CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Country Brief

Transcription

1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Country Brief November 2011

2 Context

3 Political History 1960 CAR independent from France on 13 August. David Dacko, Minister of the Interior, forces parliament to elect him as first president Dacko, candidate of single party established in 1962, wins first elections Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa, former captain of the French army, takes power in a bloody coup over a weak Dacko on 31 December with a mission to eradicate corruption and improve the economy Apr Support to Bokassa weakens after Ngaragba massacre, when 250 students demonstrating in Bangui were beaten and thrown into Ngaragba prison, where dozens died. 20 Sep Bokassa overthrown; Dacko put back into power. French army forced to secure Bangui following demonstrations of discontent Dacko wins elections over Ange-Felix Patassé, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the CAR (MLPC), however, unconfident he hands power to the Military Committee for National Recovery (CRMN) headed by General André Kolingba, the Central African Armed Force s (FACA) Chief of Staff Two attempted coups blocked; one by Patassé and one by François Bozizé and Alphonse Mbaïkoua. Bozizé flees to Chad and Mbaïkoua to Markounda, north CAR. Context 3

4 Political History 1991 Multi-party system ratified in reformed constitution Patassé defeats Kolingba in elections; ending military rule After a series of mutinies between 1996 and 1997, France boosts military presence in Bangui to protect constitutional order. French troops later replaced by 750 peacekeeping troops from the Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB) ,350 soldiers with the UN Mission for the Central African Republic (MINURCA) replace MISAB with a mandate to ensure security in Bangui for three months Patassé defeats multiple parties in first round of elections Apr - UN withdraws peacekeeping force, MINURCA, and established UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BONUCA). Heightened unrest over civil servants wages. Context 4

5 Political History 2001 May - Attempted coup; Kolingba first claims responsibility, but later thought to may have been Bozizé, then FACA Chief of Staff. Government supporters attack Kolingba supports, forcing 50,000 residents to flee Bangui. Patassé maintains his position in power with the support of Libyan soldiers sent by Colonel Qaddafi. Dec peacekeeping troops from the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), formed by Qaddafi, deployed to Bangui to secure capital Oct - Supporters of Bozizé raid Bangui; driven back by Libyan forces and combatants of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Dec 300 Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) soldiers replace CEN-SAD Bozizé, with support from Chad, launches a successful coup in March and becomes Head of State and Minister of Defense. Wave of looting by the liberators in Bangui and even more in central and northern regions Bozizé wins elections over Martin Ziguélé in second round. Context 5

6 Political History Insecurity increases in the northern regions where civil administration fled due to lack of payment, leaving FACA as the only government representatives. The Presidential Guard and the FACA conduct attacks against the population and rebel groups, and increase in banditry profiting from a weak state. Many rebel groups formed or strengthened to protect their civilians, keep control of their resources and demand support from the State. More than 300,000 displaced within the CAR or fleeing to Cameroon and Chad. Sep 2007 U.N. Mission in CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) established under Security Council resolution 1778 in order to contribute to the protection of civilians; promote human rights and the rule of law; and promote regional peace. In the CAR, presence limited to Vakaga, isolated prefecture in the north-east. Feb 2008 First Lord s Resistance Army attack on the southeastern regions of CAR, driving people from their villages to seek refugee in main towns. June 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached between the Government and all but one rebel group. Agreement calls for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. Context 6

7 Political History Jul 2008 Regional peace-keeping force MICOPAX, under the responsibility of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), replaces FOMUC starting its mandate in Jan 2009 with an objective to protect civilians, secure the territory, contribute to the national reconciliation process and facilitate political dialogue. Jun Aug 2009 Ugandan People s Defense Force (UPDF) establish presence in the LRA-affected southeast. Sep 2009 Front Populaire pour le Redressement (FPR), Chadian armed rebel group led by Baba Laddé, stage first attack in the CAR. Nov 2010 MINURCAT ends its mandate, and leaves Vakaga. 23 Jan 2011 Bozizé wins presidential elections against Patassé, and his national party, Kwa na Kwa, takes the majority in the parliament in legislative elections. 12 Jun 2011 Government of CAR signs a ceasefire agreement with the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the only major armed group not to have signed the June 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 25 Jun 2011 Launch of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) for ex-combatants with 5 groups to participate. Sources: International Crisis Group, European Commission, UN DPKO, UN Security Council Reports Context 7

8 The People of CAR Population : 4,442,000 (70% living in the western parts of the country) Languages: French (official language), Sangho (lingua franca and national language), and more than 74 local languages Religion*: 35% indigenous beliefs, 35% Protestant, 25% Roman Catholic, 15% Islam Ethnic Groups: 33% Gbaya, 27% Banda, 13% Mandjia, 7.9%, 10% Sara, 7% Mboum, 4% M Baka, 4% Yakoma, 2% other *Animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the Christian majority Sources: UNFPA (2010), CIA World Fact Book (2011) Context 8

9 Neighbors in state of conflict or instability 1. Chad Insecurity due to armed rebel groups, inter-ethnic tensions over access to land and natural resources and banditry.: 2. Lord s Resistance Army Actively committing atrocities in southeast CAR, northern DRC and South Sudan. 3. Equateur, DRC Inter-ethnic clashes led to massive displacement in 2009 and The situation has since calmed with an on-going reconciliation process Darfur, Sudan Ongoing conflict between rebel factions and the Government of Sudan. 5. South Sudan Newly independent, inter-clan conflict and tensions with the north still remain. 6. Ituri, DRC While the land disputes between agriculturalists and pastoralists have calmed, armed groups remain active. 7. The Kivus, DRC Conflict fueled by vast natural resources in the region, the Army is fighting mainly Rwandan Hutu rebels (FDLR) and a collection of other insurgents.

10 Economy and Development HDI 1 1 Human Development Index rank 179 out of 187 countries GDP 1 1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rank 168 out of 173 countries POV 1 1 Living on less than US$1.25 per day rank 103 out of 111 countries Central African Republic Country in Sub-Saharan Africa Other country Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2011 Context 10

11 Millennium Development Goals Where are we? Progress by goal with 3.5 years to go until 2015 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Achieve universal primary education Promote gender equality and empower women Reduce child mortality Achieved Very likely to be achieved, on track Possible to achieve if some changes are made Off track Insufficient information Improve Maternal Health Combat HIV/AID, malaria and other diseases Ensure environmental sustainability Develop a global partnership for development Status in accordance with national government reporting. Source: National MDG Report 2010 Context 11

12 Growth CAR s HDI grew by 10% between 2005 and 2011, above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa which grew by 7.4% Human Development Index (HDI) Growth since 2005 (%) 20% 15 Country in Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa average Central African Republic Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2011 Context 12

13 Governance The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, measuring the delivery of public good and services to citizens by government and non-state actors, ranked CAR 48 out of 53 (53 being low value) in Mauritius (score of 83) Seychelles (79) Botswana (76) Cape Verde (75) South Africa (71) Namibia (67) Ghana (65) Tunisia (62) Egypt (60) Lesotho (60) Sao Tomé and Príncipe (58) Benin (57) Morocco (57) Senegal (56) Algeria (55) Tanzania (55) Zambia (55) Gambia (53) Mali (53) Mozambique (52) Burkina Faso (52) Malawi (52) Libya (51) Uganda (51) Swaziland (51) Kenya (51) Gabon (50) Madagascar (49) Comoros (49) Djibouti (49) Rwanda (47) Sierra Leone (46) Burundi (45) Cameroon (44) Ethiopia (44) Mauritania (43) Nigeria (43) Liberia (43) Togo (43) Niger (42) Congo (42) Angola (39) Guinea-Bissau (39) Côte d Ivoire (37) Guinea (36) Equatorial Guinea (35) Sudan (33) Central African Republic (33) Zimbabwe (33) Eritrea (32) Democratic Republic of the Congo (31) Chad (29) Somalia (8) Sources: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2008/09) Context 13

14 Infrastructure A country slightly larger than France with less than 700km of paved roads. UNHAS, ICRC and BINUCA flights are the only domestic flight available to most humanitarians and are often disrupted during the rainy season. Context 14

15 High Resource Potential Timber and diamonds are the CAR s principal exports, accounting for over US$100 M in 2009, 7% of the GDP. Diamond deposits Uranium deposits Gold deposits Wood production Sources: Banque des Etats de l Afrique centrale (2009), DPDDA (2011), PARFAF (2008), HDPT (2010)

16 Humanitarian Situation

17 Pockets of fragility, instability and/or conflict North-central Chronically problematic due to nomadic group movement, banditry and presence of national and international armed groups. North-east Ethnic tensions and inter-tribal attacks. Increase in insecurity and displacement during the dry season with transhumance movements has seen an increase in criminality in this region, what some are calling Darfourization. North-west A recovering region with spontaneous returns of IDPs and refugees. The DDR process could create more durable conditions for a systematic return, however risks leaving a security vacuum. South-East Lord s Resistance Army actively committing atrocities forcing people off their land and confining them to larger villages.

18 Displacement

19 Humanitarian Access Constraints 1 Attacks by national and foreign rebel groups Close to 10 rebel groups and national and international forces operate in CAR. Armed attacks and conflicts in the north, east and south-east make it often too dangerous for humanitarian access and military authority pose access restrictions. 2 Banditry and highway robbers Banditry is a chronic problem throughout the entire of the CAR, especially along main roads where civilians are often the targets of armed ambushes. Humanitarian organisations are victim to armed robbery, looting and kidnapping. 3 Difficult terrain and poor infrastructure Slightly larger than France, CAR has less than 700km of paved roads. During the May- November rainy season, there is no road access to the east and northeast. UNHAS, ICRC and BINUCA flights are the only domestics flights available to most humanitarians and are often disrupted during the rainy season. Humanitarian Situation 19

20 Humanitarian Needs

21 Health Quick facts Less than 30% of population have access to health services and 78% live more than 10km from the nearest health center 1 physician for more than 55,500 people and 1 health worker for 7,000 people Years of life lost by causes Non-communicable diseases 14% 7% Injuries 78% Communicable diseases Life expectancy fell from 52 to 48 between 1990 and 2007 being at 48 for women and 48 for men 47% of births not assisted Maternal mortality rate at 850 per 100,000 as compared to 620 for regional average Causes of death in children under-5 1% Injuries 2% Congenital abnormalities 4% Neonatal sepsis 7% Birth asphyxia 8% Prematurity Diarrhea 14% 15% Under-5 mortality rate at 179 per 1,000 as compared to 127 for regional Other average Sources: Preliminary MICS IV (2010), World Bank, WHO Health Profile (Apr 2011) 28% 17% Malaria Pneumonia Humanitarian Needs 21

22 HIV/AIDS Quick facts 5.9% of population are HIV-positive, with over 10% infected in some prefectures HIV/AIDS prevalence by prefecture for women and men aged (%) Women significantly more affected, with 6.3% affected as compared to 5.4% of men Prevalence 2.94 times higher in urban areas than rural Prevalence of contraceptives only 19% as compared to 24% regional average % in Bangui 2 no data Source: Preliminary MICS IV (2010) Humanitarian Needs 22

23 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Quick facts 67% of the population (92% in urban and 51% in rural areas) using improved drinking water source Only 34% of population (43% in urban and 14% in rural areas) using improved sanitation facilities 25% of 4,000 water points in the country currently not functioning, and awareness levels as well as technical expertise to maintain water points is insufficient. Open-air defecation common No waste management system Access to improved water source CAR Sub-Saharan Africa Access to improved sanitation CAR Sub-Saharan Africa 67% 60% 34% 31% Source: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (2010) Humanitarian Needs 23

24 Food Security and Nutrition Quick facts Two in five children under the age of five chronically malnourished, and one in ten are underweight. High agricultural potential with 15 million ha arable land, one of the highest rainfalls per person in the world and 74% of the population engaged in agriculture. Low agricultural output with only 4% of arable land cultivated each year. 94% of farming is subsistence and the average cultivated land per farmer is less than 0.5 hectares Cultivated land Arable land Source: Preliminary MICS IV (2010), WASH Cluster (2011) Humanitarian Needs 24

25 Education Quick facts Only 1.5% of GDP spent on education, almost 5% below African average Primary net enrolment rate 63% in 2009 Pupil to teacher ratio 95:1 in primary education Almost 60% of teacher are parents Only 36% of pupils completed basic primary education in 2009 Adult literacy rate for 69.8% men and 47.2% for women Pupils per teacher in Sub-Saharan Africa (top 20) Central African Republic Rwanda Congo Mozambique Chad Ethiopia Tanzania Burundi Mali Uganda Burkina Faso Madagascar Kenya Cameroon Benin Guinea Côte d Ivoire Togo Mauritania Niger pupils for every teacher Source: Min. of Education (2009), UNESCO (2009) 20 pupils Humanitarian Needs 25

26 Protection Quick facts An estimated 66,545 Central Africans are precariously returning, and an estimated 105,206 remain displaced within the CAR. More than 22,180 were newly displaced in 2011 in the north and the east due to ongoing conflicts. 164,905 Central Africans are refugees in neighboring countries. Doubts remains over the impartiality and independence of judicial system which is weak and often absent. Poor legal documentation of citizens. Common issues include domestic violence, forced and early marriage and accusations related to witchcraft resolving in violent confrontations. Traditions often overplay human rights violations, allowing them to be left unpunished Study by the IDMC and Watchlist in Geneva in May 2011 found evidence that at least four of the six grave violations monitored under UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) are still being committed against children in CAR: the abduction of children, recruitment or use of child soldiers, attacks against schools, and the denial of humanitarian access to children. Source: UN OCHA (2011), IDMC/Watchlist (May 2011) Humanitarian Needs 26

27 Humanitarian Response

28 Field Presence

29 Humanitarian Strategy 1 Provide coordinated and vital assistance in response to the needs of people affected by violence or other humanitarian crisis based on needs assessments and a human rights-based approach while maintaining an emergency capacity response for the rest of the country. 2 Protect people affected by conflict, in particular IDPs, refugees, returnees and other people of concern whose rights have been violated and need protection and advocacy support. This includes chiefly the development of a national legal framework for protection, the promotion of rule of law and human rights and the reinforcement of key institutions and civil society. 3 Support IDPs, returnees, host communities and others living in post-emergency settings in restarting their lives by ensuring minimum infrastructures and basic social services and an increase in selfreliance. Humanitarian Response 29

30 Humanitarian Projects Number of proposed projects and priorities per sector (as of 17 Nov 2011) Health Food Security Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Early Recovery Education Protection Nutrition Coordination and Support Services Not Specified Priority Immediate High Medium Not Specified Multi-Sector Assistance to Refugees 5 projects Source: OCHA FTS Humanitarian Response 30

31 Humanitarian Requirements US$141 M required in % funded Requirements and funding per sector (as of 17 Nov 2011) Food Security Health Multi-Sector Assistance to Refugees Protection Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 11.2 Nutrition 8.2 Early Recovery 7.9 Coordination and Support Services 7.8 Education 5.6 Funding not yet allocated Funding* Requirements 27.4 *Funding include contributions, commitments and carry-over required 0 Source: OCHA FTS US$10M 20M 30M Humanitarian Response 31

32 Challenges

33 Humanitarian Projects Chronically Underfunded Requirements and Funding Requirements Funding at year-end Funding* at mid-year 100M 91M required % 100 *Funding include contributions, commitments and carry-over. 74% funded 73% 44% US$20M Source: OCHA FTS (June 2011) Challenges 33

34 Challenges in the Transition to Early Recovery 1 Administrative branch fragile and limited. 2 Unpredictable security situation in post-conflict leave a handicap in implementation of early recovery activities. 3 Poor baseline data and challenge in collecting data make it difficult prioritize socio-economic projects and to formulate indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the progress. 4 Low level and low capacity of local communities to self-manage and maintain socio-economic structures and infrastructures developed by humanitarian actors. 5 Lack of technical service support to the local communities in the design, development and implementation of technical projects for the rehabilitation of communities. 6 Sustainability of income-generating activities and factors blocking private entrepreneurship. Challenges 34

35 Development Assistance Rate Behind Others in the Region Development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa increasing on average by 181% since 1985, and only 37% to CAR ODA Growth since 1985 (%) 700% Sub-Saharan Africa Central African Republic Source: OECD (Aug 2011), Development Assistance Disbursements (constant USD), All donors Challenges 35

36 Security Sector Reform (SSR) slow to progress Often misunderstood or thought to solely include the reform of lawenforcement in the CAR, the ultimate objective of the SSR is make the State s ability to perform its duties most effectively to guarantee legal security thus creating a climate conducive to the resumption of economic activities leading to the economic autonomy of the CAR. National approach adopted at the SSR Seminar in April 2008 outlining 4 fundamental assumptions: 1 Holistic and comprehensive approach to SSR meaning each component (civil or military) must be coordinated 2 The SSR is based on actual national ownership, and the national context is the starting point 3 The commitment of the entire government is essential to effective support to political action and economic development 4 The SSR is inseparable from the democratic control of the sector, highlighting the crucial role of Parliament, civil society, the media, etc. Joint assessment of national and international experts in October 2009 found that the majority of short term tasks were carried out satisfactorily, however no progress since. Window of opportunity with the creation of a SSR unit within BINUCA and a push to encourage parties involved to re-launch the SSR. Challenges 36

37 Perspectives for 2011 and 2012 Peace Consolidation Opportunities Disarmament of 5 political-military groups underway in the field, and plan for reintegration of 8,000 former combatants Returns to the north-west driven by confidence in an post-crisis population Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the only armed group not to have signed the June 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed cease-fire with the Government of CAR in June 2011 opening the doors for their integration into the DDR process Security, collaboration and good governance allows opens up doors for growth and development Threats SSR heavily reliant on strong national approach in the State and a revision of the national SSR approach of which both are lacking Increased criminality partnered with a weak military leave population vulnerable, especially along the international borders Violent ethnic radicalization, especially in the northern and eastern regions and tensions with transhumance groups Lord s Resistance Army increasingly active in the south-east Slip back into full-scale violence Challenges 37

38 Perspectives for 2011 and 2012 Economic Growth Opportunities Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper underway, promoting a common strategy for the government and development community Most of the population in the northwestern part of the country who were displaced by the conflict between 2002 and 2006 have returned, are well established and transitioning or ready to transition to recovery and take back control of the agricultural sector Increase in timber and diamond exports help stimulate the GDP Break circle of poverty and move into early recovery and development Threats Little room for development and growth within a context of poor governance Poor infrastructure and violence inhibits access to development actors Lack of the State in resource rich regions limit formal business activity Economic growth heavily dependent on peace consolidation Weak interest and funding to early recovery and development projects Remain in circle of poverty and dependence on foreign aid and humanitarian interventions Challenges 38

39 For more information, please visit and November 2011