Country Case Study: Syria. For the Foreign Secretary and associated advisors. By Asim Rizvanovic. Asim Rizvanovic 1

Transcription

1 Using a regional or country case-study, make an assessment of the levels of instability within that region or country, and the likely impact to UK interests (out to 2015). Country Case Study: Syria For the Foreign Secretary and associated advisors By 1

2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the commencement of hostilities within Syria the conflict has killed people, 1 displaced internally 1.2 million, and caused 335,000 to become refugees. 2 Regional and international powers have vital interests in Syria and this has been highlighted by Iranian and Russian support of the current regime. This brief will highlight how UK interests are affected and how they can be furthered and protected in Syria with a list of policy recommendations which are in line with other UK policies. The prescriptions analyse the second and third moves of other parties as well as considering the overall longer-term implications. Recommendations: Creation of humanitarian corridors, supply of medical and communications equipment, supply of personal armour, monitoring of British Muslims engaging in the conflict, and dialogue with opposition leaders. SITUATION BRIEF The conflict in Syria is largely a result of forty-nine years of dominance by the minority Alawite sect. Dissent has most been most visible amongst the lower socioeconomic groups. 3 The conflict began on the 15 th. March, 2011 as part of 1 Centre for Documentation of Violations in Syria, Statistics for the Number of Martyrs, sy.org/index.php/en/ (Nov. 9, 2012). 2 Raissa Kasolowsky, "Up to 335,000 people have fled Syria violence: UNHCR", Reuters, Oct. 9, 2012 ( syria- crisis- refugees- idusbre8980zp ). 3 Suzanne Saleeby, Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract s Unraveling, Jadaliyya, Feb. 16, 2012 ( the- seeds- of- dissent_economic- grievances- an). 2

3 the regional Arab Spring uprising. The betrayal of the government s responsibility to protect as a result of the crackdown on demonstrators by government forces and the refusal of Assad to step down has led to the escalation of violence into a civil war, with outside actors influencing hostilities. Whilst the US, GCC, Arab League and the EU have condemned Assad and his regime, Russia, China and particularly Iran continue to issue support. Human rights violations have allegedly been committed by both government forces 4 and by opposition groups. 5 Key Stakeholders Bashar Al-Assad/Ba ath Party: Assad, the leader of the Ba ath party, and the party itself are seeking to retake the whole of the country by violent means. Assad s family has been in power for thirty-three years. Has made concessions in the past, such as lifting the state of emergency, but such moves have had little effect. Free Syria Army: Main opposition group. Led by Colonel Riad Al-Asaad, formerly of the Syrian Air Force. Goal is the overthrow of the government. The FSA claims that it has no political or religious prerogative, except removing Assad. If successful the likelihood of a smooth transition to democracy is very low. The US has established contact between Gulf States and the FSA to ensure its funding. The Syrian Support Group based in Washington has the ability to 4 United Nations, Humanitarian Situation in Syria Deteriorating, with 2.5 Million Urgently Needing Relief, Says Secretary- General, Accusing Both Sides of Atrocities, (Sept. 4, 2012). 5 Human Rights Watch, Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses, armed- opposition- groups- committing- abuses (March. 20, 2012). 3

4 legally raise funds for the FSA. Saudi Arabia s strong support of the FSA is an indication of its long held desire to change Syria s secular stance, and to gain a regional ally. Russia: From 2005 to 2011, Syria was Russia s seventh largest arms customer, with sales worth $831 million. 6 The navy base at Tartus is the only Mediterranean base the Russians have. Any military intervention is viewed by them as a violation of sovereignty; this view is compounded by their own current internal issues. They will only agree to moves that further their own distinct policies. Regional Players: Allegedly Iran has sent 15,000 troops from its Quds Force. 7 Likely that Iran will continue to support its ally, even if international intervention occurs, but the likelihood of openly supporting it with its maximum military strength is low at this time. Hezbollah has been supporting the Syrian government, but its involvement will not be sufficient to keep Assad in power. Equipped, trained and prepared for guerrilla warfare, whilst the requirement on the ground for the Syrian government is for a mechanised solution. Its usefulness is low and unlikely to cause much disruption amongst opposition groups. Saudi Arabia s role as chief financier is a manifestation of its will to dissolve the alliance between Iran and Syria. By installing a predominantly 6 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPIRI Arms Transfers Database (Nov. 7, 2012). 7 Russia Today, 15,000 elite Iranian special- ops 'head' to Syria, The Guardian, Oct ( iran- cooperation- protests- 969/). 4

5 Sunni regime in Syria, the power of balance within the middle-east will shift towards the Sunni sect of Islam, and further isolate Iran. Israel has little influence over the conflict; chief concern will be the potential transfer of non-conventional weapons to Hezbollah. Israel does not have a clear stance and is not openly supporting either side of the conflict. Either option for the Israelis is not a positive one from their point of view. Turkey has received an influx of refugees into its territory. Tensions between Syria and Turkey have escalated over mortar attacks, cross-border skirmishes and the downing of a Turkish Air-Force reconnaissance plane. As a result, the Turkish parliament has approved cross-border operations 8 and openly expressed its desire for regime change. 9 UK Interests in Syria The UK trades little with Syria; its main interest is security. Violence needs to be contained before spreading to other countries. The threat by British Muslims who have taken part in the conflict is very high to the UK. The UK has an excellent opportunity to rebalance power against Iran. 8 Matthew Weaver and Brian Whitaker, Turkey- Syria Border Tension, The Guardian, Oct ( syria- threat- security- live). 9 The Nation, Turkey Dubs Syria A Clear Threat Vows To Retaliate, The Nation, June ( news- newspaper- daily- english- online/international/26- Jun- 2012/turkey- dubs- syria- a- clear- threat- vows- to- retaliate). 5

6 POLICY PROPOSALS 1. Support creation of humanitarian corridor. Pros: I) Endorsed by the Syrian National Council 10 (although to what extent they represent opposition groups is very contestable. Recent developments indicate greater cohesion 11, though such actions are very likely attempts at drawing Western assistance) I Appears humanitarian conscious Useful to win hearts and minds of opposition and civilians. Cons: I) Will not be seen as enough by opposition groups Will strain Turkish-Syrian relations further. 2. Supply communications equipment. Groups are spread out between locations, without defined fronts; such equipment is vital for groups to step-up operations. The supply of medical equipment and personal armour is necessary to rebalance the theatre of war towards the opposition groups. Pros: I) Greater coordination between groups 10 The Wall Street Journal, Syrian Opposition Leader Transcript, (Dec. 2, 2011). 11 Neil Macfarquhar and Hala Droubi, With Eye on Aid, Syria Opposition Signs Unity Deal, The New York Times, Nov ( opposition- groups- sign- unity- deal.html?pagewanted=all). 6

7 I IV) Ability to mount cooperative operations across different spaces Medical equipment will keep more rebels battle-effective Morale boost V) UK will be seen as a partner. Cons: I) Temporary satisfaction; groups will want arms Russians and Iranians will see it as meddling in internal affairs; likely to increase aid to government regime. 3. Establish close contact with opposition leaders. Pros: I) Establish partnerships to ensure UK influence post-assad I Gain former ally of Iran; increased pressure on Iran Tactical advantage (intelligence-wise) if future Syria chooses not to remain an ally. Cons: I) Critics will say the UK is supporting terrorism Potential for another Afghanistan; aiding groups now does not secure their loyalty. 4. British Muslims who have engaged in combat in Syria must be monitored. Pros: I) Surveillance will control threat; to some extent 7

8 Gain Intelligence on terrorist networks in UK. Cons: I) Agencies already stretched; impossible to monitor every suspect Difficult to secure evidence that will lead to convictions. 5. Military intervention or a no-fly zone. Pros: I) Will accelerate regime-change I Secure a regional ally Military presence close to Iran. Cons: I) Expensive I Public appetite for war is lacking Very likely that presence of NATO troops close to Iran s borders will encourage it to accelerate its militarisation IV) Strong chance of proxy war against Russia and Iran, and to lesser extent China. V) Question of precedent. Critics will argue to invade far more repressive regimes VI) V Sectarian violence will be blamed again on NATO forces Critics will overlook lives saved and focus on failures. 8

9 How Other Players Will React To the Policies (To 2015) British Muslims returning from Syria will possess skills that could threaten national security. 12 Surveillance and arrests (where appropriate) must be ensured. The presence in Syria of Al-Qaeda linked cells makes this threat more dangerous. The Syrian government will continue to accuse any opposition groups of being terrorists. Meanwhile, it is likely that the government will increase violence as the opposition grows in strength. The Ba ath party and the wider Alawite sect will hold onto power as long as possible, with or without foreign intervention, as it is highly unlikely that Iran will back down in its support of its closest ally. Policy three is vital to ensure that the UK can guide regional affairs, and attain power in the post-assad military. This is imperative as it takes power away from Iran; it will be losing its greatest ally. Policy five is not recommended as the likelihood of Russia and/or China vetoing the motion is very high. Even if they would abstain from vetoing, they will not get involved with regime-change. The Russians are aware that Assad cannot hold onto power forever, hence to accelerate Assad s removal the Russians need to be given concessions. First and foremost military intervention cannot occur as the Russians will increase the supply of arms to Syria, in what it argues is the defence of sovereignty against foreign actors. It is unlikely that all opposition groups would welcome foreign troops. The UK needs to support the opposition from a distance. Sectarian violence is a high 12 Robert Verkaik, MI5 stops British extremists joining Syria was after concerns they will return home with deadly skills, The Daily Mail, Sept ( /MI5- stops- British- extremists- joining- Syria- concerns- return- home- deadly- skills.html). 9

10 probability, and such allegations have already been made. 13 Even if the government was to step down immediately, violence would not cease and will continue to be an issue for many years to come. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: I) CREATION OF HUMANITARIAN CORRIDOORS SUPPLY OF MEDICAL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPTMENT, AS WELL AS PERSONAL ARMOUR I ESTABLISHING CLOSE CONTACT WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS IV) MONITORING OF BRITISH MUSLIMS WHO TAKE PART. 13 Ruth Sherlock, Syria: Sectarian Violence Hits Damascus, The Telegraph, Sept ( sectarian- violence- hits- Damascus.html). 10

11 BIBLIOGRAPHY AFP, Foreign militants fighting in Syria battlefields, March 7, 2012, militants- fighting- in- syria- battlefields/, (accessed November 6, 2012) Al- Jazeera, Iran accused of setting up pro- Assad militias, August 15, 2012, Al- Jazeera, BBC, The secretive sect in charge of Syria, May 17, 2012, BBC, middle- east , BBC, Why Russia is standing by Syria s Assad, June 15, 2012, BBC, europe , Byman, Daniel, "Finish Him", Foreign Policy, February 2, Byman, Daniel, Can We Help Syria Without Making Things Worse, The Washington Post, February 10, 2012, we- help- syria- without- making- things- worse/2012/02/08/giqad6hj4q_story.html, Centre for Documentation of Violations in Syria, Statistics for the Number of Martyrs, sy.org/index.php/en/, (accessed November 9, 2012). CNN Wire Staff, US Military chief dubious about arming Syrian rebels, February 20, 2012, CNN, Defected officers declare the formation of Syrian Free Army. July 27, Video clip. YouTube, DeYoung, Karen and Sly, Liz, Syrian rebels get influx of arms with gulf neighbors money, US coordination, No Date, security/syrian- rebels- get- influx- of- arms- with- gulf- neighbors- money- us- coordination/2012/05/15/giqads2tsu_story_1.html, Fordham, Alice, Syrian defectors call for international help, The Washington Post, Janruary 6, 2012, defectors- call- for- international- help/2012/01/05/giqal0ikfp_story.html, Heras, Nicholas. "Hezbollah's Role In Syria Grows Murky." Asia Times, November 6, (accessed November 7, 2012). Human Rights Watch, Syria: Armed Opposition Groups Committing Abuses, armed- opposition- groups- committing- abuses, 11

12 Joseph Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011, Institute for the Study of War, December 2011 Joseph Holliday, Syria s Armed Opposition, Institute for the Study of War, 2012 Kasolowsky, Raissa, "Up to 335,000 people have fled Syria violence: UNHCR", Reuters, October 9, syria- crisis- refugees- idusbre8980zp , Macfarquhar, Neil and Droubi, Hala, With Eye on Aid, Syria Opposition Signs Unity Deal, The New York Times, November 11, opposition- groups- sign- unity- deal.html?pagewanted=all, (accessed November 11, 2012) Martin, Patrick, Al- Qaeda leader publicly sides with opposition, The Globe and Mail, February 12, qaeda- leader- publicly- sides- with- syrian- opposition/article /, (accessed November 7, 2012) Oweis, Khaled Yacoub, "Syria s Assad Ends State of Emergency", Reuters, April 21, syria- idustre72n2mc , Rozen, Laura, US Autorized Financial Support For The Free Syrian Army, July 27, 2012,( monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al- monitor/us- authorizes- financial- support.html Russia Today, 15,000 elite Iranian special- ops 'head' to Syria, The Guardian, October 4, iran- cooperation- protests- 969/, Saleeby, Suzanne, Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract s Unraveling, Jadaliyya, February 16, the- seeds- of- dissent_economic- grievances- an, Sengupta, Kim, Syria s sectarian war goes international as foreign fighters and arms pour into the country, The Independent, February 20, 2012, east/syrias- sectarian- war- goes- international- as- foreign- fighters- and- arms- pour- into- country html (accessed November 4, 2012) Sherlock, Ruth, Syria: Sectarian Violence Hits Damascus, The Telegraph, September 13, sectarian- violence- hits- Damascus.html, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPIRI Arms Transfers Database (accessed November 7, 2012). 12

13 The Nation, Turkey Dubs Syria A Clear Threat Vows To Retaliate, The Nation, June 26, news- newspaper- daily- english- online/international/26- Jun- 2012/turkey- dubs- syria- a- clear- threat- vows- to- retaliate, (accessed November 3, 20212) The Wall Street Journal, Syrian Opposition Leader Transcript, (accessed November 2, 2012). United Nations, Humanitarian Situation in Syria Deteriorating, with 2.5 Million Urgently Needing Relief, Says Secretary- General, Accusing Both Sides of Atrocities, Verkaik, Robert, MI5 stops British extremists joining Syria was after concerns they will return home with deadly skills, The Daily Mail, September 1, /MI5- stops- British- extremists- joining- Syria- concerns- return- home- deadly- skills.html, Violence and Political Unrest in Syria, March 7, Video Clip. C- Span, span.org, spanvideo.org/program/ , (accessed November 7, 2012) Weaver, Matthew and Whitaker, Brian, Turkey- Syria Border Tension, The Guardian, October 4, syria- threat- security- live, (accessed November, 2012) 13