Security Trends. Analysis. 26th September 31st October 2012

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1 Trends Analysis NCCI s Security Trends Analysis provides internal advice for NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside your organization. If forwarded internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed on to any third parties. Security Trends 26th September 31st October 2012 Analysis [Type text]

2 The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs twice a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources. Every reasonable effort is made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this analysis. NCCI collates information from reliable sources. Where a source is in doubt, NCCI seeks to corroborate that information. There may be an occasion when some information is included and its accuracy cannot be guaranteed. This typically occurs with an emerging or developing situation when it is considered in the best interests of NCCI s member organisations to be made aware of any available information. We thank you in advance for NOT disseminating this document and ensuring that it is ONLY circulated between members within your organisation General information is available to members at the NCCI website, Please do not hesitate to contact us at communication@ncciraq.org 2 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

3 Table of Contents Baghdad-Moscow Link Arms... 5 Assassinations... 6 Baghdad Challenges Turkish Military Aggression in the KRG... 7 Prison Breaks... 8 Other Significant Security Trends NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

4 Map of Iraq 4 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

5 Baghdad-Moscow Link Arms After a 4.2 billion dollar arms deal with Iraq on October 9th, Russia has become the country s second largest weapons supplier next to the United States. The contracts were decided in Moscow during a meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, although official negotiations had been in progress since April. The deal reportedly includes thirty Mi-28 attack helicopters, 42 Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile systems, and there are alleged negotiations for MiG-29 jets. Iraqi and Russia s recent history, particularly since the 1960s, is characterized by a strong, though not always consistent political and military alliance. Iraq s proximity to Russia s borders, its capacity for exchanging oil for weapons, as well as its historically precarious relationship with the United States, gives Moscow a particular advantage in establishing diplomatic relations with Baghdad. Russia, Saddam Hussein s primary arms supplier has gained a clear strategic advantage as it is now a major weapons supplier not only for Iraq, but also for Syria and Iran, further marginalizing the United States and paving a smoother route for the transport of weapons to Bashar al-assad. It should also be noted that as of October 19th, Baghdad and Washington have been working to close a deal, which would supply Iraq with 18 F-16 fighter jets by the year 2014 and Al-Maliki has negotiated a potential contract with the Czech Republic for several dozen L-159 subsonic jets. Iraq s multilateral weapons deals illustrate its ambivalence regarding who it sees as friends and foes, as well as its incentive to evade further conflict. In other words, by developing ties with multiple associates, Iraq can maintain useful alliances with various players. The colossal deal comes at a time during which Iraq must carefully balance its regional and transnational partnerships, which are occasioned by heavy conflict in Syria, as well as security and economic tensions within Iraq. al-maliki bluntly stated "we have good relations with the United States and Iran. We do not want to live surrounded by constant conflict. We buy weapons based on the needs that we feel we have The mass purchase of aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery is indicative of Iraq s desire to more effectively defend their airspace, especially as a channel between Iran and Syria. However, it is difficult to view it as much more than a mere diversion of resources from meaningful development initiatives. 5 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

6 Assassinations On September 28 th, former Basra governor, Mohammed Misbah al-waili, was assassinated by unidentified gunmen. Al- Waili was driving in his car when he was shot seven times in his head and his chest with a silenced weapon from a white vehicle. This is a common and highly effective method, illustrating the level of professionalism of the attackers. Some officials among Iraqi security forces have accused Iran of planning and implementing the assassination in order to increase their influence in Iraq. However, according to al-nas Paper on October 24 th, al-waili s brothers revealed that the assassination was funded by two businessmen, Esam al-asadi and Oaiz al-jabbouri, who organized the attack after al-waili uncovered their operation to fix elections in Basra. MP Hussein al-asadi of Basra held the police directly responsible due to their inability to prevent the incident. Assassination of former Basra Governor, Mohammed Misbih al-waili, with silenced weapons represents a new security failure for Basra Police Command, said al-asadi. However, assassinations of Iraqi political figures illustrate not a lack of security, but a fundamental absence of civil institutions through which political disputes can be resolved, as well as a lack of will on the part of politicians to reform the current system. In fact, there are many skilled security experts and law enforcement resources in Iraq; they are simply being mobilized in questionable ways. Although government and security officials, as well as other influential Iraqis have been the primary targets of assassination, rather than humanitarian workers or foreign businessmen, violence and collateral damage remain at high levels. During the last month alone there have been several other assassinations targeting judges and justice officials by various methods, which include car bombs. An earlier message posted on jihadist forums said the ISI would begin targeting judges and prosecutors, and try to help its prisoners escape. 6 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

7 Baghdad Challenges Turkish Military Aggression in the KRG The Baghdad central government has recently urged the KRG to allow the deployment of troops to the Turkey- Iraq border in an effort to thwart Turkish air raids on the Kurdish Worker s Party (PKK) within Iraq. Baghdad s initiative is especially sensitive given its tense relations with the KRG in recent months which have been exacerbated by both the Tigris Operations Command and Kurdistan s oil policies. There is, however, historical precedent for Turkish intervention in northern Iraq. An earlier agreement between Baghdad and Ankara allows Turkish cross-border operations and Operation Hammer (c. 1997), during which Turkey deployed troops in Iraq against the PKK, was executed in agreement with the KDP during the Kurdish Civil War. Nevertheless, power politics and sovereignty are not static and require consistent re-assessment. Recently, the KRG and Baghdad have participated in negotiations, which would amend their agreement and seek to resolve tensions. However, the head of the Iraqi parliamentary security committee Iskander Witwit, said in a recent statement that Turkey has recently started conducting a policy of intervention in the affairs of the regional countries," and "[t]his unjustified interference strongly influenced the relations between Iraq and Turkey and threatened their further development." With a clear allusion to Turkey s recent potent intervention in Syria, Iraq is articulating its concerns over its borders and regional autonomy, which is currently being challenged by Iran, the United States, and other powers. The irony is that by deploying troops in the north, if done unilaterally, Baghdad is undermining the KRG s sovereignty in order to bolster its own and risking further damage to its relations with Erbil. 7 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

8 Prison Breaks The mass prison break on September 27 th and its outcome illustrate Iraq s feeble security apparatus and justice system. While the failure to prevent such an incident speaks to the central government s inability to protect Iraqi citizens, it also represents a thread of a larger narrative related to security and civil development, or lack thereof, in Iraq s recent history. With daily attacks and arrests throughout the provinces, mass prison breaks simply continue the cycle of violence. The prison break occurred on Thursday, September 27 th, at Tasfirat Prison in Tikrit. Many of the detainees were a product of the mass arrests that occurred during clashes between Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and armed groups in Haditha. Tasfirat was to act as a temporary detention center before an expected transfer to a more secure compound. The escape began at the entrance of the prison with two car bombs, which killed 12 guards including a senior officer. However, reports implicate elements of Iraqi security in the incident. Although Baghdad sent a chopper from Baghdad, only 40 inmates were caught, among an estimated 180(this number varies in reports and goes up to 200). In total, 16 ISF members were killed, 50 were injured, 11 inmates were killed, and 40 were injured. The incident was followed by street clashes between security forces and escapees Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the attack and official sources, as well as the media, estimate that a majority among the escapees are al-qaeda members. However, as always, it is next to impossible to confirm or deny this data due to a lack of verifiable information regarding al- Qaeda in Iraq and weak Iraqi government coordination and information sharing. In fact, assigning blame to jihadist groups may bolster their authority by attributing to them more influence than they deserve. Furthermore, it is presumptuous to assert that the prison breaks will strengthen al-qaeda s manpower or support because there is no official count of militants among the escapees. Keeping in mind the severity of Iraq s justice system, it may very well be that among the escapees are inmates who are fleeing the death penalty for a petty crime. 8 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization

9 Other Significant Security Trends: Britain Closes Basra Consulate: The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) announced on Tuesday, October 16th, that it would close its Basra consulate in an effort to bolster its resources in Baghdad and save on spending. The order comes as a surprise to businesses and diplomats, as Basra is quickly becoming one of Iraq s major industrial and economic centers. Although an embassy office will remain in Basra, it will be temporarily staffed. According to Foreign Secretary, William Hague, "this allows [the FCO] to reduce the cost of our presence in Basra, currently 6.5 million pounds (10.47 million U.S. dollars) per annum." It is currently unclear whether the savings will benefit the diplomatic and commercial loss that Britain may sustain in the long-term. Cholera Outbreaks: As of October 14th, four people have died from cholera in the Iraqi Kurdistan region out of a confirmed 272 cases. One of the cases includes a girl from Dohuk, who was infected in Ranya and taken to Erbil, where she died. The suspected source of the infection is Lake Dukan, situated approximately 60km west of Sulaymaniyah. Cholera spreads through contaminated food and water. Once infected, patients die of dehydration from vomiting and diarrhea. The chief of Sulaymaniyah s Health Department, Miran Mohammad, stated that we have also asked people not to consume raw vegetables at the moment because there s higher risk of getting infections there too. Kurdistan s Health Minister, Rekawt Hama Rasheed, said we can say the epidemic is under control and the situation has returned to normal. School Attacks: On Friday, October 5th, Iraqi police arrested three suspects who were thought to be behind the September attack on an al-anbar primary school. The suicide bomb attack hit a primary school in al-anbar province, killing five children and wounding six others on their first day of school. Maj. Gen. Hadi Erzayej, the al-anbar police commander blamed al-qaeda for the attack on the al-kifah primary school in central Heet. The al-kifah school is among three schools that have experienced attacks in al-anbar. Syrian Refugees: As of October 22nd, Iraq hosts 44,772 Syrian refugees. The autonomous region of Kurdistan hosts approximately 34,400 Syrian refugees, with an average of 500 coming into Domiz camp, in Dohuk, every day. Specific needs among refugees are vast and include food, shelter, water, as well as psychological counseling, especially for children. Currently Dohuk hosts approximately 24,000 refugees, while Erbil hosts 5,852, and Sulaymaniyah hosts 1,683. In al-anbar, there are approximately 8,350 refugees with an average of 130 entering each day, although restrictions remain on young, single men. Host countries in region are currently attempting to prepare for winter accommodation and care, however, officials have urged for more comprehensive planning and preparation. UNHCR and its partners expect to reach approximately 500,000 displaced Syrians for winter planning. 9 NCCI We thank you for not disseminating this document and ensuring that it is only circulated between members within your organization