The CIC is supported in its day-to-day work by the International Staff s NATO Office of Security.

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1 ABOUT THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (CIC) The Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC) is the sole body that handles civilian intelligence issues at NATO. It reports directly to the North Atlantic Council and advises it on matters of espionage and terrorist or related threats, which may affect the Alliance. Each NATO member country is represented on the Committee by its security and intelligence services. It is chaired on an annual rotational basis by the nations. The CIC is supported in its day-to-day work by the International Staff s NATO Office of Security. TOPIC A: Intelligence Sharing with Non-NATO members and Civilian Institutions The growing transnational character of security threats over the past decade has meant that both military and civilian intelligence agencies have had to adapt and broaden the scope of their intelligence sharing capabilities. In response to emerging security threats and the ongoing War on Terror, in recent years, some NATO Member States have engaged in intelligence sharing with some unlikely partners. Indeed, non-nato states such as Pakistan and Russia has

2 acted as an important mechanism to satisfy operational requirements and engage in effective counterterrorism activities. Furthermore, NATO Member States have also cooperated more closely with international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and INTERPOL on issues concerning piracy, the Ukraine, disarmament, small arms, border management, and combating transnational threats. These relationships, however, are not always productive. For example, some NATO Member States have viewed intelligence sharing with Russia and Pakistan with particular suspicion, which has made cooperation on an organizational level more difficult in practice. Furthermore, Turkey has been vocal about their unwillingness for NATO to share intelligence with Israel, a prominent US ally and partner in a strategically significant region. The possibility exists for NATO to expand its intelligence sharing relationships to build more robust frameworks outside of the organization; however, the framework for cooperating with outside actors is subject to debate. As a delegate on the CIC, you will be asked to consider what kind(s) of cooperative framework(s) the CIC should construct to engage in intelligence gathering/sharing activities with non-nato states and organizations. Questions How should intelligence sharing be conducted with between NATO and non- NATO states and organizations? What criteria should be taken into account when engaging states outside of the organization? To what extent should information be available and/or limited?

3 Does NATO represent the best mechanism for sharing intelligence with outside actors? Further readings Countering terrorism. (2014, July 30). Retrieved from NATO: ww.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?selectedlocale=en Drugs. (n.d.). Retrieved from NATO Review Magazine : Hladon, S. L. (2012, April 18). Is there an appetite for information sharing in NATO. Retrieved from NATO: INTERPOL and NATO cooperation set to boost global efforts against maritime piracy. (2012, October 6). Retrieved from INTERPOL: NATO. (n.d.). Intelligence/information Sharing in Combating Terrorism. Retrieved from NATO Library Homepage: Partnerships: a cooperative approach to security. (2014, October 16). Retrieved from NATO: Smith, J. N. (2012). The criminal and the terrorist. Retrieved from Internet Journal of Criminology: t_ijc_july_2012.pdf TOPIC B: Strategies for Combating Decentralized Terrorism Changes that have resulted from the end of the Cold War and the rise of unipolarity in the international system have given rise to asymmetric warfare between state and nonstate actors. Following the Second World War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, conventional warfare became decreasingly viable given the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction. Accordingly, asymmetric warfare has become an increasingly common form of conflict for advancing the political interests of groups with limited power bases. This is evident when examining terrorism, insofar as state sponsored terrorism became a useful tool for some countries to attain domestic or international objectives without directly implicating themselves in violence against a target state.

4 However, after the events of 9/11, pressure has mounted concerning states actively sponsoring and/or hosting terrorist organizations. Moreover, given the success of counterterrorism and intelligence gathering activities at interrupting and neutralizing large-scale terrorist organizations, terrorist cells have increasingly had to resort to decentralized models for conducting smaller scale attacks. This is noticeable when considering the recent attack in Canada, a thwarted beheading in Australia, and growing concerns from the United Kingdom with regard to lone wolf style attacks. In these cases, radicalized individuals/groups engage in smaller scale operations that are inherently more difficult to monitor and deflect. An unfortunate by-product of this decentralization and smaller scale attacks is that there is necessarily less communication required than in hierarchical organizations. The Internet and social media have also become major tools for organizations to disseminate their objectives to decentralized groups. Increasingly, large scale organizations such as ISIS have only required nominal contact with those who perpetrate acts under their banner. Given this challenge, it is the task of the CIC to discuss and share effective intelligence measures to combat these threats to NATO Member States in order to deter these types of attacks in the future. Questions What methods can intelligence agents do to share information in a timely manner, bearing in mind the different legal restrictions of each country? How can, and should, states provide intelligence of their own citizens suspected of terrorism, to other states? Can terrorist organizations be viewed in the same way as criminal organizations given their decentralized nature? If so, what can be learned from combating crime and how can it be applied to combating terrorism?

5 What effective means of deradicalization can be used by states to prevent their own citizens from becoming agents of transnational terrorist organizations? Given the changing nature of the terrorists source of resources, how can counter-terrorism be changed to address these new methods? Further Reading Brant Hamilton, Nathan, and David Gray. "Decentralized Terrorism: Ramifications for a Centralized International System." Global Security Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2012): International Monetary Fund. Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism - Topics. Rowlands, Dane, and Joshua Kilberg. "Organizational Structure and the Effects of Targeting Terrorist Leadership." Centre for Security and Defense Studies - Carleton University. April Shea, Jamie. "Lecture 3 - International terrorism: is it still a strategic threat?" NATO. December 22, TOPIC B: The Incorporation of Transnational Crime into CIC's Mandate As it is well documented, NATO was founded in the wake of the Second World War to serve three broad purposes: (1) deter Soviet expansionism, (2) forbid the revival of nationalist millenarianism in Europe, and (3) encourage European political integration. At its core, the organization is based on the principle of collective self-defense, wherein Member States pledge to treat an armed attack against one or more of NATO s members as an attack against all. Though at the time, the concept of an organization that could ensure collective security in the event of interstate conflict was particularly salient, changing international dynamics over the course of the 20 th century have since challenged the relevance of NATO s interstate security focus.

6 Though NATO has successfully reshaped its mandate in recent decades and expanded its range of security activities post-cold War, there remain pertinent questions about what types of security threats the organization should focus on and where they should set limits on their engagements. This is an especially pertinent question for committees like the CIC, as the mandate of the committee can extend quite broadly when addressing threats that may adversely impact the Alliance from an intelligence gathering and sharing context. Indeed, gathering and sharing intelligence related to terrorism since the attacks on September 11, 2001, have taken on multidisciplinary dimensions including security threats such as those posed by transnational crime have consistently remained absent from the committee s agenda. As a delegate on the CIC, you are charged with assessing the threat posed by transnational crime to NATO Member States and the relevance of incorporating these security threats into the CIC s mandate. Should the CIC expand its area of expertise? Or should Member States draw a line to avoid information overload? Questions: What is the role of NATO and how does the CIC compliment its functions? Is there a role for NATO in addressing security issues arising from transnational organization crime? Should the CIC expand its mandate to include gathering and sharing intelligence related to this type of criminal activity? If the CIC were to expand its mandate, how would this be integrated into the CIC? What would the role of NATO be in coordinating intelligence sharing? How could it be done? If the CIC does not expand its mandate, what mechanisms should Member States pursue to address this security threat? Should states pursue other means outside of the organization to address their concerns? How would expanding the committee s mandate impact other activities?

7 Further Reading Makarenko, Tamara, The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, Global Crime 6, no. 1 (2004), available at: O Malley, Pat and Steven Hutchinson, Actual and Potential Links between Terrorism and Criminality, Trends in Terrorism 5 (2006), available at: Reinares, Fernando, Transnational organized crime as an increasing threat to the national security of democratic regimes: assessing political impacts and evaluating state responses, available at: