During the week following Japan s attack on U.S. military facilities in and near

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1 DEBATE 25 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY WITHDRAW QUICKLY U.S. TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN: Withdraw Quickly or Stay the Course? ADVOCATE: Sameer Dossani, Director, 50 Years Is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice SOURCE: The Case for U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan, on the Web site of Foreign Policy in Focus, a Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2008 STAY THE COURSE ADVOCATE: Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff SOURCE: Testimony during hearings on A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 21, 2009 During the week following Japan s attack on U.S. military facilities in and near Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, a Gallup poll reported that 97% of Americans approved Congress declaring war against Japan. When a day later, Germany declared war on the United States, 91% of Americans approved waging that conflict. Sixty years later, U.S. military action began in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. The U.S. goals were to destroy the terrorist group that had carried out the 9/11 attacks, and to topple the Taliban, the fundamentalist Muslim group that ruled Afghanistan. Other than World War II, it was the most initially popular war in U.S. history, with 82% of Americans favoring it. Soon, however, the war in Afghanistan faded to the back of the political concerns of most Americans. Most importantly, Americans concern with Afghanistan were overtaken by their focus on the war with and occupation of Iraq beginning in March Symbolizing this, polling organizations virtually ceased asking Americans questions about the war between 2003 and As is usually true when a president launches a military action, most Americans favored it. In this case, a poll taken the day after President George W. Bush ordered the U.S. attack on Iraq, 76% of Americans favored it. The quick success in defeating Iraq s military forces did not end the conflict though, and U.S. military deaths in Iraq went from 486 in 2003 to 849 in 2004, and peaked at 904 in Reflecting these casualties and a seeming lack of progress in Iraq, support for the war began to fall. By mid-2005 Americans were evenly divided, and at the end of 2006, 62% thought going to war in Iraq had been a mistake. In addition to the focus on Iraq, several other factors contributed to the eclipse of concern among the press, public, and politicians with the war in Afghanistan. One was that U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan were far lower than in Iraq. From 2001 through 2004, only 197 U.S. soldiers died in Afghanistan. Second, as part of their 2

2 criticism of the Bush administration s policy on Iraq, many Democrats took up the line that one problem was that U.S. intervention in Iraq, the bad DEBATE 25 war, had diverted attention from the good war, the one in Afghanistan, as part of the war on terrorism. As Obama put it during the campaign in a speech in Dayton, Ohio, What President Bush and Senator McCain don t understand is that the central front in the war on terror is not in Iraq, and it never was the central front is in Afghanistan where the terrorists who hit us on 9/11 are still plotting attacks seven years later. Indeed, when Bush announced during the campaign that he would be sending more troops to Afghanistan, Obama characterized the move as moving in the direction of the policy that I have advocated for years, but added that the president s plan comes up short it is not enough troops, and not enough resources, with not enough urgency. With Afghanistan a virtual non-issue during the 2008 presidential campaign, none of this made any difference to the election. However, public concern about the war had begun to stir by late in Bush s second term. Casualties had begun to creep up. At 131, U.S. annual deaths passed 100 for the first time in Then in 2007 at 232, deaths exceeded 200 annually for the first time. And 2009 will almost surely see 300 surpassed for the first time. As casualties grew the situation in Afghanistan stood stalemated or even, in the view of many, worsened, public support softened. In February 2007, 56% of Americans replied worth fighting, when asked, Considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting, or not? By July 2008, the worth fighting response had declined to 51%, and only 47% said worth fighting in August Sameer Dossani takes the not worth fighting view in the first of the following two readings. POINTS TO PONDER Under what conditions to you think the United States can say it has succeeded in Afghanistan and begin to withdraw its troops? Apart from whether the Taliban would support terrorists if it returned to power, should U.S. opposition to a Taliban government rest on any other factors, such as the treatment of women by the fundamentalist regime? Dossani recommends that Afghans vote in a referendum on whether they want U.S. troops to continue in the country and that the United States abide by the results. Is that a good idea? 3

3 4 Debate 25 U.S. Troops in Afghanistan: Withdraw Quickly SAMEER DOSSANI The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral, begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy. Instead of diminishing evil, it multiplies it. Through violence you may murder the liar, but you cannot murder the lie, nor establish the truth. Through violence you may murder the hater, but you do not murder hate. In fact, violence merely increases hate. So it goes. Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness: only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only love can do that. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. I want justice. And there s an old poster out West, I recall, that says, Wanted: Dead or Alive. George W. Bush In recent history, two concepts of justice have stood out. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., believed in a kind of justice that could only be achieved when systematic oppression had been eliminated from the world. Along the way, people would have to be held accountable for their crimes. Those who had done wrong would have to admit that they had done wrong and pay some appropriate restitution for their crimes, as happened decades later in South Africa s truth and reconciliation commissions. But justice was forever intertwined with a changing of the human spirit for Dr. King. It was the societal uplifting of love over hate, of human dignity over human debasement. It was a coming to terms with our violent history and affirming values of love and compassion over those of hate and retribution. George W. Bush, on the other hand, believed in the justice of old Western movies and gunfights. When he inherits the Bush legacy on January 21st, 2009, Barack Obama will have to choose between these two approaches. The decision he makes will reverberate around the world and be one of the first indicators of whether Change We Can Believe In was merely good sloganeering. Ending Bush s imperial misadventures in Iraq will certainly be a top priority for the incoming administration, but Obama will also be tested in Afghanistan. His words so far calling Afghanistan the central front in the War on Terror and demanding more military action against insurgents allied with the Taliban don t inspire confidence that he would chose the King doctrine over the Bush doctrine. In 1996, the Taliban, a faction of the anti-soviet Mujahideen with fundamentalist Wahabi Muslim beliefs, took control of Kabul and most of Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter s National Security Advisor, supported the Mujahideen (who from the very beginning had fundamentalist tendencies) as part of the Afghan trap that succeeded in fatally wounding the Soviet empire. While many Afghans greeted the Taliban s rise to power with delight, their theocratic government soon began to grate on

4 National Security Policy 5 the people of Afghanistan, for whom fundamentalist Islam was almost as foreign as Mormonism. After the events of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration portrayed the Taliban as deeply connected with al-qaeda, the terrorist network that claimed responsibility for the attacks, and therefore argued for going to war against Afghanistan. When the Taliban countered that they were happy to give up Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, if the U.S. could produce any evidence for the allegation, the U.S. scoffed. Then the U.S. invaded. The invasion succeeded in two things: First, it brought down a terrible fundamentalist regime while taking an inordinately heavy toll in civilian causalities. The Taliban had instituted a brutal form of shariah law [religious law] and forced minorities to wear identification tags. They had even destroyed ancient Buddhist carvings claiming that the depiction of the human form is unislamic. Many Afghans particularly the half of the population who happen to be women were excited to see the Taliban ousted. While this is an accomplishment, it s worth remembering that expectations for improvement in women s lives were largely unmet. The second and even more dangerous accomplishment of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was to elevate the Taliban, al-qaeda and anyone willing to resist U.S. aggression to the status of heroes or freedom fighters. Perhaps the easiest way to understand what most Afghans and many South Asians, Muslims, and others around the world felt after the invasion is to remember how Americans felt after the September 11 attacks. George W. Bush was a deeply unpopular president. [From the editor: Shameer s context is not clear here, but the job approval polls of both CNN and Gallup had Bush with a 57% approval rate a month before the 9/11 attacks.] The election that brought him to power had split the population, with shady dealings in Florida and an activist Supreme Court ultimately deciding the race in favor of Bush. Many of my liberal compatriots despised the president, who was already acquiring a reputation for spending his presidency on vacation. But after the 9/11 attacks, those same liberals were rallying around Bush. The logic was simple: in a time of crisis, with your country under attack, you support those who are going to defend you. You may not like George W. Bush, but his policies and his armed forces stand between you and whoever caused significant damage to New York and Washington, D.C. By the same logic, who stood between Afghan civilians and the NATO aerial bombardments that killed about 3,000 people? The Taliban. Every bomb that detonated on a wedding party led to tens, perhaps hundreds of young people mostly young boys and many of them orphans joining the resistance movement under the flag of the Taliban. And it s not just that the Afghan population believes that the Taliban resistance is legitimate; that resistance is legitimate under international law. No less important a document than the United Nations charter gives the Taliban and other Afghans the right to legitimate self-defense against U.S. aggression. THE REAL WAR AGAINST FUNDAMENTALISM So if aerial bombardments and occupations give legitimacy to those very fundamentalists who Afghans would remove from power, what does the real war on fundamentalism look like?

5 6 Debate 25 In 1999 I was the first staff person of the International Network for the Rights of Female Victims of Violence in Pakistan, a group that was combating honor crimes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These were incidences of domestic violence, often against a wife, a sister, a daughter or even a mother who was accused of having some kind of illicit sexual relationship. We understood that these crimes were on the rise because of the spread of Taliban-style Wahabi Islam into tribal areas that already had an extremely patriarchal view of women s bodies. What was our weapon of choice in fighting against the Talibanization of what has traditionally been a tolerant, ecumenical form of Islam? Education. We taught women their rights under Pakistani and Afghani law, we taught about the passages in the Quran that mentioned women s rights, and we also tried to educate people about other traditions whether they be secular humanist traditions or the Hindu and Christian traditions of neighboring countries and tribes. In other words we tried to undermine the hatred, the xenophobia, the fear upon which fundamentalism is built. Such efforts may take generations, and they almost always require the state to play a role in education, development and ensuring employment for all. But ultimately education is the only way to combat religious fundamentalism, just as negotiation is ultimately the only way to end war. BUYING INTO A FAILED SOLUTION While Obama s election may indicate a shift in U.S. foreign policy (and hopefully a rejection of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war), Obama has prescribed more military operations in Afghanistan. For more than a year, Obama has argued for redeploying U.S. troops from Iraq to Afghanistan. He has called Afghanistan the central front in the War on Terror and has even threatened to bomb Pakistan should there be evidence that Afghan warlords are hiding there and the Pakistani government isn t doing enough about it. (On this last point, Bush has already bombed Pakistan several times over the last few months, prompting the Pakistani government to publicly rebuke the U.S. for violating its sovereignty.) While Obama s rhetoric in arguing for increased involvement in Afghanistan makes some sense he claims that Bush has been so involved with Iraq that the al-qaeda leaders who allegedly orchestrated the September 11 attacks are still at large his proposed methodology doesn t. Instead of scaling up an already disastrous war, the United States could change course in a way that would ultimately do a lot more to ensure the world s safety. Such measures should include: 1. Withdrawing troops. International law is clear on this subject. No country may occupy another indefinitely and certainly not without the will of the people being occupied. If an Obama administration truly thinks that withdrawing U.S. and NATO troops would be a bad thing for Afghans, hold a referendum to see who would like the troops to remain. 2. Working with the various Afghan factions to begin negotiations. Wars are rarely stopped on the battlefield, and those that are have a tendency to break out again after a few years. The recent history of Afghanistan illustrates this point. It s better by far

6 National Security Policy 7 for enemies and friends, Pashtun, Tajik, and others to settle differences through negotiation based on mutual respect and the rule of law. 3. Once stability and security are guaranteed in Afghanistan, beginning the attack on fundamentalism in earnest. Working to incorporate Afghanistan into the international human rights framework through enforcing UN measures which Afghanistan has already ratified, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women is one step that can be taken in this regard. Another is major investment in social infrastructure and particularly health and education measures which will ultimately help Afghanistan recover from being bombed into the stone age. If the idea of immediately stopping all military operations in Afghanistan sounds radical, it shouldn t. No less than [Afghanistan s] President Hamid Karzai pleaded for an end to the bombings immediately after the U.S. election, as yet another wedding party [in Afghanistan] fell victim to bombs from the sky [by U.S. war planes]. For the sake of all us, Afghan and American, let s hope President Barack Obama heeds his call.

7 8 Debate 25 U.S. Troops in Afghanistan: Stay the Course MICHAEL G. MULLEN It is my privilege to testify on our strategic partnerships with Pakistan and Afghanistan. I set three priorities for the U.S. military upon becoming chairman[of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff] that continue to guide our efforts. First, we must continue to improve stability and defend our vital national interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia. Second, we must continue efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed Forces. Third, we must continue to balance global strategic risks in a manner that enables us to deter conflict and be prepared for future conflicts. The three strategic priorities are underpinned by the concept of persistent engagement, which supports allies and partners through programs abroad and at home and which must be led by and conducted hand-in-hand with our interagency partners to achieve sustainable results. These three priorities all contribute to our Nation s ability to build and sustain enduring relationships with our Pakistani and Afghan partners. REGIONAL ADJUSTMENTS In Afghanistan and Pakistan we are providing additional resources to address the increase in violence we have seen over the past year. The strategic goal as outlined by the President on March 27, 2009, is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country. As that strategy was being developed in consultation with our NATO Allies and other partners, we began responding to conditions on the ground by reinforcing the International Security and Assistance Force with some 17,700 troops, the majority of which will arrive by this summer. Our aim in Afghanistan is to check the momentum of the insurgency, train additional forces, and ensure security for the Afghan national elections in August while in Pakistan we will work with the Pakistani military to further develop their counterinsurgency skills and build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels. The main effort is Afghanistan, though our residual footprint in Iraq will remain larger than in Afghanistan until well into The strategic environment we face beyond these ongoing conflicts is uncertain and complex, particularly in South Central Asia. In the near term, we will maintain focus on threats to our vital national interests and our forces directly in harm s way. Increasingly, the greatest mid-term military threats will come from transnational concerns the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, transnational terrorism, competition over energy, water, and other vital resources, natural disasters and pandemics, climate change, and space vulnerabilities. The global economic crisis has obviously affected South Central Asia, which, on top of existing conditions, increases the likelihood that internal strife, virulent nationalism, manufactured crises, or state conflict may generate additional crises. Economic concerns will increasingly be the lens through which we and our partners and competitors filter security considerations. Many nations may decrease expenditures on defense and foreign assistance, thus making the pool of collective resources we have to address challenges smaller. We will work through our military-to-military contacts to address this tendency directly and help to coordinate priorities, emphasizing that we are all bound together in this global economy.

8 National Security Policy 9 SOUTH CENTRAL ASIA Given its strategic importance and our vital national interests, the United States will continue to engage in South Central Asia as a commitment to friends and allies, as a catalyst for cooperative action against violent extremism, as a deterrent against state aggression, as an honest broker in conflict resolution, and as a guarantor of access to natural resources. Attaining our goals in this critical region requires time, resources, patience, and endurance. Most of the challenges in the region are not military in nature and can only be met successfully through development and political leadership from within. Our role remains one essentially of consistent, transparent partnership building. These actions send an unmistakable message to all that the U.S. remains committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of partnerships available to address future challenges. Central to our efforts in South Central Asia is the relentless pressure we will maintain on al-qaeda and its senior leadership. Al-Qaeda s narrative will increasingly be exposed as corrupt and self-limiting. Though too many disaffected young men still fall prey to al-qaeda s exploitation, I believe the populations in the region will ultimately reject what al-qaeda offers. The U.S. military s task is to partner with affected nations to combat terrorism, counter violent extremism, and build their capacity to shoulder this same burden. Afghanistan and Pakistan are key partners in the fight against al-qaeda and militant global extremism and must be understood in relation to each other. Afghanistan requires additional resources to counter a growing insurgency partially fed by safe havens and support networks located within Pakistan. Additional U.S. troops will conduct counterinsurgency operations to enhance population security against the Taliban in south/southwest Afghanistan and to accelerate and improve training and mentoring of Afghan security forces. As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. We must make every effort to eliminate civilian casualties, not only because this is the right thing to do but also because it deprives the Taliban of a propaganda tool that exploits Afghan casualties and calls into question U.S./NATO endurance and effectiveness in providing security. Although we must expect higher Alliance casualties as we go after the insurgents, their sanctuaries, and their sources of support, our extended security presence must and will ultimately protect the Afghan people and limit both civilian and military casualties. Our troops will integrate closely with Afghan forces, with the objective of building Afghan security forces that are capable of assuming responsibility for their country s security. We expect the reinforcements to have the most pronounced effect over the next months. Security gains can only be assured when complemented by development and governance programs designed to build greater self sufficiency over time. Our commanders in the field can lay some of this groundwork through the proven Commanders Emergency Response Program to start smaller projects quickly, but these projects can not compensate for the larger, enduring programs required. A temporary boost in security that is not matched with commensurate political and economic development will not only fail to generate faith in the Afghan government and fail to convince Afghans of our commitment, but also fail to accomplish our objectives. Over time, these objectives will be met more through civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations, with a lighter military presence. Getting to that point, however,

9 10 Debate 25 requires that military forces generate the security required for political and economic initiatives to take root. Pakistan is crucial to our success in Afghanistan. In my nine trips to Pakistan, I ve developed a deeper understanding of how important it is that we, as a Nation, make and demonstrate a long term commitment to sustaining this partnership. In my military judgment, the programs outlined in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 can serve as an important demonstration of our Nation s enduring commitment to the government and people of Pakistan. The bill s long term approach, extending over the next five years, can help to allay the fear of abandonment that I have encountered during my interactions with Pakistani leaders. These programs, focused on civilian projects, will be essential complements to the programs we have underway with our military counterparts. It is essential that we have an expansive program of civilian assistance alongside our military assistance to the government of Pakistan. We look forward to working with Committee to ensure that this proposed legislation best positions us to achieve our strategic goals. In my military judgment, I also believe the Reconstruction and Opportunity Zone legislation the President has asked Congress to pass is an accompanying program which can stimulate badly needed jobs in Pakistan s troubled border region as well as in Afghanistan. These jobs would encourage legitimate livelihood alternatives for economically vulnerable young men and help counter the illicit and destabilizing income options that are now prevalent. We are taking multiple approaches to rebuild and strengthen relationships and address threats common to both of our nations. One key approach in the near term is to help Pakistan s military to improve its overall and specifically its counterinsurgency capabilities. Beyond the trainers we will continue to provide, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, Foreign Military Financing and Coalition Support Funds provide us the means to address this issue directly, and I ask the Congress to support these initiatives and provide the flexibility to accelerate their implementation. We will ensure that greater accountability measures are in place so that these funds go where they are intended to go. These programs will help the Pakistanis take continued action to combat extremist threats in western Pakistani territories which will complement the reinforcement of troops and special operations efforts in Afghanistan to maintain pressure on al-qaeda and Taliban leadership. We will also be well served by a substantially larger International Military Education and Training program with Pakistan, to help enhance and forge lasting mil-to-mil relationships. I endorse a similar approach for and with our interagency partners, and I fully support the building of the Civilian Response Corps, which could be of considerable use to our diplomats in South Central Asia. Achieving the objectives of any campaign requires increased emphasis not only on fully developing and resourcing the capacity of other U.S. agencies (State, USAID, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce and so forth), but also on increasing our Nation s ability to build similar interagency capacities with foreign partners. Al-Qaeda has expressed the desire for WMD and their intent to strike our homeland is undisputed. Consequently, the nexus between violent extremism and the proliferation of WMD, most dangerously in South Central Asia, remains a grave threat to the United States and our vital national interests. The defeat of al-qaeda would significantly diminish the threat from this nexus, but does not fully remove it given the conceptual blueprint already established for other extremists. We will continue to support

10 National Security Policy 11 national efforts to counter, limit, and contain WMD and missile proliferation from both hostile state and non-state actors. We will also team with partners inside and outside the region to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen regional governments confidence that we can address the WMD threat. To this end, I remain satisfied that Pakistan s nuclear weapons are secure and that Pakistan s leadership and military are intensely focused on this issue. We have worked together closely and share the same strategic concerns, namely that this threat requires vigilance for the duration, given the magnitude of damage that could be wrought by even a single incident. We both recognize that we can never take the duty to safeguard nuclear weapons and material for granted. In all, we must recognize the limits of what can be accomplished at what price and at what pace in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. This will be a long campaign. In keeping with the Presidents pledge to hold ourselves accountable, the interagency is working to develop measures of effectiveness to help us measure progress in both countries. We do understand the sensitivity to these measures our partners have, but our Nation s efforts also make it clear to them that we are committed to providing sustained, substantial commitment. Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be halting and gradual, but we can steadily reduce the threats to our Nation that emanate from conditions in those countries. We are taking steps now to move additional troops into place, to refine the command structure, and to benefit from the pertinent counterinsurgency lessons we have learned thus far as we move forward with our Afghan, Pakistani, interagency, and international partners in accomplishing the strategic goal directed by the President. Of particular importance in accomplishing this goal is India, which has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner of the United States. The historic regional security dynamics between Pakistan and India complicate an already complex situation. We have seen some progress in transparency and timeliness of communications between the two nations, particularly in the aftermath of the attacks in Mumbai last November. To the extent that we can continue to assist our two partners in resolving points of potential conflict and cooperating to address extremist threats to both nations, the better will be the effects of our actions already underway in South Central Asia. CONCLUSION In providing my best military advice over the past 18 months, one important point I have made, consonant with Secretary Gates, is that our military activities must support rather than lead our Nation s foreign policy. Our war fighting ability will never be in doubt. But we have learned from the past seven plus years of war that we serve this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated approach that employs all elements of power to achieve the policy goals set by our civilian leaders. This approach is crucial in South Central Asia. To this end, I believe we should fully fund the State Department as the lead agent of U.S. diplomacy and development, an action that would undoubtedly resonate regionally and globally. This approach obviously requires the backing of a robust military and a strong economy. As we win the wars we are fighting and restore the health of our Armed Forces, the military s approach will increasingly support our diplomatic counterparts through the persistent engagement required to build networks of capable partners. By operating hand-in-hand with partners and inte-

11 12 Debate 25 grated with the interagency and non-governmental organizations, we will more successfully protect the citizens of this Nation. On behalf of our service members, I would like to thank Congress for the sustained investment in them and for your unwavering support in time of war.

12 THE CONTINUING DEBATE: U.S. Troops in Afghanistan National Security Policy 13 What Is New In 2009 amid a still limping economy and the epic battle over health care, Afghanistan remained largely out of the spotlight, but it is a center-stage issue waiting to happen. Clearly the Obama administration is seeking new direction in the struggle. In February, the president ordered 17,000 additional troops into the country within a few months, thereby increasing U.S. forces in Afghanistan by nearly 50%. Then in May, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates signaled discontent with the progress of the war by replacing General David McKiernan, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, with Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, whose expertise is in special operations. The new administration also seemed to be trying to set the stage for accepting something less than an optimal end to the U.S. involvement. Gates told Congress that the existing mission in Afghanistan was too broad and needed to be more realistic and focused. As he put it, If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money. As for public opinion, it remained uncertain. When asked in 2009 whether going to war in Afghanistan had been the right thing to do, 58% of Americans said yes. But when asked by another poll, Do you favor or oppose the U.S. war in Afghanistan? only 41% said favor. Similarly, one poll found 53% in favor of Obama s decision to send more troops; another survey recorded 52% opposed. Where to Find More A reasonable contemporary Web site on Afghanistan is located at For U.S. policy go to the White House s Web page at and keyboard Afghanistan into the search window. The Department of Defense site at using the search window will yield more on the military side. In the Graveyard of Empires: America s War in Afghanistan (Norton, 2009) by Seth G. Jones discusses the thinking in the Bush administration about Afghanistan. For an idea that may gain traction in the future, see Ashley J. Tellis, Reconciling With the Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2009). For a general background, read David Loyn, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). What More to Do The notion of having an exit strategy has gained currency in recent years. Work with your class to devise an American exit strategy for Afghanistan by first deciding what you minimally want to achieve in Afghanistan then fashioning a military-diplomatic-economic strategy to achieve at least your minimum goals.