G20 Leaders Summit 2015

Transcription

1 G20 Leaders Summit 2015 Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment A CYVEILLANCE WHITE PAPER NOVEMBER 2015 PRICE: $2495

2 Executive Summary Political Violence Social Unrest: Protests and Demonstrations Table of Contents Terrorism Kidnappings Natural Disasters Summary G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance This report is based on open source findings. Therefore, the report is open source intelligence and does not constitute definitive evidence. Information found in the open source cannot necessarily be verified and is presented as intelligence and as additional information to enhance or expand current investigations. 2

3 Executive Summary The Group of Twenty (G20) consisting of 19 countries and the European Union hosts a series of annual meetings known as the G20 Leaders Summit to discuss international economic cooperation. Finance ministers, central bank governors, and other officials typically attend the Summit. The event is supported by the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and other groups. This year s Summit will be held in the coastal city of Antalya, Turkey from November It is scheduled during a time when Turkey is experiencing increased political instability and an overarching threat of political violence and terrorism. After analyzing the physical threat landscape, Cyveillance analysts have identified that political violence and social unrest will pose the biggest threats to the Summit and the Antalya region, with both having a medium to high likelihood of occurring. If the November 1 Parliamentary election results in the pro-kurdish political party the Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) losing the Parliamentary seats it gained in the June 7 election, Turkey s security environment could be destabilized. These chances increase if the HDP finds itself excluded from political influence or has any suspicions of election fraud. Though no protests have been announced against the Summit, there is still a medium to high chance that some form of physical protest will occur. Protests typically occur at Summits, as they provide an arena for activists to bring attention to national and global grievances that are not addressed at the meetings. Even if protests do not occur in Antalya, they could happen in other parts of the country, including business districts in Istanbul and Ankara. This could also impact multinational companies. In addition, we have identified three threats that pose a lower risk to the Summit: terrorism, kidnapping, and natural disasters. While these may not be immediate risks to the G20 Leaders Summit, if they occur in other parts of the country, the repercussions will be felt at the event. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 3

4 SECTION 01 Political Violence Currently, Turkey s political conflict stems from the outcome of the June 7 Parliamentary election, where the pro-kurdish political party, the HDP, gained 13.1 percent of the vote from the ruling party at the time, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This gave the Kurdish minority an unprecedented voice and majority in Parliament for the first time. 1 In response, Turkey s president, and member of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan attempted to form a coalition government with the opposition party, the Republic People s Party (CHP), but failed. As a result, President Erdogan called for a new Parliamentary election to be held on November 1. 2 Depending on the outcome of the November election, Cyveillance believes there is a medium to high risk of political violence affecting Turkey, including the province and city of Antalya from the HDP and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The HDP could perpetuate political violence if they fail to achieve 10 percent of the votes required to gain seats in the Turkish Parliament, or if they become suspicious of election fraud. Additionally, the PKK, a terrorist organization that supports the HDP, could lash out. On the other hand, if the HDP increases its Parliamentary representation, there could be violent nationalist backlash targeting the Kurdish community. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance

5 International organizations have voiced concern over political violence and shortcomings in the pre-election period. A delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) visited Turkey on October 5, 2015, and raised concern over political violence, including attacks on 400 HDP offices and workplaces, along with some premises belonging to the AKP. PACE also showed concern over the arrests and detention of HDP members and a sharp increase in prosecutions against critical voices against Turkey s president. 3 Significant Political Violence Incidents in 2015 On October 14, 40 lawyers from the Contemporary Lawyers Association Antalya Branch protested against the Ankara terrorist attacks outside the courthouse in the city of Antalya. Riot police sprayed the lawyers with tear gas and some were taken to the hospital. Five HDP members were also detained during the protest. 4 On September 8, Turkish nationalists staged rallies across Turkey. Protestors burnt down and ransacked approximately 130 HDP offices, as well as set fire to office equipment in the HDP headquarters in Antalya. 5, 6 Recommendations Review Cyveillance daily threat intelligence reports and predictive intelligence reports that provide advanced knowledge of demonstrations announced online. Monitor security developments in the post-election period, including preliminary reports by election observation missions from the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Anticipate a significant security presence in the city of Antalya if violent protests erupt in the post-election environment. Be cautious of potential political gatherings in the post-election period, particularly around government buildings and political party offices Toronto Pan American Games 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 5

6 SECTION 02 Social Unrest: Protests and Demonstrations Cyveillance believes there is a medium to high likelihood of some form of physical protests targeting the G20 Leaders Summit as the event provides an opportunity for social movements to capitalize on global news coverage and to bring attention to a variety of national and global grievances. While there have been no references to protests or dissemination of protest material on social media or elsewhere on the web yet, anti-capitalist groups and human rights advocates have frequently protested the Summit. Since protests are known to occur at Summits, previous host-countries have shut down the towns where the Summit was being held. For example, France sealed off Cannes from protestors during the 2011 G20 Summit. 7 Following the October 10, 2015 Ankara terrorist attacks, Turkish authorities announced that security measures will be taken in preparation for the Summit, but there is no indication that they have banned G20 protests in Antalay or nearby towns. 8 If activists are banned, they could move to other cities including the business districts of Istanbul (Levent and Maslak) or the diplomatic district of Ankara (Gaziosmanpaşa, Çankaya). Additionally, the outcome of the November election could spark violent protests against President Erdogan and the AKP. If the HDP is unable to maintain its position in the Turkish Parliament, the Kurdish community will likely give up on the political process and show its frustration through violent protests and demonstrations. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance html 6

7 Significant Social Unrest Incidents On September 4, 2015, Turkish police arrested 17 members of the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), which were protesting against the G20 meeting outside the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges building in Ankara. 9 SDP has not mentioned any upcoming protests in Antalya. On November 15, 2014, approximately 2,000 people staged a protest march through Brisbane, Australia as the G20 Leaders Summit took place in the South Bank district of Brisbane. Approximately 13 separate protests were scheduled on the first day of the G20 Summit. Activists protested against a variety of issues, including mistreatment of refugees and indigenous rights, and called for the exclusion of Russian President Vladimir Putin. A dozen people were arrested. 10 On September 5, 2013, a dozen human rights activists staged a protest on Nevsky Prospect, St. Petersburg s major avenue, as world leaders arrived for the G20 Leaders Summit. The activists attempted to draw attention to human rights violations in Russia. 11 On June 17, 2012, several thousand protesters marched through Mexico City to protest the G20 Leaders Summit held in Los Cabos, Mexico. Additional protests occurred in La Paz against the economic and environmental policies of the G20. Activists were not allowed into Los Cabos due to security regulations for the conference. On June 26, 2010, a small group of anarchists broke away from a protest march in downtown Toronto against the G20 Toronto Summit. Clashes between protesters and police erupted. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowds and arrested approximately 1,000 over two days. Recommendations Provided there are no planned protests in Antalya, expect significant disruption and delays due to heightened security measures, including checkpoints, spot-checks, road closures, and diversions. Corporations with offices in the Levent and Maslak Districts of Istanbul should maintain situational awareness in case any protests arise. Corporate offices in Istanbul and Ankara should identify nearby businesses and government buildings that could attract G20 protesters, including embassies, Figure consulates, 3 and financial organizations. Source: Public Safety Canada Governement Operations Centre (GOC) Toronto Pan American Games 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 7

8 SECTION 03 Terrorism Depending on the post-election environment, the security situation in Turkey could quickly deteriorate in the coming weeks and months. Cyveillance assesses that there is a low to medium risk of a terrorist attack against the G20 Leaders Summit itself; though there is medium to high risk of a terrorist attack in other parts of Turkey. This is due to the global media attention such an attack could bring to a terrorist cause. We have identified three terrorist groups that have the motivation and capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks in Turkey: the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People s Liberation Party Front (DHKP/C), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) The security situation in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia could deteriorate in the weeks leading up to the G20 Summit due to renewed fighting between PKK militants and the Turkish army. The PKK will most likely abstain from targeting the G20 Summit in order to prevent the backlash such an attack would inflict on the group s ideological goals and organizational capabilities. In fact, on October 10, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, or a state of inactivity, leading up to the November Parliamentary election. The group will suspend all offensive actions unless their people and guerilla forces are attacked. 14 G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance

9 We believe the PKK s ceasefire was a tactical move in an effort to increase popular support for the HDP in the upcoming election. Suspending new terrorist attacks maximizes the PKK s chances of winning over passive supporters and opponents, avoiding international condemnations, and legitimizing a Turkish government crackdown on HDP politicians, ultimately weakening the HDP s election campaign. However, the ceasefire is fragile, and the HDP failing to keep its representation in Parliament could serve as a catalyst for a new PKK terrorism campaign after the election. Frustrated Kurdish people may feel that terrorism is the only viable option if they believe they are again being denied access to power. Terrorism often starts where there is an underlying grievance and a lack of opportunity for political participation or where the opportunity for political participation has been deprived, and may be seen as a way to pressure decision makers to concede to the Kurdish minority s demands. 15 The end result would be a deteriorating security situation prior to the G20 Leaders Summit. 16 The PKK could also renew its terrorist campaign if they perceive that the Turkish government is passive in responding to possible ISIL terrorist attacks against the Kurdish community. Two recent alleged ISIL attacks in Turkey have resulted in the PKK criticizing the Turkish government for allowing these attacks to occur, and accused Turkish security forces of passiveness and collaborating with ISIL. On July 20, an ISIL supporter launched an attack against a pro-kurdish rally in the predominately Kurdish city of Suruc, close to the border of Syria. ISIL never claimed responsibility for the attack, but media outlets reported that the suicide bomber had links to the terrorist organization. 17 As a result, the PKK ended its two-year ceasefire with the Turkish government (which was then resumed on October 2015 in preparation for the November election). 18 On October 10, two suicide bombers attacked a pro-kurdish rally in downtown Ankara. The rally called for a halt to the armed conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK ahead of the November 1 election. The attack killed 102 people and injured several hundred. Media outlets reported that DNA identified the attacker as an ISIL supporter and the brother of the suicide bomber that attacked the pro-kurdish rally in Suruc. 19 The pro-kurdish community accused the government of failing to protect the peace rally. 20 Despite the PKK announcing a ceasefire leading up to the November 1 election, if ISIL continues to target the Kurdish community, the PKK s constituency will likely retaliate. 15 Victoroff, J, (2005), The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49, No.1 16 Crenshaw, M. The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No.4, 1981, Bjorgo, T, (2004), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, Routledge G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 9

10 PKK Targets Cyveillance reviewed close to 1,500 terrorist attacks perpetrated by the PKK over three decades. The PKK often selectively targets Turkish military, police, and government, and limits attacks to Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Civilians and businesses have been targeted as well, but frequently these incidents involve kidnapping and can be defined as criminal acts for financial purposes rather than terroristic aims. Cyveillance assesses that the PKK, like many other nationalist separatist groups, wants to be perceived as attacking legitimate targets and as a credible government alternative. Any chance of ever achieving international recognition for a Kurdish autonomous region or a seat at the negotiation table would be significantly reduced if the PKK launched an attack against the Summit. As such, an attack on an international conference such as the G20 Summit would be an unprecedented shift in the PKK s target selection. Transportation Government (General) Military Private Citizens The Revolutionary People s Liberation Party Front (DHKP/C) The ideological goal of the Marxist-Leninist group, DHKP/C, is to overthrow the Turkish government and replace the political, social, and economic system with a communist model of governance. 21 DHKP/C also opposes both the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both organizations are perceived as imperialists that control Turkey and influence Turkey s foreign policy. 22 Cyveillance assesses that the DHKP/C lacks the capabilities to launch a sophisticated and successful attack against the G20 Summit. Discriminate terrorist attacks against the Turkish police, military, government premises, as well as U.S. diplomatic targets in Istanbul and Ankara, are more in line with the group s capabilities, intentions, and target preferences. The DHKP/C has no history of large-scale attacks and has not used advanced tactics and weapons, such as coordinated suicide attacks and vehicle-borne, improvised explosive devices. 23 A review of recent DHKP/C attacks indicates that members lack training and bomb making experience Teymur, S. (2007). A Conceptual map for understanding the terrorist recruitment process: Observation and analysis of DHKP/C, PKK, and Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations, 23 Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) GTD Business Military Private Citizens Business Police Government (General) - 95 Transportation - 84 Educational Institutions - 60 Utilities - 32 Religious Targets - 29 Government (Diplomatic) - 20 Unknown - 14 Journalist, Media - 10 Airports and Aircrafts - 9 Violent Political Party - 7 Tourists - 6 Telecommunications - 5 Food or Water Supply - 2 Maritime - 2 NGO - 2 The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 10

11 Attempted DHKP/C Incidents in 2015 On August 10, two women used rifles to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. The attack failed and one woman was wounded and detained. 24 On January 6, a female suicide bomber attacked a police station in Istanbul and killed one police officer. The DHKP/C claimed responsibility but later withdrew this claim, as the DHKP/C realized it was not one of their members. 25 On January 1, a member of DHKP/C threw two grenades against the police honor guard outside the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. However, both grenades failed to explode. 26 The capability of the group to plan and execute an attack against the G20 is further hampered by possible recruitment difficulties. Witness testimony revealed that DHKP/C fails to recruit new members, which has reduced the number of mid-level cadres tasked with planning attacks. The DHKP/C has also reduced the number of low-level cadres carrying out attacks, from three-member teams to two-member teams. 27 Furthermore, the low number and sporadic attacks perpetrated by the DHKP/C are indicative of a terrorist group that lacks significant capabilities to sustain an ongoing terrorist campaign. The group has a history of perpetrating approximately two to three attacks per year, and has launched about 30 attacks since 1994, although none took place between 2004 and In general, a terrorist group s target(s) reflect its intentions and motivations. 28 Analysis of the 30 terrorist attacks conducted by the DHKP/C between 1994-present indicates that the leaders of the group favor attacks that are selective and discriminate, which is DHKP/C Target Type Private Citizens Government (General) Police Police - 46% Government (General) - 27% Private Citizens - 9% Military - 6% Government (Diplomatic) - 3% Airports - 3% Tourist - 3% Unknown - 3% Drake, C, J, M, The Role of Ideology in Terrorists Target Selection, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, No.2, 1998 Source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) GTD. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 11

12 common for terrorist groups with secular ideologies and non-religious goals. Additionally, the group s primary targets of attack are typically Turkish police, military, government officials, and government buildings. The group has not carried out any attacks against any other foreign governments or targets. A geospatial analysis of the limited number of attacks indicates that most DHKP/C terrorist attacks have occurred in Istanbul followed by Ankara. The Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) Cyveillance has not identified any mention in the open source of specific threats made by ISIL against the G20 Summit. ISIL has the capabilities to operate inside Turkey and conduct large-scale attacks, as demonstrated in previous attacks; however, a review of recent target selections by ISIL inside Turkey, and the unwillingness of ISIL to claim responsibility for these attacks, indicates that the group may be more interested in targeting the Kurdish community. Terrorist attacks against the Turkish government are also likely if Turkey steps up its support for U.S. strikes against ISIL targets inside Syria, or launches additional unilateral strikes against ISIL. Source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) GTD. Significant ISIL Incidents in Turkey in 2015: On October 10, two suicide bombers associated with ISIL attacked a pro-kurdish rally in Ankara. The attacks killed 102 people and injured more than 200 people. The attacks coincided with the PKK s announcement of a ceasefire leading up to the November 1 election and the PKK s preparation of a Kurdish military offensive against Raqqa, the ISIL self-declared capital in Syria. 29 ISIL has not claimed responsibility for the attacks. In September, ISIL issued its 11th edition of the online magazine Dabiq, which accused the Turkish army of apostasy for serving in the defense force of the Crusader NATO alliance. At the beginning of September, a pro-isis social media account released a death warrant for President Erdogan due to Turkey s cooperation with the United States G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 12

13 On July 20, a suicide bomber attacked a pro-kurdish rally in Suruc, near the Syrian border. The attack killed 34 people. An ISIL supporter was blamed for the attack, but ISIL never claimed responsibility. 31 On June 5, an ISIL supporter detonated two bombs at a HDP rally in Turkey s southeastern province of Diyarbakir. The attack killed two and injured 100, and occurred two days before Turkey s June 7 general election. ISIL never claimed responsibility for the attack. 32 ISIL will likely continue to attempt to exploit the conflict between Turkey and the PKK by intentionally escalating tensions between the PKK and the AKP. In doing so, it could weaken the PKK as a threat to ISIL in Syria and destabilize Turkey. In hindsight, both the attacks in Suruc and Ankara were successful from that perspective, as the July attack in Suruc resulted in the PKK ending a two-year ceasefire with the Turkish Army, and the October attack in Ankara increased tensions between the pro-kurdish community and the Turkish government. The tensions likely increased because ISIL did not claim any responsibility for the attacks, which increased suspiciousness and inflammatory accusations between the Turkish government and the Kurdish community. Future attacks by ISIL supporters against the Kurdish community, including political rallies and political party offices, cannot be ruled out. Recommendations Monitor the outcome of the November 1 election and any signs of escalating tensions between the PKK and the Turkish government. Avoid traveling to Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia due to a credible risk of terrorism and worsening security situation in those areas. Exercise increased vigilance if traveling outside Antalya, particularly around potential insurgent and terrorist targets, including political party offices, government buildings, public transportation networks, police stations, security forces, and diplomatic missions. Maintain awareness around curfews Turkish authorities may put in place, as well as the possibility of them declaring a state of emergency should there be a credible risk of terrorist attacks. Carry identification papers in the event that authorities introduce security checkpoints. Anticipate localized disruptions due to heightened security, road closures, and security checkpoints in the event of a terrorist attack G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 13

14 SECTION 04 Kidnappings Cyveillance assesses that there is a low risk of kidnappings in the city of Antalya. However, any visitors attending the G20 Leaders Summit and planning to travel throughout Turkey before or after the Summit should avoid Southeastern Anatolia and parts of Eastern Anatolia. ISIL has a presence along the northern Syrian border and is capable of conducting kidnappings from across the border into Turkey. ISIL has both the intention and a history of abducting Westerners and using them for propaganda purposes and kidnap-for-ransom schemes. Additionally, Kurdish militants operate in the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia Regions and have kidnaped Turkish officials, soldiers, and civilians in the past. The PKK kidnappings are particularly prevalent in the Tunceli Province in Eastern Anatolia and along the northern Syrian border. The PKK often engages in kidnappings as a means to finance terrorist operations. However, there is no current trend of foreigners or Westerners being targeted by terrorist groups or criminal organizations in Turkey for opportunistic shortterm express kidnapping and kidnap-for-ransom. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance Hansen-Lewis, J, Shapiro, J, N, Understanding the Daesh Economy, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.9, No.4, Süleyman Özeren et al, Whom Do They Recruit? Profiling and Recruitment in the PKK/KCK, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.37, No.4, Roth, Mitchel, Murat Severe, The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 30. No. 10, 2007, Makarenko Tamara, The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, Global Crime, Vol.6, No

15 Very high risk of kidnapping Advise against all travel High risk of kidnapping Advise against all but essential travel Monitor developments and trends before traveling Recent Kidnapping Incidents On October 3, PKK militants kidnapped two Turkish soldiers after intercepting a passenger bus on a highway between the Tunceli and Erzincan provinces. 37 On September 28, PKK militants set up a roadblock in the eastern Tunceli province that resulted in the abduction of a Turkish soldier. 38 On August 29, PKK militants kidnapped Süleyman Canpolat, the district head of the AKP s Mazgirt branch in the eastern province of Tunceli. PKK militants blocked a road near the Mazgirt district and conducted ID checks when they determined that Canpolat was in the area. 39 On October 19, 2014, a Syrian rebel commander was shot and wounded in a failed kidnapping attempt in the Turkish city of Urfa in Southeastern Anatolia. ISIL militants were allegedly behind the kidnapping, which failed when a smuggler working with ISIL failed to show up. ISIL planned to smuggle the rebel commander back into Syria through an ISIL crossing point in the town of Ackakale. 40 On September 8, 2014, PKK militants allegedly abducted 10 children in the eastern province of Mus. Approximately 30 PKK militants asked locals to show their support for PKK and then left with 10 children between the ages of 12 and G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 15

16 Recommendations Although the likelihood of kidnappings in the Antalya region is low, visitors should be aware that Turkey has a high rate of kidnappings overall. Review your crisis management plan, specifically, how to react to a kidnapping for ransom case. Understand the role your staff will play should a kidnapping occur, particularly when responding to media inquiries and addressing concerns by employees. If your corporation plans on operating in, or sending staff to, high-risk areas, consider engaging a response company that specializes in kidnappings and has the capability to react immediately. Remain vigilant and keep a low profile. Be aware of casual acquaintances and strangers that may have ulterior motives, including apparent emergencies, traffic incidents, and roadblocks. Protect information and prevent threat actors from finding out anything that could make you a target. Be cautious of conversations in public and disclosing any documents that could reveal your schedule, appointments, and absences G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 16

17 SECTION 05 Natural Disasters Visitors to the G20 Leaders Summit should be aware that unexpected natural disasters could occur in the Antalya Province and could disrupt travel routes, cause power outages, and interrupt telecommunications networks before and during the Summit. A review of 151 major natural disaster incidents recorded in the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) indicates that over the past 100 years, earthquakes, flooding, and landslides have been the most common major natural disasters in Turkey. 43 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience and the European Commission rate natural disasters as the number one risk to Turkey followed by the risk of armed conflicts. 44 Earthquakes have by far caused the highest number of mortality and economic losses in Turkey. The most earthquake-prone regions of Turkey are considered to be Marmara, the northwestern region of Turkey, the Black Sea Region in the north, and the Eastern Anatolia region bordering Iran. 45 The World Health Organization s (WHO) Regional Office in Europe estimates that there is a high risk of earthquakes in the Antalya Province and earthquakes can range from 5.0 to 5.9 on the Richter Scale. 46 The WHO s Regional Office in Europe identifies East Anatolia, South Anatolia, and the Black Sea regions of Turkey as high-risk areas for flooding. The risk of flooding in the city of Antalya ranges from low to high. 47 G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance See, Meltem, Oral Aynil et al, (2015), Earthquake experience and preparedness in Turkey, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 24, Issue

18 Recent Earthquake and Flooding Incidents in the Antalya Province On October 7, an earthquake with the magnitude of 5.2 struck the Demre District of the southern Antalya Province. There were no reports of damages to life or property. 48 On February 16, a 4.7 magnitude earthquake struck the resort city of Antalya. The epicenter was located in the town of Korkuteli, near Antalya. There were no reports of damages to life or property. 49 On January 13, severe storms and flooding blocked traffic between the city center of Antalya and Kemer. Power was also interrupted for several hours in Antalya where winds reached 95 miles per hour. 50 On December 9, 2014, Turkey s southern province of Antalya experienced severe flooding. Central Antalya was hit hardest. 51 A large number of shops and houses in the area were flooded and floodwaters inundated the main streets. Heavy rain also caused power outages in the city. Hundreds of cars were reportedly stranded. 52 On October 26, 2014, the Turkish State Meteorological Service reported that the city of Antalya had received 93.4mm of rain within 24 hours. 53 Businesses and roads in the city center were inundated G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 18

19 Recommendations Monitor the Turkish State Meteorological Service website for up-to-date weather information and weather watches and warnings. Plan ahead and know your surroundings and structures. Familiarize yourself with any emergency and evacuation plans and the location of shelters in the area. Plan how to communicate with family members, employer, and key contacts in the aftermath of an earthquake or severe flooding. Expect cell phone networks to overload in the event of an anomaly such as an earthquake. Telecommunications networks sometimes cannot handle a sharp and unexpected increase in call volume as people are trying to contact family members and friends in impacted areas. Anticipate traffic disruption as people attempt to drive home from work during work hours or to schools. The traffic situation can become more congested if there are cracks and debris on roads. In the event of a medical emergency, U.S. citizens can call the U.S. Embassy in Ankara at or the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul at The countrywide number for ambulance service is 112 and the fire department can be contacted at 110. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance 19

20 SECTION 06 Summary Overall, Cyveillance assesses that the main threats to the G20 Leaders Summit will come from political violence and social unrest, which hinge on the outcome of the November 1 Parliamentary election. If the pro-kurdish HDP loses its seats in the Turkish Parliament that it initially gained in the June 7 election, it could increase frustration among the Kurdish community and result in violent protests against the AKP and President Erdogan. The probability of violent protests increases if there are speculations of election fraud or attempts to deliberately exclude the HDP from having representation in the Turkish government. On the other hand, a wave of violent nationalist protests targeting the Kurdish community could also erupt nationwide should the HDP gain more seats than it did in the June election. The PKK could also engage in political violence or violent protests against the Turkish government if the HDP does not regain the seats it won in the June 2015 election, as the PKK supports the HDP. A loss of HDP Parliament seats would likely result in a complete loss of faith in the political process and Kurdish demands ever being resolved politically, ultimately leading to a less secure Turkey in the coming weeks. Additionally, while no specific protests have been identified, G20 Leaders Summits have previously been attractive targets for activists who wish to bring global attention to their causes. Visitors traveling to and from the G20 Summit should also be aware of threats to Turkey as a whole, which may not specifically target the Summit, but could impact the event if something were to occur. This includes terrorism, kidnapping, and natural hazards. The PKK will likely avoid targeting the G20 Summit (aside from political motivations) as it is such a high profile event that could be counterproductive to their cause. The DHKP/C may have the intentions to attack the G20 Summit or its vicinity, but lack the capabilities. ISIL may also have intentions to attack the Summit, but the terrorist organization s recent focus appears to be attacking the Kurdish community to escalate tensions between the PKK and the Turkish government, with the aim of weakening the PKK and destabilizing Turkey. G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment 2015 Cyveillance Lastly, there is always a chance of a natural disaster, especially flooding and earthquakes in the Antalya region where the Summit is being held. Natural disasters are difficult to predict in advance, but can cause significant travel disruption, power outages, and telecommunication disruptions. 20

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22 Cyveillance is the leading provider of cyber threat intelligence, enabling organizations to protect their information, infrastructure, and employees from physical and online threats found outside the network perimeter. Founded in 1997, Cyveillance delivers an intelligence-led approach to security through continuous, comprehensive monitoring of millions of online data sources, along with sophisticated technical and human analysis. The Cyveillance Cyber Threat Center, a cloud-based platform, combines web search, social media monitoring, underground channel information, and global intelligence with investigative tools and databases of threat actors, domain names and IP data, phishing activity, and malware. Cyveillance serves the Global 2000 and the majority of the Fortune 50 as well as global leaders in finance, technology, and energy along with data partners and resellers. For more information, visit Cyveillance is a wholly-owned subsidiary of QinetiQ, a FTSE250 company which uses its domain knowledge to provide technical support and know-how to customers in the global aerospace, defense and security markets. For more information, visit Sunset Hills Road, Suite 210 Reston, Virginia info@cyveillance.com Copyright 2015 Cyveillance, Inc. All rights reserved. Cyveillance is a registered trademark of Cyveillance, Inc. All other names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners