural Youths to Join the High Tide of Agricultural Cooperation (1955)( 关于动员和组织广大农村青年迎接农业合作化高潮的决议 ) Project: The Activity of Striving to be Excellent Commune Member (1954)(1954 年, 争做一个优秀社员 的活动 ) Meeting: The Conference of Youth Activists from National Business Community (1956 年全国工商界青年积极分子大会 ) Document: The Decision of Organizing Cadres to Participate Manual Labor by Batches (18th September,1957) ( 关于分期分批组织干部体力劳动的决定 (1957 年 9 月 18 日 )) The Regulation of Dealing with Youth League Member Who Has Different Problems in Rectification Movement (January 1958) ( 关于整风 整团中处理凡有各种错误的团员的规定 (1958 年 1 月 )) Document: The Resolution Concerning Organizing Masses of Youth to Learn Marxism-Leninism, Learn the Work of Mao Zedong(1958) ( 关于组织广大青年学习马克思列宁主义 学习毛泽东著作的决议 1958) The Work Plan of the CCYL Concerning Strengthen the Learning of Marxism-Leninism, Work of Mao Zedong (1960) 共青团中央关于加强学习马克思列宁主义 学习毛泽东著作的工作规划 团三届六中 1960 Meeting: The Work Meeting of Socialist Education Movement(Four Clean-ups Movement) (21 July -12 August 1965)( 社会主义教育运动 ( 四清 运动 ) 工作会议 1965 年 7 月 21 日 -8 月 12 日 ) Document: The Report of the Central Committee of the Youth League Concerning the Meeting of Socialist Education (1965) 团中央社教工作会议情况的报告 1965 年 Some Problems of Youth Work in the Movement of Rural Socialist Education (1965) 农村社会主义教育运动中青年工作的几个问题 (1965 年 ) Take the Movement to Resist U.S Aggression and Aid Korea ( 抗美援朝 ) for example. When the CCP made its decision of join the battle against the USA in Korea in October 1950, the youth league soon generated a Patriotism Education Movement with the theme of Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Safeguard our Country and Family ( 抗美援朝, 保卫家园 ) to mobilize support for the War. Over 700,000

174 164 youths were mobilized to join the Military battles. And during the war, some heroic cases, such as Huang Jiguang( 黄继光 ), Qiu Shaoyun( 邱少云 ), and Luo Shengjiao ( 罗盛教 ), were widely and extensively propagandized by the youth league to the whole of Chinese society. It greatly inspired the morale of the Army and mobilized young people s enthusiasm for the war. 33 In addition, to better supply food for the army, the Central Committee of the Youth League also adopted The Resolution Concerning the Movement of Increase Production and Practice Economy (approved in November, 1951)( 团中央二届二中全会关于增产节约运动的决议 ) to appeal to Youth to increase Production and save food The Youth League and Ideological Indoctrination Ideological indoctrination, which was always expressed in the formulation "learning or teaching Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought", was one of the most significant missions of newly re-built youth league. The CCP leaders made clear expectations in Educate the Youths ( 教育青年 ). The contents of the education are matters for discussion, but Political education, i.e. ideological indoctrination, was in the first place. In 1991, the General Office of the CCYL convened a committee (led by Ling Jihua, the Head of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP in the Hu Jintao Period) to collect and research all the articles or talks concerning the CCYL of the Revolutionary Leaders including Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, and Deng Xiaoping. They published a work Revolutionary Leaders Talk about the Work of the Youth League ( 革命领袖论共青团工作 ). From all the articles and speeches collected and published in this book the idea of "Educate the Youth with Communist Ideology" seems to be the common theme of the talks by all the revolutionary leaders towards the youth league. 33. 胡耀邦, 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进 胡耀邦在新民主主义青年团二大上的报告, 中国青年报, 1953 年 7 月 7 日第 1 版 [Hu Yaobang, Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops of Developing Motherland The Report of Hu Yaobang In the 2nd National Congress of the NDYL, China Youth Newspaper, 7 th July 1953, p.1].

175 165 For example, in the "The Mission of the Youth League"( 青年团的任务,2nd October 1920), Lenin argued that the mission of the youth league was to lead the youth to learn and to create Proletarian Culture. 34 Stalin believed that learning Leninism, using Proletarian Dictatorship and the Communist Spirit to educate the masses of young people was a key mission of a youth league. 35 When it comes to the leaders of the first generation of the CCP, Mao insisted that leading the youth in education was the major mission of the youth league. In his inscription to the 1st National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, Mao wrote: Stay with Youths from all circles, Lead them, strengthen the Learning, and develop production. 36 Concerning the contents of Learning, Zhu De, in his speech to the same Congress, directly pointed out that: The task of youth league is to unite and educate the whole generation of (Chinese) Youths, (The contents of education are) Learning Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, Learning Culture, Science, Production, and Military Knowledge. (The approach of education) should learn in the fighting and working 列宁, 青年团的任务 ( 列宁在俄国共产主义青年团第三次全国代表大会上的演讲, 1920 年 10 月 2 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ) 革命领袖论共青团工作 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1991) 页 7-25 [Lenin, The Mission of Youth League (The Speech of Lenin in the third National Congress of Russian Communist Youth League, 2nd October 1920), collected in General Office of the CCYL(ed.), Revolutionary Leaders Talk About the Work of Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1991) pp.7-25]. 35. 斯大林, 论青年团的任务 ( 斯大林对 共青团真理报 编辑部提出问题的回答, 1925 年 10 月 29 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 革命领袖论共青团工作 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1991) 页 [Stalin, Concerning The Mission of Youth League (The Answers of Stalin to the Questions of the editors of Komsomolskaya Pravda, 29th October 1925), collected in General Office of the CCYL(ed.), Revolutionary Leaders Talk About the Work of Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1991) pp.29-35]. 36. Original words are: 与各界青年一起, 领导他们, 加强学习, 发展生产. Mao Zedong, The Inscription of Mao Zedong to the 1st National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, stored in the Convention Centre of the History of the CCYL. 37. Original words are: 青年团的任务是要团结和教育整个青年一代, 学习马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想, 学习文化 科学 生产 军事知识 要在斗争 工作 劳动中学习, details please see: 朱德, 朱德在青年团第一次全国代表大会上的讲话 (1949 年 4 月 11 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 革命领袖论共青团工作 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1991) 页 158 [Zhu Du, "The Speech of Zhu De in the 1st National Congress of the Youth League(11th April 1949), collected in The Revolutionary Leaders talk about the work of Youth League(Beijing: China Youth Press, 1991) p.158].

176 166 Zhou Enlai joined the political socialization function of the youth league with "Thought Reform"( 思想改造 ). In his political report to the Second Plenary Session of the First Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League (22 November 1951), he asked the youth league to use Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the criteria to undertake the Thought Reform among Chinese Youths. 38 Liu Shaoqi believed the Youth League should be the Reserve and Assistant of the CCP ( 党的助手和后备军 ). It must lead its members to learn Marxism-Leninism and raise Communist consciousness; it must lead them to learn the Work of Mao Zedong, and the policy of the CCP. 39 So in the "Resolution Concerning Establishment of the New Democratic Youth League"( 关于建立中国新民主主义青年团的决议,1st January 1949), the CCP specified that one of the Missions of the newly re-built youth league rested on leading the youth to cultivate Communist ideology. In other words, the mission pointed to the Political Socialization of Chinese Youths. The Resolution declared: The Basic Mission of the New Democratic Youth League is to systematically learn Marxism-Leninism, continually educate the members and Youths in the practices of Revolution. Meanwhile, (it) should use the spirit of Marxism- Leninism to organize all the young active people to participate in different kinds of Movements which are claimed by the CCP and Government 周恩来, 周恩来在青年团一届二中全会上的政治报告, 1951 年 11 月 22 日, 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 革命领袖论共青团工作 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1991) 页 [Zhou Enlai, The Speech of Zhou Enlai in the Second Plenary Session of the First Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League (22th November 1951), collected in The Revolutionary Leaders talk about the work of Youth League(Beijing: China Youth Press, 1991) pp ]. 39. 刘少奇, 刘少奇在中国新民主主义青年团第二次全国代表大会上的祝词 (1953 年 6 月 23 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 革命领袖论共青团工作 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 1991) 页 [Liu Shaoqi, The Speech of Liu Shaoqi in the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League (23th June 1953), collected in The Revolutionary Leaders talk about the work of Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 1991) pp ]. 40. Original words are: 新民主主义青年团的基本任务, 在于有系统地学习马克思列宁主义, 从革命实践中不断地教育自己的团员和青年群众, 同时应当以马克思列宁主义的精神组织广大青年群众积极地参加我党和人民民主政府所号召的各种运动, details please see: 中共中央, 中国共产党中央委员会关于建立中国新民主主义青年团的决议 (1949 年 1 月 1 日 ) 收录于, 中央档案馆 ( 编 ), 中共中央文件选集 ( 十八 )( 北京 : 中央党校出版社, 1992) 页 1-7 [The Central Committee of the CCP, Resolution Concerning Establishment of the New Democratic Youth League (1st January 1949) collected in Central Archive (ed.),the Selections of the Documents of the Central Committee of the CCP(vol.18) (Beijing: Central School of the CCP Press, 1992) pp.1-7].

177 167 The youth league gave a positive reply to these expectations. In the Conference Report of Feng Wenbin (Secretary of the New Democratic Youth League)--"The Task and Work of the Chinese New Democratic Youth League"( 中国新民主主义青年团的任务和工作, 12th April 1949), the youth league defined its basic mission as educating the generation of Chinese youth to join Socialist construction. The CCYL Education consisted of two parts. One was the educational content (what to educate), the other was the approach to educating (how to educate). In the Report of Feng Wenbin, the youth league put political ideology - Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought- in the first position. And all other knowledge should be learned in order to serve this ideology. The youth league put significant emphasis on educating in the real world. That is to say, the youth league instilled ideological indoctrination into the revolutionary fighting and people s daily work. 41 The leading group of the youth league was renewed at the second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League (23th June-2nd July 1953). Hu Yaobang took the position of Secretary of the Youth League from Feng Wenbin. From then to the Cultural Revolution, Hu Yaobang held this position. Unlike Feng, Hu did not spend too much time emphasizing the slogan of ideological indoctrination. Indeed, you can scarcely find the phrases "Learning Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought" in his political documents. However, he closely combined the work of the youth league with the commands of Mao Zedong and the CCP. In his political documents, the key point was that the youth league must obey the leadership of the CCP. The idea of ideological indoctrination should become the principle for guiding all its works. In the Political Report of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League-- "Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops of Developing Motherland" ( 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进 ), Hu Yaobang emphasized: The CCP gives the youth league inestimable power. If the youth league does not rely on the leadership of the Party, all the work of the youth league cannot be 41. 冯文彬, 中国新民主主义青年团的任务和工作, 共青团中央 ( 编 ), 中国青年运动历史资料 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2002) 页 [Feng Wenbin, The Task and Work of Chinese New Democratic Youth League, collected in Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Historical Material of the Chinese Youth Movement(Beijing: China Youth Press, 2002) pp ].

178 168 done well. All the work of the youth league should be implemented under the educating principle. 42 And he also required all the Youth League members to receive Communist ideological indoctrination, as he pointed out: Every youth league member should learn the Communist outlook on life and moral value. This outlook and value point to the outlook and value of serving the mass. That is Marxism-Leninism The Youth League and Cadres Development of the CCP Today, sending young cadres to the CCP is defined as the mission of the CCYL in terms of being the reserve and assistant of the CCP. In the Constitution of the CCYL, it is called Developing Political Successors for the Party ( 为党培养接班人 ). 44 And this mission had formally been proposed by the youth league in 1953, but it was not at that time an institutional arrangement. When Hu Yaobang became the Secretary of the youth league in 1953, the youth league was aiming to become the institutional arrangement for assisting the cadre development of the CCP. However, this arrangement did not eventuate. To be specific, in the Political Report of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League-- "Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops for Developing the Motherland ( 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进 ), Hu pointed out that: 42. Original words are: 党给青年团以不可估量的力量 如果不依靠党的领导, 青年团的一切工作就都不能够搞好, 青年团一切工作中必须贯彻教育观点 ", 任何团员都应该学习共产主义的人生观和共产主义的道德观 这种人生观和道德观就是为人民服务的人生观和道德观, 就是马克思列宁主义, details please see: 胡耀邦, 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进, 中国青年报, 1953 年 7 月 7 日第一版 [Hu Yaobang, Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops of Developing Motherland, China Youth Newspaper, 7 th July 1953, p.1]. 43. Original words are: 任何团员都应该学习共产主义的人生观和共产主义的道德观 这种人生观和道德观就是为人民服务的人生观和道德观, 就是马克思列宁主义, details please see: 胡耀邦, 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进, 中国青年报, 1953 年 7 月 7 日第一版 [Hu Yaobang, Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops of Developing Motherland, China Youth Newspaper, 7 th July 1953, p.1]. 44. CCYL, General Principal of the Constitution of the CCYL(Approved in the 17th National Congress of the CCYL, 20th June 2013), website of the CCYL, accessed at: ccylmaterial/regulation/200612/t _12147.htm.

179 169 We (the youth league) should strengthen the work of cadre developing and training, especially the educational work of the grass-roots level Cadres...And (the Youth League) can send over 40,000 Districts Cadres and approximately 1,000,000 grass-roots level cadres to the Party and Government Departments. Along with the development of Revolutionary work and with the coming of state-building, we (the youth league) have the responsibility to cultivate increasingly better cadres. The youth league is the Reserve of the Party; it should recommend Cadres to the Party on the basis of the needs of the Party. 45 The youth league formally claimed to develop and train cadres for the CCP in the period of Hu Yaobang ( ). However, we can also see that the preference for leadership training rested on grass-root level leaders, rather than on the top leadership. And we lack adequate proof to confirm that the CCYL had become at that time an institutional arrangement for CCYL cadres to eventually take up positions in the Central Committee of the CCP. From congress 1 st ( ) to Congress 5 th ( ), the CCYL cadres held over 40% of the seats in the Central Committee of the CCP. The dynamic of this high percentage was mainly contributed by the phenomenon that there was no clear distinction between the party and the league"( 党团不分 ), rather than that the CCYL was already regarded as the institutional arrangement for developing political leaders for the CCP. Meanwhile, at that time, the cadres of the CCP were overwhelmingly from the working class. And most of the CCYL cadres were students. So it was easier for CCYL cadres to become leaders of the CCP than for workers many of whom could not even write. But after the Congress 6 th ( ), the CCP was in an armed struggle against the Kuomintang or the Japanese. Military talent played a significant role in the leadership politics of the CCP. Consequently, the percentage of 45. Original words are: 我们应该加强培养 训练干部的工作, 特别是基层干部的教育工作..., 并能够向党和政府部门输送近 4 万名区级以上干部和 100 余万名基层干部 随着革命工作的发展和国家建设时期的到来, 我们有责任培养出更多和更好的干部 ", " 青年团是党的后备军, 应当根据党的需要有计划地向党推荐干部, details please see: 胡耀邦, 团结全国青年在建设祖国的伟大行列中奋勇前进, 中国青年报, 1953 年 7 月 7 日第一版 [Hu Yaobang, Unite National Youths to Join the Great Troops of Developing Motherland, China Youth Newspaper, 7 th July 1953, p.1].

180 170 CCYL cadres in CCP kept dropping from 46.81% in Congress 5 th to 35.06% in Congress 7 th. Of course, since 1949 the CCP became the ruling party of China. Political succession became one of the most significant issues in the PRC. Even though the CCYL aimed to assist the leadership development of the CCP, on the basis of the data of the CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP (Details please see: Figure 5-4 the CCYL Cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP (from )), its significance in this sphere actually decreased. Figure 5-5 the CCYL Cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP (from ) 46 Congress Time Period Seats in Central Committee of the CCP CCYL Cadres in Central Committee of the CCP CCYL/CCP % % % % % % % % This is mainly reflected in the decreased percentage of the CCYL cadre in the Central Committee of the CCP. From the data of the Congress 7 st ( ) to Congress 8 th ( ) of the Central Committee of the CCP, the number of CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP increased at every congress (from 77 to 195 seats). However the percentage of CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP decreased at every congress (from 35.06% to 27.69%). 47 It reflected that the efforts of the youth league in aiming to become the arrangement for developing political leaders for the CCP and the practices of sending a reasonable numbers of CCYL cadres to the Party had made a certain degree of influence in CCP s politics. 46. The figure was made by the author. The information of it was from Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision). 47. Source from Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision).

181 171 And it appeared in the increase number of the CCYL cadre in the Central Committee of the CCP. However, during these two congresses, the number of seats in the Central Committee of the CCP was increased from 77 to 195. But the CCYL cadre in the Central Committee of the CCP only increased by 27 persons. The number of the increased seats in the Central Committee of the CCP was far bigger than the increase number of the CCYL cadres. It directly led to the decreased percentage of the CCYL cadre. Under the rule of Mao, the CCYL was not practically considered as the major leadership development arrangement of the CCP. 5.3 The CCYL in the Cultural Revolution In the Cultural Revolution, the CCYL stopped fulfilling its previous role in the Chinese Communist movement. For factional and bureaucrat reasons, the CCYL received serious attacks from the Red Guard. From the disbanding of the Secretariat of the CCYL in 1966, to the endless re-organization of the youth league, the CCYL stagnated for 12 years during this period. In the Cultural Revolution, the Gang of Four ( 四人帮, a political group formed in the Cultural Revolution, including four political leaders: Wang Hongwen 王洪文, Zhang Chunqiao 张春桥, Jiang Qing 江青, Yao Wenyuan 姚文元 ) aimed to replace the CCYL by the Red Guard. But Mao disagreed with this idea and only wanted to reorganize the CCYL to undertake the Cultural Revolution. From the interaction between Gang of Four and Mao, the significant and irreplaceable role of the youth league of being the Corporatist Mass organization of Chinese youths can be discovered The Disbanding of the Secretariat of the CCYL At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the CCYL supported it. On 16th May 1966, when the CCP adopted the "Notice of the Central Committee of the CCP" ( 中国共产党中央委员会通知 ) to guide the Cultural Revolution Movement, Detail about the start of the Cultural Revolution, please see: Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution (Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2006) p. 41.

182 172 the CCYL prepared to contribute to this Movement with great enthusiasm. For example, from 9th-26th May, the Chinese Youth Newspaper (the official newspaper of the CCYL) received over 40,000 inner youth league letters expressing their determination to join the Cultural Revolution. On 1 June 1966, with the approval of Mao Zedong, Kang Sheng ( 康生, one of the main leaders of the Cultural Revolution) led a working team and began publishing articles in The People s Daily attacking the Beijing Communist Party Committee and the Communist party Committee in Beijing University. Soon, the schools and universities in Beijing were in chaos. 49 Meanwhile, Red Guard organizations began appearing in some schools in Beijing. And they started to disturb the normal educational business of those schools. 50 Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who took charge of the first front Line work (i.e. daily work) of the CCP, hoped the Cultural Movement would be led by the Party down an orderly track. So on 3rd June 1966, they convened an Enlarged Meeting of the Political Bureau to assign the arrangements for an orderly operation of the Cultural Revolution. At this meeting, the CCYL was assigned the task of managing the Cultural Revolution in the middle schools of Beijing by Liu Shaoqi. 51 And thus the Secretariat of the CCYL first selected and organized over 1,800 CCYL cadres across the country to establish approximately 300 working groups to undertake this task. 52 When Mao Zedong came back to Beijing from Hangzhou on 18th July 1966, he criticized the approach of sending working groups into the Middle schools on the basis of a report by Jiang Qing ( 江青 ) concerning the development of Cultural Revolution Movement. Mao even said "People who suppressed the Student 49. Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) pp 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 268 [Li Yuqi, The History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p. 268]. 51. 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 413 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meeting of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) p.413]. 52. 刘晋, 亲历者回忆 : 红卫兵运动兴起的始末, 2012 年 7 月 3 日 [Liu Jin, The Memory of Witness: the Beginning and the End of the Red Guard Movement, 3rd July 2012], website of the CCYL, accessed at:

183 173 Movement cannot have a good ending ( 凡是镇压学生运动的人都没有好下场 ). 53 And on the 24th, he convened a Meeting of Standing Committee of the CCP to criticize Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. At that meeting, the CCP also made the decision to dismiss the working groups in schools. 54 When it comes to the decision of the Secretariat of the CCYL, the CCP meeting record shows that Mao did not want to disband the leadership organ of the CCYL. On 23 August 1966 Central Working Meeting, Mao had said that: Do not intervene; I cannot confirm that a leadership change of the CCYL is appropriate. So delay the decision for four months. 55 But after August 1966, the Secretariat of the CCYL was formally disbanded and the main leaders of the CCYL, which included Hu Yaobang, Hu Keshi ( 胡克实 ), Wang Zhaohua ( 王照华 ), Hu Qili ( 胡启立 ), were all suspended. And the Official Journals of the CCYL, such as: Chinese Youth Newspaper, China Youth etc. were stopped from publishing. Over 1,500 CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCYL who did not want to support the Red Guard were sent to be peasants in the May Seven School ( 五七干校 ) of the Central Committee of the CCYL in April This history can indicate that the decision to disband the Secretariat of the CCYL in August 1966 was not made by Mao, but by the Gang of Four. To the CCP leaders, particularly Mao, the CCYL still played a significant role in Chinese political system, even in the period of Cultural Revolution. And the significance of the youth league 53. 王学泰, 年的大陆高校清理 反动学生 事件, 读书文摘, 2014 年 3 期, 页 22 [Wang Xuetai, 1963 to 1966 The Universities Delt with The Anti-Revolution Students Affairs, in Journal of Reading Digest, vol.3, 2014, p.22]. 54. 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 415 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meeting of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) p.415]. 55. Original words are: 现在不要干涉, 团中央改组, 现在看不准, 过四个月再说, details please see: 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 418 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meeting of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) p.418]. 56. Concerning the attacks against the CCYL in Cultural Revolution, please see the oral memory of Hu Keshi. 叶永烈, 口述历史 : 胡克实自述 文革 中的团中央, 炎黄春秋, 2005 年 08 期, 页 1-7 [Ye Yonglie, Oral History: Hu Keshi Talking about the Central Committee of the Youth League in Cultural Revolution, Annals of the Yellow Emperor, vol.8, 2005, pp.1-7]

184 174 posed a great challenge to the Red Guard and the Gang of Four. So they spared no effort to attack the youth league The Struggle Concerning the Future of the CCYL The disbanding of the Secretariat of the CCYL was the beginning of 12 years stagnation of the CCYL system. Historically, in the Cultural Revolution, only the Central Committee of the CCYL and Beijing Communist Youth League Committee were dismissed, and other local youth league committees were in constantly reorganized. To some extent, this re-organization well preserved the CCYL from being replaced by the Red Guard in that destructive period. And the preservation of the CCYL can be greatly attributed to efforts by some CCP leaders, such as Mao and Li Fuchun. From the Gang of Four's perspective, using the Red Guard to completely replace the CCYL was their ultimate goal in terms of seizing monopoly power over youth affairs. Specifically, in December, 1967 the Red Guard working committee in the CCYL convened a meeting to propose its plan for using the Red Guard to replace the CCYL. In this meeting, the Red Guard cadres criticized that the youth league for implementing a Revisionist Line in the past years and claimed it was necessary to disband the youth league. In addition, on the basis of the criticisms, the meeting also published an Investigation Report Concerning the Future of the Youth League the Relationship and Future between the Red Guard and the Youth League ( 共青团向何处去? 关于红卫兵和共青团的关系及前途问题的调查报告 ) to argue the rationality of the proposal. 57 On 1 st July 1970 the Shanghai Youth League Reorganization Meeting, the key figure of the Gang of Four Zhang Chunqiao ( 张春桥 ) had a speech which revealed their idea to replace the CCYL with Red Guard. As he pointed out: 57. 王永魁, 文化大革命初期的团中央, 党史博览, 2014 年 4 期 54 页 [Wang Yongkui, The Central Committee of the CCYL in the Early Period of the Cultural Revolution, General Review of the Communist Party of China, vol.4, 2014, p.54].

185 175 In 1966, there was a proposal to disband the CCYL, starting from the Central Committee of the CCYL (We) generally had a plan to disband the CCYL and to use the Red Guard to replace it. 58 However, to the senior CCP leaders (such as Li Fuchun 李富春, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong), the CCYL was a significant mass organization which should be preserved. When the Red Guard initiated a trend to abandon the CCYL, the then Vice Premier of the PRC Li Fuchun made a clear instruction that: The Badge, Flag and Name of the CCYL were approved by the national congress of the youth league and the Central Committee of the CCP. So every Provincial and municipal youth league committee and the youth league committees in industry, mining and rural area should work as usual. Now what we should do is to follow, rather than cancel the Constitution of the youth league. We (the Central Committee of the CCP) did not want to dismiss the CCYL. The name of the youth league is the Communist Youth League, rather than the Capitalist Youth League or the Revisionist Youth League. So Communist Youth League is a very good name. 59 Sharing the same view as Li Fuchun, Mao insisted on a similarly positive view of the CCYL. Actually, in the Cultural Revolution, Mao was dissatisfied with the behaviour of the Red Guard and hoped the CCYL could become the main body to manage the Cultural Revolution after necessary re-organization. 60 But because the CCYL leaders had joined the activities of the Liu Shaoqi faction, Mao could not confirm whether they were in the same faction. At the First Plenary Session of Ninth 58. Original words are: 最初, 有人提出要砸烂共青团, 从团中央开始.. 当时普遍要求取消共青团, 要什么? 要红卫兵, 当时是六六年, 基本上是一个意见, details please see: 郑洸, 以红卫兵取代共青团 的历史公案, 中国青年研究 1998 年第一期, 页 [Zheng Guang, The Historical Case of Using the Red Guard to Replace the Communist Youth League, China Youth Study, vol.1, 1998, pp.36-39]. 59. Original words are: 团徽, 团旗, 团的名称是全国团的代表大会上通过的, 是经中央批准的 各省, 市团组织和工矿农村团委的工作照常进行, 现在仍要按团章办事, 不是取消团章 我们没有取消共青团 团的名字是共产义青年团, 而不是资本主义 修正主义青年团, 共产主义青年团的名字很好嘛. Details please see: 周宝兴, 李富春文革初期保护共青团, 百年潮 2002 年 2 期, 页 49 [Zhou Baoxing, Li Fuchun Protected the CCYL in the Early Period of Cultural Revolution in Hundred Year Tide, vol.2, 2002, p.49]. 60. 中国共青团, 整团建团 [CCYL, Reorganize and Build the Youth League ] website of the CCP, accessed at:

186 176 National Congress of the CCP (28 April 1969), Mao for the first time proposed the idea of a re-organization of the CCYL. 61 He clearly expressed his positive attitude to the youth league, as he said: As long as there is one youth league branch, the issue of re-organization of the youth league should be brought out. 62 The clear viewpoint of Mao heavily rejected the Gang of Four s idea to use the Red Guard to replace the CCYL. So on 12th July 1970, the Central Committee of the CCP formally published "The Notice Concerning the Re-Organization or Establishment of the Youth League"(" 关于整团建团工作的通知 "). It emphasized two points: One is that during the re-organization of the CCYL, the Party should emphasize ideological education, should organize the youth league members to learn the theory of Continuing Revolution under the dictatorship of the Proletariat, and criticize the political line of revisionism. The other is that the youth league should recover its organizational vitality through building up a good leadership core, managing well its organizational work, and removing over-age members. 63 When the Notice was delivered to all the CCP committees, the project of reorganization of the CCYL began. However, because of the intervention of the Gang of Four, from then to the end of the Cultural Revolution, the youth league was in endless turmoil May Seventh Cadre School and the CCYL Cadre The May Seventh Cadre School is a general name of a series of cadre labour camps which were established according to the Directive of Mao Zedong in the "Letter to Comrade Lin Biao" ( 给林彪同志的一封信, 7th May 1966). 64 In Mao s 61. 郑洸, 以红卫兵取代共青团 的历史公案, 中国青年研究 1998 年第一期, 页 [Zheng Guang, The Historical Case of Using the Red Guard to Replace the Communist Youth League, China Youth Study, vol.1, 1998, pp.36-39]. 62. Original words are: 还有一个一个团支部, 整团的问题也就提出来了, details please see: 姜华宣, 张尉萍, 肖甡 ( 编 ), 中国共产党重要会议纪事 : ( 北京 : 中央文献出版社, 2011) 页 431 [Jiang Huaxuan, Zhang Weiping, and Xiao Shen(ed.), The Chronicle of the Important Meetings of the CCP: (Beijing: Central Literature Press, 2011) p.431]. 63. 中共中央, 中共中央关于整团建团工作的通知 (1970 年 7 月 12 日 ) ( 党内文件 ) [Central Committee of the CCP, The Notice Concerning the Re-Organization or Establishment of the Youth League( 12th July 1970) (Internal document)]. 64. 中国革命历史博物馆, 前进的足迹 : 图说中华人民共和国简史 ( 香港 : 三联书店 ),

187 177 viewpoint, the approach of sending cadre down to do labour work can overcome bureaucracy and prevent Revisionism and Dogmatism. So he commanded: Going down to do manual labour gives masses of cadres an excellent opportunity to study again; this should be done by all cadres except those who are old, weak, ill or disabled. 65 The May Seventh Cadre School aimed to re-educate political cadres and intellectuals with hard agricultural work and the study of Mao s writings. 66 The Schools were numerous in the Cultural Revolution. For example, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council established over 106 May Seventh Cadres school across 18 provinces. And over 130,000 Political cadres and their family members, and 5,000 young intellectuals were sent to these schools. 67 In addition, in every province, municipality and autonomous region as well as many special administrative regions, counties and cities, there was this type of school. Those who had been sent to May Seventh Cadre School included the veteran cadres with extraordinary revolutionary achievements in the Long March, Sino- Japanese War, or Civil War, incumbent political cadres of Party and Government, and intellectuals who were lacking in practical experience. The May Seventh Cadre School trained the cadres at their posts in rotation. In the School the students were required to: 1 Study Marxist-Leninist Works and Mao Zedong Works to emphasize ideology and revolutionary struggle; 2 Participate in the Interrogation Movement for implementing the line of Class Struggle; 3 works among the peasants and workers and be re-educated by the worker and peasant line , 页 154 [Chinese Revolutionary History Museum, The Forwards Footprint: Description of the Brief History of PRC (Hong Kong: Sanlian Bookstore, 1995) p.154]. 65. Original words are: 广大干部下放劳动, 这对干部是一种重新学习的极好机会, 除老弱病残者外都应该这样做 在职干部也应该分批下放劳动, details please see: 姚文元, 编者按柳河五七干校为机关革命化提供了新的经验, 人民日报, 1968 年 10 月 5 日, 第一版 [Yao Wenyuan, Editor s Note on the Liuhe May-Seven Cadre School Provide New Experience for the Cadre Revolutionary in People s Daily, 5th October 1968, p.1]. 66. Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999) p 郑谦, 五七干校述论, 百年潮, 2006 年 9 期, 页 [Zheng Qian, The Record of May Seven Cadre School, in Hundred Year Tide, vol.9, 2006, pp.32-38]. 68. Fen Sing-Nan The May 7 Cadre Schools in the People's Republic of China: , Administration and Society, vol.18, no.1, 1986, pp

188 178 The terrible experiences of the May Seventh Cadre Schools cultivated the populism and reform consciousness of the CCYL cadres of the generation of Cultural Revolution. In today s factional researches of the CCP's leadership politics, populism is one of the most significant characters to describe the CCYL faction and the rule of Hu Jintao. But scholarly studies attribute this character to the social background of the members of the CCYL faction who are from the family of the rand and files. 69 Practically, this experience in May Seventh Cadre School shaped the CCYL with the organizational culture of populism and reform consciousness. In April 1969, under the directive of Mao Zedong, over 1,500 CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCYL were sent to the May Seventh Cadre School, located in the Huanghu Farm in the Huangcuan County of Henan Province. And just like the centre of the CCYL, all CCYL cadres, especially leaders, of local committee were sent to similar May Seventh Cadres Schools in their Provinces. And according to the original plan, all these cadres will become peasant there from generation to generation. 70 In the May Seventh Cadres School, compared with veteran cadres, incumbent cadres of Party and Government, and intellectuals, the CCYL cadres were clearly the youngest age group. And in this life period, they witnessed the hardship of the workers and peasants and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. It would certainly come to influence their political views towards China's political system. The CCYL cadres experienced the hard life of the poor peasants and workers. So they can better realize the feeling and understand the need of the rank and files. In this school, the CCYL leaders, such as Hu Yaobang and Hu Keshi were regarded as Capitalist-Roaders ( 走资派 ) and received endless and serious criticisms. 71 It would 69. Jacques Delisle, Legalization without Democratization in China under Hu Jintao in Li Cheng(ed.), China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2008) pp ; Li Cheng, One Party, Two Coalitions in China's Politics, August 16, 2009, website of East Asia Forum, accessed at: 刘全聚, 团中央五七干校旧事, 天津政协, 2012 第 2 期, 页 [Liu Wuanju, The Old Story of the Central Committee of the CCYL in May Seven Cadre School, Tianjin Municipal Committee Journal,vol.2, 2012, pp.40-41]. 71. 叶永烈, 口述历史 : 胡克实自述 文革 中的团中央, 炎黄春秋, 2005 年 08 期, 页 1-7 [Ye Yonglie, Oral History: Hu Keshi Talking about the Central Committee of the Youth League in Cultural Revolution, Annals of the Yellow Emperor, vol.8, 2005, pp1-7].

189 179 be reasonable to believe that they would question the correctness of class struggle and become a positive force to prevent the reoccurrence of a Cultural Revolution. 5.4 The Reasons Contributing to the Attacks on the CCYL The attacks of the Cultural Revolution on the CCYL had deep reasons. Among others, bureaucratization and its association with the Liu Shaoqi faction are the most significant reasons The Bureaucratization of the CCYL The bureaucratization of the CCYL before the Cultural Revolution was one of the main reason contributing to attacks on the CCYL in the Cultural Revolution. As early as 30th June 1953, when Mao met the leadership team of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic Youth League, he pointed out the problem of Bureaucratization of the CCYL. In his view, the youth league had become one of the institutions of the Party and lacked the independent ability to undertake its work of political socialization of Chinese youths; on the other hand, the leadership groups of the youth league were over age and the Youth League lacked vigour. 72 As Mao pointed out: The independent problem (Second Party Problem) of the Youth League has long passed. Now the problem of the work of the youth league is lacking independence, rather than independence (That is to say, leaving the administrative power of the CCP, the CCYL alone cannot fulfil its role in political socialization of Chinese youths). From Mao s words we can find out that the youth league was not a rival organization to challenge the leadership of the CCP. The Party leaders, especially Mao, hoped it could become a popular mass organization among Chinese youths rather than an official institution of the Party or Government. Obviously, the bureaucratization of the CCYL before the Cultural Revolution was not expected by 72. Original words are: 青年团对党闹独立性的问题早已过去了 现在的问题是缺乏团的独立工作, 而不是闹独立性, details please see: 毛泽东, 青年团的工作要照顾青年的特点 (1953 年 6 月 30 日 ), 毛泽东选集 第五卷 ( 北京 : 人民出版社 )1977, 页 [Mao Zedong, The Work of Youth League Should Consider the Character of Youths, The Selection of Mao Zedong (Beijing: People Press, 1977) pp.83-87].

190 180 Mao. In addition, Yang Zhao points out that to Mao Zedong, the Cultural Revolution is neither strategy, nor means, but a complete cultural and psychological reform. He wanted to eliminate the people's impulse to pursue Bureaucratization or Order. 73 His intention to destroy Bureaucratization was one of the core purposes of his last revolution The CCYL in the Factional Struggle The second reason why the CCYL was so heavily attacked by the Red Guard rests on the factional struggle between the Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi factions. As many western studies argue, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution to employ the social power of the rank and file to fight against his political opponents. 74 From the angle of the leaders of the CCYL and the position of the CCYL in the Chinese political system, the youth league would share the same attitude towards the Cultural Revolution as Mao Zedong did. Firstly, the youth league was part of maintaining the existing order and bureaucracy. The formal reason why the CCYL was impacted related to its decisions to deal with the Cultural Revolution Movement in the Middle Schools of Beijing. As the merely orthodox youth organization, the youth league enjoyed protection and high reputation from the existing order and bureaucracy. That is to say, the youth league was the beneficiary of the existing arrangements. So it would be unwilling to accept chaos and disorder in society. Following Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, the youth league supported the idea of transferring the Cultural Revolution movement into an orderly process. To be specific, besides establishing a considerable numbers of working groups (as mentioned above), the CCYL soon established "The Cultural Revolution Working Group of Beijing Middle School" (" 北京市中学文化大革命工作团 "), and most of 73. Yang Zhao, The Key of Understanding the Reality of China--Read Mao's Last Revolution in Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals(ed.), Mao's Last Revolution (Taipei, Zuoan Culture Press, 2009) pp Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-Chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism (California: University of California Press, 1974) pp ; Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp

191 181 the members of the Secretariat and the Standing Committee of the CCYL took the leadership positions in this Working Group. 75 Secondly, the youth league would not support the Red Guard. The target groups of the CCYL and Red Guard were both the youths and teenagers. The Red Guard supported disorder and struggle, and the CCYL insisted an order and economic development. When the Red Guards appeared, they not only disturbed the existing system and order, but also became the competitors of the youth league. Before the Cultural Revolution, the CCYL had long served the powers of economic development. The famous projects it held, such as "Rural Youth Product Team" (" 农村青年突击队 ") and "Product Commando"(" 生产突击队 ") were designed to help the economic development of the Country. 76 However, the Red Guards were enthused by the doctrine of Class Struggle. They preferred rebellion and destruction, rather than economic development. So they tried to lead the youth in a different direction. 5.5 Summary In the second stage of Mao period, the CCYL became a State-recognized mass organization under the leadership of the CCP serving three significant functions: mobilizing the mass movement, undertaking the ideological indoctrination of Chinese youths, and developing political cadres for the CCP. But the major role of the youth league was as the mass organization to undertake the political socialization of Chinese youths. The CCYL experienced two different developmental stages. In the first stage, from 1949 to 1966, the youth league experienced steady progress and formed the organizational structure we are familiar with today. 75. 陈利明, 历尽文革磨难 [Chen Liming, Experience the Tribulation of Cultural Revolution ], website of People, accessed at: 15/44254.html. 76. Concerning the Rural Youth Product Team ( 农村青年突击队 ), Product Commando ( 生产突击队 ), please see: 李玉琦, 共青团历史上的 100 个由来 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 , [Li Yuqi, 100 Explanations in the History of Communist Youth League (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) pp , ].

192 182 In the second stage, during the Cultural Revolution Period, the CCYL suffered serious attacks from the Red Guard and was effectively paralysed for 12 years. But because of the protection given by Mao Zedong and other senior CCP leaders, the CCYL was not replaced by the Red Guard, but was re-organized instead. The intervention of the Gang of Four meant that the CCYL was engaged in a long period of reorganization until the end of the Cultural Revolution.

193 183 SECTION III: The Post-Mao Period of CCYL Development, : Principal Role in the Development of New Leaders

194 184 CHAPTER SIX The CCYL in the Period of Deng Xiaoping ( ) This chapter explores the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL in the Period of Deng Xiaoping. This period begins in 1976 (the death of Mao Zedong) and ends in 1989 (the Tiananmen Event 1 ). To the CCYL, there were three developmental stages in this period. Stage one was from 1976 to In this stage, the CCYL recovered from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In the second stage from 1982 to 1985, the CCYL prepared an inner-youth league reform to adapt itself to the development of the new CCP policy of Reform and Openness ( 改革开放 ). The third stage ( ) was when the CCYL undertook its Inner-Youth League Institution Reform ( 共青团体制改革 ). The core theme of this chapter is that in the period of Deng Xiaoping, the CCYL was recovered as a Party-led mass organization to undertake the political socialization of Chinese youths and leadership development for the CCP. But because of the challenges and opportunities brought by the policy of Reform and Openness, the political socialization function of the youth league was shrinking, and its leadership development function was expanded by the Party. So the central role of the CCYL changed from a mass organization undertaking political socialization of Chinese youth to an institutional arrangement to assist the leadership development of the CCP. As is well known, the Reform and Openness ( 改革开放 ) policy of Deng Xiaoping contributed to numerous new developments in the CCP and Chinese society more generally. The developments in two areas were closely related to the CCYL's role in the Chinese political system. Firstly, the decline of the appeal of the official ideology and an increasingly diversified society posed challenges to the CCYL being the mass organization of political socialization for youths. Secondly, the increasing regularization of the CCP's leadership politics, especially the promotion of the strategy of Four Modernization of Cadre ( 干部四化 ), and The Third Echelon ( 第 1. Andrew Nathan, The Tiananmen Papers, Foreign Affairs, vol.80, no.1, 2001, pp

195 185 三梯队 ) created an opportunity for the CCYL to take up an institutional arrangement of leadership development. This chapter is organized into four sections. Section 6.1 explores the recovery of the CCYL from the Cultural Revolution ( ). Section 6.2 analyses the preparation of the CCYL in designing its self-reform. Section 6.3 details the CCYL self-reform under the leadership of Song Defu. Section 6.4 summarizes the major findings. 6.1 The Recovery of the CCYL after the Cultural Revolution ( ) The death of Mao Zedong and the detention of the Gang of Four contributed to the end of the Cultural Revolution. The CCYL could finally emerge from endless reorganization. There were three major features in the recovery of the CCYL in this period. Firstly, on the basis of the leadership of the CCP, the CCYL initiated a topdown recovery process. In addition, it further closely merged into the CCP system and strictly followed the leadership of the CCP. That is to say, as a Party-led mass organization, the CCYL had a certain degree of independence. However, in this recovery, the youth league reduced its independence and acted like a subordinate organization of the CCP. Secondly, reflecting on the Cultural Revolution experience was one of the focuses in the recovery of the CCYL. From criticizing the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, to stopping the class struggle as a guiding principle, the CCYL gradually rid itself of the influence of the Cultural Revolution and concentrated on the nation s modernization. Thirdly and most significantly, the leadership training function of the CCYL recovered and a new criterion for training political leaders was cultivated. From the political report of youth league national congress and the appointment of the first secretary of the CCYL, the leadership style of the CCYL began to change from emphasizing revolutionary cadre to the promotion of technocrats to serve the nation s modernization.

196 The 10 th National Congress of the CCYL and the Beginning of the CCYL Recovery The 10th National Congress of the CCYL was convened in October 1978 in Beijing. It proclaimed the beginning of the top-down recovery process and the elimination of the influence of the Gang of Four within the league. The purpose of this congress was to recover the league s role before the Cultural Revolution. So there was an emphasis on a mass movement approach to indoctrinating political ideology. The 10th National Congress of the CCYL should have been convened in 1975, but it was postponed because of the Cultural Revolution. 2 After Hua Guofeng ( 华国锋 ) arrested the "Gang of Four" in October 1976, the CCP started a series of movements to criticize the Gang for its crimes in the Cultural Revolution, but did not reject the guiding principle of class struggle. At the 11th National Congress of the CCP (August, 1977), the party formally brought the work of recovery of the CCYL onto its calendar: (The Party) must strengthen the Party leadership over the Workers Union, Communist Youth League, Women s Federation, etc. mass organization, (the Party should) reorganize, reconstruct them, and let them fulfil their role. 3 On 4th May 1978, the Central Committee of the CCP released "The Notice concerning convening the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League"( 关于召开中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会的通知 ). This Notice required the local CCP committees and branches to assist in the league's recovery. Among others, all the local committees of the CCP had to select the leadership team of the CCYL, and ideologically and organizationally protect the purity of the CCYL from the influence of the "Gang of Four". That is to say "whether to support the Gang of Four or join the Red Guard" became the most significant criteria for selecting the leaders of the committees or branches of the CCYL at all 2. 李玉琦, 共青团历史上的 100 个由来 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 157 [Li Yuqi, 100 Origins of the CCYL History (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) p.157]. 3. Original words are: 要加强党对工会 共青团 妇联等群众组织的领导, 把这些组织整顿好 建设好, 充分发挥他们应有的作用,details please see: CCP, The Political Report of the 11th National Congress of the CCP(approved in 18th August 1977), website of the CCP, accessed at:

197 187 levels The Organizational Recovery The youth league began to recover on the basis of the Party s support. It merged itself into the party system and strictly followed the leadership of the CCP. As the Work Report of Han Ying at the 10 th National Congress of the CCYL ( 韩英在中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会上的工作报告 ) pointed out: The Party leadership is the lifeline of the communist youth league..local youth league committees at all levels should strengthen their party consciousness. From the aspect of politics, organization, and work, guarantees the leadership of the CCP over the youth league. 5 At the 10 th National congress, the Central Committee of the CCYL was assigned the task of recovering the local branches, members, and the subordinate organizations, such as the Young Pioneers. 6 To recruit more members into the youth league, the member recruitment age was lowered from 15 to By 1982, the national organizational network of the CCYL had begun to recover. It built up over 2.27 million local branches and committees with a hundred and sixty eight thousand fulltime CCYL cadres and a couple of million part-time CCYL cadres 中共中央, 关于召开中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会的通知 (1978 年 5 月 4 日 ) 收录于共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 394 [The Central Committee of the CCP, Notice Concerning Convening the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League (4th May, 1978), collected in Youth History Archive in the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Introduction of All Previous National Congress of the CCYL(Official Document Collection) (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2012) p.394]. 5. Original words are: 党的绝对领导是共青团的生命线.. 各级党委都要极大地增强党的观念, 从政治上 组织上 工作上保证党对共青团的领导, details please see: 韩英, 韩英在中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会上的工作报告, 中国青年报, 1978 年 10 月 24 日第一版 [Han Ying, The Speech of Han Ying in the 10th National Congress of the CCYL, China Youth Newspaper, 24 th October 1978, p.1]. 6. 共青团中央, 共青团十届一中全会关于恢复中国少年先锋队名称的决议 (1978 年 10 月 27 日通过 ) ( 会议文件 )[Central Committee of the CCYL, The Resolution First Plenary Session of the 10th National Congress of the CCYL Concerning Recover the Name of the Chinese Communist Youth Pioneer (Approved at 27th October, 1978) (Conference Documents)] website of the CCYL, accessed at: 7. 胡启立, 关于修改团的章程的报告, 中国青年报, 1978 年 10 月 27 日, 第二版 [Hu Qili, The Report Concerning the Modification of CCYL Constitution, China Youth Newspaper, 27th October 1978, p.2 ]. 8. 高勇, 加强团的组织建设增强团的战斗力, 中国青年政治学院学报, 1982 年 04 期, 页 4-6 [Gao Yong, Strengthen the Organizational Development and Increase the Fighting Capacity of the

198 188 Compared with the membership numbers before the Cultural Revolution (at 1964, it only reached about million), the number of CCYL members significantly increased. By 1982, the number of the CCYL members was approximately million (details please see: Figure 6-1 the Number of CCYL Members). However, the first four years after the 10th National Congress saw a decline. In 1978, the number of CCYL member reached approximately million, but after 1978 the numbers dropped consistently. Figure 6-1 the Number of CCYL Members (1964, ) CCYL Member The CCP leaders believed that because of the Party s support, the CCYL had soon recovered from the Cultural Revolution. However, the Party s support also led to the Bureaucratism of the CCYL. That is to say, the recovered youth league acted like the administrative institution of the Government, rather than the mass organization which cares about the interest of mass. This Bureaucratism limited further development of the youth league in Chinese society. So on 29th September 1979, in the Celebration Meeting of the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC, Ye Jianying ( 叶剑英 ) explicitly pointed out that: (The CCYL) must firmly protect the interests of the mass it represents, actively solve their daily problems, and be opposed to Bureaucratism which does not care about the mass. 10 Youth League, Journal of China Youth University for Political Sciences, vol.4, 1982, p.4-6]. 9. The data of the figure is from the Historical Statistics Summary of the CCYL. Detail please see: 共青团中央, 团历年统计数字汇总 [Central Committee of the CCYL, Historical Statistics Summary of the CCYL ] website of the CCYL, accessed at: gqt_ghlc/tdjs/. 10. Original words are: 一定要坚决维护自己代表的群众利益, 积极解决他们日常生活中的切实问题, 反对不关心群众痛痒的官僚主义, details please see: 中共中央整党工作指导委员会 ( 编 ),

199 The Change of Guiding Principle From criticizing the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, to stopping the class struggle as their guiding principle, the CCYL gradually got rid of the influence of the Cultural Revolution and concentrated on the nation s modernization. Before the third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, influenced by the Two Whatever 11 of Hua Guofeng, the recovered CCYL only aimed to eliminate the influence of the Gang of Four and the Lin Biao Event. 12 The 10 th congress of the CCYL concluded that the disastrous impact on the CCYL and Chinese youths was caused by the anti-revolutionary behaviours of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, rather than exploring the role played by the "Class struggle" line of Mao Zedong. Consequently, the struggle against Revisionism ( 修正主义 ) 13 within the CCYL did not stop. But this time, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were described as another type of Revisionism by the youth league. As the political report to the 10 th National Congress of the CCYL pointed out: Our Party had widely and deeply criticized the rightist form of Revisionism. Our youths knew and were alert to this form of Revisionism. To Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, this leftist form of Revisionism, that is to say, the revisionism was left in disguise but right in essence, masses of youths gradually realized it 十一届三中全会以来重要文献简编 ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1983) 页 55 [The Working Committee of Re-Organizing the Party under the Central Committee of the CCP(ed.), The Brief Collection of the Significant Literature Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (Beijing: People s Press, 1983) p.55]. 11. Two whatever ( 两个凡是 ) was a guiding principle proposed by Hua Guofeng. The content of it was that We will strictly implement whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, and we will unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao commanded, details please see: CCP, Two Whatever, website of Xinhua, accessed at: content_ htm. 12. 共青团, 极大地振奋青年的创造精神 - 热烈祝贺共青团十大胜利闭幕, 中国青年报, 1978 年 10 月 28 日 1 版 [CCYL, Greatly Motivate the Creative Spirit of Youth Warm Congratulations on the Convening of 10th National Congress of the CCYL, Chinese Youth Newspaper, 28th July 1978, p.1]. 13. The Revisionism refers to The policy or practice of revision or modification; departure from the original interpretation of a theory, etc.; esp. the revision of Marxism on evolutionary socialist or pluralist principles (as opposed to its original revolutionary principles). Source from the Oxford English Dictionary, official website of Oxford English Dictionary, accessed at: view/entry/164895?redirectedfrom=revisionism#eid.

200 190 and struggled against it. 14 In addition, over-emphasizing the approach of the mass movement to indoctrinate political ideology neglected the specific interests of Youths. From February 1979 the Central Committee of the CCYL convened a Meeting of Youth League Secretaries from All Provinces, Direct-Controlled Municipalities, and Autonomous Regions to convey the contents of the third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP. Hu Yaobang represented the CCP at this meeting, whose theme was to change the work focus of the CCYL to the nation s modernization. As the Meeting record pointed out: The youth league should place the Four Modernization in the central position of all work. The youth league should change the focus on political movement to production and construction. The youth league should use the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress of the CCP to unite the thought of all members, should require all the youth league cadres to further emancipate their minds for achieving this thought change, and should practically change the work focus toward Socialist Modernization. 15 In the subsequent second Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee of the CCYL (January 1980), the youth league released The Report Concerning the Work Since the 10 th National Congress and the Task of 1980 ( 团十大以来的工作和 1980 年的任务的报告 ) further confirming its support of the new party line. The CCYL stopped political mass movements (such as: criticizing Lin Biao and the Gang of Four) and concentrated on activities for progressing modernization. 14. Original words are: 我们党对赫鲁晓夫一类以右的形式出现的修正主义进行过广泛而深入的批判 广大青年对那种修正主义是有认识的 有警惕的 对于林彪 四人帮 这种以极 左 形式出现的即假左真右的修正主义, 广东青年是逐步认识的, 是有斗争的, details please see: 韩英, 韩英在中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会上的工作报告, 中国青年报, 1978 年 10 月 24 日第一版 [Han Ying, The Speech of Han Ying in the 10th National Congress of the CCYL, China Youth Newspaper, 24 th October 1978, p.1]. 15. Original words are: 共青团组织要以四化为中心把全团工作活跃起来, 共青团组织要从以参加政治运动为主转移到以参加生产建设活动为主的方面来 会议要求要用党的十一届三中全会的精神统一全团的思想, 要求广大团干部要进一步解放思想, 真正做到实现指导思想上的转变, 切实把共青团的工作重心转移到社会主义现代化建设上来., details please see: 共青团中央, 全国团省 市委书记会议纪要 ( 团内文件 ), 1979 年 19 日 -24 日 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, Meeting Record of Youth League Secretaries from All Provinces, Direct-Controlled Municipalities, and Autonomous Regions (Internal Document), 19th -24th 1979].

201 191 Among others, the New Long March Vanguard Activity ( 新长征突击手活动 ) was the brand new project contributing to this strategy in the 1980s. This project aimed to encourage youths to devote themselves to the Socialist Modernization by learning from the heroism of soldiers in Long March. During this activity, the youth league commended over 1 million youths who had made great contributions to national economic, technological, educational, and cultural development. And these people were presented as the role models for the youth to follow. In 1980 alone, this project had trained 1,324,000 youths to reach the first rank of their industry. Over 19,000 technology inventions were created in the competitions of this project and these turned into 1,255 business projects. 16 Because of the success of this project, in the 11 th National Congress of the CCYL, the CCP leader, Hu Qili highly commended that: The activity of the youth league is gradually becoming the active factor of our country s political life The Leadership Development Function In this recovery period, the leadership development function of the CCYL was emphasized again. The CCP hoped the CCYL could become the leadership training institution to develop political leaders as both socialist-minded and professionally competent. As Li Xiannian ( 李先念, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP) pointed out in the 10 th National Congress of the CCYL: The CCYL must carefully learn the knowledge of educating people, and should devote itself to training the red and expert fresh troops for the Party 勾德元, 长征接力有来人 全国开展新长征突击手活动的回顾, 收录于共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 改革开放 30 年共青团工作回顾与研究文集 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2008) 页 [Gou Deyuan, The Successor of Long March-The Review of National New Long March Vanguard Activity, collected in Youth History Archive of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Review and Research Collection on The Youth League Since the Openness and Reform 30 Years (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2008) pp.27-38]. 17. Original words are: 共青团的活动越来越成为我国政治生活中的活跃因素, details please see: 胡启立, 胡启立在中国共产主义青年团第十一次全国代表大会上的祝词, 人民日报, 1982 年 12 月 21 日第一版 [Hu Qili, The Speech of Hu Qili in the 11th National Congress of the CCYL, People s Daily, 21th December 1982, p.1]. 18. Original words are: 共青团要认真研究培养人的学问, 要为党培养出一支又红又专的生力军, 做出自己的新贡献, details please see: 李先念, 李先念在中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代

202 192 In terms of leadership selection, there were two significant features in this period. One was to reward the cadre who had fought against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four with CCYL leadership positions. As the Work Report of Han Ying at the 10th National Congress of the CCYL recommended: The youth league should intentionally select and appoint the advanced members, who had fought against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and experienced three revolutionary movements, into the leadership position of the CCYL of all levels. 19 In addition, there was a signal of the coming of the Technocrats in the leadership appointments of the CCYL. To be specific, in the recovery of the CCYL Central Committee, the youngest Provincial Secretary at that time, Han Ying ( 韩英 ), was nominated as the Director of the Preparatory Committee of the 10th National Congress. 20 Later he was elected as the first Secretary of the CCYL at the 10th National Congress. The appointment of Han Ying signaled the Reform of the Cadre Appointment System which required better-educated, professionally more competent, and younger leaders. Han Ying can be regarded as a Technocrat: that is a political leader who had experienced college training in Engineering and science, and who had engaged in the relevant profession of engineer or scientist. 21 Han Ying had long served in the Datong Mining Bureau. During this time, he finished his university education in the Beijing Mining College through correspondence, and received the title of Mining Engineer. 22 表大会上的致词, 人民日报, 1978 年 10 月 17 日第一版 [Li Xiannian, The Speech of Li Xiannian in the 10th National Congress of the CCYL, People s Daily, 17 th October 1978, p.1]. 19. Original words are: 把那些同林彪 四人帮做了英勇斗争的和在三大革命运动中经受了锻炼的优秀 正派的先进分子, 选拔到团的各级领导岗位上来, details please see: 韩英, 韩英在中国共产主义青年团第十次全国代表大会上的工作报告, 中国青年报, 1978 年 10 月 24 日, 第一版 [Han Ying, The Speech of Han Ying in the 10th National Congress of the CCYL, China Youth Newspaper, 24 th October 1978, p.1]. 20. 李静, 改革开放初期的共青团 文革 后首任团中央第一书记韩英访谈录, 共青团中央青运史档案馆, 中国青运史辑刊 2010 年第 3 期 [Li Jing, The CCYL in the Early Period of Reform and Openness--The Interview Record of the Han Ying(First Leading Secretary of the CCYL after the Cultural Revolution, The Youth Movement Archive of the Central Committee of the CCYL, The Historical Collection of Chinese Youth Movement, vol.3, 2010), website of Chinese Youth Research, accessed at: Li Cheng, China s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Published, 2001) p 中共中央组织部, 中共中央党史研究室, 中国共产党历届中央委员大辞典 ( ) ( 北京 : 中共党史出版社, 2004) 页 193 [Central Organization Department of the CCP and Central

203 193 Because of Han's excellent performance, Zhou Enlai suggested him as a member of the Central Committee of the CCP at the 9th National Congress of the CCP. 23 The promotion of Han Ying into the Central Committee of the CCP was mainly because of his achievement in economic contribution and the appreciation from Zhou Enlai, rather than joining the Cultural Revolution. Secondly, Han Ying had a significant age advantage. According to the suggestion of Hu Yaobang (the Head of the Organization Department of the CCP at that moment), the new leaders for the recovery of the CCYL were chosen from amongst the Provincial Secretaries of the CCP. Among all the candidates, Han Ying was the youngest (43 years of age), and 7 years younger than the next- Mao Zhiyong ( 毛致用 ) (the Provincial Secretary of Hunan, 50 years of age) The Preparation for the CCYL Reform The "Reform and Openness" policy of Deng Xiaoping brought significant changes into Chinese society. Among others, the decline of political ideology of the CCP and the increasingly diversified society posted significant challenges to the CCYL in fulfilling its political socialization function. Nevertheless, the increasing regularization of the CCP leadership politics, in particular the focus on Age in regulating the entrance and exit of cadre management, the strategy of Four Modernization of Cadre ( 干部四化 ) and The Third Echelon ( 第三梯队 ), created an opportunity for the CCYL to become the instituted arrangement for assisting the leadership and membership renewal of the CCP. 25 So in the second stage ( ), the CCYL made preparations for its institutional reform. Party History Research Office of the CCP, The Dictionary of Member of All Previous Central Committee of the CCP( ) (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 2004) p.193]. 23. Ibid; 24. Ibid; 25. Guo Sujian, The Totalitarian Model Revised, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.31, 1998, pp ; Guo Sujian, Totalitarianism: An Outdated Paradigm for Post-Mao China?, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol.14, no.2, 1995, pp.62-99; Guo Sujian, Post-Mao China: From Totalitarianism to Authoritarianism (California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000).

204 Challenges and Political Socialization Function of CCYL As one of the major mass organizations in Chinese society, the CCYL undertook the task of political socialization among Chinese youths. The external environment inevitably influenced the CCYL in fulfilling this function. In the period of Mao Zedong, the unified ideology and homogeneous society was a great help. However, in the second stage of the Deng Xiaoping period, along with the promotion of Reform and Openness, the official ideology of the CCP was less prominent, and Chinese society became increasingly diversified. And these new changes directly inhibited the political socialization function of the CCYL. Challenge 1: The Decline of the Political Ideology of the CCP The Decline of the political ideology of the CCP was the outcome constituted by the power struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, and the Reform and Openness of the CCP. In this thesis, the phrase Ideology of the CCP points to a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using the organization (CCP). 26 The ideology of the CCP contains two parts: one is Pure Ideology-Marxism-Leninism, and the other is Practical Ideology Mao Zedong Thought. In the Case of the CCP, the Ideology provides the blueprint for the future society; it serves as a tool in the hands of leaders for using the organization (CCP). 27 As a side effect of Deng Xiaoping s coming into power, the ideology of Mao Zedong was questioned and challenged. To end the Class Struggle line and allow the Party to focus on modernizing construction, Deng Xiaoping had to challenge the correctness of the practices of Mao Zedong in the Cultural Revolution. And it indirectly led to the decline of the appeal of Mao Zedong Thought. To be specific, although Hua Guofeng, as the appointed political successor of Mao Zedong, arrested the Gang of Four and ended the Cultural Revolution, yet his 26. Reinhard Bendix, The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing, in David Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) p Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley, Los Angles, London: University of California Press, 1970) pp , 68.

205 195 ruling legitimacy derived from his appointment of Mao Zedong. So to consolidate his rule, Hua Guofeng ideologically advocated the idea of Two whatever ( 两个凡是 ). 28 On the one hand, he consolidated his status as the political successor of Mao Zedong, on the other hand, he had no choice but to accept all the negative assets of Mao Zedong the Cultural Revolution. Hua had to stick to guideline of the Class Struggle ( 以阶级斗争为纲 ), held a positive attitude towards the Cultural Revolution, and merely blamed the mistakes on the Gang of Four, rather than Mao Zedong. 29 However, the disaster of the Cultural Revolution contributed to the suffering of masses of revolutionary veterans, intellectuals and the rank and file. Reviewing the Cultural Revolution was in favour with the general public. And meanwhile it also provided a great opportunity for Deng to contest for political power. Most historians generally agree that the projects of Rehabilitation of Cadres Who Were Wronged in the Cultural Revolution ( 平反冤假错案, December ) and The Debate on the Standard of Truth ( 真理标准的讨论, May 1978-June 1981) are two most significant actions that assisted Deng Xiaoping s rise to power. 30 The former contributed to most of the old veterans who were wronged in the past political campaigns (particularly, the Antirightist Movement of and the Cultural Revolution of returning to the original leadership positions and weakened the selectorate of Hua Guofeng. 31 But as a side effect, it caused serious 28. Two Whatever ( 两个凡是 ) means Whatever decisions made by Chairman Mao, we must resolutely uphold; whatever directives were issued by Chairman Mao, we must follow without fail.( 凡是毛主席做出的决策, 我们都坚决维护 ; 凡是毛主席的指示, 我们都始终不渝地遵循. ). Detail please see: CCP, The Wrong Guideline: Two Whatever, website of the CCP, accessed at: 华国锋, 十一大上的政治报告 (1978 年 8 月 12 日 ) [Hua Guofeng, The Political Report of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP(12th August, 1978) ], website of the CCP, accessed at: Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2011) pp ; Zhang Wei-Wei, Ideology and Economic Reform Under Deng Xiaoping, (London: New York : Kegan Paul International, 1996) pp.20-27; Michael Schoenhals, The 1978 Truth Criterion Controversy, The China Quarterly, vol. 126, June 1991, pp ; Dorothy Grouse Fontana, Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng, Asian Study, vol.22, no.3, June 1982, pp The process of Hua Guofeng losing power is: firstly, in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (February 1980), Hu Yaobang, the closed follower of Deng Xiaoping, replaced Hua Guofeng as the leader of the CCP. Secondly, in September 1980, Zhao Ziyang soon took the position of Prime Minister from Hua, and took his leadership of the government. Thirdly, in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (June 1981), Hua was further resigned

206 196 ageing problems in the leadership politics of the CCP. The latter on one hand, used the Practices to beat the Two Whatever ; but on the other hand, it broke the superstition of Mao Zedong, and proclaimed his inescapable mistakes in the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong thought was a practical ideology built on the ideas and practices of Mao Zedong. When the mistakes of Mao Zedong in the Cultural Revolution were publicized, there was no doubt that it would lead to a reconsideration of Mao Zedong Thought, and furthermore, a crisis of belief in the political ideology of the CCP by the ordinary people and even members of the CCP. In particular, the Reform and Openness policy contributed to numerous contradictions between Marxist doctrine and market-oriented practices. And it further contributed to the decline of the ideology of the CCP. In fact, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues did not have any blueprint for the future of China when they initiated Reform and Openness. 32 And in its early period, it released the rank and file from the cult of Mao Zedong but did not provide a new ideology to the masses. For example, the Planned Economy in the Mao Zedong period focused on public ownership. And it serviced the traditional Socialist ideas which aimed to eliminate income and class differences. However, the Market Economics of Openness and Reform brought Chinese society not only private ownership, but also increasing social polarization. 33 And quite clearly, the new authority was prepared to tolerate these problems to cure the problems of low productivity which were a legacy of egalitarianism. Meanwhile, Maoism advocated collective efforts, and relied on ideological the position of the Chairman of the CCP and the Central Military Commission, and further lost the leadership on the Army. And finally, in the 12th Central Committee of the CCP (September 1982), Hua failed to be elected into the Political Bureau of the CCP and completely left the power core of the CCP. Detail please see: Keith Bradsher and William Wellman, Hua Guofeng, Transitional Leader of China After Mao, Is Dead at 87, The New York Times, 20 August 2008; Hong Yung Lee, China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats, Asian Survey, vol.23, no.6, June 1983, pp ; Lowell Dittmer, The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China, The China Quarterly, vol. 93, March 1983, pp ; Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004) pp Mere Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, Dynamic Economic, Declining Party-State in The Paradox of China s Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press, 1999) p Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996) pp

207 197 motivation for achieving national well-being. In the period of Mao, self-sacrifice and collectivism were highly recommended. However, Deng s Reform advocated individual achievement and entrepreneurship, rather than collective efforts. It relied on material incentives, rather than ideological motivation. 34 So the increasing tensions between the official ideology and the social realities led to the decline of the appeal of the official ideology of the CCP. Given that the CCYL appealed to the official ideology in educating Chinese youths, the challenges are clear. Challenge 2: Increasingly Diversified Society The Reform of Deng Xiaoping transformed China from Mao Zedong's egalitarian society into an increasingly diversified society where individualism, entrepreneurship, and materialism were the main ideological trend among Chinese youths. 35 This diversity posed challenges for the CCYL in fulfilling its role of indoctrinating Chinese youths with a unitary official ideology and the Party s decisions. Specifically, as the major Party-Led Youth Mass Organization in the CCP system, the CCYL enjoyed a unique role of undertaking Chinese youth political socialization. This advantage was not even matched when the CCP was the ruling party in the period of Mao Zedong before the Cultural Revolution when the Party monopolized all sections of Chinese society and all the elements of the society were under control. 36 In addition, in the period of Mao Zedong, altruism, self-sacrifice and collective effort were highly recommend by the CCP. So before the Reform, most Chinese youths submitted themselves to the hands of the state authority, and were willing to contribute their intellect and effort to wherever the leaders of the CCP directed. At that time, the main role of the CCYL was to operate political socialization of the Chinese youths. 34. Julia Kwong, Crisis among China s Youths: Values and Official Ideology, The British Journal of Sociology, vol.45, no.2, June 1994, p Ibid; 36. The relationship between CCYL and the CCP is the same as the relationship between the Communist Party and other mass organizations in other Communist regime. Detail please see: Christine Sadowski, Autonomous Groups as Agents of Democratic Change in Communist and Post- Communist Eastern Europe, in Larry Diamond(ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1994) p.165.

208 198 The Reform of Deng Xiaoping changed Chinese society and the CCP. Equipping an Authoritarian Regime with Market Economics was one of the significant parts of the Reform. Since then, the Chinese economy has gradually changed from Government-Dominated to Market- Dominated. Meanwhile, the CCP encouraged individual achievement, material rewards and productive efficiency. 37 It changed the blueprint of the future of China from the Communist version of Mao Zedong's selfsacrifice and simple living to Deng Xiaoping's version of encouraging individualism, and condoning material comfort. It shaped an individualistic and materialistic generation of Chinese youths. The unitary official ideology became insufficient to indoctrinate a group of youths with diversified needs. Meanwhile, along with the decline of the monopoly of the CCP over Chinese society, the appeal of the CCYL declined. Since the establishment of the PRC, the CCYL acted as one of the mass organizations of the CCP and always used administrative approaches or mass movement strategies to promote the political socialization of Chinese youths. But as a consequence of the Reform, the CCP and the Government began to withdraw, to some extent, from the economy and society. The former approach of the CCYL on undertaking political socialization of Chinese Youths was difficult to adapt to these new developments Opportunity and the Leadership Development Function of the CCYL The CCYL always served as an institution developing cadres for the CCP throughout its history. But in the revolutionary period and Mao Zedong s era, the regularization of leadership politics was never brought onto the CCP s agenda, dominated as it was by strong personalities, and ideological clashes. As the reflection of the Cultural Revolution and the defects of Communist Regimes, 38 Deng Xiaoping initiated the Reform of leadership politics of the CCP and 37. Mere Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, Dynamic Economic, Declining Party-State in The Paradox of China s Post-Mao Reforms (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: Harvard University Press, 1999) p One of the defects of Communist Regime is the non-peaceful leadership renewal. For example, in Chien-Wen Chou's analysis, by 2010, in Communist regimes, 32 (of 55 in total) political successions were accomplished by non-peaceful means (the defeated rivals were killed, imprisoned or indicted). And the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was long hold by aged leaders in the same generation (Brezhnev, Andropov, and Cherenkov) during post- Khrushchev era. When Gorbachev (a young leader) wanted to operate reformation, the whole nation soon fell into collapse. Leadership renewal issues directly affect the social stabilization and development of the

209 199 certain institutional arrangements or formal rules were introduced into the CCP. And along with the accumulation of these arrangements, the institutionalization of Leadership politics of the CCP was established and deepened. During this process, the install action of a Retirement System, the strategies of Four Modernization of Cadre ( 干部四化 ), and the Third Echelon ( 第三梯队 ) objectively provided great opportunities for the CCYL to become the key institutional arrangement for the leadership renewal of the CCP. The Retirement System and the CCYL Leadership positions were never an unlimited resource in China s politics. So without the exit of old leaders, there is no entrance for young cadres. At that period, the CCP needed a retirement system to fix the political succession defect which became evident in the Cultural Revolution and to deal with the cadre aging problem. To some extent, the retirement system is the pre-condition for the CCYL to become the leadership development arrangement for the CCP. Historically, before Deng s Reform, and like other Communist regimes, the Chinese Communist system had serious defects in leadership renewal. For example, in Chien-Wen Chou's analysis, by 2010, in Communist regimes, 32 (of 55 in total) political successions were accomplished by non-peaceful means (the defeated rivals were killed, imprisoned or indicted). And the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was long held by aged leaders of the same generation (Brezhnev, Andropov, and Cherenkov) during the post- Khrushchev era. 39 The fall of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao confirmed that political succession issues directly affected the social stability and development of the CCP. In addition, because of the lack of a retirement arrangement, the political leaders in Communist regime enjoyed life tenure in leading posts which caused serious aging cadre problem of the CCP. 40 Because of the project of Redress Unjust, Communist regime. So regulating the game of political struggle and political succession is a life-anddeath challenge to remaining Communist countries. Details please see: Kou Chien-Wen, The Development of CCP's Elite Politics: Institutionalization and Power Transition (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2012) pp , p Kou Chien-Wen, The Development of CCP's Elite Politics: Institutionalization and Power Transition (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2012) pp , p Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Oelgeschalager,

210 200 Feigned and Wrong (misjudged) Cases ( 平反冤假错案, December ), a large number of old veteran cadres returned to leadership positions. And this further increased the seriousness of the cadre aging problem of the CCP. According to the statistical data of the Organization Department of the CCP, in 1965 the average age of ministers of government departments was approximately 55; nearly 70% of them were under the age of 55. However, in 1980, the average age became 63, and over 40% of them were over The aging problem was also serious in local areas, as Song Renqiong pointed out: The leaders of all local Party are generally over-aged The average age of the Secretary and Vice Secretary of Provincial Communist Party is about 62, over 40% of them are over 66. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of Municipal Communist Party is 56. Approximately 72% of them are age between 46 and 60. In some Cities, the Party Secretary is over 70. The average age of the members of the Standing Committee of all County Communist Party is 48. Only 10% of them are under 40 and 16% of them are over So Deng Xiaoping positively installed the policies of Term Limitation and Age Limitation to regulate the Retirement of veteran cadres. 43 Generally, the formal rules of term limitation and age limitation were enforced into the Cadre system of the CCP. And the cadre aging problem was soon solved. Many leadership positions were ready for new leaders. With a great age advantage, the CCYL cadres received increasing opportunities to hold leadership positions in the CCP. Gun & Hain, 1981) pp ; Jurgen Domes, The Gang of Four and Hua Guo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in , The China Quarterly, no.71, September 1977, pp 中央组织部 ( 编 ), 组工通讯 第 164 期, 1981 年 6 月 18 日 [Central Organization Department of the CCP(ed.), The Organization Work Communication (internal document), vol. 164, 18 th June 1981]. 42. Original words are: 干部年龄普遍偏大的同时, 干部青黄不接的现象严重. 全国省委正副书记平均年龄 62 岁,66 岁以上的占 40% 全国地市州委常委, 平均年龄为 56 岁, 其中 46 岁至 60 岁的占 72%, 有些地市委书记已经 70 多岁了 全国县委常委平均年龄 48 岁,40 岁以下的仅占 10%,56 岁以上的占 16%, details please see: 宋任穷, 认真解决组织工作面临的新课题 (1980 年 7 月 3 日 ), 宋任穷回忆录( 续 ) ( 北京 : 解放军出版社, 1996) 页 423 [Song Renqiong, Carefully Solve the New Subject of Organization Work (3 rd July 1980), in Memoirs of Song Renqiong (Beijing: PLA Press, 1996) p.423]. 43 Zang Xiaowei, Institutionalization and Elite Behaviour in Reform China, Issue & Studies, vol.41, no.1, March 2005, pp

211 201 Four Modernization of Cadre and the CCYL The Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (June 1981) presented the leadership selection criteria of the CCP in the period of Deng Xiaoping. It was called Four Modernization of Cadre and required that the CCP leaders should become more revolutionary ( 革命化 ), better-educated ( 知识化 ), more professionally competent ( 专业化 ), and younger in age ( 年轻化 ). 44 Historically, this approach provided great opportunities for the CCYL cadres to become leaders of the CCP at all levels. To be specific, more revolutionary refers to the leader's political reliability to the CCP and a communist career. In the Constitution of the CCP, only the CCYL was defined as the Reserve of the party. To the CCP, the CCYL was its own youth organization and talent pool. So when it came to political reliability, there was no other youth organization enjoying more trust from the CCP than the CCYL. Better-educated and more professionally competent are indexes for measuring the educational level and professional ability of cadres. They require that the future cadres should have received higher and professional education. For example, since October 1982, education at Junior College ( 大专 ) or above has become an essential condition for the leadership candidate to be promoted to a municipal level leadership position. 45 And within the leadership team, the CCP requires that certain numbers of professional cadre should be familiar with Technology and Science. 46 The Party does not want non-professionals to lead professionals. Because of these two indexes of leadership selection, a large number of scholars 44. 宋任穷, 按照革命化年轻化知识化专业化的方针建设好干部队伍, 人民日报, 1982 年 10 月 2 日 1 版 [Song Renqiong, Building Cadre Team according to the Criteria of More Revolutionary, Better-Educated, Professionally, and Younger in Age, People s Daily, 2nd October, 1982, p.1]; 中共中央, 关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议, 红旗, 629 期, 1981 年 7 月 1 日, 页 18 [Central Committee of the CCP, The Resolution Concerning the Certain Historical Questions since the Establishment of the People s Republic of China, in Journal of Red Flag, vol.629, 1st July 1981, p.18]. 45. 政治体制改革资料选编 编写组, 政治体制改革资料选编 ( 南京 : 南京大学出版社, 1987) 页.285 [The Writing Team of the Selection of the Document of the Political Reform, Document Selection of the Political Reform (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1987) p.285]. 46. Ibid, p.180.

212 202 have realized the changing leadership type of the CCP. In the Post-Mao Zedong period, Technocrats have gradually replaced the Revolutionary Cadres, which contains but is not limited to Political Mobilizers and Military Experts, 47 and becomes one of the most significant leadership groups to sustain China s development. 48 Historically, these two indexes contributed to the Technocracy phenomenon of the period of Jiang Zemin ( ) which Chapter 7 will discuss. That increasingly described political leaders who have experienced the college training of engineering and science, and also have engaged in the relevant professions of engineering or science 49 being selected into the Central Committee of the CCP. But meanwhile, they also provided a great opportunity for the youth league University branches, where the largest number of intellectuals gathered, to prepare their members for leadership selection to the CCP at all levels. Impacted by the Cultural Revolution, the College Entrance Examination was stopped and the Chinese universities and colleges went into a long period of stagnation ( ). 50 It led to a serious waste of talent. When Deng Xiaoping returned to the leadership position in July 1977, he first resumed the College Entrance 47. Hong Yung Lee, China s 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats, Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 6, June 1983, pp ; Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1991) pp Detail of the analysis of the Technocrats in the Central Committee of the CCP, please see: Li Cheng and Lynn White, The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers, Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 4, April 1988, pp ; Li Cheng and Lynn White, The Fifteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Full-Fledged Technocratic Leadership with Partial Control by Jiang Zemin, Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 3, March 1998, pp ; Hong Yun Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Zang Xiaowei, Elite Formation and the Bureaucratic- Technocracy in Post-Mao China, Studies in Comparative Communism, vol.24, no.1, March 1991, pp ; Zang Xiaowei, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (New York and London: Rout ledge Curzon, 2003); Zang Xiaowei, The Fourteenth Central Committee of the CCP: Technocracy or Political Technocracy?, Asian Survey, vol.33, no.8, August 1993, pp ; Kou Chien-Wen, Elite Recruitment and the Duality of the Chinese Party-state: The Mobility of Westerneducated Returnee Elites in China, , in S. Philip Hsu, Wu Yu-Shan, and Zhang Suisheng (ed.), In Search of China s Development Model: Beyond the Beijing Consensus( London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014) pp Li Cheng, China s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Published, 2001) p 龙平平, 张曙, 邓小平决策恢复高考, 党的文献, 2007 年 4 期, 页 [Long Pingping and Zhang Shu, Deng Xiaoping Resume the College Entrance Exam, The Party Literature, vol.4, 2007, pp.11-16].

213 203 Examination. 51 The growing needs for young talents for his Reform contributed to universities and colleges becoming the most significant talent pool for the leaders of all sections. The Youth Leagues in Universities and Colleges recovered and were assigned two significant missions. One was to recommend young intellectuals to the CCP (named 推优 ), the other was to handle the job recommendation of graduates (named 就业推荐 ). 52 No matter whether it was Party membership or Job Recommendation, both are significant for graduates to become cadres or leadership candidates after graduation. The age index served the purpose of rejuvenating CCP cadres. As the result of the introduction of age limits on cadre promotion, the purpose of rejuvenation of the CCP cadres was fulfilled, but on the other hand, it also created an age dilemma within the CCP Cadre appointment system. As Kou Chien-wen and Tsai Wen-Hsuan explain, this age dilemma refers to the fact that for avoiding premature and permanent career stagnation, ambitious CCP cadres are compelled to seek promotion as rapidly as possible. 53 Since 1980, Age has become one of the most significant criteria in regulating the cadre system of the CCP. 54 For example, in 1982, at the Provincial level, the age of the main body of leadership team was reduced to approximately 55; at the municipal level, it was between 45 and 40; and at the county level, it was 40 to But meanwhile, because of the tradition of seniority, there was a vivid conflict between youngness and seniority within the CCP appointment system. So within the practical operational procedures of CCP cadre appointment, age restriction also hinders cadre promotion. 51. 龙平平, 张曙, 邓小平决策恢复高考改变一代知识青年命运 [Long Pingping and Zhang Shu, The Decision of Deng Xiaoping Concerning Resuming the College Entrance Examination Has Changed the Fate of A Generation of Young Intellectuals ], website of the CCP, accessed at: Interview with Prof. Zheng Guang. 53. Kou Chien-Wen and Tsai Wen-Hsuan, Sprinting with Small Steps towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System, The China Journal, January 2014, Issue 71, p Zang Xiaowei, Institutionalization and Elite Behavior in Reform China, Issue & Studies, vol.41, no.1, March 2005, pp 丁洪章 ( 编 ), 中共党员大辞典 ( 北京 : 华龄出版社, 1991) 页 232 [Ding Hongzang(ed.), The Dictionary of the Member of the CCP (Beijing: Hualing Press, 1991) p.232].

214 204 Compared with cadres in other institutions or departments of the CCP, Government, State-Owned Enterprise, and Mass Organizations, the average age of the cadres in CCYL is the youngest. 56 So the age index provides a great age advantage for the CCYL cadres in competing for leadership positions. And in the subsequent reform of the CCYL, it caught the need of the CCP and relied on this index to shape itself as one of the avenues for faster promotion among the institutional arrangements for assisting the leadership renewal of the CCP. 57 The Third Echelon ( 第三梯队 ) and the CCYL The strategy of the Third Echelon, which was proposed by Hu Yaobang for achieving the orderly and peaceful Echelon Succession ( 梯队接班 ), was a concrete arrangement to introduce institutionalization into the political succession of the CCP. The strategy of the Third Echelon Strategy was explained as follows: We are building Three Echelons. Leaders over the age of 70 were the first echelon, such as Deng Xiaoping and his peers. The Second echelon was represented by Zhao Ziyang and me (Hu Yaobang).And we find some Young Cadres with the age (between 40 and 50) to constitute the Third Echelon. Next Year, we should select a thousand Cadres to join the leadership team at the Central Level, Provincial level and District Level. 58 The purpose of the Third Echelon strategy was to provide for orderly political succession. To achieve this strategy, on the basis of cadre age, both the leadership system of all levels and each level leadership team appears as echelons. That is to say, the lower leadership level cadres enjoy a younger age. And within the same leadership level, there is an age echelon and each leadership position has reserved cadres for succession. 56. Interview with Academician Lu Shizhen. 57. Kou Chien-Wen and Tsai Wen-Hsuan, Sprinting with Small Steps towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System, The China Journal, January 2014, Issue 71, p Original words are: 我们正在建立第三梯队 70 岁以上的人叫第一梯队, 像邓小平等人 第二梯队是以我和赵紫阳为代表的人, 找那么一些 40~50 岁的,50 岁刚出头的人, 为第三梯队 明年, 我们要选那么一千人, 参加中央一级 省一级和地区一级的领导班子中去, details please see: 胡耀邦, 胡耀邦在东京举行记者招待会, 人民日报, 1983 年 11 月 27 日 [Hu Yaobang, Hu Yaobang held Press Conference in Tokyo, People s Daily, 27th November 1983].

215 205 To be specific, the leadership team of Provincial or equivalent level leader should be constituted by age group cadres. They are aged less than 60, about 50 and approximately 40. And at the Municipal or equivalent level the leadership team should be constituted by the cadres with an age of approximately 55, fewer than 50, and fewer than 40. And the age of the cadre at County or equivalent level leadership team should be under 50, about 40, and approximately The Central Organization Department of the CCP was the main body for choosing the Third Echelon. Its recruitment scope was nationwide. However, one of the key indexes of the Third Echelon was age. As the Reserve of the CCP, the CCYL gathered most young political cadres in the Chinese political system. The CCYL not surprisingly became the main body of the Third Echelon. In addition, this strategy was proposed and operated by Hu Yaobang, the former CCYL secretary. He was familiar with the youth league and had close relationships with the some CCYL cadres. This also increased the opportunity for CCYL cadres to be recruited into the third Echelon. Since 1984, the CCP started to select 1000 young and excellent cadres to join the leadership team at the Central Level, Provincial level and District Level. Among them, there were approximately 150 cadres selected and recommended by the CCYL. This mission rested on the Provincial Committee of the CCYL and Central Committee of the CCYL. As The Suggestion Concerning Assisting the Party Committee to Establish Provincial Youth League Reserve Cadre System ( 关于协助党委建立省级团委后备干部制度的意见 ) pointed out: Principally, the number of the Reserve Cadre should correspond with the number of the existing leadership team. That is to say, in a large scale province, there will be about 6 cadres, middle scale province, about 5 cadres, and a small scale province approximately 4. National Youth League Committee can recommend about 2 cadres, nation-wide in total, 150 cadres 中央组织部, 中央组织部在全国组织工作会议上的工作报告, 收录于曹志 ( 编 ) 中华人民共和国人事制度概要 ( 北京 : 北京大学出版社, 1985) 页 [Central Organization Department of the CCP, The Work Report of the Central Organization Department of the CCP in National Organization Meeting, collected in Cao Zhi(ed.), The Outline of the Personnel System of the PRC (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1985) pp ]. 60. Original words are: 后备干部的人数, 原则上与现有班子定员相应, 即大省 6 名左右, 中省 5 名左右, 小省 4 名左右 中央单位团委 2 名左右 全国共 150 名, details please see: 共青团

216 The Preparation of Inner-Youth League Reform From 1982 to 1985, the CCYL had prepared for an inner-youth league reform. 61 Its main point was to focus on its role as Reserve of the Party. At its 11 th National Congress (December 1982), Hu Qili represented the CCP to give a major speech to the congress. He expected that: The CCYL should focus on discovering the young talent, training them, and providing the path for them to success. To better fulfil the function of the CCYL being the Reserve of the party, (it) should carefully select excellent young party members to do the work of the youth league, and recruit the excellent youth league members into the party in a timely way. 62 In reply to the CCP's expectations, the Congress modified its constitution. Among the changes, two modifications were the most significant. The first one was that the youth league put the role Reserve of the CCP into the CCYL constitution again. The intention of the modification was to highlight the leadership developing function of the CCYL, as the Explanation of Constitution Modification pointed out: We believe that writing Reserve into the Constitution again, must let the youth league at all levels consciously respond the task of sending new blood to the party, training and sending young cadre to the party and government, and cultivating successors for communist careers. 63 中央, 关于协助党委建立省级团委后备干部制度的意见, 收录于 共青团组织工作文件选编 ( 北京 : 共青团中央, 1986 年 1 月 ) 页 32 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion Concerning Assisting the Party Committee to Establish Provincial Youth League Reserve Cadre System, collected in The Selection of the Organizational Work of the CCYL (Beijing: Central Committee of the CCYL, January1986) p. 32]. 61 宋德福, 共青团体制改革的思考和实践 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2007) 页 2 [Song Defu, The Thinking and Practice of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2007) p.2]. 62. Original words are: 要注意从青年中发现人才, 培养人才, 广开青年成才之路 要认真选派优秀的青年党员去做团的工作, 及时把符合党员条件的优秀团员吸引到党内来, 以充分发挥共青团的后备军作用, details please see: 胡启立, 胡启立在中国共产主义青年团第十一次全国代表大会上的祝词, 人民日报, 1982 年 12 月 21 日第一版 [Hu Qili, The Speech of Hu Qili in the 11th National Congress of the CCYL, People s Daily, 21th December 1982, p.1]. 63. Original words are: 我们相信, 将 后备军 重新写入团章, 必将使全团的各级组织, 更为自觉地担负起为党输送新鲜血液, 为党和国家培养输送年轻干部, 为共产主义事业培养接班人的重任, details please see: 共青团中央, 关于修改团的章程的说明, 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Explanation of Constitution Modification, The CCYL Document Collection Since the

217 207 The second was to add a specific chapter for regulating the CCYL cadre in the Constitution. In the new chapter, the four indexes of the Four Modernization of Cadre, which included: more revolutionary ( 革命化 ), better-educated ( 知识化 ), more professionally competent ( 专业化 ), and younger in age ( 年轻化 ) became the criteria for selecting CCYL cadre. The intention to use the criteria of the CCP to select the CCYL cadres was the expectation that CCYL cadre should become qualified CCP leadership candidates. 64 In addition, the CCYL required the youth league local branches and committees to actively assist the party to participate in the issues of the management of the CCYL cadres. 65 This practice greatly served the strategy of merging the CCYL cadre into the CCP cadre management system and greatly assisted the CCYL members to become the leadership candidates of the CCP. As the Explanation of the Constitution Modification pointed out, the intention of this addition was to merge the CCYL cadre management into the young cadre training of the CCP. In order to ensure the leadership of the Party on the youth league and to make sure the young cadre training work of the Party can receive an institutional guarantee Reform of the CCYL and the Role Change ( ) In the third stage of the Deng Xiaoping period, on the basis of preparation practices and explorations, the tentative plan of Institutional Reform of the CCYL The Basic Design of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL ( 关于共青团体制改革的基本设想 ) was formally launched and promoted after the 12th National Third plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) pp.89-97] 64. 中国共青团, 中国共产主义青年团章程 (1982 年 12 月 24 日通过 ), 人民日报 1982 年 12 月 28 日第 2 版 [CCYL, The Constitution of the CCYL(approved on 24th December 1982), People s Daily, 28th December 1982, p.2]. 65. Ibid. 66. Original words are: 为了切实保证党对团的领导, 并使党培养年轻干部的措施从组织制度上得到落,details please see: 共青团中央, 关于修改团的章程的说明, 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Explanation of Constitution Modification, The CCYL Document Collection Since the Third plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) pp.89-97].

218 208 Congress of the CCYL in This CCYL reform did not propose to change the Communist nature of the CCYL but aimed to reform it by meeting the new social challenges and opportunities. It aimed to reshape the youth league to be an organization with high efficiency and popular support among Chinese youth. As Song Defu (the first Secretary of the CCYL at that moment) pointed out: (The Institutional Reform of the CCYL) aims to adjust and perfect different kinds of regulations within the CCYL, rather than to change the nature of the CCYL; (it) is to identify the Social Function of the CCYL, rather than to cancel the basic mission of the CCYL; (it) is to regulate the relation between the CCP and the CCYL, rather than to get rid of the leadership of the CCP over the CCYL. In the past, the CCP controlled everything, and it often forgot the CCYL. Now, along with the separation between the Party and Government, the Party will have increasing energy to arrange the CCYL, to focus on the work of CCYL and to strengthen the leadership of the CCYL. 68 There were 10 elements to this reform design, as Figure 6-2 the Basic Design of the Inner Youth League Reform shows: 67. 共青团中央, 关于共青团体制改革的基本设想 (1988 年 5 月 8 日共青团第十二次全国代表大会上通过 ) [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Basic Design of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (approved by the 12th National Congress of the CCYL in 8th May 1985) ], website of the CCYL, accessed at: Original words are: ( 共青团体制改革 ) 是调整和完善团的各项制度, 而不是改变团的性质 ; 是明确团组织的社会职能, 而不是取消团的根本任务 ; 是理顺党团关系, 而不是摆脱党的领导 and 过去党委什么都管, 顾不上管团, 现在党政分开后, 有更多的精力管团了, 将会更重视团的工作, 加强对团的工作领导, details please see: 宋德福, 胆子要大, 步子要稳 再谈团干部在全面改革中成熟起来 (1987 年 12 月 28 日团十一届六中全会上的讲话稿 ), 收录于 共青团体制改革的思考和实践 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2007) 页 145 [Song Defu, Be Brave, Be Steady Talking about How the CCYL Cadre Become Mature in the Complete Reform(The Speech of Song Defu in the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress of the CCYL, 28th December 1987), collected in The Thinking and Practice of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2007) pp ].

219 209 Figure 6-2 the Basic Design of the Inner Youth League Reform 69 Yet, implementing the social function, introducing inner-youth league democracy, and reforming the cadre and personnel system were three major highlights of this CCYL reform. Implementing the social function promoted in practice the role of CCYL in politically socializing Chinese youths. Introducing inner-youth league democracy objectively promoted the institutionalization of the CCYL. Above all, reforming the cadre and personnel system was the most significant change; it assisted the role change of the CCYL and equipped it to become the institutional arrangement for assisting the leadership renewal of the CCP Social Function and Political Socialization of the Youths The role of the CCYL in the reform was still the mass organization for undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youths. The purpose of implementing the youth league's social function was to change the former approach of the political socialization of CCYL from direct ideological indoctrination to interest 69. The figure is made by the author. Source from: 共青团中央, 关于共青团体制改革的基本设想 (1988 年 5 月 8 日共青团第十二次全国代表大会上通过 ) [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Basic Design of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (approved by the 12th National Congress of the CCYL in 8th May 1985) )] website of the CCYL, accessed at:

220 210 protection. Undertaking political socialization of Chinese Youth to encourage them to support the CCP's ruling was the ultimate goal of the CCYL's work. 70 Formerly, especially during the period of Mao Zedong, private interest had to give way to collective or public interest. So the CCYL over-emphasized obedience to authority, rather than the interest of youths. It led to the bureaucratization of the CCYL which is one of the main reasons why Mao Zedong reorganized it in the Cultural Revolution. But since the reform of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese economics and society have been increasingly liberalized. It led to the decline of ideology and an increasingly diversified society. And the former significance of mass movement and official ideology sharply decreased. Private interest was admitted and even protected by the CCP. So the CCYL was reformed following the model of a State Corporatist organization. That is to say, the youth league as a State-recognized organization provided a two-way conduit between the CCP and Chinese youths. From top-down, it still kept on undertaking the political socialization of Chinese youths; from bottom-up it was required to implement the social function to protect the interests and rights of young people. In 1990, the Central Committee of the CCYL adopted "The Work Suggestion Concerning Further Contact with the mass For Better Representing and Protecting the Interests and Rights of the Youths and Teenagers" ( 关于进一步密切联系群众做好代表和维护青少年权益工作的意见 ) to shift the work focus of the youth league. 71. And since then, numerous projects were promoted to protect the interest of the Youths. For example, in 1989, "The Hope Project"( 希望工程 ) was initiated by the CCYL to help all the youths and teenagers from poor families to receive basic education. In 1991, the first "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Minors" ( 中华人民共和国未成年人保护法 ) was passed. 72 It had been drafted 70. Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, China, Corporatism, and the East Asian Model in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no.33, January 1995, pp 共青团中央, 关于进一步密切联系群众做好代表和维护青少年权益工作的意见 (1990 年 10 月 9 日 ) ( 团中央文件 )[Central Committee of the CCYL, The Work Suggestion Concerning Further Contact the mass For Better Representing and Protecting the Interest and Right of the Youth and Teenager (9th October 1990) (Internal document)]. 72. 宋德福, 帮助青少年学法守法, 人人义不容辞 ( 采访宋德福 ), 民主与法制, 1988 年 6 期, 页 1-3[Song Defu, Help the Adolescent to Learn and to Follow the Law is Everyone s

221 211 by the CCYL. In 1992, the CCYL won preferential treatment from the Ministry of Finance, Industry and Commerce Administration, and State Administration of Taxation in its policy "The Decision Concerning the Questions of CCYL on Developing the Third Industry, Establishing the Economic Entity"( 关于共青团发展第三产业 兴办经济实体有关问题的决定 ). According to this Decision, the CCYL can enjoy certain preferential policies to build up four Employment Entrepreneurial Markets for serving the employment or Entrepreneurship of College Graduates, Rural Youths, and Urban Youths. 73 Theoretically speaking, the CCYL was defined as a mass organization and did not belong to the government hierarchy. But after this Reform, the CCYL formally operated the government affairs of the youth. And the CCYL cadres became authorized personnel of the national administration and their wages were from the national treasury which could well assist them to be institutionally transferred to the leadership positions of the Party system, the Government system, the State Owned Enterprise system, and the Mass Organization System Inner-Youth League Democracy and the Institutionalization of the CCYL The Reform introduced inner youth league democracy to promote the institutionalization of the CCYL. Most China studies have noticed that Deng Xiaoping introduced institutionalization to regulate Chinese political Reform. 75 As a part of the Chinese political system, the CCYL also introduced institutionalization into its self-reform. It increased the Regularization of all aspects of the inner Responsibility (Interview with Song Defu), Journal of Democracy and Law, vol.6, 1996, pp.1-3]. 73. 共青团中央, 共青团中央财政部国家工商行政管理局国家税务局关于共青团发展第三产业 兴办经济实体有关问题的规定 (1992 年 12 月 12 日 ) ( 团内文件 ) [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Decision Concerning the Questions of CCYL Developing the Third Industry, Establish the Economic Entity(12th December 1992) (Internal document)]. 74. The Communist Youth League belongs to set-up organization of Chinese government. See 国家公共改革委员会, 中央和国家机关机构设置 [State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, Introduction of the Organ of State Administration Set-Up ] website of The State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, 11 November 2010, accessed at: t _15450.htm. 75. David Bachman, The Paradox of Analyzing Elite Politics under Jiang, The China Journal, no. 45, January 2001, pp ; David Bachman, The Limits on Leadership in China, Asia Survey, vol.32, no.11, November 1992, pp ; Lowell Dittmer, The Changing Shape of Elite Power Politics, The China Journal, no.45, January 2001, pp53-67.

222 212 management of the CCYL and laid down a firm foundation for the youth league to become the institutional arrangement serving the leadership development for the CCP. For example, in order to better manage the CCYL members, the 12th National Congress of the CCYL (1988) passed "The Resolution of Operating the Institution of Identity Card of CCYL Members" ( 关于实行团员证制度的决议 ). 76 Since then, all CCYL members were properly registered. And the CCYL strengthened the management and education of its members. On one hand, the CCYL kept on recommending excellent members to the CCP; on the other hand, the CCYL started to select excellent members to work in the Party or Government. 77 To manage the working staff of the CCYL, in 1989 the Central Committee of the CCYL published "Proposed Regulations of the Staff in the Central Committee of the CCYL"( 团的机关工作者试行条例 ), "Proposed Regulations of Full-time Staff of the Grass-root Youth League"( 团的基层专职工作者试行条例 ), and "Proposed Regulations of Part-Time Staff of Grass-Root Youth League" 团的基层兼职工作者试行条例. To regulate the elections and congresses of all levels within the youth league, in 1989 the Central Committee of the CCYL published "The Regulation of Congress and Meeting of the Youth League of All Levels"( 团的各级代表会议 代表大会议事规则 ), "The Election Regulation of the Committee of the Youth League of All level"( 团的地方各级代表大会选举规则 ), and "The Election Regulation of Youth League Grass Root Organization"( 团的基层组织选举规则 ). 78 These 76. 共青团中央, 关于实行团员证制度的决议 (1988 年 5 月 8 日, 团十二大通过 ) ( 团中央文件 )[The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Resolution of Operating the Institution of Identity Card of CCYL Member(Approved in the 12th National Congress of the CCYL, 8th May 1988) (Internal document)]. 77. 宋德福, 高居建设有中国特色社会主义的伟大旗帜, 全面推动共青团工作再上新台阶 ( 在 1992 年 12 月 17 日共青团十二届五中全会上的讲话 ), 收录于 共青团体制改革的思考和实践 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2007) 页 453 [Song Defu, Uphold the Flag of Socialism with Chinese Character, Completely Promote the Work of the CCYL to Another New Stage(The Speech of Song Defu in the Fifth Plenary Session of the 12th National Congress of the CCYL, 17th December 1992), collected in The Thinking and Practice of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2007) p.453]. 78. 宋德福, 迈好 90 年代第一步, 为治理整顿和深化改革贡献力量 (1989 年 12 月 13 日在团十二届二中全会上的讲话 ), 收录于 共青团体制改革的思考和实践 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2007) 页 215 [Song Defu, The First Step of 1990s, Contribute to the Rectification and Reform: The Speech of Song Defu in the Second Plenary Session of the 12th National Congress of the CCYL, 13th

223 213 regulations greatly promoted the democratic elections to select the CCYL cadres and delegate the management of CCYL cadres to local Party committees. According to the Reform, the leaders of the CCYL of all levels should be selected through democratic election Cadre and Personnel System Reform and CCYL Leadership Arrangement The cadre and personnel system reform of the CCYL stimulated the key change to the youth league and helped it to become an institutional arrangement to select and train excellent political cadres for the CCP and Government. Throughout the Reform, developing an excellent CCYL cadre team, which met the criteria of "Four Modernization of Cadre", was one of the main foci. The Reform of the Cadre and Personnel System contained the following practices: Firstly, the Central Committee of the CCYL handed over the power of CCYL cadre management to the local Party committees. Superficially, it served the strategy of strengthening the CCP leadership over to the CCYL. But in practice, it assisted the CCYL cadre to become leadership candidates for the CCP at all levels and greatly limited the CCYL cadres from forming an independent faction within the CCP. Specifically, in 1986, the Central Committee of the CCYL published The Suggestion Concerning the Youth League Committee of All levels to assist the Party Committee to Manage the CCYL Cadre ( 关于各级团委协助党委管理团干部的意见 ). This Suggestion was confirmed by the Central Organizational Department of the CCP. So it should be mandatory for both the CCYL and CCP at all levels. According to this Suggestion, within the management and appointment of CCYL cadres, the more senior CCYL leaders only played the assistant role, rather than the determinative role. That is to say the Provincial Party Committee plays the determinative role to manage the CCYL Cadres of the Provincial Committee, and the Central Committee of the CCYL merely enjoys the assistant role. And so on in other positions. 79 December 1989, collected in The Thinking and Practice of the Institutional Reform of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2007) p.215]. 79. 共青团中央, 关于各级团委协助党委管理团干部的意见, 收录于 共青团组织工作文件选编 ( 北京 : 共青团中央, 1986 年 1 月 ), 页 3-10 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion Concerning the Youth League Committee of All Level Assist the Party Committee to

224 214 The influence of this Reform was far-reaching. It enhanced the role of the CCYL in assisting the leadership renewal of the CCP, rather than letting the CCYL become an independent political faction, as explained below. The CCYL submitted its determinative power of appointing the leadership positions of subordinate committees to the organizational department of the local committee of the CCP. And there is no doubt that it transferred the dominance and controlling force of leaders of the upper Committee of the CCYL to the leaders of the CCP Committee of the same level. When it is possible to form a political faction, rational CCYL leadership candidates will be de facto submit their loyalty to the leader of the CCP committee of the same level, rather than the leaders of upper CCYL committee. And meanwhile, because the leaders of CCP local committee supervise the CCYL leaders at the same level, it increases their preference for and acceptance of these CCYL cadres. And it thus promotes CCYL cadres within the political system. Secondly, the reform of the CCYL explicitly regulated the ages of CCYL leaders at all levels. It equipped the CCYL cadres with a great age advantage in the CCP s political system. To be specific, with the approval from the Central Organizational Department of the CCP, on 29th April 1982, the CCYL published The Suggestion Concerning the Age Problem of CCYL Cadres at All Levels ( 关于各级团委干部年龄问题的意见 ). According to this Suggestion, Cadre Rejuvenation was first initiated in the CCYL system, and the degree of reform was much higher than the CCP. The Suggestion recommended that: Firstly, in the Central Committee of the CCYL: The age of being a member of the Secretariat in the Central Committee of the CCYL cannot be over 45. Besides that, Leaders with the age of approximately 35 should take up half of the seats. The age of the Director and Vice-Director of the department of the Central Committee of the CCYL cannot be over 40. Other CCYL cadres with County level administrative rank cannot be over 35. Secondly, in the Provincial Committee of the CCYL: The age of the Secretary cannot be over 40; the Vice- Manage the CCYL Cadre, collected in The Selection of the Organizational Work of the CCYL (Beijing: Central Committee of the CCYL, January1986) pp.3-10].

225 215 Secretary cannot be over 38. Within the Leadership Team, there should be one or two leaders aged below 35. Thirdly, in the municipal Committee of the CCYL: The age of the Secretary cannot be over 35; the Vice-Secretary cannot be over 32. Fourthly, in the County Level Committee of the CCYL: The age of the Secretary cannot be over 30; the Vice-Secretary cannot be over 28. Fifthly, in the township level Committee of the CCYL: The age of the Secretary and Vice- Secretary should be about 25. Sixthly, the age of Secretary and Vice-Secretary of the CCYL Branches in Other organs of Government, School, Factory, Mine, Street, Company, and public institutions, should be the same as the CCYL of the same administrative rank. 80 Compared with the age regulation of the CCP, the CCYL at all levels enjoys more than 10 years age advantage than the ordinary Party cadre of the same administrative rank. This can greatly increase their opportunity in the future for contesting for leadership positions in the CCP or the Government. For example, the maximum age of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCYL was 45. It corresponded to the Minister or provincial level leader with the retirement age of 63 (Minister and Provincial Level leader) and 58 (Vice-Minister and Vice Provincial Leaders). The Secretary of the CCYL had at least a 12 years age advantage. The maximum age of the Secretary and vice Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the youth league were 40 and 38 respectively. It matched to the Ting ( 厅 )/ Ju( 局 ) or municipal level leaders age with the retirement age of 55 (Ting and municipal Level leader) and 52 (Vice-Ting and Vice municipal Leaders). The Secretary and vice Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the youth league had at least 14 years age advantage. 80. Original words are: 团中央 : 书记处书记一般不超过四十五岁, 其中, 三十五岁左右, 三十七 八岁的应占总数一半左右 正副部长一般不超过四十岁 正副处长一般不超过三十五岁 团省委 : 书记一般不超过四十岁, 副书记一般不超过三十八岁, 其中应配备一两名三十五岁以下的 团地委 : 书记一般不超过三十五岁, 副书记一般不超过三十二岁 团县委 : 书记一般不超过三十岁, 副书记一般不超过二十八岁 公社 ( 乡 镇 ) 团委 : 正副书记一般在二十五岁左右 机关 学校 厂 矿 街道企事业单位团委正副书记的年龄, 可参照地方各级同级团委书记的年龄, details please see: 共青团中央, 关于各级团委干部年龄问题的意见, 收录于 共青团组织工作文件选编 ( 北京 : 共青团中央, 1986 年 1 月 ) 页 [Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion Concerning the Age of the CCYL Cadre of All level, collected in The Selection of the Organizational Work of the CCYL (Beijing: Central Committee of the CCYL, January1986) pp ].

226 Summary In the period of Deng Xiaoping, the CCYL was developed from previous Partyled mass organization to an Inner-Party institutional arrangement to develop leadership candidates for the CCP. The development of the CCYL experienced three stages. In the first stage, the CCYL experienced a top-down recovery process. In this process, the youth league further merged itself into the CCP system. From criticizing the Gang of Four and Lin Biao, to stopping the class struggle as a guiding principle, the CCYL gradually got rid of the influence of the Cultural Revolution and concentrated on China s modernization. In addition, the leadership training function of the CCYL recovered and new criteria for training political leaders were put in place. In the second stage, facing the decline of the political ideology of the CCP and an increasingly diversified society and the opportunities of Four Modernization of Cadre and the Third Echelon, the CCYL prepared itself for inner-youth league reform. In the third stage, this Reform was formally implemented. Implementing the socialization function, introducing inner-youth league democracy, and reforming the cadre and personnel system were the three major highlights of the reform process. The main feature of the CCYL started to change to become the institutional arrangement for assisting the leadership development for the CCP.

227 217 CHAPTER SEVEN The CCYL in the Period of Jiang Zemin ( ) This chapter discusses the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL in the period ,when Jiang Zemin held the position of General Secretary of the CCP from the end of Tiananmen Event (1989) to the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP (2002). It argues that in this period, the CCYL was a subordinate multiple function organization of the CCP with three major roles, including: mass organization to undertake political socialization; a youth department of the government for providing public services and human resource development; and an institutional arrangement for developing the future political leaders of the CCP. But the main role of the CCYL in this period was the last: the institutional arrangement to develop political leaders for the Party. The development of the relationship between the CCP and the CCYL in this period can be divided into two stages: the first was from 1989 to 1992, and the second from 1992 to To be specific, after the Tiananmen crisis, Jiang Zemin unexpectedly replaced the original political successors of Deng Xiaoping (Zhao Ziyang) to become the General Secretary of the CCP in From 1989 to 1992, there was an unstable period further complicated by the debate over "belonging to socialism or capitalism"( 姓资姓社的讨论 ), i.e. the struggle between the Conservatives and Reformists. Deeply influenced by the Conservatives, the political socialization function of the CCYL was re-emphasized as a measure of reflection after Tiananmen. After the warning by Deng Xiaoping on his Southern Tour (1992), 1 Jiang Zemin ultimately followed the Reform and Openness policy and contributed to equipping the 1. Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping was the famous political event after the Tiananmen. In spring 1992, Deng visited the economic special zones in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai. In this tour, Deng made various speeches to generate large local support for the reformists and criticized the conservatives against further reform and opening up. After the tour, Jiang Zemin eventually chose the side with Deng Xiaoping. Details please see: Robert Weatherley, Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006) pp.137; Zhao Suisheng, Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China, Asian Survey, 1993, pp ; Elizabeth Perry, China in 1992: An Experiment in Neo-Authoritarianism, Asian Survey, 1993, pp

228 218 socialist political system with Market economics. Consequently, on one hand, Jiang Zemin had solidified his position as the leadership core of the third generation of the CCP; 2 on the other hand, Hu Jintao was arranged to be the political successor of Jiang Zemin at the 14th National Congress of the CCP (October, 1992). During this stage, the CCYL played the role of youth department of the government and concentrated on two projects: Cross-Century Youth Civilization Project ( 跨世纪青年文明工程 ) and Cross-Century Youth Talent Project ( 跨世纪青年人才工程 ). In the 1990s reform of the personnel system of China, the CCYL was institutionally arranged as one of the most significant institutions for developing political leaders for the CCP and equipped its cadres with Age and Public institution experience advantages. In addition, throughout the period of Jiang Zemin, influenced by the ongoing economic reforms, the local branches of the CCYL were gradually marginalized. 3 The CCYL started to explore the developments in Non-State Owned Economic Organizations and furthered its steps to become the institutional arrangement to develop leadership candidates for the CCP and the Government. This chapter is organized into five sections. Section 7.1 analyses the Tiananmen Event and the Party s emphasis on political socialization function of the CCYL, and provides a case study on the development of youth league university branches. Section 7.2 details the two key Cross-Century Youth League projects and the youth department role of the CCYL. Section 7.3 reveals the development of leadership incubator arrangement of the CCYL in the reform of the personnel system of China. Section 7.4 reveals the new exploration of the CCYL into the new type of economics. Finally a brief summary is conducted in Section Tiananmen Event and the Emphasis of the CCYL on Political Socialization The political socialization function of the CCYL was greatly emphasized after the Tiananmen Event (also known as "June Fourth Incident" 六四事件 ) which nearly brought the CCP to the edge of collapse. 4 But differing from previous ideological 2. Zhao Suisheng, Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite Politics in Post-Tiananmen China, Asian Survey, 1993, pp In the ongoing reform, increasingly numbers of youths left the public sector and to establish private businesses. And it caused the local branches of CCYL in State Owned Enterprises, rural area were marginalized by lacking members. 4. Concerning the Tiananmen Event, please see: Andrew Nathan, The Tiananmen Papers, Foreign

229 219 indoctrination, the main content of the political education of the CCYL turned to Patriotism and Socialism with Chinese characters. In addition, as the one of the major management systems in Universities, where the Tiananmen Event started from, the Political Guides System ( 政治辅导员 ) in Chinese universities received professionalized and specialized reform and many political guides were recruited into the leadership group of the youth league branches in Universities. Meanwhile, the University Youth League became one of the leadership transition avenues for CCYL cadres from the University to the CCP and the Government. The Tiananmen event has a close relationship with the CCYL. It was a political movement which was developed from a student demonstration. It was triggered by the death of the CCP leader, Hu Yaobang, who was also the former Secretary of the CCYL ( ). 5 And it aimed to encourage continued economic reform and especially political liberalization. This event was defined as a "Counter- Revolutionary Riot" 6 by the CCP which launched a heavy-handed military crackdown. Some scholars have recognized a change of course in the CCP towards economics and politics in this period. 7 For example, the CCP emphasized economic growth as a way of maintaining legitimacy, and introduced a series of institutions to strengthen their rule, which Andrew Nathan described as Authoritarian Resilience." 8 However, few scholars have realized the changes in the CCYL which had a close connection with the Tiananmen Event. This section systematically analyzes the changes to the CCYL after the Tiananmen Event, particularly in the universities. Affairs, vol80, no.1, January/February 2001, pp. 1-48; Richard Baum, Tiananmen: The Inside Story?, The China Journal, vol. 46, July 2001, pp ; Jacob Kovalio, The 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident: Retrospective and Prospective of Considerations, Asian Perspective, vol. 15, no. 1, Spring- Summer 1991, pp. 5-36; Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Eugene Perry Link, The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). 5. Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2007) p.99; CCP, The Introduction of Hu Yaobang, 22nd April, 1989, website of Xinhua, accessed at: _1.htm. 6. Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (MA: Harvard University Press, 2011) p Lawrence Sullivan, China since Tiananmen: Political, Economic, and Social Conflicts (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1995); Gordon White, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post- Mao China (Stanford University Press, 1993); Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Kathleen Hartford, Reform or Retrofitting? The Chinese Economy since Tiananmen, World Policy Journal, vol.9, no.1, 1991/1992, pp Andrew Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, Journal of Democracy, vol.14, no.1, 2003, pp.6-17.

230 The Changed Guiding Principle for the CCYL The explosion of the Tiananmen Crisis directly pointed to the weaknesses and shortcomings of the CCYL s work of political socialization. As the State-recognized mass organization, the CCYL should have served the purpose of transmitting, mobilizing, and raising the political consciousness of the youths for the CCP. However, although there were many reasons contributing to the student demonstration on Tiananmen Square in 1989, the failure of the CCYL in its political socialization mission must be one of central causes. As a consequence, the CCP changed its guiding principle for the CCYL. The dissatisfactions in the Tiananmen Event Underneath the slogan of Democracy, the participants of the Tiananmen Event were constituted by different social groups with different practical complaints against the rule of the CCP. For example, university students opposed the system of "political guides"( 政治辅导员 ) which limited their freedom of employment. 9 The intellectuals were angry about the policy to "Promote the Socialist Spiritual Civilization (" 加强社会主义精神文明建设 ") which was raised by the conservatives in the Sixth Plenary of the twelfth National Congress of the CCP (September 1986). They were particularly dissatisfied with the political campaign against spiritual pollution in 1983 and the campaign against bourgeois liberalization of The employees of State Owned Enterprises were afraid of losing their secure jobs and benefits from the state authority. 11 And the rural migrants were dissatisfied with the high levels of unemployment in urban areas and the wealth gap. 12 As for the public, they were generally angry with corruption and inflation Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011) p Perry Link, Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament (New York: Norton, 1993) pp Vincent Kolo, Tiananmen 1989: 25 Years Since the Mass Democracy Movement, 2014, website of Chinaworker.info. accessed at: Dingxin Zhao, The power of Tiananmen: State-society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2001) p.124; Andrew Walder, Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989 in The China Quarterly, vol.127, September 1991, pp ; Anita Chan, Revolution or corporatism? Workers and trade unions in post-mao China in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 29, Jananuary1993, pp Suzanne Ogden(ed.), China's search for Democracy: The Student and the Mass Movement of 1989 (London: M.E.Sharpe, 1992) pp.57-59,

231 221 Whatever the individual grievances, Tiananmen was regarded as an anti-ccp and anti-socialist movement by Deng Xiaoping. 14 This event led to a political conflict between Reformists and the Conservatives. Generally, the Reformists believed that political Reform could promote economic development. They believed that the unrest could be reduced peacefully. However, the Conservatives insisted on the sole rule of the CCP and believed the student movement was a kind of Counter- Revolutionary Riot. 15 The outcome of the Tiananmen Crisis showed that the Conservatives received the ultimate triumph in this inner-party struggle. Debate and Consensus in the Leadership of the CCP After the Tiananmen Crisis, there were three major ideas towards the future management of China among the leadership core of the CCP. Deng Liqun ( 邓力群 ) believed that the CCP should impose tighter political control and increase its attention to ideological work. Chen Yun ( 陈云 ) believed the Party should limit economic reform. By contrast, Deng Xiaoping insisted that rapid economic reform remained essential. 16 Although there were differences towards political and economic reform, yet because the event was developed from university students demonstration, the CCP leadership groups agreed that the CCP should tighten political control over universities and increase its attention to ideological work and patriotic education. 17 Emphasis on the Ideological Work of the CCYL After the Tiananmen Event, the Guiding Principle of the CCYL was changed to reflect these goals by the CCP in December The focal point rested on "fighting against bourgeois liberalization"(" 反资产阶级自由化 ") and "Insist on the Four Basic Principles"(" 坚持四项基本原则 "). In addition, Patriotism was raised to increase the 14. 邓小平, 邓小平接见戒严部队军以上干部, 人民日报, 1989 年 10 月 6 日 [Deng Xiaoping, Speech Made While Receiving Cadres of the Martial Law Units in the Capitol at and Above the Army Level, People s Daily, 10th June 1989]. 15. Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, Perry Link, and Orville Schell, The Tiananmen Papers (New York: Public Affairs, 2002) p Tony Saich, Peaceful Evolution with Chinese Characteristics. in Joseph, William (ed.), China briefing (Colorado: Westview Press, 1992) pp Zhao Suisheng, A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post- Tiananmen China, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.31, no.3, 1998, pp

232 222 appeal of Communist ideology. On 21st December 1989, the Central Committee of the CCP published "The Central Committee of the CCP Concerning Strengthening and Improving the Leadership of the Worker Unions, Communist Youth League, and Women s Federation"( 中共中央关于加强和改善党对工会 共青团 妇联工作领导的通知 ) to guide the work of the official Mass Organizations. It pointed out: Because we could not consistently insist on the 'Four Basic Principles', the Bourgeois Liberalization spread all over. (We) must operate the education of insisting on ''Four Basic Principles'', insist on Reform and Openness, and fight against bourgeois liberalization among the workers, youths, and women. (We) must let the public know that there would be no future, the state would have no hope, and the construction we made and the achievement of the Reform would be lost, if we give up the ''Four Basic Principles''. In fighting against bourgeois liberalization and peaceful evolution (from socialism back to capitalism), we should not have the slightest relaxation. At present, (we) should highlight the education of Patriotism, Socialism, Independence, and Hard Work, strengthen the national dignity and confidence in the Socialist path, and carry forward the cause opened up by the pioneers. 18 In this notice, the CCP regarded the former ideological work as insufficient. And this insufficiency mainly pointed to the inadequacy of the indoctrination of the "Four Basic Principles"( 四项基本原则 ), which refers to the historical correctness of the Socialist Path and the rule of CCP. So after promulgating the Notice, the CCYL consciously emphasized the significance of "Thought Education"( 思想教育 ) (i.e. 18. Original words are: 鉴于几年来坚持四项基本原则不够一贯, 资产阶级自由化思潮泛滥, 必须在职工 青年 妇女中深入进行坚持四项基本原则 坚持改革开放 反对资产阶级自由化的教育 要让大家真正懂得背离四项基本原则, 国家没有希望, 已经取得的建设和改革成果也会丧失 ; 同资产阶级自由化的斗争, 同国际反动势力妄图使我国和平演变的斗争, 不能有丝毫放松 当前要突出地抓好爱国主义 社会主义 独立自主 艰苦奋斗的教育, 增强民族自尊心坚定走社会主义道路的信心, 把先辈开创的事业发扬光大., details please see: 中共中央, 中共中央关于加强和改善党对工会 共青团 妇联工作领导的通知 (1989 年 12 月 21 日 ), 摘录自团中央办公厅编, 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCP, The Central Committee of the CCP Concerning Strengthen and Improve the Leadership of the Worker Union, Communist Youth League, and Woman Federation (21st December 1989), The General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Significant Document Since the Third the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2001) pp.11-20].

233 223 Ideological Indoctrination) and raised it to become the central task of the youth league. In response to the call of the CCP, on 17th June 1991, the Central Committee of the CCYL issued its "Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Work of the Youth"( 关于加强青年工作的意见 ) and directed all CCYL committees to intensify and to improve the political education of Chinese Youths. It pointed out that: The Communist Youth League should insist on using Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought to educate the Youth, deeply continue to carry out the education of Patriotism, Collectivism, and Socialism, and should help the Youth to establish the correct outlook on life and on the world. (Then they) will consciously uphold the Four Basic Principles, and persist in the path of Reform and Openness. 19 And at the 13th National Congress of the CCYL (3rd-10th May, 1993)--the first National Congress of the CCYL since the Tiananmen Crisis-- the ideological work was raised to a Central role. In that Congress, as the representative of the CCP, Hu Jintao (then Vice Chairman of the PRC and a member of standing Committee of the CCP), requested that the CCYL fulfill its role in educating Chinese Youth, and develop them to become Socialist successors. He said: The Communist Youth League should consistently insist on the combination of making a contribution and educating Youths. It should persistently strengthen the education of the Basic Line, Patriotism, Collectivism, Socialism, Modern History, Contemporary History, national conditions, and the excellent Chinese cultural tradition among Youths. Currently (the youth league) should emphasize the education of Patriotism, and use the spirit of Patriotism to appeal to Youths, unite them, gather them, and lead them and cultivate them to become the 19. Original words are: 共青团要坚持马列主义 毛泽东思想教育青年, 继续深入开展爱国主义教育 集体主义和社会主义教育, 帮助青年树立正确的人生观和世界观, 自觉坚持四项基本原则, 坚持改革开放, details please see: 共青团中央, 共青团中央关于加强青年工作的意见 (1991 年 6 月 17 日 ), 摘录自团中央办公厅编, 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Work of the Youth (17th June 1991), The General Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of the Significant Document Since the Third the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2001) p.21].

234 224 Socialist Successors. 20 In the speech of Li Keqiang (then Secretary of the CCYL), he concluded that ''Thought Education" was the major principle of the CCYL. And the intention and purpose of the work of the CCYL was to cultivate Socialist Successors. As he said: (The youth league) should insist on giving a vivid and effective Though Education to the Youths. To Cultivate the New Person with Four Virtues 21 is the intent and purpose of the work of the CCYL. 22 Patriotism and Socialism with Chinese Characters Becomes the New Content of Ideological Work Reform and Openness led to a decline in the appeal of Communist ideology, particularly Mao Zedong s Utopian Communist society, and so the new contents of the ideological education of the CCYL became Patriotism and Socialism with Chinese Characters after the Tiananmen Event. As earlier examples have shown, these two subjects were emphasized in every speech of the leaders of the CCP and the CCYL since the Tiananmen Crisis. In Chinese Communist history, Patriotism was a significant theme to attract support from the rank and file. And Deng Xiaoping s socialism with Chinese 20. Original words are: 共青团要始终坚持建功和育人相结合, 坚持不懈地在青少年中加强党的基本路线教育, 爱国主义教育, 集体主义和社会主义教育, 近代史 现代史和国情教育, 中华民族优良思想文化传统教育, 当前要突出爱国主义教育, 用爱国主义精神召唤青年, 团结青年, 凝聚青年, 在实践中引导和培养他们成为社会主义事业接班人, details please see: 胡锦涛, 肩负历史的重任 (1993 年 5 月 3 日 ), 收录于, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 533.[Hu Jintao, Shoulder the Historical Task (3rd May, 1993), collected in Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL(ed.), All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) p.533]. 21. New Person with Four Virtues ( 四有新人 ) means the New Younger who has ideals, morality, knowledge, and discipline ( 有理想 有道德 有文化 有纪律 ). The origin of this requirement of being a new youth is the inscription from Deng Xiaoping to China Youth Newspaper (26th May 1980). In this inscription, Deng Xiaoping hope Chinese Youth can be new Younger with these four virtues; 22. Original words are: 坚持对青年进行生动有效的思想教育 在建设有中国特色社会主义的实践中培养四有新人, 是新时期共青团的出发点和落脚点, details please see: 李克强, 高举建设有中国特色社会主义的伟大旗帜, 团结带领各族青年为加快改革开放和现代化建设而奋斗 李克强在团十三大上的报告, 收录于, 共青团中央青运史档案馆 ( 编 ), 中国共青团历次全国代表大会概览 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2012) 页 537. [Li Keqiang, Uphold the Flag of Socialism with Chinese Characters, Unite the Youths from All Ethnic Groups to Contribute to the Reform and Openness and Modernization(3rd May, 1993, The Report of Li Keqiang in the 13rd National Congress of the CCYL), collected in Central Archive of Chinese Youth Movement of the CCYL(ed.), All Previous National Congress of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2012) p.537].

235 225 characters was the new blueprint of Chinese society. The patriotic education in this period aimed to win support for the CCP s rule, to gather the forces to help the construction of Reform and Openness, and to enrich Deng Xiaoping s theory of Socialism with Chinese characters. As the Working Outline of Patriotic Education ( 爱国主义教育实施纲要 ) issued in 1994 by the Central Committee of the CCP, pointed out: Patriotic education must be guided by the Socialist theory with Chinese characters of Deng Xiaoping and the basic line of the party. It should carry out the education on the basic line of the Party and the achievement of Socialist modernization. The party s basic line and our country s socialist construction achievement is the most realistic and most vivid textbook. (The education) must focus on using the great achievement and successful experience of Reform and Openness and Modernization Construction since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP to strengthen the Socialist belief of the masses, to ensure the basic line of the party remains unshakable. 23 In response, the CCYL initiated a series of activities to carry out this view of political education. For example, since 1994, the CCYL had annually organized a nation-wide Adult Oath Ceremony ( 成人仪式 ). The youth league gathered almost all the 18 year old students to participate in this activity. And within the Oath, Love the Socialist motherland, support the leadership of the CCP was in the central position. 24 In addition, under the theme of Patriotism, the CCYL annually organized a series of commemorative activities to praise and memorialize the successful struggles of the 23. Original words are: 爱国主义教育必须以邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义理论和党的基本路线为指导, 要进行党的基本路线和社会主义现代化建设成就的教育 党的基本路线和我国社会主义建设成就是进行爱国主义教育最现实 最生动的教材 要特别注意运用党的十一届三中全会以来改革开放和现代化建设的巨大成就与成功经验进行教育, 使人民群众进一步坚定社会主义信念, 坚持党的基本路线不动摇, details please see: 中共中央, 爱国主义教育实施纲要, 收录于中共中央文献研究室 ( 编 ), 十四大以来重要文献选编 ( 上 ) ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1996) [The Central Committee of the CCP, The Working Outline of Patriotic Education, collected in Central Research Office of the CCP(ed.), The Document Selection Since the 14th National Congress(vol.1) (Beijing: People s Press, 1996)], website of the CCP, accessed at: com.cn/gb/64184/64186/66685/ html. 24. 共青团中央, 关于规范十八岁成人仪式教育活动的暂行意见 ( 团内文件 )(1996 年 4 月 8 日 )[The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Temporary Suggestion Concerning the Regulation of Educational Activity of 18 Year Old Adult Ceremony (Internal document, 8th April 1996).].

236 226 CCP in modern history, such as: Celebration of May Fourth Recognition ( 五四表 彰 ), Commemorating December Nine Movement ( 纪念一二九运动 ), etc The Case of the CCYL in Universities After the Tiananmen Crisis, the CCYL in universities strengthened its political socialization function. Among other things, recruiting the young and excellent political guide to become the leaders of youth league branches in university was one of the most significant practices. In addition, with greater CCYL experience, increasing numbers of young communists became the successors of leaders of the Communist party in universities, or were transferred to leadership positions in the local CCP committees or local governments. Take some political leaders who enjoyed provincial administrative rank for example. They include: Nuer Baikeli ( 努尔 白克力 ) from Xinjiang University, Erkenjiang Tulahong( 尔肯江 吐拉洪 ) from Xinjiang Finance College, Yu Yuanhui( 余远辉 ) from Guangxi Agriculture College, Zhao Shucong( 赵树丛 ) from Shandong Medical College, Luo Sangjiangcun( 洛桑江村 ) from Tibet University for Nationalities, Chen Xi( 陈希 ) from Qinghua University, Chen Zhenggao( 陈政高 ) from Dalian Maritime College, Xie Zhenhua( 解振华 ) from Qinghua University, Lv Xiwen( 吕锡文 ) from Beijing Industrial University, Li Qun( 李群 ) from Shandong University, Li Kang( 李康 ) from Guangxi Collage for Nationalities, and Zeng Wei ( 曾维 ) from Liaoning Normal University. 25 These political leaders had a similar career development trajectory. All of them were political guides at University in their early career. And then they were recruited to work into the youth league branches in university. After holding the position of the Secretary or Vice Secretary of the Youth League Committee in University, they were transferred to leadership positions in the University, the local CCP committees, local governments, or other public institutions. 25. Sources from Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision).

237 227 The System of Political Guide in Universities In Chinese universities, the Political Guide is a term for political cadres who are specialized in organizing Political Education and management. The origin of this system is the position of Political commissar in the Red Army and Political Instructor in the Red Army University. 26 Since its establishment, it served the purpose of Political education and management of Chinese university students. After the Tiananmen Event, it was developed to become a fulltime and professional position which shared the rank of teacher in a University. The Political Guide was a specific member of the university staff who organized political and ideological education in that university. On 13 th February 1993, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council of the PRC issued the The Outline of Chinese Education Reform and Development ( 中国教育改革和发展纲要 ). And the 29 th point of the Outline clearly claimed to build up the professionalism of Political Guides. 27 On 13 th August, the CCP issued its Several Suggestions Concerning Strengthening and Improving the Party Construction and Political Ideological Work in Universities ( 关于新形势下加强和改进高等学校党的建设和思想政治工作的若干意见 ). This proposal aimed to build up Red and Professional political cadre team and required by Local Party Committees to adopt specific policies to train and select Political Guides. 28 On 31 st August 1994, the Central Committee of the CCP published its Several Suggestions Concerning Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Moral Education in Schools ( 关于进一步加强和改进学校德育工作若干意见 ) which 26. 张立兴, 高校辅导员制度的沿革进程考察, 思想理论教育导刊, 2009 年第 4 期, 页 117 [Zhang Lixing, The Research of the Development of the Political Guide of University or College, in the Journal of Ideological and Theoretical Education, vol.4, 2009, p.117]. 27. 中共中央, 国务院, 中国教育改革和发展纲要 (1993 年 2 月 13 日 ), [The Central Committee of the CCP, State Council of the PRC, The Outline of Chinese Education Reform and Development (13th February 1993)], website of Ministry of Education of PRC, accessed at: 中共中央, 关于新形势下加强和改进高等学校党的建设和思想政治工作的若干意见 (1993 年 8 月 13 日 ) (( 教政 [1993]4 号 )), 收录于教育部档案馆 [The Central Committee of the CCP, Several Suggestions Concerning Strengthening and Improving the Party Construction and Political Ideological Work in Universities (13th August 1993), in the Archives of Ministry of Education(File no: Education Policy 1993, no Fouth)].

238 228 suggested increasingly raising the salary and working conditions of Political Guides. 29 Along with the development of the Political Guide system in universities, the quality of the Political Guide was greatly improved. It was specifically reflected in the educational level of the Political Guide. Increasingly numbers of political guides had master degrees. 30 As a reward, the best of them became leaders of the CCYL in Universities. On 29 th September 1999, the Central Committee of the CCP issued Several Suggestions Concerning Strengthening and Improving Political Ideological Work ( 关于加强和改进思想政治工作的若干意见 ). The Suggestion required selecting young cadres to join the political and ideological work: (The party) should select a batch of young cadres who combine ability with political integrity to join this team (of political guides). To these ideological and political cadres, (the party) should pay attention to care and train them, and help them to raise their ideological and political quality and professional capacity. To those who have outstanding achievements, (the party) should give commendations and rewards. 31 And in practical work, one of the most significant rewards to these political guides is to appoint them to become the leaders of the youth league committees in universities or colleges. 32 The CCYL system in Chinese Universities In China, the University and the cadres in universities have a specific administrative rank in China s political system. Although the administrative rank of 29. 中共中央, 关于进一步加强和改进学校德育工作若干意见 (1994 年 8 月 31 日 ) [The Central Committee of the CCP, Several Suggestions Concerning Further Strengthening and Improving the Work of Moral Education in Schools (31st August 1994)], website of Ministry of Education of PRC), accessed at: Interview with officer Sun Maomin in the Ministry of Education. 31. Original words are: 要选拔一批德才兼备的中青年干部, 充实到这支队伍中来 对思想政治工作者要注意关心和培养, 帮助他们提高思想政治素质和业务能力, 对做出突出成绩的要给予表彰和奖励, details please see: 中共中央, 关于加强和改进思想政治工作的若干意见 (1999 年 9 月 29 日 ) [The Central Committee of the CCP, Several Suggestions Concerning Strengthening and Improving Political Ideological Work (29th September 1999)], website of the CCP, accessed at: Interview with Guo Jian(Vice-Secretary of communist party committee in Hebei Industrial University) ;

239 229 different universities is different (most universities enjoy the municipal level and a few of the most famous universities enjoy vice-provincial Level), yet it does not have any influence on the administrative rank of the youth league branches in their universities. Most youth league university committees enjoy the county level administrative rank, and youth league college committees enjoy the township level administrative rank. Generally, there are four levels of CCYL committees/branches constituting the CCYL system in universities. From top to bottom, the Leadership bodies are: the Youth League University Committee, the Youth League College Committee, the Youth League General Branch, and the Youth League Branch. They point to a different scope of members. Specially, the Youth League University Committee is the leading organ of all the CCYL members of a university. The Youth League College Committee is the leading organ of the CCYL members of a specific college. When it comes to the Youth League General Branch, it is constituted by a grade of students within the college. And the Youth League Branch is constituted by the students of one class. In terms of the hierarchy of the CCYL University system, as Figure7-1 the Structure of the CCYL in Universities shows, the same as the CCP College Committee, the Youth League University Committee is led by the CCP University Committee and enjoys the County level Administrative rank. That is to say, the Secretary of the CCP College Committee shares the same rank as the Secretary of the CCYL University Committee, and so on down the hierarchy. When it comes to the composition of the CCYL Cadres Team, the cadre position of the CCYL committee contains the Secretary, vice-secretary, Head of the Functional Department, and Vice Head of the Functional Department. However, not all of the Cadre positions are taken by fulltime university staff. Most of them were occupied by enrolled student in part-time positions.

240 230 Figure7-1 the Structure of the CCYL in Universities 33 (I) (II) The difference between the staff and the students is that only the staff is in the cadre s team of the University who can enjoy an administrative rank and receive a salary from the University. And for the students, the experience of being CCYL cadres both an honour and a special training. They are the subject of ideological education and political socialization. And they also contribute to the work of ideological and political education in the University. Their CCYL cadre identity will be cancelled when the term ends (normally one year) or when they graduate. So in this thesis, the CCYL Cadre in Chinese universities specifically points to staff who hold these positions. In a university, only fulltime working staff can enjoy an administrative rank. As Figure 7-2 CCYL Cadres Position in Universities shows, the positions which are held by fulltime staff mainly include: the Secretary, Vice Secretary, Head and vice head of department of the Youth League University Committee, and the Secretary, and Vice Secretary of the Youth League College. From the angle of administrative rank, it mainly points to the positions which enjoy an administrative rank from vice township level to County Level. 33. This figure is made by the author. Source from the interview with officials in Ministry of Education and School Department of Central Committee of the CCYL.

241 231 Figure 7-2 CCYL Cadres Position in Universities 34 Level Position Administrative rank(if the position is held by staff) Secretary Vice Head of Vice Head of Secretary Vice Head of Vice Head of Secretary Department Department Secretary Department Department University Staff Staff or Staff or Staff or County Vice township Vice township Committee Student Student Student Level County level level Level College Staff Staff or Student township Vice Committee Student level township level General Student Student Student Branch Class Student Student Student Branch Main Source of CCYL Secretaries in University: the Political Guide System The Political Guide system and the CCYL University system are two independent systems but share the same organizational purpose. That is to undertake Ideological Education and Political Socialization of Chinese students. In the period of Jiang Zemin (especially in the post-tiananmen period), the political and ideological work was raised to the central position of these branches. And the best Political Guides were recruited into the youth league in university and contributed to the youth league work on political and ideological education. 35 Meanwhile, relying on the leadership development function of the CCYL, the political guides received the opportunity to be recommended to become leadership candidates of the CCP, government or university. As introduced above, the fulltime Political Guide belongs to the university staff, and is part of the teachers team of the University. The CCYL is the mass organization which is made up of youths (students and young staff). Before the Tiananmen Event, the Secretary of the CCYL in university did not have to be a Political Guide in the university. Take Li Keqiang ( 李克强 ) for example; before holding the position of the 34. This figure is made by the author. The information of the cadres position of the CCYL University system is from the interviews with the 120 administrative cadres (with the administrative rank over Vice County Level) from 100 universities of China. 35. Interview with the official of the School Department of Central Committee of the CCYL.

242 232 Secretary of the Youth League Beijing University Committee, Li was a graduate of the Law School of Beijing University. According to the position of the Youth League Beijing University Committee, Li was chosen to work in the Central Committee of the CCYL. And after 16 years' working in the CCYL system ( ), Li became the Governor of Hunan Province. But since the 1990s, there are few cases where the Secretary of the CCYL was not from the Political Guide system. The leaders of the CCYL University can be divided into two parts. One is the cadre who wants to leave the university; the other is the cadre who is willing to stay in the university. When CCYL leaders reach the administrative rank of Vice County Level or County Level, they are qualified to be sent to become the leaders of local government, Communist Party Committee, or state-owned Enterprise. 36 To those who did not want to leave the university, they were sent to hold the position of secretary of the Party committee of a school or college, or the head of a university Department (such as: the Student Affairs Department, Personnel Department, or Propaganda Department). With the age advantage and the working experience of the CCYL, they were also regarded as the successors of party leaders of the university. 7.2 Cross-Century Projects and the Youth Department Role of the CCYL The CCYL in the period of Jiang Zemin fulfilled the role of youth department of the government and provided public services for the youths. To be specific, installing Market Economics in the Socialist political system was the most significant task of this period. To identify its role in this historical mission, in the second Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the CCYL (December 1993), the Central Committee approved "The Roadmap of Our Country Youth Work in the Process of Building Socialist Market Economics"( 在建立社会主义市场经济体制进程中我国青年工作战略发展规划 ). The Roadmap explicitly pointed out that the general purpose of the CCYL was to cultivate masses of Successor of Socialist careers. To achieve this general purpose, the CCYL should respond to the youth affairs from the Government and intensively organize the Cross-Century Youth Civilization Project ( 跨世纪青年文明工程 ) and 36. PRC, Term 64 of Civil Servant Law of the PRC (27th April 2005), website of the Chinese Government, accessed at:

243 233 the Cross-Century Youth Talent Project ( 跨世纪青年人才工程 ). 37 The former focused on providing public services, and the latter concentrated on young talent cultivation in different areas Cross-Century Youth Civilization Project and Public Service The Cross-Century Youth Civilization Project was a comprehensive project which aimed to motivate Chinese youths to devote themselves to Socialist construction. It had three aspects. They were Youth Volunteer ( 青年志愿者 ) for providing volunteer service to the public; Youth Civilization ( 青年文明号 ) for advocating that young staff in the public sector should provide satisfying administrative service to the rank and file; and the Youth Cultural Zone ( 青年文化园 ) for providing cultural products to the youth. Youth volunteer and Volunteer service In the Youth Volunteer aspects, the CCYL cultivated the idea that youth should positively dedicate themselves to society. It organized its members to provide public services. These included social security, rescue and relief work, environmental protection, rights protection, cultural education, and community service. From 1993 to 1998, the CCYL organized over 70 million youths to participate in such volunteer services, set up 1.3 million volunteer teams to provide social services to the elderly and the disabled, and sent millions of university students to rural areas to provide cultural and scientific education and medical support. 38 For example, in December 1993, the Central Committee of the CCYL and the National Railway Youth League Committee jointly organized about young railway staff to provide volunteer service along the railway between Beijing and 37. 共青团中央, 在建立社会主义市场经济体制进程中我国青年工作战略发展规划, 收录于共青团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Roadmap of Our Country Youth Work in the Process of Building Socialist Market Economic, collected in Central Office of the CCYL(ed.), The Significant Document Collection Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) pp ]. 38. 周强, 周强在中国共产主义青年团第十四次全国代表大会上的报告, 中国青年报, 1998 年 6 月 29 日, 1-2 版 [Zhou Qiang, The Report of Zhou Qiang in the 14th National Congress of the CCYL, China Youth Newspaper, 29th June 1998, pp.1-2].

244 234 Shenzhen. In March 1994, the CCYL organized over 10 million youth league members to join the Learning from Leifeng Activity ( 学雷锋活动 ) which provided community service to the citizens, participated in forest planting, environment protection, and historical heritage preservation. 39 On the basis of these volunteer practices, the CCYL further established the Chinese Young Volunteers Association ( 中国青年志愿者协会, CYVA)on 5th December 1994 to regularly promote volunteer work in China. One of the Secretaries of the secretariat in the CCYL held the presidency of the CYVA, and it was led and supervised by the Central Committee of the CCYL. 40 During the Youth Volunteer movement, the CCYL played the role of the youth department of the government. At first, it organized the volunteer activities to cultivate a positive social atmosphere for volunteer services. And then it set up a nonprofit organization to regularly promote volunteer careers. It became the government management department to supervise the work of the CYVA. Youth Civilization and Public Service The Youth Civilization movement was practically the activity within the public sectors, such as: Party, Government, State Owned Enterprises, and Public Institutions. Its purpose was to educate all young staff in the Public sector with professionalism and entrepreneurship, and to motivate them to become model workers to provide satisfying public service to the rank and file. And at the end of this project, a certain numbers of the best Youths and CCYL local Branches were rewarded as Excellent Youths and "Youth Civilization Unit", respectively. 41 The meritorious deeds of the Award Winners were reported in the Public Media 39. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 350 [Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p. 350]. 40. CYVA, Introduction of the Chinese Young volunteers, official website of CYVA, accessed at: 共青团中央, 关于在全国开展创建 青年文明号 活动的意见 1994 年 2 月 5 日 ), 收录在团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 279 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion Concerning Operate the Youth Civilization Project National wide (5th February 1994), collected in the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of Significant Document of the CCYL Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) p ].

245 235 and the winner was designated a role model. These rewards can be regarded as the credit for future promotion by the organizational Department of the CCP at all levels. Over 50 million youths, who were from about 20 provincial-rank party/government departments and were from 32 industries, participated in this project. And over 1628 CCYL Branches were awarded national level "Youth Civilization Unit, over 8000 provincial level "Youth Civilization Units, and 30,000 municipal level Youth Civilization Units". 42 As the extension of CCYL policy in SOE, the CCYL also focused on the Re- Employment of Laid-off Workers. In 1998, the CCYL published "The Notice Concerning Operating the 'Entrepreneurial activity of Laid-off Youths'"( 关于开展 下岗青工创业行动 的通知 ). It aimed to re-employ laid-off young workers. It further aimed to cultivate a certain number of leaders of new small businesses. Indeed, from 1998 to 2002, the CCYL planned to cultivate and train 10,000 leaders of new businesses, and helped 3 million young laid-off workers to regain employment after a series of training workshops. 43 Youth Cultural Zone and Cultural service The CCYL in the Youth Cultural Zone Project played the role of propaganda department of the party/government. Rooted in patriotism, socialism, and traditional Chinese Culture, the CCYL selected and rewarded excellent cultural works and recommended them to young people, and cooperated with local government and party committees to organize different kinds of cultural activities in the university, enterprise, urban community, and rural villages. The Youth Cultural Zone started in February 1994 and aimed to enrich the cultural life of the youths, to operate political and ideological education through 42. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 353[Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p. 353]. 43. 共青团中央, 关于开展 下岗青工创业行动 的通知 (1998 年 3 月 20 日 ), 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Notice Concerning Operating the 'Entrepreneurial Activity of Laid-off Youths' (20th March, 1998), collected in the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of Significant Document of the CCYL Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) p ].

246 236 cultural influence. From 1994 to 1998, the CCYL organized a series of activities, such as The Youth Favorite Book, Song, and Movie Selection ( 青年喜爱的书 歌 电影评选 ), Chinese Youth Cultural Work Exhibition ( 中国青年文化精品展 ) and Youth Cultural Pilgrimage ( 青年文化巡礼 ) Cross-Century Youth Talent Project and Human Resource Development The Cross-Century Youth Talent Project embodied the role of the CCYL as the personnel department of the Government/Party contributing to human resource development. It was an integrated human resource development project under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping s pronouncement Science and technology is the first productive force. It aimed to encourage and to train a generation of youths with high science and cultural quality in practical production and management. The young talents which were specifically cultivated and selected in this project included: skillful workers or new-type peasants (who can contribute to modern agriculture), scientific and technological researchers, and business-management talents. They were capable of facing the 21th century and building socialist market economics. In addition, this project also contributed to the popularization of science and technology, particularly among Children and Teenagers. The long-term goal of this project was, among Chinese youths, to cultivate a wave of learning new technology and knowledge. The New Historical Mission of the CCYL: Human Resource Development The Cross-Century Youth Talent Project reflected the human resource development function of the CCYL. To be specific, soon after the Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping, the CCYL convened its 13 th National Congress in May In this congress, the human resource development function of the CCYL was emphasized. In enlarging the Constitution of the CCYL, cultivating successors and the talent for the CCP and the country was listed among the missions of the CCYL. As the new Constitution pointed out: 44. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 354 [Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) p. 354].

247 237 In the great practices of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics, (The CCYL) should generate the successors with ideals, morality, knowledge, and discipline, sending new blood to the party, and cultivating talent for the country. 45 This function was also expected by the CCP under the leadership of Jiang Zemin. As the mouthpiece of the CCP The People s Daily pointed out in its editorial: The nature of shouldering the glorious historical mission (of the CCYL) was to use Deng Xiaoping s theory of Socialism with Chinese characteristics to equip the youth, and to cultivate and to generate hundreds of thousands of successors for a Socialist career. 46 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th National Congress of the CCYL (15-17 November 1995) issued the Implementation Outline Concerning the Cross-Century Youth Talent Project ( 跨世纪青年人才工程实施纲要 ) to specifically indicate the purpose of this project was: To generate hundreds of thousands of skillful workers of business and rural bellwethers to become rich, to recommend over ten thousand excellent young talents, to build up a vast talent reserve, to lead masses of youths to grow up to be socialist citizens with ideals, morality, knowledge, and discipline, and to create a cross-century talented troop which can bear heavy responsibilities Original words are: 在建设有中国特色的社会主义的伟大实践中, 造就有理想 有道德 有文化 有纪律的接班人, 努力为党输送新鲜血液, 为国家培养人才, details please see: 共青团, 中国共产主义青年团团章 (1993 年 5 月 10 日通过 ), 中国青年报, 1993 年 5 月 13 日, 第一版 [CCYL, The Constitution of the CCYL(Approved on 10th May 1993), China Youth Newspaper, 13th May 1993, p.1]. 46. Original words are: 肩负起光荣的历史使命, 最根本的就是要用邓小平同志建设有中国特色社会主义理论武装起来, 努力培养和造就千百万社会主义事业的接班人, details please see: 人民日报, 当代青年的历史使命 祝贺中国共产主义青年团第十三次全国代表大会召开, 人民日报, 1993 年 5 月 3 日第一版 [People s Daily, The Historical Mission of Contemporary Youth Congratulations to the Convening of the 13th National Congress of the CCYL, People s Daily, 3rd May 1993, p.1]. 47. Original words are: 培养数以千万计的企业青年岗位能手和农村青年致富带头人, 举荐数以万计的优秀青年人才, 建设宏大的跨世纪人才后备队伍, 引导广大青少年健康成长为有理想 有道德 有文化 有纪律的社会主义公民, 造就一支堪当重任的跨世纪青年人才大军, details please see: 共青团, 跨世纪青年人才工程实施纲要, 收录于团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, Implementation Outline Concerning the Cross-Century Youth Talent Project (17th November, 1995), collected in the General Office of the Central Committee of the

248 238 It reflected the role of the CCYL as the Youth department which responded to the challenge of human resource development for a socialist career. The Practices of the CCYL in Human Resource Development From training the front line of workers and peasants, recommending excellent researchers and managers to the party and government, to raising the comprehensive quality of the children and teenagers, from three aspects, the CCYL fulfilled its role of youth department in terms of the human resource development. In the aspect of training workers and peasants, the CCYL organized Skill Workers Activity ( 青年岗位能手活动 ) and Spark Leaders Program ( 星火带头人 ) in State Owned Enterprise and in rural areas. From 1995 to 2000, in the nation-wide State Owned Enterprises, the Skill Worker Activity provided different kinds of technical training for over 20 million workers and assisted them to upgrade, on average, 2 to 3 technical grades. 48 And in rural areas, the Spark Leaders Program ( 星火带头人 ) invited agricultural specialists from universities and research institutions to give training courses to young peasants. Over one million peasants learned practical agricultural techniques from these courses. In addition, the Spark Leaders Program ( 星火带头人 ) attracted the support of banks and agricultural departments of local governments. To help the peasants to overcome poverty and to achieve prosperity, this program also provided the trained peasants with financial support and supply and demand information about agricultural products. 49 As for the scientific, technological and business circles, the CCYL operated a series of campaigns to discover and select excellent researchers and managers among CCYL(ed.), The Collection of Significant Document of the CCYL Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001)pp ]. 48. 中国共青团, 青年岗位能手活动 [CCYL, Skill Worker Activity ], website of the CCP, accessed at: 巴音朝鲁 ( 团中央书记处书记 ), 大力培养农村跨世纪青年人才, 中国农业科技,1995 年 2 期, 页 1 [Ba Yinchaolu(Secretary of the then CCYL), Devote Major Effort to Cultivate Cross Century Young Talent of Rural Area, China Rural Science and Technology, vol.2, 1995, p.1]; 中国共青团, 跨世纪青年人才工程 全国培养青年星火带头人活动 [CCYL, Cross- Century Youth Talent Project: Nationwide Cultivate Spark Leader Program ] website of People, accessed at:

249 239 youths, such as Young Scientists ( 青年科学家 ), Youth Science and Technology Model ( 青年科技标兵 ), Excellent Young Entrepreneurs ( 优秀青年企业家 ). 50 And then, the youth league recommended them to corresponding research institutions, companies, and other significant positions in Party/Government projects. Up to 1998, over ten thousand young talents were recommended by the Cross-Century Youth Talent Project of the CCYL. 51 In addition, the youth league earned the support of local government to build up Youth Science and Technology Parks ( 青年高科技园区 ) to encourage innovation and the development of new market products. The first Chinese Youth Science and Technology Park was built in Hebei Province Economic and Technological Development Zone in July In regard to raising the comprehensive quality of Chinese children and teenagers, the CCYL led the Young Pioneers to organize the Chinese Juvenile Little Eagle Action ( 中国少年雏鹰行动 ) which contained Five Independence Activity ( 五自 学习实践活动 ) for cultivating juveniles independent consciousness and ability, Hand in Hand Activity ( 手拉手 互助活动 ) for teaching them collaboration and fraternity, and Venus Technological Activity ( 启明星 科技活动 ) for encouraging the creative thinking of the Children The Reform of the Personnel System of China and the Leadership Development Arrangement Role of the CCYL Since 1993, the Reform of the Personnel System has been formally promoted in the PRC. The practical operator of this Reform was the former First Secretary of the CCYL --Song Defu, who held the position of the Minister of Personnel from 1993 to 50. 中国共青团, 跨世纪青年人才的主要内容, 中国青年, 1994 年 4 期, 页 56 [CCYL, Main Content of the Cross Century Young Talent Project, China Youth, vol.4, 1994, p.56]. 51. 中国共青团, 大潮中亮出青春的旗 建立社会主义市场经济体制进程中的中国共青团, 人民日报, 1998 年 12 月 26 日, 6 版 [CCYL, Show the Flag of Youth in the High Tide: The CCYL in the Process of Building Socialist Market Economic, People s Daily, 26th December 1998, p.6]. 52. 中国共青团, 中国青年科技园创办, 神州学人, 1994 年第八期, 页 33[CCYL, The Establishment of Chinese Youth Science and Technology Park in China Scholars Aboard, vol.8, 1994, p33]. 53. 李玉琦, 中国共青团史稿 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2010) 页 [Li Yuqi, the History of the CCYL (Beijing: Chinese Youth Press, 2010) pp ].

250 The Reform of the Personnel System aimed to reform the existing personnel system to better service the development of Market economics. Generally, building up the Modern Public Servant System ( 现代公务员制度 ) and reforming Public Institutions( 事业单位 )were its two major parts. 54 The CCYL on one hand participated in the cadre management of the organization department of the CCP; on the other hand, it further merged itself into the Party Cadre system thorough promoting the position of CCYL cadres to become an integral part of CCP cadres. As Zhou Qiang pointed out in the 14 th National Congress of the CCYL: (The CCYL) should implement the Principles of Four Modernization of Cadre and emphasis on political integrity and professional competence, assist the organizational department of the CCP to appoint CCYL cadres. (We should put) emphasis on enlarging the transferring channel of CCYL cadres. The working position of CCYL is the learning position, practicing position, and devotional position. The CCYL cadre is a significant part of CCP cadre team. 55 And so on the basis of the age advantage in the Modern Public Servant System and the benefits from reforming the Public Institutions, the CCYL shaped its role to be the leadership development arrangement for the Party and Government The Public Servant System and Age Advantage of the CCYL The Public Servant System Since the Temporary Regulation of the Public Servant Law ( 国家公务员暂 行条例 )issued on 14th August 1993, China formally introduced the Modern Public 54. 宋德福, 八年人事制度改革行 ( 北京 : 中国人事出版社, 2005) 页 1 [Song Defu, The Memory of Eight Years Reform of Personnel System (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 2005) p.1]. 55. Original words are: 贯彻干部 四化 方针和德才兼备的原则, 协助党委组织部门, 配备好团的干部 努力拓宽团干部输送渠道. 团的工作岗位是学习的岗位, 锻炼的岗位, 奉献的岗位. 共青团干部是党的干部队伍的组成部分, details please see: 周强, 在邓小平理论指引下团结带领各族青年为实现党的跨世纪宏伟目标而奋斗 周强在中国共产主义青年团第十四次全国代表大会上的报告, 中国青年报, 1998 年 6 月 29 日第 1,2 版 [Zhou Qiang, Under the Guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, Unite the Youths from All Ethnic Groups to Fight for Cross Century Grand Purpose of the Party The Speech of Zhou Qiang in the 14th National Congress of the CCYL, China Youth Newspaper, 29th June 1998, pp.1-2].

251 241 Servant System into its Personnel Management. The Regulation had 18 chapters and 88 terms which strictly regulated the management (Entrance, Management, and Exit) of public servants from entering the service to Retirement. In term of entry, the focus of this Regulation rests on Exams or Assessments ( 逢进必考 ). To some extent, it not only assured the opportunity of all social classes to enter the Chinese political stage, but also guaranteed quality. The Retirement System, established in the Period of Deng Xiaoping, was consolidated. In addition, it equipped the Managers of Public Servants with the options of "Resign and Dismiss". It greatly benefited the renewal of the Public Servant System. 56 Such as, in the Temporary Regulation of the Public Servant Law, chapter 14 listed five resign and dismiss cadre situations, when the cadre became incapable of fulfilling his duties. Chapter 15 specifically regulated the retirement age of civil servants. For males it is 60; for females In terms of Management, the "staged career development" was the most significant characteristic. It shaped the hierarchy of the Chinese public servant system and sets up strict step by step processes on each promotion of a cadre. The Regulation divided the whole public servant system into fifteen levels and divided the positions of public servants into twelve ranks. The Political Level refers to the Wages and Welfare of the cadre; the position ranks pointed to the position level. For example, the State President and the Prime Minister are the power core of State Council of PRC, so their position rank is Rank I, and they enjoyed the highest wages and welfare in China, so the administrative Level also belongs to Level 1. And the position rank of vice-premier and State Councilor belongs to II, and their administrative level is from Level 2 to 3. And so on (details please see Figure 7-3 The Position and Administrative Rank of Chinese Political Servant System in Appendix). 56. 宋德福, 八年人事制度改革行 ( 北京 : 中国人事出版社, 2005) 页 8 [Song Defu, The Memory of Eight Years Reform of Personnel System (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 2005) p.8]. 57. 国务院, 国家公务员暂行条例 收录于法制出版社 ( 编 ), 国家公务员条例配套规定 ( 北京 : 法制出版社, 2004) 页 [The State Council of the PRC, Temporary Regulation of the Public Servant Law, in Law Press(ed.), Matched Regulation of the Temporary Regulation of the Public Servant Law (Beijing: Law Press, 2004) pp.10-11].

252 242 The Promotion of Ordinary Public Servants When it comes to the promotion of cadres, the Regulation explicitly stipulated the rules, the qualifications and the procedure. As the Regulation pointed out: Term 39, promoting the position of Public Servant must be operated within the quota of positions which was approved by the Country. Term 40, promoting the position of Public Servant, (the candidate) should satisfy all the corresponding qualifications; generally, promoting to the higher level leadership positions, (the candidate) should have two or more job experiences at the lower level position. Term 41, the promotion of Position of Public Servant should be processed under the following procedures. Firstly, adopt the approach of combining the opinion of leader and mass to select the candidate. Secondly, operate the qualification inspection on the basis of the requirements of the position. Thirdly, operate the promotion assessment on the basis of annual evaluation. Fourthly, through collective discussion, the leadership team makes the decision. 58 Firstly, the promotion in the Public Servant System operates only in certain numbers of leadership positions. The number of these positions is limited. That is to say, not all the cadres who satisfy the requirements can be promoted. In practice, promotion only happens when there is a vacancy in some leadership position. Secondly, two or more job experiences at a lower level position is one of the common requirements for all candidates. So before being promoted into the next level leadership position, the cadre should spend a certain period working in his or her current level. From this condition we can also appreciate the focus on job experience. 58. Original words are: 第三十九条晋升国家公务员的职务, 必须在国家核定的职数限额内进行, 第四十条国家公务员晋升职务, 应当具备拟任职务所要求的资格条件 ; 其中拟晋升上一级领导职务的, 一般应当具有在下一级两个以上职位任职的经历, 第四十一条国家公务员的职务晋升, 按照以下程序进行 : ( 一 ) 采取领导与群众相结合的办法产生预选对象 ; ( 二 ) 按照拟任职务所要求的条件进行资格审查 ; ( 三 ) 在年度考核的基础上进行晋升考核 ; ( 四 ) 由任免机关领导集体讨论决定人选, details please see: 国务院, 国家公务员暂行条例 (1993 年 8 月 14) ( 北京 : 中国法制出版社, 2004)[The State Council of PRC, Temporary Regulation Public Servant Law(14th August 1993)(Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, 2004)].

253 243 Thirdly, promotion assessment is on the basis of an annual evaluation. This condition further proves that it takes a certain amount of time for a cadre to be promoted to a higher level leadership position. Normally, (please see: Figure 7-4 the Promotion Period from Section Member 科员 to Subministry Department Chief 正厅 ) under the ideal conditions, if a cadre wants to be promoted from a common Level XI: the Section Member to Level V: the Subministry Department Chief, it may take him or her at least 25 years. Guo Gengmao ( 郭庚茂, Secretary of Henan Communist Party, a Provincial leader of the CCP with fast promotion but without CCYL working experience) was born in 1950, and reached the provincial level leadership position. At 34, he reached the county level and stayed there for 10 years. After 1991, he was quickly promoted and reached the level of Subministry Department Chief at 44. And in 2007 he was further promoted to become the Governor of Hebei Province and reached the level of Provincial Level Leader. Reviewing his career, Guo spent 25 years to reach the level of Subministry Department Chief and spent over 30 years to be promoted from clerk to provincial leader. The Figure 7-4 The Promotion Period from Section Member ( 科员 ) to Subministry Department Chief( 正厅 ) 59 Under the Ideal Condition 59. The figure is made on the basis of Regulation of Public servant, details please see: 国务院, 国家公务员暂行条例 (1993 年 8 月 14)( 北京 : 中国法制出版社, 2004)[The State Council of PRC, Temporary Regulation Public Servant Law(14th August 1993)(Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, 2004)].

254 244 Age Advantage of the CCYL Cadre in Public Servant System The CCYL, as the Reserve of the CCP, enjoys an unapproachable Age Advantage in cadre promotion. The CCYL is the only institutional arrangement for assisting the cadre to reach higher position ranks at a younger Age. And this arrangement has been approved by the leadership core of the CCP. As Hu Jintao pointed out: (The CCYL) should strengthen the cultivation of young cadres, and allow more young cadres to become mature as soon as possible. (In terms of cadre promotion, the youth league) should overcome the seniority-based old thinking, should follow the Principles of Four Modernization of Cadre and emphasize political integrity and professional competence, select and promote young cadres, and provide an organizational guarantee to the succession of the party s career. 60 As the Figure 7-5 the Expected Promotion Age, the Normal Cadre Ceiling Age, and the CCYL Cadre Ceiling Age shows, there are three kinds of age indexes: the Expected Promotion Age, the Ceiling Age (Normal Cadre), and the CCYL Cadre Ceiling Age. The Expected Promotion Age is made on the basic of the Temporary Regulation of the Tenure of the Party or Political Leadership Position ( 党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定 ). The Regulation requires that: one tenure of leadership position is about five years ( 党政领导职务每个任期 5 年 ) and unless there is a special situation, normally the leader should fulfil the duty of one tenure ( 除非有特殊情况, 应当任满一届 ). So if we assume a cadre reaches the leadership position of Section Deputy Chief (Rank X) at 30 and during the following period, he was promoted every five years, his age and corresponding level will be as the Expected Promotion Age shows. He will become a Section Chief at 35, Division Deputy Chief at 40, and so on. 60. Original words are: 加强对青年干部的培养, 使更多的青年干部尽快成长起来 要克服论资排辈 求全责备的陈旧观念, 按照干部队伍 四化 方针和德才兼备的原则, 大力选拔优秀年轻干部, 为党的事业继往开来提供组织保证, details please see: 胡锦涛, 肩负起历史的重任 胡锦涛在共青团第十三次全国代表大会上的祝词, 人民日报,1993 年 5 月 4 日, 第一版 [Hu Jintao, Shoulder the Historical Task the Speech of Hu Jintao in the 13th National Congress of the CCYL, People s Daily, 4th May 1993, p.1 ].

255 245 After reaching the position of National Level Leader (Rank I), he will be over 75 of age. The Ceiling Age points to the age limit for a cadre to be promoted to another higher position rank. 61 Specifically, after implementing the Four Modernization of Cadre Policy (especially the criterion of younger age ), the CCP and Government at all levels set up Maximum Age Limits respectively. But according to the investigation of The Special Research Team of People's Tribune, all the age limits and their corresponding Position Ranks are discovered as the Ceiling Age shows. For example, 67 years old is the age limit for being promoted to National level leaders; 63 for provincial leader; 55 for the Subministry Department Chief; 50 for Division Chief; and 40 for Section Chief. When it comes to the Ceiling Age of the CCYL, we find that the CCYL enjoys a great advantage in the Chinese political system. To be specific, on 29th August 1982, the Central Organization of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCYL jointly published "The Suggestion of the Age of CCYL Leaders at All levels"( 关于各级团委领导干部年龄问题的意见 ). This means that when the CCYL leaders of all levels reach their corresponding age, he/she has to be transferred to another equivalent administrative rank leadership position in the Party, Government, SOE, or other Public Institution. In the CCYL system, the Highest Position rank is Provincial Leader, referring to the First Secretary of the CCYL. And the other Secretary of the CCYL enjoys the Position Rank of vice Provincial Leader. Both of them have the same Ceiling Age: 45 years. And by this analogy, the Secretary and Vice Secretary of the Provincial Youth League Committee enjoy the Position Rank of Subministry Department Chief and Subministry Department vice Chief, and their Ceiling Ages are 40 and 38, respectively. 61. 人民论坛 杂志专题调研组, 干部成长 天花板 现象调查 : 困局原因何在?, 人民日报, 2009 年 12 月 17 日 [The Special Research Team of People's Tribune, The Investigation of Cadre Ceiling Phenomenon: What is the origin?, People s Daily, 17th December 2009].

256 246 Figure 7-5 the Expected Promotion Age, the Normal Cadre Ceiling Age, and the CCYL Cadre Ceiling Age X IX VII VI V V IV III II I The Expected Age The Ceiling Age of Ordinary Cadre The Ceiling Age in CCYL System Let us take the first Secretaries of the CCYL from 1978 to 2002, for example. We see that they reached the Rank of Provincial Leader at a comparatively early age. The age of being first Secretary of the CCYL in the period of Jiang Zemin was a little younger than in the period of Deng Xiaoping. Specifically, Han Ying ( 韩英 ) was 43, Wang Zhaoguo ( 王兆国 ) was 41, Hu Jintao ( 胡锦涛 ) was 42, Song Defu ( 宋德福 ) was 39, Li Keqiang ( 李克强 ) was 38, Zhou Qiang ( 周强 ) was Among these leaders, Han Ying, Wang Zhaoguo, and Hu Jintao were in the period of Deng Xiaoping. And they reached the Rank of Provincial Leader in their early 40s. 62. The Source of this figure is from: 国务院, 国家公务员暂行条例 (1993 年 8 月 14)( 北京 : 中国法制出版社, 2004)[The State Council of PRC, Temporary Regulation Public Servant Law (14th August 1993)(Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, 2004)]; 中央组织部, 全国党政领导班子建设规划纲要, 收录于中央文献研究室 ( 编 ), 十五大以来重要文献选读 ( 上册 )( 北京 : 人民出版社, 2000) 页 [The Central Organization Department of the CCP, The Outline of the Construction of National Party and Political Leader Team, collected in Central Literature Research Office(ed.), The Selection of Significant Document Since the Fifteenth National Congress(Part 1) (Beijing: People Press, 2000) pp ]; 人民论坛 杂志专题调研组, 干部成长 天花板 现象调查 : 困局原因何在?, 人民日报, 2009 年 12 月 17 日 [The Special Research Team of People's Tribune, The Investigation of Cadre Ceiling Phenomenon: What is the Origin?, People s Daily,17th December 2009]; 中共中央组织部, 团中央, 关于各级团委领导干部年龄问题的意见 (1982 年 8 月 29 日 )[The Central Organization Department of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion of the Age of CCYL Leaders of All level (29th August, 1982)], website of the CCP, access at: /124349/ html. 63. Source from the Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision)".

257 247 However, Song Defu, Li Keqiang, and Zhou Qiang were the first Secretary of the CCYL in the period of Jiang Zemin. They reached equivalent rank in their late 30s. No matter whether they were 38 or 43, all of them were younger than the expected age of being a Division Chief (45) The Reform of the Public Institutions ( 事业单位改革 ) and the CCYL In 1990s, the autonomy of public institutions in terms of recruitment and promotion was much larger than the public servant system. The CCYL, as an official mass organization, belongs to both systems. On one hand, the Central Committee of CCYL belongs to the Public Servant System. On the other hand, the local committees in public institutions (such as: universities) and subordinate organizations of the Central Committee of the CCYL committee of all levels are in the public institution system. With the benefits of the public institution system, the CCYL can freely recruit young talent, rapidly promote them to a higher administrative rank, and then transfer them into leadership positions in the public servant or public institution systems. The Reform of the Public Institutions The main characteristic of 1990s political reform was power decentralization. 64 In terms of the reform of public institutions, although the scale of the public institutions was reduced, yet their autonomy was greatly expanded. By comparison with the Public Servant System, the public institution System enjoyed a similar administrative rank structure. When a certain cadre in a public institution reaches the administrative rank of or above Division Deputy Chief, he/ she will be qualified to be transferred to a leadership position in Public Servant System. In China, when we mention the position of political leader, it cannot be limited to the public servant system. There is a kind of system which is called Public Institution ( 事业单位 ). It is an extension of political authority and it plays a significant role in China's politics. For example, in late 1994, there were over 1.3 million public 64. Zheng Yongnian, Institutionalizing de Facto Federalism in Post-Deng China, in Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu(ed.), China under Jiang Zemin (London: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2000) pp ; Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (California: University of California Press, 1993) pp

258 248 institutions and the number of their staff reached over 26 million, over four times of the number of public servants. 65 In the CCYL System, there are two types of cadre with different identities. One is the Public Servant ( 公务员身份 ): mainly official cadres who work in the Central Committee of CCYL Committee at a certain level (Central Committee, Provincial Committee, municipal Committee, or County Committee). These cadres were recruited by passing the State Civil Service Examination at a certain level (national, Provincial, or municipal). The other is the Staff of Public Institutions ( 事业单位人员身份 ), those working staff in the local committees of public institutions (such as: universities) and subordinate organizations of the CCYL committee of all levels. For example, "The Guide Center of Guangdong Young Volunteer"( 广东省青年志愿者行动指导中心 ) is one of the subordinate organizations of the Guangdong Committee of the Communist Youth League, and it enjoys the administrative rank of Division Deputy. Its working staff is identified as staff of a public institution. 66 Public servants can be shifted to hold leadership positions in public institutions. And after reaching the position of Division Deputy Chief or above, the staff of public institutions can also be transferred to leadership positions in the Public servant system. 67 The Benefit to the CCYL from the Public Institution System( 事业单位系统 ) The relative autonomy of the public institution system provides the CCYL with certain benefits in recruitment, promotion and cadre transformation. It assists the CCYL to become a political highway for cadre promotion in the CCP's system. In terms of the benefit in Recruitment, unlike the Public Servant System, the 65. 宋德福, 全面推进事业单位机构和人事制度的配套改革 收录于, 八年人事制度改革行 ( 北京 : 中国人事出版社, 2005) 页 [Song Defu, Completely Promote the Reform of Public Institution and its Personnel System, collected in, The Memory of Eight Years Reform of Personnel System (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 2005) pp ]. 66. Guangdong Communist Youth League, Introduction of The Guide Centre of Guangdong Young volunteer, website of Guangdong Communist Youth League, accessed at: zyzxh.asp. 67. Interview with the Director in Organization Department of Guangdong Communist Party.

259 249 CCYL can recruit staff without any Civil Service Examination, but according to its needs. It can better select staff on the basis of need; and it can formally avoid the limitations in staff recruitment. Such a process can further assist the CCYL to recruit young talent. Take the data of 2001 National Civil Service Examination for example; in 2001, the State offered approximately 4,500 public servant positions, but there were over 30,000 applications, and the recruitment rate was only 13.7%. 68 Because of the difficulties of getting into the Public Servant System, the autonomy of public institutions can open an alternative approach for recruiting the Princelings into public sector. In this thesis, Princelings specifically refers to the offsprings or relatives of past or incumbent senior CCP leaders. To some extent, it can be regarded as corruption in recruitment. But, in another way, recruiting Princelings into the CCYL can benefit the CCYL to get more acceptance and support from powerful political leaders, and it can also further increase the opportunity for the transformation of the CCYL cadre. In terms of the benefits in promotion, unlike the public servant system, the cadres of public institutions do not need to follow all the regulations of the public servant system. At the very least, the cadre does not need to finish a complete tenure before being promoted. The autonomy of cadre management assists the promotion of certain cadre when there is a vacancy. In the 1990s, although the number of public institutions decreased, yet the numbers of the leadership positions of these institutions grew far more than the number of leadership positions of the public servant system. After the approval from the Organizational Department of the CCP, the CCYL could establish certain public institutions on the basis of its needs. And CCYL Cadres could reach leadership positions by way of working in a public institution. In terms of the benefits in cadre transformation, CCYL cadres can be transferred to leadership position between the public servant and public institution systems. 68. 法制晚报, 国家公务员招考启动 141 万人报名 11 年增 42 倍, 法制晚报, 2011 年 10 月 13 日 [ Legal Evening Newspaper, The State Civil Service Examination Began, Over 1410,000 People Apply- In the Past 11 Year It Increase 42 times, Legal Evening Newspaper, 13rd October 2011].

260 250 Normally a public servant can be transferred to hold the leadership position of public institution; yet the staff of public institutions cannot transfer to leadership positions of the public servant system. But within the CCYL system, because the Central Committee of the CCYL of certain levels are institutions of the public servant system and there were plenty of subordinate institutions in the public institutions system, the staff of public institution can be transferred to work in Central Committee of the CCYL at certain levels. When the working position changes, the identity of the cadre changes, and with a new identity as a public servant the CCYL cadres can be transferred to other institutions in the public servant system. 7.4 CCYL and the New Type of Economic Organization The Marginalization of Youth League Local Branches Impacted by the reform in 1990s, a large number of local branches of the CCYL were marginalized, particularly in rural areas and State Owned Enterprises. For example, in 1993, over 150,000 CCYL local branches in rural areas were in paralysis. And in some counties of Jiangsu Province, the number of CCYL members sharply dropped by at least 10,000 and the youth league branches in local SOEs existed in name only. 69 Marginalization meant four things. Firstly, a number of local institutions were merged or cancelled. Secondly, the membership of the CCYL decreased significantly. Thirdly, the part-time CCYL cadres became the main body of the CCYL cadre team, particularly in SOEs. Fourth, the role of the CCYL in the economic area became unclear, and the significance of the CCYL in SOEs began to be questioned. As the Youth League Committee in Anyang Iron and Steel Group ( 安钢集团团委 ) pointed out: We fully realize five tendencies/problems in front of the development of youth 69. 中国共青团, 农村共青团工作亟待加强 ( 全国部分农村团县委书记座谈会记录 ), 中国政治青年学院学报, 1995 年 4 期, 页 [CCYL, The Work of Rural Youth League Urge to Be Strengthened(Meeting Record of Some Secretary of the Youth League Local County Committee of in Rural Area), Journal of China Youth College for Political Sciences, vol.4, 1995, pp.18-20].

261 251 league. The first is the merging trend of the institutional framework. The second is the shrinking trend of (youth league) members. The third is the weakening trend of the (youth league) members' consciousness. The fourth is the part-time trend of being a youth league cadre. The fifth is the increasing difficulty for the youth league cadres to job transfer. 70 Among these five aspects, the decrease of members was the fundamental objective reason. These seemed to be no reason to maintain the same scope of institutions or cadre team. During the period of Jiang Zemin, masses of State Owned Enterprise were privatized and caused serious job losses. The majority of laid-off workers were young workers. Take the Guixi Smelting Plant in Jiangxi Copper Corporation ( 江西铜业集团公司贵溪冶炼厂, Jiangxi Province) for example; from 1990 to 1995, CCYL members decreased 13%, from 1995 to 2000, it further decreased 33%, and from 2000 to 2002, it further decreased over 30%. In 2002, this plant had only 435 CCYL members. The number of CCYL branches in that factory was consequently reduced to 1 committee, and in the whole factory, there were 72 CCYL Cadres, but only 2 of them were fulltime. 71 However, the deepening of the Economic Reform in the 1990s led to a large number of lay-offs in SOEs. If the CCYL did not explore new working areas, its future was bleak. As the Youth League Committee in the Internet Protection Bureau of Chongqing Telecom Company Limited ( 重庆市电信有限公司网络维护局团委 ) pointed out: On one hand, along with the deepening of the Reform of SOE, it is the 70. Original words are: 我们充分认识到团的建设面临着五个方面的 趋向 一是团组织机构呈合并化趋向 ; 二是团员队伍呈萎缩化趋向 ; 三是团员意识呈淡薄化趋向 ; 四是团干部呈兼职化趋向 ; 五是团干部转岗呈困难化趋向, details please see: 安钢集团团委, 强化目标责任, 健全工作机制, 加大支持力度, 提升团建水平 安钢党建带团建工作综述, ( 内部报告, 2002) [Youth League Committee in Anyang Iron and Steel Group, Strengthen the Purpose and Duty, Perfect the Working System, Increase the Support, and Raise the quality of Youth League-- the Report of Anyang Iron and Steel Group in 'Party Building Leads League Building (Internal Report, 2002)]. 71. 江西铜业集团公司贵溪冶炼厂团委, 企业共青团工作现状与发展的思考, 2003 年共青团中央全团工作调研报告汇编 ( 内部报告, 2003) [The CCYL Committee in Guixi Smelting Plant in Jiangxi Copper Corporation, The Thinking of the Youth League Work of Enterprise: Current Situation and Future Development, The Report Collection of 2003 Work Report of the CCYL (internal document, 2003)].

262 252 irresistible trend of reducing the workers and increasing efficiency. The youth league working team will shrink, and the numbers of CCYL members will sharply decrease. On the other hand, along with the Reform of the Personnel system of the SOEs, the mobility of the youth league members will be strengthened. It will lead to the loss of members and reduction of member teams. Some youth league organizations in Enterprises will be merged with other departments. And the decrease of CCYL cadre teams and the position of CCYL cadres becoming part-time will be the main trend. If the CCYL in Enterprises remained in the original working area, and cannot adjust itself on the basis of the new developments, the working resources of the CCYL will be exhausted. And the CCYL can hardly develop. 72 In the past Planed Economic Period (Mao Zedong period), the CCYL committee was a part of the political department in SOEs under the leadership of the CCP. In the "Politics First" Historical era, the main role of the CCYL in SOEs was to organize political and ideological education for the young workers. However, in the 1990s' Reform of SOEs, there enterprises had to increase their efficiency. In this new period, the former role of the CCYL was increasingly redundant. That's why certain numbers of CCYL Cadres in SOEs started to discuss the question privately--"how Long can the Flag of the CCYL endure?" Jiao Yaoguang ( 焦耀光 ) (Former Director of the Propaganda Department in Liuzhou Communist Youth League Committee in 1990s and now the Vice-Mayor of Liuzhou) witnessed the worries of CCYL Cadres in Liuzhou. According to his memoir, in the 1990s many youth league committees in SOEs started to establish different kinds of associations to explore the future development of the CCYL. But in 72. Original words are: 一方面随着企业改革的进一步深化, 国有企业减员增效是大势所趋, 企业青工队伍逐渐萎缩, 团员数量急剧下降 ; 另一方面随着企业人事制度的改革, 团员流动性增强, 导致团员流失和团员队伍锐减, 团的工作对象日趋减少 有些企业团组织将合并于其他部门, 团干部数量锐减, 兼职化已成趋势 如果企业团的工作领域依然停留在原有的范围内, 不能够根据形势的发展适时地作以调整, 团的工作资源就会逐渐枯竭, 企业团的工作就很难有所作为, details please see: 重庆市电信有限公司网络维护局团委, 健全共青团机制, 在企业转型全面推进的新形势下开创企业共青团工作的新局面, 团中央 ( 编 ), 2005 年度中国电信优秀政研成果 ( 内部报告 ) [Youth League Committee in the Internet Protection Bureau of Chongqing Telecom Company Limited, Perfect the CCYL Working System, Under the Complete Reform of the SOE, Open Up the New Working Area of the CCYL in Enterprise, in CCYL collected, 2005 Excellent Political Research Report of China Telecom (Internal Report) ].

263 253 private, they seemed pessimistic about the future of the CCYL in SOEs The CCYL Explores the Development in the New Type of Economic Organization In the Reform of SOEs, the number of CCYL members decreased and it began to build up CCYL branches in the new type of economic organization. This New Type Economic Organization ( 新型经济组织 ) included township enterprises( 乡镇企业 ), foreign-owned enterprises( 外资企业 ), corporate enterprises( 股份制企业 ), and private enterprises ( 私营企业 ). In short, they are all Non-State Owned Enterprise. On 20th December 1993, the Central Committee of the CCYL released the "Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Work of Developing the Youth League Membership"( 关于加强发展团员工作的意见 ). In this document, the CCYL raised the goal of recruiting CCYL members so that by the end of 1995, membership should reach 65 million, approximately 18% of the national Youth population. And at the end of 1997, the number of CCYL members should over 70 million: about 20% of the national Youth population. Three kind of social groups were identified as recruitment sources. The first was the traditional source which includes workers, peasants and intellectuals; the second is a new source which contains the working staff in New Type Economic Organizations; and the third is middle school students. 74 Recruiting new members from the new type of Economic Organization was a significant change in direction. In July 1995, the CCYL further published "The Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Development of the Youth League in the New Type of Economic Organization"( 关于加强新经济组织团的建设和意见 ) to regulate the work of building CCYL local branches in these organization. The 73. 谢洋, 穿越 25 年的求索 广西柳州市学术性群众组织 求索会 长盛不衰的背后, 中国青年报, 2011 年 1 月 4 日 [Xie Yang, The Exploration Past 25 Years-- the Story Behind Guangxi Province Liuzhou City Academic Mass Organization 'Exploration Association', China Youth Newspaper, 4th January 2011]. 74. 共青团中央, 关于加强发展团员工作的意见 (1993 年 12 月 20 日 ), 内部文件 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Work of Developing Youth League Member (20th December 1993), Internal Document].

264 254 Suggestion regulates as follows: In the New Type Economic Organization, if there are three or more CCYL members, it should build up a CCYL branch on the basis of the Constitution of the CCYL. If the CCYL members are fewer than 3 persons, but the number of the youths is over 30, the authority over the enterprise or local CCYL organization should help it develop members and then establish a CCYL branch. If the CCYL members are fewer than 3 persons, but the number of the youths is over 15, the authority over the enterprise or local CCYL organization also needs to help it develop members and then establish a CCYL branch. If the CCYL members are fewer than 3 persons and the number of youths is small, it can jointly establish a CCYL branch with other economic organizations or Industry Associations...All Economic Development Zones, High-Tech Parks, and Industrial Districts are concentrations of the New Type Economic Enterprise. So they should build up CCYL local committees or working committees. 75 The intention of the CCYL to build up CCYL Branches in these new organizations was clear, and their role was to serve the career development of young staff. Take the private business-- Zhejiang Transfer Group for example. The Group was established in The CCYL Committee of the Group was built up in 1998, which was developed from a spontaneous youth organization in the Group. In 1993, the Young staff had built up a youth organization for cultural education in their spare time. But along with the development of the Group, increasingly young staffs were willing to join this youth organization for self-improvement, and in 1998, they finally decided to build up a CCYL committee. 75. Original words are: 新经济组织中, 凡团员在 3 人以上的, 均应按照团章规定, 建立团组织 团员不足 3 人, 青年在 30 人以上的, 应由企业主管单位或者所在地团组织在其中发展团员后, 建立团组织 团员不足 3 人, 青年在 15 人以上的, 一般也应在发展团员后建立团组织 团员不足 3 人且青年数量较少的, 可以就近与其他单位联合建立或依托行业协会建立团组织... 各类经济开发区, 高新科技园区及工业小区是新型经济组织集中的地方要建立团委或团工委, details please see: 共青团中央, 关于加强新经济组织团的建设和意见 (1995 年 7 月 3 日 ), 收录于收录在团中央办公厅 ( 编 ), 党的十一届三中全会以来共青团重要文件汇编 ( 北京 : 中国青年出版社, 2001) 页 441 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, The Suggestion Concerning Strengthening the Development of the Youth League in the New Type of Economic Organization (3rd July, 1995), collected in the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Collection of Significant Document of the CCYL Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (Beijing: China Youth Press, 2001) p.441].

265 255 The case of Zhejiang Transfer Group was not rare. In 2007, over 100 thousand new type of economic organizations had built up CCYL branches or committees, comprised over 60% of Non-state Owned Enterprise Summary In the period of Jiang Zemin, the CCYL was a subordinate multiple function organization to serve the rule of the CCP. These functions were: mass organization for undertaking political socialization; youth department to provide public services and human resource development; and an institutional arrangement for developing political leaders for the CCP. After the Tiananmen Event, the political socialization function of the CCYL was emphasized, particularly in universities. But on the basis of recruiting the political guides into the CCYL leadership group, on one hand, the CCYL strengthened its effectiveness in organizing political socialization, and on the other hand, it fulfilled the role of leadership development by transferring political guides into the leadership positions of the party and government. After Deng s Southern Tour, the third generation of the CCP ultimately concentrated on the building of Market economics. The CCYL served as the youth department of the Party/Government to contribute to the Cross-Century Youth Civilization Project in providing public services and the Cross-Century Youth Talent Project in developing human resources. These practices equipped the CCYL cadres with governing skills. In the reform of the Personnel System in the 1990s, on the basis of the age advantage in the Modern Public Servant System and the benefits from the Reforming the Public Institutions, the CCYL reinforced its role as the leadership development arrangement for the Party and Government. In addition, impacted by the economic and political reforms of the 1990s, the local branches of the CCYL became marginalized, particularly in rural areas and 76. 新华网, 访谈 : 青年团干部谈新时期共青团工作和青年的力量 [Xinhua website, The Interview: The CCYL Cadre Talks About The Work of The CCYL and The Power of Youth in New Era ], 7 th June 2008, website of Xinhua, accessed at:

266 256 SOEs, so it initiated a new exploration of developing local branches in these new types of economic organizations, with great success.

267 257 CHAPTER EIGHT The CCYL in the Period of Hu Jintao ( ) This chapter discusses the relationship between the CCYL and the CCP in the period of Hu Jintao ( ). Conventional wisdom believes that the significance of the CCYL in the period when Hu was General Secretary of the CCP was that it led to the rise of the CCYL faction/"tuanpai" in the CCP s leadership politics. To be specific, many China scholars believe that the consolidation of Hu Jintao s power was due to support from members of the CCYL faction in key positions. 1 The senior leaders of the CCP, many of whom once worked in the CCYL, were regarded as his key supporters. 2 Furthermore, it is sometimes argued that because the social origin of most CCYL cadres was from ordinary families, the policy preference of CCYL cadres focused on social fairness and justice, which closely aligned with Hu s objective of a Harmonious Society ( 和谐社会 ). 3 This chapter argues that in this period the CCYL was an inner-party institutional arrangement to develop political cadres for the CCP. This arrangement was the institutional cause leading the to the emergemence of a significant number of senior officials with a CCYL background in CCP s Central Committee, and it was also a solution to the age dilemma in the CCP s cadre appointment system. This arrangement contained three stages: recruitment, training, and position transformation. In addition, as a multi-function organization serving the rule of the CCP, the CCYL continued to fulfill its other functions as the mass organization to undertake the political socialization of Chinese youths and as a government department to provide public services to young people. 1. 任知初, 胡锦涛之权力基础 决策来源与个人形象, 中国战略 ( 华盛顿 : 美国战略暨国际研究中心 ) 第 2 期, 2004 年 4 月 25 日, 页 9 [Ren Zhichu, The Power Foundation, Policy Source and Personal Image of Hu Jintao, The China Strategy (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies) vol.2, 25th April 2004, p.9] 2. Li Cheng, Hu's Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League, China Leadership Monitor, no.3, July 30, 2002, website of Hoover Institution, accessed at: hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm3_lc.pdf. 3. Li Cheng, Hu's Policy Shift and the Tuanpai's Coming-of-Age, China Leadership Monitor, no.15, July 30, 2005, accessed at: clm15_lc.pdf.

268 258 This chapter is organized into six major sections. Section 8.1 demonstrates that in the Hu Jintao Era, China s politics became increasing regularized. The institutional causes contributed to the rise of leaders with a CCYL background, and for solving the age dilemma in cadre management, the CCP also expected the CCYL to serve as an inner-party institutional arrangement to develop leadership candidates for the Party. Section 8.2 explores the recruitment stage of this CCYL arrangement. It includes three approaches for recruiting young talents into the league. Section 8.3 shows the training stage of CCYL arrangement. It explains the purpose of the CCYL training and the practical advantages of the CCYL arrangement. Section 8.4 demonstrates the position transformation stage of CCYL arrangement. It reveals the approaches in position transformation of CCYL cadres. Section 8.5 presents other functions of the CCYL in the period of Hu Jintao, including: mass organization to undertake political socialization of Chinese youths and youth department to provide public services. The major findings of this chapter will be summarized in the last section. 8.1 The Characteristics of the China s Politics in the Hu Jintao Era In the period of Hu Jintao, China s politics displayed three significant characteristics. First was the prosperity of the CCYL faction in the Central Committee of the CCP; second was the increasing regulation of China s politics. Some formal rules (including age limitation) were further institutionalized to regulate the leadership changes of the CCP. The third characteristic was the appearance of an age dilemma in the CCP s cadre appointment system The Prosperity of the CCYL Faction and CCYL Cadre in the Central Committee of the CCP The prosperity of the CCYL faction was the main characteristic of the Hu Jintao period. To explain: numerous CCYL faction members were promoted in the Central Committee of the CCP especially since the 16 th National Congress (2002), when Hu became the General Secretary of the CCP. In addition, my research also finds that increasing numbers of political leaders with a CCYL background took up seats in the Central Committee of the CCP.

269 259 One point to note is that CCYL faction members and the leaders with a CCYL background are not the same concept. The idea of a CCYL faction member specifically points to the senior CCYL cadre who had a direct connection with Hu Jintao. And the political leaders who had served as full-time CCYL cadres can be regarded as a leader with a CCYL background. So the latter is a more inclusive concept than a CCYL faction member. It contains the CCYL cadres without close connection with Hu Jintao. And it would be inappropriate to explain their promotion to the Central Committee of the CCP as a result of the CCYL faction. Conventional wisdom focuses on the prosperity of the CCYL faction at the 16 th (2002) and 17 th (2007) Central Committee of the CCP and argues that factional causes mainly contributed to this phenomenon. But after comparing the data of the seats taken by the CCYL faction members and the CCYL Cadres (i.e. leader with CCYL background) from 14 th to 18 th Central Committee of the CCP (as Figure 8-1 Seats of CCYL Faction and CCYL Cadres in 14 th -18 th Central Committee of the CCP), this study has a more nuanced finding which points to the fact that not only did the CCYL faction take up more seats in the Central Committee of the CCP, but the CCYL cadres were also prosperous in China s politics. This led to the idea that, apart from factional causes, there should be institutional causes to explain the prosperity of leaders with a CCYL background in the China s leadership politics. In Figure 8-1, CCYL Faction index refers to the number of seats of the CCP Central Committee taken up by the CCYL faction. The number contains the full members and alternate members of the Central Committee. And the CCYL Cadre points to the number of members in Central Committee of the CCP who had a CCYL background. On the basis of this figure we find that: Firstly, both the CCYL faction members and the CCYL cadres had obtained more seats in the Central Committee of the CCP than they did in the period of Jiang Zemin. Specifically, in the period of Jiang Zemin, the CCYL faction only took 23 (7.21%) and 34 (9.88%) seats in 14 th and 15 th Central Committee of the CCP respectively. But in the period of Hu Jintao, the number of seats held increased to 95 (16.34%) at the 16 th Congress and 109 (23.18%) at the 17 th Congress. Just like the CCYL faction, the CCYL cadres also showed a similar escalating trend. Fifty seats in the 14 th Congress and 65 seats in the 15 th Congress increased to 95 in the 16 th and 109

270 260 seats in the 17 th Congress. Figure 8-1 Seats of CCYL Faction and CCYL Cadres in 14 th -18 th Central Committee of the CCP 4 Congress 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th Seat of Central Committee (full and alternate members) Seat of CCYL Faction Seat of CCYL Cadre Percentage of CCYL Faction 7.21% 9.88% 16.34% 23.18% 25.53% Percentage of CCYL Cadre 15.67% 18.90% 26.69% 29.38% 33.78% Percentage Change of CCYL Faction Member and CCYL Cadre in CC of the CCP 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 14 th 15 th 16 th 17 th 18 th CCYL Faction 7% 9.80% 16% 23% 25.53% CCYL Cadre 15.67% 18.90% 26.69% 29.38% 33.78% This similar increasing trend shows that not only were the CCYL faction members more numerous in the Central Committee of the CCP, but also that leaders with a CCYL background took up an increasing number of seats in the Hu Jintao era. It points to the reasons for the prosperity of CCYL cadre rooted in factional and institutional causes. As Wang Zhengxu points out, in order to quickly consolidate his power, Hu Jintao promoted a large number of CCYL faction members to the Central Committee of the CCP and these political leaders were the key supportive pillar of his rule. 5 In respect of institutional causes, differing from other political factions in China, 4. Data of these two figures is from Dataset of Central Committee Members (CCYL Cadres vision). Concerning the members of CCYL faction, it refers to the scholarly studies of CCYL faction. Detail please see: Wang Zhengxu, Hu Jintao s Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China s Elite Politics in Issue and Studies, no.4, December 2006, pp ; Kou Chien-wen, CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of Channelling Cadres, in Prospect Quarterly, no.3, October 2007, pp ; Paplo Rosa, Who won? Power and Factional Balance in China after the 18 th Congress of the CCP, in Journal of Political Power, vol.7, no.2, pp ; Li Cheng, Hu s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai s Coming-of- Age, in China Leadership Monitor, no.15, pp Wang Zhengxu, Hu Jintao s Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China s Elite Politics in Issue and Studies, no.4, December 2006, pp

271 261 the CCYL was empowered with an organization mission to provide cadres for the Party and Government. 6 After the Reform of Deng Xiaoping and the development in the period of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the CCYL was shaped as the institutional arrangement for developing cadres for the CCP (which will be demonstrated in the following sections). Secondly, the increasing trend of the CCYL faction members and the leaders with a CCYL background kept on developing in the 18 th Central Committee of the CCP, when Hu Jintao was replaced by Xi Jinping as the General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the Central Military Committee of the CCP. According to the argument of factionalism, the CCYL faction should be weakened when its top leader Hu Jintao left the power core of the CCP. However, the number of CCYL faction members and CCYL cadres increased in the 18 th Central Committee of the CCP. This underlines my central argument that the institutional causes of the CCYL rise played a more significant role in upholding the prosperity of CCYL cadres in the Central Committee of the CCP than factional causes. This thesis does not deny the significance of factional affiliations in China s politics. But the data of 18 th Central Committee of the CCP shows that the CCYL cadres were institutionally transferred to hold leadership positions in the Party, irrespective of the core leadership change. Apart from factional causes, the institutional setting should be considered as contributing to the prosperity of the CCYL cadre in the Hu Jintao period Increasing Regularization in the Leadership Changes of the CCP The second characteristic of China s politics in the Hu Jintao period was that some formal rules were increasingly emphasized in the leadership succession process of the CCP. Among others, age limitation became the most significant rule to regulate the leadership change of the CCP, particularly its top leadership. Take the Political Bureau of the CCP for example. As Figure 8-2 The Age of Members of the 13th -17th Political Bureau of the CCP shows, before the rule of Hu Jintao, age became an increasingly significant rule to regulate the election of the 6. Kou Chien-wen, CYL Cadres Rising in the Era of Hu Jintao: Factional Considerations or Organizational Mission of Channelling Cadres, in Prospect Quarterly, no.3, October 2007, pp

272 262 Political Bureau. At the 13 th Congress (1987), there were still 5 leaders who were over 70 years old who were part of the Political Bureau of the CCP. But in the following 14 th (1992) and 15 th (1997) Congresses, leaders over 70 were limited in entering the Political Bureau, with one exception in the 15 th Congress of the CCP. He was Jiang Zemin, who was 71 at that time. However, after Hu s accession to power, the age limitation was strictly implemented and there was no exception allowed. Since the 16 th Congress (2002), there has been no leader over the age of 68 elected into the Political Bureau. Meanwhile, when age became one of the most important rules to regulate the retirement of leaders, it also became the key to a leader s promotion. The candidate who has a large age advantage (much younger age) has more possibility to be promoted into the higher levels of the leadership group of the CCP. And the CCYL is one of the institutional arrangements to assist political cadres with advantages-which includes an age advantage- to become a political leader of the CCP. The following sections will demonstrate this CCYL arrangement in some detail. Figure 8-2 The Age of Members of the 13th -17th Political Bureau of the CCP 7 Congress 13 th 14 th 15 th 16 th 17 th Age New Over % (5) 0.0% (0) 4.5% (1) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) Elected % (1) 4.8% (1) 22.7% (5) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) Member % (1) 28.6% (6) 18.2% (4) 21.7% (5) 39.1% (9) % (4) 38.1% (8) 18.2% (4) 52.2%(12) 34.8% (8) Under % (6) 28.6% (6) 36.4% (8) 26.1% (6) 26.1% (6) Total 100% (17) 100% (21) 100% (22) 100% (23) 100% (23) 7. This figure did not contain the member of the Political Bureau who was from the Army. Source from: 寇健文, 迈向权力核心之路 : 一九八七年以后中共文人领袖的政治流动, 政治科学论丛, 第 45 期, 2010 年, 页 12 [Kou Chien-wen, Paths to the Top: The Political Mobility of Chinese Civilian Leaders After 1987, Political Science Review, no.45, 2010, p.12].

273 The Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System In the Hu Jintao period, adopting an institutional approach to regulate stable and orderly cadre management and the requirement for the cadre rejuvenation contributed to the Age Dilemma in the CCP s cadre appointment system. 8 This Age Dilemma is a systemic flaw. On one hand the Party imposed age limits on cadre promotion to each level; on the other hand, in order to achieve an orderly cadre management, the CCP required fixed tenure and institutional procedures. By the time an ordinary cadre had satisfied the entire institutional requirements for promotion, he/ she may already have reached the age limit. After issuing "The Regulation of the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leadership Cadre"( 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例 ) on 9th July 2002, the CCP formally adopted an institutional approach to regulate the issues around the selection, training, and appointment of the Party and Government leadership cadres. 9 Apart from a former Regulation in the period of Jiang Zemin, this Regulation further extended its regulatory scope to the Party cadre. The Regulation was requested by Hu Jintao to become the general guide in relation to leadership. 10 From the requirements of the candidates, inspection procedures, the cadre appointments, leadership tenures, and various other aspects, the Regulation was strictly defined. The CCP s intentions were clear: these detailed regulations would contribute to stable and orderly leadership promotion. However, they also restricted the quick promotion of young talents. And they violated the needs of cadre rejuvenation which was the most significant principle set by Deng Xiaoping. Since the promotion of the Four Modernization of Cadre in 1980, the CCP had a convention of requiring rapid promotion of young talents. The age requirement 8. Kou Chien-Wen and Tsai Wen-Hsuan, Sprinting with Small Steps Towards Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System, The China Journal, no.71, 2014, p 中国共产党, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例 (2002 年 7 月 9 日 ), 收录自 中国共产党党内规章实用速查大全 ( 北京 : 红旗出版社, 2013) 页 [The CCP, The Ordinance of the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leadership Cadre, collected from The Dictionary of Inner Party Regulation of the CCP (Beijing: The Flag Press, 2013) pp ]. 10. 胡锦涛, 胡锦涛在全国学习贯彻 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例 电视电话会议中的讲话, 共产党员,2002 年 8 期, 页 4[Hu Jintao, The Speech of Hu Jintao in the Video and Telephone Conference Concerning Nation-Wide Learning The Ordinance of the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leadership Cadre, The CCP Member, vol.8, 2002, p.4].

274 264 became one of the most significant indexes for regulating the retirement and promotion of CCP cadres. 11 In this 2002 Regulation, the Party clearly required that: (The CCP) should lay emphasis on selecting and appointing Young Talents. 12 In order to fix this age dilemma problem in the CCP s cadre management system, the CCP expected the CCYL to become an institutional arrangement to develop young cadres for the Party. In 2000, the Central Organization Department of the CCP had already released "The Suggestion of the Central Department of the CCP Concerning Further Promoting the Work of Training and Selecting Young Cadres"(5th September, 2000)( 中共中央组织部关于进一步做好培养选拔年轻干部工作的意见 ). In this Suggestion, the CCYL was defined as one of the main institutional arrangements for recommending young talents to the Party and Government. As it pointed out: The CCYL organization at all levels... should zealously recommend young talents to the Party, and assist the organizational department of all party Committee in such selection. 13 Generally speaking, as the Reserve of the CCP (as defined by the Constitution of the CCP), the CCYL already enjoyed a significant function of recommending young talents to the party and the CCYL cadres at all levels were naturally considered as leadership candidates of the Party and Government. In a positive response to the call of the CCP, on 25 April 2004, the Central Committee of the CCYL issued the Suggestion Concerning Further Strengthening the Young Talent Work ( 关于进一步加强青年人才工作的意见 ) to raise the 11. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) pp Original words are: 应当注重选拔任用年轻优秀年轻干部., details please see: 中国共产党, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例 (2002 年 7 月 9 日 ), 收录自 中国共产党党内规章实用速查大全 ( 北京 : 红旗出版社, 2013) 页 210 [CCP, The Ordinance of the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leadership Cadre, collected in The Dictionary of Inner Party Regulation of the CCP"(Beijing: The Flag Press, 2013) p.210]. 13. Original words are: 各级共青团, 要积极向党组织推荐优秀年轻干部, 配合各级党委组织部门做好培养选拔优秀年轻干部工作, details please see: 中共中央组织部, 中共中央组织部关于进一步做好培养选拔优秀年轻干部工作的意见 (2000 年 9 月 5 日 ) [The Central Organization Department of the CCP, The Suggestion of the Central Department of the CCP Concerning Further Promoting the Work of Training and Selecting Young Cadres (5th September, 2000) ], website of the CCP, accessed at:

275 265 development of young talent work to the central place of the CCYL. As the Suggestion pointed out: The special relationship between the CCP and the CCYL determines that the youth league should positively assist the Party to do the young talent work..(the CCYL) should closely catch four key points of young talent work, including: educating, gathering, recommending, and appointing, to develop large numbers of excellent young talents for the Party and Government. 14 Concerning the CCYL arrangement for developing leadership candidates for the Party, it contains three stages, including: Recruitment, Training, and Position Transformation. It will be detailed in the following sections. 8.2 Cadre Recruitment The first stage of the CCYL leadership development arrangement rested on the recruitment of cadres. On the basis of the case of the Central Committee of the CCYL, this section systematically explores this recruitment approach. There are three channels to become a fulltime CCYL Cadre. They are: Civil Servant Examination channel; Public Institution channel; and Public Transferring channel. The following section takes the example of the working organs of the Central Committee of the CCYL to systematically analyse these channels Civil Servant Examination Channel As a part of the Chinese political system, the CCYL, just like Party and Government Institutions, has adopted the Civil Servant Examination Channel to select Cadres since the release of Temporary Regulation of Civil Servants 国家公务员暂行条例 in This channel is a kind of institutional arrangement for selecting working cadre for the Party and Government through a uniform national examination. 14. Original words are: 党与团的特殊关系, 决定了共青团必须积极协助党做好青年人才工作..( 共青团 ) 紧紧抓住青年人才培养 凝聚 举荐 配置四个关键环节, 为党和国家培养 输送大批优秀青年人才, details please see: 共青团中央, 关于进一步加强青年人才工作的意见, 收录于团中央组织部 ( 编 ), 共青团青年人才工作文件材料汇编 ( 内部发行, 2004) 页 [The Central Committee of the CCYL, Suggestion Concerning Further Strengthening the Young Talent Work, collected in Organizational Department of the Central Committee of the CCYL(ed.), The Working Document Collection of Young Talent Work of the CCYL (Inner Youth League Document, 2004) pp ].

276 266 The exam is operated by Government bureaus which specifically manage civil servants. For example, the National Civil Servant Examination ( 国家公务员考试 ) is operated by the State Bureau of Civil Servants ( 国家公务员局 ); the Provincial Civil Servant Examination ( 省公务员考试 ) is operated by the Provincial Testing Bureau ( 省考试局 ), and so on. The selected individuals enjoy the Civil Servant Identity ( 公务员编制 ) and specific non-leadership positions in Party, Government, Court of Justice, Procuratorate and Mass Organizations (e.g. CCYL). Because of the total quantity, Civil Servants recruited through the Civil Servant Examination are the main source of leadership candidates in Chinese politics. However, those who enter the Chinese political system through this examination can only obtain non-leadership positions (such as: Staff 科员, Deputy Chief Section Member 副主任科员, or Chief Section Member 主任科员 ) in their early political careers. The advantage of these winners rests simply on Civil Servant Identity, rather than being considered as leadership candidates. When it comes to the CCYL, however, this channel is not the major approach for recruiting Young Talents. Take the working organs in the Central Committee of the CCYL for example, according to the data from National Civil Servant Examination. There were only 33 cadres recruited through this approach. (Details please see: Figure 8-3 the Data of the Original Unit of the Employed Cadre of the Working Organs in the Central Committee of the CCYL through State Civil Service Examination( )in the Appendix.) First, the application of this approach depends on the existence of a vacancy, so the recruitment opportunity is not always available. The Central Committee of the CCYL did not recruit any cadres in this way in 2008 or In addition, the number recruited through this approach is not fixed. For example, in 2011 and 2012, it was 10, in 2009 it was 6, in 2007, 7. Both phenomena reveal that among the recruitment approaches of the CCYL, the significance of this approach is not high. Furthermore, among these 33 cadres, in total, 15 were from Local Government, 13 from University, 3 from local youth league committee, and 2 from State Owned Enterprises. Second, young undergraduates with strong examination abilities are the main winners from this approach. According to the " Civil Servant Examination

277 267 Announcement"(2007 年至 2012 年公务员考试公告 ) 15 and the "Dataset of Civil Servant Position Information " (2007 年至 2012 年职位信息表 ) 16, we can see the preference of the CCYL rests on undergraduates who have had working experience in the student unions in universities. Although the age limit for attending the Civil Servant Examination is 35, yet the age of a majority of the employed cadres of the CCYL through this approach is between 22 and 25. The CCYL has always had an additional term in the position requirement for those who have had working experience in student unions in college Public Institution Channel The Public Institution Approach gives the CCYL a certain degree of autonomy in terms of young talent recruitment, and it is one of the most significant recruitment channels in the CCYL system. As Chapter 7 mentioned, within the CCYL system, the CCYL cadres enjoys two kinds of Cadre Identities a Civil Servant Identity and a Public Institution Identity. The leading cadre who worked in the organ of the CCYL of certain levels (Central, Provincial, Municipal, and County Level) enjoy the Civil Servant Identity. But the number of these positions is limited. However, the majority of the CCYL cadres, who belong to different kinds of subordinate institutions, possess the Public Institution Identity. The Public Institution Channel refers to the approach for the CCYL organs to recruit CCYL cadres for itself and its affiliated institutions. In the period of Hu Jintao, all this recruitment should be formally operated through a series of examinations. However, these Exams are actually operated by specific affiliated institutions of the CCYL, rather than a standard testing bureau of the Government, such as the State Civil Servant Bureau. Indeed, they were supervised by the organization department of the youth league of that level. Because of this greater autonomy for recruiting young 15. 中共中央组织部, 人事部, 中共中央组织部人事部中央机关及其直属机构 2007,2008, 2009,2010,2011,2012 年考试录用公务员公告 [Central Organization of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel, Central Organization of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel Concerning Employed Examination Announcement of Recruiting Public Servant for the Central State Organs and Its Affiliated Institution (2007,2008,2009,2010,2011,2012) ] website of State Administration of Civil Service under the State Council of PRC, access at: 中共中央组织部, 人事部, 2007 年至 2012 年 公务员招录职位信息表 [Central Organization of the CCP and the Ministry of Personnel, Dataset of Public Servant Position Information ] website of Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of the PRC, accessed at:

278 268 talents, this channel became one of the most significant and frequent approaches for recruiting CCYL cadres. The advantages of this channel are twofold. Firstly, the institution can have a greater possibility to recruit cadres with problem solving capacities, rather than merely examination skills. On the basis of practical requirements, the CCYL can hold diversified forms of exams and in-depth interviews in the process of the recruitment. In addition, the working performance of the recruited cadres can be investigated before sending the Cadre to the organ of the CCYL. Secondly, this channel provides the autonomy for recruiting Princelings (the offspring of incumbent or former political leaders) and excellent young talents from the rank and file who have won the appreciation from incumbent leaders or leadership selection guardian (senior scholars, officials who are judges in the leadership selection committee etc.). In terms of Princelings, there is no doubt that they generally possess broader informal relationship networks than those from the rank and file in Chinese politics. And this advantage clearly assists their career development. But to the CCYL, recruiting these cadres can assist it to earn resources and acceptance from different factions of Chinese politics. In an interview with a cadre in the Organization Department of the CCYL, he admitted that in the working organs of the Central Committee of the CCYL, approximately 30% of the CCYL cadres were the relatives of Vice-Provincial leaders or above, and the remainder were rank and file. 17 A similar phenomenon also appeared in the Provincial Committees of the CCYL, such as Guangdong, where approximately 40% of CCYL cadres are relatives of Municipal Level leaders. 18 In terms of excellent young talents from the rank and file, this channel matches the recommendation tradition in Chinese politics. Concerning the selection of political leaders in China, there are two kinds of time-honoured systems the Recommendation System 19 and the Imperial Examination system. 20 They occurred in 17. Interview with the cadre in the Organization Department of the CCYL. 18. Interview with the cadre of the Organization Department of Guangdong Communist Youth League. 19. Concerning the Recommendation System, detail please read: John Fairbank, Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Harvard University Press, 2006); John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1979); 白钢, 中国政治制度通史 ( 第二卷 ) ( 北京 : 人民出版社, 1996) [Bai Gang, The General History of Chinese Politics (vol.2) (Beijing: People Press,

279 269 the Han Dynasty (206BC-220AD), were reformed in the Tang Dynasty (618AD- 907AD) and prospered in the Song Dynasty (960AD-1279AD), and served to select talents for the government. 21 The key element in the Recommendation System is the approval of incumbent leaders or leadership selection guardians. The early career development of Ling Jihua ( 令计划, the Director of the General Office of the CCP in the Period of Hu Jintao) illustrates the significance and operation of recommendation in recruitment to the CCYL. Before entering the Central School of the CCYL (one of the affiliated institutions of the Central Committee of the CCYL), Ling was merely a CCYL grassroots young cadre with only a high school education. In the 1978 National Grass-root CCYL Cadre Training Programme, his hard-working image won the approval of Prof. Zheng Guang ( 郑洸 ), Director of the Youth League Teaching Office of Central School of the CCYL of that time ( 时任中央团校青年团工作教研室主任 ). With the recommendation of Prof. Zheng, Ling was successfully recruited into the Central School of the CCYL as an office clerk through the Public Institution Channel. After one year's investigation, he was recommended by Prof. Zheng to the Central Committee of the CCYL as Hu Jintao s Secretary. 22 And thus, Ling started to enter Chinese politics following Hu Jintao. Without the autonomy of the Public Institution Approach, how could a common cadre with only a high school education be discovered? 1996)]; 任立达, 薛希洪, 中国古代官吏考选制度史 ( 青岛 : 青岛出版社, 2003) [Ren Lida and Xue Xihong, The History of Ancient Chinese Official Examination System (Qingdao: Qingdao Press, 2003)]; 陈茂同, 中国历代选官制度 ( 上海 : 华东师范大学出版社, 1994)[Chen Maotong, Official Selection System of Ancient China (Shanghai, East China Normal University Press, 1994)]. 20. Concerning the Imperial Examination System of ancient China, please read: The Editorial Committee of Chinese Civilization, China: Five Thousand Years of History and Civilization (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2007) pp ; Peter Bol, This Culture of Ours: Intellectual Transitions in Tang and Sung China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); 中华孔子学会, 儒学与现代化 : 儒学及其现代意义国际学术研讨会论文集 ( 北京 : 人民教育出版社,1994) [Chinese Confucianism Association, The Collection of Confucianism and Its Modernization (Beijing: People Education Press, 1994)]; 王炳照, 中国科举制度硏究 ( 河北 : 河北人民出版社, 2002) [Wang Bingzhao, The Research of Imperial Examination System (Heibei: Heibei People Press, 2002)]. 21. Chen Yunzhe, The Research Overview of Western Political Circles on China s Political Ecology in Journal of Politics and Law, vol.7 no.2, 2014, pp Interview with Prof. Zheng Guang.

280 Public Transferring Channel The Public Transferring Channel is one of the approaches for recruiting Cadres for the CCYL at Vice-County Level and above. It is led by the CCYL organs and their equivalent organization department of the CCP (such as Central Committee of the CCYL and Central Organization Department of the CCP, Provincial Committee of the Communist Youth League and Organization Department of Provincial Communist Party, and so on). The cadres recruited through this approach are regarded as the formal reserve cadres of the CCP and Government. 23 Upon entering the CCYL, they are assigned to hold certain leading position within it. This channel selects and recruits young cadres from other systems (Party, Government, Court of Justice, Procuratorate, University, State Owned Enterprise or other Mass Organization, etc.) to hold leadership positions in CCYL committees and working departments. The selection is on the basis of a recommendation from all public institutions within the jurisdiction of the organization department of the CCP. Take the Central Committee of the CCYL for example. At regular intervals (approximately 5 years), the Central Organization Department of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCYL will jointly recruit cadres to work in the Central Committee of the CCYL. The recruitment scope covers every corner of the Chinese Public sector, which includes: Local Party or Government, Universities, State-Owned Enterprise, Court and Procuratorate, Army, other Mass Organizations, and the local CCYL committees. All Organization Departments of the Provincial Level Organization Party Committees have the right to nominate. Once investigated by both the Central Organization of the CCP and the Central Committee of the CCYL, the cadre can be formally recruited into the CCYL. Guo Xiangyu ( 郭祥玉 )was Director of the Rural Youth Working Department of the Central Committee of the CCYL ( 年团中央农村青年 工作部部长 ). He was recruited into the CCYL through the 2009 Public Transferring Programme. Before entering the CCYL, he was a senior Civil Servant with vice municipal rank in Heilongjiang Province. As the standing member of Tsitsihar City Communist Party Committee, he was recommended by the Organization Department 23. Interview with the cadre of the Organization Department of Guangdong Communist Youth League.

281 271 of Heilongjiang Province Communist Party to the CCYL and the Central Organization Department of the CCP. After a series of investigations and interviews, he successfully entered the CCYL. 24 The CCYL and Organization Department of the CCP will jointly operate this type of recruitment. Nominally, the domination of recruitment which refers to the power of making determinative decisions on recruitment is shared by the CCYL Organ and its equivalent Organization Department of the CCP. But, in practice, the dominance of recruitment will pass from the CCYL to the Organization Department of the CCP on the basis of position rank increase. (Details please see Figure 8-4 The Relationship between the Dominance Belongings and the Position Rank in the Public Transferring Approach.) Figure 8-4 the Relationship between the Dominance of Recruitment and the Position Rank in Public Transferring Approach (Central Committee of the CCYL) 25 In the Central Committee of the CCYL, there are three categories of ranks of leadership positions. They are Vice-County and County Level, Vice-Municipal and Municipal level, and Vice-Provincial and Provincial Level. Normally, the Recruitment of Vice-County and County Level Cadres is determined by the Central Committee of the CCYL, and the Central Organization Department of the CCP supervises, rather than joining the practical examination and investigation. When it comes to the Vice-Municipal and Municipal level cadre, both of them will act as a team to investigate the candidate recommended by other Provincial level institutions. And both of them share the Domination of Recruitment. 24. Interview with Guo Xiangyu. 25. The figure is made on the basis of the interview with senior cadre in the Organizational Department of the CCYL.